SUPPLY—NAVY ESTIMATES.

HC Deb 26 June 1882 vol 271 cc475-514

SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

(1.) Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £996,091, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Expense of Victuals and Clothing for Seamen and Marines, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1883.

COLONEL MAKINS

said, that, in reference to the grant for the Marines, some discussion took place on the last occasion the Navy Estimates were before the Committee; and he had then strongly urged upon the Government that some Member representing distinctly and directly the Royal Marines should be added to the Board of Admiralty. The Marines formed one-third almost of the fighting force of England, and he thought they ought to be directly represented on the Board that was to govern the whole of the Navy. The case of the Marines was a very peculiar one. The Force itself was peculiar in its constitution. It was attached to the Navy; the Naval Department drew the pay of the men and controlled them, and yet in every other sense they were soldiers. One of the difficulties at present attached to the Force was the slowness of promotion. He was not speaking of the Infantry; but in reference to the Marine Artillery the stagnation of promotion was really as great as ever. Officers who had served from 20 to 25 years had no chance of obtaining field rank until their period of service amounted to some 30 years. Whereas a captain in the Line obtained field rank after 18 or 20 years' service, a captain of the Marine Artillery had to serve 28 or 30 years before he attained that rank. There was no Force in the Service of so valuable a character in regard to which the promotion was so slow. It had, practically, a bad effect upon the Service. It rendered it unpopular, and in the future it would be found that young men of ability would pause before they selected that branch of the Service, when they found it in the highest degree probable that it would take so long a time before they could attain the same rank which, under similar circumstances, they would attain in other branches of the Service. It had another prejudicial effect in making the officers of Marine Artillery feel that they were filling an inferior position, and very naturally they did not see what reason there was why—as in all respects, both as regards pay, rank, and promotion, they enjoyed the same privileges as the Army—they should be so very much inferior in respect of promotion. There was another point to which he also wished to draw the attention of the Secretary to the Admiralty—namely, the appointment of Major Derriman to be adjutant of a Volunteer Corps at Carlisle. The effect of the appointment was that Major Derriman was acting in two capacities, and was drawing pay from both Departments. Either this officer belonged to the Army for the time being, holding, as he did, a Staff appointment, or he belonged to the Marines, in which case his pay could not be drawn from the Army Department. The Prime Minister had informed the House that in future officers in this position would not be eligible for Staff appointments; but he (Colonel Makins) could not understand why they should not be. It was a slur on the Department which ought to be removed. As the question was one of great interest, and affected the efficiency of an important branch of the Service, he hoped it would not be considered that he had been unduly taking up the time of the Committee by calling attention to it.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, he hoped to have from the Secretary to the Admiralty a satisfactory assurance that it was not intended to carry out the proposal to reduce the Marine Force. The Estimates proposed a reduction of that Force by 600 men. He did not know what the Force was at this moment; but he believed that it was about 200 under the proper strength, and the proposal was that it should be gradually reduced by 600 men. At present the force numbered somewhere about 13,000, and ought to be at home ready for any emergency; but it had been reduced by detachments sent to Ireland. That being so, he thought it would be unwise, in the present state of our foreign relations, to continue the reduction of the Force, as it was by no means too large for the services it might be required to perform. He understood that the reduction had taken place, not because the men were not wanted, but because money was wanted in other directions. The result was that the pay of certain officers had been increased, and the money had been saved by reducing the strength of the Marine Force. He had good authority for saying that this was more than an accidental circumstance, for the First Lord, in "another place," had himself stated this as the reason. By reducing the Force, money had been obtained for increasing the pay in other directions without involving any increased charge upon the public general service. Looking at the fact that the service of the Marines might be required at no distant date, he thought it was not desirable that the Government should insist on the reduction of the Force, but that it should be increased to the full strength at which it stood last year. He desired to thank the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty upon what he perceived to have been the result of the recommendations he had made as to the lighter draught of the ships required for service in the Mediterranean. The Fleet at present in the Mediterranean consisted of 11 vessels, four of which were outside the harbour of Alexandria, unable to get in on account of the low draught of water, two were inside the harbour, and five were at Malta, and were about to be supplemented by the Penelope, the Orion, and the Belleisle. He was also glad to hear that the Cyclops, the Gorgon, and the Hydra were being got ready for the purpose of reinforcing the Fleet; but he was afraid there might be some question whether those ships would be considered sufficiently safe to make the voyage. Personally, he had always doubted their seaworthiness, and he was still more confirmed in the opinion he had expressed when he found that vessels of that particular draught of water were not more readily employed in the service; and he believed the cause to be that it was not considered safe for them to undertake the voyage. He regretted that the Audacious was still undergoing repairs, or she might have been made available from her light draught. He understood that she would not be available for the next two months. He was glad to see that the Hotspur was now being got ready, and he congratulated the Admiralty upon their now adding to the Force in the Mediterranean ships that would certainly be of some service there. Looking at the events which had arisen, he hoped that the recruiting for the Marines would not be stopped, and that that famous Force would be maintained not only efficiently, but in sufficient numbers for the Public Service.

SIR MASSEY LOPES

said, he regretted that the discussion of the Naval Estimates had been postponed so long. When they were first brought forward by the right hon. Gentleman the present Chief Secretary for Ireland, it was promised that there should be an opportunity for a full discussion upon them. Three months had now elapsed, and they had had no opportunity of considering the Navy Estimates; and at that hour at night (12.15) it was scarcely to be expected that they could deliberately consider these matters. He regretted the unavoidable absence of his right hon. Friend the late First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. W. H. Smith). In reference to the Royal Marines, to which his right hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay) had just alluded, he was glad to find that the prospects and condition of that Force were to be improved. The stimulus to promotion in commissioned ranks could not fail to be of service. It was also satisfactory to find that the pay of the non-commissioned officers was to be increased. This was both just and politic, and assimilation, when on shore, to the status of the Line regiments was reasonable and right; but he must regret that, in order to confer these advantages, there had been a corresponding reduction in numbers. It was quite true that the late Government reduced the number of the Marines by 1,000; but it was understood that that was the lowest estimate which ought to be made in reference to them, and he very much regretted that the Lords of the Admiralty had now decided upon reducing the strength of the Force by 600 more. By so doing, they were losing what was equivalent to a whole battalion of well-trained and well-seasoned men—men who at any moment would have been able to assist the country in any emergency, and might be relied upon at a moment's notice. True, there were not so many Marines in peace time serving afloat; but that body could always be depended on to supplement the Land Forces, and were a great auxiliary to the Army. The late Secretary to the Admiralty, when he brought forward the Estimates, made a very able statement; but the arguments adduced by the right hon. Gentleman were arguments rather in favour of increasing the Force than of reducing it. The right hon. Gentleman told the House that the number of men on board of a ship had been very much reduced during the last 20 years. He believed the right hon. Gentleman compared the years 1862 and 1882. No doubt the statement of the right hon. Gentleman was quite true; and though now-a-days they did not require the same number of blue jackets, so large a proportion being artificers and stokers, on board of a ship, he thought they must all admit that if at any time they had to land a force they would be rendered more dependent upon the Marines. He recollected the right hon. Gentleman the late Chief Secretary giving the authority of Lord St. Vincent, that if ever the hour of real danger should come to England, the Marines would be found of the utmost service to the country. The right hon. Gentleman quoted other high authorities to the same effect, and it was a well-known fact that, whenever our war vessels were called upon to send men ashore, the first to be told off were the Marines. But surely these were arguments for retaining the Force at its ordinary strength, rather than reducing it. But what was it the Board of Admiralty had done? It was quite true that they had improved the condition of the general Service at a cost of £24,000 per annum. But in order to improve that condition they had reduced the number of Marines by 600. He did not hesitate to say that the House of Commons, and the country at large, would have been perfectly willing, and even anxious, to pay £24,000 per annum in order to improve the position of the Marines; but they would not wish to improve that Service by reducing the strength of the Force. It was impossible, at the present moment, to exaggerate the importance of the Royal Marines. The present Board of Admiralty had also improved the position of the Engineers; but though he regretted to say that they had done it upon the same principle, he did not find so much fault with it. It was rather, he thought, a politic movement. Her Majesty's Government were inclined to regard the artificers as being in many instances quite able to do the work of engineers. He was not inclined to object to that view, and therefore he did not find fault with what the Government had done; but in regard to the Engineers generally he thought it was a mistake to reduce the strength of the Force, especially at the present moment, when everybody felt anxious owing to the complicated state of European affairs. He hoped the Secretary to the Admiralty—if it were found necessary to land Marines at Alexandria—would fully consider what number of men our ships would be able to land. Of course, he did not expect the hon. Gentleman to reply to that question; but he wanted the Secretary to the Admiralty to tell them that the Admiralty had decided to recruit up to the point that it was deemed necessary to retain, and that the strength of the Force should not on any account be allowed to go below it. He again wished to express his regret at the absence of the late First Lord of the Admiralty; but he was authorized to state that these were the views which, if his right hon. Friend had been present, he intended to express, no doubt with greater effect than he (Sir Massey Lopes) had been able to express them.

MR. GORST

asked the Secretary to the Admiralty what changes the Admiralty proposed to make in the nomination for the appointment of naval cadets? His hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) had called attention, a short time ago, to the condition of the administration of the Navy, and to the pressure which was constantly brought to bear upon it. Since that time the late Secretary had been appointed to another position, and the misfortune was that his Successor might not feel him-self bound to carry out the engagements entered into by his Predecessor. Last Session a very interesting debate took place on the subject of naval cadets, and great hopes were held out by the late Secretary to the Admiralty that, in the first place, the competition for the appointment of naval cadets would be thrown open in the same manner as the appointments in the Army, and that the appointment would not be retained any longer as a piece of patronage by the First Lord of the Admiralty for the time being. He should like to know whether any steps had been taken to fulfil the expectations held out by the late Secretary to the Admiralty that something would be done in this direction? He failed to see why, if officers of the Army could be obtained by open competition, a similar course might not be pursued in reference to the Navy. Seeing the Secretary for War in his place, he would ask him to say whether any objection was entertained to the system of open competition in the Army? And if they could get officers for the Army in that way, why on earth should they not obtain officers in the Navy in the same manner? The same rule ought to be followed throughout the Public Service, and all appointments should be thrown open to public competition. Another hope or prospect held out by the late Secretary to the Admiralty was that the Admiralty would consider the desirability of appointing naval cadets of a more advanced age. At present, many of the naval cadets appointed were mere children taken out of the public schools, and placed in institutions where they received very indifferent teaching. Many of these schools were of an inferior character, and these boys learned less than they would learn anywhere else, and their future ability as naval officers was very little advanced. Two years ago, Lord Dalhousie, then a Member of the House of Commons, made an interesting speech upon this subject, in which he condemned the system in terms which no one of less experience than himself would have liked to use. He believed the opinion expressed by Lord Dalhousie was shared by a large number of naval officers of experience, and there was a general impression that it would be much better to appoint naval officers of more advanced age—say, from 16 to 17—who would be able to go to sea when appointed. No other country appointed children to be naval officers, and he wished to know if any intention existed on the part of the Board of Admiralty to alter the age at which naval cadets were appointed? That was the second point to which he wished to direct the attention of the Secretary to the Admiralty. The third point had reference to a question on which he understood that a distinct pledge had been given. He had called the attention of the late Secretary to the Admiralty to the fact that all the public schools of the country were examined by a Syndicate sent from Oxford or Cambridge, and he had suggested that the naval schools for the training of officers of the Navy should be subjected to a similar examination. He believed that the education given on board such ships as the Britannia was not of the highest class, and it was most desirable that there should be an examination by a Board of Examiners from Oxford or Cambridge, who should present a Report, so as to enable the House to form an estimate of the value of the instruction given.

SIR HENRY FLETCHER

said, that on a previous occasion when the Navy Estimates were brought forward, he had brought two subjects under the notice of the Government. One had reference to the Royal Marines, and up to the present moment no definite answer had been given to the question he had asked. That question was one which he had put to the present Chief Secretary for Ireland when Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Trevelyan)—namely, whether a general officer would be appointed to superintend the management of the Royal Marines at the Board of Admiralty? He had not received any reply from any Member of the Government up to the present time. The Royal Marines now consisted of a body of men something like 13,000 in number, and he had argued most strongly, on the previous occasion to which he referred, that they were a body of men who ought to be represented upon the Board of Admiralty by a responsible Minister; and he would ask most earnestly whether any decision had been arrived at by Her Majesty's Government upon that point? He was of opinion that, considering all things and having regard to what might take place, he was entitled to have an answer to that question. He also wished to urge, as strongly as possible, the points which, had already been mooted in the course of the discussion in connection with the reduction of the Royal Marines in the present year. A short time ago he had spoken in the most emphatic terms against the proposed reduction of the Force by 600 men, and he thought the events which had lately occurred proved most conclusively that the reduction which had been in contemplation, and which he hoped the Committee would be assured had not yet been carried out, would be a most undesirable one. The Royal Marines were a most efficient body of men, and he had urged in the month of February that if any emergency were to arise, such as that which had arisen within the last few weeks, it would be necessary to rely upon the services of this important Corps. He was glad that the question had been referred to by other hon. Members, and, if not too late, he sincerely hoped that the reduction would not be carried out. There was also another question which he had brought before the House on a previous occasion, and upon which he had obtained no answer. He had asked several questions last year with regard to the Royal Warrant which was issued in connection with the Army, and also the Warrant for the re-organization of the Marines; but he had received no definite reply. In the month of June last year the present Chief Secretary for Ireland said, that the delay in the production of the scheme for extending the Royal Warrant for the Army to the Royal Marines would not affect the promotion or pay of any one, and that all the changes would date from the 1st of July, 1881. He humbly submitted that that engagement had not been carried out, because the retirements in the Royal Marines were not gazetted until the month of December, 1881, and it would not involve a very great charge upon the Exchequer if the engagement even now were adhered to. There were only a very few officers interested in the matter; but to those few officers it was a question of great importance, seeing that their prospects, both in regard to pay and promotion, had been very much impaired, owing to their not having been gazetted on the 1st of July, 1881, in accordance with the engagement made by the Government. Instead of their having been gazetted at that date, they were not gazetted until December, 1881, and certain officers who ought to have been promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel were passed over by several hundred officers in the Army. That was a matter of very great importance to officers who were quartered in garrison in Ireland. The undertaking the House had from the Secretary of the Admiralty last year was that nothing should interfere with the promotion of these officers, and that they should not suffer in consequence of the delay of the re-organization of the Royal Marines. He hoped that the present Secretary to the Admiralty would be able to give the Committee some assurance that the claim of these officers had been taken into consideration, and that justice would be done to them. It was a very great hardship that any of these officers should be passed over, after the assurances which had been given by the late Secretary to the Admiralty. The only officers affected were two lieutenant colonels, two majors, three captains, and one or two quartermasters, so that the expense of carrying out the arrangement proposed by the Government would not be very great. He would not say anything further upon that subject. He did not ask for a positive answer that evening; but he did hope that the Secretary to the Admiralty would take the matter into consideration, if he was unable to give an answer now. He would remind the hon. Gentleman that several months ago a promise was made that the matter should be taken into consideration, and that a reply should be given. In regard to the proposed reduction of the Royal Marines, he would only say that he looked upon it as a great mistake to reduce a Force which would be most useful and effective in the present emergency, especially when it was well known that the reduction was only made from motives of false economy, to provide retiring pensions for officers.

CAPTAIN PRICE

said, it was now more than three months since they had the statement of the Secretary to the Admiralty. The first place in that statement had been given to a consideration of the claims of the Marines, and as the Committee had already heard something from more than one Member about that Force, he should like to occupy a few minutes in supplementing what had fallen from other hon. Gentlemen. First of all, he would endorse what had fallen from the hon. Member who had just sat down as to the necessity of giving a seat at the Board of Admiralty to an officer of that Corps, who would more fully represent the interests of the Marines than they were represented at present. A fuller representation was necessary, as they had too long been accustomed to see the claims of the Force far from being liberally dealt with by the Board. The Force had been shuffled about from one Service to the other. At one time it had been convenient to look upon it as part and parcel of the Army, and at another time to look upon it as part and parcel of the Navy; so that, between two stools, the Marines had always fallen to the ground. Besides this, he would venture to suggest to the present Secretary to the Admiralty, that in all cases where a Marine was being tried by court martial on board ship, it was desirable that one member of the court should be a Marine officer, and at present that was not the case. He had intended, during the progress of legislation last year, to have taken action in order that some provision should be made for this, but circumstances had not favoured him. If the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty would look into the question, no doubt he would find that there was considerable disposition amongst the authorities to agree to his proposal, and it was only fair that such should be the case. They all liked to hear of a man being tried by his peers, and it was constantly the case that Marines were tried by a court martial consisting entirely of naval officers, and that questions cropped up before the court that could only be properly understood and decided by officers of the Corps to which the prisoner belonged. He remembered a complicated case not very long ago, that of Lieutenant Woods, a Marine officer, who was tried within a stone's throw of a number of Marine officers at Plymouth, and yet was tried entirely by naval officers. The injustice of this case was felt by not only the Marine, but the Naval officers as well, and, in fact, by the whole Service. This was felt to be a considerable grievance, and he did not think there would be any difficulty in removing that grievance, because on most of the Naval stations—indeed, upon all of them, except, perhaps, the Australian and Pacific stations—there were Marine officers of the rank of captain. There were no Marine officers of that rank on the two stations named; but in these places the force only numbered some 250 men in the one case and 180 in the other. A great deal had been said on the question of a reduction of the Force, and he agreed with what had fallen from hon. Members. It was humiliating, when they came to think of it, that when a grievance had existed for years, and had been admitted by Lord Northbrook in the other House and the late Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Trevelyan), it should be stated to Parliament and the country that it could only be remedied by a reduction in the efficiency of the Force. That reduction had taken place to the extent of 600 or 700 men. The late Secretary to the Admiralty had endeavoured to reconcile the House to this state of things by saying that in these days the number of Marines on board ship was very much smaller than it used to be, and if they were to send more than one-half the force on board a vessel than they used to send, they would be crowding the ship, and putting more than the proper complement of Marines on board. He did not think that, in these days, it was necessary that the Marines should be at sea half their time. It was necessary some time ago. Everyone must admit that seamanship occupied a very much inferior position now compared with gunnery than it did some years ago. There was not such a necessity now to "salt" the Marines, to use a term in common use 20 or 30 years ago, as there used to be. He should think if one-third of the Force was at sea at a time it would be quite sufficient. No doubt, it would be desirable to have more of them at sea at one time; but the advantage they would derive if they had only one-third of them at sea at a time in having a larger force at home would compensate for any disadvantage. It was said this Force was one of the finest forces in the whole of Her Majesty's Service; and when he had advocated an increase of pay, or an increase of pension, or any other advantage to the Corps, he had been told that they must not compare them with their comrades in the Line. They were told that the Marines had certain advantages which compensated for the deficiency in pay. Two or three years ago there was a large increase given to the Line, but the Marines did not share in it. They were told, when they drew the attention of the Government to it, that the Marines had certain advantages that the Lines- men had not. Well, this was a question he did not wish to go into, because it involved the consideration of many complicated details; but they must not forget that the Marine was a superior man to the Linesman. He did not wish to be invidious, but that had always been considered to be the case, and it was the case at the present moment. Last year he obtained a Return from official sources showing one or two particulars with regard to this matter. He had asked for particulars as to the average length of service of the Marines serving in the garrison at Plymouth, and other particulars, as compared with the average length of service of the Linesmen serving in the garrison at that port—the men of the 23rd Regiment and the 13th Regiment. He found that the average height of the Marine private was 5 feet 7 inches, and that of the private in the 23rd and the 13th Regiments 5 feet 6 inches. He found that the weight of the Marine private was 159 lbs., and that of the private in the 13th Regiment 154 lbs. Then the average age—and this was an important matter—was in the Marines 26 years, and in the 13th Regiment only 22 years, and in the 23rd Regiment only 19¾ years. Here, then, they had the private of the 23rd Regiment, who was in years a mere boy, getting higher pay than a Marine private 26 years of age. Then as to the average length of service; in the case of the private of Marines it was eight years, whilst in the case of the private of the 13th Regiment it was three and a-half years, and in the case of the private of the 23rd Regiment only two and a-half years. He had asked, also, for information as to the percentage which had passed the School Standard. He could not get the record as regards the private of Marines, but he did with regard to the corporals and sergeants. In the Marines all had passed the School Standard, but in the 23rd Regiment only one-half the sergeants, or, strictly speaking, 51 per cent and 75 per cent of the corporals had passed the Standard. These were a few facts which would go to show that the Marine was not only worthy of his hire, but was a superior man, and a man better worth paying than the Linesman. He (Captain Price) had asked a question the other day about the pension of colour sergeants in the Marines. He dared say the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) would remember the answer he had given. His (Captain Price's) point was that the pension of colour sergeants was 2s. 3d. in the Marines and 2s. 6d. in the Line.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

The maximum in each case.

CAPTAIN PRICE

Yes; and the hon. Member had answered him by saying that it had been proposed that, in this respect, the Services should be assimilated; but they had not been assimilated, for the reason that the Greenwich pension was enjoyed by the Marine and not by the Linesman. The hon. Member should remember, however, that the Greenwich pension was not paid until a Marine had reached the age of 55. In the Line the colour sergeant might retire at 38 or 39 on his 2s. 6d. a-day; but the Marine sergeant only got 2s. 3d., although, if he should live until the age of 55, and should be fortunate enough to satisfy certain officials, he would come in for another 3d. The hon. Member, he thought, would see his point. There was another thing in connection with this that he wished to point out, and that was that it was only upon the Marine showing that he was in poor circumstances that he was entitled to the Greenwich pension at all. Of late years it had grown the practice to make use of the Greenwich Fund to supplement the Imperial Fund in the same way for paying the Navy. When it suited the Admiralty, they said—"Oh! the Greenwich Fund is a sort of charity. We cannot give it to anyone until they have attained the age of 55. If we find his circumstances are pretty good, we do not give it at all." And when it suited the Admiralty, on the other hand, in reply to hon. Members who stated that the Marines were not paid as well as the Line, they said—"Oh! but there is the Greenwich Fund from which they derive extra pension." There was one more point with regard to the Marines to which he wished to call attention, and that was the pension of the widows of warrant officers. In the Army warrant officers' widows got a certain pension; but in the Marines that was not the case, and he was at a loss to know why it should not be. He did not know whether the Admiralty had any intention of making a better arrangement with re- gard to the pension of these widows; but he hoped they had, and that something would be heard about it very shortly. The next subject which had been touched, on by the late Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Trevelyan) was the question of the naval engineers. The hon. Member had gone very fully into that matter. Well, on behalf of his (Captain Price's) constituents, he must thank not only the present Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman), but the late Secretary to the Admiralty for what had been done with regard to this branch of the Service. The present Admiralty had carried out very loyally the plan which was, he believed, sketched out by the last Administration. He did not know whether they had gone the full extent of what was sketched out, because he did not exactly know what the plan had been; but with regard to the engineers, he thought the late Secretary to the Admiralty had made a little too much of what had been done, having told the House in very distinct terms that they should now consider that the engineer officers were by no means a badly paid class of men. The hon. Member had given them certain comparisons which he had no doubt had a great deal of weight with the House; but he thought that those who were fully conversant with the matter would not look upon the comparisons given as altogether satisfactory. He was sorry the late Secretary to the Admiralty was not present, because he should have to quote a little from what the right hon. Gentleman had said. On a previous occasion he told the House that he must compare them, in the first place, with the executive officers of the Navy; and he went on to say that none of those officers, except a captain, received a higher rate of pay than the maximum of the engineers. But the right hon. Member had neglected to tell them how difficult it was for an engineer to get his maximum, and that was one great grievance that these officers had. There was a clause in the Regulations dealing with the pay and pensions of the engineers, which provided that it was only on an engineer officer obtaining the rank of chief engineer that he should begin to count certain services for pay and pension. He must serve 11 years as chief engineer before he could count the whole of the time he had served as an engineer. But then there was another provision, which was that at the age of 55 a chief engineer should be compulsorily retired. Now, as the average age at which a man became a chief engineer was from 42 to 44, the House would see that it was almost impossible for an officer to have served 11 years so as to count sufficient time to enable him to a full pension. If he did not count the whole 11 years—if he lost even a month—he had to forfeit a considerable amount of pension. The half-pay of a captain was 12s. 6d. a-day on promotion, and the full pay of a chief engineer, on promotion, was 13s., so that the half-pay of a captain was almost identical with the full pay of a chief engineer. Then with regard to commanders—and the House would remember the age and length of service entered very materially into these comparisons—the average age of a commander for promotion was 35, when he had seen 12 or 13 years' service, and his pay, on promotion, was £1 1s. But the chief engineer did not get more than 17s. until he had completed 28 or 29 years' service, and was 50 years of age. Then a comparison had been made with the navigating lieutenants, who were Executive officers. The navigating lieutenant was about 26 years of age on promotion, and he got 12s. a-day. An engineer got 11s. per day after six years' service; but by the time he was promoted to be chief engineer he received 13s. a-day, while the navigating officer was in receipt of £1 a-day. The next comparison which had been made was with the Civil branch of the Service. The hon. Member, he thought, had spoken about the paymasters. The paymaster of a troopship or a flagship might be receiving £693 a-year, whereas a chief engineer could not receive more than £470 a-year. He must apologize to the Committee for going into these details; but the ex-Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Trevelyan) had gone into them at considerable length. The right hon. Member had said, turn to the Merchant Service. They found that the chief engineer on board of a man-of-war got as much as £400 to £470 a-year, whilst a first engineer on board one of the great packet ships was paid at the rate of £18 to £22 a-month. But the late Secretary to the Admiralty had taken those ships which served in the home trade, where engineers were paid at about that rate. This did not seem to be the fact when they came to some of the foreign trades—China, for instance. In the China trade, the first engineer got from £40 to £70 a-month, or about three times the sum mentioned by the late Secretary to the Admiralty. And, more than this, the mess of these officers in the Merchant Service was paid for them. Their linen was found, and he thought he was right in saying that they also had a right to trade. They might have an interest in the cargo, and, in many cases, they also got a bonus from the consignees of the cargo; so that the engineers were much better off in the Merchant Service than in the Navy. The chief engineer onboard the Great Eastern got £1,000 a-year. No doubt, he should be told, that that was an exceptional case, and so it was; but it must be recollected that though the duties of this officer might be exceptional, and very responsible, they certainly could not be said to be more responsible than those of a chief engineer on board one of our first-class men-of-war. The duty of an officer on a ship of that kind must be far more responsible and far more important than the duty of chief engineer on board the Great Eastern. Any engineer in Her Majesty's Service would be fit to place on board a Cunarder, or any other of the fine ships that traded across the Atlantic. There was, he should think, hardly an engineer in Her Majesty's Service who would not be able to take charge of the engines of any merchant ship; but if the first engineer of an Atlantic Liner were to go on board a man-of-war, it would take him months to learn all the duty that a chief engineer had to do. He thought, therefore, that the Admiralty had very much underrated the duties and importance of this class of officer. Though the thanks of the Service were due to the Government for what they had done, he thought they had not fully appreciated what they were obliged to do in justice to that Service. There was another question to which he certainly ought to draw attention, besides the question of pay and pension, and that was the question of messing. A great deal had been done in that direction, and, no doubt, they could not do all that was desirable at once. They could not make all the engineers mem- bers of the ward-room mess at once, although that might be done at the Royal Naval College at Woolwich. Speaking as a naval officer, he saw no objection whatever to this mess being thrown open to the engineers. At Woolwich the mess was a very large one, and any difficulties of a social character which might exist in an arrangement of this kind would be felt very much less than anywhere else—much less than they might be felt on board ship, where there was a small mess. He now wished to refer to another matter, and that was the case of the engine-room artificers. Those were a very important body of men, and were becoming a very large body. It had been the policy of the late Administration to increase very considerably their numbers, and the men of this body were, to a very large extent, taking the place of the engineers. No doubt, that was very good policy. It had resulted in considerable economy, and not, it seemed to him, at the expense of efficiency; but, having done this, they ought to go a little further in the direction of bettering the position of these "non-commissioned officers," he thought the late Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Trevelyan) had called them. He called attention to this matter entirely with the view of increasing the efficiency of the Service. The position of the engine-room artificers ought to be a much more responsible one than it was, and he thought it would tend very much to increase the efficiency of that branch of the Service if men received the rank of warrant officers. The experience he (Captain Price) had had in the Service led him to believe that that step would have the effect of largely increasing the efficiency of the Service. These men had to undertake the duties and responsibilities that used to be borne by engineer officers. It was now the case that in almost every ship in the Navy, especially in the smaller ships, the engine-room artificers occupied a most superior position. They were very often in possession of the engine-room. During a certain part of the day they were in sole charge of the engine and boilers, and the whole machinery, in fact, of the engines; and, certainly, if he were commanding a ship in which one of these artificers was in command of the engines whilst the ship was under weigh at sea, he should feel himself relieved from much anxiety if he knew that the man had a superior rating to that which was allowed him now. An improvement in the position of the artificers would tend to a better carrying out of discipline. He was convinced of that. Being in the position of a warrant officer, he would command greater respect and insure greater obedience from those under him; and upon obedience he thought depended not only efficiency, but absolutely the safety of the ship and the lives of those on board. Not only disobedience to a command, but also the slightest hesitation or slowness in carrying out a command by a person in charge of the engine-room, must very often cause a serious accident—he did not think it would be too much to say that it might often cause the loss of the ship and of all on board. He really thought the Admiralty ought to take the matter into their consideration. The change he proposed would not be an expensive one to carry out; but if they were to put these men in the position of warrant officers, he would guarantee that they would be able to perform their duties much better, and that the extra expense would be very little, if any. The Admiralty might say they could not find cabins for these men. Well, they might go without cabins until such time as they could be supplied; and, at all events, they might, in other respects, be treated as warrant officers, wearing the uniform of that class. He had already detained the Committee too long, and he, therefore, would not trouble them with any further observations.

MR. MACLIVER

said, he supported the views of the hon. and gallant Member who had just spoken. It would have been much better, he thought, if the Secretary to the Admiralty had not held out hopes to the chief engineers 12 months ago that their position would be improved—it would have been much better if he had not propounded a scheme that did not benefit them at all. What they required was that they should be placed in the same position, age for age, and service for service, with Executive officers. If they obtained that, they would be satisfied. The scheme was in such an indefinite state, that the chief engineers had good grounds to complain. He also supported the view of the hon. and gallant Member opposite with regard to the engine-room artificers. He thought they were entitled to some consideration, and that it would be a great advantage if they were made warrant officers.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF

said, that after the remarks of the hon. and gallant Member (Captain Price), he had very little to say about the engineers; but there was one point in the Memorandum he held in his hand to which he should draw attention, and one paragraph which he should read. The paragraph was as follows:— In addition, the engineer officers would earnestly request that all time served as engineer after the attainment of eight years' seniority in that rank should be allowed to count as 'senior service.' The 11 years which have to be served in the 'senior rank' before the whole of their 'junior service' is allowed to count towards increase of full, half, and retired pay, is a very great hardship, and in many instances deprives officers of £100 a-year in their retiring allowance. Lieutenants—the relative rank of engineers over eight years' seniority—begin to count their senior service from the date of promotion, at from 21 to 25 years of age; whereas the engineer officer only begins to count his senior service from the date of promotion to rank of chief engineer—relative rank of lieutenant over eight years—or at the age of 38 to 44 years. It seems only just, therefore, that these officers—chief engineers—should be permitted to count as senior time all service from the date of attaining the relative rank of lieutenant. This point had been urged very strongly by two hon. and gallant Gentlemen, and he would not go at any further length into it. He hoped that the Secretary to the Admiralty would consider the case of the engineers, and see how far the Board of Admiralty could add to the concessions made in the time of his Predecessor. There was another point to which he would like the hon. Member (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) to devote his attention—namely, the question of pensions awarded to naval schoolmasters. The answer given to him some time ago by the hon. Member's Predecessor (Mr. Trevelyan) was that the question of the pensions of seamen's schoolmasters was under the consideration of the Board of Admiralty, and had been referred to the Committee now sitting on the subject of Pensions, and that until their Report was received no further information could be given. He did hope the hon. Member would be able to see his way to meet the views of the naval schoolmasters, and place them in the position they wished to be in with regard to pensions. Another question related to engineer artificers. That had been fully treated by his hon. and gallant Friend, in whose remarks he fully concurred. Then there was a question relating to the first-class petty officers of the Navy, who appeared to have been rather overlooked by the Admiralty. The pay of the first-class petty officers was 2s. 2d. per day, with certain privileges if they were divers or torpedo men; but the daily pay of a sergeant in the Army was 2s. 6d. in the Guards, 2s. 8d. in the Cavalry, 2s. 4d. in the Infantry, 3s. 2d. in Garrison Artillery, 3s. 6d. in the Engineers, and 2s. 8d. in the Hospital Corps, and the sergeants had other privileges which were not accorded to a petty officer in the Navy. Then there was another question which he had raised last year, but with which he would not trouble the Committee now at the same length—namely, the question of pensions to widows of Marines and seamen. That question had been brought before the Admiralty on many occasions by officers of high rank in the Navy; but it had not been sufficiently considered. He himself had mentioned the cases in which the widows of seamen, who had lost their lives in emergencies, had received pensions, whereas the widows of others who lost their lives in connection with events of not less importance received no pension at all. The Admiralty had various sources of revenue out of which these pensions might be given to the widows of Marines and seamen without throwing any great cost upon the country; and he earnestly asked the Secretary to the Admiralty to turn his attention to this question, as it was one which excited great interest in the Service, and had attracted the notice of officers of high rank and distinction, and was one which everybody with any knowledge of the Navy felt ought to be urged on the favourable consideration of those to whose hands the Service was committed.

LORD HENRY LENNOX

said, he would not, at this hour of the night, trouble the Committee with any lengthened observations on the naval policy of the country; but he wished to express his concurrence in the protest of his hon. and gallant Friend against the recent reduction in the strength of the Royal Marines. He objected to that as a matter of policy, but he thought it was still more objectionable for the reasons put forward in support of it—namely, that it was necessary to give a certain number of men increased pay, and therefore the number must be reduced to provide the amount necessary for that purpose. He wished also to protest against the reduction of Marines which had taken place. Events at Alexandria and in the Mediterranean were the strongest confirmation of the folly of that reduction at present. The Marines were admitted by everybody who knew anything about the subject at all to be the best landing force that any country could have, and our Marines could be landed and. do work which soldiers, whatever might be their general merits, could not do as well; and he believed that if Sir Beauchamp Seymour had had a larger force of Marines during the recent riots at Alexandria, the British Consul would not have been wounded, and a naval officer would not have been killed. Then there was another point—namely, the present condition of this country in regard to its iron-clads. We were at present embroiled in a dispute not with a great European Power like France or Germany, but with the Egyptians, or rather with a rebellious officer of the Egyptian Army; and what was the condition of this country? If he was not mistaken, there was at this moment only one iron-clad in commission this side of the Rock of Gibraltar, and that was one which was almost admitted to be unseaworthy three years ago. It was true that we had three iron-clads in commission, and a ship or two at Devonport; but if it was necessary to commission the latter, where should we find the Marines to man them? He should like to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty to say what, after the present arrangements had been completed, would be the number of Marines available at Devonport, and after the orders which had been mentioned in the newspapers had been carried out at Chatham, what would be the force of Marines available at Chatham? He asked that because he saw in the newspapers that the French iron-clads at Toulon were ready for sea, and that 13,000 Marines—or 500 men more than the whole of our Marine Force—had been drawn from the Northern ports of France and collected at Toulon, in order to man these ships as a landing force in the event of their being required at Alexandria. He should be very glad if the hon. Gentleman could deny that Chatham and Devonport, after the present orders had been carried out, would be almost denuded of Marines, and also that he would see that the reduction of the Marines was a mistake, and would endeavour to restore that Force to its previous strength.

MR. T. C. BRUCE

said, when the Navy Estimates were before the Committee some time ago, at a late hour the Committee was given to understand that a better opportunity would be given on a future occasion to discuss the very important questions involved in those Estimates. That opportunity had apparently now come; but he was not sure that there was much advantage in regard to the hour, and as the Committee were now discussing the last Vote which concerned the personnel of the Navy, he was afraid at this hour that subject could hardly be dealt with in the manner it deserved. He should not attempt to discuss it at any length; but he wished to express his concurrence in what had fallen from some of the hon. and gallant Members who had already spoken. He hoped the Government would reconsider the proposal to reduce the Marines, for he thought the experience of late years, and of the present time, had proved that the Navy would probably be in the future principally employed in what he might call an amphibious service, and would probably not be much engaged in its own proper element, but in service on land as well as on sea. The fact of the present construction of our ships—the small number of men they carried, and the large proportion of mechanics and engineers among those men—would lead to our relying more than ever on the Marines. It was true, perhaps, that in ordinary circumstances these vessels would not be able to carry a large number of Marines; but he could not help thinking that, under the circumstances in which we were now placed, it would be very desirable to nave a large force of Marines to draw upon for the purpose of landing when there was no enemy at sea and the fighting must be done on shore. There was also the question of the engineers. The late Secretary to the Admiralty had made a comparison between the pay of the engineers in the Royal Navy and the engineers in the Merchant Service; but it seemed to him that there was a great deal of difference in the duties. The engines in the Royal Navy were extremely complicated, and the duty of the engineers was far more difficult and varied than that of engineers in the Merchant Service, in which the engines were of a much more simple construction. The engines in the Merchant Service were not used as those in the Navy were for a great variety of purposes in working the ship. Another consideration was that the ships of the Royal Navy were frequently sent to unhealthy countries, where the men suffered from the nature of the climate, without receiving any higher pay.

BARON HENRY DE WORMS

said, he wished to urge the claims of the Engineers to special consideration by the Admiralty, and he begged to quote an opinion given by the Junior Lord of the Admiralty that the value of the engineer officers was universally recognized, especially as the machines under their charge were now so complicated. The pay of those officers had not increased in the ratio as the increase amongst other ranks of officers. At the age of 40 a chief engineer received 13s. a day; an Executive officer, 23s. 6d.; a navigating officer, 18s.; a medical officer, 24s., and an account officer, 15s.; but at 55 the mean rate of pay per day of an engineer officer was 12s. 1d.; an Executive officer, 19s. 7d.; a navigating officer, 15s. 5d.; a medical officer, 22s. 5d., and an account officer, 15s. 10d. He thought those figures sufficiently proved that these officers were not paid in proportion to their services, or to the pay of other officers, and the testimony of the Junior Lord established the fact that their duties were extremely onerous. He therefore hoped the Admiralty would award them the remuneration due to their services.

MR. BROADHURST

said, he wished to support the appeal for a further consideration of the case of naval engineers. As the proposal made by the late Secretary to the Admiralty had not yet been put in force, there was yet time for the Government to give further favourable consideration to the claims of these men. He could not possibly conceive any similarity between the responsibilities of an engineer officer in the Royal Navy and those of an engineer in the Merchant Service. In the case of an engineer in the Merchant Service, he had to keep his machinery going simply for carrying purposes, or for going from port to port as quickly and as safely as possible; but in the case of a naval engineer, he had charge of machinery of a very complicated and important nature, and he had not only always to maintain it in efficiency, but he must always be ready for action, and he had in that case to consider the safety, the honour, and the interests of the nation. Then these engineers were frequently sent to very hot climates for considerable periods at a time, which destroyed their health and shortened their lives, and these considerations ought to be taken into account in estimating the services of these men. He hoped there was yet time for the Government to consider the claims of these men, without whom the Navy would be absolutely valueless. It was impossible to overrate the immense importance of their work, and their claims ought to be considered in proportion to their importance. The case of the artificers was also one calling for the consideration of the Government. He understood that these men were not asking for any very considerable increase in their pay, and it could easily be shown that what they asked for would add greatly to the advantage of the Service, and to the efficiency of their duties on board ship. He hoped that another year much more time would be allotted for the consideration of all these questions. It was very objectionable that the questions affecting the Navy should be discussed late at night. It was not creditable to the House or to the country. It was not the fault of the Government altogether to-night; but he hoped they would so arrange on another occasion that there would be a fair opportunity for full consideration of these important matters.

MR. PULESTON

said, he objected to the principle laid down in the answer of the Secretary to the Admiralty to a question put to-day, that because a scheme was carried out in 1876 it could not be re-opened in 1882. He quite concurred with hon. Members who had spoken that the practice of dealing with these Estimates without proper discussion was a scandal. Last year the Estimates had to be taken at the fag-end of the Session, when there was scarcely anybody pre- sent, and he did not agree with the hon. Member for Stoke (Mr. Broadhurst) that it was not the fault of the Government, because he thought they had occupied the time of the House with matters of far less consequence. There had been worthless debates on such questions as the policy of the House of Lords, and it was perfectly useless to take up any important question with regard to the Navy at 2 o'clock in the morning. No one was then in the humour to listen to arguments, and it was no use talking. He hoped the remaining Votes would have a fuller consideration than the Votes taken to-night. The naval engineers, perhaps, might be thankful for favours to come which were promised by the late Secretary to the Admiralty; but when the time came for the fulfilment of those pledges a new scheme was introduced, which put them in a worse position than they were previously in. He quite appreciated the difficulties in regard to this question; but what he complained of was that the reforms, which were so essential for the efficiency of the Service, were taken up in a piecemeal way, and when they were given were not effective, and did not keep up at all with the progress of the country and the necessities of the Service. There was a great deal to be done, not only with reference to the engineers, but all through the Dockyards and the Naval Service generally, in equalizing the classes of workmen. Reference had been made to the question of naval schoolmasters. Those men were very much worse off than the other classes referred to, for they only got half the pension of a Marine. It was a great mistake to allow a class of such importance to be dissatisfied with their allowances and pensions, and he hoped the Secretary to the Admiralty would take note of their case with a view to improving their position.

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

said, they were now on Vote 2, which related to victuals and clothing for seamen and Marines; and even anyone who was conversant with the mode in which the proceedings of the Committee were conducted would have been puzzled to know what was the Business before the Committee. The proceedings of this evening showed the disadvantage which necessarily attached to the way in which the Votes for all the different Services were brought before the attention of Parliament. Not only had they now to sit until the small hours of the morning to consider the Estimates of various kinds, but they had a discussion in such a fashion that it was perfectly impossible that anything like a logical or intelligible criticism could be sustained by a number of Members on such varied Services of the Navy. He would not attempt to go into the large number of questions which had been raised by different hon. Members, but there was one feature with regard to the Estimates which he thought the Committee ought to take note of. There was an apparent saving on the whole of the Estimates of £221,000. On this particular Vote for victuals and clothing there was, on the other hand, an increase. He thought that the increase in the present Vote required some very detailed and clear explanation. The present Administration came into Office with very loud professions of economy and reform in the Public Service, and to note some of the speeches which were still made by Liberal Members throughout the country, one would be led to believe that something like practical economy, combined with efficiency, would be carried out. What was the fact with regard to the naval administration of the Government? They acceded to Office in 1880–1, and the figures for that year certainly did show a diminution in. the cash charges of the actual expenditure in connection with the Services. The Effective Votes were reduced by the sum of £141,000, and looking generally at the Estimate, one would be inclined to think that the Government had a right to take credit to themselves for that reduction. Let them examine that reduction in a very simple way, and they would find in reality there was no reduction at all, but in order to produce an apparent reduction, the efficiency of the Service had been shamefully sacrificed. There was a reduction of £141,000 in the Effective Vote, but, on the other hand, there was an increase in the Non-Effective Vote of the sum of £54,000. Whether a reduction of Effective Services was good or not depended very much upon the efficiency of the Service in connection with which the expenditure was lessened; but an increase in the Non-Effective Vote contributed nothing to the efficiency of the Service, and was a dead loss to the country. The reduction of £141,000 in the Effective Vote, reduced by the £54,000 increase in the Non-Effective Vote, left a balance of £87,000. The Government could not take credit for the reduction of £87,000 at all, because, in connection with the present Vote for victuals and clothing, if hon. Members would turn to the Navy Victualling Accounts of 1880–1, they would find that at the beginning of the present Government's administration, they took over from their Predecessors victuals remaining in store in April, 1880, of the total value of £534,924. In the first year of Office of the present Administration that amount of stock had been reduced to £458,000—that was to say, the whole of the reduction in expenditure in the Votes represented the diminution of stock in the victualling yards, and that was what was called economy and efficient administration. Besides that, the Victualling Yards' Return presented a number of very curious and interesting features which would repay examination by any hon. Member. At this late hour he would not occupy the attention of the Committee unduly; but he had shown, he thought, how the whole of the reduction on the Naval Estimates was accounted for by the reduction of stock in the victualling yards alone. But that was not the whole of the story, because, when he took up the Appropriation Accounts for the same year, audited and reported upon by the Controller and Auditor Genera], he found that over and above the reduction of stock in the victualling yards there was a further reduction in still more important yards—namely, the Dockyards. The value of the stock in these yards in the beginning of the financial year 1880–1, as would be seen from the Dockyard Expenses Account, was, on the 1st of April, 1880, £2,967,000. On the 31st March, 1881, the end of the first administrative year of the present Administration, that value had been reduced to £2,757,000, or by a sum approaching a quarter of a million of money. Well, that was too much for the present Government to face, and in order to account for some, at least, of that reduction they had claimed that the difference was due, to a certain extent, to the variation in the rates. He knew something about the way in which those rates were assessed, and he was convinced that the variation in rates, put into plain and honest figures, was depreciation in value, so he must object to the reduction on that account, at any rate to the full extent—£76,000. Even admitting that that was a fair explanation of the difference to the amount of £76,000, there still remained the difference between £2,967,000 and £2,853,000—namely, £113,600. Now, he had dealt with two different Returns, the Victualling Yards and the Dockyards Returns, and they showed that instead of a reduction in expenditure on the whole account, there was a small reduction on Cash Accounts to the extent of £141,000, which was entirely met by the increase in some other Votes, while the great expenditure and reduction in the stock in the victualling yards and dockyards and naval stores was entirely unaccounted for. He would not dwell further on that matter, except for the purpose of pointing out that in the present Estimates there was a new feature, which he had mentioned on a previous occasion, and that was that the money which used to be paid into the Exchequer as Exchequer Extra Receipts was now being taken in aid of the Votes, and that, consequently, there was the appearance of the Votes being lighter than they really were, because in order to obtain information as to what the actual amount of the charge was, they must add the total shown on the total page to the amount taken in aid. Under the circumstances, it became more than ever important that some system of stocktaking should prevail on which the Committee could have something like reliance. The Controller and Auditor General had, over and over again, pointed out that he had no means of properly checking this Department of the Administration; and when they came to consider that such a Return as was now presented in this Blue Book, with regard to the Victualling Account alone, contained, he thought, £500,000 worth of shoes, £178,000 of blue cloth No. 2, and £164,000 of half boots, without any apparent means of checking the issue, or checking their condition, it was time that they should ask the Government to give the Committee some assurance that practical steps would be taken to institute a complete system of independent check and stocktaking, which the House of Commons should have resort to. So much with regard to the general expenditure. With regard to the details of this particular Vote, he should like to ask the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty if he could account for the fact that, besides "The provisions received under contract," there was a second head—namely, "Saving of payments for provisions not taken up," that amounted to about a quarter of the whole? It seemed an extraordinary thing to one not connected with the administration of the Navy, that 25 per cent of the expenditure for victualling seamen and Marines should be taken out in cash. There must be something requiring investigation, something surely calling for explanation, in a feature so extraordinary as this. Then he must ask the hon. Gentleman, also, whether the Marines in service in Ireland were subject to the same regulations in respect to rations as the Marines were in this country, or did they enjoy any exceptional privileges in connection with rations; and he would also ask whether they received any separation allowance for their wives and children which was not given to the Marines in this country?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he would endeavour, with the indulgence of the Committee, to answer the various questions that had been addressed to him. In the first place, he must say that he shared the regret that had been expressed at the late hour this discussion had come on; but he was bound to point out to the Committee that the Government ought not be blamed in the matter, inasmuch as this was the third Government night on which the Navy Estimates had been the First Order on the Paper. Although they had not got the full benefit of the time thus devoted to Naval Estimates, he did not think the Government was at all in fault. With regard to the future, he believed it was his hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Puleston) who asked if he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) could not give a promise to take an early day for the discussion of naval matters more in detail. It certainly was the intention of the right hon. Gentleman the Head of the Government that a day should be given in July, and by giving a day the right hon. Gentleman, of course, meant that it should be a substantial opportunity of discussing the most important Votes. He (Mr. Campbell - Bannerman) was not in a position to give any pledge beyond that. The hon. and gallant Member for Essex (Colonel Makins) made some observations on the subject of the Marines, and suggested that the Marines deserved to be, and ought to be, represented on the Board of Admiralty, and his hon. Friend the Member for Horsham (Sir Henry Fletcher) joined in supporting that proposal. It seemed to him (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) that this was not altogether a reasonable request, because, in the first place, he rather disputed the view that was implied—the view that an officer was required on the Board of Admiralty to represent the interests of a certain section of the Service. If an officer was appointed to the Board of Admiralty, it was as an Executive administrative officer, and he was not placed there to represent the peculiar interests of a certain section of officers or men. He did not know that it had ever been suggestsd, for instance, that the Royal Artillery, or Royal Engineers, should have at the War Office a separate Adjutant General for themselves. The Adjutant General was responsible in the first place, and the Deputy Adjutant Generals for the Royal Artillery and Engineers under him managed the discipline of the particular branches of the Service to which they belonged; and as to the Admiralty, there was a Deputy Adjutant General, and an Assistant Adjutant General under him, who, under the Naval Lords, had the control of all the affairs of the Navy and the Marines. He did not think it could be said the interests of the Marines were not fully considered, or that any matter connected with them did not receive all the attention that it deserved. His hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Makins) also pointed out that there was a stagnation of promotion in the Marine Artillery; that the promotion had been greatly improved, as he understood it, in the Marine Infantry, but not in the Marine Artillery. Something had been done for both, but possibly there might be some inequality in the promotion of the two branches of Marines; but at this moment he could only say he would look into the matter. He could not, however, make an absolute promise; there had been a great deal done to improve the promotion, but it was quite possible it might not have been as effective in the Artillery as in the Infantry. His hon. and gallant Friend had alluded also to the case of Major Bramwell. He (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) would look into the case; it was quite a new matter to him. His right hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Sir John Hay) also alluded to the question of Marines. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman appeared to him (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) to make, for a countryman of his, who ought to be logical if anything, an extraordinary error; he confused post hoc with propter hoc. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman said that he was glad to find that in consequence of his observations on the question, the Admiralty were now sending out some vessels of lighter draught to the Mediterranean. He and his Colleagues attached great weight, as they ought to do, to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman's opinion; but he could not flatter him by saying it was altogether due to the observations he made that certain ships of lighter draught had been sent out to the Mediterranean. It was true the Admiralty had sent out an additional number of ships to the Mediterranean, and it so happened there were amongst the number some which were of a lighter draught than those already there when the right hon. and gallant Gentleman referred to the matter. He did not wish, however, on this occasion to enter into the question of the military preparations in the Mediterranean, or to discuss what had happened, or what had been prepared for any eventualities that might occur. His right hon. and gallant Friend made another observation of the same kind; he said that they had reduced the number of Marines in order to meet the increase of pay. He could not help thinking that that was a fallacy which had been repeated by a great many hon. Members. The real reason of the reduction was stated by his right hon. Predecessor (Mr. Trevelyan), who had said that the complement of ships had been much reduced, and that, as the Marines bore a certain proportion to the rest of the men on board ship, fewer Marines were required. It was a well-known fact that fewer Marines were now found on board ship than formerly. The real point was this, that it was not thought advisable, for the maintenance of the efficiency of the Corps, that there should be more than a certain propor- tion between the men afloat and the men ashore. Seeing that the number of Marines who were required on board ship had been greatly decreased, it was also reasonable there should be a certain decrease in the number on shore; that was the reason for the reduction that had been made. There was, as had been pointed out by an hon. Gentleman opposite, a year or two ago a reduction of 1,000 Marines which was carried out by the late Board of Admiralty. [Sir JOHN HAY: To which I objected.] He (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) was not making any comlaint at all, but showing that it had been the idea of the Admiralty for some time past that a reduction of the number of Marines was possible. There might be a great deal to say against a reduction; he was not prepared himself, not being so fully conversant with the matter as he might be, to give all the reasons that might be alleged on the question. But he would point out this, that so far, at all events, as concerned the immediate circumstances of the day, he did not imagine that the reduction had as yet had any effect at all; he did not imagine that there were many fewer Marines in the Service now than there would have been if the policy of reduction had not been adopted a month or two ago. [Sir JOHN HAY: Four hundred.] Four hundred less than under the late establishment? He was not quite sure, but, at any rate, the argument that the Marines were depleted by the number sent to the Mediterranean was no argument at all. If, when required, an additional force of Marines could not be sent away from England, the thing would be reduced to an absurdity.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, that what he had asked was, would there be sufficient Marines at home, after the additional force had been sent away, to man the ships at home, supposing the Marines were required for that purpose?

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

said, that was another question. He would not insist upon it, but he thought that his right hon. and gallant Friend contended that if they sent 6,000 away, they ought to maintain the Reserve at its full strength. Inquiries had been made also by some hon. Members, amongst whom he thought was the noble Lord the Member for Chichester (Lord Henry Lennox), whether Sir Beauchamp Seymour, in command of the Mediterranean Squadron, ought not to have a larger force of Marines at his disposal?

LORD HENRY LENNOX

begged to say that he had never asked anything of the kind.

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

begged the noble Lord's pardon. He would point out this, that Sir Beauchamp Seymour had the full force of Marines that his ships could carry. In ordinary times they could not have a larger number of Marines in the ships than the full complement of the ships, and whatever force Sir Beauchamp Seymour had capable of being landed at Alexandria would correspond with the number and size of the ships that he had under his command.

LORD HENRY LENNOX

said, he would not interrupt the hon. Gentleman at this late hour, but he should have another opportunity of entering into the subject.

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

said, the hon. Member for South Devonshire (Sir Massey Lopes) was the first, he thought, to allude to the case of the engineer officers, and several other hon. Gentlemen had gone into that matter. The Admiralty had done for the engineer officers not certainly all those officers asked for, or all that might have been done, perhaps, in the opinion of some of the officers' friends; at the same time, they had made a very substantial improvement in their condition. He might say that what his right hon. Predecessor had announced with regard to these men was not the complete scheme of the Government. He did not wish to give rise to any great expectations; but still there were many of the points alluded to to-night that would be found to be met, he thought, in some degree, when the scheme ultimately came out. The whole scheme was really founded upon the principle of decreasing the number of the engineer class and increasing the number of engine-room artificers. For the engineer class, high capabilities, considerable technical education and training—qualities that were not absolutely necessary for many of the duties they had hitherto had to discharge—were required; and, therefore, it had been thought that the Navy would not suffer in its efficiency if there was a smaller number of highly-trained engineers and a larger number of engine-room artificers. Various advantages had been given to the engineers, including several increases of pay. The increases were not very large, but still they were substantial, and he might say that the separate engineers' mess was being abolished in ships as circumstances would permit. It had been already abolished in the troopships, and in all vessels from corvettes downwards. A good deal had been said about the 11 years' service which was necessary before a chief engineer could count all his time for pension, and it was alleged that this had the effect of entirely preventing them from realizing the full rate of retired pay. No doubt, something might be done to modify that; but, beyond making that statement, he could not at present make any further promise. He would point out, however, that that rule as to 11 years applied to other kinds of officers besides engineers, navigating officers, and paymasters; so that there was no hardship peculiar to engineers. Something, he believed, was intended to be done which would, in some respects, remove their complaint. The hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) had questioned him about the naval cadets, and had quoted something which he said was not exactly a pledge, but an understanding or an undertaking of his (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman's) Predecessor, that certain changes would be introduced. He (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) very much doubted whether his right hon. Friend had ever given any pledge or undertaking on the subject; in fact, it would have been very improper for him to do so, because in regard to a matter of that sort he could not of his own act, if he might use the expression, have given a promise of the kind; but the two points to which the hon. Member had drawn his attention were the adoption of public competition for entry of candidates and the question of age. Well, upon these points opinion was very greatly divided. It had been said that naval officers of great distinction were in favour of the changes proposed. He knew that, but he knew at the same time that there was a great deal to be said on both sides—that there were also many naval officers of great distinction who were opposed to the changes. It was not so one-sided a matter as the hon. and learned Member seemed to think, and all he could say was that the whole question of the en- trance and education of cadets would always have the constant careful attention of the Admiralty. The hon. and gallant Member for Horsham (Sir Henry Fletcher) and the hon. and gallant Member for Devonport (Captain Price) said that it would be desirable to have a Marine officer sitting upon all courts martial held upon Marines. No doubt primâ facie, there was a strong case for such an arrangement; but it would be difficult to lay down a certain rule on a question of that kind, because it was obvious that there must be many cases where it would be inconvenient to have Marine officers sitting upon the trial of Marines. He would see whether any arrangement of the sort could be carried out. Comparison between the Line and Marines had been drawn to show that the pay of the latter was insufficient; but to meet arguments advanced in the interests of the engineers and Marines there was one reply which suggested itself, but which he was always reluctant to use or trust to, because it was what he might call a brutal argument. It was one, however, that he might venture to use on this occasion, and that was, that where they found a large number of men in the Service and willing to enter it, they must draw the conclusion that that Service was popular. In both the cases referred to, both in the case of the Marines and engineers, there was no difficulty whatever in obtaining men. In the Marines, the facts which the hon. and gallant Member (Captain Price) himself had given showed that they got a very high class of men. Owing to these facts they were able to shut the door very closely, and to be very particular as to the class of men admitted; and if they were to open it more than they did they would at any time be able to get a much larger number of men than they at present required. The comparison drawn between the Line and the Marines was not a fair one. In the Line the age and the period of service had been increased last year, so that the comparison which had been made was now hardly correct. Besides, any comparison of the average age of men serving, founded on long service as compared with short service, was misleading, because in the case of short service it was always contemplated that the ranks should be filled up from the Reserve, He had been questioned with re- gard to the pay of the sergeants, and he could only say that he did not mean to shut the door on this subject at all, but that he rather wished to guard against any idea of a close comparison being instituted between the two Services. As the Committee knew, the whole question of pensions had lately been under the consideration of a Departmental Committee. That Committee had laid its Report before the Board of Admiralty, and they would take the earliest opportunity of considering it. Probably it would be considered in the autumn, and he dared say some changes might result from it. As to the question of widows' pensions generally, he did not know that he should be justified in holding out any hopes in the direction hon. Members thought desirable. But there was one thing that Lord Northbrook had been anxious to accomplish, and that was to have some better provision for the widows of seamen disabled in action or by accident when on service. His noble Friend hoped to be able to do something in the matter in the course of the present Session—at all events, the matter was receiving the most careful and anxious attention. As to the engineroom artificers, several points in regard to them had been brought forward. It had been suggested that they should be made warrant officers, but that was a matter which he could only promise to bring before his Colleagues. The noble Lord the Member for Chichester (Lord Henry Lennox) had spoken about a reduction of the Marines; but upon that point he had made a general answer, which he trusted the noble Lord would accept. He did not wish to deny that there might be considerable feeling on the subject, but, as at present advised, he could not undertake that any new policy would be adopted in the matter. The noble Lord asked what number of Marines were available at Devonport and Chatham? He (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) could not answer him that question now, but he would be happy to communicate the facts to him privately. The noble Lord had alluded to the French Government as sending a large force of Marines, or being ready to send a large force of Marines—some 13,000 he thought the noble Lord had said—from Toulon.

LORD HENRY LENNOX

said, he had stated that his authority was the newspaper reports of the day, that a force of 13,000 Marines in the French Navy, which was a land force, had been sent from a Northern port of France to Toulon, to embark in the iron-clads in readiness to proceed to sea.

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

said, he understood that there was a contrast drawn between our position and that of France with regard to the Marines; but the noble Lord must be aware that the Marines of France were not the same as our Marines. The French "Infanterie de la Marine" were landsmen and not seamen, so that the case the noble Lord had referred to was analogous to our sending a few regiments of the Line on board a troopship

LORD HENRY LENNOX

said, it was too late to discuss the matter.

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

said, an hon. Friend had put a question to him to-day as to the settlement made in 1876 as to the retiring allowance to hired workmen in the Dockyards; he did not mean to imply that that was an absolutely final settlement, for, of course, all such matters were open to consideration. As to the pensions of schoolmasters, that subject would be dealt with in the general arrangement effected with regard to pensions, which would be carried out, or, at any rate, carefully considered in the course of the autumn. The hon. Member for Queen's County (Mr. Arthur O'Connor) had complained of the expenditure in the Navy, and it was refreshing to hear him, for most of the speeches which had been delivered to-night had been speeches recommending increased expenditure, because the improvements which had been urged as desirable to carry out were improvements which would lead to increased cost.

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

said, the hon. Member had misunderstood him. He had not complained so much of the increased expenditure as the increase in the amount of stores.

MR. PULESTON

said, he had drawn attention to the irregularity with which the accounts were kept. He had pointed out that the figures were displaced in such a manner as to deceive the Committee. Of course, he did not mean to say that this was done intentionally.

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

said, that what he had been referring to was the statement made before the question of the stores was raised. The hon. Member had compared the reduction in the effective expenditure with the increase which had taken place in the non-effective expenditure. It was a lamentable fact that there had been that reduction and that increase. It did not admit of any denial that in the Navy, as in the Army, for some years past, there had been going on a continued rise in non-effective expenditure which those who now had charge of the two branches of the Service had no power to stop. Engagements had been made with men now serving, and those engagements must be fulfilled. They were endeavouring, however, to the best of their power, to prevent future generations being charged in this respect as heavily as was the present generation. With regard to stock-taking, he could assure the hon. Member who had called attention to it that there was a most elaborate and costly stock-taking effected by skilled officers well qualified to carry it out. The hon. Member desired, it seemed, that there should be an additional stock-taking by the Auditor General.

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

Yes; an independent stock-taking.

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

said, that one great difficulty in the way of that would be the question of expense. One stock-taking in itself was a very expensive thing, and if they doubled it, the cost would be a very serious matter. However, he quite agreed with the hon. Member that it was very desirable that these things should be looked into most carefully. With regard to the question that had been put to him as to the savings which were effected by the seamen, it had always been a habit in the Navy for the men to have certain rations served out to them; but they were not obliged to take them up, and they did not take them up very frequently, in order that they might have an opportunity of getting a variety of food for themselves. This was the principle which had always been acted upon, and this accounted for the item in the Estimates. He had nothing further to say in regard to the questions which had been put to him, and if he had omitted any point he should be very glad if hon. Members would remind him.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, that, with regard to the Marines, if the hon. Member would turn to page 184 of the Estimate he would there find that they were reduced by the number of 600, and that there were 987 fewer good-conduct men than there were last year—that was to say, that in reducing the Force by 600 men they had not only brought about a reduction in strength, but, besides that, taken away 300 good-conduct men. That showed that they had not now such good men as they had before.

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

said, that what the hon. and gallant Member spoke of, he supposed, was the establishment of the year, not the actual number of men in the Force.

SIR JOHN HAY

No; the men in the Force.

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

said, he should have thought it would have been the establishment for the year. Of course, if the quality of the men had been let down by recruiting, it would improve as the men were trained.

MR. BROADHURST

said, the hon. Member had not said whether he would take into consideration the case of the engineers.

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

said, he thought he had sufficiently answered that point. Certain things which had been mentioned were to be done for them, and the Circular which would be issued on the question would not be long delayed.

MR. PULESTON

asked whether a complete statement would be made?

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

said, he could not say anything upon that subject.

MR. PULESTON

asked whether the Circular would be presented this Session?

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

Certainly.

CAPTAIN PRICE

said, that, with regard to the Marines, in answer to something that fell from the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman), he should like to remind him that last year Lord Northbrook, in making his statement in "another place," distinctly stated that he could not ask the country for more money, and that the changes which he was making could only be effected by reducing the strength of the corps.

Question put, and agreed to.

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

said, he would take no more Naval Votes to-night.