§ MR. BOURKE,in rising to give Notice that to-morrow he would ask the Government, Whether they had made any demand for reparation for the losses and injuries sustained by British subjects in the late disturbances in Egypt; or, whether they intended to make 1128 such a demand? also said, that, having received a telegram from Alexandria, which led him to believe that apprehensions were entertained there regarding the interruption of the Mail Service, he wished now to ask the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether the Government had received any intelligence confirmatory of such a report. He would also ask another Question now, and if the hon. Baronet could not answer it at once, he would give Notice of it for tomorrow. It was, Whether, considering that the Papers which had been promised to be delivered to the House next week, or the week after, would give very little information respecting the existing state of things in Egypt, the Government would not be prepared, either to-day or to-morrow, to make a general statement with regard to the condition of affairs in Egypt upon which hon. Members would be able, with the permission of the House, of course, to make observations.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKESir, with regard to the Question about the Mail Service, we have not heard anything ourselves; but, through the kindness of the manager of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, I have seen a copy of the telegram to which the right hon. Gentleman refers. It is couched in very vague and general terms, and does not specially refer to the Mail Service, but speaks of probable danger to the Europeans in perfectly general terms, and there is no special reference to the Mail Service. [Mr. BOURKE: Yes; the telegram does refer to the Mail Service.] Then it is not the same telegram as that which has been sent to me; and, in that case, I should like to see it, and, if necessary, I will make further inquiries about it. With respect to the request of the right hon. Gentleman for a general statement on the part of the Government as to Egyptian affairs, I fear that any statement in the absence of the Papers would be one on which it would be impossible for hon. Members to comment, because the whole case depends on a very considerable number of Papers, which we are trying to get out as soon as possible.
§ MR. BOURKEAre the Papers not ready? It is now some six or seven months since the Papers have been in progress. If the hon. Baronet had said 1129 that to produce the Papers would not be in the interest of the Publice Service, I could understand that that might be a perfectly valid reason; but when the Government have promised that they would produce them, I can hardly understand why they are not more advanced, seeing that they have been in progress for the last six or seven months.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEI do not know what the right hon. Gentleman means by talking about the Papers having been six or seven months in hand. It is not six or seven months. Those which were presented last week come up to the 5th of February. The Papers now being brought out are in three sections, the first section coming down to the 17th of April, the second to the 15th of May, and the third to the end of May. We are trying to get them all out together; but if there be any delay in that course, the sections down to the 15th of May will be brought out first. They are now in the stage of second revise; they have been to Paris and have been returned by Lord Lyons; and we have the observations of the French Government upon them. Sir Edward Malet's telegram with regard to them has not yet been received.
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEWe can understand, Sir, that, of course, there must be some delay in the production of Papers of this character; but what the public and the House are interested in is to know something more than we shall know, even when the promised Papers are presented. Therefore, we do not so very much care for the Papers at this moment. Of course, whenever the time comes for reviewing the whole conduct of the Government in regard to Egypt, it will be important that we should have the whole of the Papers; but what we really desire now earnestly to know is what the present state of affairs in Egypt is; and, as far as it can be done, to know also, or have some idea given us of the policy which the Government are pursuing. What we wish, and what my right hon. Friend wishes, to ask tomorrow is, Whether the Government will not be prepared to make some general statement that will give us some knowledge and some satisfaction on these points?
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEThe Papers up to the 15th of May are absolutely 1130 essential to an understanding of the present situation, and no short statement that could possibly be laid before the House, without those Papers themselves, will be satisfactory. I can promise them in the course of next week; but the exact day cannot be named until we get a telegram from Sir Edward Malet as to what Papers he objects to and what he consents to appearing.
§ MR. CHAPLINasked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether his attention had been called to the alarming telegrams in that morning's papers as to the condition of the Army in Egypt. One of those telegrams, appearing in The Times, was dated Alexandria, June 13, 11.25 a.m., and it said—
Quiet continues, but the situation is extremely grave, as all depends on the goodwill of the Army, which begins to show signs of insubordination and of disliking the task of protecting the Christians. If the Army refuses to perform this duty there will then be terrible danger to all.Another, dated Alexandria, midnight, said that while the soldiery at Cairo appeared to be perfectly orderly, at Alexandria—On the contrary, it seems that the soldiers are insolent and triumphant. Europeans are jostled and treated with the greatest rudeness…The general opinion here is that there are fears of disorder arising before any possible arrival of Turkish troops; and the Europeans would prefer all the risks of landing the allied Marines to the present insecurity. There is no doubt that the soldiers assisted largely in the scenes of disorder, and that the atrocities go far beyond all former ideas conveyed to you.He wished to ask, Whether the Government were in possession of any information which led them to the belief that there was a good foundation for the statements in those telegrams; and, if so, he wanted to know whether the Government had taken any measures which, in their opinion, were adequate for the protection of British subjects?
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKESir, the statement that the soldiers assisted largely in the late riot at Alexandria is, according to all the information we possess, the opposite of the truth. The soldiers were perfectly orderly, and, according to all accounts we have received, helped to put the riot down and restore order. As to the apprehensions of future disorder at Alexandria, 1131 Dervish Pasha is certainly of opinion that, he can maintain order in Alexandria. The same thing has been stated by him to the Sultan at Constantinople. He has also stated to the Consuls that he is perfectly convinced he can maintain order. The whole of the European Consuls have seen Dervish Pasha on the subject of the safety of the European residents, and he has made a very strong statement on the subject. He stated, indeed that in the urgent circumstances of the case, he assumes a joint responsibility with the Egyptian Government in the preservation of order.
§ MR. ONSLOW?What Egyptian Government? Who is the Government of Egypt?
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKESir Edward Malet, who arrived at Alexandria to-day, is not going on board ship, but will stay at an hotel in the town. Therefore, from all these facts, with the report of Dervish Pasha, and from the report of the Consuls, and from the fact that Sir Edward Malet is to stay at an hotel in Alexandria, instead of going on board an iron-clad, I do not understand that there is reason to apprehend further disturbance.
§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTI wish to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If his attention has been called to the following telegrams:—The correspondent of The Daily News at Alexandria says—
All the merchant ships in the harbour are besieged with refugees, and the steamers sailing are crowded with ladies, the men gladly taking deck passages. The position is a terrible one. We are entirely at the mercy of a few thousand soldiers. The fleet is no protection. Its presence here in the first instance, without troops to follow up the ultimatum, was the cause of the present disastrous situation. Unable to receive one-fourth of the families aboard the ships of war, and unable to act, their coming has been a delusion and a snare.The very well informed correspondent of The Times says—Ten days ago I quoted an authority I thought worthy of confidence, who said the only blunder left for the Powers to make, and that, perhaps, the greatest, is sending a Commissioner without troops. The warning was disregarded, and the blunder, having been committed, has proved the worst. On the same authority, I say, unless an overwhelming Turkish Wee be at Alexandria and Ismailia before Sunday, worse has yet to come.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKErose to Order. He wished to know whether 1132 the hon. Member was in Order in reading a number of long telegrams from newspapers, and founding Questions upon them?
§ MR. SPEAKERBefore the hon. Baronet rose, I was about to rise, in order to point out to the House and the hon. Member the extreme inconvenience of founding Questions on every telegram in every newspaper. I am bound to say that it does appear to me that, before Questions of such gravity are put, an hon. Member should take some measures to ascertain the truth of the telegrams.
§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFsaid, that the evident reluctance of Her Majesty's Government to give the House information of any kind as to what was going on in Egypt compelled him to take a course which he adopted with very great regret—namely, to move that the House do now adjourn. The hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles W. Dilke) appeared to him to have abused the marvellous powers he possessed of compressing within the narrowest compass the least possible amount of information. He seemed also to have pushed to the extreme the theory that no Papers were to be laid upon the Table without the consent of another Government. No doubt, the difficulties they were now involved in were principally derived from their association with the French Government, which they allowed to seize Tunis without protest of any kind. At the time when the Control was established in Egypt, England and France were on good terms with the Caliph, the head of the Mussulman religion, and later on they received his assistance in deposing Ismail Pasha. Subsequently to that act of friendship on the part of the Caliph, Her Majesty's Government opened their career by what was now called the Naval Demonstration, which was to most Mussulmans taking territory from Turkey and handing it over to their enemies in Montenegro. They wound up that act by one which appeared to him (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) to partake of a filibustering character—namely, the proposal to seize the Custom House of Smyrna. Beyond that, they took no active steps to prevent the French Government from seizing hold of Tunis, and these two acts gave a colour to the Control of Egypt, which did not exist 1133 when the Sultan assisted them; and they were now debarred from commenting upon the conduct of their own Government, because the Government put everything upon the back of France—the action of that country being what had disturbed our relations with the Porte as regarded Egypt. On the 11th of May he asked the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, what steps the Government were taking to protect European life in Egypt, and he absolutely refused to answer; and from that time, down to the date when the House had been told that some ships were to be sent to Alexandria, the Government had refused to give them any information whatever. He had then asked for Papers, and the hon. Baronet said that the House could only have them with the consent of the French Government. But now that the French Government had given their consent, hon. Members were told that they could not have them without the consent of Sir Edward Malet. In other words, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, having no policy of his own, was bound to ask and to accept the advice of one of his own subordinates. The excuse was most preposterous, and he (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) had never heard of such a case. They were, at that moment, in a very dangerous position in Egypt—dangerous to their own interests in the East, and dangerous, he believed, to the safety of their Empire in India. They were told that there was a gunboat at each end of the Suez Canal. Why was not a gunboat sent up to Ismailia? Why were they not told what steps were being taken to secure life and property at Alexandria? Over and over again he had asked what steps were being taken, and over and over again he had been refused any information. He laid much stress upon an agreement with France; but he maintained that they ought not to subordinate their own interests to those of France. France had raised this question by her action in Tunis. She had excited the suspicions of the Mussulman races throughout the world, imperilling their interests in the East, and, he believed, the safety of their Empire in India. It was monstrous that the Government did not give them any more information. They knew nothing later than the 5th of February. They could not get the Papers. One day they 1134 were told that the French Government would not agree to their production; and another day they were told that Sir Edward Malet had not agreed. In consequence of the great reticence of the hon. Baronet, a reticence unprecedented, and which had never been known in that House before, for they had never been tied to the skirts of a Government which had damaged and disturbed their relations with every other Power in the world—in consequence of that reticence, concealment, and vacillation, he might say imbecility, of the Government—he felt bound to take the course he had done, and to move the adjournment of the House.
§ BARON HENRY DE WORMSseconded the Motion.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—(Sir H. Drummond Wolff.)
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, that the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) had spoken of the evident reluctance of the Government to give information to the House. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) ventured to assert that more late information had been given to the House in regard to Egypt on recent occasions than had ever been given before on any question involving dangerous points of foreign affairs. ["Oh, oh!"] He would appeal to the pages of Hansard to confirm that statement. The hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin), who spoke a little while previously, had read things which were deserving of notice, and which seemed to him (Sir Charles W. Dilke) to be almost the exact opposite of what had been read by the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett). That showed what confusion arose from reading telegrams from different newspapers, and immediately founding Questions upon them. The hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire had said that the Europeans at Alexandria would prefer a landing of troops from the Fleet, with all the risks that might attend it, to their present position of insecurity. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had only to inform the hon. Member that the Government had the most perfect confidence in the tact, discretion, and courage of Sir Beauchamp Seymour, and that Sir Beauchamp Seymour had power to land seamen and Marines, to any extent he 1135 pleased, from the Fleet under his command. There were four ships cruising off the coast, three of which were able to go into the harbour of Alexandria whenever they pleased. Sir Beauchamp Seymour was in possession now of a very large force. There was also a large French force, and a considerable force belonging to the other Powers, who would be sure to land troops and Marines, if we did so, for the protection of their subjects. The Government were content to leave the question whether a force should be landed or not to the discretion of Sir Beauchamp Seymour. The hon. Member for Portsmouth had spoken of our relations with the Porte as though we were in quarrel with the Porte at the present moment. All he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) could say was, that our relations with the Porte were friendly in the extreme; and the language which had been used by the Sultan himself personally to Lord Dufferin showed an absolute agreement with this country in regard to the steps to be taken in Egypt. The hon. Member for Portsmouth had given the House his views with regard to the French alliance. It was with great regret that he said so, because he had a high opinion of the judgment of the hon. Member; but he could not but think that his language on that occasion had been mischievous in the extreme. It was absolutely impossible that he should follow him through the speech ho had made; a Motion for the adjournment of the House at that time was always irregular, and it was extremely dangerous when made for the purpose of introducing discussions on foreign affairs. The only way of limiting that danger was for the Government steadily to refuse to be parties to any such discussion. With regard to the publication of the Papers, the hon. Member said he had never known a case where Papers had been delayed in order to obtain the consent of a subordinate to their publication. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) would venture to say that there never was a case where that was not done. It would be impossible to obtain agents of repute to serve the country abroad if their despatches and the conversations between themselves and foreign Ministers were to be published without their consent. They could not get any man of character to serve the country abroad if that were done; and he would venture to say 1136 that on no occasion had despatches been published without their previous consent. He did not know whether the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote) was going to give any countenance to the Motion; but, speaking with a full sense of his responsibility, he must repeat the statement he had made just now—naniely, that the language by which this Motion had been supported on that occasion was language of the most mischievous character, and was calculated to do great injury.
§ BARON HENRY DE WORMSsaid, he trusted that he should not be accused of any wish to embarrass Her Majesty's Government.
§ MR. PUGHrose to Order. He wished to ask, whether the hon. Member for Greenwich (Baron Henry De Worms) was in Order in addressing the House now, having previously seconded the Motion for Adjournment?
§ MR. SPEAKERsaid, that several hon. Members rose at the same time; and he was not aware that the hon. Member for Greenwich seconded the Motion.
§ MR. WARTONBut as to the point of Order?
§ MR. SPEAKERcould not say that the hon. Member was out of Order, because several hon. Members seconded the Motion, and he did not accept the hon. Member as having done so, therefore he was entitled to be heard.
§ BARON HENRY DE WORMS,resuming, said, that if any embarrassment had been caused to the Government in regard to Egvpt by the present discussion, that embarrassment was more directly due to the Government themselves than to the Opposition. He thought the very peculiar relations which existed, or which had existed, between this country and France, with regard to the Egyptian Question, would gain rather than lose by being thoroughly ventilated in the House. The hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) had pointed out that the policy of France and the policy of England were very distinct, or should, at all events, be kept quite distinct, in this Eastern crisis. France had adopted a line of policy of her own with regard to Tunis; and it would be dangerous in the extreme if this country were in any degree to follow the lead so given by 1137 France. He could well believe that Her Majesty's Government was peculiarly embarrassed at the present moment, inasmuch as it must be extremely difficult for the Prime Minister—if he might use the expression—to eat the words which he used some years since with regard to the policy of the "unspeakable Turk." He quite conceived that Her Majesty's Government was very much embarrassed in having to go hat in hand, and to ask the "unspeakable Turk" not only to protect the Khedive, but to extend his gracious protection to Her Majesty's subjects who were now in Egypt. Then, on the other hand, the Opposition would not be doing their duty if they did not elicit, by the best means at their disposal, some statement of policy—if policy there was—from Her Majesty's Government. He was ready to accept the assurance of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it was very difficult indeed for the Government to give an outline of their policy, not, indeed, because it would be embarrassing to the relations of the Government with other countries, but because they had no policy at all. Some days ago he had inquired of the Prime Minister whether any steps would be taken to protect the Khedive, and the Prime Minister replied that the Khedive was in no danger whatever. If that was so, what was the reason of the sudden departure of the Khedive from the capital? They were told also by the Prime Minister that there was not the slightest apprehension of any danger to the Suez Canal, and that it could not be destroyed from the banks; but he was not aware of any scientific opinion corroborating that statement; and he ventured to think, from personal knowledge, that the Canal could thus be easily destroyed, and yet no steps were taken by Her Majesty's Government to prevent that catastrophe. But then he knew the Prime Minister held views peculiarly his own respecting the Suez Canal; he did not admit the paramount value of the Canal for our communication with India, and declared that the communication could be kept up with equal facility by way of the Cape. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Never.] He had been under the impression that such a statement had been made; but, of course, he accepted the denial of the right hon. Gentleman, and would withdraw the remark. Upon 1138 the occasion, however, of the purchase of the Suez Canal Shares, the right hon. Gentleman undoubtedly said that both financially and politically there never was a greater blunder made, notwithstanding the fact that 80 per cent of the total tonnage passing through the Canal was British. Politically, however, he (Baron Henry de Worms) considered that the late Government never took a more judicious step. For many years it had been considered that England was the arbiter of the Eastern Question, no country in the world having so great a stake in the East; but at present—to their shame be it said—that position, to which they were entitled, had passed entirely out of their hands. Germany was at the present moment the arbiter of the Eastern Question. In consequence of the policy of alternate conciliation and bullying adopted by the Government, they had alienated most of the Powers in Europe, without conciliating the remainder, and they now found themselves in the present extraordinary position they stood in with regard to Egypt. They had handed over to the Turk the power of interfering with their communication with their Indian Empire. At that very moment they were obliged to appeal to Turkey to support their influence in Egypt. and to take part in a Conference; and if the Conference was held, instead of British interests preponderating, they would be the last in the race. Their interests, instead of being paramount, would be set aside by other Powers whose interests were less than their own. They knew that Austria had considerable influence in the Eastern Question, but they had alienated Austria, and it was very likely that she would throw her influence in the scale against them. Again, no one could say that some day Russia might not once again hold out her hand to Turkey, and then the English people would be justified in throwing the whole blame upon Her Majesty's Government. Turkey was our old Ally, and if she had sinned against civilization, other Powers had sinned also. He did not wish to speak at any great length upon the subject now; but the present humiliating position of the country was due to the peace-at-any-price policy adopted by the Government, a policy which generally resulted in war, and against which he desired to enter his most earnest protest. 1139 That Government not only did not protect the lives and property of British subjects in Egypt, but imperilled the best interests of our great Indian Empire.
§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLsaid, he certainly should not attempt to follow the hon. Member opposite (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) in the whole of the various questions which ho had raised, and which were very much out of place at that moment; but he wished to express the very great regret with which he had heard the expressions of hon. Gentlemen opposite with regard to Franco. He was also specially surprised that they should raise the question of Tunis. We might think that France, for her own interest, and in the interest of Europe, was ill-advised in regard to Tunis; but this they knew—that it was an English Foreign Secretary—a Member of the late Cabinet—who invited France to go to Tunis. ["No, no!"] It was distinctly so. With reference to what fell from the hon. Member opposite (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) in connection with his repeated expression referring to the Sultan as head of the Mussulman religion, he should be very glad if he might be allowed, in Parliamentary language, to say that the hon. Member was talking nonsense. He would not go into the very debateable questions that had been raised; but he must express a strong hope and belief that if a peaceful French Government might see a reasonably peaceful solution of the question, we should not be dragged into war by the Liberal Government of this country. It must be admitted that the question had been greatly aggravated by the dreadful event at Alexandria. There was no minimizing that event. It had been a most serious disturbance, attended with great loss of life. But the Government were bound to take care that they did not listen to one side of the case merely. He had been about to ask the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles W. Dilke) a Question with regard to a telegram—not a vague and unsupported telegram, but one of apparent authen-city—which appeared in The Times, regarding a statement made by no less a person than the Prime Minister of France, M. de Freycinet, who stated that he had received a detailed account of the origin of this disturbance. This was the statement attributed to him— Baron Henry Do Worms 1140
The origin of the unfortunate events was a quarrel between an Arab and a Maltese. The Arab's companions came to his aid, and Maltese and Greeks to the aid of the Maltese, and both Maltese and Greeks fired from the windows of the adjoining houses. Several Arabs were hit. The houses were then pillaged, and inoffensive Europeans were attacked.If this statement was in any degree authentic, they must admit that the aggression was not wholly one-sided, and he had no doubt that the Government would take these things into consideration. The French Government had great interests in Egypt; and he must say as strongly as he could that if the French Government saw its way to a peaceful solution, he was confident that Her Majesty's Government would not drag us into violence and war.
§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTsaid, that, in his opinion, the country would view with approbation the step taken by the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff). There was, undoubtedly, a general feeling of alarm throughout the country, and that alarm was justified by the facts. The European residents were in the greatest danger, and many of them were flying for their lives. In view of these circumstances, the Government had been asked to give some reasons for the belief that they were taking steps to protect British subjects in Egypt; but the House had been unable to obtain the slightest assurance on that subject. They wished to know what was the policy of the Government; they wished to know what they were going to do to secure the great interests of England in Egypt, and what steps they would take to maintain order and the predominance of this country? He regretted that he had not been permitted to read some extracts; and, with regard to those he had read, he had always understood that it was perfectly in Order to read short quotations from the newspapers to the House; in fact, the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) had just previously read longer extracts than he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) had, and without interruption. He should like to read one short sentence from The Times in support of his argument. The correspondent of that newspaper was well informed, and he said in his letter—
Unless an overwhelming Turkish Force be in Alexandria before Sunday next, worse has yet to come.1141 He had often asked the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Questions on that subject, and he challenged him or anyone to say that those Questions were of a captious or Party character. His whole object had been to point to one fact—namely, that the Egyptian Question could only be settled by cordial co-operation between England and the Porte. It could only be settled now by a despatch of Turkish troops. He contended that in default of any guarantees from the Government they were entitled to press for some information. The assertion of the hon. Baronet that the Government had given the fullest information possible was most inaccurate. It was like many other statements of the hon. Baronet, which sounded very well, but which proved utterly groundless when closely examined. It was clear that the Government had no policy—that they were at the mercy of events. But the state of Egypt would not admit of delay; great alarm was being caused in this country; and they were, therefore, justified in demanding some statement as to the policy of the Government in the future. As to the joint intervention with France, he wished to refer to that in the most moderate terms. He did not blame France for acting in this matter as seemed best for her own interests. But he blamed Her Majesty's Government for not considering, first of all, the just interests of England. To say the least, that joint intervention was most unfortunate. Our interests were only coincident with those of France so far as the financial stability of Egypt was concerned. But if they went one step beyond that, the interests of the two countries were undeniably diverse. Considering that the security of our Indian Empire largely depended on Egypt, and that six-sevenths of the tonnage which passed through the Suez Canal were British, he thought it would not be incorrect to say that our interests in Egypt were to those of France as six or eight to one. Another grave reason against the joint intervention was the action of France lately in regard to Tunis. By that action she had drawn down upon herself the hatred and detestation of the whole Mussulman world, and justly so. [Ironical cheers from the Ministerial Benchet.] If those cheers were intended to emphasize a statement made by the hon. Gen- 1142 tleman the Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) that the French annexation of Tunis had been brought about by the action of a Member of the late Government, he (Mr. AshmeadBartlett) denied the accuracy of that allegation. A suggestion might have been made, but it was merely in conversation. It was made as part of a general scheme; and it was quite certain that the late Government would never have consented to so flagrant a violation of International right and British interests. That statement, therefore, could only be accepted in the most general terms. It was well known that one reason why the Porte had not intervened hitherto more actively to put down the Egyptian revolution was that the Sultan was unable to do so, in view of the strong feeling in the Mussulman world against France. The British Government had tied themselves on to the policy of France; and the Ottoman Government, however disposed to unite with England, could not do so, because it was not English influence pressed upon them, but really French dictation under the cloak of a joint action. That was the position in which the Government found themselves, and he was surprised that statesmen should have allowed themselves to be drawn on as they had been. As far as could be gathered from the meagre Papers supplied to the House, it appeared that the Government had acted at the dictation of France. The Joint Note, which was the beginning of the difficulty, was actually drawn up by M. Gambetta. The action of that statesman was perfectly justifiable from a French point of view; but the Government ought not to have allowed themselves to be led by him. Another strong reason against joint intervention with France was the absolute instability of any French Government. Since the Republic had been established in France, there had been some 20 different changes of Ministry in a decade. It was a mistake, therefore, for the Government to ally themselves with that Power, instead of maintaining the invaluable understanding which had been come to between Germany and Austria and the late Government. It was well know that, as long ago as October last, the Sultan offered to put an end to the difficulty, and that he sent a Mission to Egypt to deal with that ambitious adventurer, Arabi Bey. That 1143 Mission was actually chased from Egypt by the Government, acting under the dictation of M. Gambetta. He felt sure that the present difficulty would be put an end to by the despatch of Turkish troops to Egypt. No Power disputed the International right of the Porte to control the affairs of Egypt. If Egypt were the only question involved, the Government might be allowed to drift on; but they must remember that the question of our Empire in Central Asia went along with it. [Ironical cheers.] Hon. Members who cheered ironically, perhaps, thought that Arabi Pasha had not heard of the surrender of the Transvaal, of the retreat from Candahar, of the anarchy in Ireland, and of the Kilmainham Treaty. He begged the Prime Minister's pardon. He had forgotten the pain which it caused him to have that interesting transaction described as "the Treaty" of Kilmainham. He would gladly substitute the phrase used by Earl Cowper, the late Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, and describe it as "the surrender of Kilmainham." If Her Majesty's Government did not very soon reverse their unfortunate policy with regard to Turkey, the effect would be most disastrous to the power of England in the East. The effect of the action of the Government would be to alienate the Mussulman population in India, and to deprive us of the only assistance on which we could rely in the great struggle impending in Asia. He hoped the result of the discussion might be that they would obtain a declaration of policy from the Government.
MR. GLADSTONESir, the time of the House is valuable, and I would observe that the discussion, which has now been carried on for nearly an hour, is one in which the more responsible portion of the Party opposite has not thought it prudent up to this time to take any part, although they have had ample opportunities. I take notice of that circumstance by no means in the way of criticism, or of objection, but in the way of acknowledgment of the self-restraint and justice which have been shown by hon. Members opposite. Of course, Gentlemen like those who were connected with the Foreign Office, and who were generally responsible for conducting the affairs of the late Government in this particular in the late Parliament, are aware how difficult it is to 1144 do good by Party intervention in a singularly complex question at a critical moment, and how easy it is, by unrestrained indulgence of the expression of crude and irresponsible opinion, to do mischief in such questions. But, however, the House is in a happy position, because, although we have learned from the mouth of the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) that the present Government allows everything to drift, and has no competency whatever to enforce right views, and no disposition to escape from wrong ones, and although the present Government is thus incompetent, the Opposition Bench is silent; yet the House and the country may have this consolation—that while all responsible persons, both those in Office and those out of Office, fall short of their duty, yet there are other Gentlemen in this House—and young Gentlemen, too, in this House—who are perfectly prepared to announce to us, without a doubt and without a difficulty, all that ought to be done, and all that ought not to be done, in what way, and by the most simple and summary process to solve the most difficult problems. I need not say that prominent in that band of distinguished and promising statesmen—in that band, and, indeed, more than prominent, I should say confessedly at its head—is the hon. Member who has just sat down. The main characteristic of that hon. Member is that the amount of information which he possesses in relation to foreign affairs is such that not only no Gentle-man out of Office, but no authorized and established Department of the Government can, for a moment, compete with him. Questions that are difficult to them are easy to him. What is a crisis for them is no crisis to him; but only requires the application of common sense such as his to cause every cloud to vanish, and to bring back to us a clear sky, instead of a storm. I hope, however, before I sit down, to convey some real information, some degree of consolation to the mind of the hon. Gentleman, because, undoubtedly, he never fails in telling us pretty plainly what he means, and to that I will address myself; but before I proceed further I must say one word with regard to the speech of the hon. Member for Greenwich (Baron Henry de Worms). I must own that in general his speeches, since he 1145 has entered this House, have been distinguished by moderation and forbearance, so far as I have had occasion to notice them; but I am sorry to have to say that the character of his speech of to-day was not quite conformable to that rule. I say so, not because I wish to assume the office of a censor, but because he made a multitude of assertions which I do not wish to detain the House by noticing one by one, but which, at the same time, unless I did refer to them, I might be supposed to have admitted. One assertion, however, I must notice, for of all the extraordinary accusations in the world which the hon. Member has thought fit to bring against me, the most extraordinary is the one in which he charges me with having depreciated the importance of the Suez Canal. Surely the hon. Member cannot be aware—though he might be legitimately unaware, if he had not chosen to refer to the subject gratuitously—that at the time when the Government of this country, formed by the Party opposite, was opposing the making of the Suez Canal, I, with many hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House, took an active part in the debate in this House on the position of the Government, in urging that the resistance of this country to that most valuable work should be withdrawn, and that instead of opposing we should support it. He comes forth, under these circumstances, and accuses me individually, and, by implication, those with whom I have the honour to sit, of indifference to the importance of the Suez Canal. If the hon. Member does undertake to speak on those questions, he ought to improve his stock of historical information. Turning to the main question, Sir, I am bound to say that I cannot wonder—considering its extreme complexity, and the great interest of England in the East, and the strong and legitimate personal interest that many persons, both in and out of this House, feel in the fate of our fellow-countrymen, possibly their friends and relations, in Egypt—I cannot be surprised at some strong ebullition of feeling existing with regard to this subject. I am not surprised at the existence of such feelings, and I do not complain that they have found utterance in this House; and I will endeavour, as far as I can, in what I have to say, to avoid a controversial tone, observing, however, 1146 in the first place, that as we hope that next week the Papers on this subject will be in the hands of hon. Members, they will not take it as an unkind remark if I say that they will then be able to approach the consideration of this question with far greater advantage, after having had the opportunity of tracing the conduct of the Government in all the manifold stages of this subject, on authentic information, than if they approached it at present, when, with regard to these important and really critical matters, they have almost no authentic information in their hands. The information they have is incomplete and fragmentary, such as has been elicited in answer to Questions, and not by way of continuous exposition, by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Now, the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down complained of us, in the first instance, because he says we have not answered a number of questions which have been put to us by himself and others. He asks—Is there to be an Anglo-French intervention in Egypt? Is there to be a Turkish military intervention in Egypt? and many other questions, to which he thinks we ought to have given categorical answers. My reply is, that to no one of these questions was it our duty to have given a categorical answer; on the contrary, we should have departed from our duty if we had given categorical answers to any of them; for, had we done so, we should have been merely limiting and curtailing liberty of action, not only on our own part, but on the part of all other Governments, and especially on the part of the Government of Turkey. Our business is to preserve that liberty of action; our business is to indicate the ends we have in view, and not the means by which those ends are to be attained. Those ends have been most distinctly and repeatedly stated by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. They are well known to consist in the general maintenance of all established rights in Egypt, whether they be those of the Sultan, those of the Khedive, those of the people of Egypt, or those of the foreign bondholders, or whatever they may be—that, in fact, the single phrase, that we seek the maintenance of all established rights, and the provision of due guarantees for those rights, is the description of the policy 1147 by which the Government is directed. With regard to the means to be adopted for carrying out those ends, I say that the specific measures ought not to be indicated, and that it would be a gross error and dereliction of duty on our part either to affirm what they are, or to exclude any specific measures that may be adopted. But in one important point I may make an approximation to the hon. Gentleman. I greatly lament what has been said here as to the Government of France. The Government of France has been struggling in the Legislative Assembly of that country with free, and possibly—I know not—very censorious comment; but certainly with a rather unrestrained comment and accusation, put forward in a manner to which some Members might find a parallel in some of the speeches and suggestions which have been made in some of the discussions in this House. But the Government of France, while feeling and labouring under the difficulties of this subject, has declared, in strong and unequivocal terms, its intention to labour loyally and heartily with the Government of England; and in these circumstances it is not for us to be behind the Government of Franco in declaring, on our part, an intention to reciprocate that feeling. But when I say that, and while I deeply deprecate all attacks upon the Government of a friendly Power so peculiarly associated with us in many portions of this matter, I do not intend to draw any distinction to the prejudice of other friendly Powers, least of all to the prejudice of either Germany or Turkey; and in these matters I have the satisfaction of telling the hon. Member that it is impossible for anyone to be more completely mistaken than he is in the assertion that he has made on this subject. I must say that his view with respect to the Government of France was most peculiar. He has laid down distinctly a portion of the outline of the policy which ho says we ought to pursue. What is that policy? It consists of a close co-operation with France in the East, as far as financial interests are concerned, and sharp opposition to France the moment we get beyond the limit of those financial interests.
§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTSir, the Prime Minister has, no doubt unintentionally, misrepresented me on two very serious and important points. In 1148 the first place, I made no violent attacks whatever on the Government of France. ["Oh, oh!"] I spoke with the best of motives; I simply said that French interests and our interests were divergent. In the second place, I did not advocate the joint intervention of France and England in financial matters. I merely said if we went one step beyond that our interests and those of France would become divergent.
MR. GLADSTONEI never said that the hon. Member had made any violent attacks upon the Government of France. [Cries of "Oh!"] I beg your pardon, but let any hon. Gentleman who chooses to interrupt me in that way prove that I did so by repeating what I said to that effect. [The right hon. Gentleman, who had resumed his seat, after a pause, rose again, and continued his speech.] I said that such attacks had been made. I did not refer to the speech of the hon. Member; but, if anything I have said appears to go beyond that, I beg the House will consider it to be withdrawn. What I said the hon. Gentleman did lay down was that the consideration for the cooperation with us of France in Egypt is a financial consideration, and that we should engage with her to that extent, but should offer opposition to her in all matters outside of that.
§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTdenied that he had made such a statement.
MR. GLADSTONEThat is my understanding of the hon. Member's speech. I never used the word intervention. I said the financial co-operation of France as to financial interests; and if he disputes it, and says that I have misunderstood his meaning upon the point, I am exceedingly glad, because I think that a representation more vicious and more absurd than the possibility of our maintaining co-operation with France with regard to financial interests in Egypt, and then, at the point beyond that, commencing a recognized and systematic counter-working against France with regard to political interests undoubtedly could not be conceived, I am very glad to think that that is not the view of the hon. Member. The view of the hon. Member is this. He makes a charge against us. He appears, I think, to ridicule the idea of our endeavouring to work with the rest of the European Powers, and at the same time he complains, as the hon. Member for Green- 1149 wich had complained before him, that we had alienated almost all those Powers. Now, we accept the charge that we have endeavoured to work with the European Powers. That we accept, that we admit, that we profess, and, if it were a matter for boasting, we should be inclined to do so in reference to that point. But with regard to the alienation of those Powers, I say that there is not a shadow of foundation for the assertion that either the generality of those Powers, or any one of them, is at this moment otherwise than in hearty co-operation with this country. But I will go even further than that, and I will meet the hon. Gentleman on the point that he is most anxious about. He says—and I think justly says—that there ought to be, at this moment, a thoroughly good understanding and a spirit of co-operation between England and the Sultan. That is quite true; we recognize the fact that in dealing with this Mahomedan population the instrumentality—if influence were thought to be required—the instrumentality of Turkey is the best medium through which that influence can be exercised. And when the hon. Member sees the Papers, which will shortly be laid upon the Table, he will find that we have all along acted upon that principle. [Mr. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT dissented.] The hon. Gentleman naturally shakes his head without having seen the Papers. It is quite fair in the position of the hon. Gentleman that he should a little prejudge the matter. That I do not for a moment complain of; but I think when he reads these Papers he will see that my assertion is made good; and what I wish to say is this—that if there ever was a moment when that understanding and that spirit of co-operation was strong, clear, and unequivocal between the Government of Turkey and the Government of this country it is the moment at which I speak. I will not undertake to prophesy what is to happen to Egypt. My hon. Friend behind me, the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell), has referred to the deplorable occurrence on Sunday last, and asked whether we are in a position to affirm that which is understood to have been said by the French Minister. I do not think, Sir, that information of so specific and pointed a character has come directly into the hands of Her Majesty's Government; but, undoubtedly, so far as our 1150 information goes, we are agreed with the French Minister in that which perhaps may be considered the most important point of the whole question connected with these deplorable disturbances—namely, that their origin was an origin which is properly to be considered as accidental, and as extraneous to the great Egyptian crisis of the present moment, although there is no doubt that when the quarrel had once broken out it found materials in a highly inflammable state of affairs, and therefore assumed dimensions which were of a dangerous and formidable character. But, without pretending to predict, I will venture to give the House this assurance—that while the great influences that can be brought to bear upon this question are many and various, I believe that, at the present moment, they are all firmly united and combined in the prosecution of a common course. There is the Khedive, as the Governor of Egypt, the whole of whose conduct during the last few critical weeks has entitled him in a marked degree to the confidence of all. Then the Sultan is, I believe, at this moment, acting in entire harmony with the Khedive—unquestionably he is acting in entire harmony with the Government of this country, and I firmly believe, and can, I think, confidently state, acting in entire harmony with the Government of every Power in Europe. As to the doubts which have been excited in the hon. Gentleman's mind with regard to Germany, I must say that no less than twice within the last 10 or 12 days Germany has distinctly supported the representations made to the Porte that it would be for the interest of all parties, for the interests of the Sultan as concerning his Sovereignty, for the interests of the Khedive, and of the people of Egypt, that the Conference should assemble in reference to affairs in Egypt, and has urged that those representations should be attended to.
SIR STAFFORDNORTHCOTESir, I entirely recognize the justice of the view of the Prime Minister, that the present is not the moment at which we can properly or advantageously discuss the conduct of the Government with respect to the affairs of Egypt. At the same time, the right hon. Gentleman will, I think, see that it is not unnatural that the subject should be raised, and opportunities be taken of putting 1151 Questions to the Government, and of expressing opinions upon a matter which has a direct personal interest for the people of this country. We must bear in mind that, if this is rather an irregular occasion for bringing forward this question, the House has surrendered the whole of its time to the Government, and, therefore, we must have a little latitude in the matter. I must also take the liberty of saying that I think the Government have, on one or two occasions, and especially in some of the answers given by the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles W. Dilke) to-day, adopted a policy of undue reticence, and that they have pushed that policy rather too far. The hon. Baronet tells us that we have to wait until next week for the presentation of Papers which will only bring us down to the 17th of May, and that even those Papers cannot be produced until there has been an opportunity of obtaining Sir Edward Malet's opinion with regard to them, Nobody doubts that it is the right and duty, and the constant practice of a Government, to communicate with and consult their agents as to the Papers which ought to be produced; but the question is, as to Papers so long back as the 17th of May, has there not been ample opportunity of obtaining that opinion? I cannot, therefore, understand why there should be delay with regard to the presentation of those Papers. Then, nobody can help feeling this—you have, at the present moment, a very great state of uneasiness with regard to the safety of British life and property in Alexandria; you have had a very alarming riot on Sunday last, which may have been—I dare say it was—accidental in its immediate origin; but which certainly was characterized by circumstances which show that there is a great deal more behind than a mere accidental quarrel which we may expect not to occur again. Questions were put as to the position of affairs, and how far proper precautions were taken for the safety of British subjects and others in Alexandria; and what does the hon. Baronet tell us? He says that Dervish Pasha, in connection with the Egyptian Government, has guaranteed their safety, and when asked what he means by the Egyptian Government, he intimates that he really does not know.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEIf I may be allowed to make a correction, I said I was quoting from the words of Dervish Pasha, in which he says he was prepared to assume the joint responsibility.
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEJoint responsibility, with whom? [Sir CHAHLES W. DILKE dissented.] The hon. Baronet speaks of a joint responsibility, and when I ask with whom, he can only shake his head.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEIn order that there may be no mistake upon the subject, there is another telegram, I may state, from Sir Edward Malet on the same subject, in which he says that which is very obvious—namely, that Dervish Pasha, not as regards the objects of his mission, but as regards the one question of the security of life and property, was acting in concert with Arabi Pasha.
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEOh! I am not now prepared to enter into any discussion upon what arises from that statement; but it is obviously a very important feature. Up to this moment we have no information as to what are the relations between Arabi Pasha and the Government of the Khedive, or the Turkish Commissioner, or anybody else. But it now appears that there are certain relations upon which I think it would be proper that this House and the country should have more detailed information. [Mr. BOURKE: Can the Government give us any Papers?] I do not know whether it would be right to ask the Government whether they can give us any information on this subject? I wish to say, on the part of those who sit near me, that we are not anxious to precipitate this matter; but we do think the time has come when it would be very desirable that we should be told by the Government, in general terms, what the real state of Egypt is at this moment, and what is the position of these personages of whom we hear so much, and about whom so very different reports reach us from other sources. My right hon. Friend (Mr. Bourke) reminds me that a short time ago a demand was made for the exile of Arabi Pasha; but that is going into a question which, perhaps, would be more properly discussed when we know a little more. What I think the country ought to have is a further and more complete 1153 statement to give more relief to its anxiety than merely to be told that we have every confidence in Sir Beauchamp Seymour's readiness to land marines when necessary. Everyone knows that Sir Beauchamp Seymour is an officer of the greatest gallantly, and we can rely on his taking such measures as may be necessary; but have the Government nothing else to tell us on that subject but the reference to Sir Beauchamp Seymour? I hope that we shall be favoured, in the course of a day or two, with some further information from the Government with regard to the real state of affairs, and I hope also that measures will be taken to press forward the production of the Papers which are necessary to throw a light upon the subject, so as to enable us to form an opinion upon it. I do not know that there is any object in continuing this conversation; but I think it is not at all unnatural, nor at all undesirable, that this conversation should have arisen. I should be extremely sorry if anything that was said could cause any kind of difficulty or embarrassment between us and our Allies abroad, and especially the French Government. We have not the least doubt that there has been perfectly loyal action between the French Government and Her Majesty's Government; but we are not at present informed as to what that has been. But we can suspend our comments on the whole matter until we are informed what the real state of things is, and what is the present information Her Majesty's Government have to go upon.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKESir, by the indulgence of the House, I may, perhaps, be permitted to make one word of reply to the speech of the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Stafford North-cote), and his request for further information as to the employment of Arabi Pasha's influence by Dervish Pasha for the protection of European life and property. The whole of the Consuls in Cairo, including the English and French Consuls, met Dervish Pasha on the subject of the steps to be taken for the protection of European life and property, and at the meeting they made no request to Dervish Pasha to appeal to Arabi Pasha, but merely insisted on measures being taken to secure European life and property. Dervish Pasha stated that he and the Khedive himself would 1154 take the necessary measures in connection with Arabi Pasha, without raising any question bearing on the general position of Dervish Pasha's mission, or the position of Arabi Pasha—but merely using an influence which de facto existed, and which Arabi Pasha possessed, for the immediate protection of European life and property. In reply to that, the Consuls expressed no opinion as to the position of Arabi Pasha, but stated that the measures which Dervish Pasha proposed to take were measures which they thought in themselves satisfactory as well as necessary.
§ MR. BOURKEasked the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether the document which had been referred to, and which he (Mr. Bourke) called an Ultimatum, but which the hon. Baronet said was not an Ultimatum, was withdrawn at the time Dervish Pasha proposed that Arabi Pasha should assume the government of the country?
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEWe are not concerned, Sir, with the relations between Dervish Pasha and Arabi Pasha. We have nothing to do with those relations. We have merely stated what we thought it was necessary to do for the pacification of Egypt, and the protection of life and [property, and we have withdrawn nothing at all.
§ MR. ONSLOWsaid, the Government seemed to have been utterly mistaken throughout all these proceedings. The hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister told the House, in answer to certain Questions, that they had no fear with respect with the safety of the Europeans in Egypt. No sooner, however, were those words uttered than there occurred the breaking-out at Alexandria. They were also told that the Government did not think that the Khedive's life was in danger, and the hon. Baronet had said that Arabi Bey intended to be perfectly honest in his dealings with the Khedive, and that he had no intention of deposing him.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEWhen were those statements said to be made? Nothing of the kind has been said by me.
§ MR. ONSLOWmaintained that it had been said by the hon. Baronet that, in his belief, no molestation would be offered to the Khedive.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEWhat I simply did, in connection with this matter, was to read a telegram from Dervish Pasha expressing that official's opinion to that effect.
§ MR. ONSLOW,continuing, explained that ho wished to show how mistaken the Government had been throughout the whole of the proceedings. No sooner was the statement about the safety of the Khedive made than he had to bolt off to Alexandria. On a recent occasion he (Mr. Onslow) had put a Question with reference to the safety of the British subjects in Cairo. The hon. Baronet replied that Dervish Pasha had guaranteed their safety. Immediately afterwards, however, Dervish Pasha departed for Alexandria with the Khedive, so that now the lives of our fellow-subjects were at the mercy of the rebel and traitor, Arabi Bey. It was monstrous that that should be so. Considering the inflammable state of affairs in Alexandria, the Government ought at once to take strong steps to preserve the lives and property of the Queen's subjects. He would admit that there were difficulties in the way; but the Government ought to rise superior to them—in fact, they ought to have foreseen them. The Government had all along shown the greatest light-heartedness and indifference in this matter. They had rather pooh-poohed the difficulties of the case; and now they were in a horrid mess, relying upon Turkey to get them out of it. Notwithstanding what had been said, he (Mr. Onslow) had reason to know that the greatest apprehension was entertained, not only at Cairo, but at Alexandria and the Suez Canal. That day they had learnt that the passengers on board the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamer and in other ships in the Canal feared that they might be attacked. Had the Government, he asked, done anything further to protect the lives of those who were passing through the Suez Canal? They had been warned two or three times how serious was the state of affairs, and on the heads of its Members would lie the responsibility if an attack should at any time be made upon the English in Cairo or at Alexandria. The Government, it appeared to him, had ignored what ought to be the primary consideration in connection with the great Eastern Question—namely, that the power of England should be 1156 paramount in Egypt. It was the duty of this country to remain allied with. France; but, at the same time, it was equally her duty to put her foot down, and to show to the whole of Europe that England must have the master-hand over the affairs of Egypt. It seemed to him, however, as if France had bamboozled the Government of this country, for France appeared to be the paramount Power in Egypt, and all that we had done was to say "Ditto" to M. Gambetta. The Prime Minister had said that we were pledged to support the Khedive; but how were we going to support him should he be attacked—by moral force alone, or by physical force? Surely we ought to show him and the whole of Europe, by a physical demonstration, that we were prepared at all hazards to maintain his interests. He regretted that the Government should hitherto have treated the whole of this matter in an off-hand and somewhat shabby way. The hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had given the House evasive answers, and the House had but little knowledge of the intended policy of the Government. If the people of India should see us, in connection with Egyptian affairs, giving way to Austria, Germany, or any other Power, our reputation in that country would be greatly jeopardized.
MR. JOSEPH COWENsaid, that, in common with other hon. Members, he had no wish to press the Government unduly. He realized the difficulties of the situation, and was willing to make every allowance for them. The position of affairs in Egypt was critical, and it was not in the interest of the Public Service to press any Minister to make a statement that, in his judgment, could not be safely made. Upon that point there was no difference of opinion. What they complained of was, that the Government, in giving the information they were asked for, gave it reluctantly, and that what was got from them was got in a fragmentary, diffuse, and imperfect way. Language, it had been said, was invented for the purpose of enabling a man to conceal his thoughts. The language of his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in agreement with that saying, effectually concealed the policy of the Government; and it would pacify the 1157 natural impatience of the public, and the anxiety of hon. Members, if Ministers would make a clear, definite, and, as far as they were able, full statement of the position of affairs. They could state what had been done, and what, under certain conditions, they meant to do. If such a statement was made, this incessant system of interrogation would cease. He did not think that, up to the present, the Government had any reason to complain of the attitude taken by their opponents. Both the Opposition and the hon. Members on that (the Government) side of the House who were doubtful as to the policy they were pursuing, had exercised a reasonable reticence; but matters had now become so serious that something more than questioning had to be resorted to. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister had made a speech which had interested and amused the House. He had bantered the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) pleasantly enough; but he had said nothing. Nobody was one whit the wiser when he sat down, He told the House that the Government wanted to maintain the status quo; but they knew that before. He had expatiated upon that indefinite entity called the European Concert, the merits of which the Prime Minister appreciated much more highly than he (Mr. Joseph Cowen) did. But beyond these two statements—both of which they were familiar with—no information had been vouchsafed. What did the Government mean to do? A few weeks ago, according to the statement of his hon. Friend, they issued an Ultimatum demanding that Arabi Pasha should be exiled; he was not arguing as to the wisdom or unwisdom of such a course of procedure, that was not the point under consideration. It was whether the retention of office by, and the remaining in Egypt of, Arabi Pasha was contrary or not to English interests and to the welfare of Egypt. His exile might or might not be desirable; but it was clearly the opinion of the Ministry that he should be sent away. But Arabi had not been banished. According to the statement of his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the rebellious Arabi was really master of the situation. He was left in sole charge of Cairo, the capital of the country. The Khedive was not able to send him away; Der- 1158 vish Pasha did not seem to be willing; and the man whom the French and English Governments had determined should be banished had, in effect, well-nigh banished them. Now, they found that it was to this same man the authority of the State was committed, and on his word that peace and security at Cairo depended. The country would regard that as a very dubious proceeding, and would, he thought, look upon the Government as guilty of some inconsistency. Arabi either threatened our interests or he did not do so. If he did not, the Government ought not to have acted as they had done; but, if he did, then decided steps ought to be taken against him. They had heard something before of the Government depending for the restoration of peace in a country upon men whom they had declared to be guilty of treasonable practices. If Arabi Bey was not to be trusted we ought not to depend upon him. If he was to be trusted, and maintained in his position, what right had the Allied Fleets at Alexandria? They should be withdrawn and reliance placed upon the man who claimed to have authority in Egypt, and we ought to recognize his claim to act as the Representative of national feeling in Egypt. The Prime Minister had spoken in very cordial and complimentary terms of the Turkish Government. According to his statement, England was now on very friendly relations with the Porte. He (Mr. Joseph Cowen) was glad to hear it. It indicated a change in the policy of the country. The statement of the Prime Minister on the subject that day, and the statement he had previously made in the hearing of the House, contrasted in a very marked manner. The right hon. Gentleman used to talk about driving the Turks, "bag and baggage," into the Bosphorus or into Asia. [Mr. GLADSTONE: I never said so.] Well, he would not squabble about words. He would accept the right hon. Gentleman's denial; but the right hon. Gentleman could not deny that he and the majority of the Liberal Party had for years past advocated a strongly anti-Turkish policy. They despised and derided the Turk, and now they had to go and ask his help. Their line of action in the past and their line of action now certainly did not harmonize; and he could not help thinking that if some of the harsh things that 1159 were said of the Turk had not been said, the course of the English Government in the East would have been a little smoother than it was at present. One other remark he wished to make. The Prime Minister objected to a statement made by the hon. Member for Greenwich (Baron Henry de Worms) about the Suez Canal. But the right hon. Gentleman had misapprehended what the hon. Gentleman had said. It was quite true that the right hon. Gentleman from the first had been a supporter of the Canal project. Those who were familiar with the history of that undertaking, knew that when Mr. Roebuck-submitted his Motion in Parliament respecting it, one of the ablest speeches made in support of the scheme was that of the Prime Minister. It was quite true, therefore, that the right hon. Gentleman was in favour of constructing the Canal, when many people were opposed to it. But what the hon. Member for Greenwich said was, that recently the Prime Minister had declared that even if the Canal was closed, our old way to India might be resumed without much disadvantage. During the Eastern discussions, he had repeatedly referred to the way round the Cape as an alternative passage to the East, which might be resorted to without much inconvenience. An occasion would soon arise when the whole policy of the Government in Egypt might be reviewed, and reviewed with more ample material at command than they now possessed; and in that event, what he (Mr. Joseph Cowen) and others wished the Ministers to do, was to permit full information about events as they proceeded, at least as far as the interests of the country would permit. There was no desire to be awkward with them, or to take advantage of them. So far as he was concerned, he had no wish to revive old discussions, or to twit them too hard with their inconsistencies. He was only too glad that they had come back to the national faith with respect to our foreign policy in the East. But still it was not reasonable to suppose that Parliament would be quiescent when such important events were transpiring, and there was such a paucity of intelligence concerning them from official sources.
§ MR. CHAPLINsaid, he would not have risen again; but he thought the information supplied by the hon. Baro- 1160 net the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs threw considerable light upon the alarming statements to which he (Mr. Chaplin) had drawn attention earlier in the day. The difficulty with which that information was extracted suggested to him (Mr. Chaplin) a resemblance between the present occasion and certain other transactions which occurred not long ago. He was, in fact, reminded of the suppressed paragraph about which so much had been said. There was a resemblance also between the policy now pursued by the Government in Egypt and their policy in connection with the circumstances to which that paragraph had reference. Were they to understand that it was to the agent of disorder in Egypt that they now looked for the suppression of disorder? That he understood to be the effect of the answer which was extracted with great difficulty from the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEI most distinctly stated that the Consuls had nothing whatever to do with Arabi Pasha; but their dealings were entirely with Dervish Pasha, and stated their reasons why they accepted the proposal of Dervish Pasha.
§ MR. CHAPLINsaid, he understood that to be the effect of the answer given by the hon. Baronet to his (Mr. Chaplin's) right hon. Friend the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote). The hon. Baronet said he had assurances from Dervish Pasha that order would be preserved; but that was to be done through the agency of Arabi, and it might, therefore, be fairly said that it was to the very agents of disorder in Egypt that the Government looked for the suppression of lawlessness in the future. Meanwhile, no other measures had been taken for the security of the lives of British subjects at Alexandria. That was nothing but the Kilmainham compact over again. He was not surprised at the intense alarm felt just now by British residents at Alexandria, though the hon. Baronet said that from all the information he had received there was no legitimate ground for the apprehensions that had been expressed. But could it be that there was no ground for apprehension in such circumstances as these, when there had been already 115 murders of Europeans, to say nothing of 1161 others that might have occurred, but of which nothing was known?
§ SIR CHAELES W. DILKEThat is not our information.
§ MR. CHAPLINNo; you never give us any information.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEThat may be an amusing Party retort; but I stated that I had given the whole of the information the Government possessed in regard to the murders.
§ MR. CHAPLINsaid, their precise complaint was that the Government did not communicate their information, and that, though the hon. Baronet said that never had more information been given in similar circumstances, those who were not in the confidence of the Government knew nothing beyond what they could gather from newspapers and telegrams from abroad. A few minutes ago the House did not know what steps had been taken by the Government for the protection of the British residents in Alexandria; but it now appeared that they were to be protected through Arabi Pasha, and, that being the case, he should not rest or be satisfied until they had extracted from the Government distinct information as to what steps they bad taken, and would take in the future, to protect European life and property.
§ SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTI do not rise to prolong the debate, but only to make clear what has been stated by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) charges the Government with having entered into relations with Arabi Pasha. [Mr. CHAPLIN: No, no!] Then I do not know what he means by talking about the Kilmainham compact—
§ MR. CHAPLINI asked this question of the Government—Is it to the agent of disorder that they look for the suppression of the outrages in Egypt? And, by saying that, I am speaking of what I was told, that it was the action of Dervish Pasha acting through Arabi Pasha.
§ SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTThe answer to that is perfectly plain and distinct. We look to Dervish Pasha, who is the Representative of the Porte, to whom hon. Gentlemen opposite have hitherto been willing to refer everything, as the Representative of the Sovereign of Egypt. [Mr. CHAPLIN: But what are his instructions?] What business have Her Majesty's Government to ask for a 1162 communication of the instructions of the Sultan to his own agent, except so far as the Porte chooses to communicate it to us? Can there be anything more extraordinarily inconsistent than the language of hon. Gentlemen opposite? They say, "You are not giving influence enough to the Porte;" and then they turn round and attack Dervish Pasha for his conduct. We look to him as the Representative of the Sovereign of Egypt, the Porto, in Egypt. That is why Her Majesty's Government look to Dervish Pasha. He gives us assurances with reference to the protection of life and property, and the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Chaplin) attaches to those assurances the epithet of a Kilmainham compact. That is no affair of the Porte and its Representative. ["Oh, oh!"] That is the hon. Gentleman's opinion of the conduct of Dervish Pasha, the Representative of the Porte. Her Majesty's Government are not responsible for what relations Dervish Pasha may establish with Arabi Pasha or anybody else. The relations he chooses to have with Arabi Bey is rather the affair of Dervish Pasha and the Government he represents. ["Oh, oh!"] I am stating a proposition which cannot be disputed. What Her Majesty's Government have done is, through the mouths of the Consuls, to ask Dervish Pasha to undertake the responsibility of protecting life and property in Egypt. What methods he has at his disposal, or chooses to take, he is responsible for to his own Government.
§ MR. J. LOWTHERsaid, that as the Government had stated that they looked to Dervish Pasha for the protection of life and property in Egypt, it was important that Dervish's position should be understood. It appeared, from what the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department had said, that he was the Commissioner and, therefore, Representative of the Porte, the Sovereign of Egypt; though, on the other hand, a suggestion had been made that his position somewhat resembled that lately occupied by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Clare (Mr. O'Shea) in other well-known proceedings. As, therefore, some doubt had been thrown upon this matter, he (Mr. J. Lowther) thought, having regard to the fact that the lives and property of Her Majesty's subjects in Egypt were, in the opinion of the Government, dependent on Dervish 1163 Pasha for their protection, that the Commissioner's precise position should be clearly stated to the House. The hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had made no reference whatever during the discussion to a person who had occupied a very prominent position throughout the whole of these troubles—namely, Arabi Pasha. The Government had stated that they had in no shape or form recognized him, but looked to Dervish Pasha for the maintenance of order. It transpired, however, at the last moment, that Dervish relied upon Arabi for the fulfilment of this duty. Thus, the Government relied upon Dervish, and Dervish relied upon Arabi; but he would not pursue any further the schoolboy's calculation of the consequent relations between the Government and Arabi. There was, however, one question he would like to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—WasArabi Pasha present at the conference held between Dervish Pasha and the Consuls?
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEIf the right hon. Gentleman will give Notice of that Question, I will answer it.
§ MR. J. LOWTHERpresumed that, in that case, he might take it that the Government did not at present know whether Arabi was present or not. He would give Notice of the Question; and he would also give Notice of the further Question, Whether the Consul in Egypt had informed the Government of the details of the Conference with Dervish Pasha, but had omitted to mention the not unimportant fact whether Arabi had been present? Without wishing to prolong the discussion unduly, he would like to make one comment on the severe tone that had been adopted towards his hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff). The hon. Baronet opposite had charged his hon. Friend with being guilty of a considerable offence in his reference to the Government of France; but the hon. Baronet should have noticed the emphasis laid by his hon. Friend on the necessity of cordial co-operation with that Government. The general observations of the hon. Baronet as to the great danger and impropriety of speeches made by Members of this House, in or out of it, which endangered our relations with Foreign Powers, were most sound; and it was a matter for regret that during the hon. 1164 Baronet's speech the Treasury Bench was not so well, or, at any rate, not so influentially, filled as it had since become, for his remarks upon that point were deserving of attention in that quarter, especially, of the House. The Prime Minister, who had since entered, had also justly deprecated unrestrained indulgence in the expression of crude and irresponsible opinion. The House was thoroughly with the right hon. Gentleman in deprecating observations which might eventually lead to a demand for inconvenient explanations from Powers at peace with Her Majesty. The right hon. Gentleman, while the hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle (Mr. Joseph Cowen) was speaking, had denied that he had said it would be an advantage to the human race if the Turks were driven, "bag and baggage," across the Bosphorus.
§ MR. J. LOWTHERAbout what?
§ MR. J. LOWTHERsaid, he was under the impression that the Bosphorus separated Europe from Asia. Of course, he at once accepted the right hon. Gentleman's statement.
MR. GLADSTONEI do not want the right hon. Gentleman's acceptance of anything. The thing is in print, and if the right hon. Gentleman takes the trouble, before he occupies the time of this House with such statements, to read the print it would be an advantage. I never said one word about the removal of the Turks from Europe to Asia.
§ MR. J. LOWTHERsaid, that the right hon. Gentleman had kindly called his attention to a work in which this was printed. He (Mr. J. Lowther) regretted if his recollection was not accurate; but ho thought he had not unfairly epitomized the statements therein expressed by the right hon. Gentleman when he indicated that Asia should henceforth become the exclusive residence of the official Turkish Power.
§ MR. J. LOWTHERsaid, he should have great satisfaction in renewing his acquaintance with the work to which the right hon. Gentleman had referred; but, in succeeding in eliciting a general disclaimer of sentiments of that kind, he thought he had done a good service 1165 in drawing attention to the matter. The right hon. Gentleman had spoken of the co-operation of the Turkish Government with Her Majesty's Government on the present occasion.
§ MR. J. LOWTHERsaid, he certainly must have greatly misunderstood the right hon. Gentleman. The hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at least intimated that all the Powers, including Turkey, were thoroughly in harmony on this subject; and he (Mr. J. Lowther) understood that the Prime Minister offered this consolation to the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ash-mead-Bartlett), that Germany and Turkey were co-operating most cordially with England, which amounted precisely to what he (Mr. J. Lowther) had just stated, and which had elicited the direct contradiction of the right hon. Gentleman, though he now qualified that contradiction with the further interlocutory interjection of "Now you've got it." He would only add a hope that the discussion would not terminate without some reply to the Question—Who was, and who was not, responsible for the maintenance of order in Egypt?
§ MR. GOSCHENsaid, there was only one observation which he wished most respectfully to submit to the House, and that was, whether some of the speeches to which they had been listening, more particularly those of the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) and the right hon. Member for North Lincolnshire (Mr. J. Lowther), were calculated to promote the object they all said they had in view—that of protecting the lives and property of Europeans in Egypt. It seemed to him a most serious subject, and he confessed he was surprised that, on the occasion of discussing a matter so serious to this country, and touching so deeply the feelings of many who had relatives in Egypt, they should have heard allusions to "Kilmainham treaties," and other matters totally unconnected with the subject, and giving rise to roars of laughter from hon. Members opposite. He did not conceive that this was a laughing matter, and he was sure that the tone of the right hon. Baronet the Leader of the Opposition, being in such marked contrast to these speeches, represented the feeling of the great majority of hon. Members on the 1166 Conservative side of the House, and this would be apparent to the country. But the point he wished to submit most respectfully was, whether the Government could, consistently with its duty, reveal to the House what measures it was likely to take, and could take, for the protection of life and property in Egypt; whether a premature statement of the course which the Government thought it right to adopt might imperil the objects at which they were aiming, were questions of the deepest importance. Many questions had been put to the Government with regard to the protection of Tewfik Pasha and the Europeans at Cairo; but how could the Government answer such questions without revealing their policy to the disorderly and anarchical powers which now existed in Egypt? It was perfectly natural that this country should take the deepest interest in what was occurring, and desire to be made acquainted with the measures contemplated by the Government; but it appeared to him that if the Government were to say in advance what measures, military or naval, they were going to take, it might frustrate the particular designs which they entertained, and not only frustrate those designs, but in the interval imperil the lives of Europeans. He had himself no knowledge whatever of the particular course which the Government was likely to take; but suppose a military expedition had been resolved upon, could any course be more foolish than to press that a statement should be made revealing to the House the measures proposed to be taken? Whether the English or the Turkish Government intended to act, whatever might be the measures which would be adopted, he submitted that those measures should not be revealed to the House or to the public. The Government, it must be remembered, could not speak to that House without speaking at the same time to Egypt, and allowing all the intriguers who might wish evil to the Christian population to know precisely what they intended to do. Therefore, he submitted that, notwithstanding the natural desire of everyone in that House to be re-assured by having told to them the condition of affairs, it was scarcely fair to choose a moment like that when the hands of the Government were tied, and they could not state what they were going to do—it was not the 1167 best moment to choose for interrogating the Government with regard to the state of Egypt. He trusted that, notwithstanding the pressure that might he put upon the Government, they would feel that the great majority of the House felt the danger and risk there would be in any premature revelation of the measures it might be necessary to take for the advantage of Egypt, and the protection of the lives and property of Her Majesty's subjects, and the Christian population generally.
§ SIR JOHN HAYsaid, he wished, notwithstanding what had just fallen from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen), to know what naval preparations had been made for saving the lives and property of the English population at Alexandria? The hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had spoken of the squadron of iron-clads under the command of Sir Beauchamp Seymour, and had said that one of those vessels, the Invincible, was in the Harbour at Alexandria. He had also correctly informed the House that the draught of water in the entrance to Alexandria Harbour was 24 feet 8 inches. The Invincible was in the harbour, and drew 22 feet 1 inch. The other five ships all drew more than 24 feet 8 inches, and the reason why they were not in the harbour was because they could not go into it. He would give the draughts of the ships, both when loaded and when lightened. The Alexandra drew 26 feet 6 inches, and could be brought on an even keel to 26 feet 3 inches. The Inflexible drew 25 feet 5 inches, and could be lightened to 24 feet 5 inches; but there were then only three inches of bar to go over, and the ship would have to go up a very tortuous channel, which would be very dangerous to attempt, because a coal barge sunk in the channel could prevent the ship coming out. The Monarch drew 26 feet, and could be lightened to 24 feet 2 inches; the Superb drew 26 feet, and could be lightened to 25 feet; and the Temeraire drew 26 feet 6 inches, and could be lightened to 25 feet 9inches. So that out of these six vessels only three could, when lightened, enter the harbour. He asked why they did not strengthen the squadron by vessels of lighter draught, from which they could readily land men? He did not believe 500 men could be landed from the ships 1168 now in harbour, and no admiral would be justified in keeping his ships outside the harbour under present circumstances if they could get in. He, therefore, thought the House was entitled to know what naval preparations were being made, what transports had been sent to take away the refugees, and what ships were being sent that could go into harbour, so as to be of use in the protection of life and property at Alexandria. As he had said, two only of the ships besides the Invincible now on the coast could enter the harbour, and that with risk, while three were wholly unavailable for the purpose. He did not think that sufficient preparations had been made for the protection of the lives and property of persons now in Alexandria.
§ MR. JACOB BRIGHTsaid, there was great fear for the security of life and property in Egypt at the present time, and ho had a telegram from a Manchester merchant, Mr. Robert Dobson, informing him of the death of his son and another young man who was with his son. Of course, with regard to his son he knew the worst; but he was somewhat anxious to know about the property. There were goods amounting to £4,000 belonging to those two young men who were killed; and Mr. Dobson telegraphed to him (Mr. Jacob Bright), asking him to question the Government as to the responsibility of the Egyptian Government with regard to property left in that defenceless position.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEWith regard to the first part of the Question, if I may be allowed to answer the appeal, having once spoken, I have telegraphed to Sir Edward Malet to ascertain the names, and have lists, as far as possible, prepared of the people killed in the recent riots. With regard to the second part, as to the property, I have referred the letter, which was sent to me by the gentleman who sent the telegram, to those who will give an opinion on the legal point raised.
§ MR. LABOUCHEREthought that his hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) would gain nothing by pressing the question any further. The Government had fairly stated that it would be contrary to the public interest to make any explanation whatever. He (Mr. Labouchere) did not commit himself to any opinion on the matter; but he would ask his hon. 1169 Friend, having regard to the importance of the Prevention of Crime Bill, which was coming on, to withdraw his Motion, so that they might fall hack upon that most interesting, if somewhat exhaustive, discussion.
§ MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMANsaid, he came into the House just as his right hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay) was finishing his observations, and he, therefore, could only understand their general tenor. He understood that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman was making observations as to the draught of water required for the vessels of the Mediterranean Squadron entering Alexandria Harbour. His right hon. and gallant Friend had put on the Paper a Question to be addressed to him (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) tomorrow on that subject. He was not prepared to-day with the precise figures relative to each ship; but even if the Question had been given Notice of for to-day, he thought he should have been obliged to appeal to his right hon. and gallant Friend, whether it was really consistent with the public interest that these details should go forth to the world, thereby informing the people in Egypt as well as hon. Members in that House as to the precise vessels which could enter Alexandria Harbour, and the particulars connected with their draught.
§ SIR JOHN HAYsaid, that his figures were extracted from the excellent book of Sir Thomas Brassey, one of the Lords of the Admiralty.
§ MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMANI have not the slightest doubt it is before the public in one form or another; but the question is, whether it should be publicly repeated in this House in regard to the existing state of affairs in Egypt. No one knows better than my right hon. and gallant Friend that a ship, though its draught of water may be a certain figure, may be considerably altered so as to enter a place where it could not otherwise enter. Besides, the depth of water at the entrance to the harbour varies according to the state of the weather, and according to other circumstances, so that while one day a vessel may be able to enter, it could not get in the next.
§ SIR JOHN HAYOr get out again.
§ MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMANCertainly, or get out again. At any 1170 rate, I must appeal to the House, whether I or my right hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay) should state the precise draught of water of every ship there, and the precise requirements of the harbour. I really do not think that it is wise, or that any good purpose would be gained by it, and I appeal to my right hon. and gallant Friend not to address to me the Question he has on the Paper for to-morrow, for the reasons I have just stated.
§ SIR JOHN HAYAllow me to explain that I think I am entitled to give the facts I have stated to the House, since the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has stated to the House what the ships are capable of doing.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEYes, in answer to a Question, but not voluntarily.
§ SIR JOHN HAYQuite so.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEAnd if I may be allowed to say so, I maintain the perfect accuracy of the information which I then gave.
§ MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMANI may, perhaps, be' allowed to add that the information which has been given in general terms by my hon. Friend (Sir Charles W. Dilke) is quite accurate; but what I object to is that a catalogue raisonne should be given of the ships, with the draught of each of them. That is quite another matter.
§ SIR JOHN HAYWith reference to the appeal of my hon. Friend (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) regarding the Question of which I have given Notice for to-morrow, as I have already given the information to the House, I am quite satisfied—without putting my Question—I am quite satisfied my information is accurate, because, as I have said, it is taken from the book published by my hon. Friend (Sir Thomas Brassey).
§ MR. ECROYDsaid, he wished, before the discussion closed, to make a strong appeal to the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The fate of the two young men who had been mentioned had naturally spread a thrill of intense horror throughout the community in which their relatives resided, and the business circles with which they had been connected; and he, therefore, appealed to the hon. Baronet to obtain all the information he could 1171 from Egypt, as promptly as possible, in regard to the position and circumstances of the English residents connected with commercial affairs in that country, and make it public in whatever way he might deem most suitable, with the least possible delay. The agony of suspense which had already been endured by many could not be described.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEI have already stated that we have telegraphed for a list of the names of those Englishmen who have been killed, and that we shall be glad to make it public; but I do not think it would be desirable to make public our opinion as to what might be the danger at one place more than at another. I think that would only tend to increase the danger.
§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFsaid, that the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) had been good enough to describe something which he (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) had said as "nonsense." That was not a very courteous statement to make in that House in regard to what an hon. Member had said. He (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) would not argue with him as to what was nonsense or what was not; but the hon. Member had endeavoured to bring in the old story about Lord Salisbury and Tunis. He (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) did not say whether the taking of Tunis was right or not, and he had no responsibility in the matter. But he would observe that it was to be borne in mind that the taking of Tunis took place after the Control had been established, and, therefore, threw some doubt on the good faith of France in the matter. The hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and others had expressed themselves satisfied with the position of Admiral Seymour at Alexandria, and the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) had complained of Questions being put on the subject, and had said that such Questions should not be answered. But there would be no danger in the Questions being answered if the Government Would send serviceable ships. The danger existed in their sending ships which were not serviceable. It had been shown that, when lightened, only two of them could go into the harbour. The Government, therefore, had sent ships to Alexandria which could not assist the Euro- 1172 peans. [Sir CHARLES W. DILKE: Oh, no!] The hon. Baronet said "Oh, no!" and they were asked to trust to the presence of Sir Beauchamp Seymour. On the 11th of May the hon. Baronet told the House that the Government had taken all the steps that were necessary; but the presence of Sir Beauchamp Seymour had not prevented the massacre that took place on Sunday last—and there had been a massacre, for it did not matter whether 50 or 150 had been massacred—although one of the ships was in the harbour and two outside. Therefore, if the Opposition had no confidence in the adequacy of the preparations of the Government, it must be acknowledged that they had some ground for that want of confidence. The Prime Minister had said that the Government had all along been acting in conjunction with Turkey and in harmony with the Turkish Government in this matter, and that we should see that when the Correspondence was published.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, that his right hon. Friend at the head of the Government had already contradicted that statement.
§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFsaid, that was not so. What the Prime Minister had positively stated was that all along we had looked upon Turkey as an instrument for acting upon Egypt.
§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFWas that the case, or was it not? If it were so, what was the meaning of the despatch dated 31st January 1882, and communicated to Lord Granville by Musurus Pasha? That despatch was to the effect that there was nothing to justify the Collective Note to Tewfik Pasha, that the opinion of the Sultan ought to have been obtained, and that the Government of the Porte felt bound to inquire what were the reasons for such a course. The Turkish Ambassador to this country had been requested to bring the subject before the Minister of Foreign Affairs. If the Government looked upon Turkey as the proper instrument to exercise pressure upon Egypt, it was remarkable that the Porte took so very different a view of the case. It was scarcely credible that Her Majesty's Government, after having offended Turkey as they had done, should go down on their knees to her, and ask her to get them out of the extraordinary 1173 hobble in which they were now placed. He was perfectly willing to withdraw his Motion for the adjournment of the House.