OFFENCES AGAINST THIS ACT.

HC Deb 07 June 1882 vol 270 cc367-454

Clause 4 (Intimidation).

Amendment again proposed, In page 3, to leave out lines 14 and 15, and insert "by acts or threats of violence, or injury to person or property, uses intimidation, or incites any other person to use intimidation,"— (Mr. Charles Russell.) —instead thereof.

Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."

MR. DILLON

said, he had anxiously listened last night to the debate, in order to hear what the Government had to say in favour of the clause under notice, which he (Mr. Dillon) considered to be the worst in the Bill. The right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland (Mr. Trevelyan) seemed to believe that there was no necessity to address his arguments to the Irish Benches, and therefore he had turned his back upon them, and addressed his own Supporters. That fact had certainly kindled in his (Mr. Dillon's) breast a slight hope that the right hon. Gentleman's own Supporters were somewhat shaky in regard to the clause. There was an omission from the right hon. Gentleman's speech which any impartial mind must have noticed. The right hon. Gentleman quoted one passage, and one passage only, in support of the charge he made against the Land League combination, and the dreadful system of intimidation which he accused the League of having inaugurated. The passage was one from a speech delivered by a reverend gentleman who had no official connection whatever with the National Land League in Ireland. It was from a speech delivered on the 27th September, five months after he (Mr. Dillon) had been arrested, eight or nine months after Mr. Davitt had been arrested, and after Mr. Brennan and all the Executive of the Land League in Ireland had been locked up in prison. It was certainly not for want of material in the way of speeches made by members of the Land League, for he regretted to say that a great deal of paper had been wasted in reporting those speeches, and in Dublin Castle there existed an enormous number of volumes containing full and ample reports of all the speeches they had ever made. Now, one of the most striking injustices committed by the Chief Secretary for Ireland in the course of his speech was to attribute to the Leaders of the Land League all the outrages that had been committed since they had been shut up in prison. It would only have been frank and fair and honest for the right hon. Gentleman to state—-and it was a well-known fact in Ireland—that the leaders were in prison when these outrages were committed. Several striking instances had been given in which "Boycotting" had been abused. Mr. Davitt interfered and put a stop to the abuse on more than one occasion in the sternest possible way. He (Mr. Dillon) himself had more than once been appealed to on behalf of people who had been "Boycotted," and he had always relieved them from all difficulty on that head. He might mention one instance, which was well known to several Members of that House; it was one which occurred on the estate of the hon. Gentleman the Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) a short time previous to the arrest of Mr. Davitt. A school teacher was "Boycotted" upon that estate. An appeal was made to Mr. Davitt, and he had heard it stated, upon the authority of the hon. Member on whose property the occurrence took place, that Mr. Davitt instantly put a stop to the "Boycotting," and no trouble on that head had occurred since. He (Mr. Dillon) himself had been appealed to on several occasions, and as long as he was at liberty in Ireland he had always put a stop to "Boycotting" whenever it seemed to him that injustice was being done. But there was a statement which fell from the Chief Secretary for Ireland in, as it appeared to him (Mr. Dillon), an unguarded moment. The right hon. Gentleman, alluding to a bad case of "Boycotting "which occurred in September, 1881, said that "for the purpose of that 'Boycotting' a well-known ruffian was going round;" but the right hon. Gentleman stopped there, because he felt that he had made a mistake. The fact was that the case occurred five months after he (Mr. Dillon) had been locked up in Kilmainham Gaol, three or four months after Mr. Brennan was put in prison, and nine months after Mr. Davitt was arrested; and yet the right hon. Gentleman asserted that a well-known ruffian was at large in the county of Wicklow, and not only at large, but that he was allowed to go round and carry on this system of "Boycotting." Now, the course pursued at that time, according to the authority of the right hon. Gentleman, was to arrest the men who were openly, in public speeches, with full responsibility to the law for every act they committed, stating the advice as to "Boycotting" which they were prepared to give to the people, and, at the same time, to leave at liberty "well-known ruffians" for whom, the House was assured, the Coercion Act of last year alone was passed. These well-known ruffians were allowed to go round and carry out a system of "Boycotting," not publicly announced in the face of day, but practised in secret, and, therefore, subject to the greatest system of abuse; while the men who encouraged and advised nothing they did not put forward from a public platform were shut up in gaol. He wished to give a challenge to the Chief Secretary for Ireland, and he trusted that the right hon. Gentleman would have an opportunity of answering it. He (Mr. Dillon) had made a great many speches on public platforms in Ireland, and he knew that the right hon. Gentleman had a verbatim copy of every word he had uttered. He challenged the right hon. Gentleman, however, to quote a single passage from any speech he had delivered on an Irish platform which constituted an offence against the English law under the Conspiracy Act. If that were not so, why had he not been put upon his trial? They might say it was because no conviction could have been got against him. But would it not have been a strong argument for the abolition of trial by jury if he had been put upon his trial and the jury had acquitted him in the face of the Government evidence, and in the face of the law as laid down by the Irish Judges? He did not think the Irish Executive would have passed over so favourable an opportunity if it had occurred to them; and he challenged the Chief Secretary for Ireland to quote any of his speeches which could be proved to be an offence against the English law. It was a curious fact that under the Coercion Act, under which he was arrested on the 2nd May, 12 months ago, he was not arrested for intimidation. He had read, while in Kilmainham Gaol, the statement made by the right hon. Gentleman the late Chief Secretary (Mr. W. E. Forster), in the House of Commons, that he had carefully studied every line of the speeches he (Mr. Dillon) had made in Ireland, from the period of the passing of the Coercion Act until the period of his arrest, and the right hon. Gentleman apologized for not having arrested him sooner. He (Mr. Dillon) did not envy the right hon. Gentleman the task he undertook, for it must have occupied a good deal of his time; but he put it to any reasonable man, whether, if the right hon. Gentleman had been able to arrest him on a charge of intimidation—and he had only to sign a warrant to that effect—he would not readily have done so if there had been any ground to justify such a course of action? But with all his (Mr. Forster's) power of private information, and with his (Mr. Dillon's) public speeches before him, reported verbatim for the gratification of the Irish Executive, the right hon. Gentleman did not sign a warrant for his arrest on the charge of intimidation, and he was arrested on a warrant for inciting to a breach of the peace. He did not acknowledge the justice of that charge; but he referred to the fact in order to show that in the mind of the Chief Secretary for Ireland he had not been guilty of intimidation up to that time. He was arrested on the 2nd May. He was not arrested for intimidation, and he was entitled to take it for granted that he was acquitted of intimidation in the eyes of the late Chief Secretary for Ireland. But repeatedly on the platform, previous to the 2nd May, he had openly advocated the practice of "Boycotting." There was no occasion on which he did not advise that recourse should be had to the practice of "Boycotting;" and, if "Boycotting" was illegal, why was he not arrested upon a warrant for intimidation? "Boycotting" was one of the troubles they had to deal with in Ireland; but he was prepared to adhere to that practice, and to prove that he had advised the Irish people consistently, in doing so, to keep within the law. He had used different arguments with that object in view, and one was that it did not pay to break the law. He, therefore, always advised the people to keep within it. He had invariably said—"Tell us what the law is, and I will ask the Irish people to keep within it; but I want to know what is the law? But the Government had invariably refused to do so. But to return to the charge brought against him and his Friends by the Chief Secretary for Ireland. He had been accused of breaking the law and practising a system of intimidation. To him and his Friends had been attributed all the blame of the "Moonlight" outrages, which the right hon. Gentleman chose to call, as his Predecessor had called them before him, the ultimate end and outcome of "Boycotting." It was just the same as if they were to attribute to any man who happened to play at whist all the evils that arose from card-sharping. It was fully as unjust and unreasonable to attribute to the Leaders of the Land League the "Moonlight" outrages as to attribute to English Trades Unionism the outrages at Sheffield which were notoriously practised in connection with Trades Unionism in England. The Trades Unionism of England repudiated the responsibility, as the Leaders of the Land League repudiated outrages in connection with "Boycotting;" and it was notorious that they had always done so as long as they were allowed to speak in public. So long as they were left at liberty, they invariably repudiated what was now called the "outcome of Boycotting.'" He did not propose to say any thing as to the desirability or undesirability, or otherwise, of the practice of "Boycotting." All he desired was, once for all, to state to the House—and, if he could do so, to lay before the English people—what"Boycotting,"as recommended by the Leaders of the the Land League, really was; because a series of misrepresentations had been made in that House, and also by the London Press, in regard to the system which had been recommended. An attempt was also made to blacken the character of the Land League by these misrepresentations. He had, over and over again, explained to the Irish people what he meant by this system of "Boycotting." He had done so openly, because he never recommended privately what he was not prepared to recommend upon a public platform; and he had often said that he was prepared to stand his trial if he had broken the law. He had not with him the exact words he had used, but he had a clear recollection of having stated, on the 27th February, 1881, at Burriscane—and he quoted the speech because he knew that extracts had been made from it, and largely placarded over Ireland as his definition of"Boycotting"—he had a distinct recollection of what his advice on that occasion was. He told the people that— Boycotting' consisted in having no dealings with a man who had done certain things, and he mentioned three things. He said— Have no dealings with him; shut your doors against him, and have no association with him. Do no injury to him, or to anyone belonging to him, or to his property, if you do, you destroy the system of 'Boycotting,' because you break the law. He remembered using those very words, and they were afterwards printed on a placard and authoritatively posted in Ireland as his definition and advice to the people on the question of "Boycotting." What he committed himself to was that if anybody did certain things which he was about to mention to the House, if he belonged to the Land League, they should have no further connection or dealing with. him. A great deal had been said in that House as to the interference with individual liberty which this horrible system of intimidation, as it was described, had brought about. Now, he (Mr. Dillon) did not believe there was in England a man who valued individual liberty more than he did. No man in England would interfere more unwillingly with any man's liberty than he would, and no one would more strongly resent interference with a man's liberty; but everybody would recognize that when a great public good was sought, and men were binding themselves together to set right a great public evil, every man who entered the combination must surrender a portion of his individual liberty. That was a recognized fact in any combination for any purpose whatever. The conditions he had referred to were well known, and they were explained to every person who entered the Land League. They were—that for three things the practice of "Boycotting" might be resorted to, and that was all the interference the Leaders of the Land League ever made with individual liberty. As he had before stated, when a man's liberty was interfered with, except in regard to these three matters, he had strongly deprecated it. The three things were as follows:—First, "Taking a farm from which a man had been unjustly evicted;" and here he would take the opportunity of replying to the extraordinary attack made upon him by the Prime Minister the other day, because he had accidentally left out the word "unjustly." In Ireland the people were of opinion that nineteen-twentieths of the evictions now going on there were unjust. ["Oh, oh!"] It was a matter of opinion, and the Irish people thought they were. Why were hon. Members there that day talking about an Arrears Bill, and why was Ireland said to be in a state of discontent and disaffection if they were not unjust? If he, in a moment of haste, accidentally omitted the word "unjustly" when nineteen-twentieths of the evictions came under the head of un just evictions, he thought it was hardly necessary for the Prime Minister to found an argument upon so slight a slip. The second offence for which "Boycotting" was to be resorted to was assisting in any way in an unjust eviction. The third offence was, if any man entered into an engagement with his fellow-tenants on an estate to hold out for certain terms as to the reduction of rent, and then broke that engagement by making terms for himself. These three were the only interferences with individual liberty which the Land League ever sanctioned, and they did not sanction any interference with the individual liberty of a man who did not enter their combination. They only sanctioned it with men who, knowingly and with their eyes open, entered into combination, being fully aware at the time that those three points were the fundamental rules of the Association, and they "Boycotted" any member of the combination who did any of those three things. So long as he (Mr. Dillon) was at the head of the Land League in Ireland, and so long as Mr. Davitt was at the head of it previously, they never sanctioned, but strenuously set their faces against, any further interference with individual liberty. He was prepared to admit that after the Leaders of the Land League were arrested, the system of "Boycotting" had been very grossly abused. It had been used for purposes of private malice in some districts, and for old faction fights and feuds of long standing, which had been smouldering for years. Instances had been brought under his notice in which a certain faction had succeeded, in consequence of an old quarrel some 100 years old, in getting some individual "Boycotted." But it was grossly unjust to charge the Leaders of the Land League with the responsibility of these circumstances, or with any of the consequences which had followed from their imprisonment. He contended that when the Government arrested the men who did nothing in secret, but always avowed openly in public what their advice was, and allowed well-known ruffians to go all over Ireland and carry on "Boycotting" on their own responsibility, they took the responsibility upon themselves. He admitted frankly that the system of "Boycotting," defend it as best they could, was a rough system; but if it had not been adopted, the most fearful evils would have happened, which, by the course taken, the Land League had been able in some measure to stave off. He had heard a good deal of criticism upon this system of "Boycotting," and especially from Irishmen. But there was no popular movement, political or otherwise, in which men could engage; no matter how good their objects might be, where some men were not to be found— some of them sitting in that House— who spent their time in criticizing, finding fault, and throwing dirt against those who, under circumstances of tremendous difficulty, were struggling to save the masses of the people from utter destruction and ruin. These men, ho said again—there were some of them in that House—deserved more condemnation than he could well put in Parliamentary language. Still, he was perfectly prepared to allow that the methods resorted to were rough. But they had no other methods to look to. They had tried reason and persuasion first in that House; but these appeals were in vain. They were face to face with a terrible difficulty; they were face to face, in the words of the Prime Minister himself, with what amounted to destruction and sentences of death to thousands and thousands of the Irish people. They had to select between the method of "Boycotting" and peaceful combination, which as reasonable men they adopted, and more dangerous methods for solving the difficulty, and he and others had not been ashamed or afraid to stand upon a platform, and speak out publicly what it was they advised the people to do. They had no choice between that system and the system which took its place when the Government arrested the Land League Leaders. If they had not had recourse to "Boycotting," did the House of Commons suppose that the Irish people would have starved in patience and silence? If they had not had recourse to "Boycotting," "Captain Moonlight" would have taken the field a year earlier. Judging from past Irish history, there was nothing to induce them to believe that anything else would have been the result, and he believed himself—nay, he was convinced—that if the Leaders of the Land League had been left at liberty "Captain Moonlight" would not have appeared upon the scene at all. The self-interest of the Leaders of the Land League would have induced them to strain their authority with the Irish people to keep "Captain Moonlight" and his retainers in the background. He admitted that their measures were rough, and that they might have made mistakes; but their difficulties were tremendous, and it was not always very easy to keep a cool judgment when thousands of their fellow- countrymen were being trampled on and starved to death. The Leaders of the League were put in prison, although they had committed no crime, and the results which followed from their imprisonment were used to blacken their movement and their fair names, and to give a seeming justification for their arrest. But, in spite of all, they had obtained some slight measure of advantage and success, and all the sophistry of English statesmen would not take from the minds of nine-tenths of the Irish people the conviction firmly rooted in them, that, but for the National Land League, there would have been no Irish Land Act. and that, but for the rough methods that were resorted to, and the strong combination they had formed, there would have been to-day none of the hope they now began to see of the transfer back to the people of Ireland of the land which was taken from their fathers.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

I desire to make as clear to the House as I can what is the decision of Her Majesty's Government in reference to the clause under notice. Now I say, and I say it in the most frank manner, that the object of this 4th clause is to put an end to the practice of "Boycotting;" and I propose to judge and criticize every Amendment from that point of view. I do not expect the assent or the support of any hon. Member of this House to this clause, or any part of it, who is not in favour of putting down "Boycotting;" but I do invite, and I confidently expect, the support in favour of the clause generally of every hon. Member who desires to put down that system of intimidation popularly known as "Boycotting." The Government are willing to accept any and every Amendment in the clause which is consistent with putting down "Boycotting." They can and will accept no Amendment in the clause which will make it incompatible with putting down "Boycotting;" and it is by that test I propose to try the Amendment of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell) and every other Amendment to the clause. Does "Boycotting" exist, and ought it to be put down? It is not necessary to prove that. It has been demonstrated in a calm, frank, and deliberate manner by the hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon), who has just sat down. There cannot be a better authority on the subject of "Boycotting" than the hon. Member for Tip-perary. He, it is true, draws a nice distinction between one kind of "Boycotting" and another. He speaks of "Boycotting" in one case as being— and I took down his words as he uttered them, because I thought it necessary to be very correct—he speaks of the system of "Boycotting" as advocated by the Leaders of the Land League; and I ask the House to consider by the light of his speech what that system is. He says it is true that the practice has been abused by other people who acted in a manner which was not authorized by the Leaders of the Land League. But this clause is not only meant to deal with the authorized agents of "Boycotting," as I understand the hon. Member, but it is also meant to deal with the unauthorized agents who carry on a system of "Boycotting" which the hon. Member does not approve. The hon. Member says that, when he was at large, he relieved a number of persons suffering from what he considered unjust and unauthorized "Boycotting," which shows that the hon. Member for Tipperary had complete plenary powers of absolution in the matter of "Boycotting." If a man were under the sentence of "Boycotting," the hon. Member and his Colleagues, if they thought fit, could give him plenary absolution, and relieve him of the penalty when he thought that injustice would be done. Those were the words of the hon. Member—"when injustice would be done." Now, I frankly state that the view of the Government is that a man is to be relieved from "Boycotting" and from the plenary authority of the hon. Member for Tipperary and his Colleagues; not when they think injustice will be done, but that he is to be relieved from it by the law of the land. That is the difference between our view and that of the hon. Member for Tipperary. He gave us a very interesting description of the system of "Boycotting" patronized by the Land League; and, although he was not very definite in the matter, I gathered from the tone of his speech that he approves of that system now. [Mr. HEALY: Hear, hear!] I am glad to hear that cheer from the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy); but I trust that even among hon. Members sitting on that Bench the hon. Member for Tipperary and the hon. Member for Wexford stand alone in that determination. [Mr. BIGGAR: No, no!] I will tell them my reason for saying that I wish to speak frankly. I certainly understood the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) to speak of "Boycotting" as a thing of the past. He spoke of it in an apologetic tone, which I regretted; but, at all events, there was this advantage in what he said—that he spoke of it as a thing which might have been justified by a condition of things which once existed, but which was no longer justifiable in the present condition of things. To use a French expression, I took "act" of that declaration to the House of Commons. I thought it a hopeful and important statement. I think it important to know whether that statement of the hon. Member for the City of Cork, or the statement of the hon. Member for Tipperary to-day, accurately represents the views of those whom the hon. Member for Tipperary calls the Leaders of the Land League. In the latter view, I will take the statement of the hon. Member for Tipperary—of what he understands by "Boycotting." I do not wish to go back to any of the speeches in the past to which he has referred, or to repeat phrases like "making a man a moral leper," and so forth. I wish to keep the discussion as free as possible from phrases of that kind—

MR. DILLON

Does the right hon. Gentleman mean to say that I used those words? If so, I must remind him that I never did so.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

No; I do not wish to suggest even that that phrase was ever used by the hon. Member for Tipperary; but it is a phrase that was used. What I say is that I desire to keep this discussion free from anything in the nature of recrimination as far as possible, and to take things as they are at this moment. In the presence of the hon. Member for Tipperary, I give what seems to me, from his speech, to be a fair construction of his views upon the matter. In speaking of "Boycotting," the hon. Member seemed to recognize two systems—one which he regards as a moderate and justifiable system, according to the views of himself and the Leaders of the Land League, and another kind of "Boycotting" which he calls an abuse of the practice which irregular practitioners of that system have carried it out. Now, I will take the hon. Member's view of what he calls "moderate 'Boycotting,'" as patronized by the Leaders of the Land League. The hon. Member says the people have liberty to combine. Of course, they have liberty to combine; nobody denies that. ["Oh, oh !"] I do not deny it, at all events, and I hope hon. Members will allow me to go on. I am trying to argue the matter fairly. I admit the liberty of people to combine; but what I deny is the right of the people who combine to affect others who are not parties to the combination.

MR. DILLON

I have distinctly said, over and over again in public, that no "Boycotting" was to be permitted against any person, except those who entered into our combination.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

Let us see whether that is really the case. I think the hon. Member cannot sustain that view of what he has stated. But allow me to proceed. The hon. Member says "Boycotting," according to his view, was to instruct persons—that is, the persons belonging to the Land League combination—to have no dealings with certain classes of people. I will come to who those people were presently. He says—these are his words—"Have no dealings with him; shut your doors against him; but do no injury to him. Now, it does not seem to me that you can carry out this system without doing a man an injury. Take the case of the village blacksmith mentioned the other day. Suppose you say to the blacksmith that every man in the village shall shut their doors against him, and have no dealings with him; does that do him no injury? It seems to me that the hon. Member for Tipperary was omitting an important qualification. What I understood him to mean was, that they were to do no injury by violence. That may be; but you may injure a man so as to destroy his very existence, without using actual violence against him. If you advise every man in the village to close his doors against another man, and have no dealings with him, he cannot subsist. Let us see what the hon. Member for Tipperary recommends as moderate "Boycotting." You are to have no dealings with, and you are to shut your door against, whom? Against three classes of people. First of all, the man who takes a farm which, in his opinion, an unjust eviction has been made; so that it may be used against a man who is a member of the Land League, or any other man. I understand the hon. Member for Tipperary to say that it can be used against any man? [Mr. DILLON: Any man.] Then, is it not directed against a man who is not a member of the combination? What the hon. Member means is that "Boycotting" is to act against any man, whether in the combination or not, who takes a farm from which a tenant has been unjustly evicted. Therefore, I say that this is a combination intended to act against people outside the combination in the most distinct manner, and when the hon. Member says— "If you choose to take a farm from which a man has been unjustly evicted, you shall be 'Boycotted,'" is not that trenching upon the liberty of the subject; and may it not be used equally against a man outside the combination as against a man within it? The word "unjustly," which was omitted in the original declaration, was a very important omission. The adjective "unjust," in regard to evictions, was a very important adjective indeed, especially when it was coupled with the "no rent" manifesto. When the "no rent" manifesto was sent out, and everybody was told not to pay rent, how were you to distinguish between unjust and just evictions? If you order a man to pay no rent at all, what becomes of the distinction between unjust and just evictions? I give this, however, only by way of parenthesis. First of all, every man, whether he be in the combination or not, if he takes a farm from which a man whom the Land League in its discretion regards as having been unjustly evicted, is to be subjected to this social ostracism. That is not all. Every man who aids in any act of this kind is also to be subjected to the same proscription. That is the second head of the classes intended to be dealt with by the hon. Member for Tipperary; and what does it mean? It means that every officer of the law who does his duty is to be proscribed and "Boycotted;" every bailiff who serves a writ: every policeman who takes part in the execution of the law— nay, even the driver of the car which carries the bailiff, or policeman; every man, in fact, who, in the remotest degree, contributes to do that act which is the subject of what is called the "moderate 'Boycotting'" patronized by the Leaders of the Land League, is to be proscribed. That is the second case. Then the hon. Member says the third case is to include a man whom I understand to be in the combination, though I do not know that it is entirely necessary that he should be in the combination; but if he has once agreed to demand a certain reduction of rent, and then, under motives of prudence or any other motive, such as a sense of justice, or from any other reason whatever, he consents to moderate his terms, he is to be "Boycotted"—that is to say, that a man, whether in the Land League or out of it, who demands from his landlord a reduction of 50 per cent in his rent, and then, upon a conference with his landlord, or for other reasons, which may seem good to himself, he consents to take a reduction of 30 per cent, according to the hon. Member for Tipperary, he is to be "Boycotted."

MR. DILLON

I said that where a man had entered into an engagement with his fellow-tenants to demand a certain reduction of rent, and then had broken that engagement by making terms privately for himself, he was to be "Boycotted."

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

That seems to me to be very much like what I said; but I will put it in the hon. Member's own words. A man has entered into an engagement with the tenants of a particular estate to go together and say—"We will demand of the landlord a reduction of 50 per cent." They go together, and one of them, from considerations of justice, or from considerations of prudence, it may be in regard to his own family, under pressure of the wants of his wife and family, thinks, on the whole, it would be better to make terms with the landlord, and to take a reduction of 30 per cent. That man is to be made a "moral leper," and no man is to deal with him, but is to shut his doors against him. Now, that is "Boycotting," not taken from loose phrases, not taken in the heat of a platform speech, or in the excitement of a stirring period when the hon. Member says it was necessary to use strong language; but taken from language used deliberately on the floor of the House of Commons, in the presence of the hon. Mem- bers I am now addressing, in the very carefully-considered speech made by the hon. Member for Tipperary, who comes down here to explain to the House what "Boycotting" means, what are its objects, and what are the methods by which it is to be carried out. After that explanation I ask the House if they mean to assist the Government in putting down this system; and, if they do, to accept this clause, the object of which is to put it down. I will ask the hon. Member for Tipperary if it is possible to conceive—what I do not regard as possible—that any reasonable man could allow such a system, even as moderate as that regulated and recognized system patronized by the Leaders of the Land League, to exist? Suppose you did, what are you to do with those ruffians of whom the hon. Member speaks, who carry on "Boycotting" without the exequatur of the Land League? At all events, even on his own admission, it is necessary to deal with them. There are those two classes, and, for my own part, I can make very little distinction between the one and the other. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell) says that this is the creation of a new offence. Well, of course it is; if it were not, why should we have this Act, and why should we have this clause? We have introduced this Bill because, in our opinion, it is necessary to deal with the new state of things. That is a truism. We do not bring in an Act of Parliament to create offences which' already exist. Well, is that an exceptional way of treating Ireland? ["Oh, oh !"J I hope that hon. Member will understand my remarks. Have we not dealt with England in exactly the same way? What took place in the year 1871? There had arisen in some districts in England a system of terrorism which, in some respects, resembled that which we have now to deal with in Ireland. There were a certain number of things done which the law did not punish, and which were practised, consequently, with impunity. What did Parliament do? It set to work to pass a Bill to meet the state of things which then existed, and the result was the Act of 1871. [Mr. T. P. O'CONNOR: Was that the right hon. and learned Gentleman's own Bill?] No; I never passed a Bill upon the subject. Well, what did that Bill deal with? It was an Act to amend the criminal law relating to violence, threats, and molestations, and injury to person and property. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell) wishes to confine this clause to acts of violence. [Mr. BIGGAR: Hear, hear!] No doubt the hon. Member for Cavan (Mr. Biggar) will cheer that statement, because he knows perfectly well that if the Bill were limited to acts of violence it would not touch "Boycotting." That is one of my objections to the Amendment; and the objection is a vital one. If the words proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk are accepted, you do not touch "Boycotting" at all. What is the very essence of "Boycotting?" The hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon) said—"Do a man no injury, but shut your door against him and have no dealings with him." Therefore, carry the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk, and you give a letter of licence to "Boycotting." Well, that was not the way in which Parliament dealt with the evil in England. [Mr. HEALY: You repealed the Act.] Parliament at once proceeded to make new offences, and they passed a distinct clause with reference to threatening and intimidation. They then created a whole class of offences with reference to molestation and obstruction. [Mr. HEALY: I ask again, did you repeal the Act?] The hon. Member for Wexford is impatient. If the Act was not exactly repealed, it was re-cast and modified. I am not now discussing the special clauses of that Act; but I am showing the Committee how the Parliament of the United Kingdom dealt with the evil in England. My general argument is this—When you have got a new evil you must have new remedies, and you must create new offences. I say we are not dealing with Ireland in an exceptional way. We dealt with England on the same footing by the Act of 1871. I will come to the Act of 1875 presently. I will show you that it is the policy, and the necessary policy, of Parliament, where a grievance is great, admitted, and widespread, not to shrink from enacting remedies capable of coping with the grievance. In that sense we were reminded by the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) last night that the condition of Ireland is such that no general law would apply to it without modification. That is the very reason why we claim that this clause should be tried, not upon the same principle as that which has been adopted in England, but upon a principle altered so as to deal with the distinct evils which exist at the present moment in Ireland. That is the claim we put forward for the trial of this clause. The Act of 1871, and some subsequent Acts, were modified by the Act of 1875. But I stand upon the Act of 1875, and I say that the Amendment of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dundalk is totally inconsistent with the Act of 1875. It is an absolute limitation of the Act of 1875. Now, what does the Act of 1875 say? It says that— Every person who, with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing, or to do, any act that such person has a legal right to do, or abstain from doing, wrongfully or without legal authority uses violence or intimidation. It is not "intimidates by violence," but "uses violence or intimidation," which shows that something was meant to be defined different from violence, and not included in violence at all. In my opinion, the Act of 1875 did quite enough, if it stopped at those words, without going on to specify any offences, but leaving the tribunal, from its own judgment, to form an opinion as to what constituted intimidation. Now, intimidation, as we have seen by experience, is a matter of so peculiar a character that it varies in every place and with every hour; and, in my opinion, all attempts to define intimidation will rather obscure than enlighten the subject. [Cries of "Hear, hear! "from the Irish Members.] I do not know if hon. Members opposite agree with me; I should like very much to know their views. Would they like to have the question of intimidation left at large to the tribunal? [An hon. MEMBER: No; leave it to a jury.] I did not expect that they would. The hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon) has made a demand to-day, which, I am afraid, is the only part of his speech I can give a cordial assent to. He says—"You will not tell us what the law is we have to obey." Well, the object of this clause is to tell you. The fact is that intimidation is so Protean in its shape that it is impossible to define it. It is because there has been an obscurity on the subject; because people could pretend they did not know these things were illegal, that it is necessary for Parliament to speak in distinct terms, and to tell them what is the law, and what are the things which they are not to do, and that is what this 4th clause says; and the object of that clause is to teach the people of Ireland what intimidation is, so that the people of Ireland may understand in future what is legal and what is illegal. The hon. Member says he wishes to keep within the law, and he wishes other people to keep within it also. I am glad to hear that declaration; and when this clause passes into law, he will be able to tell the people what they can do, and what they cannot do. The hon. Member says—"These things were not illegal before." That is quite true. I think, if you will allow me to say so, that people who speak by the card, and run so near illegalities, will not be surprised if many of those who act under their advice overstep the limit they themselves lay down, and those persons are not in any was astonished that there are so many of these unauthorized agents who better their instructions, and go beyond the narrow limits to which the hon. Member for Tipperary would wish to confine them. The line laid down by the hon. Member has been very indistinct; but, if this clause passes, there will be no danger of a misunderstanding in the future. Hon. Members for Ireland and the people will know what are the things which Parliament has determined shall not be practised. The Act of 1875 declared illegal the using of violence or intimidation against any person, his wife, or children, or injury to his property, not by violence, but by intimidation, and to induce him to do things which he would otherwise not have done. Then it proceeds to make, not in combination, but singly, various acts, which were not illegal before, illegal, and every person who resorts to them is punishable. And why? Because it was found these acts were done for bad purposes and with an evil effect. Several matters which were not an offence before the passing of the Act became criminal offences after it did pass. To follow a person and interfere with him in his employment was not an offence, either in the case of a number of people or of an individual; but after this Act passed it became an offence. Why do I call attention to these things? To show that the Parliament of England, when it found a wide-spread grievance and wrong done to the liberty of an individual in this manner, deliberately applied itself to provide a remedy. Now, the Act applies to Ireland as well as to England. Why, then, do we want a new enactment in respect to Ireland? I will answer that question very frankly. Because the system of "Boycotting" is a different system to that which was adopted in the outrages connected with the Trades Unions; and, therefore, the system, being different, the remedy must be different. And then my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dundalk comes here, and proposes an Amendment which will absolutely cut down and limit the regulations of the Act of 1876; because he proposes to introduce in a Bill, which has regard to the condition of Ireland, a definition of intimidation, which, if applied to Trade Union purposes in the Act of 1875, would have been totally useless. How does this clause generally differ from the clause in the Act of 1875? It differs in two material particulars, and, I think, in only two material particulars. First of all, it includes incitement to intimidation, as well as intimidation itself. I think everyone will admit that people who incite to intimidation ought to be punished. As to intimidation itself, I think there will be very little difference on that point. Then it introduces another thing which was not in the Act of 1875. It includes past acts as well as intimidation with reference to future acts. Why is that necessary? It is necessary from the very essence of "Boycotting" itself, because a man is "Boycotted," not in reference to what he is going to do, but in consequence of what he has done. Therefore, the clause must necessarily be different from the clause in the Act of 1875. It comes entirely under a new principle, because it applies only to the present exceptional condition of Ireland. I take my stand on that. I say we are dealing with the Irish evil exactly as we dealt in point of principle with the English evil. We discovered exactly the methods in which oppression is used; we discovered what methods of molestation were made the means of oppression in the case of Trades Unions; and in this case we have inquired what the methods of oppression are which are used in Ireland for "Boycotting," and we propose what we consider to be a remedy. If the Committee is of opinion that our remedy is not a perfect one for the evil, and will suggest modifications in that remedy, we will accept them, after fair discussion, if they will really grapple with the evil; but we cannot, and do not, accept modifications which have for their object to leave the evil untouched. I do not pretend that it is not a difficult subject to deal with. It is a difficult subject, as the Trades Unions formed a difficult subject. It has taken many years to shape our legislation; therefore, we have no attachment at all to any particular method we may have adopted for dealing with this evil. But you must keep the evil in view, and see that your clause grapples with it; and you must entertain and accept no Amendment which, in point of fact, gives an immunity to that evil. My objection—and I must apologize to the Committee for having detained them so long—my objection to the Amendment of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dundalk is that it excludes "Boycotting" altogether from the Bill, It provides only for acts or threats of violence or injury, in which intimidation is used. Now, it is the very essence of "Boycotting" that it does not use violence in intimidation. The object of the Government in this clause is to put down intimidation of every description, whether by threats of violence or injury to property; but not exclusively in that way, although, I am bound to say, mainly in that way. If that were the only object, the Act of 1875 might prove sufficient; but it is because there is a system of oppression, equally as potent as any injury by violence to person or property, that we have introduced this Bill. The object of the clause is to grapple with that evil; and, as I said before, the Government will accept any Amendment which grapples with the evil, but none that leaves it untouched.

MR. DILLON

wished to say one word by way of explanation. He desired to withdraw the statement that "Boycotting" was not intended to deal with any person who was not inside the Laud League combination. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department had properly corrected him upon that point. At the same time, he contended that that was the policy of the Trades Unions of England, the members of which refused to work with anyone outside the Union.

MR. JOSEPH COWEN

said, he was sure the House had listened with satisfaction to the able and temperate statement of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department. No one could object to the spirit of what he said, and the difference between them appeared now to be reduced to one of phraseology. They were agreed, or at least nearly agreed, in principle. No one could deny—no one attempted to deny-—that great oppression, injustice, and cruelty had been inflicted on many unoffending and deserving persons by the reckless exercise of the practice of "Boycotting." If the clause under consideration only prevented such practices, and punished those who resorted to them, there would be no objection to it and little criticism about it. But it did more than that. Its wording was very vague and extremely elastic. It might be made an instrument of great oppression, and the Committee ought to take care that, while putting down one form of injustice, they did not create another equally as offensive and far more powerful. If the wording of the clause could be altered in such a way as simply to reach acts that had been committed as a direct consequence of speeches made, he would not object to it; but he certainly did object, and that most strenuously, to any attempt to punish a man for the expression of his disapproval with the course of action of another man. There was one observation of the right hon. and learned Gentleman that ho dissented from. The right hon. and learned Gentleman had said that this was a new practice. He (Mr. Cowen) thought such a statement was very far from the fact. "Boycotting," or the spirit that prompted what was called "Boycotting," was as old as creation. It existed in all times, in all countries, and among all manner of men. And it would continue to exist as long as the human race continued to be moved by the common passions of mankind. It would not cease until we had got the Millennium. New practice, indeed! Did not the Jews refuse to have intercourse with the Samaritans? Did not the Greeks "Boycott" the barbarians? Did not the Romans set up exclusive dealing? There was no man familiar with the history of agrarian struggles in other times and other lands who did not know that the identical class of offences that were committed in Ireland, and which this Bill was devised to reach, had been committed in other countries during like conflicts. The Norman peasants established an association closely resembling that of the Land League. They decreed that they would not deal with or have any intercourse with those who refused to join their combination—a combination which sought the abolition of rents, taxes, tolls, as well as liberty to fish, hunt, and labour in wood, meadow, and water. The peasant who refused to associate himself with them in their effort had a mark set upon his lintel, or a post driven before his door, to indicate that he was a man to be shunned. Did not the English Legislature at one time "Boycott" Irish cattle? Did they not at another time "Boycott" Irish woollens? Dean Swift advised his countrymen to retaliate by burning everything that came from England except coals. And even at that moment, and in other walks of life, were they not constantly witnessing instances of "Boycotting?" What was the Liberal Caucus but a species of "Boycotting?" If anybody wished to experience political "Boycotting," let him think for himself—let him look at public questions with his own eyes, and not through the spectacles of Party Leaders. And if, when he had done that, he had the misfortune to differ from these said Leaders and the temerity to express his difference, he would very soon learn—if he had had any doubt before—that "Boycotting" existed in Parliament and amongst politicians, as well as in Ireland and amongst the peasantry. The statement of the Secretary of State for the Home Department, therefore, that this was a new practice, was contrary to all experience, and conflicted with history. While he (Mr. Cowen) condemned, as severely as anyone could do, the practice of injuring any man for difference of opinion— either political or social—he was averse to making the law so stringent as to intimidate or prevent the legitimate expression of the said difference. And the Bill proposed to do that. A man was to be punished, if what he said injured another man. The strength of the clause centred round the word "in- jury." What was injury, and how were they to define it? He knew of a case where a "blackleg" in the North of England brought an accusation against the members of the Trades Union, that he had been injured. His charge was that, in consequence of the fear which the Trades Union agitation had created in his mind, he was unable to sleep, and, in consequence of being unable to sleep, he could not do his day's work, and, therefore, he brought forward an allegation of material injury at the instance of the Trades Union agitation. [Laughter.] Of course, that was a very extreme case; but, as the Bill stood now, it would be equally liable to that strict interpretation. All he had to say with respect to the clause under consideration was this—that if the Government dealt with the present organization in Ireland in the same spirit and on the same lines as they dealt with the Trades Union organization in England, there would be no reason to complain; and, so far as he was concerned, he would not have been induced to give any opposition to the Bill, or to support any Amendment in it. But there was necessarily a difference between a landlord and an artizan, and it was desirable to take into consideration different rules and regulations, and to draft the Bill in different words. But a Bill of this kind, dealing with Ireland, should have been brought in in the same spirit and in the same way as they had already dealt with the Trades Union organization in England. If that had been done, he believed the opposition to the most important sections of the Bill would have very materially evaporated. It was because the Bill did not deal with the matter in that sense, but much more harshly, that this opposition had been raised. The clause itself was a much more stringent one than that which applied to intimidation and picketting; and, not only was that the case, but the tribunal before which the offenders would be brought was altogether different from any tribunal which existed in England. If a workman in England broke the Trades Union rules, and he was intimidated by a fellow-labourer or a fellow-workman, the offender was taken before a bench of justices, where there was a reasonable chance of the case being heard and judged on its merits. But if a man offended against this Bill, he would, in many instances, go before a bench of magistrates who would be prejudiced against him. It was, therefore, necessary, in any Act dealing with such a form of social ostracism, to guard its provisions so as to prevent them from being used as means of oppression. He was not wedded to the words of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dundalk (Mr. C. Russell). There were other Amendments on the Paper which were intended to accomplish the same object, several of which were better than the present proposal made by the hon. and learned Member. But what he (Mr. Cowen) wished for was to have the thing clearly defined. The offence, however, was one which they were all anxious to destroy, because the greatest advocates of despotism were the men who attempted to override the law; and when the law was overridden, tyranny stepped in. All of them wore anxious to destroy this practice; but, at the same time, they wished to prevent another offence of equal magnitude from springing up.

MR. GLADSTONE

I hope that I shall be allowed to remind the hon. Member who has just sat down (Mr. Cowen) that there are two rules absolutely necessary for real progress in discussing the clauses of a Bill in Committee. The first is that we should not insist upon discussing all the clauses upon each clause. If the hon. Member introduces here the objections which he entertains to the tribunal before which the offence in question is to be tried, it cannot conduce to the progress of the discussion. That is a portion of the Bill which ought to be considered in dealing with the clause relating to the tribunal. In the same way, the speech which the hon. Gentleman has just delivered is a speech directed against the entire clause, and not a speech strictly relevant to the Amendment before us. My right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department, in the able and, I think I may say, the conclusive speech he has delivered in defence of this clause, never bound himself to adhere to every word of the clause as it stands, but he left it fairly open to argument; and while, in the clearest manner, defending the purpose and meaning of the clause, he showed that the Amendment now before the Committee was inconvenient for that pur- pose and meaning of the clause. Does the hon. Member for Newcastle think that the Amendment is necessary for the purpose of the clause? Is it consistent upon his own showing? The hon. Member says that the spirit and feeling which finds development in "Boycotting" are not limited to Ireland or the Land League. In that I entirely concur. The evil spirit which there is in "Boycotting" dwells more or less in the breasts of most men; that is to say, the disposition they have—I hope some not at all, but many little, and most men a good deal—in every country to use their own liberty, and the legal rights and powers with which they are invested, in a manner to limit unjustly the liberty and powers of their fellow-men. The question is, what is the amount of the evil? In Ireland it is a great and serious evil, limiting most unduly the liberty of action of men, attaining the object at which it is directed, and seriously endangering the peace and order of the country. It is not because "Boycotting," or the spirit of "Boycotting," Is peculiar to one age or one country that this clause is introduced, and in substance must be insisted on by the Government, but because this system has become in Ireland a monstrous public evil, threatening liberty, and interfering with law and order. If it exists to this extent there, it is vain to point out that the spirit of intolerance, and the disposition to interfere unjustly with the liberty of action of one's neighbours, is to be found elsewhere, as in Ireland. The hon. Member did not attempt to meet the argument by which my right hon. and learned Friend showed so demonstratively—that, inasmuch as violence alone would be touched under the name of intimidation, if the Amendment was adopted "Boycotting," which, we think, unfortunately leads to violence, and has violence as its certain consequence, but which, at the same time, in itself does not include or depend upon violence, would not be touched. I would press upon the Committee that there was, in my opinion, an admission made in the speech of my right hon. and learned Friend which was more generous than could justly be claimed by the hon. Member for Tip-perary (Mr. Dillon). My right hon. and learned Friend admitted, as a possible construction of the speech of the hon. Member for Tipperary, that in the third of his classes of cases, perhaps he meant only to say that Members of the Land League who had entered into the combination were to be subject to the action of the principle he had in view. The case he put was the case of an engagement among tenants to demand a certain reduction of rent from their landlord; and, if some one of those tenants altered his mind, he would become liable to be "Boycotted." That is what the hon. Member for Tipperary defends. What is meant by "an engagement?" I take it that what is meant is simply this—that the tenants, actuated by a common feeling, have, in a loose and general way, agreed to a certain cooperation. They have said—"Let us make common cause and ask for a common reduction." I say it is a monstrous abuse of terms to treat that as an engagement absolutely binding on every one of these men to adhere precisely and throughout to what was originally intended. It is undoubtedly a co-operation; but to make it an engagement, and give it the character of a formal instrument, with regard to which no one could alter his mind without getting the consent of the rest—that even the vast majority of them cannot alter their minds without the consent of the rest— is an abuse of terms.

MR. DILLON

The Prime Minister is mistaken. It is a well-known practice in Ireland, when these engagements are made, that they cannot be departed from without the consent of the majority.

MR. GLADSTONE

We have now at last heard the unwritten law, about which so much has been said. Here is an oral tradition set up by the hon. Member, which is to be brought into action and carried to the point, not only of interference with liberty, but of ruin to goods and property, and which it is highly probable that he who objects to it has never heard. My right hon. and learned Friend said it was possible the hon. Member for Tipperary meant that no one was to be "Boycotted" under his third head, unless he was a member of the Land League. Suppose there are 100 tenants who have agreed to demand a certain reduction, and that 50 are members of the Land League and 50 are not. I understand that, according to the doctrine of the hon. Member, the 50 who are members of the Land League would be liable to be "Boycotted" if they altered their minds as to the terms they would accept. What I want to know is, if the 50 who were not members of the Land League altered their minds as to the terms they would accept, they would be liable to be "Boycotted" or not?

MR. DILLON

The case has never in my experience arisen. No man entered into these combinations who was not a member of the Land League.

MR. GLADSTONE

I did not ask the hon. Gentleman if he was aware of any case. What I asked him for was an interpretation of his law. He has laid down the law, and I think it is fair to ask him to interpret the law. He asks my right hon. and learned Friend to let him know the meaning of the law; but its interpretation will not rest upon the authority of my right hon. and learned Friend, but upon the authority of the House. In this instance, on the contrary, it rests solely on the authority of the hon. Member; and I ask him the meaning of the law. If 100 tenants concurred in making a certain reduction, 50 being members of the Land League and 50 not being members, and the 50 who are not members of the Land League determine that it is their interest to ask lower terms, I ask, would they be liable to be "Boycotted" under the hon. Member's law or not? It is not easy to get an answer to that question.

MR. DILLON

I am bound to say this is a knotty question which never arose in my experience; and, therefore, I am not prepared to answer it.

MR. GLADSTONE

The hon. Member is greatly pleased by his own ingenuity in evading a point which is as plain as the sun at noon-day, but which it is not convenient to answer. It is perfectly plain that all persons entering into this supposed agreement—which is a concurrence ad hoc for a common object with respect to which the people must retain the right to change their mind according to fresh evidence brought before them—would, though not members of the Land League, be liable to be "Boycotted" under the law of the hon. Gentleman. Then, with regard to evictions, it was said that any persons assisting in an unjust eviction is to be liable to be "Boycotted." A complaint was introduced of myself in regard to this matter. I referred to the hon. Member's speech, and he coolly finds fault with me for not having interpolated the word "unjust" before "evictions." Is there, in the view of the hon. Member, such a thing as a just eviction? What eviction is just? If a tenant refuses to pay his rent, and is then evicted, is that, in the view of the hon. Gentleman, an unjust eviction? Of course it is. In point of fact, it is not the use of the phrase with the word "unjust" which misrepresents the meaning of the hon. Gentleman. It is the interpretation of the word "unjust," which is little more than a mere fetich, and which is only used in order in some way to disguise and render tolerable in the face of the nation the doctrine of the hon. Gentleman. The man is to be "Boycotted" who has taken part in an unjust eviction, we will say. Let us see how far that reaches. Of course the Constabulary Force, who are the instruments of eviction, are to be "Boycotted." But the Constabulary have to find their way to the place, and they must find their way on a car, and that car must be hired out to them, probably by some innkeeper. Well, the innkeeper in that way substantially, though indirectly, became a party to the evictions; and I apprehend that I do not misrepresent the hon. Member when I say that, according to the law which he has laid down, the innkeeper who supplies the car is to be "Boycotted," because he supplied the car to the police which carried the police to the place where the eviction was to be effected. But it may go farther yet, because the innkeeper himself must have wants. He must have a butcher and a baker, and the butcher and baker must not supply the innkeeper who supplies the car which carries the police to the place where the eviction is to be made. And so, in point of fact, this is a case of the house that Jack built in the passing from point to point, and from person to person, through the whole population under the influence of this doctrine. However, the main purpose for which I rose was to refer to a declaration which was given, no doubt, with perfect sincerity, by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle. He closed his speech by stating—"If you will consent to deal with the subject of intimidation and "Boycotting" in Ireland in the same spirit in which you dealt with the sub- ject in England in the case of Trades' Unions, you will find no objection made on principle to your proceeding." As to interpretation of principles and general declarations, neither can be bound, nor can we; but as to the principle which he lays down, in the presence of my right hon. Friend who has had so much to do with the framing and conduct of this Bill (Mr. W. E. Forster), and of my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department, I do not hesitate to say that that is precisely the object which we aim at. We desire to deal in exactly the same spirit with the question of "Boycotting" in Ireland as Parliament has dealt with the question of Trades' Unions in England, the difference being, as has been generally recognized by the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell), that when you proceed to deal with any form of interference with the just liberty of action of Her Majesty's subjects, you must take into view the particular circumstances of the case, and you must adapt your particular provisions to those circumstances. It is precisely in that spirit that my right hon. and learned Friend has declared that we desire to proceed, and by that rule we intend and desire to be bound throughout the whole of the proceedings upon this clause.

MR. HEALY

asked, why, if, as the Prime Minister had said, the Government intended to act in the spirit of the Trades' Union Act, six months' imprisonment was inserted in this Irish Bill, without the option of a fine, while only three months could be imposed under the English Act, with the option of a fine? The Prime Minister found fault with the hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon), because he had not instantly sprung to his feet to answer the question he put. Why did not the Prime Minister himself now get up and say whether, that inconsistency having been pointed out, he would remedy it?

MR. GLADSTONE

said, that question was a distinct and separate matter, and would come under consideration by-and-bye, when there would be an opportunity of speaking upon it. It was not, at the present moment, a point at issue.

MR. HEALY

was glad to know there would be an opportunity by-and-bye of dealing with the point; but what did that denote—that the Government, when they framed this Bill, had a very different notion from their present notion? How did the English Act begin? It began with a provision which was not to be found in the Irish Bill, and he himself had put down an Amendment which he had copied from that Act, but changing the words "employers and workmen" to "landlords and tenants." The English Act said that— An agreement, or combination of two or more persons to do, or procure to be done, any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute between employers, and shall not be indictable as a conspiracy, if such act committed by one person would not be punishable as a crime.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy) would find in those words no application to an individual act, apart from combination.

MR. HEALY

said, they were now dealing with the spirit of the Bill, and he having met the declaration of the Prime Minister, and the Secretary of State for the Home Department, and pointed out the difference in spirit which existed, would the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree to accept the words of his Amendment? The point in question plainly showed the spirit in which the Government proposed to legislate, and of this he would give another instance from the English Act. In Clause 7 of that Act would be found these words— Attending at or near the house or place where a person resides, or works, or carries on business, or happens to be, or the approach to such house or place, in order merely to obtain or communicate information, shall not be deemed a watching or besetting within the meaning of this section. Was there anything in the Irish Bill equivalent to that? He had put down an Amendment in the sense of that Proviso to this effect— Provided, that no refusal by any person to deal with another in the way of the trade, business, or employment of either, and no declaration of intention not to so deal, and no resort to the practice of what is commonly known as exclusive dealing shall of itself be deemed to be intimidation. Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman accept that Amendment? He would not, although the Prime Minister had declared that exclusive dealing was no crime. Therefore, he (Mr. Healy) thought he had disposed of the pretence of the Government that they wished to deal, or would deal with the Irish Bill or people in the same way as they had dealt with the English Act. These were the specious promises which the Government made, and which could be shown to be futile and disingenuous. He would put a case to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, who said he wished to put down intimidation. If a man wished to buy bread from a baker, or sugar from a grocer, and the baker or grocer refused to serve him, would that be intimidation under the Bill? Why did not the Government get up and answer? A man might go into a shop and say, "I demand to be supplied with groceries;" and if the grocer refused to serve him, would the Government make that an act of intimidation? Why did the right hon. and learned Gentleman not answer?

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, if it would shorten the debate, he would answer the question. It depended on the surrounding circumstances whether the refusal amounted to intimidation or not.

MR. HEALY

Who is to be the judge of it?

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

The tribunal appointed by Parliament. I may also add, to make matters clear, that we are disposed to give an appeal in such cases, as in all cases of summary jurisdiction, to Quarter Sessions.

MR. HEALY

said, in that case, the right hon. and learned Gentleman's view differed from that of the Prime Minister. Last year the Prime Minister laid down the principle that exclusive dealing could not be dealt with as a crime; but the right hon. and learned Gentleman now said that if one man refused to supply another with goods, that refusal might, under certain circumstances, be a crime. He wondered whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman would apply that principle to England and Scotland? If once this system was commenced there would be no end to it. Suppose the tradesman were willing to sell to a particular customer, but only at a prohibitive price. What if he charged £1 for a loaf of bread? Would that conduct be criminal? Would that be intimidation? The man might be willing to supply the other, but he could put his own price upon the goods. It came to this—if the offence depended on certain surrounding circumstances, that the Government would have to describe those circumstances, and, in so doing, to add to the Bill a Schedule of fair prices in order to prevent the measure from becoming futile. They would have to do that, because the idea of driving a coach and four through an Act of Parliament was not confined to the country in which it originated. "Boycotting" would be just as practicable, and the Government would be passing a futile Bill. What astonished him was that the Government seemed to think they could put down feelings of burning injustice in the minds of the Irish people. The Secretary of State for the Home Department said they must take their choice between "Captain Moonlight" or "Boycotting." That was precisely his own view; and the Government would find that where farms had been unjustly taken from people, the people would not tolerate a system which brought ruin upon them. The Government wore very strong on the question of ruin, and insisted that no man should be ruined by "Boycotting"; the people of Ireland insisted that no man should be ruined by the landlords' system, and if a man was turned out of his farm that would be "Boycotting." He (Mr. Healy) was not one of those who apologized for "Boycotting," for he would not say that in some cases "Boycotting" had not been grossly abused. However, it was not only a necessary practice, but, in cases where it was aimed at injustice, it was a practice that had been often employed with very good results, and a practice to which alone the Irish people could resort. The people of Ireland would try and strike back for injustice, and the Government must keep that in mind. The Irish people would not tolerate injustice so long as they could be avenged. The Government thought they would put down crime by that Bill, but they would do nothing of the kind. The practice of taking the lands over the heads of the people, by fixing a higher value than the market value, and so driving the people to degradation, to workhouses, and to emigration, was a practice which the people of Ireland were determined, as a whole, to resist, and all the Acts of Parliament were contemptible and despicable in the face of that determination, because the views of an united people could not be put down. The Government might deal with this matter in one or two ways. They might make eviction impossible, and that would at once put down "Boycotting." But this Bill was simply intended to prop up the rotten edifice of the land system, and the prop and the edifice would come down together. If men took farms from which others had been unjustly evicted they would take them at their peril. The Irish people would not tolerate that, and the Government might take it as a fact that all the English Bills, and all the English Governments that might exist, would never succeed in putting down the view of the people, that the present iniquitous practice of land-grabbing was an evil, and must be put a stop to. The Secretary of State for the Home Department said that very great evils had to be coped with in Ireland, and special remedies were necessary. Was not the whole system of Irish crime comparable with what took place in England during the Trades' Union outrages? The Prime Minister praised Trades' Unions now; but the Secretary of State for the Home Department had said that Parliament, by the Act of 1871, put this stigma on Trades' Unionism. But the right hon. and learned Gentleman had not mentioned, that no sooner was that Act passed than the Trades' Unions agitated against it, and never ceased until it was repealed; so that there was now not a trace of those parts of the Act to which they objected. The people of Ireland might consent to this Bill, if they were assured that they would have a hearing in the House of Commons, and in the newspapers, as the Trades' Union had; but if an Irish Member made a speech in that House, or in Ireland, it was put into a few lines, while every charge made against the Irish by Englishmen was printed in full in the English papers. Therefore, the Irish people had not the same opportunity that the Trades' Unions had of influencing the views of the country. The right hon. and learned Gentleman said he was willing to deal with Ireland as with England; but what occurred in England? On the previous night the right hon. and learned Gentleman had dwelt, almost with tearfulness, upon the "Boycotting" offences in Ireland. Here were some of the outrages committed by the Trades' Unions, taken from the Blue Book— Saw Grinders' Union.—Parker's horse hamstrung in a field by three men, hired by Secretary of Union. Powder exploded at Parker's door, and in the house of Bishop. Parker shot at at his own door, and arm disabled, by men hired by Union. Lindley shot and wounded by an air-gun. Can of powder exploded in Poole's house, because an obnoxious person was lodging with him. Lindley shot at with an air-gun whilst sitting in a crowded taproom; died from effects of wound. These outrages did not occur in the days of the Saxons; they occurred only 12 or 13 years ago.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

That was the very reason of the passing of the Act of 1871.

MR. HEALY

asked, whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman could bring forward anything in the whole history of "Boycotting" in Ireland comparable with what took place in this English time? He would go on with his case. Assassins hired by Union: they had tracked him for five or six weeks. Can of powder exploded down Baxter's chimney. Halliwell blown up by explosion of powder." Wilson's house blown up by quart of powder placed in cellar; whilst he, his wife, and children were in their beds. Unsuccessful attempt to blow down Firth's chimney. Attempt to blow down Wheatman and Smith's chimney with 241hs. in can. Can of powder exploded in Holds-worth's cellar. Attempt to blow up Reaney's wheel. Powder exploded in Fearnehough's cellar: a reward of £1,100 failed to elicit any information. File Grinders' Union.— Gillott's house blown up by powder thrown into cellar, whilst he, his wife, two children, and two apprentices were in bed. Torr's warehouse wrecked. Fork Grinders' Union.—Mason assaulted by 30 Union men, two only of whom were secured and fined. Three weeks afterwards powder was placed to blow up him and two companions. Brickmakers' Union.—17,000 of Robinson's bricks trampled upon and destroyed by night. His cow stabbed, and had to be killed. Attempt made to blow up house in which he, his wife, son, and four daughters were sleeping. Unsuccessful attempt to burn his haystack. One of his horses stabbed dead. About 45.000 of Bridge's bricks destroyed, with barrows and machinery. Scissors Grinders' Union.—Syke's machinery injured. Fender Grinders' Union.—Sibray, White, and Hulse assaulted by Union men. White left for dead. Attempt made to blow up Wast-nidge's house. His wife shockingly burned. A poor woman lodger died from burns. No one punished. It was needless to go on further with these quotations, but they showed outrages far more frightful than anything that had occurred in Ireland; and yet the right hon. and learned Gentleman brought in a Bill which would give six months' imprisonment, without the option of a fine or a jury; while in England only three months could be imposed, and the option of a fine was given. In face of this, it was said that the spirit of the Government was the same in both cases. The right hon. and learned Gentleman had made a declaration that he would deal with Ireland in a similar spirit as with England; and, that being so, he (Mr. Healy) trusted the Government would now accept some such Amendment as had been proposed.

MR. LABOUCHERE

said, he deeply regretted that, when a Minister of the Crown stated what he intended to do, he should use such a vague and almost slang expression as "Boycotting." "Boycotting" conveyed no distinct impression, to his (Mr. Labouchere's) mind; and it might mean a great deal, or a very little. The first expression of opinion with regard to "Boycotting" was uttered by the right hon. Gentleman the late Chief Secretary for Ireland, who said that "Boycotting" was an offence, but was no crime. That opinion had also been expressed by the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, who drew a definition between intimidation by threats and violence and intimidation by words, by means of exclusive dealing; and said that exclusive dealing was not a crime. The Secretary of State for the Home Department now said that "Boycotting" included exclusive dealing and something more; that it included putting a man "in Coventry," and that his object in that Bill was to put down "Boycotting" regarded in that wide sense. Whenever any hon. Member had sought to move an Amendment to the Bill the hon. and learned Attorney General for England had replied that a new principle of the Bill was being introduced. He (Mr. Labouchere) understood—and, as he believed himself, other hon. Members understood—the object of that Bill was to create a new tribunal to administer law in Ireland; and that the claim for that tribunal was that the law at present existing in Ireland could not be carried into effect. Now, however, the Secretary of State for the Home Department went further, and wished to create a new offence.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, that, no doubt, the first three clauses dealt with the new tribunal, and the other clauses referred to summary jurisdiction. Being out at night and articles in newspapers were, no doubt, new offences.

MR. LABOUCHERE

said, it appeared that the Government were not only seeking to create new offences, but were doing more—they were seeking to make that an offence against the law in Ireland which was not an offence against the law in England. That appeared to him to be a monstrous proposal. [Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: Being out at night.] That was a mere detail, because it was not the fact of being out at night that was an offence, but because it was the means of an offence. He supposed the Secretary of State for the Home Department did not consider it morally wrong for a man to be out at night. [Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: Legally wrong.] Legally wrong, according to that Act. But the Government proposed that exclusive dealing should be legally wrong in Ireland, though morally right in England. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman was going to fight out that Bill upon these lines, the best thing the Irish Members could do would be to fight it out to the last. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman would say that he would simply put into this Intimidation Clause what existed in the Act of 1875 with regard to intimidation as applied to Trades Unions, then he (Mr. Labouchere) thought the Bill might proceed quietly, and hon. Gentlemen opposite would make no objection to it.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

It is not necessary to do that, because the Act of 1875 applies equally to Ireland.

MR. LABOUCHERE

said, that was so; but cases were tried with a jury, and if the right hon. and learned Gentleman would say that everything in the Act of 1875 should apply to cases in Ireland, then the Bill might be accepted. But what hon. Gentlemen opposite from Ireland objected to was this—making a crime in Ireland what was no crime in England. He (Mr. Labouchere) considered that the "Boycotting" that was pursued on the lines laid down by the hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon) was, no doubt, disagreeable to those affected; but it was necessary in Ireland, and if the Irish people had not adopted it, they would never have obtained that small measure of justice which they had, so far, gained. The Government ought to explain what a man might do in Ireland, and what he might not do. Was it really to be said that if persons met together and said they declined to have any dealings or conversation with someone who acted in a particular way, they were to be taken before a stipendiary magistrate, and if the magistrate considered that the man avoided had been injured in his business or intimidated, those men should be put in prison for six months? If that really was the object of the Bill, then the Irish Members were right in lighting it out to the last. Such a law did not exist in England, and the Secretary of State for the Home Department would not attempt to apply it to England. Surely the right hon. and learned Gentleman knew that the system of sending a man to Coventry existed in England. Was he not aware that if any man was employed in a workshop who was not a member of the union those connected with the union would tell the employer that unless he dismissed this man they would leave his shop? Was not that intimidation? He thought the right hon. and learned Gentleman would do well to withdraw this clause at the present moment. He had said he was willing to accept Amendments, and it would be well for him now to discuss the clause with hon. Members opposite from Ireland, and with the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. C. Russell), and see whether it was not possible to lay down some clear terms with regard to intimidation. Ho might make it an offence to intimidate by acts of violence or by threats of violence; but not to make that a legal offence in Ireland which was not a legal offence in England.

MR. MARUM

desired to call the attention of the Committee to the question exactly at present before them, and that was the Amendment proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell). That Amendment proposed that acts or threats of violence, or injury to person or property, or incitement thereto, should be intimidation. The hon. and learned Member wished that some criminal element should be inserted in the Statute. The framing of the Act was very peculiar in that respect. It stated that— The expression 'intimidation' included any word spoken or act done calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to, or loss of, his property, business, or means of living. There seemed to be a spirit of double meaning or double entendre in the expression "fear of loss of business, or means of living." No doubt, a man might be in fear, in popular parlance, if he went on to the Turf or on to the Stock Exchange, and in fear of a loss of money, but that was not bodily fear; and it appeared to him (Mr. Marum) that there was a double meaning in this phraseology. Whatever the meaning might be, it was certain that the effect of the clause would be to create a crime where there was only civil loss or injury, without any criminal element proceeding from the acts or threats, as the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk wished to put it. If that sort of crime was allowed to be created, without any criminal element, what would be the effect? What sanctioned or regulated all our actions so much as the law of the land? The censorship of sound public opinion; and here, by this Bill, it was to be provided that ostracism, or the exercise of public opinion, should be penal. Supposing a man was in business, what was the strength of his position? It was the goodwill—the good opinion and respect of his neighbours. But if his neighbours agreed to exercise their opinion over him, this Bill would subject them to imprisonment. If individuals caused civil injuries without any criminal intent, and not as proceeding from threats or acts of violence, the party using that legitimate censorship—the sanction of public opinion, which might in its exercise produce loss of business—would be liable to punishment for crime. What mainly sustained the fabric of society was clearly the censorship of public opinion, and if not only that sanction of public opinion was actually taken away, but a countervailing sanction of principle—the sanction of the law was the penalty proposed in this Bill—was introduced, then the effect of public opinion would be neutralized, and they would be pulling down the edifice with one hand and trying to put it up with the other. The inherent defect of this clause was that the Government proposed to make any act which caused civil loss a crime. The objection of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk was to the creation or making of an offence, the element of which would cause loss or injury to the trade or business of an individual. If Ireland really required for its resuscitation such a sweeping and drastic measure as that now proposed, it would destroy the value of public opinion. If a clergyman felt it his duty to censure any particular individual for immoral conduct, it might be said, under the terms of the Bill, that the individual censured was so injured in his trade or business that the clergyman would come under the purview of the Act. It might be necessary that the words "wrongfully and without legal authority" would protect him; but the word "wrongfully" here seemed to be open to various interpretations. Was the word to be interpreted politically or morally? He should support the Amendment, believing that there ought to be some criminal element introduced to create a crime.

MR. T. C. THOMPSON

said, in his opinion, there was some misunderstanding as to the nature of the Amendment. The Government proposed a clause somewhat different to the English Act, and the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell) wished to provide that no prosecution should take place, except in the case of threats or acts of violence. He (Mr. T. C. Thompson) did not object to the substance of the enactment proposed by the Government; but he held that the Government were importing something into the matter which was not quite English, and that instead of adhering to the original plan, they ought to import the words "by acts or threats of violence, or injury to personal property." It should be necessary that some act should be done. What was wanted was to punish something actually done— something like a positive act. He would not exclude "words" altogether, because threats were conveyed by means of words, and he did not exclude threatening letters. Threats spoken in the presence of a man and threatening letters sent were of the nature of acts. But there must be something definite that could be brought home to the man accused. The proposition of the Govern- ment violated some of the great principles of our law, because Acts of Parliament and decisions of Judges laid it down that a man should not be punished for mere words spoken. It would be found from research into the past that words spoken were never used as a means of convicting persons of treason. The whole policy and spirit of our principles of law was that we should not convict or punish a man for mere words. There must be something really written or done. The distinction was clear. An act could be clearly proved, whilst it was almost impossible to depend upon the accuracy of any report of "words spoken." They did not want to punish people for words; but, if the proposition of the Government was carried out, it would enable them to prosecute people for words repeated from one person to another; for suspicions in the mind of a policeman, which would make the liberty and position of the people less safe than it now was. He was glad to hear from the Government that they intended to propose that persons in such cases should have the privilege of appeal; that would be a great advantage. "Boycotting" seemed to be an offence peculiar to Ireland at present; but it must not be forgotten that "Boycotting" had always been regarded by the English Constitution as possible, because there were two or three cases in which "Boycotting" in England was specially prohibited. For instance, a carrier was, under all circumstances, bound to carry goods for all people; a publican was bound to receive every person into his hostelry and supply him with refreshment; a clergyman of the Church of England was bound to keep open his church to all comers; and it must, therefore, be supposed that the constitution of the English law contemplated "Boycotting." It contemplated that a carrier might refuse to carry for persons to whom he objected, that a publican might refuse to serve those he disliked, and that a clergyman might close the doors of his church against those whom he deemed hostile to his views. But the law says they shall not do such things. Therefore, looking at it in that way, they must conceive it possible that that great Empire had always looked to the possibility that men might combine together for trading purposes. He was one of those who looked forward to a future state of happiness for Ireland. He did not think it was likely that men would go on fighting for ever about agricultural matters. He thought that the time was coming very soon when the peasantry in Ireland would be content with their condition; that there would arise in Ireland great prosperity founded upon a great trade. The history of Ireland proved that England had been the ruin of Ireland by putting down trades to satisfy the greed of the predecessors of men whom he saw around him in that House. These men were continually engaged in contests with their workmen; and, in future, it would not be combinations of tenants against landlords that would arise, but combinations of employers against workmen, and then workmen might find themselves unfairly restricted by such an enactment as this. He hoped the Committee would remember that they were legislating not only for the present, but for the future; and anything done now would be quoted as a precedent in future, "in questions of merely trade disputes," when it would be said that such was the policy of the Empire in old times. He hoped the Committee would bear that in mind, and reject the clause as it stood.

MR. T. D. SULLIVAN

said, that the Secretary of State for the Home Department had said that that clause was aimed at the practice of "Boycotting;" but it seemed to him that the clause would go very much further than "Boycotting." It took in the vague offence of intimidation, and where that would begin or end nobody could tell. It reminded him somewhat of the definition given by an enthusiastic American, who said the United States were bounded on the North by the Aurora Borealis, and on the West by the setting sun. This Act was not bounded even by the setting sun, with the moon and the stars added thereto, and he could not tell where the crime of "Boycotting" would begin or end, or what words might not be held by somebody to be calculated to terrify some man, or to affect his business. It would be very dangerous, under the Bill, to criticize a grocer, or a baker, who might take any part in public affairs. Grocers, bakers, publicans, and others were sometimes candidates for Town Commissionerships and for Poor Law Guardianships; but if any one of those was strongly opposed as untrustworthy or unfit for the post, and public opinion was excited against him, he might contend that his business had been injured by such opposition, and the people who had opposed him would be liable to prosecution. What would constitute intimidation had never yet been defined. Would nods, or winks, or black looks constitute "Boycotting"? It wa3 said that a great deal might be conveyed by a nod, and it might happen that a man might say that his business had been injured through a word circulated, or a nod or wink passed—and prosecutions could be founded on such trivial things as those. Irish policemen had declared that they were offended by hearing a boy whistling "Harvey Duff," and one policeman had sworn that the whistling of "Harvey Duff" constituted abusive language. Abusive language would constitute intimidation, and he wanted to know where people were to be under this Act? They would simply be at the mercy of the Irish magistrates. It was all very well to speak of the spirit in which this Bill would be passed; but it was not by the spirit, but by the letter of the Act that the people of Ireland would be judged; they would be in the hands of magistrates and police, and it would not do to affect a reasonable and Constitutional spirit whilst this Bill was passing through the House. If the Government so greatly disliked intimidation and oppression, why did not they attempt to deal with the intimidation and oppression practised by landlords and agents? It was notorious that tenants had been intimidated into not doing things they had a legal right to do, and into doing things they had a legal right to abstain from doing. Severe and cruel intimidation had been applied to tenants in regard to their votes at elections at one time; and although the Ballot Act had put an end to that intimidation, it had not been made a crime for Irish landlords to intimidate tenants by the most cruel form of intimidation—namely, eviction, which was equivalent to starvation and death. Landlords intimidated tenants to send their children to proselytizing schools; would that be made an offence? A great deal had been said in condemnation of "Boycotting," and there had been some pathetic and moving descriptions of the sad results of "Boycotting." He (Mr. Sullivan) often wondered, when listening to arguments of that sort, why the tender feelings of the Secretary of State for the Home Department did not go all round the compass—why he was tender on one side on the subject, and had no compunction on the other. Why was it that the turning of people out of their houses did not excite the tender feelings of the right hon. and learned Gentleman? They had heard, as he had said, sad and moving descriptions of the condition of the alleged victims of "Boycotting;" they had heard sad accounts of the harm and injury resulting from "Boycotting;" but he (Mr. Sullivan) had never heard that any person had died in Ireland through "Boycotting." The practice of "Boycotting" was intended for the prevention of a very great evil. One of the curses of Ireland was the class of persons known as the "land-grabbers." The Irish landlords had some defence for their exaction of rack-rents, because of the existence of the Irish land-grabber. These men pounced upon evicted farms, no matter how the eviction had taken place. Very often a land-grabber went to a landlord before any eviction had taken place, and incited the landlord to evict his neighbour, because he coveted his little plot. These men were the curse of the country, and it was little wonder that the people tried to think of or devise some means of checking their ravages. What system did they advise? What system did the Land League recommend? It said, "Treat these men as obnoxious— treat these men as unworthy of social communication. Do not shoot them— do not fire into their houses—do not kill or maim their cattle—simply shun them. Shun them at the fair—shun them in the market—have nothing to do with them—show that you dislike them and their conduct." He thought that very good advice. He gave that advice himself, and he was not ashamed or afraid to confess it. He thought it was the fairest and best means that could be devised of dealing with a class of public enemies whom the law would not touch, and who were a peril to the peace and well-being of Ireland. He hoped the Irish people would adhere to that system. He hoped they would abstain from violence of any kind. They were never advised by the Land League to have recourse to violence. They were warned and cautioned against it; but to regard that class of persons as obnoxious, and as enemies of the public welfare, without having any recourse to violence or criminality. He hoped that feeling and sentiment would survive amongst the Irish people. He believed it was too late to come out and endeavour to make the land-grabber a popular man. It was too late to come and ask the Irish people to bow and smile to him, and, as some people might expect of them, take off their hats to him. It was too late to expect them to submit to slavery or tyranny from any class. He had been speaking of intimidation practised by landlords, agents, and others, and let him mention one instance of such intimidation. Ho was informed by a clergyman, in the county he represented, that not long ago a landlord in that part of the county passed on the road a young man who did not salute him by taking off his hat. On the following day the landlord sent for the farmer, and told him to send the young fellow out of the country, or he, the farmer, should go out of his farm. The young man was sent to America, because the farmer did not wish to lose his land. That young man would grow up; but what must be his opinion of English law? Was not that intimidation? There was no law to touch it. If this clause would meet intimidation all round, he would have no objection to it; but he knew it would be worked against the people, and it would not touch the real terrorism and violence in Ireland—the terrorism of the landlord and of the police. He should do his best to oppose this clause at every stage.

DR. COMMINS

said, he disapproved as much as any hon. Member of the House of some acts that had been done under the name and guise of "Boycotting;" but, at the same time, he must dissent quite as widely from the provisions of this section, which had been introduced, as the Secretary of State for the Home Department told them, for the purpose of putting down "Boycotting." The Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell) provided a remedy for one of the greatest flaws in this section. Admitted that it was perfectly right to put down anything that inflicted a grievous wrong upon any subject of the Crown, still they were entitled to know what were these acts which were to be put down. It would not do to say we mean to put down "Boycotting." "Boycotting" was a force unknown to the law. It was a phrase upon the interpretation of which no two persons would agree. Some would consider "Boycotting" nothing more than the right of passive resistance, as the last resort of the oppressed in that country—a resort that the Irish tenant was quite as much entitled to as any other oppressed individual in any part of the world. Others might consider that "Boycotting" amounted to something like intimidation—something like putting a person in bodily fear, which, though not always an offence within the law of England, had, recently, in certain cases, been allowed to be an offence. The first difficulty that occurred to him was, what was it that this section proposed to do? One thing they knew it proposed to do, and that was to interfere with every act of life of one section of the Irish people. Nobody imagined— no hon. Member in that House imagined— that this section, or any part of it, was intended to meet the emergency, or what was known as the "Crowbar Brigade." It was an undeniable fact that it was only intended, that it was intended to be aimed and used against those who constituted the recently-deceased Land League, or against those who sympathized with the tenants in their attempt to get rid of the odious system of landlordism, which had been the ruin of the country. The clause was intended to prevent them from doing acts which they had a perfect right to do. Any single act of a man's life, however insignificant, might be brought within this section, unless there was some restriction made, such as was proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk. Not a word a man could speak, not even a wink on his part, not a single manifestation of his will, but could be interpreted by somebody into an act of intimidation. This section provided that not only was a person liable to the provisions of the Act who intimidated, but that the person who incited another to intimidate was equally liable. Incitement might be given by a wink; it might be given by a signal; it might be given by standing at ease; and doing anything at all might be alleged to be I in pursuance of some arrangement; and, consequently, he maintained that, under this section, there was not one single act of a human being's life in Ireland, which could be described or put into words, which the fragmentary deposition of a policeman, or of an interested informer, might not construe into a transgression of this section, as it at present stood. It had been said that it was introducing no new principle. That was the argument that was deduced by several hon. Members who spoke last night; but the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant candidly admitted that it was introducing a new principle, although he had not condescended to tell the Committee what the new principle was. He told them it was intended to put down "Boycotting"—intended to put down crimes which consisted of refusing to supply people with goods; by refusing to work for them. That was introducing a new principle; and it was not only introducing a new principle, but it was violating the admitted principle of the law as it at present stood. The authority of the Prime Minister had been appealed to in support of the proposition that "exclusive dealing" was not illegal, and the Prime Minister himself repudiated the insinuation that he considered exclusive dealing legal. He (Dr. Commins) appealed to a higher authority than the Prime Minister, and that was the authority of the law, as contained in the Statute Book. They knew that the principle of exclusive dealing was the right assumed by persons to confederate and combine, and agree one with the other to avoid dealing with certain persons, to avoid entering into their employ, and to induce others to keep out of their employ. That was the meaning of exclusive dealing, and all that had not only been legalized, but at this moment there was a Statute to that effect, which the Prime Minister, with all his power and his majority at his back, dare not lay a finger upon. The Trades' Union Act of 1871 expressly legalized every one of these acts. The hon. and learned Member for Dundalk, alluding to this subject, last night, said it was a peculiarity of the law of England that acts which individuals would be perfectly justified in doing would not be justifiable if persons conspired and combined together to do them. That might be true to a certain extent. The Trades' Unions Act of 1871, which, unfortunately, did not apply to Ireland, said, in Section 2— The purposes of any trades' union shall, by reason merely that they are in restraint of trade, he deemed to be unlawful, so as to render any member of such trades' union liable to criminal prosecution for conspiracy or otherwise. That expressly legalized exclusive dealing. That section permitted members of Trades' Unions to make agreements not to deal with persons outside the Union; but to deal only with such persons as they might consider desirable to deal with in the interests of their trade. Hon. Members knew what "blacking" a shop was. Trades' Unions were really registered Unions; for they might get the sanction of the law for their rules. They might actually get legal facilities for the carrying out of those very rules, although they were manifestly in favour of a restricted trade. Let him give the Committee an instance of what was constantly occurring in manufacturing districts. The manufacturer, who was not a member of the Union, broke one of the rules, and the consequence was that his shop was blacked. What was done in that case? The very Act which had been cited so very often made it legal for Trades' Unions to place persons outside of that shop and watch who went in and who came out of it, to get information. If a member of any Trades' Union of England was found going into such a blacked shop, he was "Boycotted." He was expelled from their Union; he lost all the benefits of the Union; he lost the money he had put into it; and if he happened to lose the work in the particular shop in which he had offended against the rules, he might find it almost impossible to get any other employment in England. That was what the law of England said it was legal and just and proper to do. Section 3 of the Act of 1871 said— The purposes of any trades' union shall not, by reason merely that they are in restraint of trade, be deemed to be unlawful, so as to render void or voidable any agreement or trust. And the 4th section provided that— Though actions might not be brought upon agreements between members of trades' unions, as to the conditions on which members would carry on business, who they would sell to or refuse to sell to, or whom they should employ, to pay fines imposed on members by Courts of Justice, strike pay, &c, or for the collection of funds for these purposes, or agreement between one another for these purposes, even by bond, that nothing in the Act shall make any such agreement unlawful. Here was a deliberate sanction given to the acts that were proposed to be rendered so criminal in Ireland. It was because of such acts people would be rendered liable to prosecution. Under this section they were asking for some safeguard against abuse of the clause. A person might be apprehended at the whim of some man who considered that his business or his prospects in life were in some way interfered with by a mere act, or nod, or word, which he might interpret in his own way, and, in consequence, consider himself justified in instituting a most oppressive prosecution. One of the greatest evils that could exist in any country was an indefinite definition of the Criminal Law. No country could have liberty—no country could have real protection, or political or personal liberty, if the Criminal Law did not clearly and distinctly define what it was that were crimes, and what it was for which they might not be subjected to penalty, or pains, or punishment, or forfeiture. In this case there was no definition whatever. Even if the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk were accepted the clause would still be indefinite. The clause would be such as to leave it at the discretion of the person who made the accusation, and at the discretion of the magistrate who heard the accusation, to say what would be an offence under the Act, and what would not. Even if the people in Ireland had confidence in the administration of the law— and unfortunately they had not, and the confidence in the administration of the law became less and less the lower they descended—this section would work very unfairly and unsatisfactorily. Amongst all right - thinking and unprejudiced people there was a feeling that the higher functionaries of the law in Ireland were deserving of the highest confidence. There was most absolute, entire, and complete confidence in the impartiality and justice of the Lord Chancellor, for instance, and there were other Members of the Irish Bench deserving of a similar tribute for their honesty and integrity. But there were some in whom the people had no confidence whatever, and that want of confidence increased as they descended in the social scale. Amongst some of those on the lowest step of the ladder there was not only no confidence in the adminis- trators of the law, but absolutely an unqualified distrust. They had heard the names of certain individuals mentioned too frequently in the debates in that House, and he would not be so invidious as to mention those names again; but it was a patent and undeniable fact that one of the crying evils of Ireland had always been the want of confidence of the people in those who had to administer the law, particularly those in subordinate positions. A want of confidence would vitiate provisions, such as those contained in this clause, which gave no definition of crime, but which left it entirely subject to the construction of the person, however prejudiced and however unskilled in construing Acts of Parliament. Many of the Irish magistrates were totally unfitted.

THE CHAIRMAN

The hon. Gentleman is alluding to a subsequent part of the Act, which provides that the magistrates are to administer the law; his remarks, therefore, have no bearing upon the present Amendment.

DR. COMMINS

apologized, and said, he was perfectly willing to restrain his observations in the direction indicated by the Chairman. One of his chief objections to this section was the indefinite nature of it. It was almost impossible for any man to say what would fall under the clause and what would not, and he thought it was quite legitimate on his part to point out that that indefiniteness was made all the worse by the character of the persons who would have to administer the Act. However, he would retain anything he had to say on this matter until the clause providing for the appointment of magistrates to administer the law came under discussion. He maintained that it was essentially necessary to introduce some element to guide the construction of the law by these unskilled, and in many cases unprofessional magistrates—some element that could be appealed to, and some element that had already existed in the law. That element the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk proposed to introduce by the Amendment they were now discussing. For these reasons he supported the Amendment most heartily. Ho supported it because it would tend to limit the mischief that this section must undoubtedly achieve; he supported it because it would tend to preserve to the people of Ireland the last remnant of Constitutional liberty—the privilege of merely condemning men whom they felt to be the ruin of the country; men who had degraded and impoverished their country—he supported it because it would allow the people to have recourse to a passive resistance to their oppressors by leaving them "severely alone."

MR. BRYCE

said, he thought that anyone who attempted to discuss this clause must begin by admitting that some such clause was absolutely necessary. Hon. Members sitting on the Liberal side of the House could have no doubt at all that an ample ease had been made out for a clause of this kind. The only doubt that could exist in their minds was how far that clause should go. They hardly needed the very powerful statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant for Ireland to cause them to believe that the practice of intimidation and of "Boycotting" had been carried on to a point in Ireland which had been one of the chief difficulties in the government of that country; and he thought that everyone on the Ministerial side of the House would agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department, that this clause should be passed in a shape which would enable it to deal with "Boycotting" as it was practised at present in Ireland. But having said that, he thought they must make some deductions, they must enter upon some further considerations, before they could accept the clause as it stood. There seemed to be three principles which ought to govern their conduct in determining the wording of the clause. In the first place, it ought not to go beyond what was necessary for dealing with the evil; secondly, it ought not to include anything which in the ordinary sense was not a criminal offence; and, thirdly, it ought, if possible, to keep within the same lines as the English law. He thought that they might take these principles to guide them in their consideration of this matter. Let them consider how far the clause went. They were much indebted to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, not only for the very moderate and temperate speech he had delivered, but for the way in which he had narrowed down the point at issue. The point was a difficult, yet a comparatively small one. The point at issue seemed to lie entirely—he hoped the Chairman would not think him out of order in referring to this subsequent part of the clause, because, to him, it seemed essential to do so if they were to deal with the matter fairly and honestly— the point at issue seemed to lie in the last line of the clause—namely, in the words "or in fear of any injury to, or loss of his property, business, or means of living;" and the question which the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell") raised was, substantially, whether these lines should remain in the clause. They were pretty well agreed that the practice of "Boycotting" or intimidation should be checked and stopped, so far as it went in the direction of personal injury to the person intimidated, or to any member of his family, or person in his employment: but the question was whether the definition should go on to include eases of exclusive dealing. They ought carefully to define whether they meant "Boycotting" unaccompanied by personal violence, or "Boycotting" which consisted of exclusive dealing to be dealt with by the clause. The right hon. and learned Gentleman, as far as he (Mr. Bryce) understood, did not mean to say that he considered every case of "Boycotting" was necessarily wrong, or rather that every case of exclusive dealing ought necessarily to be taken as punishable under this Act. He thought they might take it that the right hon. and learned Gentleman was of opinion that if a man refused to supply groceries to another man, his refusal would not necessarily amount to intimidation. He submitted to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that the words in the Bill, as they stood, would cover every case of exclusive dealing.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, that the last section of the clause was in explanation of the words as to intimidation at the commencement, and that the whole was governed by the Clauses "a" and"b," which denoted the purposes of intimidation.

MR. BRYCE

was much obliged to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for the explanation. He confessed he had rather assumed, perhaps wrongly, that the right hon. and learned Gentleman intended to say it would depend upon the circumstances of the case whether exclusive dealing should or should not be considered an offence. It appeared to him (Mr. Bryce), that oven in cases where words spoken or acts done were directed to the objects set forth in the Sub-sections "a" and "b," nevertheless, if those acts or words amounted merely to expressions of an intention not to deal, such expressions were not necessarily always, though they might be sometimes, wrongful, and therefore punishable acts. One was justified, he thought, in considering matters of this kind, to put extreme cases. In dealing with penal Statutes, they had the right to require that they should not be extended to acts which would not, in the ordinary understanding of men, be acts which ought to be punished. If they included in that definition things which the ordinary sense of man rejected as not amounting to acts of intimidation, instead of clarifying the law, they would obscure it. The object of a definition ought to be to make the law more clear; but this attempt at definition would make it more difficult. Now, suppose that at the time of a Parliamentary or other election, the wife of a clergyman went to a dairyman and told him that if he canvassed for the Liberal candidate she would take no more butter from him, and that she believed there were many good Churchmen who would do the same, such a case would come within this definition, for these would be words spoken which would be intended to put a man in fear of loss of business or means of living. They knew that "Boycotting" in this sense was very largely used both in England and Ireland; and even the Ballot Act had not wholly prevented it. They knew that persons were prevented from taking an active part in elections owing to such representations, and yet no one supposed that an act of that kind should be punishable by six months' imprisonment, with or without hard labour, on summary conviction. Suppose that in a country town there was going to be a general holiday, and all the shopkeepers except one were willing to give their employés a holiday. If a man or men went to the one shopkeeper who declined to close his shop, and said, "If you do not close we will deal with you no longer," such words would come within the moaning of this definition, because they would put the man in fear of loss of business, and the words would have been spoken with the view of influencing his action. Yet no one could suppose that the man or men who had approached him in that spirit should be committed to gaol for six months. They knew perfectly well that at the Bar, if a counsel habitually took lower fees than his brethren, or otherwise infringed various professional rules, they refused to hold any briefs along with him. That remedy against others who disobeyed the unwritten law of the Bar was thoroughly established by usage, and yet it would clearly come within the terms of this definition. He did not suggest these difficulties for the sake of making the solution of the question any more difficult. His object was rather to narrow the point, and endeavour to get hon. Gentlemen to address their minds to the solution in the proper manner. He could not say they could go so far as to support the Amendment, because it appeared to him that the Amendment would go the length of allowing all kinds of exclusive dealing to be practised with impunity. He was bound to say that the case made out by the Government was that they must deal with exclusive dealing in its more aggravated forms; and he thought that anyone who had experience of Irish affairs would admit that they would not be fairly grappling with the evil if they did not endeavour to prevent "Boycotting" in its extreme and unjustifiable form. He found a great difficulty in saying exactly what the solution of the case should be. He did not pretend to be more competent to solve the problem than any other hon. Member; but he would venture to throw out one or two suggestions to the Government, which, he thought, would ease the difficulty they felt in regard to the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk. It would be well if the Government would give some indication of the view they intended to take, or of the proposition they intended to make, in this matter. He would suggest, as one alternative, that the Government should omit the definition which began with line 25—namely, In this Act the expression 'intimidation' includes any word spoken or act done calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or moans of living. This suggestion was, no doubt, open to the objection that this Act would have to be administered by Resident Magistrates, who were not all professional men. Of course, that objection was diminished by the undertaking of the Government to give an appeal; but, still, it was too much to expect the Resident Magistrates of Ireland to interpret what intimidation was and what it was not, and he was reminded that the appeal allowed was only one to the Court of Quarter Sessions, which, after all, was not a Court of high legal authority. His second suggestion was that the Government might rely sufficiently upon the word "conspiracy;" in other words, that they should not think it necessary to deal with acts or words imparting an intention to have exclusive dealing with isolated individuals. The right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland had said that the practice of "Boycotting" was largely associated with terrorism. That was true; but it had another bearing on the case, and that was that in the majority of cases you could punish a man for an act of terrorism, which act would clearly be within the purview of the clause, apart from those words he (Mr. Bryce) proposed to strike out. He suggested that the Government would do well to rely upon the word "conspiracy" instead of upon the words "acts or words," so that they should make it an offence for a man to conspire with any other person or persons to intimidate any person by putting him in fear of the loss of his property, business, or means of living. He thought that in that way they would not make exclusive dealing a criminal act, but that they would make a combination or a conspiracy to injure a man, by exclusive dealing, a criminal act, and would bring it within the Summary Jurisdiction Clause of the Bill.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, he might observe that that was part of the principle of the Act of 1875.

MR. BRYCE

said, it was perfectly true; but, at the same time, the Committee would recollect that in the Act of 1875 the particular point they were now considering did not arise, because there was no provision in that Act referring to exclusive dealing. The limitation to the conspiracy or combination which he (Mr. Bryce) ventured to suggest, would only apply to cases arising under the last words of the clause. His object in making this suggestion was to strike at the combination or conspiracy to deal exclusively in order to injure a man in his property, his business, or means of living. The third solution he would propose was to omit altogether the last words, "or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living." And the last suggestion he would make was that the definition in lines 25 to 29 might be, to some extent, qualified by adding the words which the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy) had put down in an Amendment. He was not sure whether the Government were prepared to accept any part of that Amendment; but he thought it was one which formed an excellent basis for inserting a qualification such as would somewhat relax the stringency of the clause. The Amendment of the hon. Member (Mr. Healy) was to insert, after the word "living," in line 29— Provided, That no refusal by any person to deal with another in the way of the trade, business, or employment of either; and no declaration of the intention not to so deal, and no resort to the practice of what is commonly known as exclusive dealing, shall of itself be deemed to be intimidation. Those words were, no doubt, very extensive, and he was not prepared to say that they were not too extensive. He was inclined to think, however, that the words suggested by the hon. Member for Wexford might, with certain modifications, prove a solution of the difficulty that now confronted them. It must be remembered that the law was to be administered by persons who were not always skilled lawyers, so that caution was particularly needed; and, therefore, he thought that if the Government would endeavour to mitigate the too great width and severity of the last words of the clause in some way or other, they would find a very general disposition on the Liberal side of the House to support them in the clause as a whole.

MR. PLUNKET

said, he did not intend to go over any part of the ground which the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Home Department had dealt with in their very able speeches. He only wished to make a very few observations on what had fallen from the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce). The hon. and learned Gentleman had, no doubt, treated the matter with a great deal of acumen and ingenuity; but if the Committee adopted his views, they would really whittle away and emasculate the clause of its most necessary and vital provisions. The hon. and learned Member frankly admitted that his object was to get rid of the words at the end of the clause; words which, as stated by the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland, were the very essence of the clause, and without which the clause would be of no avail.

MR. BRYCE

asked the right hon. and learned Gentleman to allow him to explain. He thought that, at the commencement of his remarks, he disclaimed any intention of emasculating that clause. He did not think that the only solution was to get rid of the words "or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living;" but he certainly desired, if they were retained, to qualify them so as to prevent them working unjustly.

MR. PLUNKET

understood that one of the proposals of the right hon. and learned Gentleman, and the one which he put first, was to really get rid of the words altogether by their omission. He wished to contrast the view which was put forward by the hon. and learned Member, which he ventured to say was the view of a doctrinarian, with the view put forward by the Chief Secretary for Ireland, with the consent of the Government—the Government which was responsible for the peace of Ireland— the view of the right hon. Gentleman was, that this part of the clause was absolutely essential. He (Mr. Plunket) would not dwell upon the suggestion of the hon. and learned Member, that certain acts done at an election time, that certain acts done on the occasion of a village entertainment, or something of that kind, might possibly be brought as offences within the purview of this Act. There was not an Act of Parliament that had ever been passed about which they might not suggest some improper application of its provisions; but he really thought that those who used such expressions as these took a trifling view of the case when they suggested the possibility of the measure being applied at the time and in the way which they had indicated. The hon. and learned Member suggested that the Government should deal with conspiracy alone. That was just the very thing that it would be useless to rely upon as being dealt with in this case. How were they going to prove conspiracy? It was because they could prove an individual act, where they could not prove conspiracy, that the clause was framed in this way, and that the admirable precedent of the Act of 1875 had been followed. Why was it that those words were introduced in the Act of 1875? For two obvious purposes. In the first place, to direct and assist the Court in the performance of its duties; and, in the second place, to inform the persons, who might otherwise make themselves amenable, to the consequences of a law which created a new offence. The hon. and learned Member, at the close of his speech, said it struck him as very odd to leave these things at the mere discretion of the Resident Magistrates, who had to make the inquiries, and who might not even be lawyers. In the first place, the clause gave a magistrate a clear indication of the character of the offence with which ho had to deal; and, in the second place, it gave a fair warning to those persons who might otherwise be affected by the operation of the new law. The Act of 1875 was intended to meet a most remarkable instance of a new difficulty, with which it was necessary to deal, on account of conspiracy—perhaps conspiracy by the isolated act of an individual instead of a number of individuals. The object of the present clause was to deal with even more subtle and more novel offences than were even contemplated by the Act of 1875. He would like to remind the Committee, before the debate proceeded any further, of the view which was taken of the question of intimidation by the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland. Last night, when speaking of the very words to which the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets now objected, the right hon. Gentleman said— The words 'business or means of living' were all-important, and could not be omitted from the clause without upsetting the main purpose for which it was intended. The clause was directed against the systematic nature of 'Boycotting,' which was carried out at the price of serious suffering to individuals. This system of 'Boycotting' was almost inextricably mixed up with the grosser forms of terrorism, and inflicted extreme hardship and cruelty—cruelty which frequently followed men very far indeed. These were the words of the official exponent of the views of the Government in bringing this clause before the Committee, and he (Mr. Plunket) did intreat the Committee and the Government to pause before depriving the Government of Ireland of the power they now sought by accepting any such suggestion as that of the hon. and learned Member opposite (Mr. Bryce). It was quite idle to suppose that "Boycotting" had been carried out in Ireland entirely and only by violence or threats—violence either to the individual himself, or to any member of his family. No; the worst and the cruellest forms of "Boycotting" were those which had made a man's life not worth living; those which had ruined his prospects, which had effaced all the results of a long and honourable life; and those forms of "Boycotting" had been directed against those members of the community who least deserved to be treated in that manner, and they had been made use of for the purpose of forcing men to act in a manner dishonourable to themselves, and contrary to all the teaching of morality and religion. It was exactly this subtle and new invention, this terrible weapon with which they had armed themselves, that it was necessary to strike from the hands of the leaders of this movement in Ireland. These were the reasons which he thought ought to weigh with hon. Gentlemen, even if they had not been reinforced by the observations of some of the hon. Members from Ireland sitting below the Gangway on the Opposition side of the House that day. He did not wish to comment upon it at the time, as he did not wish to introduce matters of controversy there; but he wished to put this view to the Committee. Whatever they might think of the various ways of dealing with this matter if the clause had never been proposed in its present form, what did they think would be the effect if they now struck out those words from the clause? Why, the effect would certainly be that the people of Ireland would be told that this attempt to put down this species of "Boycotting" had been rejected by the House of Commons. That would be the effect in regard to the people; but what would be the effect upon the Court? In what position would the Resident Magistrate, who might not be a lawyer, and who might not grasp the undoubted truth that an Act of Parliament must be interpreted as it was found, and not by the surrounding circumstances, find himself? The Resident Magistrate would be told that there were definitions put into the English Act of Parliament, and it was proposed to introduce them in this Act; but, when the Bill came to be discussed in detail by the House of Commons, the particular words which aimed at this form of "Boycotting" were deliberately struck out. He wanted to know what the ordinary Resident Magistrate, endeavouring to administer the Act, was to do. Would not a difficulty be found owing to the difference which had been made between the wording of this Bill and the Statute applying to analogous offences in England? Must not any man who was not a lawyer be oppressed with this consideration, that the words had been deliberately introduced by the Government, but had been rejected by the Committee of the House of Commons? He would not longer detain the Committee on the present occasion. He hoped he had said nothing of an irritating character to any Member of the Committee. He spoke with very considerable experience, for he knew something of "Boycotting." He was on the farm of Captain Boycott before the relief came to his aid; he saw the process in its inception; he had watched every step of it since. It had been his duty—the necessary experience of his life—to watch it; and he now said, with all the solemnity that he could use, that he believed the words which it was now proposed to leave out were the most valuable words in the whole Bill for putting an end to this serious evil with which they had to deal.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, he had endeavoured to enter into the solemnity of the right hon. and learned Gentleman's (Mr. Plunket's) speech; but he confessed that, though he had endeavoured to tune his mind to the high emotions the right hon. and learned Gentleman had expressed, he had been unable to perceive either the necessity or the wisdom of the course which he recommended to the Committee. The great argument of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin was, that even supposing the words were unnecessary, even supposing that these provisions ought never to have been in the Bill, now that they were in the Bill they must stick to them. He (Mr. O'Donnell) did not know whether that was an argument peculiar to the Tory mind; but certainly he had never seen the statement of the great principle, that "whatever is is right," more emphatically set forth in that House or elsewhere. The contention of the right hon. and learned Gentleman really amounted to this— Granted that you have made a mistake with regard to the fundamental provisions of your Bill, inasmuch as you have brought it in, and it has been read a second time, and is now in Committee, you must stick to it without amendment. He (Mr. O'Donneil) expected that, when they again took up the New Rules of Procedure, they would hear a strong appeal from the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin against any further consideration of a Bill which had once passed its second reading. The right hon. and learned Gentleman attacked the arguments of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce), on the ground that they tended to the whittling away of the necessary provisions of the Bill. Now, what the right hon. and learned Gentleman called whittling away, he (Mr. O'Donnell) called a just definition. He (Mr.O'Donnell) and his hon. Friends argued that if the Government maintained in the Bill indefinite, vague, and misleading provisions with regard to intimidation, so far from preventing intimidation, they would, in fact, encourage the very worst forms of it. Now, he frankly admitted, just as his hon. Friend the Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) admitted, that the practice of exclusive dealing, as carried on in Ireland, had, in many cases, been grossly abused, and he certainly would make no objection whatever to the punishment of such gross abuse. He could not, however, approve of punishing just and unjust combination and necessary and improper exclusive dealing alike. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin quoted a sentence from the speech of the Chief Secretary for Ireland last night, a sentence in which that right hon. Gentleman pointed out that exclusive dealing was, in many cases in Ireland, mixed up with the grosser forms of terrorism. He (Mr. O'Donnell) did not deny that that was so. He said that whenever they came across a case of exclusive dealing that was mixed up with the grossest forms of terrorism, they ought to punish it; but where they had to deal with a case of exclusive dealing of a legitimate kind, such as was practised by English tradesmen, they ought not to punish it just as though it was a case mixed up with the grossest forms of terrorism. The vague form of words in the clause covered both the righteous and unrighteous forms of exclusive dealing. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the Tower Hamlets spoke of "Boycotting" as one of the chief difficulties in the government of Ireland. With a slight change in the words, he (Mr. O' Donnell) would agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman. If the hon. and learned Member had said that the practice of "Boycotting," as carried on during the last two years, had been one of the chief difficulties in the way of the misgovernment of Ireland, he would agree with him. The Government admitted that the law they had been endeavouring to enforce for the last year had been a wicked and unjust law; and they now, at the eleventh hour, proposed to amend it. "Boycotting," generally speaking, had been one of the chief difficulties in the successful enforcement of those bad and wicked laws which were now to be reformed by the Government. Let him, at the outset, protest against the use of the word "Boycotting." What was "Boycotting?" "Boycotting" was simply one of those expressions in reference to which the late Mr. Disraeli, in this House, offered a memorable protest, when he protested against the introduction of slang and jargon into legislation. "Boycotting" was a mere expression of slang and jargon, which might mean nothing—it might mean anything—it might mean what was right and what was wrong. "Boycotting" was a word like "Popish," a word which had acquired a certain evil significance amongst a large class of the English population. "Boycotting" was a word like "Muscovite ambition" in the mind of a strong Conservative. "Boycotting" was a meaningless and slang expression, and he protested against its use. He objected to the words in the clause on the ground of their extreme indefiniteness, and also on the ground that they openly and emphatically and unmistakably brought within the purview and operation of coercion practices which were not only legitimate but necessary. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department stated that the criterion of the guilt of the offence of exclusive dealing was to be found in reference to Sub-sections a and b, and that it was the view with which exclusive dealing was brought into play that supplied the material for the legality or illegality of exclusive dealing. By Sub-section a, a person was forbidden to use what was called "intimidation." And intimidation was— Any word spoken or act done calculated to put any person in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living. Any word spoken or any act done was intimidation, if it was done— With a view to cause any person or persons either to do any act which such person or persons has or have a legal right to abstain from doing, or to abstain from doing any act which such person or persons has or have a legal right to do. He could see that under such a subsection a man might be prevented doing a right and necessary act. If a man, in the exercise of his right, did an act which was distasteful to him, he, in return, had a right to express and display his displeasure. Suppose he had a pleasure ground, and admitted to it a number of persons, but excluded a certain person, because that certain person had, in his legal right, excluded him from his pleasure ground some days previous. The man had a perfect legal right to exclude him, but to punish him for his use of that legal right he was determined to inflict upon him a certain amount of inconvenience and hurt. If he did so he was guilty, under this clause, in Ireland, but not in England, of criminal intimidation. He was reminded of another instance. If he refused to deal with a baker, in an Irish town, because that baker was a supporter of some enemy of his, he would be punishable, under this clause, by six months' imprisonment with hard labour. He maintained that he had a perfect right to deal with whomsoever he pleased, and no one had a right to inquire the reason why he did not deal with any particular man. If a person was in the habit of doing something which was objectionable to any man, or any set of men, that man, or set of men, had a perfect and a legal right to refuse to deal with him. He was confident this attempt on the part of the Government to prevent the practice of exclusive dealing would utterly fail. Let them take the case of a newspaper established in an Irish town. That newspaper advanced views and principles objectionable to the people of the town, and some representative of the popular Party started an opposition newspaper. A public meeting was held, and it was resolved that, in consequence of the action of the unpopular editor, the support of the popular Party be in future given to the popular newspaper. Such action on the part of the people would be construed into criminal intimidation, punishable by six months' hard labour. He need not say that it was monstrous, and criminal, and illegal that such a provision should be contained in any Act. Again, they were interested in the improvement of the condition of the labourers in Ireland. The condition of the agricultural labourers in Ireland had been a pet topic with hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House; and, at the time the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) was specially engaged in obtaining redress for the farmers of Ireland, the Conservative Members were in a constant state of gush about the labourers. Suppose that in a certain locality there was a farmer who treated his labourers unjustly, stinted them in their wages, compelled them to herd in some hut or hovel not fit for a pigstye—and these cases were numerous—suppose the labourers of such a farmer resolved that none of their number should work for that farmer, until he gave an undertaking to treat them rightly, properly, and justly; under this clause they would be visited with six months' imprisonment with hard labour. Further, let him instance the case of a rack-rented estate in Ireland, an estate in heavy arrears, an estate on which the practice of keeping the tenants in arrear was of old date. The Prime Minister and Parliament had passed a Land Act which, if allowed to operate on this estate, would shortly reduce the rack rents, and place all the tenants on a footing of liberty and prosperity. The landlord, or his agent, or his understrapper, made it understood amongst the tenantry that if they applied to the Land Court the landlord would at once come down upon them for their arrears. That was the kind of intimidation that would not be touched by the Act; the landlord would have full power under the Act to exercise intimidation. If the tenants on the estate, and on the neighbouring estates, passed a resolution that in case the landlord made use of the arrears, in order to prevent, or if, by the threat of eviction, he prevented a man obtaining the benefit of the Land Act, then all the surrounding farmers should combine to take no vacant farm upon the estate of that unjust landlord, everyone of those farmers would be liable to summary conviction, and to summary sentence to six months' imprisonment with hard labour. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister was digging a pit for himself. These Intimidation Clauses would be worked, and were meant by the Party who sat by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin to be worked, in order to prevent the Irish farmers making use of their legal power of combination to prevent tyrannical landlords continuing their tyrannical conduct. Again, there was nothing in the Irish agrarian situation so really dangerous, and so really mischievous, as the paramount evil of open competition amongst the farming class. There was no Land Act that could be passed that would ever be advantageous to Ireland if over competition amongst farmers continued. It was necessary for the well-being of the country that there should be combination amongst the farmers to prevent that over competition. If the Irish farmers in any district, knowing that a farm was not worth more than 15s. or 20s. an acre, came to the conclusion to debar from the benefits of their union any man who offered more than 20s. an acre for it, there was intimidation; and every farmer who entered into a combination to keep rents at a fair value, and to prevent rack-renting, would be also liable to be charged with intimidation, and might be sentenced to six months' imprisonment with hard labour under this clause. As a matter of fact, the clause was absolutely unworkable. Let him take a case. His contention was this—the clause was a direct stimulant, and provocative of the gravest form of crime. Suppose there was a village tyrant, on whom the force of public opinion might be brought to bear by a regulated system of exclusive dealing, and suppose Her Majesty's Government interfered to force a grocer to sell him groceries, or a baker to sell him bread, or a milkman to sell him milk, when the people were deprived of the ordinary and legitimate means—-the same means that would be used in England—of putting pressure on a man, he (Mr. O'Donnell) contended that they stimulated and caused to exist secret societies that would take very different measures with that village tyrant. If they prevented legitimate "Boycotting," they would stimulate assassination. Really, from the point of view of an unpopular landlord—if he were one—he should not like the people that hated him to be forced to supply him with provisions. He should like, under such circumstances, to adopt the Oriental fashion, and to have a "taster" to test the quality or the innocuous character of these compulsorily-provided provisions. If there were grocers or bakers in the village, the kinsmen of families he had driven to ruin and despair, he should be very sorry in all cases to sustain himself upon the food they might be compelled to supply him with. He should think it much safer to put himself in the hands of an Emergency grocer or baker, or get his food from a far-off and less dangerous source. It had been stated in that House that "Boycotting" was made use of against the most honourable and respectable classes of the community, and he frankly admitted that, in some cases, "Boycotting" was made use of unjustly; but, in an overwhelming majority of cases, "Boycotting" was practised against men who, if they had what they richly deserved, would be in penal servitude. He knew cases of landlords and agents who were "Boycotted," and he knew that for 25 and 30 years back these men had done all they could to wring the last penny from the miserable families in their power; and he said that when men rendered themselves unpopular for the sake of greed, they ought to be exposed to the legitimate consequence of their unpopularity. It was right that the Government should protect them from violence and direct attack on their lives and property; but his contention was that it was no part of the duty or right of the Government to force the community, who detested these oppressors, to live on friendly relations with them, and to attempt to force the community to do that would fail, because no law could permanently go against human nature. Was it pretended that, under this clause, the landlord who warmly demanded arrears in order to put pressure on his tenants in view of the operations of the Land Act, ran the slightest risk of six months' imprisonment with hard labour? No; there was not the slightest danger that the grossest intimidation by the landlords would be punished under the Bill; there was not the slightest danger that "Boycotting" by the landlord classes would be punished. There were scores, and hundreds, and thousands of cases all over Ireland of men who had been "Boycotted" by the landlord classes; there were hotel-keepers, stationers, drapers, and men in every walk of life in Ireland who, in consequence of their being members of the popular Party, were "Boycotted" by the wealthy gentry in their neighbourhood. A remarkable case of that had just occurred in Dublin, under the immediate notice, and with the full knowledge, of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) when he was Chief Secretary for Ireland. A member of of the Dublin Corporation and a tradesman of that City, had spoken in favour of the popular Party, and against the terrorist measures of the governing classes. That person had a large establishment in Westmoreland Street, where he sold stationery and articles of bijouterie and articles which were calculated rather to adorn than to be of any particular use; his trade lay exclusively amongst the wealthy classes. In the columns of The Daily Express there appeared an article, calling on the gentry and the wealthy classes to withdraw their custom from him, in consequence of his action. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford had not put the editor of The Daily Express in gaol under the Coercion Act on reasonable suspicion of intimidation; and he (Mr. O'Donnell) did not believe that any police magistrate of Dublin, or any President Magistrate throughout the country, would punish a similar exercise of the power of "Boycotting" by the landlord classes. He knew hotels that had been habitually used by the wealthy classes which, owing to their owners belonging to the popular Party, or to their being used occasionally by Land League orators, and by Members of Parliament belonging to the popular Party, were put on the black list by the neighbouring gentry, and such hotel proprietors had suffered considerable loss in consequence. Well, he maintained that the resident gentry had a perfect right to choose their own hotels. He did not propose that any man should be obliged to use any particular hotel—any hotel to which he might object—for, no doubt, he was the best judge of where he should go; but his (Mr. O'Donnell's) complaint was that under this Act there would be one measure of justice meted out to the popular Party, and another measure of justice meted out to the rich. What was more common in Ireland of late than for the proprietors of large estates to declare that they were so disgusted with the progress of the agrarian agitation and the changes in the relations of proprietors and tenants introduced by the Prime Minister, that they would break up their establishments, and henceforth have nothing but a money relation with the Irish tenantry—that they would take all the money they used to devote to their Irish establishments somewhere else? Was not that a distinct punishment of large numbers of people in consequence of the sympathy of the tenantry with the Land League, and the legislation of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister? But there was no danger that any gentleman who became an absentee to punish his parish would be liable to six months' imprisonment through the breaking up of his establishment, although the act might mean a loss of salary and means of livelihood to scores and scores of persons. He (Mr. O'Donnell) had listened with great attention last night to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant. He was by no means desirous of implying that the new Chief Secretary for Ireland was not a vast improvement on the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford; but as he had listened to the right hon. Gentleman's exposition of the Government case-—the Dublin Castle case—on the subject of intimidation, he (Mr. O'Donnell) could not help saying to himself, "What a marked progress the right hon. Gentleman has already made in the ways of Dublin Castle?" He must confess that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford, who had entered on his duties in Ireland with as clear an account, and with as popular a past history, as the present Chief Secretary for Ireland, did not show in so short a time so much progress in the ways and ideas of Dublin Castle as the new Chief Secretary had done. [Cries of" Question!"] That was exactly the question. Hon. Gentlemen who were ignorant of Ireland might not perceive it; but it was his duty to enlighten them on the point.

MR. WARTON

I rise to Order. I wish to ask whether the question before the Committee is a comparison between the two Chief Secretaries to the Lord Lieutenant?

THE CHAIRMAN

I understand the hon. Member for Dungarvan is about to reply to some arguments that the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland brought before the Committee last night; and I think it quite fair that he should have an opportunity of replying.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, the Chief Secretary for Ireland last night went exactly on the lines of his Predecessor in mixing up together the legitimate intimidation of exclusive dealing with the illegitimate intimidation of terrorism. It was enough for the right hon. Gentleman to say that over a large district in Ireland there was a good deal of "Boycotting," and also a good deal of outrage, in order to make him think he was justified in asking the Committee to consider that a combination of the popular classes against unpopular individuals must necessarily be put down as terrorism. There was no justification for that confusion of two totally different subjects. According to his (Mr. O'Donnell's) mind, the true criterion as to whether an act of exclusive dealing, or a resolution for exclusive dealing, was criminal or not was supplied by the question whether that exclusive dealing, or whether that resolution for exclusive dealing, was or was not to be carried out by terrorism? He contended that in every ease in which the Government could prove that exclusive dealing, or a combination in favour of exclusive dealing, was supported in the case of any man, or any dozen of men, by terrorism, then the Government ought to punish the terrorizors with the whole force of the law; but he said that the tenantry, openly and honestly, had a perfect right, if they chose, to enter into a resolution not to take a farm from which another man had been unjustly evicted. They had an absolute right to do that, and any law which prevented them was a wicked and tyrannical law that ought to be evaded by every means at the disposal of the nation. The farm-labourers had a right, he contended, to enter into a combination not to work for any farmer or landlord who did not give a just wage, a fit house, and proper diet to his farm-hands; and though the result of that combination might be to reduce the hard and unjust employer of labour to the most extreme destitution, he maintained that if that employer of labour preferred to starve rather than give a fair wage, let him starve; and neither for his present condition nor for his condition in the world hereafter should he (Mr. O'Donnell) have the slightest regret. The objects and the scope of this measure were far beyond the objects and the scope which were represented to be all that were within the design and desire of the Government. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister and the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department had declared that they were prepared to guarantee to the Irish people the same rights of combination enjoyed by the English people. Had they done so? The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Home Department had, again and again, declared that they were not willing to deprive the Irish people of a single right of combination enjoyed by the English people. Then let them carry out their intention, and insert into this Bill words conferring upon the Irish people the same rights as those enjoyed by the Trade Unionists of England. He did not ask for a single right more; but he and his Friends contended that, just as the body of English workmen—shipwrights, masons, bricklayers, &c.—had a perfect right to combine together, and to refuse to work except on certain terms, and had a perfect right to appeal to all their brethren in other trades to unite with them and refuse to work with a hard employer until that hard employer had granted the terms demanded by his labourers and tradesmen, so they contended that the Irish labourers, and Irish farmers, and Irish operatives in town and country-had a perfect right to refuse to work for, and had a perfect right to refuse to aid and assist, their employers, and to refuse to supply these individuals and classes whom the decision of Irish trades' organizations had declared to be enemies of the trade interests and the just rights of the Irish labourers or fanners with the goods they required. They asked for no more. Where a man committed violence and outrage in support of a trade resolution, punish him with rigour, no matter what the trade resolution might be; but where the people choose to occupy a passive attitude, where they stood apart and shunned and refused to assist or to serve an unpopular person, whether he were an employer of town or country labour, a Bill that interfered with that right was a Bill unjust, was a Bill that could only be technically the law, and a Bill which, so long as it was in existence and on the Statute Book, would be an act of tyranny, and would justify the resistance which every free nation ought to oppose to tyranny until tyranny was dead. The crime of intimidation was left purposely so vague in this Bill that it would be left in practice to depend upon the arbitrary will of a number of Government nominees all over the country. There could be no confidence in such provisions; there could be no faith in such Judges; there could be no recognition of duty to carry out a law of that kind. If Her Majesty's Government would introduce words—whether the words of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell) or others—which would make it clear that the object of the Government was to put down violence and terrorism, and not to put down rightful and necessary combination, then the opposition of the Irish Party would disappear in a moment; but if the Government would insist in mixing up in the one anathema lawful combination and rightful union on the part of the farmers against unjust landlords, rightful union of farmers against land-grabbers, and rightful union of labourers against unjust farmers, or the farmers against unjust labourers, with violence and intimidation, it was the duty of every honest man, by every means in his power, and by every encouragement and counsel, consistent with prudence, to oppose the Bill and to insure its failure. The Bill, in its present wording, and this clause of the Bill, were against necessary combination. Unless combination was permitted in Ireland, the Land Act could not work; there could be no protection against unjust arrears, no protection for the labourers against hard service and miserable wage; and the Bill, by preventing legitimate combination, would only give another and a most terrible stimulus to secret and desperate crime; and if, after this Bill became law, outrages of a most serious character multiplied, the moral blame would rest with the Government that insisted upon passing such an unjust measure.

MR. HORACE DAVEY

said, that the speech which the Committee had just heard was one of those speeches which made it most difficult for Liberal Members to offer such criticism or observations as they might wish to the proposal of the Government; but he would not be deterred by the observations which the hon. Member for Dungarvan (Mr. O'Donnell) had made, from offering one or two criticisms upon the language of the clause under discussion. He should have the Committee with him when he said that the question under consideration was one of extreme importance; not only did he see the extreme importance of putting down the practice, which had been called the practice of "Boycotting," and which was admitted by hon. Gentlemen opposite to have been carried to a gross abuse; but he thought that the Committee must also appreciate the importance of taking care that, whilst they desired to put down that system in the manner in which it was now exercised in Ireland, they must be careful that they, as far as possible, framed their definition of the offence they intended to put down, and at which they intended to strike, so as not to introduce a precedent which might, on future occasions, be found to be fraught with some inconvenience. Now, he thought the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Plunket) had done injustice to the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce), for he (Mr. Horace Davey) had not understood his hon. and learned Friend in any way to have palliated or extenuated the practice of "Boycotting" as carried on in Ireland. He understood his hon. and learned Friend to have entirely agreed with what had been said by speakers on the Government Benches— with what had been said by the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland—as to their desire to put down the offence, and all that his hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets wished to urge on the Committee was that the definition of intimidation was so worded that it would include cases which the common sense of mankind would at once decline to treat as criminal offences. Whether that was so or not—of course it was a question of verbal criticism— he (Mr. Horace Davey) did not understand that there was really any material difference in substance between his hon. and learned Friend and the right hon. and learned Member for the University of Dublin, who had followed him. The only matter which he and his hon. and learned Friend, and other hon. Members on that side of the House, wished to enforce upon the Committee, was that they should take care that the definition was not so wide as to give an excuse to the magistrates to treating as criminal offences what it would be revolting to the common sense of mankind so to treat. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin would allow him (Mr. Horace Davey) to say so, he had listened with great admiration to the speech in which he (Mr. Plunket) had denounced the offence they were dealing with. He (Mr. Horace Davey) could not command words so eloquent himself; and, if the Committee would allow him, he desired to adopt fully the language in which the right hon. and learned Gentleman had described the enormity of the offence. The question was one of great difficulty, and he was sure Her Majesty's Government desired to give candid consideration to it, and not to put any definition or clause in the Bill which would go beyond the necessity of the case. The position of the case appeared to him to be this—no one could say that exclusive dealing, in itself, was unlawful. It was, of course, an obvious truism that a person had a right to select his own butcher, or baker, or grocer; and, on the other hand, that any butcher, baker, or grocer had a right to decline any particular person's custom; therefore, in itself, exclusive dealing was not unlawful. But, then, ho could quite conceive—and that was the foundation of the clause—that circumstances might make, and in Ireland had made, exclusive dealing unlawful. Well, if that were the true position of things, they should endeavour to frame this clause in such a way as to make exclusive dealing an offence only when exercised and carried out under circumstances which made it an offence; or, in other words, it was the circumstances by which it was accompanied, and under which it was exercised, and the extent to which it was carried, and long persistence in it, which was evidence that it was mala fide. It was the circumstances which created the unlawfulness, and not the exclusive dealing itself. The hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce) and some other hon. Members on that (the Ministerial) side of the House thought that, in that definition of intimidation, the words— Calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living, would include every case of exclusive dealing, apart from the circumstances under which it was adopted. He gave credit to the magistrates in Ireland, who would have to interpret this Act, that they would not desire to put an extreme construction on it; but he took it that Parliament was bound, when creating a new offence, and when that offence was one which—if it was not a "bull" to say so—was in itself not an offence, so far as possible to use language to express its mind and meaning as accurately as it could. He was quite aware that in framing Acts of Parliament it was impossible to observe perfect accuracy of language; but, at least, they could try to do so, and he was sure the Government would try to make the words sufficiently accurate and explicit. How was it to be done? The Secretary of State for the Home Department had interrupted the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets, and had pointed out that the words with which they were mainly concerned at the present moment, "wrongfully and without legal authority," governed the whole section; but he (Mr. Horace Davey) did not think that that was a perfect answer to his hon. and learned Friend's observation, and he would tell the Committee why. It occurred to him, that if they once got to this, that exclusive dealing was intimidation, then it was like any other kind of intimidation, and he should suppose that to use intimidation for either of the purposes included in Subsections a and b would be in itself wrongful; and he should suppose, particularly when he looked at the English Act of 1876, from which these words "wrongfully and without legal authority" were taken, that these words were not intended to qualify the use of the intimidation, but to meet the case of a person in a public, or official, or judicial position, who, of course, was obliged, and whose duty it was, to exercise intimidation towards wrong-doers. He did not himself think that "wrongfully and without legal authority" in any way qualified the nature of the intimidation. It was difficult to express in verbal criticism of this kind one's exact meaning; but he trusted he had succeeded in bringing it to the minds of hon. Members. If they once got to this, that exclusive dealing came within the definition of intimidation, inasmuch as every intimidation must, he conceived, be unlawful, unless used by a person authorized by law to intimidate, then the fears which had been expressed, not only on the other side, but in other parts of the House, were not altogether groundless. He had considerable doubts about the clause, and he would not say that he had not changed his mind with regard to it more than once. He had been disposed to support the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk; but the reasons urged against the Amendment were, to his mind, conclusive, and he thought it was framed in such a way as not to meet the particular offence against which the Bill was directed. It seemed to him that the arguments which his right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Home Department—the whole of whose speech he did not hear—were conclusive on the point. He might incidentally remark that this debate had been to him an illustration of the value of debate, because, speaking for himself, he could only say he had derived the greatest possible instruction and assistance from the speeches that had been made. He rejected the Amendment as far as he was concerned. He thought the Government were entitled to have words in the Bill which would meet the particular case of "Boycotting;" and he thought that the reasons that were given in his very able speech—if the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department would allow him to call it so—and certainly the very lucid speech delivered yesterday evening by the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland, were conclusive in showing that conspiracy alone was not enough, and that combination alone was not enough. He thought it was a just observation that where a "Boycotting" notice was attached to a chapel door the act was the act of one man, and they might be able to get at that one person when they could not detect or punish the conspiracy or combination of which that one person was the instrument and mouthpiece; therefore, he thought it would not be sufficient merely to confine it to the offence of conspiracy or combination. He could not say the words were altogether satisfactory; but he did not feel himself justified in any way going against the Government on those words, and, as the clause stood, he had come to the conclusion it was his duty to support the Government entirely. But, inasmuch as it was admitted by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department, that it was the circumstances that made exclusive dealing an offence, he hoped the Government would give a favourable consideration—at any rate, he was sure they would give a candid consideration—to an Amendment that was mentioned by the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce)—namely, to add to the end of the clause such words as these— Provided, That no refusal by any person to deal with another in the way of his trade, business, or employment, shall of itself be deemed to be intimidation. That seemed to him to express, as nearly as one could do, the idea he desired to convey to the Committee, that exclusive dealing of itself was lawful, but that it was properly included in the definition of intimidation, because it could be—-and in Ireland, he regretted to say, it was—easily practised under such circumstances as to bring it within the law. He hoped the Government would believe I that his hon. and learned Friend and himself, and others in that part of the House, had no desire to minimize the effect of this clause in the criticism they had thought themselves justified in offering to the Committee. Whether they had succeeded or not, their desire had been to render the clause as accurate as possible,

MR. SYNAN

said, the Committee could not but look upon the tone and spirit of the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. Horace Davey) as satisfactory. In that tone and in that spirit he (Mr. Synan) claimed to share, and cordially to concur, and though he might differ in some respects from the views of the hon. and learned Member, yet, on the whole, he might say he was on all fours with them. It was not his intention to go into the general question as to whether "Boycotting" or exclusive dealing was legitimate; neither was it his intention to go into the questions addressed to the Committee by hon. Gentlemen behind him, as to the justification for "Boycotting" in Ireland, although he concurred with those hon. Gentlemen to this extent—and he concurred in the concluding portion of the observations of the hon. Member for Dungarvan (Mr. O' Donnell)—that if it was intended to bring exclusive dealing on the part of the tenant within the provisions of the Bill, he hoped also it was intended to bring exclusive dealing on the part of the landlords also within them, so that there would be justice, in that respect, done all round. If exclusive dealing was to be treated as a charge to be brought within the terms of the Bill by any prejudiced magistrate in Ireland, he thought it was the business of the Committee now, and the duty of Her Majesty's Government, to make the words so clear that it would be impossible for any magistrate, however prejudiced, to bring legitimate exclusive dealing within the law. He came now to address himself to the clause before the Committee and to the Amendment of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Bus-sell). He was quite prepared to admit that the proposal of his hon. and learned Friend went beyond the words of the Act of 1875, because the words of that Acts were " uses violence to or intimidates another person" so as to produce certain consequences more or less injurious to the person or property. His hon. and learned Friend used the word "violence" alone, and left out the words "or intimidates." But then the Act of 1875 was as much in force in Ireland as it was in England, and if anyone did come within that Act, he exposed himself to its punishments just as much as anyone who came within the present Act would expose himself to its punishments as soon as it became the law of the land. Which, he would ask, were the more reasonable, the words of his hon. and learned Friend, or the words of the clause, upon which hon. and learned Gentlemen on the other side of the House differed? Though they were inclined to support the Government, they condemned the words. But how were they to be amended? The words of the clause were "every person who wrongfully or without legal authority, uses intimidation," &c. Of course, a person would use intimidation wrongfully and without legal authority; and, as the clause stood, there seemed to be a contradiction of terms. The words supposed that a man could justly intimidate. A person, he supposed, might justly give a caution or advice; but how a man could justly intimidate another man it was difficult for him to conceive. But the words recommended the whole of the rest of the clause. And what was the rest of the clause? What did the word "intimidation" include? The clause went on to say—"In this Act the expression 'intimidation' includes." And the magistrate who might have to administer the Act might say—"Intimidation only 'includes' these things; but there are many things which come under it beyond those mentioned—what is said to be 'included' does not comprehend the whole meaning of the word intimidation." He certainly thought the word "includes" might be read as implying that something had been left out, and that something else was meant; therefore, it was impossible to keep in the word. Passing by that, and leaving on Her Majesty's Government the duty of correcting it, at all events let them see what was included. It included— Any word spoken, or act done, calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living. He could understand an act calculated to cause injury or danger, and he could understand an act calculated to cause injury to or loss of property, business, or means of living; but that an act should be punished with imprisonment and hard labour, that only produced a fear in a man's mind that he would suffer injury, or loss to his business or his property, was a most extraordinary thing. The inquiry would be a metaphysical one. How could he decide what effect a particular act might have on a particular man's mind? One person might not be afraid by reason of a particular act—he might not be afraid that it would cause injury or danger to himself, his family, his business, or property; whereas, a nervous man or an old woman might consider that almost anything said or done, however innocent it might be, would produce danger to person, or danger or loss to business or property. It was impossible that the word "fear" could be left in the clause, for it was impossible to leave the commission of a crime to depend on the nature and condition of mind of the person in regard to whose business or property the particular act which would constitute the crime would be done. It was impossible that the mental condition could be a proper test of the injury done. It was impossible, unless they wanted to comprehend everything, and bring every innocent word or act into the net, together with every form of exclusive dealing—it was impossible to allow the word "fear" to be the test of the crime. He would defy the Government to produce any Act of Parliament in which the fear which it might excite in a man's mind was made the test of a word spoken or an act done being a crime, and exposed the man who had spoken the word or performed the act to punishment. No; the test of the crime was the injury done to the person or property of the man in the opinion of a person of common understanding. If they went back to the Act of 1871, it set the matter beyond any question. The Act of 1871 and the Act of 1875 only stated the acts done, and nothing was left to depend upon the fear which might be excited in a man's mind. These acts were—first, violence, threats, and intimidation cal- culated to injure a man's person or property; secondly, breach for which a man might be bound to produce surety for the maintenance of the peace; thirdly, violence to, or the obstruction of, any person in the manner defined by the Act—either by a master towards a workman, or a workman towards a master. Then there were words in the 7th clause of the Act of 1875 touching conspiracy. But the clause was not confined to conspiracy or to trades' unions, but comprehended all cases, and extended to all men. The acts that came under that were the using of violence or intimidation to a man so as to produce injury to his person or property; secondly, the persistent following of that person; thirdly, the hiding of the tools of that person; and, fourthly, watching or besetting that person's house or place of business; the fifth head mentioning two or more men. Any Judge could decide upon these acts. The mental condition of the person believed to have been injured had nothing to do with the matter. But, in the Bill before the Committee, the mental condition of the man who complained was made the test of the injury done; and he (Mr. Synan) contended it was impossible that such a clause could ever be passed by this House. It was impossible that it was not intended to confine this clause to what it had been declared that it should be confined. The Prime Minister had said he did not intend to apply a different law to Ireland to that which was applied to England, but only to adjust it so as to suit the individual circumstances of Ireland. Why, then, did the Government go beyond that intention? Were not the words of the Acts of 1871 and 1875 sufficiently comprehensive to cover the peculiar circumstances of "Boycotting" in Ireland, unless they meant to drag within the definition of "Boycotting" the system of exclusive dealing which under the Acts of 1871 and 1875 were perfectly legal? These were the grounds on which he was against the words of the clause; and as there was no other Amendment before them, save that of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell)— though his words went beyond the Act of 1875—and as he condemned the clause so completely, as, he thought, every other judicious and honest man must do, he should go into the Lobby with his hon. and learned Friend.

MR. GLADSTONE

I desire to make a suggestion. I would respectfully submit that this Amendment should now be allowed to come to a division. We all feel that we are on a matter of great importance, and I believe that everyone desires to make practical progress with the debate; but I wish to point out that no practical progress with the debate whatever can be made so long as we continue to discuss the subject on the immediate question before us. The hon. Member who has just sat down (Mr. Synan) has delivered a speech which, I think, contributes very much to the better understanding of the question. That was preceded by what I may call the admirable speech of an hon. and learned Gentleman on this side of the House (Mr. Horace Davey); but those two speeches, if they referred to any part of this particular clause, referred to the latter part of it. We are now on the words proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell), and these words have been stated by him—as has been admitted on all sides—to exclude altogether the question of "Boycotting." But it is agreed in almost every quarter that "Boycotting," in some shape or other, is to be included. The speeches of the hon. Member who has just sat down, and that of my hon. and learned Friend on this side of the House, were both on the question in what manner, and on what terms, we should deal with it. I say, let us get quit of the Amendment immediately before us. That has nothing to do with "Boycotting" whatever, and there has been no debate on it. During the discussion to-day hardly 10 minutes have been spent in considering the Amendment; and if we are now permitted to get rid of that question, we can then proceed to the consideration of other Amendments which have reference to the way in which the provisions of the clause can be adapted to the object which it is generally desired to attain. If it is meant to have any limitation at all, we should be allowed to get rid of this Amendment and proceed with the discussion of the Amendments proposing such limitation.

MR. BIGGAR

said, the right hon. Gentleman asked them to take a division on that particular question at that par- ticular moment; but there were several objections to that course, which he would state to the Committee. One important objection to having a division was, as the right hon. Gentleman himself had said, that the subject had not been sufficiently debated. If he (Mr. Biggar) understood the Prime Minister, what he said was that a particular question had been raised and had not been sufficiently debated.

MR. GLADSTONE

I beg the hon. Member's pardon; what I said was, that the debate had been completely exhausted, or, if I did not say it, that was my meaning.

MR. BIGGAR

said, that as he understood it, the right hon. Gentleman, first of all, said he thought the debate had drifted into one particular line—namely, the question of "Boycotting;" but he (Mr. Biggar) ventured, with all due deference, to say that there were other questions which might arise on this Amendment entirely outside the question of "Boycotting," questions which were entitled to very serious consideration, and on which he and other Members of the Committee had not expressed their opinion. The hon. and learned Member who had moved this Amendment (Mr. Charles Russell) last night ought—not, perhaps, according to ordinary routine, but according to what was desirable on a matter of such great importance—to be present to reply upon the whole case with regard to this particular Amendment. If that were a trumpery Amendment, of no importance, the contention of the Prime Minister might be entitled to considerable weight; but it was not a trumpery Amendment. It was one of a very material character, and the hon. and learned Gentleman who had moved it, owing, no doubt, to his professional duties, had not been able to attend and take part in the discussion of his own proposal. For that reason, he (Mr. Biggar) submitted that the contention of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister did not hold water, and that the debate should be adjourned, and the Bill considered at its present stage at 4 o'clock to-morrow. There was another important question in regard to this branch of the subject, and it was this—that his hon. Friend the Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell), who was the Leader of that particular section of the House, had not yet had an oppor- tunity of expressing any opinion with regard to the Amendment before the Committee. For these reasons, he thought the best plan would be to move to report Progress, so that the matter might be further considered to-morrow. He would not, however, make the Motion, as there were several hon. Members who had not yet spoken, who desired to do so to-day. Hehimself had not spoken, and as he had taken notice of certain points in the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Dundalk, which had not yet been answered, he should be glad to go on now, and offer an opinion upon the hon. and learned Member's observations. The earlier part of the clause was of a very general nature, and, as the Secretary of State for the Home Department had specifically said, was to take cognizance of one particular form of offence—namely,"Boycotting."But there was one peculiarity as to this word "Boycotting," and that was that, so far as he (Mr. Biggar)knew, the right hon. and learned Gentleman had not defined what was really meant by it. He had heard a great many things called "Boycotting," some of which, as had been pointed out, were not defensible—at least, he did not undertake to defend them. He had heard of a farmer taking produce to market, and being unable to sell it, not because the buyers "Boycotted" him, but be-cause rude people raised a crowd around him and drove away the intending purchasers. That was an offence which would come under the general law of intimidation or riot, and there would be no difficulty in dealing with it. But if action in a case of this kind were taken in a totally different manner, if the buyers merely abstained from buying from the farmer, surety that could have been done without infringing any moral or legal obligation even under the measure now before the House. To give, as an illustration, a case which had come under his own observation in a town in a central part of Ireland, a person went into a grocer's shop, and asked the grocer to buy a load of turf, but a little girl came in and said, "This turf is 'Boycotted,'" giving a hint to the shopkeeper that, perhaps, it would be as well not to buy the load of turf on that occasion. There was no intimidation there, but an expression of opinion on the part of the child that it would be better not to buy a load of turf at that time. It could not be said that this child was able to use any sort of intimidation against the shopkeeper, a man of mature years, and in very good circumstances. Would this case come under the Bill? Under the Act of 1875, it was possible to prosecute a person and punish him severely if he used any form of intimidation. Supposing, in the case he had quoted, instead of a little girl coming into the shop and saying, "This turf is 'Boycotted,'" a rough man had entered and said to the shopkeeper, "If you buy this man's turf, you will have your windows broken, or your trade taken from your shop, or some other punishment inflicted on you," the Act of 1875 would have operated, the offence of intimidation would have been committed, and, in all probability, the man would have been convicted in the ordinary course of law and punished. But it seemed to him (Mr. Biggar) that the Government were simply beating the wind. There was not the slightest use in bringing in a Bill of that kind to define a form of misconduct, which, if it were misconduct, was so hard of proof, and with regard to which it would be so easy to evade the law. An hon. Member had pointed out what was done in those cases which occurred in England and Ireland, and which closely approximated in character to "Boycotting."

THE CHAIRMAN

I have listened very carefully to the hon. Member; but I do not find that he is talking on the Amendment at all.

MR. BIGGAR

said, he was replying to the observations which had been made in the course of the debate, and the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk had specifically stated that this question of what was called "Boycotting" was raised in the particular Amendment now before the Committee. He would take care that in the course of his observations he did not say anything that was out of Order, or anything that was not perfectly in reply to something which had been said by another speaker during these discussions, or that did not specially refer to the Amendment, or the words the Amendment referred to. As to this intimidation, no doubt, according to the law that existed in England, a certain sort of exclusive dealing was perfectly legal. Supposing a particular class of persons obtained a monopoly of a particular trade, that class must act impartially to everyone who went to them. Reference had been made to the publican. He was a person who was obliged to servea man who went into his house during legal hours and asked to be served, whether he liked that man or not. A Railway Company, again, were bound to give accommodation to a person who proposed to travel on their line. But, on the other hand, a person who simply hired out carts without a licence was not bound to lend his horse and vehicles, unless he felt disposed to do so, and unless he liked the person he had to deal with. And supposing a shopkeeper lived in the next house to the publican, he was not bound to do as the publican had been obliged to do with regard to the supply of goods, but was perfectly at liberty to sell, or to refuse to sell, as he might feel disposed. And now he (Mr. Biggar) would make some reference to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department. He had laid it down that persons were not at liberty to inquire whether a customer had paid his rent. That was taking an extreme view as to cases that should come under the cognizance of the Act. It proposed that persons who, for trifling reasons, refused to give a supply of food to other people should be liable to punishment; but, on the other hand, if the landlord had claimed an excessive and unreasonable rent, and evicted his tenant, destroying his means of living, he suffered no punishment under this clause. He (Mr. Biggar) held that the Bill was one sided in its substance, would have no operation, and was very mischievous, for the reason that it would give the Irish people to understand that there was to be one law for the rich and another for the poor, one law for the landlords and another for the unfortunate tenant farmers. It even went farther than that, and said that persons were not to incite to intimidation—

THE CHAIRMAN

I have pointed out that the hon. Member is discussing just now all the details of the clause upon an Amendment that is specific. It is with reference to a person using intimidation or inciting others to use intimidation by acts or threats of violence or injury to person or property.

MR. BIGGAR

said, he certainly was referring to injury done to person or property. What he had been referring to had seemed to him to be a question of intimidation—such cruel and oppressive conduct on the part of a landlord to an unfortunate was surely one of the grossest forms of intimidation. A threat of eviction was surely intimidation, and eviction, when carried out, was surely one of the severest punishments that could be inflicted on a man. He submitted that he was in Order on the point, and not deserving of the Chairman's censure. However, he would not pursue the matter further, as he should probably have another opportunity of speaking.

MR. PARNELL

said, he trusted the Government would consent to report Progress. He understood the Prime Minister was anxious that a division should be taken on the Amendment before the Committee; but, in view of the fact that they had had no intimation from the Government that they intended to make a concession as to the definition of the offence of intimidation, and of the fact that a great many hon. Members who intended to vote on their (the Irish Members') side had left the House, under the impression that a division was not to be taken that evening, and also in view of the fact that several Irish Members desired to address the Committee on the subject of the Amendment, he did not see how they could agree to take the division until Thursday. At the same time, he might say that there would be no desire on the part of the Irish Members to unnecessarily prolong the debate on Thursday. He begged to move that the Chairman report Progress.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. Parnell.)

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, that after what had been said by the Prime Minister, the Government could not consent to the Motion for reporting Progress. Hon. Members opposite, seeing that the hour was approaching when the debate must, of necessity, cease, had the matter in their own hands; but to consent to the Motion would be to admit that the Amendment had not been fully discussed, and probably there was not a man in the House who thought so. It was admitted that the Amendment be-fore them could not be sustained; therefore it was obvious they ought to allow it to be disposed of. All that the Prime Minister would ask was that they should dispose of this Amendment, leaving over any others that would modify the clause.

MR. CHARLES RUSSELL

said, that as he proposed the Amendment, he should like to say a word with regard to it. He had listened to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland (Mr. Trevelyan) yesterday, and had heard a good deal of the debate to-day, and he confessed that the speeches which had been made did satisfy him that there were some cases of "Boycotting," which he might call extreme eases, unaccompanied by acts or threats of violence to person or property, which it might be perfectly proper to treat as criminal offences under the Bill, and which would not entirely come within his Amendment. But when he said that, he begged distinctly to say that he preferred his Amendment, with all its shortcomings, to the clause of the Bill as it stood. He thought it was matter for regret that the suggestion made by his hon. Friend below him the Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere), early in the day, was not adopted—namely, that the clause should be postponed and that the Government should bring in a new clause, which should have for its object the definition and limitation, the ascertaining with exactness the scope of the clause. He must say that he should oppose, as far as he possibly could, a clause which left it in the power of a magistrate, stipendiary or otherwise, to treat as an act of intimidation and criminal offence any word spoken or act done which, in his judgment, amounted to "Boycotting." He admitted there were shortcomings in his Amendment, and would willingly assist the Government in defining cases of "Boycotting," which yet might not be "acts of violence or threats;" but unless the Government endeavoured to define the offence more accurately he should stand by his Amendment.

Question put.

The Committee divided:—Ayes 30; Noes 250: Majority 220.—(Div. List, No. 116.)

And it being a quarter of an hour before Six of the clock, the Chairman left the Chair to report Progress.

Committee to sit again To-morrow.

And it being Six of the clock, the House was adjourned without Question first put till To-morrow.