HC Deb 26 May 1882 vol 269 cc1711-32
SIR WILFRID LAWSON

I feel bound to take advantage of this opportunity of making a few remarks on a matter of great public importance. I am obliged to do so, not from any answer the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has made to me, but on account of the answer he has not made, because it is impossible to get any information from him at all as to the state of affairs in regard to Egypt. He said five minutes ago that the Government thought it very undesirable that there should be a discussion on the affairs of Egypt. I quite agree in that. I do not want to discuss the affairs of Egypt; I want to discuss the affairs of England. What I want to know is—What is going to be done with our Fleet, for which we are responsible, and for which we pay, and which at the present moment has been sent into these Egyptian waters? I dare say the House remembers very well what happened four years ago when we were going to adjourn for the Easter holidays. There was a critical position in European affairs then, and we Liberals made a very great disturbance. We said that we were not going to adjourn for the Easter holidays until we had distinct declarations from the then Ministers of the Crown that no decisive steps of a warlike character would be taken until the House had reassembled. I remember that some of us were so earnest in the matter that we absolutely divided the House against the Easter holidays; and amongst those who voted in the small minority on that occasion was my hon. Friend the present Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Courtney). The House did adjourn, because we got some information from the then Leader of the House (Sir Stafford Northcote). He gave information which satisfied the bulk of the House, and the result was that the next morning we heard that the Indian troops had been sent to Malta. I believe there was a misunderstanding in regard to what he said; because the right hon. Gentleman has explained the matter since. But what are we to expect when there is no declaration at all? I think the House is bound to have some understanding as to what warlike steps it is possible may be taken very shortly, and while we are all away in the country, because our ships at the present moment appear to be in a very delicate position. Ships of war, I presume, are intended to make war. It may be all very well to say that there is no intention to resort to force; but after we have read the extraordinary document in all the papers this morning, we may be prepared for anything. It is called in the papers an Ultimatum; but my hon. Friend says it is not an Ultimatum. Well, what is an Ultimatum? These Consuls say that there are three points that they insist upon, and then say that if these points are not agreed to they will exact their due fulfilment. I should like my hon. Friend, when he gets up, to answer—I do not suppose he will answer, but he will say something or other—what an Ultimatum is, if this is not an Ultimatum. We are all utterly at sea in this matter. We have to gather our information by bits and scraps—to drag it out of my hon. Friend with the greatest difficulty—and it is not of much value when we get it. This is what I have been able to get during the last week. I will read it to the House. My hon. Friend told me the other day that— The Fleet was sent to protect life and property; and we hope that its presence will contribute without the employment of force —what is the use of sending out a Fleet if it is not to employ force?— to the maintenance of the status quo in Egypt and of the Sovereignty of the Sultan. The Sovereignty of the Sultan! We have the present Ministry sitting there to "maintain the Sovereignty of the Sultan!" It is the old fetish—the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire—on behalf of which we have sacrificed millions of money and poured out torrents of blood. That I should live to see the day when a Liberal Ministry should come down to the House and declare that their policy is the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire! Then the hon. Member, in his answer, went on— Of the position of the Khedive and of the liberties of the Egyptian people, as well as to improve the development of their institutions and to observe international obligations. Two or three iron-clads to do that! Really, is this the time, when we are busy in this House with two Bills for the pacification of Ireland—one of them to bribe the Irish people, and the other to put them in a state of siege—when it is all we can do to help in the amelioration of these Irish affairs—is this the time, I ask, for us to be engaged in this enterprize? I do honestly think it would be a great deal better for us to obtain the pacification of Ireland before we set to work on the regeneration of Egypt. This may appear a very slight matter. All wars appear slight when they begin. If you are going to interfere in this matter with the affairs of Egypt, I do not know what end there may be to the amount of blood and treasure you will have to expend before you are done. Now, I have thought it absolutely my duty, before the House breaks up, to make my protest against these extraordinary proceedings. I do not know that it will be of any use. I know the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) can do anything he likes. I do not think the country could have a better man at the head of affairs; but whatever he says, whether it be right or wrong, I believe will receive immense support from the country. But I am not the man to follow even my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister if he is going to initiate the policy again of the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. I consider it is the great glory of the present Government—hon. Gentlemen opposite may not think so, but I am sure hon. Gentlemen on this side will agree with me—I consider that the great glory of the Administration is their policy of non-intervention in foreign affairs. I shall be deeply sorry to see them depart from it on this occasion, whatever may be the plausible reason they may give for doing so. I think it will be only decent—I hope I do not use an offensive word—to give the House some assurance that no warlike steps shall be taken while the House is adjourned, and when hon. Members have no opportunity of expressing their opinion on the matter. That is the only object I have in rising at the present time, and that is the only reason for which I have felt bound to oppose the Motion for Adjournment.

MR. GLADSTONE

Sir, it would very ill become me to complain of the tone of the speech of my hon. Friend after the more than kind expressions he has used; yet freedom of debate requires me, of course, to comment on that speech, and to notice the points raised. The effect of what my hon. Friend says is that he expects some explanation from the Government on the present question; and I think, perhaps, it is time for me, as representing the Government—considering that my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has already made a statement on the subject on his own responsibility—to come forward to share his responsibility by stating what my views upon the subject are. It is only right that I should say that if there be anything to complain of in the answers that have been given by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary on the score of reticence, the blame is in no way due to him individually. My hon. Friend (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) began by imposing upon himself a kind of self-denying ordinance, which I do not believe he was able to observe to the end of his speech. He said he was not going to ask for anything to be said, or to complain of anything that had been said, or to enter into the discussion of the affairs of Egypt; but only to complain in regard to something which had not been said, and which he thought ought to be said. I will first consider what that something is. His desire apparently is that some absolute pledge should be given with regard to the British ships of war which are now in Egyptian waters, which are not there alone, but which are there in concert with the ships of war of France; and certainly with regard to European interests and affairs. He also wishes to have from us an absolute pledge that, during the Whitsuntide Recess, no use should be made of those ships involving the employment of force. He has, I think, in a Question of which he gave Notice, phrased his desire more broadly—that we should not, without previous communication with Parliament, make use of force. The hon. Baronet referred to the occasion four years ago, when application was made to the Conservative Government by some Members of the Liberal Party—I was not one of them—for a specific pledge on a similar subject before the Easter Recess, and when a statement was obtained which was thought at the time to afford a full and perfect guarantee; but a miscarriage occurred, which has since been explained in such a way as to remove all suspicion from the mind of my hon. Friend; but still a miscarriage did occur, and on the strength of the statement my hon. Friend went away with the satisfaction which, he says, was doomed to be dispelled in the course of 24 hours. That experience is of so encouraging a character to my hon. Friend that it leads him to make an application to us for a similar statement, although that statement might, within the range of possibility, issue in a similar miscarriage. My hon. Friend proceeds distinctly on this proposition—though I do not know that he reduces it to a formula—that all that can be said is that a misleading statement is better than no statement at all. I am very doubtful whether it is, and I am prepared, if necessary, to contest the point. Sir, it is not possible for us to give any pledge upon the subject; but, when I say that, it is not with the slightest belief in my own mind that there is any probability of an occasion arising for the employment of force; and, therefore, my hon. Friend may dismiss from his mind any suspicion of the kind. Upon the general subject of demands from the Government for pledges of this kind, I am so far fortunate that I stated my views at a time when I was not in Office, and when the late Government was in Office, and very shortly before the occurrences to which my hon. Friend has just referred. I then said that it was quite impossible for a Government to give any pledge not to do this or not to do that when force was placed at their disposal expressly for the purpose of being used in the interests of the country. While asserting that general proposition, to which I adhere, I likewise said, and now repeat, that it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government, and not only their desire, but, in my opinion, it is the absolute duty of the Government, in all such matters, to act in accordance with what they believe to be the deliberate views of Parliament and the country. There may be cases where their views on the question at issue are beyond, or at variance with, what they believe to be the opinion prevailing in the country. If there be such a case as that, then I think it is their duty to make known to Parliament what their intentions are, unless under circumstances the most extraordinary, before they proceed upon any general views and principles, except such as they feel convinced are known to and approved by the general sense of Parliament and the country. That sense, however, maybe either expressed or understood. In this case, we believe that we know perfectly well what is the general sense of Parliament and the country as regards the affairs of Egypt; and I believe, whatever we may do or may not do, it will be found to be in accordance with that general sense. Sir, it so happens that in this instance we have, perhaps, more than the usual facility of judgment; because, in regard to the very delicate situation in Egypt, we are inheritors of what we received from our Predecessors—a complicated difficulty in some respects—a dangerous position—but a position in regard to which I have never felt it to be any part of my duty to bestow any censure upon what was done by the late Government. My general belief is that it arose not only out of what they believed to be the necessity of the case, but probably from—as far as I can judge from a distant view of it—a real necessity inherent in the case. My hon. Friend says it is indeed strange we should become adherents of the doctrine of the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But why does he introduce that phrase into this discussion? Simply because my hon. Friend near me, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has upon one, or probably more than one, occasion—and I think he was perfectly right—referred to the maintenance of the Sovereignty of the Sultan over Egypt as one of the objects to which we are bound to have regard. [Sir WILFRID LAWSON: It is in the Ultimatum.] Quite so. What I think is the point to which my hon. Friend refers is that he considers the maintenance of the Sovereignty of the Sultan in Egypt to be the same thing as the general doctrine of the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. I am not going to say anything upon that general doctrine, either for or against it; but I am going to say this—that with regard to the Sovereignty of the Sultan, in our opinion it ought to be respected when it is not abused—that is a moderate statement—a mild statement—and it is part of our duty to respect it. Any attempt to disturb it, in our opinion, in a case of this kind, would not be wise, would not be consistent with good faith, would not be consistent with the views of the other Powers of Europe, or of those of anybody able to deliver a responsible judgment on the matter. We cannot, however, I am bound to say, agree to have our hands tied; and I think anyone who will consider the peculiar character of this question will see that it is right on general principles to decline to give a pledge of this kind, and especially right in the case now before us. My hon. Friend seems to think it is reasonable, when you have ships in foreign waters, to give pledges that they will, under no circumstances, be allowed to employ force. Quite apart from any general doctrine about the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, we found ourselves, on coming into Office, heirs to certain engagements contracted under the Treaty of Berlin. We made it our duty to prosecute, with all the energy we could, a settlement of those questions. There were two very important territorial questions, one relating to the territory of Montenegro, and the other relating to the territory of Thessaly, in connection with Greece. We were able, together with the other Powers of Europe, to bring those questions to a settlement, and to a satisfactory settlement, and we have done much to encourage confidence and security, and to give practical satisfaction and relief from difficulty and grievance to considerable portions of the population in the East of Europe. That was not done by absolute abstention from the exhibition of force; and most certainly was not done under restrictions which would have been imposed upon us if we had been asked at that time to give an absolute engagement under no circumstances to employ force. It is not politic to ask us to enter into such an engagement, and it is not possible, consistent with duty, to give it. The real question—and I now address myself not to the entire House, but to my hon. Friend—is, whether my hon. Friend has good reason to suspect us of pursuing aggressive schemes, of immoderate doctrines, and of notions of self-assertion, or of any other defect on that side of human weakness, which tends to excess in this matter. If he has not, I hope he will refrain from pressing for the engagement he asks from us. In regard to the general question of this discussion, it is, in my opinion, a highly responsible act which is done by the Government, when it requests the House of Commons to refrain from discussing a question of foreign policy; and it is an especially responsible act, I fully admit, when the interest of a question of foreign policy, involving such complications as exist in this case, has been considerably prolonged. Notwithstanding that, I do most earnestly deprecate the discussion of this subject. I do most confidently say that its discussion can do nothing but mischief. We may err—I see no reason why we should—but, rely upon it, it is better even to take the chance of that than to enter upon a discussion, if I am correct in saying that it cannot do otherwise than do mischief. What is the peculiarity of this question? It is not that this question is in itself so very, very difficult to understand and so very, very difficult as to perplex you more than usual in the separation of right from wrong in regard to it. The peculiarity—the great peculiarity—of this question is the multitude of Parties entitled to give responsible opinions, and to exercise real influence with respect to it. We have acted on the principle that, in matters of this kind, separate action is generally to be deprecated and avoided; but, in, the present instance, the general considerations which dissuade us from separate action are infinitely strengthened; because the close and intimate relations with France, in which we find ourselves in consequence of previous arrangements in Egypt, create a kind of unity—a kind of obligation to unity—as far as policy upon this question is concerned, of a highly peculiar character. I would say that the association of France with England in the agreement itself was not one whit closer—of course, the purpose may be different—but the association was not one whit closer at the time of the Crimean War than now in regard to Egypt. As was declared not long ago by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State on this question, the points of view of England and France has not at every moment been, and could not be, absolutely the same; but, although some variation and divergence has not been wholly absent in the past, we find ourselves now entirely and, as we believe, cordially united. We have to consider, also, our relation to the Powers of Europe, who naturally feel that they have a right to be consulted in this matter. We have to consider the position of the Sultan of Turkey and his relation to the Khedive of Egypt; and, again, the relation of the Khedive in internal matters with regard to a movement of a mixed character, involving, on the one hand, something of a national element; and, on the other hand, I am afraid, a good deal of a military element, but creating together a position, I will not say of the extremest difficulty and danger—because I think that would be an exaggeration—but a position of the extremest complication; and it is most desirable that we should not be betrayed into a false step. What would be the consequence of a discussion? A great variety of opinions would be expressed—some leaning, perhaps, to an enhanced view of the Sovereignty of Turkey; some leaning towards the expression of a strong sympathy with the popular and national movement; some leaning to a strong assertion of the doctrine of the Concert of Europe; some, perhaps, again, being inclined to view with jealousy any supposed subordination of our action to that of France. But each and all of those different opinions would be put forth to the world; they could hardly be accurately reported; they could not be correctly understood, or be justly viewed, in relation to the authority belonging to each of those from whom they proceeded; and the effect would be nothing more than to add fresh complications to a situation sufficiently complicated already. I thank the right hon. Baronet opposite for what he has said. He has expressed, I must admit, and not unnaturally, the idea that there may be other information which might appertain to the information which has appeared to-day in the papers. But the right hon. Gentleman will well understand that we are only in possession of that information by telegraph, and nothing like a full and copious explanation of the circumstances under which it has become public is as yet in our hands. It is a great responsibility, Sir, which we have upon us; but we feel it to be our absolute and bounden duty, on the one hand, to adhere—as we do unreservedly adhere—to the hopeful and even cheerful view given on a former occasion to the House by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State; and, on the other hand, it appears to us that this is not a time at which it would be useful that a discussion in this House should take place. Nay, more, we are convinced that, although we have nothing peculiar in our principles, nothing idiosyncratic, nothing in the way of differences as between one Government and another, no motive of any kind, direct or indirect, which would lead us to deprecate discussion; but, on the contrary, we would willingly enter upon it on any proper occasion; yet, viewing the relations in which we stand, and the multiplied parties concerned in this matter, and the impossibility of treating it as we might do any business that was entirely within our own discretion, and of which we could at once calculate all the obligations and all the risks, we are bound to distinctly express the opinion that any debate in this House at the present moment could hardly, by possibility, in any direction do good, and would almost inevitably do injury to the public interests involved in the peaceful settlement of the present internal affairs of Egypt.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

Sir, I entirely agree with the general principles which the Prime Minister has laid down as to the importance of leaving in the hands of the Government the responsibility of dealing with such a question as this; but the statement which the right hon. Gentleman has made was not, I think, at all calculated to diminish the feeling of anxiety which prevails in regard to Egyptian affairs. At the same time, I most thoroughly recognize the truth of the considerations which he has urged upon us with the view of preventing any premature discussion of the state of affairs, which cannot at the present moment, in the opinion of the Government, be fully disclosed to us. I must say that I think that a discussion upon half, or less than half, information would be much worse than no discussion at all. I only wish to say a word with reference to one observation made by the right hon. Gentleman. He said that the position of the Egyptian Question was not one which was entirely the creation of the present Government, but that they inherited the situation that had been created by their Predecessors; and he alluded to that in a way that might be taken to throw some part of the responsibility for the present state of affairs on the previous Government. ["No!"] I do not suppose that that was the intention, and I only wish to say that, without for a moment disclaiming any responsibility for the late Government for all their actions, and being prepared, whenever the official information is laid before us, to give a most perfect defence of that policy and the most candid consideration to the effect which that action must have had on the subsequent policy of the present Government, I would only say at the present moment, in the absence of information as to the policy of the present Government in respect to Egypt, we do not wish to be supposed to acknowledge having any responsibility in the matter which does not properly belong to us. I am quite aware, however, of the extreme delicacy of these questions, and after what he has said I agree with the right hon. Gentleman as to the impropriety of raising a discussion upon them on the present occasion.

MR. JOSEPH COWEN

said, it would be unpardonable on the part of any hon. Members of the House of Commons to provoke a discussion on a subject of such delicacy that the Government had assured them it could not be debated without possible damage to the Public Service. All present, whatever their opinions, would recognize the ability and force of the appeal that the Prime Minister had made, and that it was unassailable. The Government were responsible for what was being done, and as the House was only partially informed on the subject, adequate debate was impossible. Therefore, there was no other alternative for the House but silence. But he could not help observing that this was a consideration that did not always operate upon some hon. Members. He had a recollection that appeals of the kind had been made from the Treasury Bench during last Parliament, in circumstances of as great difficulty and danger as the present, and had not always been complied with. But that could pass. He could not help remarking, however, that the Prime Minister, while discouraging any attempt at discussion, had started many topics that were of a very debateable character. He had, however, no wish to discuss them, beyond saying that it had been stated—and great stress had been laid upon the point—that the Government would only proceed in concert with other Powers. He (Mr. Joseph Cowen) was not so certain that such co-operation must necessarily be an advantage. There was no reason why the Government should not act with other Powers when the objects of those Powers were the same as our own; but in the present instance that could scarcely be said to be the case. We were entering into a partnership with a Nation whose designs were different to ours, if not hostile to them. He had no wish to say an unfriendly word of France; but it was folly to shut our eyes to the fact that what France was wanting in Egypt and what England was wanting were entirely different things. England, unlike France, was not seeking conquest. All that she required was to maintain her road to the East. He was prepared to go any length for the maintenance of that highway. He would fight for it if it was essential. France was seeking quite different ends. She was striving to assert her supremacy along the whole of the Northern Coast of Africa. It was her undisguised aim to make the Mediterranean, as far as she could, a French lake. That was a project which he did not think it was either our interest or duty to commit ourselves to or encourage. This concert might lead us into trouble, and he viewed it with considerable misgivings. He (Mr. Joseph Cowen) was not going to discuss the matter; but he might mention that the Prime Minister had stated that the Government would be guided by the opinion of Parliament. It was not quite clear how the Government were to get the opinion of Parliament if it was not expressed. It was desirable for the right hon. Gentleman to understand, therefore, that there were hon. Members in that House who did not at all approve of England taking with France any action which would involve us in complications for her special advantage. The Egyptian people had a right to manage their own affairs. We were not concerned to interfere, except in so far as our interests in the Suez Canal were endangered. But it would be an extremely serious thing if we were to be dragged at the heels of France into troubles, the end of which it was impossible to foresee. Affairs would develop in the course of a few days; and, as they were not to have a discussion on the affairs of Egypt at present, if the Leader of the Opposition or some other hon. Member did not call attention to the matter on the re-assembling of the House, he (Mr. Joseph Cowen) certainly would do so, with the view of eliciting from the Government a more complete and explicit statement than they had yet given on that subject. The position, by the Government's own admission, was critical; and he hoped they would be able to satisfy the not unnatural anxiety of the public on the subject after the Recess.

MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT

said, it was not his intention to enter upon a discussion of this important question, in view of the very urgent request of the Prime Minister and of the opinion expressed by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition (Sir Stafford Northcote). He had, however, to complain that for a whole month, notwithstanding the Questions put to them, the Government had withheld information on Egyptian affairs. He had come to the House prepared to criticize, to some extent, the policy of the Government with regard to Egypt, and to prove that the difficulties in which England was now involved were entirely due to the grave mistakes of the present Ministry. He would not, however, trench upon ground which the Prime Minister described as extremely delicate; but the right hon. Gentleman himself had, in the course of his remarkable statement, entered upon other ground which was debateable, and which did not closely affect that question. He (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett), therefore, considered himself perfectly within his right, and also within the interests of the public, in meeting two statements which the right hon. Gentleman had made upon subjects not directly connected with the question of Egypt. The first of these statements was the credit and honour which the right hon. Gentleman took to himself and his Party for the so-called settlement of the Greek Question; but he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) could never allow such claims to pass un contradicted. The facts with regard to the Greek settlement were these. The unfortunate instigation and advice of the present British Government raised in the minds of the Greek people and Ministry exaggerated expectations. The conduct of the right hon. Gentleman cost Greece £7,000,000 and the mobilization of 80,000 men. It cost Turkey an almost equal loss. It brought these two countries and Europe to the brink of war. And, after all, the British Government found themselves compelled, in May, 1881, to force upon Greece the acceptance of the terms which were offered by the Porte in August and October, 1880, and which Greece might then have obtained without the expenditure of a single million and without mobilization. He thought such conduct as that shown by the Government in that matter deserved great condemnation, and he could not say that he regarded the settlement with any degree of satisfaction. The second statement of the Prime Minister to which he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) took exception was his endeavour to connect the policy of the late Ministry in Egypt with that of his own, and to involve the Conservative Party in any share of responsibility for the present crisis. There were, however, three essential and conspicuous points of difference between the policies of the two Ministries—(1) the intervention of Lord Beaconsfield's Government in Egypt was of a purely financial and administrative character; (2) that intervention was never made without the full prior knowledge and cordial assent of the Sultan, the Sovereign of Egypt; and (3) the unjust aggression and cruelty of France with regard to Tunis had entirely changed the feelings of the Mussulmans of the whole East towards France, and rendered any co-operation with her extremely impolitic and dangerous for England. He would venture, with all respect, to offer the right hon. Gentleman and his Colleagues a suggestion with regard to their policy. There was but one way in which the troubles and dangers in Egypt could be allayed—namely, by a frank and cordial understanding with the Ottoman Government. The difficulty in that country was due to the fact that the Government had taken step after step without obtaining the previous consent of the Sovereign of Egypt. It was only by and through the Porte that the crisis in Egypt could be ended. It was by that policy alone that the immense interests of England in the East could be upheld and the peace of Europe maintained, and those various objects, which the Government professed to be anxious about, secured. The suggestion which he ventured to make was this. Let the right hon. Gentleman go in a frank way to the Sultan, and invite him to put a check to the revolutionary movement in Egypt. He would find this the only safe and efficacious, as it was undoubtedly the only just and equitable, course. Any other course must lead to serious complications, if not to war. The Sultan was now master of the situation. With regard to what had happened, he would read two sentences from a document which was public property and which expressed the views of the Ottoman Government upon this subject. Some days ago the following protest was addressed by the Porte to Her Majesty's Government:— It is through the intermediary of the Porte, and through that intermediary alone, that measures of appeasement should be concerted and applied. To assure us that the rights of the Sultan will suffer no infringement, and to forbid us any interference in an Ottoman Province, are contradictory assertions which it is difficult to reconcile. The result of this contradiction will be to cause our prestige in Egypt to vanish and our counsels to be ignored, and will open the door in that country to subversive ideas detrimental to the Egyptian population, whom it is our duty to protect. The dominion of the Sultan for centuries over Egypt, the identity of our customs, laws, and institutions, and the principles of International Law all combine to designate the independent action of the Sultan as alone capable of removing rivalry and the clashing of interests and of causing the voice of reason to be heard in Egypt. In conclusion, he would entreat the right hon. Gentleman to revert to the policy of Pitt, of Wellington, of Palmerston, and of Beaconsfield—namely, that of friendship and alliance with the Ottoman people. That policy was far better than an uncertain and most dangerous cooperation with the Republic of France.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, he did not wish to continue the discussion; but he was greatly afraid that the statement of the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles W. Dilke) might lead to misapprehensions. The hon. Baronet had spoken, both yesterday and to-day, of a Fleet being sent to Alexandria, and that was not correct; for it would lead to a misapprehension that there was a much larger force employed than was really the fact. The force which had been alluded to as the British Fleet at Alexandria was more correctly described by the Prime Minister as ships of war.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

I wish to say I gave the exact number yesterday.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, he would admit that such was the case; but if his right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary for Ireland (Mr. Trevelyan) were in his former Office, the right hon. Gentleman would bear him (Sir John Hay) out when he stated that this was not a Fleet, but only a small detachment of a Fleet, for a Fleet consisted of 10 sail of the line or of 10 iron-clads, and there was only one English iron-clad and one French iron-clad at Alexandria, and these constituted only one-fifth of a Fleet. He should also have liked to ask his right hon. Friend whether it was possible for England to send sufficient ships to Alexandria if they were wanted to form a Fleet? His (Sir John Hay's) own impression was that, though France could send them from Toulon if necessary, England had only nine armour-clads in commission at home and in the Mediterranean available for that purpose.

MR. HEALY

said, he thought the Prime Minister should remember that considerable difficulty might arise in Parliament if, as might soon be the case, a Party, say, of 100 Irish Members, were to express the view, against the dominant wishes of Members of that House, that Arabi Pasha was a patriotic individual, and the hope that he would succeed in driving the foreigners into the sea. A crisis of that kind might occur in the affairs of the British Empire, even in their own time, because those Members might consider that the interference of England in the affairs of Egypt was simply a question of cash, and that a similar interference might be brought about in Ireland if they had a few foreign bondholders investing money in that country. It was all very well for the Prime Minister to say that there would be no interference with the Sovereignty of the Porte in the affairs of Egypt, so long as the Sovereign power was not abused; but he thought the Czar of Russia had just the same right to say that of the affairs of Ireland, if a considerable Party in the House, representing a large proportion of the population of the country, were to get up and say that the Sovereignty of Her Majesty was abused. In that case the Czar might say that the Sovereignty of Her Most Gracious Majesty in Ireland should not be interfered with so long as it was not abused. It might not much matter now, while England was at peace, for England could afford to disregard the opinion of such gentlemen; but, if ever she went to war, the time might come when some foreign Powers might interfere with the English Government in respect of its misgovernment in Ireland, just in the same way as England was now doing in Egypt, and in view of the possibility it would be well for the Government to allow the Representatives of Ireland to manage their own affairs in their own country.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, that, in his opinion, the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister might be justly characterized as being as clear, and as luminous, and as perspicuous as a remarkably fine specimen of the London atmosphere towards the end of November. Some surprise might naturally be felt at his (Mr. O'Donnell's) taking part in the present debate; but he was unable to understand what fell from the Prime Minister and the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Charles W. Dilke). It appeared to him that the only difference between the statements of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the statements of the Prime Minister was the difference between the monosyllabic and the polysyllabic method of saying nothing in particular on the subject. He was compelled to make his remarks in that House, because the British nation insisted on the Irish Members making their appearance in that House. He largely sympathized with the objections of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) to the policy of secrecy adopted by the Liberal Party in foreign affairs, since the accession of that Party to Office. The hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle appeared to dread that in the gloomy interval during the Recess, some sudden resolution might be adopted akin to that of the late Government when they called the Indian troops to Malta. He (Mr. O'Donnell) did not know whether the hon. Baronet contemplated some foreign expedition on the part of the Irish Constabulary; but, for his own part, he believed that there was very little apprehension of any foreign expedition being sent out by Her Majesty's Government, as they had already too much trouble on their hands to pick a quarrel with any Power whatever, unless it were a very small one indeed. Though it might be the opinion of the Government that silence was golden, especially when prudence was the better part of valour, there were aspects of the Egyptian Question which demanded, if not an explanation by the Government, at any rate, a distinct and clear enunciation of opinion on the part of independent Members of that House. The Under Secretary of State denied that that was an Ultimatum which appeared in the papers that morning. A challenge was thrown out to the Government Bench to say what, then, was an Ultimatum. He (Mr. O'Donnell) could only explain the statement of Her Majesty's Government that it was not an Ultimatum, by assuming that no declaration of policy by a Liberal Government could be taken seriously as the last word they had to say on the subject. Therefore, though the document which appeared in the papers ordering instantaneous submission on the part of the Egyptian Ministry might be regarded by some as an Ultimatum, he was of that frame of mind which would feel no surprise on seeing an Ultimatum of an entirely different nature in the papers to-morrow. The Premier said that the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle apparently preferred a misleading explanation to no explanation at all; but what he (Mr. O'Donnell) had to complain of was that they had already received a large number of misleading explanations from Her Majesty's Government on Egyptian affairs. They were led to suppose, over and over again, that what Her Majesty's Government was to do was to receive the entire concurrence of the Porte and of the Powers of Europe. The only corroboration of that very confident statement which had yet appeared had taken the remarkable form of a most decided protest by the Porte against the action of Her Majesty's Government. The Premier had declined to express what the policy of the Government was on the Sovereignty of the Sultan, and the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. That was precisely the core and main point of the difficulty in the East, that no one knew what was the policy of Her Majesty's Government on those points. It might be singularly embarrassing to a Party which had arrived at power to confess that their policy now was the very policy they had so pitilessly denounced when Lord Beaconsfield was in Office. The Prime Minister, however, had laid down a general principle calculated to cover more or less satisfactorily the most surprising changes of that description. He had laid down that the Liberal Party in Office could not be expected to carry out the policy of the Liberal Party out of Office. [Mr. GLADSTONE: I have never said so.] He had only ventured to put a gloss upon the declaration of Her Majesty's Government, and he thought the right hon. Gentleman would admit at once that it was not an unnatural gloss. The right hon. Gentleman had laid down, in words that would be historical, that the Government were not bound to maintain, in a position of greater responsibility and less freedom, the views they had expressed in a position of less responsibility and greater freedom. [Mr. GLADSTONE: I never said anything of the kind.] He was certain the Premier clearly saw his way to the maintenance of the denial he had just uttered; but, at the same time, he was bound to say he was not endowed with the powers of accurate perception possessed by the right hon. Gentleman. There were people in the East and in other parts of the world who might form what might be mistaken views of that kind. It was that very ambiguity which surrounded the views of the Government upon the most essential points of Eastern policy that was at the bottom of nine-tenths of the existing anxiety. The Government declared that they objected to having their hands tied. But were not their hands tied? What was the nature of their apparent dependence on the French Government? So far as he had been able to judge, the policy of Her Majesty's Government for a long time back consisted in saying "Ditto" to the French Foreign Office. Were Her Majesty's Government engaged in suppressing the nationalities of North Africa, like France, and wounding the feelings of the Mahomedan population? Were they aware of the interpretation put by the Mahomedan world upon their warm co-operation with and apparent dependence on France? At any moment there might be an insurrection of the Arab tribes, from Morocco to Arabia, against the French power; and if the British Government, at that critical hour of national explosion, were found side by side with France in Egypt, nothing on earth could prevent the Native population from considering England as the ally of France. He spoke in behalf of a policy of withdrawal from co-operation with France in this matter, and of paying greater attention, in the interests of common prudence, to the feelings of the Native population. England had suppressed the nationalities of a sufficient number of African peoples to render it by no means improbable in Native eyes that, upon due temptation, England would be quite as capable as France of adding another unjust annexation to the many which had already taken place. Her Majesty's Government had a right to be reticent, especially when they had nothing to say. But independent Members had a right to express an opinion on the subject; and, so far as he could see, there was no aggression, no interference with national rights, no violation of International Law, as regarded the peoples of North Africa, which had not been either approved or done by Her Majesty's Government. The Government had affected to defend the despatch of a squadron to Alexandria, on the ground that it was necessary for the protection of the life and property of British subjects; but where was that policy, when French men-of-war bombarded, and French soldiers sacked the property of British subjects at, Sfax? It was forgotten that there was at present an active, intelligent, widely-spread, and ably-conducted Mahomedan and Arabic Press, as well served with correspondents and educated writers, in proportion to the state of their civilization and education, as the Press of any part of Europe. All those facts which Her Majesty's Government thought might produce mischief were perfectly notorious in the East. What was the use of Her Majesty's Government imitating the ostrich and hiding their heads, when all these things were known in the East? It was perfectly well known throughout the East that there was a French Party which originally collaborated with the National Egyptian Party, with the design of making use of that Party as a tool against the supremacy of the Sultan, of separating Egypt from Turkey, and of taking hold of that country, which was the constant object of French cupidity. It was only when the Egyptian National Party proved themselves to be a real National Party that the French Government took steps to suppress it. In fact, the French Government discovered that Her Majesty's Government was likely to prove a more efficient tool in their hands for the disruption of the Ottoman Empire and the separation of Egypt from the Porte than Arabi Pasha and his Party. It was believed among the Mahomedan nations that Europe was once more embarking upon a sort of modern copy of the Crusades. In North Africa a vast insurrection against the French power was imminent. He believed that a European war, which would be very unseasonable just now, was treading closely on the heels of the Government's proceedings in Egypt. As an Irishman, he said that was a dangerous time for the Government to enter into a difficult enterprize in the East, for they had neither the political reputation nor the military force to enable them rashly to do that at the present moment. It was also to be remembered that in the event of war the whole future of the Indian Empire would be trembling in the balance, and a single false step would leave this country in as dangerous a position as it was in when the valour of a few Irish regiments rescued it at the beginning of the present century; and it was probable that, if they asked their assistance at the present time, the answer would be that the evicting landlord had scattered far and wide, over distant shores on the Atlantic and the Pacific, the strong arms and stout hearts that were once at the disposal of England, but whom England had rewarded with exile and despair.