HC Deb 24 October 1882 vol 274 cc34-45
MR. GLADSTONE

It will, Sir, be in the recollection of the House that Mr. Edmond Dwyer Gray, a Member of this House, was put into confinement for an offence which is termed contempt of Court, in the month of August last, and that his committal to prison was signified to the House in the regular manner through the Speaker by a letter from Mr. Justice Lawson. The discussion of the matter arising out of that communication was approached before the Adjournment under very peculiar circumstances. It was felt that it was not an occasion on which the judgment of the House should be asked—in fact, to have done so would have been quite contrary to usage—on the merits of this particular case of committal for contempt of Court, or with regard to the Law of Committal for Contempt at large; but it was said that we ought to have proceeded to appoint a Committee for the purpose of ascertaining whether the proceedings which had been taken in this case were within the established and customary limits, and were within the terms of the Motion brought forward on a former occasion with regard to the case of Mr. Whalley—"Whether any of the matters referred to therein demanded the further attention of the House." It will be called to mind that, at the time referred to, in August last, it was stated, on the part of the Government, that they proposed to deviate from the ordinary course of proceeding, on the simple and practical ground that if that course were pursued it could not at that period be made effective. A Committee appointed on a question of this kind ought to be a Committee composed, by the best choice that can be made, of those Members who are of great experience and weight, or who are designated by peculiar circumstances as the fittest to undertake an examination of that sort—not an examination of great labour, or of a complicated nature but an examination requiring great accuracy and knowledge of such subjects, and capacity to deal with them; and the fact was that, at that time the dispersion of the House had reached such a point that the Members present in London did not enable us to constitute such a Committee, and it was perfectly hopeless to think of recalling them at short notice for the purpose of proposing it. Well, Sir, I suppose that these considerations weighed with the House. We urged that the re-assembling of the House would be the proper time for considering the matter, and we also pointed out that the investigation of the Committee could have no effect upon the validity, the legal validity, of Mr. Justice Lawson's proceeding, and, therefore, no effect upon the personal liberty of the Member who had been committed. I suppose, Sir, that the House, upon the whole, took that practical view of the matter, and introduced what certainly was, in point of form, an innovation, in accordingly postponing the appointment of the Committee, simply in order that if a Committee were to be appointed at all it might be effective. The House has now met, and this question is, of course, a subject which it is right to deal with. A Member making such a Motion is entitled to deal with it as a question of Privilege, and one which never would be understood to be included within the general declaration of the Government with regard to the subjects of Business to be treated of at these Autumn Sittings of the House. I think it is plain, Sir, when the House has now assembled in large numbers, that we have the means of constituting an efficient Committee. I am glad to know, I believe, by the personal presence of the Gentleman himself in the House, and otherwise from authentic information, that the period of his confinement has been brought to a close, and there is no longer any question, therefore, of his own personal liberty; but it remains just as much a matter of propriety as it was before for the House to make an investigation similar to those which it has instituted on former occasions, in order to ascertain that there has been no excess of power, and that the limits of custom and legality have been observed. As far as the formal matter of the committal for contempt is concerned, I do not think, Sir, it is necessary for me to refer to particular precedents at this moment. They can easily be produced should it be the desire of the House to hear them; but it was so completely admitted in August that precedents pointed to the appointment of such a Committee, that I think, in the absence of any question, I may venture to take the matter for granted. I may venture, also, to state my opinion that it would be an impropriety on my part, and that it would be an error, were we to go beyond these confined limits of debate, which have uniformly, I believe, been maintained on similar occasions—that is to say, were we to deal with the question of the Law of Contempt, which is a question of great general interest; and in regard to which, perhaps, I need not too much disparage what I have just said, if I venture to intimate to the House that it is a subject which has been brought much of late into the popular view both on this side and on the other side of the Channel, and that the Government have it in contemplation, not during the present short Sittings, but at the regular commencement of next Session—they have it in contemplation—they hope at a very early period—to submit a measure dealing with the altering the present law. That being so, Sir, I have only to notice a fact which appertains to the regularity and formality of Procedure in this instance. I am given to understand that the Speaker in the Chair has not yet received a formal communication from Mr. Justice Lawson, announcing the release of Mr. Gray; but, although I cannot, therefore, refer to any such communication in the Motion I am about to make, the absence of it does not in the slightest degree affect the propriety of the Motion, because the Motion is to deal not with the release, but with the committal. I think, therefore, I need do no more at the present moment than read to the House the Motion I am about to make, and place it in your hands. I propose, Sir— That the Letter of the 16th August 1882, from the Right Hon. Mr. Justice Lawson to Mr. Speaker, informing the House of the commitment of Mr. Edmond Dwyer Gray, a Member of this House, for contempt of Court, be referred to a Select Committee for the purpose of considering and reporting whether any of the matters referred to therein demand the further attention of the House. I ought to say, before sitting down, that I believe I am acting upon established usage in making the present Motion, without waiting to give Notice of Motion, making it at the first moment when it could be made. But I may point out to hon. Members that the making of the Motion does not immediately bring about the sitting of the Committee—that a selection of names must be made to constitute the Committee, and Notice must be given of those names—there will necessarily be a delay of some days, or probably not more than one day, before the Committee can be actually appointed. Such was the case on the last occasion when a Committee was appointed with reference to the case of Mr. Whalley, and such is the case now. I do not intend to propose, together with the Motion I now move, any list of names of Members to compose the Committee.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Letter of the 16th August 1882, from the Eight Hon. Mr. Justice Lawson to Mr. Speaker, informing the House of the commitment of Mr. Edmond Dwyer Gray, a Member of this House, for contempt of Court, be referred to a Select Committee for the purpose of considering and reporting whether any of the matters referred to therein demand the further attention of the House."—(Mr. Gladstone.)

MR. PARNELL

I have heard, Sir, with great satisfaction from the Prime Minister that the Government proposes, at some future time, to lay propositions with regard to the Law of Contempt before the notice of Parliament; but I would ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, in view of that intention which he has just expressed, it would not be desirable to enlarge the scope of the Reference to the Committee, with the view of investigating the general question? While I make the suggestion, I am not at all sure that the terms of the Motion, of which the right hon. Gentleman has just given Notice, do not per- mit an inquiry by the Committee into the general question of policy apart altogether from the immediate case of the arrest itself; but if the attention of Parliament is to be directed to the matter, it appears to me that the labours of the Committee would be, to a great extent, of a formal character and thrown away if the general question were not to be inquired into. We all admit Mr. Justice Lawson acted within his powers in ordering my hon. Friend (Mr. Gray) into custody, and in releasing him from that custody. We admit that he acted according to the letter of the law as it at present stands; and what we desire to put before the House and the country at large is that it is important to have it declared on the authority of such a Committee as the one now proposed, that this law, giving such a power to a Judge—the power, practically, of sentencing a man to perpetual imprisonment without appeal—is of such an anomalous character that it requires alteration. My hon. Friend has no desire to seek redress regarding the injury which he considers has been done to himself personally; but he is desirous that what he has gone through may serve as a basis for attracting public attention to the very anomalous state of the law as it stands at present, and therefore I would ask the right hon. Gentleman whether it would not be desirable to make the matter perfectly clear? Has the Committee, under the terms of his Resolution, power to go into the general question; and if it has not that power, is it not desirable that it should be given? Otherwise I fear that the deliberations of the Gentlemen composing the Committee, who are, according to the wishes of the right hon. Gentleman, to be Gentlemen of experience and weight in the House, will be thrown away, and will be so much loss of time; if, on the other hand, the Committee, by the terms of the Reference, have the power, would it not be desirable expressly to say so in order that no doubt should arise afterwards?

MR. LEWIS

Sir, when this matter was before the House on a former occasion, I took leave to say, on the general question of the power of commitment for contempt of Court, that I thought the experience of the last 25 years on the subject was of that character that it undoubtedly required Governmental Parliamentary interference. The sort of contempt which has sometimes been committed is a contempt which the Judges have brought upon their Courts themselves. In point of fact, the power of committing for contempt has sometimes been exercised by Judges in a very remarkable way. We have heard of Judges who put it into force because there was not a sufficient number of javelin men to escort them through the town. There are other cases also in which the Judges have forgotten both themselves and the Courts in which they sat. The case we have now under consideration is one in which the party has been committed for contempt outside of the Court; and, whatever may be the merits of that case, the power held by Judges to sentence persons to imprisonment and the payment of heavy fines, without the power of appeal in any way, in whatever way it may be exercised, is a power which must ever be thoroughly obnoxious to our views of freedom and justice in this 19th century. I do not very often agree with the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken (Mr. Parnell); but I confess that, inasmuch as we have been drawn away from our pleasures and occupations at this time of the year, we may as well utilize ourselves and endeavour to employ the time of the House and of the Committee for the purpose indicated, not only in the speech we have just heard, but in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman opposite. The Bill or measure, which has just been suggested by the Prime Minister as likely to be introduced next year, will not be impaired at all by the consideration of what might be the amendments or improvements made in this law by a Committee of Gentlemen of high authority in the House. It is a matter of the gravest possible character. We know that the Judges will endeavour to hold tenaciously the power they now possess; and we know that they look with considerable dissatisfaction upon any infringement on the rights and jurisdictions which they have so promptly and freely exercised hitherto. But I think the House will find that it will be a very good preliminary for legislation on this subject that the Committee should have under their consideration, even for two or three sittings, the very grave public questions which are involved in this matter. The case is enlarged in interest, and the general question is in- tensified in importance, by the particular circumstances with which this Motion deals. I, for one, ventured to say on a former occasion that I thought Mr. Justice Lawson was right in the punishment with which he visited the offence in this case; but it is the peremptory way in which the punishment was administered that causes public dissatisfaction and brings discredit on our Courts of Justice. What is the case? It is the case of a Member of this House, who has been Lord Mayor of the City of Dublin, and who is at this time High Sheriff of that City, who, according to the view of the case generally entertained, did undoubtedly commit himself in a very grave and remarkable way. But what was the punishment accorded to him? It was three-fold—he was fined, imprisoned, and held to bail, under circumstances which might have resulted in a very long term of imprisonment. How was it administered? Was it administered with anything like deliberate notice? Notice was given the night before for next morning. Was that the sort of notice upon which any Member of this House should be dealt with by a Judge, however experienced and able? What was the extent of the punishment? Why, it was of the most severe character. Not too severe, however, if the hon. Gentleman the Member for Carlow (Mr. Gray) will allow me to say so, for the offence he committed; but the greater the offence, the greater the necessity that that offence should be deliberately considered, and all the circumstances duly weighed, in order that justice should be respected throughout the land. It is impossible that this power should be continued to be exercised in our Courts of Justice in the way it has been exercised in this case, with any hope of retaining respect for the administration of the law. This offence was committed, I admit, under circumstances of great aggravation; but the punishment was administered in the worst possible way. It is one thing to commit a person caught flagrante delicto, for contempt committed in the presence of the Judge; but this is a case in which the offence was committed out of Court. The trial was actually over, the jurisdiction of the Judge, ad rem, was actually finished; and it was then the Judge took upon himself to exercise this power only upon a few hours' notice, depriving a distinguished person of his liberty, of his property, to the extent of £500, and possibly of his future liberty. It seems to me that this is a very grave case, and I am happy to know that there is a prospect of the occurrence of such a case again being prevented by legislation. The great Sidney Smith said that you never could get a railway properly managed until two or three railway directors were killed. So, in the same way, we would never have this matter taken up by Parliament, but for the fact that a distinguished Member of this House, who has been Lord Mayor of the City of Dublin, and who is now its High Sheriff, is taken by the collar, on a few hours' notice, and turned into prison, a part of his property stripped from him, and a heavy punishment threatened if he does not give bail. If, therefore, anything is to be done, it appears to me that it would be most desirable to refer the whole question to the Committee. We know that it will have nothing to do under the terms of the Motion of the Prime Minister. Why should it not, however, have something real to do, if it is to take in hand this grave public matter? What should be the restrictions which should be placed on Judges? What are Judges? Who are Judges? The answer might be made, and, no doubt, truly, that they are gentlemen clothed in ermine. Many of them have been appointed—and in Ireland it is said they are always appointed—for political reasons. I will not express any opinion on that. I am afraid that the record, if inspected, would be too serious to look upon. I am afraid we should find that there is hardly a Judge on the Irish Bench who has not ascended the Bench through the greasy ladder of politics. In Ireland undoubtedly it is so; in England, also, it is often unfortunately the case, though, no doubt, Lord Chancellors of late years have broken through this most pernicious custom of making political appointments which we know must affect the administration of justice. Do Judges make no mistakes? Have they no tempers like other men? Have they no prejudices like other men? Have they no bias like other men? In other words, is it to be supposed that the process of swearing in a Judge turns a black-hearted man into the most fair-minded, dispels all his bias and prejudice, and perhaps transforms him into an angel of light? Why, Sir, we have had some wonderful stories of the manner in which Judges have shown their feelings, in which those learned gentlemen do not appear to the greatest advantage; and I think it is high time now that such a change should be brought about as will remove one of the greatest scandals connected with the administration of justice. If the Motion of the Prime Minister is not changed, I certainly shall vote for an enlargement of its terms, so that the Committee should take into consideration what are the restrictions which should in future be placed upon this power of committing for contempt of Court, and to what extent it should be intrusted to Her Majesty's Judges.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)

Sir, if I understand the suggestion of the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell), which has been supported by the hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Lewis), who has just addressed the House, it is that the Resolution of my right hon. Friend should be altered in its terms, with a view to extending the inquiry of the Committee to the general law, instead of confining it to the subject of the committal of the hon. Member for Carlow (Mr. Gray). I must at once remind the House that this is a question of Privilege, affecting one of our own Members. If it was other than a question of Privilege it could not be brought on as it has been at this particular time, for not only would it be against the Rules of the House of Commons to bring it forward, but it would not have been in accordance with the pledge given by the Prime Minister before Parliament separated two months ago. The House will recollect that the question of Privilege is only raised when it affects the law as applied to Members of the House. If, therefore, the Motion was applied to the Law of Contempt with reference to the subject in general, it would at once place the Motion outside the area of this Privilege. I apprehend, therefore, that it would not be in accordance with the Rules of the House to extend this Motion, which has reference to a question of Privilege only, to the consideration of what the general Law of Contempt is, for that subject is not before us. If the measure that has been referred to by my right hon. Friend should be found to be insufficient, then a Motion could be made for the inquiry as to whether that measure be, or be not, sufficient to meet the requirements of the subject. But to mix up these two matters, one of which is a question affecting the Privilege of a Member of this House, and the other the question of the general Law of Contempt, would, in my opinion, not only be out of Order, but would be an unwise course to take, especially after the announcement which has been made by the Prime Minister.

MR. SEXTON

Sir, we heard with satisfaction the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, because we attached to the terms of the Motion which he submitted a far wider meaning than we are now permitted to attach to them after hearing the observations of the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (the Attorney General). When I heard the Prime Minister say that the Select Committee shall be entitled to inquire into all the matters referred to in the letter of Mr. Justice Lawson, I imagined that the chief function of the Committee would be to inquire into the general Law of Contempt. One of the matters referred to by Mr. Justice Law-son is the committal by that Judge of a Gentleman brought before him for contempt of Court; and I understood from the Prime Minister that, among all the matters referred to in that letter to be dealt with by the Committee, the general Law of Contempt would be one. But now the hon. and learned Attorney General raises a point far more ingenious than practical when he says that, because the matter comes before this House in the shape of a Motion concerning Privilege, it cannot go beyond the question of Privilege. We have heard from the Prime Minister that the Government mean, at an early date, to introduce a measure dealing with the general Law of Contempt of Court. Am I not entitled to ask, then, in view of that intention, why should not the Committee to be appointed be enabled to gather evidence which may place this House in a position to say, when the Government measure is produced, whether or not it ought to pass? I consider the hon. and learned Gentleman's view of the case an exceedingly narrow one; and it seems to me an extraordinary thing that, because the question immediately before the House concerns a Member of the House, therefore the action of the Committee should be limited to the consideration of the personal case. I say deliberately that if the Committee to be appointed only inquire into the regularity and legality of Mr. Justice Lawson's proceedings, it may as well not be appointed at all—nay, better not, because it will be an empty formality, and can result in nothing. We all know perfectly well that the warrant of committal was regularly made out, and that there is no Statute Law governing the privileges of Judges in this matter. It is a mere matter of custom, limited by the discretion of the Judge who is acting; and the discretion of the Judge simply means his indiscretion; and if the Committee only inquire whether the Judge acted regularly and legally, and according to custom, it is a foregone conclusion what their finding will be. We all know that the Committee will report that Mr. Justice Lawson acted legally and regularly, and according to custom; and that they had no fault to find with his view. I object to the elaborate farce of appointing a Select Committee on the subject merely for the purpose of telling us that. We know already that if the Committee be limited to this view it will exonerate Mr. Justice Lawson. What we wish to know is, whether the Committee will be allowed to deal with the burning question which is agitating the public mind in Ireland, a question upon which hundreds of Petitions have been received by Irish Members, and which we are precluded by the Rules of the House from presenting? No episode in recent Irish public life has created such excitement and apprehension as the arbitrary conduct of Mr. Justice Lawson in this case; and if the Government intend, at an early date, to introduce to the House of Commons a measure dealing with the general Law of Contempt of Court, we are entitled to claim that the Committee to be appointed should not be limited to the personal question of the imprisonment of the hon. Member for Carlow (Mr. Gray), but that, in the spirit of common sense, the Committee should be empowered to collect evidence which may enable the House to review the whole question, and say whether this arbitrary power should continue to be exercised by the Judges of the land.

MR. PLUNKET

Sir, I do not intend to say a word now upon the general question as to whether the law ought to be altered on the subject of committals for contempt of Court, because a time will come for discussing it when the Government propose their measure. I only wish to say that, while reserving my opinion on that subject, I cannot be here without entering a short protest against the observations of the hon. Member who has just sat down (Mr. Sexton). I think it would be a great misfortune in the interests of the public, as well as of the Judges, who have been intrusted with such great responsibility lately under the Act passed for the repression of crime in Ireland, and who have been, and will be, exposed to such great danger in the discharge of their duties—I say I think it would be a great misfortune if any idea should go abroad from anything said here that there was a general impression in the country, or in this House, that grave or serious charges could be brought against the learned Judge (Mr. Justice Lawson) in the course he has pursued. I merely wish to express my own belief in an opposite direction to the hon. Member who has just spoken. I hold that Mr. Justice Lawson, who has been referred to, acted in the strictest discharge not only of his legal right, but of his duty, under most difficult circumstances. When the matter was last debated in this House, I ventured very briefly to express my view on the subject, and said that if the matter was again brought up I should be prepared—and I am now prepared—to maintain the views I then held; but I do not think it would be his wish, or for the interest of the House, that I should enter on the subject now. I therefore simply enter my protest against the idea that there is any imputation conveyed on the conduct of the learned Judge by anything that has happened in this House to-day. If the question is raised in a formal way I shall be prepared to maintain and vindicate the action of the Judge on that occasion.

Question put, and agreed to.