OFFENCES AGAINST THIS ACT.

HC Deb 09 June 1882 vol 270 cc666-772

Clause 4 (Intimidation).

Amendment again proposed, In page 3, line 24, to leave out all the words after the word "Act," to the end of the Clause.—(Mr. Bryce.)

Question proposed, "That the words 'In this Act the expression' "intimidation"' stand part of the Clause.'"

MR. DILLON

said, that a much wider interpretation was given to the clause as it stood than the Government attributed to it. He proposed to quote a passage from one of the leading Metropolitan journals, in order to show the construction which was put upon the word "intimidation," as it was introduced by the Home Secretary; and he did so for the purpose of showing the absolute necessity of prolonging the discussion of the clause, in order that the Members of the Committee, and persons outside the House, might be satisfied as to the real object and intention of the clause, no definite understanding having yet been come to as to the exact meaning of the word. The extract was from a paper which represented a considerable amount of public opinion. It said— The Home Secretary's defence of the clause was ingenious. The latter part, he said, 'was only the interpretation put upon intimidation in the first part.' In other words, no person would be held to be guilty of intimidation unless he had placed compulsion upon others to take part in any riot or unlawful assembly or to resist the processes of the law in regard to eviction. That was the opinion of The Standard as to what the Government meant by intimidation—namely, that nobody would be guilty of intimidation unless he put compulsion on somebody to take part in a riot or unlawful assembly. In arguing against the adoption of the Amendment yesterday, the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister repeated over and over again the statement that practically this clause was drawn in the same spirit as the Act of 1875. He had had the curiosity that day to look at the debate which took place when the Bill of 1875 was passing through the House, and he confessed that the discoveries he had made from perusing that debate had surprised him very considerably. He, first of all, discovered that the clause as it stood in the Act, and as it had been copied by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General, was a clause which was not drawn by the House of Commons at all, but drawn up by the House of Commons, in substitution of the clause accepted by the House of Commons, and sent up to the other House by a small majority, under great pressure from the Government. It was drawn up by the Lord Chancellor, and was substituted for the clause which had been sent up by the House of Commons. On referring to the report of the debates which took place when the Bill was passing through Committee, he found that right hon. Gentlemen now sitting on the Treasury Bench were in Opposition, and that their views with regard to the crime of intimidation were of a totally different character—indeed, of a totally opposite character — from the views they expressed now. The right hon. and learned Gentleman who was now Home Secretary was not then in Office; and he found the right hon. and learned Gentleman strongly opposing the Intimidation Clause which was then being passed through the House. The right hon. and learned Gentleman made use of the following words. He said that:— He agreed with the hon. and learned Member for Limerick that great mischief might arise from the ambiguity of the clause. So far as it went beyond the existing law, it was altogether unnecessary."—[3 Hansard, ccxxv. 1583.] Those were the words of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary in 1875. Great mischief, the right hon. and learned Gentleman thought, might arise from the ambiguity of the clause, and yet the clause referred to by the right hon. and learned Gentleman was nothing like so ambiguous as the clause now submitted to the Committee. The right hon. and learned Gentleman said the clause was so ambiguous that it might give rise to very great mischief. It was moved by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire (Sir R. Assheton Cross), who had charge of the Bill, and it said that— Every person who, with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a legal right to do or abstain from doing, shall use violence to any person. And the present Home Secretary then contended that the crime of intimidation, as defined by that clause of the Act of 1875, meant using or threatening violence in such a shape that a magistrate would be entitled to bind the man who resorted to it over to keep the peace; and that, he said, was too ambiguous, and that great mischief might hereafter arise from the adoption of such a definition. But he (Mr. Dillon) did not rest his argument alone on the authority of the Home Secretary. Going a little further into the debate, ho met with another friend of Ireland, in the shape of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster). What did that right hon. Gentleman say? He made two very remarkable statements, and he (Mr. Dillon) certainly wished that the right hon. Gentleman would stick to them. If he did, he would be assisting the Irish Members that day in resisting this Intimidation Clause. The right hon. Gentleman, speaking in favour of an Amendment proposed to a new clause, said—"This clause, drawn as it now is, would practically amount to this—that if a man looked crooked at the wife or children of a labouring man he might swear that he had been intimidated." Why did the right hon. Gentleman use that argument? He went on to explain it by saying—"Surely the prosecution should be left to the man who was threatened; a third party ought not to be brought in." Would the right hon. Gentleman stand up to-day and support his opinion of 1875, that the prosecution should be left to the man who was intimidated? That was the view he advocated when in Opposition; and he asked whether the opinion the right hon. Gentleman then expressed, as champion of the working men of Bradford, he was prepared to extend to the working men of Ireland? The right hon. Member for Bradford moved an Amendment in the direction of the principle he had laid down, and, on the right hon. Gentleman's Motion, the clause was amended by the insertion of the words "on complaint made by the person intimidated." That was one of the things which the Irish Members were contending for in this, and surely the right hon. Gentleman ought to support them in their contention. Not only had the right hon. Gentleman moved the Amendment, but he induced a Conservative Government to accept it; and it was inserted in the Bill. But there was one very important point which he (Mr. Dillon) had dwelt upon the other day, and, on the suggestion of the hon. and learned Attorney General, the Home Secretary had overwhelmed him with contempt for having made it. It was that it seemed to him that the House of Commons should never have consented to have passed an Intimidation Clause, such as that which existed in the Act of 1875, if it had not been interpreted in a certain fashion. Now, when he went to examine the records of that debate he found the guess he had made was perfectly correct, and the only way in which the Government got the clause listened to was by giving a pledge so that it should be interpreted in accordance with the Charge of the Recorder of London, delivered in the famous case of the cabinet-makers. The Lord Chancellor said— The Recorder's charge in what was known as the Cabinet-makers' Case embodied the law upon the subject. In the course of his charge the learned Recorder said— ' The question you will have to ask yourselves is, whether the evidence shows that the defendants were guilty of obstructing and rendering difficult of access the prosecutor's place of business, or whether anything which they did was calculated to deter or intimidate those who were passing to and fro, or whether there was an exhibition of force calculated to produce fear in the minds of ordinary men, or whether the defendants or any of them combined for that purpose. If you think that, it seems to me, then, it will be your duty to find a true bill; but if you think their conduct may be accounted for by a desire to ascertain who were the persons working there, or peaceably to persuade them or any others who were proposing to work there to join their fellow workmen who were contending, whether rightly or wrongly, for the interests of the general body, it seems to me that there is no evidence sufficient to establish the charge that is here made.' This expression of the law in the Recorder's charge appeared to the Home Secretary to be exactly the intention and scope of the Act of 1871; and, so far as he was concerned, his right hon. Friend would have been content to trust that application of the Act in future cases. The working-men, too, would, he believed, have been satisfied with this construction of the Act. The House of Commons thought, however, that it was not desirable to leave the question open to any doubt whatever, and words were accordingly introduced into the present Bill, in order that future rulings in similar cases should be placed on the same footing as in the case tried by the Recorder."—[3 Hansard, ccxxvi. 38.] There was no getting behind the statement made by the Lord Chancellor that the clause should be interpreted and ruled by the Cabinet-makers' Case. [Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: Hear, hear !] The Home Secretary said, "Hear, hear !"If the right hon. and learned Gentleman would be content to be ruled as to the interpretation of the clause by the Charge of the Recorder of London, he (Mr. Dillon) would engage to withdraw all opposition to the clause. But he knew the right hon. and learned Gentleman had no such intention. The right hon. and learned Gentleman wished to persuade them that the English Act contained no proposal upon the Intimidation Clause, when he must have known that at a time when he was a much younger politician than he was now, when he was received as the champion of the rights of English working men, and when his right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) took a foremost part in the fight, they had both insisted on having a strict definition of the word "intimidation," or else that the Bill should not pass the House. When the Bill came down to the House of Lords to be considered in that House, Mr. Lowe, now Lord Sherbrooke, who was also a champion of the rights of the working men, said, speaking of this open Intimidation Clause, such as it now stood in the Act, having been carried by a very narrow majority— Nothing could be more dangerous or unfair than the use of ambiguous expressions of this kind."—[Ibid. 711.] At the beginning the right hon. Gentleman had stated that it was a case of law between the rich and the poor, and therefore, as Mr. Lowe said— Nothing could be more dangerous or unfair than the use of ambiguous expressions of this kind, especially in a measure which ought to be easy of interpretation, being, as it was, a law between the rich and the poor. The springing of an offence of this kind suddenly upon the country seemed to be one of the most imprudent pieces of legislation he had ever seen, and he was astonished that such a mistake should have been made."—[3 Hansard, ccxxvi. 711.] If that was the interpretation of Lord Sherbrooke, what would he say in reference to the term "intimidation?" The noble Lord had said that— The springing of an offence of this kind suddenly upon the country seemed to be one of the most imprudent pieces of legislation he had ever seen, and he was astonished that such a mistake should have been made."—[Ibid.] What would he say of a Bill which proposed to spring 100 new offences on the country at very short notice indeed? The right hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill (Sir E. Assheton Cross), in endeavouring to defend the clause, said— In its present form, it was really less strong than it had been before. In its original form the words were 'who threatens or intimidates.'"—[Ibid. 712.] The Irish Members wore quite willing to take the words "threatens or intimidates;" but this Member of a Conservative Government went on to say— But there was a question raised as to whether a threat was sufficient to bind a man over for, and therefore the word 'threatens' was omitted. Intimidation, however, was another matter altogether; and this was what he (Mr. Dillon) wished to dwell upon — namely, what, in the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman, was the nature of intimidation— Intimidation, however, was another matter altogether, and the clause in its present form, instead of its being stronger than it was, was weaker. [Mr. LOWE: No, no !] In his view it was weaker. It now provided that not only must there be some action on the part of the offender, but it must have a certain effect on the person whom it sought to intimidate."—[Ibid.] That, he (Mr. Dillon) thought, thoroughly explained, the matter, and a definition to that effect would enable the farmers in Ireland to get at the meaning which the word "intimidation" in the present clause was to have. But now he came to a speech made by another Member of the present Administration — the right hon. Member for Sheffield (Mr. Mundella). The right hon. Gentleman said— Whatever might have been the intention of the noble Lord who made the Amendment in the House of Lords, the effect would be to leave intimidation wholly without qualification or definition."—[Ibid.] And so it was now; the intimidation was left entirely without qualification or definition. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say— As the Bill stood before, the intimidation was to be such intimidation as would justify a justice of the peace in binding over a person; but as it now stood, the word 'intimidates' was left entirely without qualification, so that the justice would have to decide as to what it might be. No doubt, the intention was to follow the Charge of the right hon. and learned Recorder, but that right hon. and learned Gentleman really defined what he meant by intimidation, using the words 'such an exhibition of force as is calculated to produce fear in the minds of ordinary men.'"—[Ibid.] Would the Government accept the definition of the hon. and learned Recorder of London, which had been regarded as an authoritative definition of intimidation, and had been accepted in that sense by both sides of the House? Would they insert the words of the Recorder of London in this Act? If so, the Irish Members would withdraw all further opposition to it. If they declined to accept that definition, they had no right to say that they were legislating in the same spirit for the Irish peasantry as they did for the working men of England. The noble Lord (Lord Sherbrooke), who used to be an influential Member of the Liberal Party, said what he (Mr. Dillon) had endeavoured to argue the other day, that the necessity for a definition in the clause of the offence of intimidation was very much increased when they bore in mind the nature of the tribunal before which the offence would have to be tried, and also in view of the fact that it was a law made to be administered for the poor man against the rich man. There was another point in favour of his contention that the law of 1875 was passed not as a measure of coercion for the working men of England, but as a measure of relief. A great deal depended on the administration of any law, and the spirit in which it was introduced. The law of 1875 was passed not to coerce the working men of England, and not to put an end to combinations, but for the purpose of relieving working men from restraints; and it was well known that if the Intimidation Clause was to be strictly interpreted, the only result would have been that another Bill would have had to have been introduced in the following year to modify it. He was not sufficiently a lawyer or authority to state the effect of the cases which had been decided under the Act; hut there was not the slightest doubt in his own mind that the magistrates and the County Court Judges, in ruling under that Act, appealed to the Charge of the Recorder of London, as being protective in the matter of interpreting the meaning of the clause, especially when that view was backed up by the statement of the Lord Chancellor of England himself. If any man contended, as a matter of argument, that that clause would have to be worked in this country against the working men of England and their unions as an open intimidation clause, let him produce his cases. He denied that it had ever been so used, and he challenged the Attorney General or the Home Secretary to produce any case in which it had been so used, or to show that wherever it had been brought into action—if it ever had been brought into action— the Charge of the Recorder of London was not only appealed to, but allowed to be a protective definition in favour of any man who might be prosecuted. As he had already stated, if the men who were then advocating the rights of the working men of England had a right to insist, as they did insist, and to press hard for a stricter definition than was given by the Government in the clause, how much more had the Irish Representatives a right to ask for a stricter definition in this clause when they were dealing with a Bill not of restraint, but of oppression? Because the Bill was not brought in to encourage, but to put down combination—not to encourage the methods the farmer, or the agricultural labourer, or the mechanic, all the world over, were obliged to resort to in order to defend their rights against capitalists or landlords, but to put them down. He contended that the Bill was introduced not in order to enable the Government to take off the shackles from the Irish working man in the shape of the small farmer, and enable him to combine and maintain methods of combination, but to make it impossible for them to combine; and, that being the object and intention of the Bill, if the Committee consented to pass it without a single statement of any definition whatever—for the only statement they had had was a repeated declaration that Her Majesty's Government utterly refused to define it — this sub-section would simply enable the magistrates, in applying the Act, to stop at nothing. The Irish Representatives had, therefore, a tenfold greater right than Lord Sherbrooke, the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary, or the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) ever had to insist on limitations being placed to the term "intimidation," and they had a tenfold greater right to insist on the limitation of this section. He did not see that the Government, in the course of the discussion upon the Bill, had yielded by a single inch to any of the representations which had been made by the Irish Members. The case stood now exactly as it stood when they first objected to this clause—that the magistrates, who were notoriously partizans, and completely under the Ministerial influence of the Treasury Bench, would have it in their power—to use the words of the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster)—to send to gaol for six months with hard labour "anybody who looked crookedly at the child or wife of any man in Ireland." Those were not his words, but those of the right hon. Gentleman, and they were applied to a clause much milder than that which the Irish Members objected to. But times had now materially changed with the right hon. Gentleman, and he (Mr. Dillon) saw no course open to the Irish Members but to continue to the best of their ability to endeavour to amend the clause by every means in their power. He trusted that the Government would come forward and accept the fair and reasonable offer made to them to give an undertaking that the interpretation of the Intimidation Clause in Ireland should be ruled by the Charge of the Recorder of London, in the same manner as the clause in the Act of 1875 was interpreted.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, he had no reason whatever to object to the desire of the hon. Member to amend this clause in any way he thought desirable; but he would ask the Commit- too to consider the position of the Amendment. The Amendment before the Committee proposed to omit the words "In this Act the expression 'intimidation' includes," &c. Now, that was an objection to a definition of intimidation. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce), with all his great ingenuity, which all of them recognized, tried his hand at an amendment of the definition of the Government, and was obliged to admit that he failed to make one, and, therefore, his hon. and learned Friend proposed to omit all definition whatever. The hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) said that was what he desired to do; and hon. Members on the Benches opposite below the Gangway seemed to agree last night with the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets that it was desirable to leave out all definition of "intimidation." That was virtually the proposition now before the Committee. But ho ("Sir William Harcourt) had said on Wednesday—"Is what you wish to have intimidation left without a definition?" And, with one accord, they said, "No." Last night they all said "Yes." When the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets proposed to leave out all definition—

MR. DILLON

said, the right hon. and learned Gentleman was misrepresenting what was said. The hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets only said that he wished to leave out the definition of the Government, but not that he would not substitute another definition for it.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

remarked, that even assuming that was the object, these words must be left in the clause, and, therefore, it was necessary that the Committee should negative the Amendment. If the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets did not wish to leave out all definition, it would be necessary for the Committee to go on in regular order. If the hon. and learned Member or the hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon) desired to have a definition of intimidation, they must have these words in the clause—"In this Act the expression 'intimidation.'" If the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets desired no definition, he was right in proposing to omit these words; but the hon. Member for Tip- perary could not be right, because he said ho wanted a definition. If the hon. Member for Tipperary and his Friends wanted some different definition from that of the Government, let them bring it forward, and the Government would consider it. If not, they would take their own. What he complained of was, that upon the Amendment Paper there was a singular absence of definition. The hon. Member for Tipperary said a great deal about desiring a definition; but he (Sir William Harcourt) did not find any definition except one by the hon. Member for Roscommon (Dr. Commins). Then, in the name of common sense, do not let them, in the interests of definition, strike out the words that were necessary to enable them to introduce a definition. That was not a reasonable proposition, and he would not be seduced by the hon. Member for Tipperary into going into any collateral issue as to the discussion which took place in 1875. For his own part, he was perfectly satisfied to be judged by what he did then, and he knew very well that the result of the Act of 1875 was to leave intimidation without a definition; whereas, by the Act of 1871, it had a definition. The Act of 1875 amended the Act of 1871 by leaving out the words of definition which it contained. The Lord Chancellor said, with reference to the Act in 1875— This is not an interpretation of the law of intimidation, and we may be quite sure that the interpretation will ho given. Well, that, ho said, would be the case in the present instance.

MR. SYNAN

said, Irish Members wore charged by the right hon. and learned Gentleman with wanting to exclude all definition; but the fact was, that the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce) and Irish Members on those Benches resisted the definition because they wanted the Government to insert in the Bill a limit to the word "intimidation." The definition of the Government widened the meaning of the word, and brought under it things which, according to the law of intimidation, were not intimidation at all. If the Government intended the word to have the ordinary meaning, they would accept their definition; or if they gave the ordinary legal meaning of the word, they would not resist them. If the Government were sincere in their expressions, they would confine themselves to the legal meaning of the word. He understood the Government that the acts done should be done with the intent of producing injury to person or loss of business. They had not got the word "intent" in the clause, and if they admitted the first line of the definition, how could they depend that the Government would put upon the Table a definition which should be the legal meaning of the word "intimidation?" Would the Government also accept the Amendment of the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy), and say that the clause should not apply to exclusive dealing? It appeared, that while Irish Members were anxious to secure themselves by limiting the definition, the Government were intent upon widening it. The hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets was clear in his opinion that the Government aimed at exclusive dealing under this definition, and it was that which the Amendment of the hon. Member for Wexford was intended to meet. He said Irish Members were fairly entitled to some further information and assurance from the Government; and unless they satisfied them that the acts done meant acts done with the intention of producing fear or injury to the individual, it was clearly the duty of Irish Members to resist the definition until that assurance was given.

COLONEL COLTHURST

said, he thought the question the Committee had to consider was whether "Boycotting," or, as the hon. Member opposite termed it, "exclusive dealing," was to be efficiently dealt with or not. The first consideration which governed this was as to whether the ordinary law had or had not been found efficacious in dealing with it. The answer was, that it had not. For the last two years "Boycotting" had spread over a great extent of the country. Besides the ordinary law, there was the unwritten law of the Land League; and ho maintained that that law, as expounded by the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell), had been utterly unable to deal with "Boycotting." The hon. Member for the City of Cork, speaking at Ennis, said, last year, that "Boycotting" ought to be confined to cases in which men took farms from which others had been evicted; and he would not do the hon. Member the injustice of saying that he then made a mental reservation. On the contrary, he believed that his views remained the same now as they were 12 months ago on the subject of "Boycotting." It was clear, then, that this unwritten law had been inefficacious in the matter of "Boycotting" also; for schoolmasters had been subject to this persecution for expressing an unfavourable opinion, and persons also for having, as it was said, spoken disrespectfully of the Land League—in short, men in Ireland had been "Boycotted" for every assignable reason; for reasons which the hon. Member for the City of Cork and the hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon), who went further than he did, condemned. The hon. Member for the City of Cork, with all his influence and power in Ireland, had been utterly unable to repress this practice. Both the ordinary law and this unwritten law having failed, the Government were compelled to come forward and ask for this legislation. Now, he submitted that, if this clause were passed, it would deal effectually with "Boycotting;" but there remained the consideration whether it would interfere gratuitously or unnecessarily with the liberty of any considerable portion of Her Majesty's subjects. He contended that it would not; and, in concluding his remarks, he could not better illustrate the position of things than by referring to a conversation which took place between a gentleman and his neighbour some weeks ago. "Is not this a terrible Coercion Act we are groaning under?" said the latter. "Yes, it is," said the other; "but have we not been groaning under a more terrible one all our lives— the Ten Commandments?" "I do not think anyone who keeps the Ten Commandments need fear the Coercion Act." "I do not think they need," was the reply. He believed the people of Ireland wanted to keep the Ten Commandments, if only the hon. Member for the City of Cork would allow them to do so. As the clause would not interfere with anyone who did keep them, he, for one, was not afraid to vote for it.

MR. T. P. O'CONNOR

said, that, notwithstanding his acquaintance with the Ten Commandments, the hon. and gallant Member opposite had not scrupled to break the one which forbade him to bear false witness against his neighbour, in saying that the majority of his constituents were in favour of this Bill.

COLONEL COLTHURST

What I said was, that the clause would interfere with no one who wished to keep the Ten Commandments.

MR. T. P. O'CONNOR

said, if the hon. and gallant Gentleman asserted that the majority of his constituents did not keep the Ten Commandments, he was not keeping them himself. His objection to the action of the Government was, that while they and their supporters admitted that the clause went beyond the necessities of the case and required some limitation, they did not produce a limitation. Now, the Irish Members did not want to be cheated or hoodwinked in this matter. They said if the Government agreed that the clause required a larger limitation than it had at present, they were bound to produce their limitation; and when they had settled that, Irish Members were prepared to allow them to proceed as rapidly as they wished with the clause.

MR. BIGGAR

said, they had heard from the hon. and gallant Member opposite (Colonel Colthurst) a dissertation on exclusive dealing.

COLONEL COLTHURST

said, he had referred only to "Boycotting."

MR. BIGGAR

said, he had, no doubt, misunderstood the hon. and gallant Gentleman; but he seemed, nevertheless, unable to give a definition of "Boycotting." For his own part, he was very much indisposed towards this practice, which had been put in operation against himself. He would not trouble the Committee by going into details of what had happened in his own case; but it was well known that these things existed, and would continue to exist. The Government should state frankly if it was their intention to make a law against persons who walked past a shop to deal at another, where they could get as good value as they could at the first shop. A man who did that was undoubtedly exercising a certain amount of pressure, and his action amounted to exclusive dealing with certain parties; and if the doctrine of exclusive dealing were carried to its full extent, no one would be safe from the charge that he was injuring his neighbours with regard to their material prospects in life. They had got at something like a definition of what he would call"Boycotting"—a word that might mean anything or nothing. In that definition "Boycotting" meant exclusive dealing; and he would now ask the Government in what way this Act would be made to apply to a system which was practised in all trades, and in the Medical, Legal, and other Professions? The system was in operation in a variety of forms; to legislate against it was to make a law which interfered with the arrangements of society, and no such law could be passed. It would be legitimate enough to enact that a man should not say to another—"If you do this or that you will suffer a penalty for doing it." But he held that unless some actual threat were held out, there should be no punishment of any kind. They knew that under the existing law there had been some extreme cases of punishment for alleged intimidation. There was the case of the persons who were sent to prison by the magistrates simply for asking subscriptions for the Political Prisoners' Fund, and it formed an excellent illustration of what would happen if this clause were allowed to pass without a proper definition. Irish Members, therefore, asked the Government for a bond fide definition; without which they were better with none at all. It seemed to him that the definition they had before them could be applied in such a way as to give the maximum amount of annoyance with the minimum amount of advantage. Another illustration of the way it would be applied was the case of the lady who was sent to prison because she shook her head at the police. He held that the charge of intimidation should be substantiated; and unless that were done, by proving an actual threat or something that amounted thereto, the Bill, without resulting in any real good, would become a further source of trouble and riot. Moreover, he maintained that if the practice were pursued of making offences of the most trivial nature liable to very severe punishment, offences of a far more serious kind would be multiplied.

MR. CHARLES RUSSELL

said, he was as much opposed as anyone in that House to needless and protracted discussion. He was, however, obliged to occupy the attention of the Committee for a few moments. It seemed to him that Her Majesty's Government had made no effort to help the Committee out of the difficulty in which it was placed, and ho wished to state why he thought that observation was justified. As the clause stood, it was literally correct to say that any act done or word spoken which two Resident Magistrates chose to think amounted to intimidation, constituted an offence for which the accused person might be sent to prison for six months. That, he said, was a power so wide and undefined as he would not be a party to committing to the highest Judges in the land, and it was, therefore, a power which, in his opinion, ought not to be given, if it could be avoided, to a tribunal presided over by Resident Magistrates. He had frequently said, with regard to this body, that with reference to many of them no complaint ought to be made; and he had always deprecated attacks upon them in that House, because they were placed in circumstances of great difficulty, and it was impossible for the House to judge in particular cases of the facts which the Resident Magistrates had before them. It was, nevertheless, the fact that this body did not possess, speaking generally, the confidence of the people in Ireland; and, therefore, he considered Her Majesty's Government were bound to say "Aye" or "No" to the question as to whether or not they proposed to introduce any limitation into this clause. If they intended to stand by the words of this definition, which he was prepared to show was no definition at all, then he thought the Committee should go to a division at once. But if it was proposed to introduce some definition which would render more certain that which was now left uncertain and at large, he said it was not the duty of private Members to introduce that definition. It was the duty of the Government to do this, who were bound to put before the Committee the form of the limitation, qualification, or definition, or whatever else it might be called, which they desired to have expressed in their Bill. Now, although he should not be in Order in discussing later Amendments, he hoped he should be allowed to say that the hon. and learned Member for Christchurch (Mr. Horace Davey) had put down an Amendment to this clause, and that the hon. and learned Member for Lincoln (Mr. Hinde Palmer) had proposed words for the purpose of qualifying that Amendment. That being so, he asked the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary to read the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Christchurch, qualified as it was proposed to be, and say whether he would accept it. That Amendment, in its qualified form, would exclude from the Bill that which he ventured to say ought never to have been brought within it. Again, there was an especial reason why it appeared to him desirable that Her Majesty's Government should speak out at once. He, for one, said that there was some inconsistency, as had been pointed out by his right hon. and learned Friend, in at one time opposing a definition, and at another time insisting that there should be a definition. But the reason for that apparent inconsistency was that, if the definition was to be left as it now was, it would be better to have no definition at all. He (Mr. Russell) certainly preferred to have a definition which should clearly, accurately, and distinctly express what was to be brought within the purview of the clause and what was not; and, therefore, he respectfully urged upon the right hon. and learned Gentleman to tell the Committee in plain and unmistakable language, either that the Government did or did not insist upon the whole clause as it stood, and, if not, to state what were the limitations or alterations which they proposed. Because let the Committee remember that with regard to the clause now under discussion, which the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce) proposed to omit, was not a definition in any sense at all. It was that the expression "intimidation," used in the clause, included any word spoken, or act done, calculated to put any person in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living. The term, therefore, remained uncertain and at large, and it would still be left to the magistrates to apply the word "intimidation" to any word spoken, or act done, as they might choose to think right. For these reasons, he said the Government ought distinctly to state their intentions as to the limitation, or otherwise, of the clause.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, the Government could not be supposed to have decided upon the introduction of a clause of this character without very careful and anxious consideration; and the clause now under the consideration of the Committee was expressed in the form which, in the opinion, of the Government, offered the best means of dealing with this matter. That being so, it was not for them to alter a clause which was the result of continued deliberation. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell) had said it was not the business of private Members to amend the clause. But, then, whose business was it? The Government brought forward a clause, as they considered, in the best possible form; and, he said, it was for those who differed from it to propose Amendments to it which they considered necessary. His hon. and learned Friend—himself an ingenious lawyer—had tried his hand upon the clause by bringing forward an Amendment, which ho afterwards admitted would not do. That circumstance seemed to be rather in favour of the Government proposal. The hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce) then tried his hand at amending it, and he could not satisfy himself. Finally, the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) put down an Amendment, and the Committee had not accepted it. Up to the present time, therefore, he thought the Government clause had stood fire very well. His hon. and learned Friend, having brought forward an Amendment which did not satisfy his own mind, said that the last paragraph in the clause was no definition of the word "intimidation." That was perfectly true, and the Government had always said so. Moreover, they had said from the beginning that they did not intend to define "intimidation;" and, after four days' debate, he had only to repeat the statement. He was now asked to make a frank statement, and he said, in reply, that, in his opinion, it was impossible to define intimidation. That was the view taken in the Act of 1875; it was the view the Government had already stated, and to that they still adhered. His hon. and learned Friend said the last paragraph was not a definition — it included things which it ought not to include. But the Government thought otherwise; and if hon. Members were of a different opinion, let them discuss that question at the time when it properly came forward. His hon. and learned Friend had alluded to several alterations which had been proposed to the clause, and had asked him to say what he intended with regard to them. By all means let them be taken in order; but he submitted it was an unreasonable thing to ask him to mix them all up together, and to state what he thought of them collectively and individually, and what it was proposed to do with them by Her Majesty's Government. Her Majesty's Government proposed to submit the section as it stood to the consideration of the Committee, and, in turn, to consider the Amendments which hon. Members had put upon the Paper with a view to altering the clause. That seemed to him to be the reasonable and Parliamentary course to pursue. But he repeated that, from the point of view of his hon. and learned Friend, and from that of every hon. Member, the expression "intimidation" ought to be retained in the clause; and even if it were possible to define it, it must still stand part of the clause. The only issue before the Committee was that raised by the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce), that the clause should contain no definition at all. That was the question to be decided; and he was sure his hon. and learned Friend the author of the Amendment would admit that this was the sole issue before the Committee. By proposing to leave out the paragraph, his hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets said, in effect, "Let us leave the word 'intimidation as it stands, without definition." But the Government, while they did not think there should be definition, thought that there should be explanation; and, with this issue before them, he appealed to the Committee to allow them to go to a division.

MR. EDWARD SHEIL

said, it appeared to him, from the observations they had just listened to on the subject of the clause before the Committee, that the author of it could be no less distinguished a person than the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary himself. He hoped the Committee would not accuse the Irish Party, who offered opposition to this clause, of attempting to defend intimidation. What they protested against was that the interpretation of the clause should be left to the discretion of the Resident Magistrates, who, by their action, had already shown how little they were to be intrusted with such enormous powers, and the unkind treatment which people might expect at their hands. The hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Bus-sell) had just told the Committee that he would not trust the powers of the clause to the highest Judges of the land. That being so, let the Committee bear in mind that the proposed tribunal of Resident Magistrates was deeply distrusted by the people of Ireland, and consider how far they were likely to have their respect and confidence in future. They were not even now to be trusted with the powers which they possessed; still less were they to be trusted with those powers which even the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary himself did not attempt to defend. Therefore, he hoped, even at that time, it was not too late—especially after the wise words uttered by the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk—for the Government to re-consider their decision with reference to the clause. The Committee should bear in mind that the Resident Magistrates, who were to constitute the proposed tribunal, were closely linked with the landlords; and, although he said nothing at all against that class, there could be no doubt that, at the present moment, they were suffering under feelings of great dissatisfaction. That being so, it was not difficult to imagine what would be the consequence of placing this undefined power in the hands of men connected with a class labouring under a sense of what they believed to be wrong. It was only to be expected from such a tribunal that the powers of the Bill would be made use of in an unjust manner. He deeply regretted the position taken up by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary with regard to the clause, and could only say that as long as the Government refused the reasonable concessions asked of them, the opposition of his hon. Friends to the clause would continue.

MR. CALLAN

said, that unless some limitation of the clause was introduced, it was difficult to see what act done in Ireland might not be made to come within the operation of the Bill. The hon. and gallant Member for Cork County (Colonel Colthurst) seemed, on the subject of intimidation, to have what was vulgarly called a "flea in the ear." The Clause said that intimidation Included any word spoken or act done calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living. Now, it might be said that words uttered with regard to a Parliamentary Election which intimated to a candidate that he would be put to the expense of contesting his seat, came within the clause. Irish Members intended to put a great many Radical Members to intimidation, in the shape of the expense of a good contest at the next General Election; and he asked whether they were to be prevented putting Irish Radical Members to loss and damage in this sense on the decision of the Resident Magistrates that it was an act of intimidation? He himself might go down to the county of Cork and use words to the electors which would have the effect of putting the hon. and gallant Member opposite to the heavy expense connected with a County Election; he might have to go before the magistrates, and it might be sworn that he had done an act calculated to put a person in fear of injury to or loss of his property. The act might be held to be intimidation, and he would be liable under the Bill, unless the Home Secretary agreed to put some limitation on the paragraph. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman placed some limitation on the paragraph, his present objection would be removed; but, if not, under the circumstances he had described, he could only look forward to spending six months in the county gaol when the next election took place. The clause, as he had pointed out, referred not only to injury to the person, but to the fear of injury or loss of property; and he asked what would be a greater loss to a man than to put him to the expense of contesting his election for a large county? Very few Members, under such circumstances, would spend less than £3,000; and he ventured to say that no one was in a better position to confirm the accuracy of this statement than the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General after his experience at Taunton. He objected very strongly to the clause in its present form, and would remind the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary that, unless he agreed to place some limitation upon it, he would be adding to the length of the present discussion.

MR. JOSEPH COWEN

said, the most forcible objection which had been raised to the clause was that it would be used as a means of preventing legitimate agitation. Of course, Her Majesty's Government said they did not mean that. He did not think that was their intention; but hon. Members opposite contended that this would be the effect of the clause unless it was amended. That being so, he suggested that it might be possible to add to the clause words to the effect that nothing in the Act contained should be held to subject any person to punishment for anything said or done honestly in the protection of his own interests or in fair political agitation.

MR. METGE

said, the Government had refused, from the commencement of the discussion upon this clause, to give the Committee any definition of the word "intimidation." But the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary had, in the course of yesterday's discussion, stated that the object of the clause was to put down "Boycotting," and that he intended to judge and criticize every Amendment proposed to the clause by that test. But if the intention of the right hon. and learned Gentleman was not to define the word "intimidation," and if his wish was that this clause should not interfere with the powers of the Executive Government in Ireland to put down "intimidation," why, he asked, did he not agree with the suggestions which had been made by Irish Members on that side of the House and upon the opposite Benches below the Gangway? He did not think that either the Committee or the right hon. and learned Gentleman believed that "intimidation" would cover all the forms of "Boycotting" which would present themselves to the minds of the Resident Magistrates in Ireland; and in the case of those men who would have to carry out the provisions of the measure when it became law, there would not be a moment's hesitation as to the way in which the word "intimidation" would be interpreted. The right hon. and learned Gentleman, he believed, in his definition of "Boycotting," took a wider view of the matter than was usual with other occupants of the Go- vernment Benches. But he (Mr. Metge) thought that the opinion of the Committee was not in favour of putting down "Boycotting" in a general sense, although all were agreed that some forms of it should be put down. But the clause which the Home Secretary said now was not an attempt at definition, was certainly an attempt at description, and of a very vague character. The first word of the clause pre-supposed a large area of other crimes which the Government had included in the term "intimidation." Now, his idea of a definition of this kind was that it should be purely explanatory, or that it should be a definition of a general term by a less general term—certainly not the reverse of that method of procedure. The position, then, in which they were left with regard to the clause was most unsatisfactory, so far as the word "intimidation" was concerned. But, apart from that, there were other words in the clause which were the cause of uncertainty on account of their vagueness. There was the word "calculated," for instance, which, to his mind, was even more dangerous than "intimidation;" indeed, to his mind, it was the most dangerous word in the clause, inasmuch as it was not to be taken in the ordinary sense, but in the sense as calculated in the mind of the magistrate, or rather in the particular frame of mind in which he might happen to be at the moment. Here, then, was a word which itself condemned that part of the clause in which it was placed; and, besides this, there were other words in the clause of an equally vague character, all of which required to be defined quite as much as the word "intimidation." He believed that if the clause remained in its present form, the very widest acceptation of these terms would be taken by those who would have to carry out the Act. But the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary had stated in another argument which he advanced in support of the clause, that the meaning of "intimidation" was perfectly clear to the professional mind, but that the desire of the Government was to instruct the people of Ireland as to what was criminal under the law. This view seemed to him rather different to that which the right hon. and learned Gentleman had just stated. But, whatever might be the real object of the Govern- ment in this matter, it was not so much the wish of Members near him that the Irish people should be so instructed, as that some limit should be placed to the freedom which the Resident Magistrates were sure to take in construing the Act.

MR. T. D. SULLIVAN

said, it appeared to him that the clause, inasmuch as it would interfere with the ordinary ways of social life in Ireland, would become an absolute impossibility. He asked the Committee to consider what the clause really meant, and to look for a moment at its wording. In this Act the expression "intimidation" included any word spoken or act done calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living. That being so, let it be supposed that a shopkeeper was doing a thriving business in a particular street, and that another man chose to set up another shop of the kind in the same street. That act might ruin the business or the property of the shopkeeper first alluded to, and reduce the man to a condition of absolute pauperism. Well, it seemed to him that, as the clause stood, that perfectly innocent act of competition in business was rendered an offence against the Act. Take the case of a newspaper. He was personally interested in this matter, because he was himself a newspaper proprietor; and he asked the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary whether he would be at liberty to prosecute any person who set up a rival paper in the same city where his own newspaper was published? It seemed to him that he certainly had power, under this clause of the Bill, to prosecute and he should consider, if the event happened to which he had referred, whether or not he should use it. He would not detain the Committee by describing other cases to which the clause would be made to apply; but he repeated that it was an impossible clause, inasmuch as it covered a multitude and variety of things which could not reasonably come within the scope of a legislative measure. The application of the clause, moreover, depended on the discretion of a class of magistrates by whose judgment the people in Ireland were unwilling to abide. He contended there was no security or liberty for anyone under the measure, especially under this section of it, which was all-pervading and far-reaching; and Irish Members were, therefore, bound to limit its application if they possibly could, and to extort from the Government some definition which would restrict the injury and harm which was likely to arise under the clause. He heard the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary say on a former occasion that certain matters must be judged, not in respect of their probability, but in respect of their possibility. Acting on that advice, then, he judged that under this Bill any amount of confusion and disturbance was possible. If hon. Members could not amend the measure, they were, at least, bound to protest against it, and that they would continue to do to the last.

MR. BARRY

said, he desired to make a suggestion similar to that which had been put forward by the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen). It was believed in Ireland that the effect of this clause would be to stifle and prevent any kind of political agitation. Hon. Members were, of course aware, that the Government entirely disclaimed any such intention; and, that being so, he thought it would go a long way to remove public apprehension if the Government would insert some words to the effect that political agitation would not come within the scope of the clause. Without such a declaration, he was afraid Irish Members on those Benches could arrive at no other conclusion than that it was the deliberate intention of the Government to stifle or destroy all legitimate agitation in Ireland.

Question put.

The Committee divided: —Ayes 130; Noes 49: Majority 81.—(Div. List, No. 121.)

DR. COMMINS

said, although he had little hope of making an impression on the Committee after the very conflicting declarations which had been delivered from the Treasury Bench with regard to the intentions of the Government in the matter of this clause, and with regard also to the difficulty—nay, impossibility —of defining the word "intimidation," yet he would venture upon a definition which would be better than the so-called definition which was furnished in the Bill. He offered this to the consideration of the Committee, first, because of the utter inadequacy, from a legal point of view, of the definition which the clause contained. Intimidation, they were told, by this so-called description or definition, or whatever other name was to be given to it, included Any word spoken or act done calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living. Now, he said that these words were so wide as to be inadmissible in any Act of Parliament—that they were so wide as to include every or any act of a man's life; that by them "intimidation" was so enlarged as to mean anything beside that which the act or word expressed to the person alleged to be intimidated by it. Whether or not that was the view which the Government took of the clause, it was its effect from the legal point of view. An hon. Member (Mr. Barry) had thrown out to the right hon. and learned Home Secretary a general challenge to say what was meant, and what interpretation was to be given to the words of the clause; but his hon. Friend was no lawyer, or he would have known that no declaration of the kind would have been worth the paper it was printed on. No Judge or magistrate, whether superior or otherwise, having to administer this Act, nor even a policeman, would be bound to pay the slightest regard to the Home Secretary's declaration as to the meaning of the words which the paragraph proposed to explain. It was the Judges, and the Judges alone, who could interpret an Act of Parliament, and the Judges did interpret Acts of Parliament by rules which were as well known as those of arithmetic. It was not for one moment to be supposed that men whose business it was to interpret Acts of Parliament passed during a period of 800 years would not know now to interpret this Act. Why, every legal interpretation, ancient and modern, would be exhausted by them in its administration. Therefore, he said, the clause must be judged by the words out of which it was constructed, and, taking those words, the definition might mean anything. To begin with, it did not answer the purpose of a logical definition at all, which meant what a term included, to the exclusion of everything else, and, so far from doing that, it gave no information whatever as to what it excluded, while it allowed you to include anything you liked. From the point of view, then, of the logician, the definition was utterly bad, and the student who offered the words in the paragraph as a logical definition of intimidation would probably be turned out of his class. The so-called definition was so ungrammatical and illogical as to be utterly worthless. The hon. and learned Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Bulwer) and the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. R. T. Reid) had respectively instanced the crimes of manslaughter and fraud as offences not defined in law. But, if they had been criminal lawyers, they would have known that there was not an indictable offence in England which had been more strictly and logically defined than that of fraud. The hon. Member for Hereford ought to have known that the whole catalogue of offences were most strictly defined which he said the law of England had never defined at all. No doubt, the hon. Member found a proposition laid down in some elementary treatise, that the Courts of Equity never defined fraud, because, if they limited the term, the ingenuity of the fraudulent would seek to go outside the limits laid down. But both the hon. Members in question, as well as the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary, who put forward this as undoubted law, forgot that the House of Commons was not now dealing with equitable principles, but with principles of Criminal Law; and so the absurd statement that fraud had never been defined, was used as an argument in favour of the legislation proposed to be created by this Bill. Now, there was no such offence known to the law as "Boycotting," and to say that the word "intimidation" meant that, was only to make the difficulty worse than it was before. It was impossible to get a definition of that term, because no two persons were agreed as to what "Boycotting" was. One person might consider it to be legitimate non-intercourse, and another legitimate exclusive dealing; and if this section of the Act were intended to prevent legitimate acts of that kind, all he would say was, that the Bill constituted an attempt at imposing upon the people of Ireland the grossest tyranny ever exercised in a civilized country. It was an invasion of the rights of humanity which no people would endure, and which would produce a thousand crimes in defence of those rights. He wished to examine whether this description was open to that charge. Intimidation, according to the wording, included Any word spoken or act done calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living. Now, no act was criminal according to law unless the intent was criminal. Here, however, the word was not"intended"—it was "calculated." But the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary said there were other words which would carry that meaning to be found in the Bill. If that were so, why were they not employed here? In whose mind was this word "calculated" to operate? Was it in the mind of the magistrate, or the policeman who happened to be getting up the case? Did this mean "calculated" in the mind of a nervous man or woman, or in the mind of some person spying upon another man's acts. Lord Hale, in treating of the intimidation which would reduce what would be otherwise murder to an act of self-defence, said that the fear which the law would take into consideration in judging that offence must be the kind of fear that would fall upon a brave and firm man and not upon a fool. But in this definition they had no restriction as to the kind of fear which the person intimidated was to suffer. He would now examine whether there was any single act which a man committed that might not put some person in fear of loss of property, means of living, or of injury or danger to himself, or some member of his family, and he began with the acts of a man's public life. Suppose a man attended a public meeting. Public meetings in Ireland were aggregations of large numbers of human beings. Mobs were liable to become riotous, and a person who considered that the action of an assembly which he attended was calculated to put him in fear would naturally be inclined to prosecute those who took part in it, and he might appeal to the words of the clause, and the magistrate adminis- tering the Act would be strictly and legally bound to convict according to the legal interpretation of the clause. Nothing more would be necessary than that the prosecutor should say—"It was calculated in my mind to cause injury to myself and put me in fear; therefore, I call upon you by the law to give these persons six months' imprisonment." That would be the result of a public meeting. He would now take the case of the private acts of individuals, and inquire whether any private act would be free from the construction which the apprehensions or fears of an individual might place on the acts of another. A man might go out after nightfall, wishing to call, say, upon a neighbour—now, it was well known that in Ireland persons never met each other without a form of salutation—and supposing this person happened to meet a policeman, or someone who he believed was ready to do him an injury, and passed him by without the customary salute, the person so passed by might say to himself—"This man has passed me without a salute; he means to terrify me, and he did terrify me." A prosecution might be instituted in this case under the legal interpretation of this section, unless the words were defined as he proposed they should be. He would now refer to cases which had occurred in Ireland, and in connection with which there had been some utterly illegal convictions — convictions which under this Bill would be now legalized. And here he would remark that it was a marked feature of the Bill that it made things legal which were formerly illegal, and other things illegal which before were legally done according to right and usage. Take the case of a person setting up a school in opposition to another already existing. A case of the kind occurred in the neighbourhood of Mallow. The Attorney General for Ireland would know this case very well, for it occurred in his own neighbourhood. Of course, the cry was set up that the second school was a school of the Land League; but not only was the person who established it prosecuted for holding a Land League school and exercising the ordinary occupation or profession of a schoolmaster, but he was sent to prison, and when he came back to the place he was driven out by the police. This was one of the most high-handed acts he had heard of for some time, and the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General for Ireland had been compelled to offer some attempted justification for it. Then there was the case of a gentleman who went to pay a visit to a lady, and whom a policeman, without the decision of any Judge, but with that assumption of authority which was unjustified by any law of the land, ordered to leave the house. These were the kind of things which would be legalized by this Act. Again, fairs were very common in Ireland, and it was well-known that within the last few months, people, instead of going to the fair green at a place in Queen's County, transacted their business on the high road, and in this case, both buyers and sellers were prosecuted. There was probably a question of franehize connected with this, but the buyers and sellers had a right to meet on the public road and make their bargains. Under this section, these people could now be legally convicted. He would take another case of what had occurred within the last 12 months, and which, unless this clause were modified, might happen again. Again, they had heard a great deal of the cruelty of "Boycotting" a blacksmith's forge, and the loss of business consequent upon it. They knew that the amount of business for blacksmiths in Ireland was very small, and that, as a rule, an Irish village would only support one business of the kind; they knew that some blacksmiths had made themselves unpopular, and that other blacksmiths looking for business had gone to some villages and set up other forges there. These men were regarded as quite illegal blacksmiths, and under this Act could be prosecuted and sent to gaol, because they interfered with the business of other persons. The same with coopers; and, on similar grounds, they would be liable under this Act. He did not wish to detain the Committee with an enumeration of the instances to which he might refer; but he would say that there was scarcely an act of any kind, public or private, that any person in Ireland could do, but might under this Bill, if it were passed into law, be hold by some magistrate to be to the injury or damage of a man's property, business, or means of living, or as tending to put him in fear of such injury or damage. But it was said that they were better off under the provisions of this Bill than the English people were under the Conspiracy Act of 1875, because the Conspiracy Act of 1875 did not define intimidation. But this argument, as used by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary, did not hold water at all; because, to begin with, the clause or sub-section they wore now discussing did not give a definition of what was to be construed as intimidation. All it did was to add other things to intimidation, instead of defining what intimidation was. The provision appealed to by the right hon. and learned Gentleman had been appealed to over and over again by the hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon) as giving a definition of intimidation, and there could be no harm in him (Dr. Commins) referring to it again. Ho wished to call the attention of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary to the point, because, although in the Act of 1875, in which they were getting rid of what was in the previous Acts—while in the present case they did not attempt to finish what that Act intended to do—the clause relating to this subject was so constructed as to restrict the meaning of the word "intimidation," and the cases which were to be considered as intimidation were kept within very narrow and easy limits, so as to afford a tolerable definition of an illegal act. The 7th section of the Act of 1875 was described in the side note as a section imposing a penalty for the offence of intimidation, or annoyance by violence, or otherwise. The section set forth that— Whosoever, with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing an act which he has a right to do, or to do an act which he has a right to abstain from doing, without legal authority, uses violence to intimidate such other person, or his wife or child, or injures his property, shall be guilty of the offence of intimidation created by the Act. This clause defined the offence of indimidation, and the definition was a very good one as far as it went. It showed, in the first place, that the person intimidating must direct his violence towards some individual, because it defined a certain "other person, or his wife or child," and spoke of injury to the property of "such other person." Here, therefore, the words of the section set forth clearly that there could be no intimidation unless there was, first of all, a person to be brought forward who could be shown to have been intimidated, or intended to have been intimidated. The person accused of the offence of intimidation under that section must be shown to have intimidated some other person, or his wife or family, by using violence, or by injuring the property of that other person. The main point here was that there must of necessity be a person to be intimidated, and it must be shown that the accused intended to intimidate him or to injure his property. But how stood the case with regard to the section at that moment under the consideration of the Committee? That section was so rudely constructed that the person to be intimidated need have no existence at all; while in the Act of 1875 he must not only exist, but he must be set forth in the proceedings as the person it was intended to intimidate, or whose property was to have been injured, and this person must be brought into Court. It must be shown that the person so appearing in Court, or his wife or family, were intimidated, or intended to be intimidated, and the act of intimidation must be proved. But, under the present section, there need not be any specified person against whom intimidation was intended to be exercised. He might be anybody or nobody, and it need not be proved that the act done or the word spoken really had intimidated anyone, or that there was anyone who could be intimidated. They all knew that under the ordinary law it was a legal necessity that unless they had the person whose pocket was picked, or attempted to be picked, they could not prove the offence of picking or attempting to pick a pocket; but here they had a statutory provision, under which it was to be enacted that a man might intimidate a non-existing person, and by which he might be convicted of the crime of intimidation where no person was intimidated, or nobody existed who could be intimidated at all, or where no one need come forward to say he had been intimidated. This was very different from what had been done by the Act of 1875, which, as he had shown by reference to the Statute itself, had made it absolutely necessary, in order to constitute the offence it created, that there must be a person who had been intimidated, and not a vague and indefinite person who might have existed, or whom it might have been intended to intimidate, or whose property it might have been intended to injure, or whose wife or child it might have been intended to intimidate, and upon whom the act alleged must have taken effect. That which he had quoted from the Conspiracy Act of 1875 was, he wished the Committee to perceive, consistent with the whole force and bent of the English law as it was ordinarily understood and applied. According to the English law, as it had hitherto been construed, there must be a person to be convicted of the offence charged. It was one of those old maxims of the law of England which had been instituted by the wisdom of the past, and which had been steadfastly maintained for the purpose of protecting people from having false charges brought against them, that before any person had been convicted of an offence it was necessary that proof should be given of a corpus delicti. He saw one of the greatest lawyers in England on the Bench opposite to him, and he challenged the right hon. and learned Gentleman to bring forward a single instance in the whole Criminal Law of the country of an offence having been proved against any individual without there being satisfactory proof of a corpus delicti. He challenged not only the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but any other learned Member of that House to bring forward a single case in which this proof had not been necessary; and yet, in defiance of this well-understood legal maxim, it was now proposed to create, in an Act to be applied to Ireland, a new doctrine entirely subversive of the existing state of things. He did not think he need go any further to show how utterly dangerous was the description of intimidation sought to be introduced into this Bill, nor need he go further to show that the clause would be better, that the administration of justice would be rendered more safe, by striking out the words to which he objected, and leaving it to Johnson's Dictionary and to the common sense of the magistrates who would have to administer the law, to say what intimidation was, so that the people might know what they would have to avoid, and would be able to keep clear of the risk of conviction with regard to what they might do or abstain from doing. It would, he repeated, have been a great deal better to have left it thus. In the Criminal Law there ought to be no crime and no offence— and, practically, there was none at the present time known to the law—of which there was not some definition, so that persons might know what it was they had to avoid. It was a universal principle underlying all their Criminal Jurisprudence that it was utterly unjust, and, therefore, inexpedient, unwise and impolitic, as well as cruelly mischievous, that any person should be liable to be accused and convicted of an offence which he could not himself commit, and as to which there were no means of knowing whether it was an offence or not, and with regard to which the conviction was only to be obtained by ex post facto legislation to be administered by any "Justice Shallow" who might happen to be in a position of authority. For this reason, he urged that it would be much better if the Government or the Committee were willing to strike the objectionable paragraph out altogether, and trust, as he had already said, to common sense and Johnson's Dictionary for an interpretation or definition of the offence against which it was sought by this Bill to provide; at the same time, acting on the uniform, universal, well-established, and scientific principle of legislation he had endeavoured, it might be very presumptuously, to expound. Why, he asked, did not the Government adopt this course instead of adhering to their proposal, and attempting to do what the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary had admitted that they were unable to do; what he had also said the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell) had tried, and was equally unable to do; what the hon. and learned Member for Christchurch (Mr. Horace Davey) and the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce) were unable to do; and, lastly, what the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Cowen) was also unable to do, for the hon. Gentleman had made a suggestion, in reference to which the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary had said he could not make a definition of the offence of intimidation? It might be exceedingly presumptuous on his (Dr. Commins') part to deal with such a question; but he had, at all events, made an attempt, and unless the Government were enabled to make a better one, he would submit his proposition to the Committee, in the hope that it might be deemed worthy of acceptance; and he did so on the ground that, however imperfect it might be in other respects, it would have the effect of narrowing the question, and of giving the Irish people to understand what it was they were to avoid, while it would also give the Justices clearly enough to understand what it was they would have to convict an accused person of having done. To begin with, there was one thing in his Amendment which, in his opinion, ought to recommend itself to the Committee on the very common principle that ought to be observed in legislating for Ireland, and, it was this, that it enunciated a cast-off principle of English legislation, which, like old clothes, in some cases, seemed to be good enough for Ireland; for the Irish people were glad enough to take occasionally these cast-off principles. In the Criminal Law Amendment Act, which the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary had reminded them of, there was a definition of criminal intimidation. That definition was of such a character that it aroused the whole of the trades unions of England to something like frenzy, and the consequence was that they agitated the whole country against it. They held public meetings at which they denounced it, they presented Petitions against it, and they made it a leading topic on the platform of the Trades Unions' agitation from the year 1871 to the year 1874. So effectual was that agitation, that in the course of those four years they compelled the Government to withdraw that definition, and to re-cast the Act of 1871, of which the Committee had heard so much. And why had the Government done this? It was because they considered that it was too wide for application in England; it left too much to the discretion of the magistrates; it interfered too much with the freedom of trade in England; it afforded too much power to interfere with trade combinations in England. And when he offered it now, humbly saying it was a cast-off principle of English law, for the acceptance of the Committee, he urged that it ought, at least, to carry with it the recommendation that it was, as he feared, only the cast-off English principles that the Irish ever got. In the Criminal Law Amendment Act criminal intimidation was defined as such intimidation as would justify its being dealt with as an offence under the law—as any threatening, or attempt to intimidate, as would enable a Justice of the Peace, on a complaint being made to him, to bind over the person guilty of such threat or act of intimidation in securities to keep the peace. That was the provision contained in the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1871, and it was found that it was too wide for England — that Englishmen would not have it—that they felt it to be an intrusion on their liberties, and would, if insisted upon, tend to provoke the working classes to civil war. He thought, therefore, that the Irish people were not asking too much when they said they would be glad to have applied to them a law which the English working class would not bear even for so short a period as three years. They would be glad to get the law, even in that form. But he would say more than this, because he had drawn his Amendment in such a way as to include every act of intimidation that he had heard complained of in that House, and that might properly be said to be a criminal act. They had heard many eloquent descriptions of "Boycotting" in the course of these debates, and a variety of methods by which "Boycotting" was practised had been brought under the attention of the Committee. Indeed, many things that were said to be included in the resort to "Boycotting" were perfectly legitimate—things which, he asserted, could not be touched by the Bill before the Committee without attacking the most sacred and natural rights of the Irish people. The vulgar form of "Boycotting" included things which, assuredly, if any semblance of liberty was to be retained, the people of Ireland ought to be allowed to do. The Irish peasant, surely, was entitled to associate with whom he pleased, as long as he cared to associate with them; he was entitled to trade with whom he chose, so long as those persons did not improperly carry on any business requiring a Government licence, such, for instance, as that of a publican or a person licensed to let cars for hire; and he was also entitled to work for whom he pleased. If this liberty was to be denied, the Irish people would be placed in a worse position than that of the people of Russia—although there, no doubt, such a thing as the exercise or non-exercise of a man's ordinary occupation might be punished as a cri- minal offence. Nevertheless, here they found that, under the shallow and hollow name of liberty, hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House were coolly proposing to subject men to the grievous penalty of six months' imprisonment for refusing to associate with those whom they did not like, and for refusing to work for those whom they considered to be infamous characters who were not deserving of their service. If they were to preserve the smallest semblance of liberty in Ireland, these rights must be retained. Her Majesty's Government, no matter how loosely they might construct the law, or what persons they might intrust with the administration of it; no matter how they might oppress the people with soldiers and police; no matter what amount of intimidation there might be on the side of the Government—for, no doubt, this was an attempt to counteract intimidation by intimidation—no amount of intimidation it was in the power of Her Majesty's Government to apply, unless they went back to a period of early Irish history and exterminated the people — shooting them at sight, as directed by a recent Circular about which they had heard enough described — unless this was what they intended to do, any provision like that contained in the clause under discussion would prove utterly inoperative; and, so far from having the effect of putting a stop to "Boycotting" and non-intercourse, and refusing to work for persons who were disliked, it would only have a tendency to aggravate the evil, and merely drive what now was discontent to desperation, and desperation to outrage. Under this Bill, if passed, they would only find results similar to the results of like Acts of oppression which had been inflicted on Ireland in past years, often without even the sanction of the law, and it would be seen that the consequences of further legislative oppression would be the mere repetition of acts and scenes which no one in that House deplored more than he did. Therefore it was that he now came forward with an endeavour to safeguard the last remnant of human liberty in Ireland—the last remnant of social freedom, and the means of social and commercial intercourse. Of course, it might be said that this might be very unpleasant to some people; but he would point out that the evils inflicted by oppressive legislation had been very unpleasant to some people, and the desperate social remedies to which they had been driven in consequence had been so very unpleasant to many people, that he had heard the right hon. Gentleman the late Chief Secretary for Ireland, from his place on the Treasury Bench, describe them as outrages on humanity. Two years ago, before the right hon. Gentleman became indoctrinated with the spirit of Irish diplomacy, before his good intentions had had their first blush rubbed off, he had heard him say that the landlord who, in the then state of the country, used to the full his legal rights, would be deserving of the execration of humanity. These were high words, and he (Dr. Commins) distinctly remembered their being used in that House. But they did not hear such language now. At the present moment, instead of these people being said to be deserving of the execration of humanity, it was those who merely exercised their human privilege of leaving others alone who were to be deemed deserving of the execration of humanity, and the infliction upon them of the penalty of death by military execution. He threw down the challenge to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary, or whoever else had charge of the Bill, to point out one single act of that class of "Boycotting" which was understood in the ordinary and vulgar application of the system so-called, that ought properly to be restrained by the intervention of the law, which would not be included within the four corners of the Amendment he asked the Committee to adopt. Let the Government suggest any such act that was not included in the Amendment, and if he found that this was so he would include it. Hon. Members on the Opposition Benches below the Gangway had been challenged to produce their definition of intimidation, and they had answered the challenge. Her Majesty's Government had confessed themselves incapable of furnishing a definition, and he (Dr. Commins) now came forward and said he was ready with a definition, which he now furnished—a definition that would include every offence and every possible combination that could be engaged in with intent to do illegal damage to a third person. If this were not enough for the Committee, if they wanted something wider than his Amend- ment, all he could say was that the spirit which had hitherto characterized the law seemed to have somewhat gone out of it, while those who were engaged in the framing of the law preferred that it should remain vague and obscure, and appeared to be animated by the spirit of those who, in ancient Borne, hung up the Twelve Tables so high that the people were unable to read them. He would put it to the Committee whether it was possible for any reasonable man to say, before the civilized world, that the laws which were to govern Ireland were made so that the people of that country could be expected to understand them? Under this Bill, it was proposed to create an offence that could not be defined; and he maintained that this was done as a snare or pitfall which was to be laid for the Irish people by a class of officials who had always been looked upon as the oppressors of the people. Ho was sorry to have taken up so much of the time of the Committee, and he must thank the Committee most cordially for the attention with which it had received his most imperfect observations. He would conclude by saying that unless something better than the definition of intimidation at present inserted in the clause were furnished by the Government—if, in fact, the Government persisted in their expressed intention, and adhered to the description or definition, such as it was, that they had already given, they would leave the Bill open to the observation that it was a measure not directed against violence, not directed against crime, not directed against injustice, but one which was in reality directed against public opinion. In which case he told Her Majesty's Government that in the long run they would find public opinion to be too strong for their Bill, and too strong for themselves. He begged to move the Amendment which stood in his name.

Amendment proposed, In page 3, line 25, to leave out all the words after the word "intimidation" to the end of the Clause, in order to insert the words "shall mean any words spoken or act done against any person from which he would have reasonable grounds to apprehend that the person using such words, or doing such act, intended to do him some illegal damage, or to cause or incite some other person or persons to do him such damage, in such manner as would justify a justice of the peace, on complaint made to him in that regard, to bind over the person guilty of such language or act in securities to keep the peace."—(Dr. Commins.)

Question proposed, "That the word 'includes' stand part of the Clause."

MR. O'SULLIVAN

said, he hoped the Committee would accept the Amendment just moved by his hon. Friend the Member for Roscommon (Dr. Commins). If they made no other step in the shape of altering or amending the Bill, they certainly ought, in his opinion, to adopt this proposal, because if the clause were to be left in its present shape, with its wide and sweeping language unaltered, it would be open to any Justice of the Peace to put any construction he might think fit on the word "intimidation."

Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; Committee counted, and 40 Members being found present.

MR. O'SULLIVAN

said, there were many things in the clauses of the Bill to which he objected, and there were some to which he had the strongest possible objection, and among the latter was the paragraph in the clause then under consideration, which the Amendment moved by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Roscommon (Dr. Commins) proposed to omit, and for which it was intended as a substitute. The words used in the clause were— Any word spoken or act done calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living. This would leave it open for the magistrate before whom a case was brought to put his own construction on a word that might have been used by someone in a passion, but who only used it in the heat of the moment, and had no intention to do any injury. As to the words— Or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living, it might be that a man might lose his property, business, or means of living, by the mere result of ordinary opposition or competition in his trade. It was quite possible for one man to thoroughly destroy another's business by commencing an opposition to him in the next street; and if the Committee was to legislate in this loose way and give such wide scope to the magistrates in their interpretation of the clause, they would find that many persons would be committed to prison who ought not to be so dealt with. If, however, the Committee accepted the Amendment, it would have the effect of furnishing such a definition of intimidation as would prevent the sweeping constructions that would otherwise be put upon innocent words and acts by magistrates, who would not be at all scrupulous in going to any length they were enabled to do. There were several other parts of the clause that were very objectionable; but if the Committee accepted the Amendment of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Roscommon (Dr. Commins) these objections would be greatly modified, for that Amendment would define the charges on which a man might be brought before the magistrates and convicted in the penalties imposed by the Bill. It certainly appeared to him a very hard thing that because a man who had been worked into a passion might make use of words which he had no intention of carrying out—expressions which he only suffered to escape him in the heat of the moment—he should be liable to be brought before a magistrate, and committed to prison for a term of six months, for having said what was calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself or family. It might be held under the clause, as it stood, that one man threatened to do injury to another by setting up in business and starting an opposition trade. Therefore, he thought that if Her Majesty's Government intended to permit any change to be made in the Bill or to accept any Amendment, the Amendment of his hon. and learned Friend (Dr. Commins) ought to be adopted. If, however, the Government were determined to throw down their Bill on the Table and say they must have the Bill, the whole Bill, and nothing but the Bill, it would be of no use to attempt making any further Amendment. If, on the other hand, they were disposed to listen to reason, he would strongly recommend them to accept this Amendment. There was nothing objectionable in the Amendment, nothing that could be regarded as wrong; and it would not alter the Bill very much if adopted, but would merely show the Irish people that they need not be afraid of the measure, unless they choose to commit themselves by acting in an unlawful manner. What he wanted to see secured was the protection of the men who were innocent, and who, having made use of words they were sorry for directly afterwards, ought not to be subjected to the heavy penal consequences of this Bill. If the Committee would accept the Amendment of his hon. and learned Friend (Dr. Commins), they would be affording this protection by putting the offence of intimidation in a definite shape.

MR. O'KELLY

said, he regarded what had taken place with regard to this clause as a striking illustration of the temper of the Government. The matter now under consideration was very important. If Her Majesty's Government simply meant to deal, as they had previously intimated, with actual acts of violence, or with acts tending to incite to violence, he thought they might very fairly accept the Amendment of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Roscommon (Dr. Commins); but, from the silence they had hitherto observed with reference to that Amendment, it might, perhaps, be assumed that they had definitely made up their minds to make no concession to the Irish Members in the passage of this measure, and that they intended to insist on the passage of every clause in the Bill, whether it was reasonable or unreasonable—and no matter how unreasonable the Irish Members might show it to be. If the clause stood as it was originally drawn, without amendment, it would be the means of inflicting very great hardship and injustice on the Irish people—not on any small class in Ireland, but on the general population of the country. The effect of this clause would be very widely felt, because it would place the people completely at the mercy of every policeman and every hanger-on of a landlord or of a landlord's agent in Ireland; and he assumed that the Government scarcely desired to place so unreasonable and unconstitutional a power in the hands of irresponsible persons. If the Government would only go so far even as to pledge themselves to the Committee that this measure, stringent as it was in many of its provisions, should only be put in force with the consent of the Executive Government in Ireland, they might then have some guarantee that it would not be used for the purpose of executing local vengeance, or for the satisfaction of petty spites. But, in its present form, there was no guarantee that every maliciously-disposed person in the country might not make use of the Bill, when passed, for the purpose of wreaking his own private vengeance; and, so far from contributing to the peaceableness of the community, the constant tendency of the operation of the measure would be to promote friction among the people. If Her Majesty's Government would accept the definition offered by this Amendment, the people of Ireland would at least be able to form something like a clear notion of what was legal and what was not legal—of what they might do under this measure, and what they might not do. If the Government insisted on maintaining the clause in its integrity, no one would be able to understand what were the limits of his rights— what he would be at liberty to say, or what act he would be at liberty to do. This he hold to be a most unreasonable state of things, and one that no sensible Government ought to promote or be the means of bringing about in any country. According to the Amendment, any person who might be in any way injured, or in any way threatened, or put in danger to his person or his property, by which he could seek protection under the existing law, would be able to go into Court and punish the person who had attacked or threatened him; and he was sure that this would supply the Executive in Ireland, and those who had to administer the law in that country, with ample powers for dealing with any system of "Boycotting" or of social ostracism that might be attempted in Ireland.

MR. LEAMY

said, he would not pretend to say ho was at all surprised at the Government not accepting the Amendment of his hon. and learned Friend (Dr. Commins), because he assumed that by this time they had made up their minds not to accept any Amendment that might come from that quarter of the House. The Government were determined not to accept any advice it received even from its own supporters, including some very distinguished lawyers; and by insisting on carrying the clause under discussion without amendment, they were committing to the Irish magistrates a power which ought not to be given to anyone. It seemed to him that if the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary had inserted words in the clause that would have included any word spoken or act done by any person in Ireland, he would have given the Committee about as good an indication of what was intended to come within the purview of the Bill as he had done by what he called his explanation. The right hon. and learned Gentleman had told them he was not able to define intimidation, and stated that he had not attempted to do it; but he had endeavoured to explain what was meant, and the explanation was that any word spoken or act done that might be calculated, in the opinion of the magistrates, to put any man in fear of injury, or loss of property, or business, or means of living, was intimidation. He (Mr. Leamy) confessed that he failed to see how any magistrate, acting honestly under the powers given by this Bill, could refuse to sentence, either to a mild or a long term of imprisonment, anyone who criticized the conduct or character of another, or spoke ill of another in regard to the conduct of his trade. If a man ventured to suggest that the goods of a particular shopkeper were not worth buying, or told a friend that he could get a better class of goods from one man than from another, he would, under the operation of this clause, be liable to be brought before the magistrates, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. There was nothing in the clause which stated that the surrounding circumstances were to be taken into account. It would be quite enough for a man to say to another—"I advise you not to deal at such a person's shop, because you cannot get good articles there," to bring a man under the penalties of this Bill. The Amendment would, if carried, have the effect of rendering any man liable to be sent to gaol under the Bill, provided he used such language or did such act as under the Act of Edward III., which conferred large powers, would enable the magistrates to Bind a man over to keep the peace. They had, within the last few months, seen men bound over to keep the peace in Ireland under that Statute; and they knew very well that in the opinion of the present Irish Government the conduct of the magistrates, in the judg- ments they had given under that Statute, was regarded as harsh, as was shown by the action the Executive had since taken. Anyone who had had experience of the numerous and varied cases in which the magistrates were able, under the Statute of Edward III., to bind people over to keep the peace, would see that if the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Roscommon (Dr. Commins) were accepted, in nearly every case—he might say he was sure it would happen in every case—in which the Government would desire the law to interfere the magistrates would have power to send any man to gaol under this Bill. But he supposed the Government must be considered to have resolved on carrying the Bill as it stood. They had come to the determination that when once they had put a word into the Bill it could not be taken out again without somehow going back on the principles of good government, and all that sort of thing. They had also seen, during the last few days, in the discussions that had taken place on this Bill, that the moment Her Majesty's Government ventured, even ever so slightly, to speak in favourable terms of some Amendment or suggestion from the Benches occupied by the Irish Members, some Conservative occupant of the Front Bench immediately got up and said to the Government —"Oh, you must not do such a thing." Why should you speak in such a civil way to hon. Members opposite? The Irish people will think you are not in earnest, that you are not sincere, that you mean nothing, if you give way on this point. "The Government knew very well that they could carry the clause. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary said that evening, the clause had stood fire very well during the last three days. Why, if the Irish Members had riddled the clause, and it had been also riddled by the supporters of the Government, so that they had not left one single word of the clause, as originally drafted, in its place, the Government, and the majority they had at their back, would set the clause up again exactly as it was before. What, therefore, was the use of hon. Members riddling a clause, if the Government were determined to force it down their throats? Of course, it was the duty of the Irish Members to protest against this course. They all know very well that the effect of the administration by the magistrates of the now Bill would only be to further exasperate the people. They would be convinced by what was now proposed that they had nothing to hope for from the great Liberal Government which had come into Office with such sounding promises for the amelioration of the condition of the Irish people, and winning them over to the side of law and order by making the law something which they could respect, and could not in every case afford to complain of. But how had these promises been kept? This Bill was not intended to afford protection. As the hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon) had pointed out, there was a wide difference between this measure and the English Act of 1875— the Act which the English workmen obtained to relieve them of restrictions and prevent undue interference with the right of combination. The hon. Member had shown that the magistrates, knowing the spirit in which that Act was introduced, would feel it their duty to be as slow as possible to punish those who were brought before them under it. But in this case they had a Bill which said that every act done, or word spoken, that might be deemed calculated to injure anyone in his business or property was a crime; and it would be almost impossible for any magistrate, however desirous he might be to administer the law fairly, to allow a single act or word brought to his notice to go unpunished as a crime. He should be glad if they could get some intimation from the Government as to whether or not they intended to leave out the last words of the clause—the words "any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living." It appeared to him that, as the clause then stood, if a tenant said to his landlord, "I won't pay my rent," he could be summoned to the Court and sentenced to three or six months' hard labour. Did the Government intend that because a man might refuse to pay his rent, or said he had not enough money, and would not pay for a month or more, he should be sent to gaol for that? Because, if a man used such language, he would be clearly saying that which was calculated to put his landlord in fear of injury and loss of property. When a tenant said he should not pay his rent then, or he had not the means, the landlord might very likely be in some fear that he would never get his rent at all, and, as his rent was his property, that would be fear of the loss of his property; and he (Mr. Leamy) did not see how any magistrate administering the law could pass this over. It was, he was afraid, evident that the Government were resolved to carry the clause through as it stood in the Bill. They had done the same thing last year, and they had failed in the object they had intended to secure; and he had very little doubt that when the House of Commons met again next Session the Government would be compelled to admit that this latest Coercion Act was as complete a failure as the last had been.

MR. HEALY

regretted that this Amendment must exclude consideration of the next, because it would be necessary to put in the word "include," and he did not know whether the Government had any objection to inserting that word. The opposition of the Government was an extraordinary one. They wished magistrates to have power to sentence men to six months' imprisonment for anything that they could imagine; and they proposed to place no limitation upon that power whatever. He would like to hear from the Government whether their position was one of a non possumus character, and whether they refused to give any concessions and no reasons for their refusal. It was not usual, when an Amendment had been moved, for the Government to say nothing upon it.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Sir FARRER HERSCHELL)

said, the hon. and learned Member for Roscommon (Dr. Commins) had, in speaking upon this Amendment, dealt with many things which were really outside the scope of the Amendment, and had given a number of illustrations of cases which he said would come under the clause, but which he (the Solicitor General) thought it would be impossible to bring under the clause. The hon. and learned Member had left out of sight the fact that, in order to bring any person within the scope of the Act, any act done or word spoken must be 'done with a view to coerce someone to do something he did not wish to do. Those were the governing words of the clause, and that purpose must be proved in every case in which an offence was alleged against any person. The hon. and learned Member said he had taken the grounds of the Amendment from the Act of 1871. It was perfectly true that that Act contained, not exactly this definition, but something in the nature of this definition of intimidation. But that definition was abandoned when the Act of 1875 was passed; and the hon. and learned Member was mistaken in saying that the agitation which took place was against that definition of intimidation. It was directed against a different part of the Bill altogether—namely, that relating to molesting and obstructing, and had nothing to do with intimidation or the definition of intimidation. When the Act of 1875 was passed, it was thought wiser not to define intimidation, and, therefore, intimidation was omitted. He could not think the hon. and learned Member had been so successful in defining intimidation as to meet all cases, which he should have thought every hon. Member would desire to meet under this Bill. If that definition were accepted, the only cases in which a man could be punished for intimidation would be those in which he had done acts or uttered words in respect to which he could be bound over to keep the peace. Surely there had been sufficient illustrations during this debate to show that acts were done in violation of liberty in Ireland—and admittedly so done by the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) and others—which would not come within this Amendment at all; and the hon. Member for the City of Cork admitted that it was desirable to put a stop to "Boycotting" which was used for purposes of a most objectionable and cruel character—to prevent persons obtaining the means of livelihood, and so starving them into submission to a course which they thought was not the right course. He thought many hon. Members would join with the hon. Member for the City of Cork in wishing to cut down that practice; and when the hon. and learned Member for Roscommon proposed to alter this clause in order to leave some vestige of liberty, as he said, to the people of Ireland, he would remind the hon. and learned Member that what the Government desired was that the people of Ireland should be left free, and should not be coerced and forced by intimidation to what their consciences condemned. He could not imagine, in the name of liberty, any invocation of tyranny greater than that from the Irish Benches. Why was it the Government desired to see this clause passed? He did not think even Irish Members could doubt that it was because it was revolting to one's whole nature that a man should be forced and driven by the acts of others, and by the fear of starvation, to take a course which his conscience condemned. Could there be more horrible tyranny than that? When he thought of those who had been thus coerced and driven against their own will and desire, it was very difficult to be altogether patient with criticisms, some of which were conceived directly against the Bill, as though it were a wicked thing to endeavour to put a stop to crime. If a better way could be shown of doing this, or if there were mistakes in the drafting of the Bill, by all means let that be done, and the Government would anxiously and carefully consider the objections, and would do everything possible to put down the terrible affliction which had been visited upon many people in Ireland. Who were the people the Government wished to protect? The Irish people. [Mr. HEALY: The Irish landlords.] It was something new to him to learn that Irish landlords had not a right to be protected from intimidation. Had even an Irish landlord no rights? Was it wrong to protect him, and leave him at liberty to act within his rights as a landlord? But he denied that it was the Irish landlords whom this Bill was designed to protect. The Irish landlords were one class, and a very small class, of those whom the Bill was designed to protect. There was not a class in Ireland that had not suffered more than landlords—peasants and farmers had all suffered from "Boycotting" infinitely more than landlords—and, therefore, he denied that the Bill was intended to protect landlords alone. It was for all men and all classes in Ireland; and he should have thought that the hon. Members opposite might have been willing to assist rather than impede the carrying into effect of a clause which would have the effect of preventing intimidation and coercion of a kind which seemed to be of the worst and most cruel description that could be imagined. The course which the Legislature had pursued might be bad; but the coercion by men actuated by selfishness and evil passions was infinitely worse than the most mistaken coercion of the most mistaken Government that ever existed. He altogether demurred to the view of the hon. and learned Member for Roscommon, that there was something wrong in putting a stop to this coercion, and the Amendment now before the Committee would not meet that case; and that was his objection to it. There were kinds of intimidation which hon. Members below the Gangway opposite admitted were not justifiable; and he thought ho had fulfilled the demand that was made upon him by stating, in as plain terms as he could, the reason why, although they were willing to fairly consider any Amendment that was consistent with putting an end to what he should have thought all would desire to stop, it was impossible to accept an Amendment which really would not meet many of the cases which even the hon. Member for the City of Cork had admitted the Government ought to put an end to. On these grounds, the Government could not accept the Amendment.

MR. HEALY

said, he thought the hon. and learned Gentleman had entirely mistaken the points of his hon. and learned Friend's Amendment. His hon. and learned Friend desired a limitation of the word "intimidation," because he feared the powers given under this Bill would be abused. The hon. and learned Gentleman had not attempted to meet that in the smallest degree. He had stated a number of truisms which nobody could dispute; but they were altogether beside the question. The hon. and learned Gentleman said nobody had a right to compel a man to do what was revolting to his conscience. Did the hon. and learned Gentleman maintain that proposition? He remained wisely silent, because, no doubt, he remembered the Vaccination Act. A man might be obliged to do some things which were revolting to his conscience in England or in Ireland. Then the hon. and learned Gentleman said it was not the Irish landlords alone who were to be protected. Whence came the demand for this Bill? Who asked for it? Where were the Petitions in its favour? He would challenge the Government to show a single demand from anybody in Ireland in favour of this Bill. He and his hon. Friends represented Ireland in a much stronger sense than anyone on the Treasury Bench. Where, then, was the demand? The Judges had already condemned the Bill twice in succession, and the Prime Minister was altogether evading that point, knowing that the first portion of the Bill was absolutely condemned by those who were intended to carry it out. Was there a demand from any "Boycotted" class for this particular Bill? Could the Government show one man in Ireland who would say that this Bill would do the smallest atom of good? What was "Boycotting?" It might be said that a man should be compelled to sell provisions; but how were people to be made to buy them? A man in Ireland might be compelled to sell bread by the Intimidation Clause of this Bill, under which he could be sentenced to six months' imprisonment; but people could not be compelled to buy his goods, so that this Bill was ridiculous, useless, and absurd, except as a Bill to give magistrates vindictive power. The Government said intimidation was so Protean that it could not be defined; and the Home Secretary said that some cases of intimidation, when it took the form of refusing to supply provisions, would be dealt with by six months' imprisonment. If a man took his butter or cattle to market, would people be punished by six months' imprisonment for not buying of him? If not, what was the good of this "Boycotting" clause? If there were two blacksmiths in a town, people could not be prevented from dealing with one of them and not with the other; but, under this Bill, a man might be sentenced to six months' imprisonment for saying that he would deal with only one of the smiths. Therefore, he could not see what advantage this Bill would give from the Government point of view, while he could see great disadvantages. The Solicitor General said coercion was worst of all when motived by evil passions. The Irish Members contended that the evil passions of magistrates in Ireland was the worst form of coercion that could be conceived, and, therefore, they were the most unfit persons to exercise those powers. A member of the Land League might be brought before a magistrate, and the magistrate would sentence him to six months' imprisonment simply because of his membership. Would the Government say they were not going to use this Bill to prosecute members of Associations for bringing down rents? The Bill was intended to prop up the landlord system in Ireland. It was intended for the use of landlords, and would be administered by landlords or those in sympathy with landlords, only to prop up landlordism and nothing else. The people of Ireland wished to know what was to be crime in Ireland in future. The Home Secretary said people would be told plainly when this Act was passed. But that was not the case, because there was an absolute difference of opinion among the Government themselves. The Prime Minister said exclusive dealing was not a crime; but the Home Secretary thought it was a crime. Which of the two voices in the Cabinet was to be believed? The people of Ireland were told they must obey the law; and would the Government say what the law was? The people had no guarantee that this Act would be used fairly by the Government for its ostensible purpose. He was quite willing that if a man was being starved to death, measures should be taken to prevent that; but he was not willing that, if a man refused to buy another man's butter, he should therefore get six months' imprisonment. If the Government could show any distinct ground for the Bill, the Irish Members were quite willing to meet them; but they did nothing of the sort, and there had been no demand in Ireland for the Bill. It was purely motived by English opinion. The Government had brought in this Bill simply because they considered their existence imperilled, and they were met by Tory Gentlemen, who said great danger would arise unless this clause was retained as it stood. He considered "Boycotting" to be a thing which neither this Government, nor any other Government, could prevent; and in India "Boycotting" was maintained by the Government. The caste system in India was a species of "Boycotting." If a man belonged to one caste he would be refused fire or food or water by another caste; and the Government maintained that system because it was in accordance with the predilections of the people. It was "Boycotting" in Ireland, however, that was to be struck at. Men who joined together to prevent themselves from being starved were to have no pity from the Government. The Solicitor General was very sympathetic about those ruined by "Boycotting," and who, he said, were tyrannized over for doing what they had a right to do; but the Solicitor General forgot that the root of this system was the system of landlordism. The people were being ruined by the Government and by the landlords. Was there no "Boycotting" in that?

THE CHAIRMAN

The hon. Member has never yet come to his speech in support of the Amendment which is now before the Committee. I must remind the Committee that if we are to discuss the whole clause on every one of the 20 Amendments on the clause, it will be impossible for the Bill to get through Committee this Session. There is a particular Amendment before the Committee now, and I must ask the hon. Member to keep to that question, which is to insert certain words.

MR. HEALY

said, he was dealing with a proposal to leave out the word "intimidation." The Government said that intimidation was of so Protean a character that it could not be defined.

THE CHAIRMAN

We are dealing with the word "includes." The last Amendment practically concluded with the whole of the words proposed by the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce), and stand part of the clause.

MR. HEALY

said, his hon. and learned Friend proposed to define intimidation, and he was obliged to consider what intimidation was not; and he was considering intimidation from the point of view of the Government. Therefore, as intimidation was Protean, some latitude of argument was necessary and almost inevitable; but he had not the slightest objection to conclude his remarks, while urging that, in dealing with intimidation, there must be considerable latitude.

SIR EARDLEY WILMOT

said, he could not support the Amendment. He had carefully followed the discussion, and considered that the concession made by the Government with regard to the words "in order to," to be proposed hereafter by the hon. and learned Member for Southwark (Mr. Cohen), met every difficulty in the case. The word "calculated," standing by itself, might have led to difficulty, because it might comprehend a tradesman refusing to supply a customer with goods. A cus- tomer might be indebted to a tradesman, and the tradesman might ultimately say he would not serve him with further goods—as tradesmen sometimes did when they could not get their bills paid—and in that case the words "calculated to put any person in fear" might have amounted to a case of exclusive dealing, which would bring a tradesman within the proposed Act. As the words "in order to" had been accepted by the Home Secretary, he had no fault to find with the clause, and he thought that Amendment would get rid of the first class of exclusive dealing cases — although he should have preferred the words "with intent to" to "in order to;" but, at at any rate, they had much the same meaning. Then there was the case of a third party going to a shop and telling the shopkeeper that if he served A or B with goods it would be the worse for him. There was a clear case of intimidation, and that would be abundantly met by the clause as proposed by the Government, Then there was a third class of cases in which it was difficult to allege direct or positive intimidation, where a number of tradesmen combined and, without any communication with the person they wished to ostracize or "Boycott," refused to serve him with goods. In such a case, although there was not positive intimidation, there was constructive intimidation; and there was a well-known case in the Law Books, in which Lord Bramwell delivered an able judgment on a Common Law offence which was really "Boycotting." Lord Bramwell said every man had a right to have not only personal liberty, but also liberty of his mind and his actions. If a number of men set themselves up to deprive him of that liberty and coerce him, Lord Bramwell said there would be abundant evidence of a Common Law offence, and would bring the offenders within the law of the land. Hitherto such a case had been only indictable; but now, by this Bill, the Government proposed to make it subject to summary jurisdiction, with an appeal to Quarter Sessions. On the whole, he thought the Irish Party ought to feel that the limitation of the words would get rid of any difficulties they felt as to the possibility of exclusive dealing, which was legitimate, making persons liable to penalties under this Act. With regard to "Boycotting," he had received a letter from a highly-respectable gentleman in Ireland, in which the writer said "Boycotting" had done as much harm as any other cause, and no redress could be obtained at the present time except by indictment. For the last six months he had been unable to get a horse shod or a man to work for him, and members of the Defence Society, who had been induced to enter his employ, had been refused food altogether. The writer said he was unfortunately settled in the land, and had been shot at and "Boycotted" for six months past for spending his life and fortune among people whom he could not very much respect. That shooting and that "Boycotting" was still going on to a very great extent, and it was necessary for the Government to take this matter firmly in hand and to root up this gigantic evil.

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

observed, that if this clause was put into operation in Ireland by magistrates like the hon. Member who had just spoken, it would not have received so much opposition as it had received; but the magistrates in Ireland were not of that character, and, therefore, Irish Members took a view of the Bill which could not possibly occur to the hon. Baronet. It was rather difficult, under the different rulings that had been given, to discuss any of these clauses with any feeling of safety. If they were to have a certain Amendment, they must be at liberty to consider what the Bill would be without the Amendment. The Solicitor General had said he thought the Irish Members would have been almost grateful to the Government for such a measure as this, because it was intended, not for Englishmen, but for Irishmen; and therefore, they ought to be delighted to have the aegis of the police and the magisterial power thrown over the unfortunate Irish people. He recollected having heard the same thing said last year very often with regard to the Coercion Bill; but he had yet to learn that the people of Ireland had any reason to be grateful to the Government for introducing that measure; and he was not at all disposed to think that there would be, in the future, any reason for blessing Her Majesty's present Advisers for introducing this measure. But the Solicitor General seemed to have entirely mistaken the object of this Amendment. The object was not to protect "Boycotting" in any sense whatever. It was proposed in order to afford reasonable protection to persons who would otherwise be exposed to unjustifiable and petty tyranny. If a man was proceeded against under the Act of 1875, it was necessary to show that he had committed one of the offences specified in the Act, and the same sort of protection ought to be extended to the Irish people in this measure. That was a very reasonable request, and he had heard no logical or reasonable answer from any portion of the House to that application. Under the Act of 1875 it was necessary to show that a man had been guilty of using violence to or intimidating any other person, or his wife or child, or injuring his property, or persistently following him from place to place, or hiding his tools, clothes, or other property in use by such other person, or preventing him or hindering him in the use thereof, or watching or besetting his house or other place where such other person resided or worked or carried on business, or happened to be on the approach to such house or place, or following such other person with two or more other persons in a disorderly manner in or through any street or road. These were the offences, one of which must be specifically shown against a man, under the Act of 1875. But it was not enough for the Government now so to lay down the limits beyond which a charge could not be stretched under the Act of 1875, and to specify things which should not be considered intimidation. A further provision in the Act was that— Attending at or near a house or place where a person resides or works, carries on business, or happens to be on the approach to such house or place, in order merely to obtain or communicate information, shall not be deemed a watching or besetting within the meaning of this section. That was a very important safeguard; and the hon. and learned Member for Roscommon (Dr. Gommins) wished that to be added to this Bill, in order to give the people of Ireland the same sort of protection as had been given to the people of England, A well-known writer on the liberty of the subject and the security of the person, who dealt with every branch of the English Criminal Law, said that, under the head of modern definitions of intimidation, the principle of protecting workmen against work- men was stated in sufficiently general terms, and included all persons whatsoever, and was no longer a piece of class legislature, and that, whenever any person, whether a workman or not, who had a legal right to do or abstain from any act, was wrongfully and without legal authority, and with a view to compel him to act against his will, persistently followed, watched, or beset, the law said at least a penal offence had been committed. That being the case, and these terms being of local application, he (Mr. A. O'Connor) thought it would be difficult for the Solicitor General to prove that such a case as he had contemplated would not be covered by these terms. The Solicitor General pointed out that the agitation between 1871 and 1875 was not directed against the Intimidation Clause of 1871, but against the molestation and obstructive provisions. Then he drew the distinction, and admitted that there was a distinction, between obstruction and molestation and intimidation. If that was to be admitted in the English law why not in the Irish law? The Irish Members wished to introduce some such limitation as would be provided by the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Roscommon, in order to protect the Irish people. In England the particular act charged against a man must be specified clearly, and it must be shown to come within the provisions of the Act of 1875. But if a man was arraigned under this Bill the police-constable would be able to adduce the most trivial, trumpery, and ridiculous charges—even the slightest glance or word of advice—and say that that, in his mind, was calculated to put somebody else in fear. In fact, there was nothing a man could do of a most innocent description which might not, upon the interpretation of the constable, make him liable to six months' imprisonment with hard labour, and that without the protection of a jury. That was perfectly monstrous; and he would urge on the sense of justice of English Members to interpose to prevent the passing of such an iniquitous enactment. At any rate, some logical argument or really solid reason should be shown for placing the liberties of the Irish people under the heel of the local magistrates and police. No such argument had ever been advanced.

MR. DILLON

said, the Home Secretary, in replying to some observations of his some time ago, had made a great mistake. The right hon. and learned Gentleman said that at least some of the Irish Members had made a declaration that they did not want a definition of intimidation, while other Members did desire a definition. The Irish Members would rather not have a definition than have the Home Secretary's. They would rather have the word "intimidation" undefined than have the Government definition, though they would much rather have their own definition. He was reminded of what took place during the debates on the Act of 1875. The Government of that day were urged to give a definition of the word "intimidation" by the present Attorney General, who was then on the Opposition Benches, and he pointed out that if the word was not defined no specific action would be required to constitute an offence, and thus making faces at a workman's child might be construed as an offence under the Act. The Government of that day met that argument by practically promising that, although the word was left undefined in the clause, it would be defined by the interpretations which the Judges would place upon it; but did the Party now in power accept that? Nothing of the kind. They divided, and the Government only carried their proposal by a majority of 10, the whole of the Liberal Party opposite going against the word "intimidation" being left undefined. Now, because it was an Irish Bill that was introduced, not only would the Liberal Party not do what the Irish Members asked, and leave the word undefined, but they must put in a definition which left the word ten times worse than if it was undefined. Notwithstanding the superior rhetoric of the Home Secretary, he would not be able to throw dust in their eyes. They would rather have the word undefined, because they believed that the decisions of English Judges, and the precedent of the English Act, would rule the definition of the word in Ireland. A counsel defending a man could appeal, as authorities, to the decisions of the Judges under the Act of 1875 in England. The Government knew that perfectly well; and it was with a view to depriving Ireland of that privilege that they put in this definition, which swept into the nets of this clause everybody in Ireland who looked crooked at the wife or child of an Irish landlord, or any man who refused to return the "Good morning" of a landlord. There was a man now in Dundalk Gaol imprisoned for refusing to do that. If a man refused to say "Good morning" to a man who had taken a farm from which another man had been evicted, that would be intimidation under this Act. It would be quite sufficient for a person who was well known, and had some influence, to turn his back on such a man. If he (Mr. Dillon) went into a town, and, in the presence of a large number of people who knew him, refused to take the hand of a man he had previously known, he should be held guilty of an offence under the Act, and the man could swear he had intimidated him, and created public odium against him. If this Act was passed, he dared not refuse to shake hands with a man he had previously known. Did the Government mean to say by this Act that he, or any other man who was known to have some influence with the people, were bound to conciliate a man, and speak respectfully of him, and to take his hand, or, if not, to be accused of having done an act "calculated to injure him in his business or means of living?" There was not the slightest doubt that such a case would come under this clause, and he had no doubt there were people in Ireland and in Tipperary who would gladly sentence him under it. The Irish Members wanted intimidation defined. They wanted to know what the law was in Ireland, and not to have arbitrary power set up; but they would rather have the word left as it was in the English Act than accept the definition of the Government, and, therefore, their first object was to get a proper definition, as proposed.

MR. HEALY

said, he thought the Attorney General for England seemed amused at the suggestion of the hon. Member, that a word or a look might render him liable to six months' imprisonment; but a Miss Reynolds, in the Queen's County, had been sentenced to six months' imprisonment for merely saying, when some policemen seized the carts and horses of a man, that although they might seize the carts, they could not compel anybody to drive them. If a man who was known in the neigh- bourhood refused to shake hands with another, or to go on the same side of the street with him, he would he held to have intimidated the other man. He challenged the Prime Minister to show that there was any intimidation in the act of Miss Reynolds; that there was a bit more or less that was offensive in the eye of the law than the ease of which his hon. Friend had stated would be likely to put him into prison. It was an extraordinary thing that Irish Members, standing in opposition to and challenging this Bill, were in the same position exactly as the Attorney General when he was fighting the Act of 1875. The Attorney General, at that time, said that by leaving the word "intimidation" undefined, no overt act or anything would be required to obtain a conviction. Was that still his view? No. He now said they were dealing with a Liberal Government and the stipendiary magistrates whom the Government would appoint, and, therefore, there would be no fear. The Attorney General had further said that the mere making of faces at a workman's child would be sufficient to constitute an offence; but he sneered at the hon. Member (Mr. A. O'Connor) for saying that if he refused to give a man a salute he would be imprisoned. When the hon. and learned Gentleman was out of Office he could take a very different view of what intimidation was. Ought he not to he ashamed of himself to sit upon the Treasury Bench and defend a position so contrary to the position he defended in 1875? He was obliged to defend that position now, simply because he was English Attorney General, and the Irish Members were in the position he had deserted. The hon. and learned Gentleman would not have got the position he now held if he had not taken that course. Last year the Prime Minister said exclusive dealing was not a crime, but now brought in a Bill which made that a crime. What were they to do with a Government of that kind? On the one hand, there was the Attorney General defending the position he assailed a few years ago; and on the other hand, there was the Prime Minister, who last year said exclusive dealing was not a crime, this year bringing in a Bill to make exclusive dealing a crime. He himself (Mr. Healy) had an Amendment on the Paper, declaring— That no refusal by any person to deal with another in the way of the trade, business, or employment of either; and no declaration of intention not to so deal, and no resort to the practice of what is commonly known as exclusive dealing-, shall of itself be deemed to be intimidation. Would the Government accept that clause and insert it in the Bill? No; they would not. The Prime Minister last year was not opposed to exclusive dealing; this year he made it a crime. The Attorney General four or five years ago had his own view about intimidation; this year, simply because he was across the floor of the House and was Attorney General, he took a different view.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)

said, the hon. Member had made a somewhat strong attack upon the Government in general, and upon one Member of it rather more directly than the others. He (the Attorney General) had been of opinion in 1875, as he was now, that some overt action was required to complete the offence of intimidation. The House of Commons consented to the Statute of 1875 becoming law, and what had been the result? Had any injustice resulted from the acceptance of those words? He maintained that no injustice had fallen upon any individual, and he was prepared to contend that no injustice would follow the passing of this Act. There was much more to be said in relation to what occurred here. There were no Sabsections (a) and (b) in the Act of 1875; there were no such safeguards and protection in that Act as were given in this case, because in this Bill, in consequence of what occurred in Sub-sections (a) and (b,) intimidation must be used with a certain view and object—intimidation must be used with the view and object of injuring some person or persons. It was quite right to say that exclusive dealing was not to be treated as an offence; and it was equally true to say that it was to be treated as an offence, and for this reason, that the offence must depend upon the circumstances under which exclusive dealing occurred. He did not know that "exclusive dealing" was a proper term to use. If the right of choice of your tradesmen or customers, as the case might be, proceeded from a right motive, exclusive dealing would be perfectly legal. It would, for instance, be per- fectly legal for a customer to say, "I will not deal with you because you do not keep good articles;" or for a tradesman to say, "I will not sell to you because you will not pay me, or because your family has got the fever." That was the exclusive dealing which the Prime Minister said might be resorted to. It was quite a different thing when there was exclusive dealing for the purpose of depriving a man of food. When a man said, "I will form a part"— separate or individual action, it might be—"of a collective system to prevent a man getting food," which was the means of life in the country, he would be guilty of the exclusive dealing which was aimed at by this clause. Although no reason might be given, the offence must depend upon the circumstances. He could not judge of what the tribunal would say in any particular case. It was correct for hon. Members to say that the Prime Minister said that exclusive dealing was a right thing; but the exclusive dealing in the mind of the right hon. Gentleman was not exclusive dealing done with a view to cause any person or persons either to do any act which such person or persons had or have a legal right to abstain from doing, or to abstain from doing any act which such person or persons had or have a legal right to do. It was, therefore, a mere matter of phraseology which was being dealt with. He did not wish to enter now into the general matter in relation to the clause; but he would say, that when it was said they were interfering with liberty of action, this clause was intended to give freedom and liberty of action to every subject in Ireland. They intended that a man should not have his views controlled by those who said, "If you do not do a certain thing, we will not deal with you; if you take a certain view on political and social matters, we will put you under a ban." He asked hon. Members whether, in order to preserve the right of individual action which was so requisite for good government, a clause of this kind was not necessary? He would not go into detail, because it seemed to him they were always drifting away from the leading matter under consideration. The hon. Member for Roscommon (Mr. O'Kelly) asked that there should be no offence unless the intimidation was accompanied by actual violence, or by a threat of violence. They had departed from that position long ago, and he did not think the Amendment was one which could be accepted.

MR. T. D. SULLIVAN

said, very little light had been thrown on the subject by the speech they had just listened to from the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General. They now learnt that the question of motive arose in the matter. The hon. and learned Gentleman said there was exclusive dealing which might be harmless and legal, and there was exclusive dealing which might be illegal, and the legality or illegality would lie in the motive of the man who practised this exclusive dealing. Then they were to have an inquiry into a man's motive, they were to have an Inquisition in the case of any man who was supposed to be practising exclusive dealing against any particular shopkeeper. They talked of foreign Inquisitions; but was there ever a more stringent and a more absurd one than this, that a man should be brought before an Irish magistrate and made to declare the motives which influenced him in not dealing with a particular person? Ordinary social life would be impossible under such a law. He could give them an instance of one purpose to which the law might be applied. There were in Dublin a number of shopkeepers known as the "Lion and Unicorn" tradesmen, specially patronized by Dublin Castle. These tradesmen set up over their establishment a rampant Lion and a tremendous Unicorn, gilded and painted in a most brilliant fashion. Under this law it would be a crime for people to refuse to leave their money with the "Lion and Union" shopkeeper. Suppose one of these loyal gentlemen said—"My business is declining, although I have the 'Lion and Unicorn' and the words 'By special appointment to His Excellency the Lord Lieutenant' over my shop; these seditious people pass my door, and take their money elsewhere;" and suppose he laid a charge against some person who formerly dealt with him, but did not do so now; the accused would be brought before the magistrate and asked to declare his reason for no longer dealing with this loyal shopkeeper. It was an absurdity, but such proceedings were quite possible under the Act. The clause was so drawn as to bring within its scope every human being in Ireland. This legislation was aimed at the whole Irish nation, and it was left to the discretion of a magistrate to say what punishment a man should receive for any simple act he might do or word he might utter. It had been admitted over and over again that this was an impracticable clause; it would be absolutely impossible to work it to the full extent, and it would depend upon the temper of individuals how far it would be used and abused. Under the circumstances, he considered the clause, from first to last, obnoxious, and, of course, every proposition that went in the direction of limiting the evil contained in it would receive his hearty support.

MR. JUSTIN M'CARTHY

said, that, according to the Attorney General, they were not to be alarmed by this measure because of the example in the English Act. But the evil would lie in the working out of the measure. All cases arising in England under the Act of 1875 were to be investigated by juries; but in Ireland the cases arising under the present Act would come before Resident Magistrates or a tribunal composed of Judges, and not before juries. He could not help thinking, when the hon. and learned Gentleman was speaking, what a marvellous being, in the opinion of the Government, a Resident Magistrate must be. The Prime Minister shrunk from defining what was intimidation; the Attorney General dared not define intimidation; but the Resident Magistrates of Ireland could be safely trusted to define it with perfect justice and accuracy. What Parliament might not venture to do a Resident Magistrate might do. More than that, so great was the trust put in his impartiality that the Resident Magistrate might even inquire into the motives of a man. The clause unamended was certainly imperfect and unsatisfactory.

MR. BIGGAR

remarked, that hon. and learned Gentlemen had told them that exclusive dealing in itself was not improper, and was not an offence; but that if it were resorted to with a bad motive it became an offence. Although the Attorney General vouchsafed this information to them, he did not tell them what evidence would be required to prove the motive. If the Attorney General would give them in the Bill some indication of the proof required, it would assist the Committee very much, because in Ireland they were to have to administer this law tribunals of a peculiar nature. Last year one of the tenants of Lord Kenmare was sent to prison because he could not pay his rent. He (Mr. Biggar) supposed that under this Bill a tenant would be sent to gaol if he did not come to pay his rent on a particular day, although he might not have the means to pay his rent at all. Heagreed with his hon. Friend the Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon) that there was no proper definition, and that what was intended ought to be made clear. It was very easy for people to avoid a breach of the law if they knew what the law was; but in this case they were told that the law depended upon the whim of individual magistrates. The Solicitor General had told them that anything done under this clause must be done with a view to coerce. Now, that was not a correct reading of the clause, because the word "coerce" did not appear at all. The word "cause" was used, and that was a word much more easily satisfied in the mind of an Irish magistrate; so that, in point of fact, this argument of the Solicitor General was quite defective. Of course, they all agreed that anything calculated to coerce, or to intimidate, or to take the personal liberty of the subject, was, in the words of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General, most objectionable, and should be put down. But in Ireland they knew very well that this law would be so administered as to very injuriously affect a particular class. The persons who had the administration of the law in their own hands would always take care that, while the persons belonging to their own class should escape all punishment, the members of the other class should suffer very severely under the Act. All manners of coercion were used by landlords and agents and bailiffs for the purpose of getting impossible rents from impossible tenants. Tenants had been turned out of their holdings, and no account had been taken of the improvements and goodwill which, in many cases, was greatly in excess in point of value of all the rent due. Tenants were often deprived by the landlords of the means of living; in fact, the coercion practised by landlords towards tenants was far greater than the coercion exercised by tenant farmers against landlords. In regard to "Boycotting," if the practice came to the worst, and there was a refusal to supply the necessaries of life, he (Mr. Biggar) did not suppose that any personal inconvenience would arise, because if one tradesman did not supply goods another would. He suspected that in many cases shopkeepers refused to supply goods to a needy landlord because he did not wish to give him any further credit. The case of the Government was a very unfortunate one; they created intimidation an offence, but they could not explain it. They expected the Bill to be properly interpreted and administered by the magistrates, who had no legal training, and who had not even the advantage of the advice of a professional man. This was haphazard legislation, and the decisions under such a clause as the present must be of an irregular and haphazard description.

MR. P. MARTIN

said, he had listened very attentively to the observations of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General, and regretted to find no answer had been given to the simple question which his hon. Friend the Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon) had so clearly and forcibly submitted for the consideration of the Government. The great bulk of the Irish Members, as he stated, were dissatisfied with and condemned the attempt made in the Bill to define the offence of intimidation. It was a definition plainly loose and vague, and an imperfect and inadequate definition was, unfortunately, likely to cause want of uniformity and injustice in the sentences pronounced by those magisterial tribunals. Then, under the circumstances, as the Irish Members were willing to leave the offence without definition, as was done in the English Act, why should the Government persist in a refusal which must inevitably result in a great waste of time? In his (Mr. Martin's) bearing, the Prime Minister stated in the House a couple of days ago that he was anxious that, in every way, this Irish measure should bear a strict analogy to the English Act. If in the English Act there was no definition of intimidation, why should it be sought to put in this Bill a definition of what the Government themselves said it was impossible to define accurately? Why not leave the matter to the Court if they had confidence in that Court, though the Irish Members might not have confidence in it? As the hon. Member for Tipperary pointed out in the clearest and most forcible manner, there was every reason why they should do this, because the decisions in the English cases would be a guide and a check to the Irish Court in adjudicating upon cases of intimidation. Why, therefore, not strike out this intended definition of what the Government frankly admitted it was impossible to define? Why not leave the matter to the Court, in the hope that it would be guided by the English decisions? With all respect to the Government, he must confess that they were on this occasion provoking a great waste of time. It was only two days ago that the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary asked the Irish Members sitting opposite—Did they contend, or would they be willing, that there should be no definition? He must say the impression left on his mind, and, he would submit, conveyed by the words used by the Home Secretary, was that he could not accept the words by which the offence was then sought to be defined. But, if it was demanded, he was willing there should be no definition of intimidation, and to leave it to the discretion and judgment of the tribunal under this Act, as in the English Act, to say whether an offence had, or had not, been committed.

MR. PARNELL

said, he wished to support the hon. Member for Kilkenny (Mr. P. Martin) in the suggestion he had just made. The hon. Gentleman had suggested that the Government might save a great deal of time by withdrawing cumbrous, clumsy, wide, and inconclusive definition, and allow the clause to pass without it. What would the Government gain by continuing in the non possumus attitude which they had taken up in the various stages of this Bill—by asking the Committee to accede to a certain definition of intimidation which would make it impossible for anyone to do anything or to say anything without breaking the law, if the stipendiary magistrate chose to say that the particular act or word constituted intimidation? A great deal of capital had been made by the Government out of the practice of"Bo3'cotting,"and they had expressed their determination to put it down; they had said they would not allow anything to be cut out of the Bill which would deprive them of the power to put down "Boycotting." He did not think the Government cared any-thing at all about the power of putting down "Boycotting." He believed their object was simply to put down combination to deprive the Irish people of the right of combination. He was perfectly willing they should take power to put down "Boycotting," if they could not put down anything else by means of such power. If they would bring forward an Intimidation Clause, giving them power to put down "Boycotting," but which, at the same time, would preserve to the people the right of combination, he would be quite prepared to agree to it. This clause, however, in addition to giving them power to put down "Boycotting," gave them power to put down the right of organization or combination. [The ATTORNEY GENERAL dissented.] It was perfectly useless for the hon. and learned Gentleman to express dissent. The clause did give the Government the power he (Mr. Parnell) had described. This appeared to be the situation, and he would ask the Government how long they wished this entanglement to continue? Let them take power to put down "Boycotting," but leave to the Irish people the right of combination. The present clause went a great deal further than that, and the Irish Representatives objected to Sit on that ground. Did the Government wish to give a labourer the right to leave his employer's service? "We do," said the Attorney General for England; "but it must depend upon the circumstances." It must depend upon the digestion of the stipendiary magistrate, and the hon. and learned Gentleman must know that was so. A person accused of intimidation in Ireland was to be deprived of the protection afforded by trial by jury, but he was to be left at the mercy of the stipendiary magistrate. Under such circumstances, it was perfectly unreasonable to ask the Representatives of Ireland to abate their opposition to the clause, or to any portion of it, by one iota. What rights would the Government allow in Ireland; what would they permit to be said or done in Ireland? They had not defined their ideas in their Bill, and they had not defined them in their speeches. The Committee were in a state of blissful ignorance, and that ignorance would only be removed when a number of respectable men had been sent to prison for six months with hard labour. The position provided by the Bill was not one in which the Government ought to expect the Irish people to be placed; it was not one in which the Representatives of the Irish people ought to allow their constituents to be placed. He and his hon. Friends would have to contest the Bill at every step and at every stage. He could not but think that a desire on the part of the Government to promote the progress of Public Business, and to proceed with those measures of conciliation which had been foreshadowed, would induce the Government to accede to the request of the hon. Member for Kilkenny (Mr. P. Martin), which was that they should drop the tail of the clause, and consider what saving section they should add hereafter. If they would now omit the last paragraph of the clause, they would be able to consider the situation between this and Report, and make progress with their Bill. It would be perfectly within their power |hereafter to introduce, if they desired to do so, such definitions as might seem suitable to the clause.

MR. DILLON

said, it was very hard for the Irish Members to understand the way in which they had been met by the Government. Yesterday, and on several previous occasions, the Government stated, over and over again, that they were perfectly willing to let the term "intimidation" stand without any definition at all. ["No, no!"] The Government on the Opposition Benches did not say so, but the Government on the Treasury Benches distinctly said so. The Irish Members had always said they wanted a definition of intimidation; but, recognizing that they were not a majority, they were prepared to make a compromise. They wanted a definition; if they could, they would insist upon it. They had a perfect right to a definition, and the Members who sat opposite were committed to a definition, having voted for it, over and over again, on behalf of the English working men. He and his hon. Friends were aware of their weakness, and they were prepared to accept an open intimidation clause—that was, they were prepared to abandon their position in favour of an open clause, in the hope that the decisions of the English magistrates and the English County Court Judges would form some check upon the reckless pro- ceedings of the Irish, magistrates. While the Government were holding out to them that this was an open intimidation, they still stuck to what had been correctly described as the tail of the clause, which was a plain incentive to the magistrates to interpret the clause in a certain and given way. His hon. Friend the Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) had very properly said that the judgments under this clause would depend upon the digestion of the magistrates. The judgments would depend upon the wishes of the man who paid for the last bottle of champagne. It was well known where the magistrates of Ireland got good dinners; it was well known that the fate of many men was settled around the dinner-tables of landlords; it was well known what would be done with the magistrate who interpreted the law in a fair and honourable way—he would be "Boycotted," he would be deprived of his dinner, and of his bottle of champagne. He (Mr. Dillon) was stating what was a notorious fact in Ireland. He might state that, whereas in the English Act there was a clause stating that neither an employer of labour, nor his father, nor his son, should adjudicate as a magistrate upon a case in which ho was personally interested, a clause providing that neither a landlord, nor his brother, nor his son, should sit on a case in which he was personally interested, was not likely to be introduced in this Act, because the effect of it would be to sweep away the entire Bench of stipendiary magistrates. He would like a Return to be laid before the House showing how many stipendiary magistrates who would have to administer this Act were either landlords, or brothers or sons of landlords. The Attorney General had just said that no injustice had resulted from the open Intimidation Clause in the Act of 1875. The hon. and learned Gentleman, however, forgot what he (Mr. Dillon) had pointed out frequently—namely, that when the Bill of 1875 was passing through the House, there was, practically, an assurance given that the interpretation of the clause in the Courts of Justice would be based upon the charge of the Recorder of London, and he believed the clause had been so interpreted. He was satisfied that if intimidation in England had been interpreted in any other spirit than in accordance with the Charge of the Recorder of London, there would have been a great outcry, and, long since, there would have been a measure introduced to adequately define intimidation, and thus protect the working man. He was so satisfied with the manner in which the English Act had been interpreted that he was willing, on behalf of the Irish Party, to accept an open intimidation clause as a compromise.]

DR. COMMINS

said, this was a strange sort of clause. If they looked at it on paper, they found it resembled a scorpion, for the sting of it was in the tail. He had previously explained the principles of the English law, and he had asked to have those principles extended to Ireland. In the request he was joined by his hon. Friends; but what was the result? They were denied the extension of the principles of the English law to Ireland almost with mockery. They were told, in the speeches which were made to defend this "scorpion tail" that the Government would not tell the people of Ireland what the law was; that they would not follow precedent; but that they would leave the interpretation of intimidation to the ignorant prejudices of the most interested and least trusted class in Ireland. Class legislation of the worst kind was being enacted in this Bill. He had tried to introduce Amendments founded upon the principles of the English law; he had tried to introduce a principle which would enable people to know what they might do and what they ought to avoid; he had tried to introduce a principle which was sought to be introduced in the English Act, but which was rejected because it was inconsistent with all ideas of English liberty; yet the people of Ireland would be glad of its introduction, because it would give them some rule of life. But he had on every occasion met with signal failure. This clause gave the people no idea of what was right and what was wrong. The Act of 1875 had been appealed to over and over again. The great principle of that Act was that every decision might be revised by a Superior Court—the Court of Queen's Bench. The accused, too, had the inestimable advantage of being tried by jury. He had to be tried upon indictment, and the indictment had to define the offence; it had to clearly lay down how the man had transgressed, and it had to be tried by a jury and before the Chairman of Quarter Sessions, or a Judge of the land. Moreover, when any question of law arose, a case might be reserved for the Court of Criminal Appeal, and the definition of the Judge might be heard on the point. In this instance, the accused could not appeal to the Judges of the land; he could not go to the Court of Queen's Bench; he could not appeal to an official interpretation of this nebulous and indefinite sort of crime. The man was to be left at the mercy of a magistrate, in whose hands this power was being placed to crush anyone who engaged in a political or social agitation. The Irish people were willing to accept the principle of the Act of 1875. Why did not the Government give it them? Would the Government refuse to give the people any guide as to their action? He challenged any of the Law Officers of the Crown to say there was a single thing in the practice of "Boycotting" which constituted a legal offence. He did not believe it was possible to cite a single instance in which "Boycotting" had amounted to a crime in the eye of the law.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Sir FARRER HERSCHELL)

said, the subject was fully gone into when the hon. and learned Member was absent.

DR. COMMINS

said, those who had heard the discussion would be able to form their own opinion; but he was confident that no such instance of absolute crime resulting from "Boycotting" could be cited. He maintained that this was an attempt on the part of the Government to establish anarchy and call it law. He was afraid the Government were determined, by this section, not so much to prevent crime and anarchy as to place a weapon in the hands of one class to use against another class. He warned them not to forget that the class they were trying to arm were only counted by thousands, whereas the other class were counted by millions, and never could be crushed by this or any other Government.

Question put.

The Committee divided: —Ayes 163; Noes 35: Majority 128.— (Div. List, No. 122.)

MR. HEALY

said, he wished to move, in page 3, line 25, after "any," to insert "unlawful." He believed the Government would have no objection to the insertion of this word, because it was to be found in the English Act. He presumed, as a matter of fact, that the word had only been omitted from the Bill by mistake. He had simply copied it out of the English Act, and hoped the Government would have no objection to insert it in the Irish Act.

Amendment proposed, in page 3, line 25, after the word "any," to insert the word"unlawful."—(Mr. Healy.)

Question proposed, "That the word 'unlawful' be there inserted."

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, he did not quite understand what part of the English Act the hon. Gentleman referred to. As far as he could see, the Amendment, if adopted, would make the clause read— In this Act the expression 'intimidation' includes any unlawful word spoken or act done calculated to put any person in fear," &c. and would really not have any sense in that part of the provision.

MR. HEALY

said, he had not had time to refer to the English Act; but this part of the clause, as it stood, seemed to be absurd. It was— In this Act the expression 'intimidation' includes any word spoken or act done calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living. Supposing a man had infringed his patent, and he said to that man, "I will Bring a lawsuit against you to restrain you and recover damages," that would be a "word spoken" calculated to put a person in fear of "injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living." Therefore, as the thing stood, it was simply absurd. If a man owed him 5s., and he told him he would bring an action against him if he did not pay it, that would be a word spoken calculated to put the man in fear of injury to his property or means of living; and he (Mr. Healy), for speaking that word, would be liable to prosecution and imprisonment for six months with hard labour. Surely the Government saw the absurdity of that, and would have no hesitation in accepting this very small and legitimate Amendment.

MR. TREVELYAN

said, the point could be argued very shortly. The hon. Member had referred to the English. Act of 1875, and that Act gave a very clear analogy, but not in the direction pointed out by the hon. Gentleman. Under this Bill, certain, forms of molestation, which were not in themselves criminal, would be regarded as criminal. The English Act of 1875, in the same way, made certain acts criminal which were not in themselves criminal, such as persistently following a person about and hiding his tools. These acts were not criminal; but they were declared to be acts of intimidation. He would give an instance of a form of molestation, which, though not in itself criminal, must clearly be regarded as criminal in the Bill. One form of molestation not uncommon was that of leaving a man's gate open so that his cattle might stray away. Such an act would only be a civil trespass; but acts of that nature done persistently, in order to frighten a man and prevent him from paying his rent, should be included in criminal offences. If they accepted this word "unlawful," a great many of those acts which it was the intention of the Bill to render criminal offences would be lawful.

MR. PARNELL

said, this was too nice a distinction—it was a piece with the whole of this Bill. The right hon. Gentleman said that if a person left a gate open, that might be construed by the magistrate before whom he would be taken as an offence calculated to intimidate. If a man, in passing through a field, left a gate open, so that cattle could stray out, it might be held to be intimidation, if the owner of the field or the prosecutor chose to take that position. It was a monstrous thing to allow such a charge as this to be tried before the Court of First Instance, and yet this was a fair example of the kind of action that might be constituted into an offence under the Bill. It was a monstrous thing that a Liberal Government should exist, capable, by the mouth of its Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, of laying down such a doctrine as that the Committee had just listened to, and capable of striving to pass such an Act.

MR. TREVELYAN

said, it was almost unworthy of the hon. Member to press that matter. He (Mr. Trevelyan) had been arguing this case, not to score a point against the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy), but, as he had thought, for the purpose of carrying conviction to the minds of hon. Members opposite, in the minds of men who, as he had believed, had been following him closely. They must know that the words as they were in the clause formed an integral part of his argument, looking at the words which were precedent to them, "wrongfully and without legal authority."

Question put.

The Committee divided: —Ayes 32; Noes 192: Majority 160.—(Div. List, No. 123.)

MR. REDMOND

said, he wished to move, in page 3, lines 25 and 26, to leave out "word spoken or." His reason for moving this was because the sub-section, as it stood, left it entirely in the discretion of the tribunal as to what was to constitute an act done or word spoken calculated to intimidate. Were it not that this was left to the discretion he should not object to the words he proposed to strike out. Under the circumstances, considering the kind of tribunal that was to try, he was anxious, in every way that he could, to modify the sub-section. The position of the Irish Members with reference to the sub-section was perfectly clear. They desired, if they could, to have intimidation defined. If they could not get it defined as they desired to have it in the Bill, they wished to have the sub-section left out altogether; but, failing that, they were anxious, word by word, to modify the effect of the subsection. He must say that before they went further, he trusted the Government would give them some intimation that they desired to meet the views of the Irish. Members on both sides of the House, and the views also of some English Members. He would not unnecessarily take up the time of the Committee, but would content himself with moving the Amendment.

Amendment proposed, in page 3, lines 25 and 26, to leave out the words, "word spoken or."—(Mr. Redmond.)

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)

said, it was impossible to accept this Amendment, as its effect would be to remove from the operation of the measure words which might be spoken of an outrageous and violent kind. It would not be an offence against the Bill, if the Amendment were accepted, to tell a man that ruin and disaster would fall upon him; indeed, it would be hard to find that an offence had been committed unless a blow had been struck.

MR. T. D. SULLIVAN

said, he did not think the omission of the words would be a bit more absurd than their inclusion in the Bill. Let them look at the words— In this Act the expression 'intimidation' includes any word spoken or act done calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living. He maintained that the leaving in of the words "word spoken" was just as absurd as the leaving out of them—rather more of the two, because what word was it that they could speak in reference to the trade or business or character of anyone that would not come within the scope of the measure? He thought that to retain the clause in its present shape was tantamount to putting into the Bill a clause of this sort—"Resolved,"or"Be it enacted, That for every idle word a man shall speak he shall be accountable to an Irish magistrate." There was at present a movement going on in Ireland for the encouragement of Irish manufactures, and supposing he said, "I intend only to purchase Irish manufactures for the future," that would have the effect of, to some extent, injuring those shopkeepers in Dublin who retailed English goods. Every one of those shopkeepers, under this Bill, would have cause of action against him. Suppose he said that he should buy his next pair of trousers from a tailor who only dealt in Irish goods, the neighbour or rival of that man, it might be over the way, would have cause of action; and the more he promulgated the idea that it was better to deal with tradesmen who only sold Irish goods, either by writing or by word spoken, the more would he be an offender under the Act, and the more would he render himself liable to six months' imprisonment with hard labour. He maintained that the clause was unworkable and could not be carried out to its full extent. It might be carried out to some extent; but what was the use of passing a law which would be, and must be of necessity, trampled on by the Irish people?

MR. SYNAN

said, that unless the "words spoken" really were for the purpose of intimidating it was absurd that they should remain in the clause. He apprehended that the Amendment moved by his hon. Friend was to ascertain whether the Government were going to amend the clause by stating that the words were to be spoken "with intent" to produce in a person— Fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living. The Government had intimated that they intended to amend the clause in some degree; and if they specified that the words must have been spoken with ill-intent there could be no objection to retaining that portion of the clause it was proposed to leave out; if, however, they did not specify that, they had no right to retain the words in the clause. He wished to know whether the Government intended to propose an Amendment to the effect that the words must be spoken with ill-intent?

SIR E. ASSHETON CROSS

said, the Committee should not lose sight of the words of the clause, which were to the effect that every person who wrongfully and without legal authority used intimidation to oblige anyone to do that which he had a legal right to abstain from doing, or to abstain from doing that which he had a legal right to do, should be guilty of an offence under the Act, and, surely, he ought to be guilty of an offence under the Act.

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY

apprehended that from the point of view of the hon. Member who moved the Amendment, if the Government would define the words "wrongfully, and without legal authority," the words, as they were in the later part of the clause, might stand, but that, as the clause stood, any word spoken might be subject to punishment under the Act. He knew that some stress would be laid on the use of the word "wrongfully;" but that was anything but a technical word.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, he thought he had rendered all this clear before. He was almost ashamed of repeating to the Committee that he intended to accept the words to be pro- posed by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Southwark (Mr. Cohen) —the words "in order to," so as to make it quite clear that the words must have been spoken with ill-intent. That had been repeated over and over again yesterday; still, it did not seem to produce any effect. He had always said that it was not intended in any of the clauses of this Bill to turn any act or word into an offence which was not committed or spoken in order to produce the effects set forth in the measure.

MR. HEALY

said, that, for his part, he was quite aware of the intention of the Home Secretary; but he did not believe it met the case in the slightest degree. Supposing the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) or his Friends went over to Ireland, and got up an agitation against public-houses, or in favour of the Permissive Bill, such agitation would have the effect of putting a person "in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living;" and the hon. Baronet, and those who acted with him, would be liable to prosecution and imprisonment for six months, with hard labour. The agitation which was going on in Ireland was an agitation for the reduction of rents, and the agitation the hon. Baronet was interested in was an agitation—indirectly, perhaps—for a reduction of the profits of the publican. In both cases, both the landlord and the publican were put in fear of a reduction of their means of living. Were they in Ireland to be deprived for the future of the power of agitating and speaking in favour of a reduction of rents in Ireland? Was it the intention of the right hon. and learned Gentleman to deprive the Irish people of this power? If he (Mr. Healy) got up at a meeting in Ireland and made a speech, saying that the rents of the landlords should be cut down 25 per cent, would that not be an act "calculated to put a person in fear" of "injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living?" What he wanted to know was this—and he did not know what argument could be used against furnishing the information —whether the Government would make a distinct statement as to whether a man, agitating in future in the interests of the Irish tenants in favour of a reduction of rents, would not come under the powers of this measure? If not, would the right hon. and learned Gentleman say why not? He was a lawyer, and was in charge of the Bill, therefore it should not be very difficult for him to answer such a simple question. The man who was agitating for a reduction of rents might be perfectly legitimate in his arguments—the landlord might be a rack-renter. Why, the Sub-Commissioners would come under the Bill as it at present stood. By delivering an argument in favour of reduction of rent they clearly would be guilty of "a word spoken, or act done, calculated to put any person in fear" of "injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living. He (Mr. Healy) only a few minutes ago had moved to insert the word" unlawful "before the words," word spoken or act done; "but the Home Secretary would not accept the word, and had said it was absurd. The right hon and learned Gentleman might throw up his head in a majestic manner; but he (Mr. Healy) would, nevertheless, put it to the Committee, if an act was not an illegal act, why should it be prevented? Why should a Sub-Commissioner, for giving a judicial opinion in favour of a reduction of rent, be considered liable to punishment for having spoken a word, or performed an act, calculated to put a person in fear of injury to or loss of his means of living? What he wanted to get from the Government was something to show why all these cases which had been put by the Irish Members were not possible under the Bill. Perhaps the Home Secretary would oblige.

MR. T. C. THOMPSON

said, he agreed with the Amendment.

MR. T. P. O'CONNOR

said, the course the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary was pursuing was most unusual. He was asked what would be the effect of the clause; but, instead of answering, he sat in silence on the Treasury Bench. He (Mr. T. P. O'Connor) knew his hon. Friend had given an additional argument to the Conservative Party in favour of the clause by saying that the Sub-Commissioners would come under it; but he would not pursue this question, as several Members beside him did not seem to stick by what his hon. Friend had said. Would the Home Secretary answer this question? Sup- pose he got up at a public meeting and said the rents of the neighbouring landlords were at least 25 or 30 per cent higher than they should be, and that they should come down, would he not, in the view of magistrates favourable to the landlords' interest, come under this clause, as having used words calculated to interfere with the livelihood of those landlords? [Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT dissented.] The right hon. and learned Gentleman shook his head; would he tell him why he (Mr. O'Connor) would not come under the clause?

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, he should not have thought hon. Members would have accused him of having been too silent. He had not risen to answer the questions to which reference had been made, because he had not thought that they were seriously put— because he had thought they had been put ironically. To treat the matter seriously, he had no hesitation in saying that the clause would not interfere with a man for saying rents ought to be reduced 50 per cent; but it would not permit him to say that a man who paid a high rent ought to have nothing to eat.

MR. T. P. O'CONNOR

said, the right hon. and learned Gentleman had, with characteristic skill, failed to meet the question. The question was, whether he, standing up and saying that a landlord was receiving 50 per cent more than he ought to get, and that if any tenant who paid the rent demanded was paying more than he ought to pay, would come under this Bill? In the opinion of the magistrates he might, by so doing, have been acting wrongfully, and without legal authority; in fact, in the opinion of many of the magistrates in Ireland, to endeavour to take 1 per cent off the rent of the landlord was a wrongful act.

MR. HEALY

said, that, as the Government made no sign in the direction of answering his hon. Friend, he presumed his hon. Friend would go to a division. He (Mr. Healy) could promise for the hon. Member that, if the Government gave some explanation on the point before the Committee, he would withdraw his Amendment. A division would take 10 minutes, and a speech, even from the Home Secretary, would not occupy more than five minutes; so that it would be a saving of time for the right hon. and learned Gentleman to give an explanation. They had put it to him whether, if they got up at a meeting in Ireland and said that a man's rents should be reduced 25 per cent, they would not come under this Bill? The question was a plain one, and deserved a plain answer. The clause was so comprehensive that it would include every act that a man could do, and every word that a man could say in Ireland or anywhere else. Why did the Home Secretary sit silent? He presumed it was because he had no answer to give. The Government would not answer, because it was impossible for them to do it. There was nothing in the Bill to prevent a magistrate in Ireland from giving a man six months' imprisonment for advocating a reduction of rent. The very object of the Bill was to enable a magistrate to do that; and the Irish Party would take care to let the tenant farmers, not only of Munster, Leinster, and Connaught, but also of Ulster, know that this Bill had been brought in to put a stop to reasonable agitation.

Question put.

The Committee divided: —Ayes 208; Noes 29: Majority 179. — (Div. List, No. 124.)

MR. ARTHUR COHEN

said, he wished to move the insertion of the words "in order to, and" to make the paragraph run in this way— In this Act the expression 'intimidation' includes any word spoken or act done in order to, and calculated to, put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living. He would only detain the Committee a few minutes in order to explain the meaning of the Amendment. If the Irish Members fully appreciated the effect of this Amendment, they would find a great many of their objections to the clause removed. Words not spoken intentionally to intimidate would be no offence under the Act, and these words that he was proposing were sufficient to solve substantially the difficult question of exclusive dealing. If exclusive dealing were carried on with the intention of intimidating, it was clear it ought to be an offence; but, on the other hand, if it were carried on without that intention, then, if his Amendment were adopted, such innocent ex- clusive dealing would be no offence. If he was not mistaken, almost all the objections that had been raised would be met by this Amendment; and he ventured to submit, with very great confidence, that if any person, with intent to intimidate, did any act which was calculated to put any person—and that, of course, meant any reasonable person— in fear of injury or of damage, that person ought, according to the soundest maxims of law, to be deemed guilty of an offence. That, he had no doubt, in the mind of any lawyer, would be the true effect, and was certainly the real object of this clause.

Amendment proposed, in page 3, line 26, after the word "done," to insert the words "in order to, and."—(Mr. Arthur Cohen.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, he could only say that the Government were very glad to accept these words to make it quite clear that an act without the intent to put a person in fear should not be an offence.

MR. T. D. SULLIVAN

asked whether the hon. and learned Member would accept the words "intended to" in place of "in order to?"

MR. ARTHUR COHEN

said, he saw no objection to the proposed alteration.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, he did not object to the alteration.

MR. HEALY

asked whether the hon. and learned Member for Southwark (Mr. Cohen) would have any objection to move these words?

MR. ARTHUR COHEN

said, he would move the words proposed, if it were in Order, and if the Irish Members preferred them. For his own part, he had a preference for his own words, believing that they would appeal more strongly to the mind of a lawyer. He was glad the Amendment, whichever form it might take, would have the approval of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary. If the Irish Members would trust him, he was sure they would find the words "in order to" more calculated to carry out their object than those proposed by the hon. Member (Mr. Sullivan).

MR. GIBSON

said, no one could deny that the Amendment of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Southwark—for whose opinion he had much respect—was a very important Amendment. It would require the tribunal before which a man was brought to trial for an offence under the Bill to come to a conclusion as to the intent with which an act was done; and, of course, that was a very grave change to make in the clause. ["No, no!"] There could be no doubt that it was. The words originally presented in the clause were framed with a view of dealing with the very serious and sometimes very terrible generality of "Boycotting" that it was so hard to reach. He did not wish to appear—notwithstanding what had fallen from hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway on that (the Conservative) side—as a person who refused to accept Amendments if he thought they were reasonable; and if, on consideration, he was satisfied that it would not seriously interfere with the legitimate examination of the offence of "Boycotting," he would not question the matter further.

MR. MARUM

said, he and his hon. Friends would be satisfied to accept the Amendment "with an intent," and then the clause would read "the expression 'intimidation' includes any word spoken, or act done, which puts any person in fear," &c.

Question put, and agreed to.

MR. HEALY

next proposed, in page 3, line 26, to substitute the word "the" for the word "any," and said he wished to have it quite clear that there must be some person intimidated. He did not think the Government could object to this Amendment. He did not care whether the article was "a" or "the;" but it ought to be made clear that there was some person intimidated. Upon that point the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), forgetful of what he said in 1875, had made an important omission. The right hon. Gentleman said in 1875 that if a person was obliged to give evidence, that would only make the intimidation stronger and prevent his giving evidence. Speaking on the 16th of July, 1875, when he was in Opposition, the right hon. Gentleman said the prosecution should be left to the man who was threatened, and that a third party ought not to be brought in. This was a second instance of the divergence of view of hon. Gentlemen opposite—first by the Attorney General, and now by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford— between the position they took up now, when in power, and in 1875, when in Opposition. In 1875 the Attorney General argued that "intimidation" was a vague word, and ought to defined, and in 1875 the late Chief Secretary for Ireland held that a third party ought not to be brought in. Now, both these Gentlemen had changed their views; but, apart from that, he thought there could be no objection on the part of the Government to insert the definite article, whether "a" or "the." He would propose to insert "a," and not "the," instead of "any."

Amendment proposed, in page 3, line 26, to leave out the word "any," and insert"a."—(Mr. Healy.)

Question proposed, "That the word 'any' stand part of the Clause."

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, he could not quite understand the distinction drawn by the hon. Member. He could understand "the," referring to some particular person; but "a" seemed to him not quite good grammar in place of "any."

MR. HEALY

said, the reason why he moved this Amendment was that at the present moment all the clause provided was that words or acts were calculated to put some substantive person in fear and trembling. He would agree to propose the substitution of "the;" but he had agreed to propose "a" at the suggestion of the Chairman. Certainly "the" was his word, and, if the Government would accept that, he should be happy to propose it, because it would refer to some definite person who was intimidated. It might be argued from any speech that somebody might, perhaps, have been intimidated; but if the word "the" was inserted there would be some particular person.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, he thought it would be better to add the word "particular" to "any," in order that it might be shown that some particular person had been intimidated, and that would throw on the prosecution the necessity of proving that some particular person had been intimidated. The clause, as it stood, threw no such necessity on the prosecution; but he thought the prosecution ought to be bound to show that some person or persons were intimidated, or were intended to be intimidated, by words spoken or actions done. The Government had accepted the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Southwark (Mr. Cohen) to insert "in order to put some particular person in fear of injury or danger. That Amendment ought now to be supplemented in the way he had suggested. He did not think that the substitution of the word "the" for the word "any" would meet the objection of his hon. Friend; and if "any" was retained, he should move to insert" particular "after" any, "and before "person." Perhaps the Government would state their intention at once on the matter, for if they would accept the words "any particular" no further discussion would be necessary.

MR. HORACE DAVEY

said, he hoped the Government would not give way to this Amendment. He was not sure the Committee fully appreciated what was meant by it. If the clause was read as meaning intimidation to put some particular person in fear, then, in order to constitute an offence under the Act, it would be necessary to show some person who was intimidated. Suppose a notice was put up on a chapel door, or in some other conspicuous place, that any person who took a farm from which someone else had been evicted should be "Boycotted," that would be addressed to all the world, and would be an offence under the Act. But if the Committee acceded to this Amendment, and confined the clause to words spoken to some particular person, that action would not be an offence, because it would be impossible to prove that words spoken in that way were calculated to intimidate any particular person.

MR. HEALY

said, he would not press the proposal to a division, and would withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

MR. HEALY

proposed to insert, in line 26, after the word. "any," the words "firm and courageous." He stated that Sir James Fitz James Stephen, in defining the character of "intimidation," had said "intimidation" must be with the intent to carry out any common purpose, lawful or unlawful, in such a way as to give firm and^*courageous persons reasonable apprehension of a breach of the peace. He (Mr. Healy) held that intimidation should be of such a character that ordinarily firm persons would be put in fear by it. Upon the Act of 1875 the Attorney General was anxious lest any person should be sentenced to throe months' imprisonment for such intimidation as making faces at a workman's child; and, seeing that the hon, and learned Gentleman's acumen then was directed to the prevention of intimidation, he did not now see why the person to be intimidated should not be a person of ordinarily firm and courageous character.

Amendment proposed, in page 3, line 26, after the word "any," to insert the words "firm and courageous."—(Mr. Healy.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)

said, the hon. Gentleman's argument was that no person should be convicted unless he was firm and courageous. But how could they ascertain a person's firmness?

Question put, and negatived.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, he really wished to limit this vague definition; and, therefore, he proposed, after the word "person," to insert the words, "to whom or with reference to whom such word is spoken or act done." That would give something tangible to go upon, and would tend to narrow down the accusation.

Amendment proposed, In page 3, line 26, after the word "person," to insert the words "to whom or with reference to whom such word is spoken or act done."— (Mr. O'Donnell.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

observed that, according to the Amendment, the person to whom the words were spoken, or with reference to whom the act was done, was to be the person intimidated; but it was plain that if the intimidation was only to be against the person to whom the words were spoken, any man who told another man's wife that he was going to shoot her husband could not be accused of intimidation. The Committee had already decided whether or not the person intimidated was only to be the person against whom the act was actually done, and it was plain in Sub-section (d) that if a man who had paid his rent was intimidated in order to intimidate all the other people who had paid their rent the offence would be very much limited. That had been decided over and over again, and he hoped the Amendment would not be pressed.

Question put, and negatived.

MR. DILLON

said, the Amendment he was about to propose was not of a very serious kind, and he hoped the Government would accept it. It was in page 3, line 28, to leave out the words "or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property." It must be apparent to the Committee that this was an important Amendment, though, of course, it would be argued that it was too important to be accepted. But what would be the result of leaving these words in the sub-section? It would amount to saying that no labourer should have a right to leave his employment, except at the risk of six months' imprisonment, for doing what might cause some injury to the employer. It might be said that the magistrate would interpret the law in a liberal spirit; and with regard to the circumstances of the case, too, was it just or reasonable to place in the hands of the magistrates a law which left every labouring man in such a position that he could not leave his employment without the risk of imprisonment? Any employer might be able to say that if a workman left his employment, particularly if he was a good workman, no matter what the motive was, he was put in fear of injury to, or loss of, his property. There were a variety of employments in which this would be the case. Suppose the case of a driver of a horse, which was accustomed to him. If that man left the employment, and a strange driver was introduced, the horse might not work so well, and the master might be able to say that he was in fear of loss through that circumstance. It might be said, of course, that magistrates would act in a reasonable way, and would not press or strain the law, unless in cases for which this clause was specially drawn; but at the Cork Assizes a case had occurred which made a profound impression upon him, and influenced his view as to the manner in which the Act might be used. A respectable and well- known man, with a large family, was put on trial on a charge of having formed one of a small crowd who had thrown stones at an old man who was unpopular. The old man was only slightly injured, and recovered in a few weeks; but the accused man was convicted, although it was not sworn that he had been seen throwing stones, but only that he had been seen coming away from the crowd. He was convicted because he was known to be a prominent Land Leaguer, and was sentenced to five years' penal servitude, which he was now undergoing in Spike Island. In looking over the list of sentences at the Assizes he saw not only this case, but he saw a case in which a soldier was convicted of an indecent assault. He was only sentenced to six months' imprisonment with hard labour. The learned Judge who passed that sentence of five years' penal servitude, and who had since been elevated to the House of Lords, stated that if the neighbourhood quieted down he would exercise his influence with the Castle authorities to get the sentence reduced, and that showed that the Bench had been turned into a political weapon. This clause would be strained against any man who was known to be a Land Leaguer; and if any man left his employment, or took part in a labour combination, and the fact that he was a member of such combination was stated to the magistrate, that would be sufficient to convince the magistrate that the man had left his employment in pursuance of a conspiracy to injure his employer. The clause would make every man in Ireland a slave to his employer, and would deny him the right to leave his employment, unless it happened that the magistrate of the particular district was generous, impartial, and just.

Amendment proposed, In page 3, line 28, to leave out the words "or in fear of injury to or loss of his property."— (Mr. Dillon.)

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, no magistrate or Judge would so interpret this clause as to prevent a man leaving his employment merely because he desired to do so. If it was assumed that a magistrate or Judge would unrighteously pronounce sentences under a law which had no application to the case, it did not matter what the law was; but if it was assumed that this clause would be applied to a man, not for leaving his employment, and not for any unlawful object, the man could not possibly be brought within the Act. But if the Amendment was accepted, a man might threaten to maim cattle, or burn a house and injure property or individuals; and, therefore, he could not assent to the Amendment.

MR. HEALY

said, he understood from the right hon. and learned Gentleman that the magistrates had a clear view of the law; but although the Committee had been talking about this Bill for a week past, they had not been able to get a clear view of the law, and he did not believe anybody had, except the right hon. and learned Gentleman himself. He did not think the magistrates in Ireland were likely to be more enlightened than tolerably intelligent Gentlemen in that House. With regard to the question of strikes, there had been strikes by farm labourers in England which had inflicted injury on the farmers. Were similar proceedings in Ireland to be declared unlawful? He understood the Home Secretary to say that in some cases they would be unlawful. Was that the right hon. and learned Gentleman's view? In his opinion, no clause ought to be so wide as would say that an act committed at one time would be lawful, and if committed at another time would be unlawful. If the Home Secretary would show what check there would be upon the magistrates in administering this law, the Irish Members would meet him; but the right hon. and learned Gentleman was unable to show anything but something which might be in the mind of the magistrate. If men struck against a farmer or landlord, what guarantee was there that they would not be interfered with under this law? The Committee were entitled to know what strike would be permissible and what would not; at present they were completely in the dark on the point.

MR. DILLON

said, he had entertained the hope that the Government would accept the Amendment. He could not understand how a magistrate could help arriving at the conclusion he (Mr. Dillon) had suggested to the Committee. The words of the clause were— Any word spoken or act done calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, "&c, with a view" to cause any person or persons cither to do any act which such person or persons has or have a legal right to abstain from doing," &c. What was a strike? It was a combined act of workmen, done with a view to compel an employer to give an increase of wages, although an employer had a right to abstain from giving any increase of wages. It was a well-known fact that many men in England were absolutely ruined by strikes. In Ireland nothing was to be done to cause a person to do anything he had a legal right to abstain from doing; therefore, was it not as clear as noonday that a strike of labourers would be illegal, and would subject the men to six months' imprisonment with hard labour? Any employer of labour in Ireland would, after the passing of the Act, be in a position to cause the imprisonment of any of his workmen who struck work.

MR. MARUM

said, he and his hon. Friends were apprehensive that the words " wrongfully and without legal authority" would not be sufficient to save the action of the Trades' Union Act in Ireland without some distinct proviso in reference to that country. Whether the words he had quoted were sufficient for the purpose or not, they did not even appear in the 6th clause, which related specially to combinations.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. PORTER)

said, the Amendment was very clearly open to several objections. 80 far as it was an Amendment on a matter of substance, it fell within the decision which had been arrived at upon the Amendment proposed some time ago by the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. C. Russell). The present proposal was to exclude from the clause the consideration of any intimidation arising from fear or from injury to or loss of property. As had been pointed out by the Home Secretary, an Amendment of that character was absolutely untenable. The Amendment did not meet the difficulty which had been pointed out by hon. Members who had just spoken. The question of combination did not arise in the Amendment at all. The clause would only prevent intimidation by means of threats or fear of injury to property, which was resorted to with the view of inducing people to alter their conduct. If there was any reasonable apprehension that legitimate combinations would be prohibited, it would become necessary to preserve the provisions of the Act of 1875 with respect to Ireland.

MR. O'DONNELL

asked if they wore to understand from the declarations of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General for Ireland that the Government were prepared to say that all the forms of combinations which were permissible under the Act of 1875 should be allowed in Ireland?

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, the Government proposed that nothing in this Act should be taken in any way to affect or diminish the operations of the Act of 1875—that was to say, that this Act should not be interpreted as affecting or limiting in any way what had been authorized and permitted by the Act of 1875.

Question put.

The Committee divided: —Ayes 173; Noes 25: Majority 148.—(Div. List, No. 125.)

MR. DILLON

said, they had now reached a stage of the discussion at which ho had to propose that the tail of the clause should be cut off. The last words of the clause were— In this Act the expression 'intimidation' includes any word spoken or act done calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, "business, or means of living; and the words he wished to be omitted were "business, or means of living." This was really the worst part of the worst clause of the Bill. This definition might put a man in perpetual danger. Under these words, as was pointed out on the second reading, if a man objected to the cut of his coat he would commit an offence; if a man objected to the quality of any goods supplied to him, he would commit an offence. If a man, when conversing with another, were to say — "So-and-so is behaving very badly," he could, under this clause, be held to be guilty of an offence. If a certain solicitor had busied himself very much in behalf of any movement, and he (Mr. Dillon) were to say, "Mr. Sound-So has acted very badly," the gentleman might go straightway to a magistrate and say, "Mr. Dillon has been using certain words calculated to injure me in my business." He (Mr. Dillon) would then be had up and imprisoned. These latter words of the clause would really make it impossible for anyone to speak at all in Ireland with any sense of security. The Irish Representatives knew perfectly well that this Act would be administered in the grossest possible way. He might mention a notorious case which any hon. Gentleman who was acquainted with Ireland would probably remember. A certain trader or dealer in Sackville Street made some remarks with reference to the proceedings of the Irish landlords. The gentleman was a very well-known Orangeman and a leading Tory, and the day after he had made his criticisms of the actions of Irish landlords a circular was issued calling upon landlords to withdraw their custom from the man's shop, at which they had previously largely dealt. It was stated—but he very much doubted the truth of the statement—that this clause would be used with a spirit of even-handed justice against landlords who put men in fear of injury, or loss of business, or the means of living. Lord Sherbrooke had said this was a law which ought to be strictly defined, so that there should be no mistaking its meaning; it was a law affecting rich and poor, and therefore there ought to be the clearest definition. It was clear, from whatever point of view they regarded the words he proposed to omit, that the law would not be administered between rich and poor alike. "Boycotting" was exercised by no class so much as by the educated class; yet no one would contend for a moment that it was proposed to put this law in force against them. He had an Amendment on the Paper bearing on the subject; he hoped he would be able to put it to the Committee. If the Government would accept the present Amendment, of course he would withdraw his subsequent one, which was to insert, in page 3, line 29, after "living"— Provided always, That nothing in this Clause shall be taken to apply to—

1. (a) The right of physicians to refuse to meet in consultation, and otherwise to cause injury to the business and means of living of any member of their profession, who shall attend a patient for the sum of five shillings or less;
2. (b.) Or to the ancient and well-known system of Boycotting, by which the 758 members of the Irish Bar have from time immemorial enforced an unwritten law to the following effect:—
1. (1.) That no barrister shall enter a circuit town before his circuit, lest he might canvas solicitors for briefs;
2. (2.) That no barrister shall use any public advertisement for the purpose of bringing his merits under the notice of the public," &c. &c.

He defied anyone to deny that the unwritten laws referred to in his Amendment were not enforced on the members of the Irish Bar in a way as to be a perfect terror of an Irish barrister. He had heard of Irish barristers being ruined by being socially ostracized, because they had broken one of the unwritten laws of their Profession. Why should the Irish barristers and doctors have a right which was denied to Irish farmers and labourers? If the Government would proceed to break down the system of combination amongst barristers and amongst doctors, and inflicted six months' hard labour upon a barrister or a doctor who "Boycotted" one of his brethren, because he dared to break one of the unwritten laws of the Profession; if the Government would undertake to deal out even-handed justice to rich and poor alike, he would willingly withdraw his Amendment. It was because he knew this law was directed against the poor, and not against the rich, that ho now proposed this Amendment.

Amendment proposed, in page 3, line 29, to leave out the words "business or means of living."—(Mr. Dillon.)

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, the hon. Member said this was the tail of the Bill, and, no doubt, it was; but the tail very often carried the sting. The words it was proposed to strike out were the words which most nearly touched the practice of "Boycotting," and they must naturally be so regarded by hon. Members opposite. It was quite plain that if they struck out these words it would not be an offence to intimidate a man, and prevent him from doing what he had a legal right to do, by putting him in fear of injury to, or loss of, his property, or means of living. The whole object of the Bill was to prevent intimidation of that kind, and it was evident that if they accepted the Amendment they would fail in their endeavours to put an end to "Boycotting." With reference to the old stories about the Medical Profession and the Legal Profession, the arguments by which they were accompanied were by no means new. They had always been used in all the old Trades' Union discussions—discussions on these subjects had never taken place without these worn-out illustrations being brought up. Arguments of this kind ought not to have weight, or to prevent the Committee from dealing with the particular evil which they knew existed in "Boycotting."

Question put, and agreed to.

MR. LEAMY

said, he had challenged a division on the last Amendment; but the Chairman, it seemed, had not heard him. He begged now to move that Progress be reported.

THE CHAIRMAN

called upon Dr. Commins.

MR. HORACE DAVEY

said, the Amendment he had put down on the Paper had already been the subject of a discussion in course of the consideration of the other Amendments to the clause. It would not be necessary for him to make a long statement on the subject, because, in the course of the observations he had made in speaking to the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce), he had foreshadowed this Amendment. His proposal recognized the fact that it was intended to put down "Boycotting" as an offence against which the clause was directed. It was not intended to let hon. Members argue on the assumption that it was in any way proposed to exempt "Boycotting" from the Bill—

DR. COMMINS

rose to a point of Order. He said he had an Amendment on the Paper preceding that of the hon. and learned Member (Mr. Horace Davey).

THE CHAIRMAN

The hon. and learned Member was called on, but did not answer.

MR. HORACE DAVEY

said, the object of his Amendment was this. It had been pointed out that Clause 4, as it stood, called for explanation, and was framed in such a way that it would not do what it was the object and intention of the Government to do. He now sought to frame the clause in such a manner as to make it accord with the intention of the Government—that was to say, to make it provide that that should not be an offence which the Government did not desire to make an offence, and to allay the fears that had been expressed and felt that the language of the clause was such that under the Act things might be converted into offences, which it was never intended to be made offences. Illustrations had been given of that, and it was not, perhaps, necessary to renew them; but this would show what he meant. Suppose an association of ladies was formed to "Boycott" linen-drapers who did not provide proper seats for their work-people, they would come under the clause as guilty of— Word spoken or act done intended to and calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living. The formation of the association would certainly have been for the purpose of compelling the shopkeepers to do that which they had a legal right to refuse to do. Where they were defining an offence it was important that they should define it in such language as would accurately express what they meant; and he ventured to think that the principal objection would be removed if they adopted the Amendment he had on the Paper. The words were these— Provided, That the refusal by any person to deal with another in the way of trade, business, or employment of either, shall not of itself be deemed to be intimidation. What he intended to express by that was, that the mere fact of saying, "I will not deal with you," or "I will not supply you with goods," was not in itself an intimidation—that was to say, that that act, being a lawful thing, should not be punished; but that the circumstances under which it was done, or the circumstances under which the words were spoken, should constitute the intimidation. As he had ventured to say on another occasion, it was the circumstances, and not the act itself, which constituted the offence; and in this Proviso he had attempted—whether successfully or not the Committee would say—to embody that idea. The hon. and learned Member for Lincoln (Mr. Hinde Palmer) had an Amendment to his Amendment, which proposed to insert, after the word "person," the words "individually, and not collectively, or in combination with others." The Amendment, as amended, would read in this way— Provided, That the refusal by any person individually, and not collectively, or in combination with others, to deal with another in the way of the trade, business, or employment of either, shall not of itself be deemed to be intimidation. With the permission of the Committee, he proposed to adopt the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Lincoln; and, if it was in Order, he would move his Amendment as amended. He believed there was no technical difficulty in the way of the acceptance of this proposal. He was bound to say that the words suggested by the hon. and learned Member for Lincoln were an improvement, because he believed—and he had no doubt that his hon. Friends who had assisted him in framing his Amendment would agree with him—that a combination to do an act which was in itself lawful, must bear a totally different complexion to the same act when done by a single individual.

Amendment proposed, In page 3, line 29, after "living," insert "Provided, That the refusal by any person, individually, and not collectively, or in combination with others, to deal with another in the way of the trade, business, or employment of either shall not of itself he deemed to be intimidation."—(Mr. Horace Davey.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)

said, the very fact of his hon. and learned Friend proposing the Amendment would secure the attention of the Committee. From the manner in which it was worded, a great many Members, at first sight, might consider that it was consistent with the Bill. But if it was considered carefully, it would be seen that those who had supported the first part of the clause must also support the latter part as it stood. The proposal was that it should not be intimidation on the part of one person to refuse to deal with another in the way of "trade, business, or employment." What did the hon. and learned Member mean by that? Did he mean that the mere fact of a person saying "I will not deal with you" should not be an offence? If he meant that, then the Government meant that too. Of course, it was legitimate for a man to say—"I will not deal with you; you have no stock-in-trade, and I fear you will not pay me." That would not be an offence under the clause as it stood. If they properly translated the words "shall not of itself be deemed to be," in the Amendment, it would mean such a thing should not be an offence unless it came within the section. They could not say that unless a thing came within the section it should not be an offence, which was the effect of the Amendment. The Government had said that it was the intimidation plus the act which made the act intimidation; whereas the hon. and learned Member said it was the act minus the intimidation which constituted the offence. The Amendment merely said that unless the act came within the section it should not come within the section. The hon. and learned Member would excuse him if he said that the acceptance of the Amendment would not only render the clause ridiculous, but the Committee ridiculous also. ["No, no !"] Well, the point was one he would not discuss. He hoped his hon. and learned Friend would not press the Amendment.

MR. MARUM

said, that, with all respect to the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just spoken, he did not agree with him. They were not to suppose that in the Court the magistrate would possess that amount of observation and clearness of mind possessed by the Attorney General. It might be that the words might safely be omitted; but, at the same time, it might be necessary that in a Court of this description the words should appear so that it should be clear that where refusal to deal with a person occurred, it should not be conclusive of intimidation, but an element for consideration in the matter. It was said that without the Amendment the Court would take the matter into consideration; but that was assuming that the Court would have the same dispassionate judgment and the same judicial mind as the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite. He wished to have an announcement of this kind in the Bill, so that, where necessary, it could be placed before the minds of persons in a judicial capacity, who might not take that technical view of the matter that a man of trained mind would take. The intention was that a mere refusal to deal should not be regarded as a proof of the offence. This was not a Combination Clause. The 6th clause was the Combination Clause, so that it would appear that it was not necessary to add the words "individually, and not collectively, or in combination with others," in this part of the Bill. It would be inconsistent to put these words in that part of the Bill which dealt with individual acts, and not acts of combination. The Amendment, he thought, was necessary for the sort of Courts they might have to deal with.

MR. HEALY

said, he wished to call the attention of the Chairman to a point of Order. He should very much have preferred the hon. and learned Member (Mr. Horace Davey) to have moved the Amendment without the addition of the hon. and learned Member for Lincoln (Mr. Hinde Palmer). As he (Mr. Healy) had an Amendment on the Paper, which, unfortunately, ho had not been in his place to move, and as the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Christchurch was of very little use as amended, he wished to know whether, if on Monday he put down his Amendment, he should be in Order in moving it? On Monday the Prime Minister would be in his place, and they would be able to hear his opinion of exclusive dealing. His Amendment said— Provided, That no refusal by any person to deal with another in the way of the trade, business, or employment of either; and no declaration of intention not to so deal, and no resort to the practice of what is commonly known as exclusive dealing, shall of itself he deemed to he intimidation. Supposing they allowed the discussion on the present Amendment to drop, should he be in Order in moving the Amendment that had been passed over?

THE CHAIRMAN

If the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member is withdrawn, no doubt the hon. Member could go back to the words in the Bill following those last discussed and decided, and anyone can propose an Amendment. I should not like to say whether the Amendment of the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy) could be moved until I have looked at it a little more, because it seems to me at present that if the Amendment we are now upon is negatived, the principle of the Amendment of the hon. Member for Wexford will have been decided. I should, however, like to consider the point.

MR. HEALY

said, there seemed to be some doubt on the question, and as this matter would lead to an important debate involving the whole question of "Boycotting," he thought it would be as well that they should now report Progress.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."— (Mr. Healy.)

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, he would appeal to the hon. Member to allow them to dispose of the Amendment before them.

MR. HEALY

said, he should have no objection if he could afterwards bring on his Amendment.

THE CHAIRMAN

The Proviso the hon. Member (Mr. Healy) proposes to move is substantially the same as that before the Committee. Any Proviso that is substantially different can, of course, be moved if the clause is not put. I trust that under the circumstances the hon. Member will allow this Amendment to be disposed of.

MR. HEALY

said, he did not object to withdraw the Motion if he had a ruling from the Chairman that his Amendment could be put on Monday. The subject under discussion, however, was one which should be discussed in daylight. Exclusive dealing was at the bottom of it, and that was a matter on which a good deal turned. If the Chairman informed him that he could move his Amendment on Monday he would withdraw his Motion.

THE CHAIRMAN

The first part of the Amendment of the hon. Member for Wexford is contained in the Amendment for the hon. and learned Member for Christchurch; therefore, unless that were omitted the Amendment could not be moved. The latter part of the Proviso, however, could be moved.

MR. T. P. O'CONNOR

said, that, if ho understood the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary, he intended to bring in a clause that would preserve to Irish tenants the right of combination preserved to English working men by the Act of 1875. Ho (Mr. O'Connor) would observe, then, that the whole question of combination—including such combination as was dealt with in the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Christchurch — would have to be considered on the Saving Clause of the right hon. and learned Gentleman. He would suggest that they should approach the consideration of this Saving Clause with a Committee unpledged as to the whole question.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, the hon. Member must have misunderstood him. What he had said was, that he would save the Act of 1875, so that it would not be in any way overriden by this Bill. The clause he would introduce would be the ordinary Saving Clause —"Nothing in this Act shall contravene anything in the Act of," &c.

MR. T. P. O'CONNOR

said, he had evidently misunderstood the right hon. and learned Gentleman, and they were not in as good a position as he had thought they were. What the right hon. and learned Gentleman had said just now only confirmed the reasonableness of the demand of the Irish Members—namely, that the question should be left open until they were able to discuss it as a whole. The difficulty they were under was plain. The hon. and learned Member for Christchurch (Mr. Horace Davey) wished to discuss an Amendment, the hon. Member for Wexford wanted to propose one, and other hon. Members might wish to do the same, all these Amendments dealing with the question, a portion of which only was raised by the Amendment now before the Committee. Was it fair, then, to ask the Committee, at half - past 1 in the morning, to pledge itself beforehand by a division on a matter which was to be fully discussed at another Sitting?

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, as he understood the matter, the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy) wished to raise a larger question than was raised by the hon. and learned Member for Christchurch (Mr. Horace Davey). If that was so, clearly he would be entitled to raise the question on Monday, if it was not the identical question to that before the Committee. Hon. Members opposite, unless he (Sir William Harcourt) was mistaken, said the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Christchurch did not meet their views, therefore the Committee should be allowed to dispose of that Amendment. When that Amendment was disposed of they could then bring forward Amendments that would meet their views.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, it would facilitate matters very much if it were ruled that the hon. Member for Wexford could bring in his Amendment, even though the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Christchurch were disposed of that evening. He would point out that the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Christchurch was not merely that hon. and learned Gentleman's Amendment as it stood, but his Amendment coupled with that of another hon. Member. It would be seen, then, that these two Amendments, taken together, were very different indeed—the Amendment of the hon. Member for Wexford and that before the Committee. The Chairman could, without difficulty, rule that the Amendment of the hon. Member for Wexford was substantially different to that of the hon. and learned Member for Christchurch.

THE CHAIRMAN

It is not a question of my ruling, but of the decision of the Committee. If the Committee should decide that— The refusal by any person to deal with another in the way of the trade, business, or employment of either, shall not of itself be deemed to be intimidation, the hon. Member could not afterwards move that— No refusal by any person to deal with another in the way of the trade, business, or employment of either," &c., "shall of itself be deemed to be intimidation.

MR. HORACE DAVEY

said, he thought there was some justice in the remarks of the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy) as to the way in which he (Mr. Horace Davey) had moved this Amendment; and although he might not be prepared to support the Amendment of the hon. Member for Wexford, he thought he ought not to stand in the way of the hon. Member having an opportunity of proposing the Amendment. He, perhaps, might have misled the hon. Member for Wexford by adopting the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Lincoln (Mr. Hinde Palmer); and, as the last tiling he desired was to J give the slightest ground for saying that he had misled any hon. Member, he would withdraw his Amendment.

Motion, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again," by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed, At the end of the Clause, to add the words "Provided, That no refusal by any person to deal with another in the way of the trade, business, or employment of either: and no declaration of intention not so to deal, and no resort to the practice of what is commonly known as exclusive dealing, shall of itself he deemed to he intimidation."—(Mr. Healy.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there added."

Motion made, and Question proposed) "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."

MR. GOSCHEN

said, before the Committee reported Progress, he wished to submit a few observations to the Committee and to the Government with regard to the position in which the Committee found itself. His observations did not refer to the last three or four hours of the debate in Committee, but to the general course of the Bill since the House went into Committee upon it. The Committee entered upon this particular clause on Tuesday last; they debated it on Wednesday; they debated it again on Thursday; they had debated it again to-day; and it was not yet concluded. He did not at all deny the gravity and great importance of this clause, and he did not wish to cast reflections on any single Member with regard to the course ho had adopted respecting any of the Amendments; but he thought any Member who had been present throughout these debates would admit that there had been a constant repetition of the same arguments; that issues almost identical had been submitted to the Committee several times; and that, although a majority had decided upon certain principles connected with this clause, nevertheless the case against the clause had been put into a different form and again submitted to the Committee. As fast as Amendments were disposed of further Amendments crowded the Notice Paper; and ho thought the time had come when the Committee should consider what action should be taken with a view to progress in this matter. If it had taken all this time to deal with Clauses 1, 2 and 3, and part of Clause 4, he put it to the Committee to consider when they were likely to arrive at the end of this Bill? Meanwhile, he asked the Committee what was going on in Ireland? Hon. Members opposite, and some hon. Members on this (the Liberal) side of the House, wished to stop evictions; and they were aware that the Government was making an endeavour, in the Arrears of Rent Bill, to stop the causes of evictions. Was it right, in the interests of Ireland itself, by these protracted debates, to delay beyond the actual requirements of the case the completion of this present Bill? Were there not other matters in Ireland which urgently required to be dealt with? Could any Member of the House have heard the Chief Secretary read that formidable list of offences and of outrages which had been committed? [Mr. LABOU-CHERE: Evictions !] Surely the House desired to stop evictions and outrages; and he hoped the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) would endeavour to strengthen the hand of the Executive in dealing with that fearful state of things, which was bringing disgrace upon Ireland. The Committee were acquainted with the clauses in the Bill which followed this particular clause. The Irish Government had asked for those clauses; and he put it to the Committee whether they could afford to go on week after week, as slowly they had proceeded so far, and whether it was not likely that if they proceeded at their present rate, it would be six weeks, at least, before this Bill could be concluded? Was it right that they should proceed in that manner? He believed he expressed the feelings of the vast majority of the House in saying they would be prepared to make any sacrifice of time and patience in regard to this measure, and he thought hon. Members opposite would admit that the Committee had shown much patience. They had not complained, and if it was necessary to continue the debate at this late hour, he hoped Her Majesty's Government would consider whether there were not means, even by more continuous Sittings than the present, of hastening the mea-sure. The debates would have been much more protracted if hon. Members who desired to support the Government had not frequently remained silent because they did not wish to lengthen the debates. He hoped their silence would not be taken as indicating any luke-warmness with regard to the action of the Government, and that it would be understood that they did not object to the action of the Government, although they had thought it better to remain silent. They wished this Bill to be passed, and as speedily as possible. The blood that was being shed in Ireland was not only Saxon blood, but Irish blood. The Executive asked for such powers as were necessary to stop that bloodshed, and if this Bill did not suffice to stop it they must ask for further powers; for neither the Government nor the House would endure a continuation of these outrages. The Government must be armed with the powers they asked for; and he hoped that before Monday the Government would consider whether any further steps could be taken to expedite the progress of the Bill.

MR. HEALY

said, it was evident that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon had not been present during the debates on the Land Bill last year; for if he had, he would have found that the Tory Party delayed the Government no less than four days on the first three lines of the Bill, whereas the Irish Members on this occasion had only delayed the Government six days on one whole clause. The Bill now before the House affected the rights of the people of Ireland; but the Bill before the House last year only affected the interests of a few landlords; and hon. Gentlemen above the Gangway on the Tory Benches did not scruple to waste the time of the House and prevent the Bill being passed, although evictions were then taking place. He did not hesitate to say that there had been more pain, more misery, more loss inflicted on the Irish tenantry in one year than there had been inflicted on the landlords by outrages in 100 years. The right hon. Gentleman opposite was very solicitous, as they all were, when individuals incurred loss and suffering in Ireland; but he must remember that the people for whom he appeared to evince most sympathy were the aristocrats—the people of his own class—at all events, the monied class. The Irish Members represented the poor; and certainly, if they had no sympathy for the class from which most of them sprung, and if they did not understand the feelings of the poor, he should like to know by what title any hon. Member could claim to represent anybody in that House? They felt as much for the people they represented as the right hon. Gentleman could feel for his class; and he would remind the right hon. Gentleman that, although he complained that so much time had been spent over this Bill, the Government had now practically got the pith and core of the Bill—the abolition of trial by jury and of "Boycotting." The remaining portions of the Bill did not, in the opinion of the Government, constitute the major part of the Bill; so that in about a week they had practically got the core and the marrow of their proposals. What was the conduct of hon. Members last year? They kept the House of Commons 50 nights on the proposal to limit the rights of Irish landlords; but the Irish Members had now kept the House six nights altogether on proposals to limit the rights of the people of Ireland for three years, and yet the right hon. Gentleman said they were wasting time. He would remind the Government, who claimed to be a Liberal Government, that there were a number of hon. Members on these (the Irish) Benches who were quite as Liberal as any hon. Member opposite, and that their support and sympathy might be required by the Liberal Party when the right hon. Member should be on these Benches. If the Government wished to come to a closure with the Irish Party, they would have a tough Party to tackle. That Party was not afraid to oppose any proposals the Government might bring forward, and the Government would have to consider whether time would be saved by following the advice of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Goschen). The right hon. Gentleman had given the Committee the benefit of his absence on this clause, for which they could not be too grateful; but, having waited till 2 o'clock, he came down to give the Government the benefit of his advice. He would remind the Government that whenever they were in a difficulty they were assailed behind the back by hon. Gentlemen of the peculiar temperament of the right hon. Member for Ripon. He did not believe that the following of the right hon. Gentleman, all told, would amount to half-a-dozen Members in that Houses; while the Irish Members numbered 30 or 40, and represented some 5,000,000 of men. Making that contrast between the right hon. Gentleman and this Party, he would leave the Government to form their own conclusion.

MR. PLUNKET

said,, he had no desire to enter into a controversy as between the interests of landlords and tenants; but he would mention, in regard to the hon. Member's remarks as to this Bill being carried in the interest of the landlords, that of the five attempts to murder reported that day, one was committed upon a landlord, one was upon an unfortunate soldier, and the other three were attempts to murder poor farmers.

MR. T. D. SULLIVAN,

referring to the advice of the right hon. Member opposite (Mr. Goschen) to hurry this Bill because outrages were being committed, evictions were taking place, and blood was flowing, said, the contention of the Irish Members was that this Bill would do no good in Ireland, but a great deal of harm. That being their belief, they were bound to resist it to the utmost within their legal rights and abilities. The right hon. Gentleman had said the Arrears of Rent Bill was waiting on this measure; but when the Arrears of Rent Bill should come before the House hon. Members above the Gangway on the Opposition side of the House would take good care that it did not make progress. They would fall upon that Bill and strangle it, if they could; and if they could not do it, that would be done for them "elsewhere." Here, then, was the situation. The Committee were appealed to to hurry through this coercive measure, which would not improve the condition of things in Ireland, but would rather make confusion worse confounded; while the remedial measure which was promised after this Bill was a mockery, a delusion, and a snare. He believed it would never be passed into law; it would be opposed by hon. Gentlemen above the Gangway in a most protracted and determined manner, and would receive a coup de grace "elsewhere. "Therefore, the Irish Members stood on their rights in opposing this cruel measure, which they believed, would produce, not peace and order, but anarchy in Ireland.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, the Committee had arrived at an hour in the morning when they might pretty well consent to this Motion, and not enter into debate in a heated spirit. With reference to what the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Goschen) had said, the Government were fully impressed with the extreme necessity of proceeding as rapidly as possible, consistently with full and fair discussion, with this measure. They felt that the present circumstances of Ireland made it more than ever necessary that this Bill should pass into law without unnecessary delay. At the same time, as the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy) had said, it was true that the early clauses of the Bill were among the most important portions of the Bill. If he were asked his opinion, he should say he thought the debate upon this clause might have been more condensed than it had been, and some time might have been economized; but he had perceived, during this evening, a disposition to forward the discussions, and not to unduly delay them; and the Committee having passed this clause, which had been one of great difficulty and complexity, he hoped they would make more rapid progress with those portions of the Bill which had still to be dealt with.

Motion agreed to.

Committee report Progress, to sit again upon Monday next.