SUPPLY—FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (VOTE OF CREDIT). [THIRD NIGHT.]

HC Deb 27 July 1882 vol 272 cc1992-2108

SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

(1.) Question again proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £2,300,000, be granted to Her Majesty, beyond the ordinary Grants of Parliament, towards defraying the Expenses which may be incurred during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1883, in strengthening Her Majesty's Forces in the Mediterranean."—(Mr. Gladstone.)

MR. BOURKE

Sir, at the conclusion of the remarks I was permitted to make yesterday afternoon I was alluding to the despatch of Lord Granville, dated November 4th, and I was remarking that there was nothing to criticize in connection with that despatch, except there was no mention contained in it of British interests in Egypt. That despatch had, at first, a quieting effect; but the assembling of the Chamber of Notables shortly after that despatch appeared seems to have had a disquieting tendency upon the French Ministry. Attempts were made at this time to draw closer the relations between the two Governments of England and France with a view of action in the matter, and the famous Dual Note was written by M. Gambetta and accepted without hesitation by the British Government. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at that time was in Paris, engaged in a very laudable, but ill-starred, endeavour to conclude a Commercial Treaty between France and England. The making of that Treaty was no doubt a matter of considerable importance both to England and France; and, from a political point of view, it was of very great importance to the British Government. Whether the anxiety of Her Majesty's Government to conclude that Treaty had or had not any effect in their desire to conform in every respect to the wishes of the French Government in regard to Egypt I am, of course, unable to state; but there is no doubt that that is the general impression both in this country and in the diplomatic world. The Dual Note was no doubt the turning point of the whole of these transactions. It fell like a thunderclap upon Egypt and upon the whole of Europe. With regard to Egypt, it was looked upon as ignoring altogether the Sultan's authority, and it treated the Khedive as a puppet in the hands of the European Powers; and the consequence was that it invoked a very strong protest from the Porte. I do not think there could be any doubt whatever upon the mind of any ordinary reader that that Note certainly implied material intervention on the part of both England and France because England and France were united, it was said, to oppose the pretensions of Arabi Bey in Egypt, and they declared that the two Powers would be found united in preventing those pretensions being carried into effect. It was looked upon by the Powers as the first step to action; and as a first step to action on the part of England and France it was unanimously rejected by the Eastern Powers, as we see by the French Yellow Book. Well, Sir, the British Government, through Lord Granville, endeavoured to explain away the impression that was made upon Europe by this Note. I do not think that explanations generally are of much use in a matter of that kind. I think they generally leave the question where it was, or, if possible, lead to further misunderstanding. But when this question of explanation was suggested by Lord Granville to M. Gambetta, he declined altogether to enter into negotiations as to the matter of any sort or kind. Of course, he gave his reasons for that decision. He said that any explanation would encourage the arrogance of the enemies of France. Now, I do not know to whom the eminent French Minister alluded when he mentioned the enemies of France; whether it was some of the Powers, or Turkey, it is impossible to say. But that was a very remarkable answer. In the meantime there was not one single line from our Ambassador at Constantinople in these Papers; there is not a single trace to be found of any despatch of Lord Dufferin upon the question of the Dual Note, although it is the turning point of the whole of the negotiations. The Government have kept back Lord Dufferin's opinions upon this vital question. It is quite clear that from that moment England had lost all her influence with Turkey upon the question. The whole of the Mussulman population were alarmed, and Mr. Malet suggested that, in the serious condition of affairs, the only solution of the difficulty was a Commission from the Porte. That met with the same reception at the hands of the French Government as all other suggestions of the same character. They refused to allow the Porte to interfere in any way. About this time a change took place in the Government of France, and, at the suggestion of the British Government, an appeal was made to all the Powers; and from that moment, it may be said, that the joint action of England and France was at an end. After the new Ministry came into Office, the Powers generally were made acquainted with everything that passed, except one thing, which I will mention hereafter. But there can be no doubt that the impression left upon Egypt with respect to the Joint Note was still more unfortunate as time went on, because, although at first it had a bad effect in Egypt—the people imagining that a holy war against them was going to be proclaimed—they felt that, as nothing was to be done under the Joint Note, and that as England and France were only threatening, they were really to be regarded, to use the words of Sir. William Gregory at that time, as being "nothing more than a pair of blusterers." At this period M. Tissot arrived in England as Ambassador from France. Everybody who knows M. Tissot is aware that he is a most accomplished and able diplomatist; but it will be as well for us to remember that, up to this time, he had been the French Ambassador at Constantinople, so that he came to England permeated with the views of M. Gambetta, although representing the Ministry of M. Freycinet, and pledged, as much as a diplomatist could be, to forward the views of M. Gambetta with respect to the non-intervention of Turkey in Egypt, and intervention on the part of England and France. Before many days elapsed, M. Tissot called Lord Granville's attention to the very serious state of things which had now arisen in Egypt, and he asked Lord Granville if any suggestion could come from the British Government. Lord Granville's answer to this very important communication from France was one of the most remarkable, I think, ever made by any English Minister; and I must say that I think there never was a more foolish proposition made by a Minister. It was made in these words— I then," said Lord Granville, "said that an idea had occurred to me that I should be glad if he would mention to M. de Freycinet, hut simply as a personal suggestion of my own. It was that the French and English Governments should each send to Egypt some person of financial knowledge and experience, who might act as advisers to the Agent and Consul General in drawing up the details of any proposals for settling the future basis of administration. Now, anything more futile I cannot imagine could be proposed. There was nothing in the financial administration of Egypt at that time which required such a remedy, and the reception which this suggestion met with by the French Government was the only one it could naturally receive. It is curious to observe the irony with which the suggestion was treated. It was summed up in one or two words by M. de Freycinet in Paris— That the suggestion made by the English Government would take away the only institution left that they look to for keeping anything like law and order. The next suggestion was made about a month after, and it was of a still more remarkable kind. It would appear that Lord Granville was applied to, whether he could suggest anything as to the affairs of Egypt, those affairs having been going on from bad to worse. After stating that affairs were considered by Lord Granville to be more gloomy and alarming, he says— It would have a great moral effect in Egypt if the English and French Governments were able to announce to their respective Parliaments that not only were they prepared with the concurrence of Europe to take a step at once towards an arrangement with the Egyptian Government, but that they were also agreed as to the policy to be pursued in case of matters coming to a crisis, which they still hope may be averted. Now, Sir, what is the proposition? Recollect that we have heard very often in this debate that the moral effect likely to be produced by the interference of Turkey was much to be deprecated. Yet this was the proposition— The procedure to be resorted to in case of necessity might, in my opinion, consist in asking the Sultan to send a General, with full powers to restore discipline in the Egyptian Army with a well-defined agreement, that he was not to exercise those powers in any way without the concurrence of an English and a French General who would be associated with him. Care must he taken so to frame the arrangement that the functions of the three Commissioners should in no way detract from the position, or trench upon the duties of the French and English representatives. I thought this plan was not likely to meet with objection on the part of the other Powers, and it seemed to me to be calculated to prevent the necessity of a resort to armed intervention, which might, perhaps, ultimately become inevitable, but which, as both Governments agreed, presented great difficulties, and was open to grave objection in every form. I imagine that no person who knows anything at all about the opinions of the Sultan, or the views which he, or any other person connected with the Porte, entertains, would suppose that he would do otherwise than scout such a proposition as that. The idea of these two Generals being sent to Egypt, and that the Porte was to give all its influence to them—that they were to be sent there without any authority, and without a single armed man—and that the Turkish General was to conform in every respect with the opinions of the French and English Generals, was absurd. The French Government saw at once that that was not a proposition that could receive support, and they treated it in the same way as they had treated the previous suggestion. But affairs grew more gloomy at Constantinople, and Consul Cookson and Mr. Colvin wrote at that time very serious despatches calling attention to the grave events which were occurring. Mr. Malet reported that— It was impossible to regain influence until the military supremacy was broken. Another suggestion was now made by the English Government. This time they seemed to have plucked up their courage, and they wont so far as to threaten. The threat assumed a peculiar character, because they threatened that they would use a force over which they had no control whatever. "On our part," said Lord Granville to Lord Lyons— We were ready to consider, with every wish to aceede to it, any proposal that might be made by M. de Freycinet; but as regarded any proposal of my own, I have nothing better to suggest than the plan I had already mentioned of sending three Military Commissioners, Turkish, English and French. Under the present urgent circumstances, I should have been ready to accompany it with a threat of Turkish intervention. After offering every slight it was possible to offer to the Turkish Government, the British Government supposed that they had the power of offering a threat of Turkish intervention. Lord Granville adds— I believed that such a threat would he the most likely means of preventing the necessity for any intervention, and I repeated my wish to avoid such intervention, if possible. That threat, of course, was not put into execution, because it met with exactly the same reception from the French Government as the other two propositions from the British Government. At this time the French Government seemed determined to become more energetic, and they proposed to the British Government to send the English Fleet to Egypt. That proposal was accepted, of course, at once, but no notice whatever was given to the Sultan; and the Fleet was sent to Egyptian waters, and, consequently, to Turkish waters, without the slightest intimation to the Sultan. The consequence was that it met with the most energetic protest from the Porte; and it must be remembered that at that time Lord Dufferin was not even allowed to suggest Turkish intervention, although the British and French Fleets were sent to Alexandria. Things at Cairo grew worse and worse. Preparations for war were made by Arabi Pasha; insults were heaped upon Christians of all kinds, and all these events were attributed to the policy of the two Powers. It was clear then that Arabi was the only power in Egypt who had any influence whatever; he was the only power that had force at his back, and, notwithstanding this, the next proposition that was made was even still more absurd than the others, because it was proposed to the Khedive that he should banish Arabi, who was the only man who had any power in Egypt. How he was to carry out that advice was not stated. Of course, the advice itself, when it became known, irritated all the partisans of Arabi and the whole Military Party, and hastened the crisis. At this period there was a sharp difference of opinion between England and France. Lord Granville suggested, as he had done often before, that it was desirable to send Turkish troops to Egypt. M. Tissot spoke of the uselessness of such a proposal upon that occasion. I think the sharpness of the difference between the two Governments was extremely remarkable, for, certainly, the "uselessness of the proposal" is not language often employed by one diplomatist towards another. I am glad that the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is in the House at this moment, because I wish to call the attention of the House to an answer given by him to a Question asked by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition (Sir Stafford Northcote) on the 15th of May. My right hon. Friend asked whether the hon. Baronet could give any information as to the present position of affairs in Egypt; and after making a statement similar to that which was made by Lord Granville in the House of Lords on the same day, the hon. Baronet ended his statement by saying— In March certain differences manifested themselves in the views of the English and French Governments; but the divergences which then existed are wholly at an end."— [3 Hansard, cclxix. 669.] Now, I fail to find in the whole of these Papers that the divergences were at an end. The hon. Baronet, however, immediately added— During the present month the unconstitutional steps taken by the Ministers of the Khedive resulted in a most critical situation. This became the subject of an active interchange of views between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the French Republic, with the happy result that the two Powers are now in absolute accord as to the steps to be taken in view of future eventualities which it is now hoped may not arise. The two Governments feel confident that the course agreed upon will meet with the assent of all the other Great Powers and of the Porte."—[Ibid.] He went on to say in answer to another question— The Porte had been informed of the steps that had been taken. He had already stated that the English and French Governments were of opinion that the course they had taken would meet with the assent of the Turkish Government. Now, at that moment there was a sharp difference between the Porte and ourselves.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

What I then said was that an agreement had been come to in view of future eventualities. I said that I was quite sure that what had been done would be approved by the Porte.

MR. BOURKE

Steps were not agreed to by the Porte.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

They were not known to the Porte at the time.

MR. BOURKE

But the hon. Gentleman stated that the steps taken would meet with the assent of the Turkish Government.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

Yes; it was our opinion that they would.

MR. BOURKE

The hon. Gentleman said that the English and French Governments were of opinion that the course taken would meet with the assent of the Turkish Government; but that course never did meet with the assent of the Turkish Government so far as I know. In regard to the ships going to Egypt, the Sultan was perfectly ready to send a ship alone by himself; but he was told he must not do anything of the kind, and something more which ought also to be considered, and which almost amounted to an insult. He was actually told that if he sent a ship to Alexandria it was likely to be kindly received by the ships already there. Now, that was a decided insult, seeing that the waters were his own. I wonder what course we should have taken if we had been placed in the same position—if we had been told by two Powers that our own waters were in their occupation, but that we were welcome to send a ship of our own which would be kindly received. I think we should have considered the whole matter a great and gratuitous insult. Shortly afterwards a Conference was proposed. Now, in the first instance, I cannot see that there was any necessity for a Conference whatever, because at Constantinople the Ambassadors of the different Powers are in the habit of meeting continually; and if it was a desirable thing that the English and French Governments should bring their views to the notice of other Powers through their Ambassadors at Constantinople, it was a perfectly easy matter to bring them under such notice without any Conference at all. As to the meeting of the Conference, it was against the will of the Sultan, and it added, I think, another gross insult, still worse when it was said, as it has been in one of the papers, that the Sultan ought to be pleased at the compliment. I am not surprised that the proposal was regarded in the light of an insult, not only by Turkey, but in other quarters as well. The proposal to meet in the capital of the Sultan was analogous to half-a-dozen gentlemen meeting in a private drawing-room with- out the consent of the occupier of the house. The first thing the Conference did was to propose a military intervention. After preventing the Sultan from exercising his authority, we called upon him to exercise that authority to put down a military revolt, when it had risen to such a crisis that it was very dangerous and almost impossible to do so without the employment of a very largo force indeed. The terms were not only hard, but insulting; and at that time Germany came forward and said that she considered the terms offered to the Porte in regard to military intervention as being far too hard. And then what did you do? Why, you turned round, and, having failed to obtain Turkish intervention, you endeavoured to obtain a mandate from Europe on behalf of the English and French. It is quite clear that the Powers had very different views upon that question, and they refused to grant a mandate for that purpose. They declined to make themselves enemies of Turkey; and the}' did not take the same view we had taken of the friendship of the Sultan. It was of the utmost importance to them to remain on good terms with the Sultan, and they entertained different views from those of the present Government of this country with regard to the friendship of the Sultan. In that way I am afraid they have shown a very great contrast to the policy of the other Powers, a contrast which other Powers will endeavour to accentuate, and which hereafter may have a very prejudicial effect upon England. I believe the justification for the bombardment of Alexandria is a sound one, and I do not propose to enter further into that matter. I believe that it can be vindicated on the grounds of necessity, self-defence, and International Law. Of course, I deplore the policy which led to that bombardment, and the necessity of that disaster; but I shall offer no hostile criticism on the act itself. I have nothing to say in regard to it upon a diplomatic and international point of view. I would wish, at the same time, to bear my humble tribute to the gallantry of the officers and men engaged in that action, and I think it must have given great satisfaction to the House to find that our Fleet was in such a perfect state of efficiency. They had no mean enemy to contend with, and I think that the Egyptians fought with a courage and with a perseverance that entitled them to the admiration of all candid and generous men. I have stated the points upon which I differ with Her Majesty's Government, and I will now sum up in a very few words. I think they have made a mistake in ignoring the authority of the Sultan, in offending the religious feeling of the Mahomedan population, both of Egypt and of Asia, and in showing, by their changing and shifting policy, that they were ready to suit that policy to the ephemeral circumstances of another Power whenever they were asked to do so. The result has been that we have been left to act alone as far as Europe is concerned. We are told that we have the good wishes of certain Powers; but good wishes are generally accompanied by "Good bye;" and if we are to go to Egypt in conjunction with Turkey, I fear very much, after what has passed, that we shall not now be able to go there with that cordiality which is required, and which is necessary when military operations are to be carried on by two Powers acting in conjunction. But, at the same time, I wish to guard myself against being in the least degree disposed to follow Turkey blindly, or in allowing for an instant that there should be any change in the relations that exist between Turkey and Egypt. I do not think it would be for the interests of the world, or for the interests of Turkey herself, that the relations between Egypt and the Sovereign Power should be modified. At one time I should have been disposed to allow Turkey to go to Egypt alone—that is, to go there with her moral influence—but I should never have allowed her to go alone with an army. Now, of course, the time has passed for allowing her to go without an armed force at her back. It is necessary, if she goes at all, that she should go with an army. Such a proposition will require, I think, very grave consideration, and it is quite a different thing asking Turkey to have gone some months ago and asking her to go with us now. I should like now to say a word or two in respect of those who are in favour of non-intervention altogether. Independently of the reasons stated by the hon. Baronet on the 7th of June—namely, our duty to India, the capital we have invested in Egypt, and our Eastern commerce generally—I should like to ask those who are in favour of non-intervention, if we left Egypt to-morrow, do they think the other Powers would do the same? Can they point out for a moment that free institutions would have the slightest possibility of being instituted in Egypt? Do they think the other Powers, if we leave Egypt, will be kinder to the Natives than we are; and if the other Powers are left in Egypt, and we go away, do they think those other Powers will employ more Natives in the administration of the affairs of the country? The Committee may take it from me that it is the fact, if any persons will go over to the offices where we have an official establishment, either at Cairo or Alexandria, they will find a larger number of Egyptian officials employed than in any analogous establishments belonging to any other Power. That is a fact which is notorious, and which I have seen myself. It is perfectly certain, therefore, that, as far as the rest of Europe was concerned, the Natives would suffer rather than benefit by our withdrawal. It has been mentioned several times in the course of the debate that an agreement has been arrived at with France as to the Suez Canal. I hope, before the debate closes, that we shall have some information about that agreement. It is an agreement of the greatest possible importance, not only for the present, but for the future. I trust the Government will tell us exactly what the terms of the agreement are as to the protection of the Canal. I want to know whether it is a permanent or a temporary arrangement, and what arrangement has been made in detail for the protection of the Canal. With regard to the arrangement for the future, I shall defer the observations I have to make until I hear what it is. The hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State went at some length into the subject of the future government of Egypt. I think it is too soon to speak of that question. The first thing we have to do is to restore order and reduce the anarchy which now prevails. In the meantime, I hope we shall apply ourselves with energy to the task before us, and that we shall not ask ourselves too critically who are our allies. I think it is a very bad way of obtaining allies to be continually asking ourselves who are going to be our friends. If we follow a straight for ward course, especially when we are dealing with an Oriental nation, we shall always find that allies will come to us with the greatest alacrity, without entering into any agreement or stipulation which may embarrass us in future. There is one other reason why I think we ought not to hamper ourselves with unnecessary alliances. English diplomatists have no special genius for intrigue, and if we embark in courses of intrigue we shall certainly be defeated. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) spoke with some severity of the intrigues which, he said, had been going on between Paris, Constantinople, and Arabi Bey; but the right hon. Gentleman cannot deny that until a short time ago these communications were perfectly legitimate. In fact, it was the very thing we had been asking the Sultan to do. How was the Sultan to exert his moral influence in putting down disturbances without communicating with Arabi Boy? Of course, Dervish Pasha went openly from Constantinople to Egypt and put himself in communication with Arabi Bey. It cannot, then, with any degree of justice, be said that these were intrigues. But when the history of these events comes to be written, it will be found that there were other intrigues going on with Arabi Bey which had no justification whatever. It is not necessary to say more on that subject now, because I am quite sure that Her Majesty's Government are perfectly alive to the fact, and that agents— not Turkish agents—have been very active in their intrigues with Arabi Bey. I hope, also, that Her Majesty's Government, before this debate concludes, will tell us something about the "Self-Denying" Protocol. How do we stand with regard to it? I hope the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Childers) will be able to tell us. It was made upon the understanding that other Powers were to co-operate with us. If we are to act alone I think it is a matter for serious consideration whether that "Self-Denying" Protocol should be allowed to bind us as to its terms any further. I am, as much as any Member of this House, in favour of pursuing an unselfish policy in Egypt; but, at the same time, do not let us be hypocritical about it, or imagine for a moment that the Powers will believe us if we say that we are not going to Egypt mainly for our own interests. Having undertaken this gigantic work, I hope that we shall not stay our hands until it has been thoroughly completed. I hope the British Government will rely upon British power, moral and physical; and that, if necessary, they will not hesitate to call forth all the power of the nation, and all the power of our Indian Possessions as well. If they do so, I believe they will do much to condone, in the minds of those who differ from them, the weakness of the past, and if they do not, I believe they will add very considerably to their difficulties. I hope they will not think lightly of their duty, because the more difficult they think it, I am quite sure the more easy it will be of accomplishment. So long as they are bold and true to British honour and British interests, I think I am not presumptuous in assuring them that they may rely upon the support of the Tory Party both in this House and in the country.

MR. CHILDERS

I do not propose to trespass upon the attention of the Committee at any length; but it would not be right for me, as the Minister who is charged with a considerable portion of the duties represented by the Vote of Credit, not to address some remarks to the Committee, and perhaps the present would be the most convenient moment. We have heard, during this debate, a considerable number of very interesting and able speeches; but I think I shall be doing no injustice to other speakers if I allude specially to those of my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, of the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Mr. T. C. Bruce), who sits on the other side, and of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen), all of whom contributed largely to the information that will enable us to discuss the question. The speech of the Under Secretary of State, if he will allow me to say so, in his presence, formed a most admirable summing up of the history of the question, not only of the earlier history, but also of the details of what has passed during the last six or nine months, with an accuracy which has never, I believe, been equalled in a statement of so laborious and, at the same time, of so interesting a character. The hon. Member for Portsmouth I am sorry not to see in his place; but he brings to the question extraordinary knowledge from his position as a banker largely interested in the East, who knows the whole systems of the finance of the Eastern world, and of whom it may be said that be pre-eminently, mores hominum multorum vidit et urbes, contributed to the debate a most remarkable amount of knowledge, and who put it before us in such a way that, in spite of our reading for the last two years upon this important English question, he told us in the course of his speech as much as many of us could acquire after many days' or months' study. It was a most interesting speech, and must have contributed much information to the Committee. It was a most fair and impartial speech, and although my hon. Friend is a good partizan in his way, it was without a trace of Party feeling; and I may say of it that, except as regards one point in which be differs from us in his estimate of the value of a French alliance, and the manner of dealing with the French Ministers in foreign affairs, we might rest upon it a great deal of the defence of the conduct of the Government. He introduced into the debate the consideration of the difficulties which have attended the question in consequence of recent occurrences at Tunis. No more fair statement could have been made in many respects, and none that could have more completely justified the conduct of Her Majesty's Government. The speech, too, of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen), who sits behind me, was a speech of which the Committee must be proud, as coming from one who, not only officially, but personally, has been connected with this question for some time past, upon whose recommendation the late Government acted to so large an extent, and whose knowledge of the whole question, during the time he bad connection with the financial affairs of Egypt, must be admitted to be not only extensive but accurate. My right hon. Friend may, perhaps, be thought to have spoken out rather plainly and frankly with respect to the right manner of dealing with Oriental Powers, and especially as to the proper mode of transacting financial business. He used strong language, which some may say went too far; but still he exposed the weak side of our transactions with Eastern Powers, and especially with the Porte, and in that respect his warning deserves to be taken into serious consideration by the House. My right hon. Friend struck the very keynote of the controversy in which we are engaged when he asked hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, who dispute the conduct and the line taken by Her Majesty's Government, with which horse they proposed to win—do they propose to win by attacking Her Majesty's Government because their action has isolated them in regard to European affairs, or do they propose to win on the ground that their line of policy has hampered and entangled us in alliances with other Powers? I watched with great interest the answer which would be given to that question by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke). He said—"We want to know what you are going to do, but we will not tell you what your fault has been." But the temptation to argue from the point of view which he had adopted was too much for the right hon. Gentleman. Afterwards, and in a few sentences, he said, after some words about the Concert of Europe, that he was against sacrificing the interests of England to the Concert of Europe, and that we ought to co-operate with France, but ought to have told her fairly and broadly that we could not follow her policy. I take these words of the right hon. Gentleman to mean that be thinks our fault has been rather that we have been hampered by arrangements with other Powers than that we suffered in the direction of isolation. Taking that as the view which he adopts, I should like to address a few words to the Committee to show bow it was that we were in a position to pursue the line of policy we first adopted, and which I think I can show we have consistently followed ever since. I would like the Committee to consider, first, whether we have acted consistently with the conditions which were laid down when we took Office two years ago? On this question of the policy of the English Government in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean, the despatches of 1876 and 1878 show that in this respect the late Administration arrived at an understanding with France which is perfectly plain, and appears on the face of the Papers presented to Parliament. The late Government said to France— "We claim to do what we like with Cyprus, and we leave you to do what you like with Tunis. But, with respect to Egypt, we agree jointly to use British and French influence." That was the step taken by the last Government. Well, we inherited that policy in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean, and we have often done our best loyally to act up to it. I do not say that we approved of it, or that we disapproved of it. We found it the policy of the Government which we succeeded, and we worked up to it loyally and faithfully and, I think I shall be able to show, with success. But, although that may be the general outline of the policy of his Government, I do not think the right hon. Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke) described accurately the situation of public affairs in that part of the world, and especially in Egypt, when we succeeded to the administration of the foreign affairs of the country. He said we inherited a peaceful policy in Egypt, only broken by the first military riot which took place a year ago. He said, with respect to the last arrangement made by Lord Salisbury for the exercise of British influence in Egypt, that when Lord Salisbury was urged to nominate a European Minister he declined, and that it was entirely by the action of the Khedive that the Minister was appointed, and that when the Khedive was dismissed the Control was established. He said the Committee would see that Lord Salisbury adopted no now policy in 1879, and that after the small revolution which took place in Cairo we re-established the Control on its former footing. But nothing can be more inaccurate than that description of what was done in 1878–9. The first military riot was not in 1881, but in 1879; so that the difficulties with the Army began not in 1881, but in 1879; and that riot, to use Lord Salisbury's own words, had the effect, by a military tumult, in which the officers of the Khedive were really the rioters, of overthrowing an independent Ministry with two European officials attached to it. Therefore, the difficulties with the Khedive really began, not in 1881, but a few months before we took Office. They began with the military riot at Cairo.

MR. BOURKE

The first riots had no connection with this affair.

MR. CHILDERS

I have only taken up the words of the right hon. Gentle- man, He said the first military riot took place in 1881, whereas the first riot took place while the late Government were in Office. We did not inherit a peaceful state of things. The late Government insisted on the abdication or the resignation of the Khedive, and the revision of the Control, and they revised the Control on a perfectly different system from that which existed before. Under the new arrangement there were two Controllers, one appointed by us and the other by France. They were removable only by us and France, and they were Members of the Khedive's Ministry. So that, the old arrangement having been revised, a new system of Control was established, under which the two Controllers General were nominees of the Governments of England and France, and could not be removed except by the act of those two Governments. The words in the Papers are "removable by thorn." I do not now raise the question whether that was a good arrangement or not; but it was an entire change; and what I want to show is that the statement of the right hon. Gentleman that the late Government loft everything in a peaceful condition is not strictly accurate, because a short time before there had been a serious military riot which led to the upsetting of the Government, and a new Control was established which was placed upon an entirely different footing. There is no doubt that the new arrangement, however good it might have been, was full of danger. What happened? Well, as I have said, we worked strictly upon the lines laid down by our Predecessors. A very few months after we took Office another military riot took place in February, 1881, not arising from any act of ours; and there was a third in September. Therefore, when the right hon. Gentleman says the late Government left Egypt peaceful, we might just as well say we left Turkey peaceful in 1874, and then objected to the conduct of the late Government, because in 1875 and 1876, not in consequence of any act of theirs, a large portion of Turkey was found to be in a state of incendiarism. So far as the allegation goes, that there were satisfactory arrangements with the Khedive, which we, by some act of ours, upset, it cannot for one moment be substantiated. The fact is that whatever may have been the intention of the arrange- merit of 1875, it contained elements of great danger; and, without our touching them, those elements within a few months after our accession to Office led to the trouble which has now been brought upon us. Having inherited that state of things, and that policy, what were our efforts in the furtherance of order and good government in Egypt? In the first place, our endeavour was to carry out that jointpolitical influence of France and England which had been established by our Predecessors, and, in my humble judgment, wisely established. We endeavoured to do so with the good feeling and the goodwill of the Powers. We endeavoured, in all that followed, to use to the utmost, I will not say the moral influence, but the material influence of the Sovereign Power; and our great anxiety has been throughout all these troubles, while favouring National objects in Egypt, to get rid of the military usurpation which has been destroying the happiness and progress of the country, and to do so on the lines and principles I have described. We have kept these objects steadily in view, and when hon. or right hon. Gentlemen complain that in this respect we went a little too far in the direction of obtaining the concurrence of France, or in the direction of obtaining the Concert of Europe, or that we pressed too much or too little upon the Porte the duty of exercising its own rights and its own duty—I say, however much you may criticize in detail one act or another act, and say that one was too soon and another too late, I think I may refer, in answer to what my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) has said—for he has pointed out that what you ought to look to is not this step or that step, this detail or that detail, but to our acts as a whole—that the position was an extremely difficult one, and that the attention of Her Majesty's Government was necessarily directed to the attainment of two or three great objects. I believe in the end, in spite of the difficulty of the transactions in which we have been engaged, and in spite of the weakness of the French Government, which has delayed us so much, it will be seen that we have kept steadily in view our object, and have never flinched from it. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote) says we have been dawdling. That is the charge he brought against us in his speech. If he means by dawdling not being over hasty in plunging into the first difficulty that presented itself to us, I admit the justice of the charge. If, on the other hand, he means that we have unnecessarily delayed, I say that it is not so—we have not dawdled, but we entered with prudence into negotiations, in order to bring them to a successful result. I venture to say that if we had adopted a different course we should have had serious difficulties with France, and we should not have been proceeding now with the goodwill of Europe. In all probability we should have run the risk of a serious war. As it is, I think it is plain that Europe is now satisfied that we have no selfish object in the course we have taken or in the military operations for which we ask the sanction of the Committee. On this point it is necessary that we should be very clear, and I think it would be much to be regretted if Europe suspected that we, for instance, were seeking the sole Protectorate in Egypt. Our object is entirely of an unselfish character, keeping clearly in view the maintenance and protection of our interests, and the interests of other civilized countries. We desire order and good government in Egypt, and we desire this both for the advantage of England and that of the whole world. We hope to succeed in bringing about this—that Egypt shall cease to be a Military Power, except in respect to such forces as it may be necessary to maintain in order to protect herself from the incursions of her Southern neighbours. But it must be remembered that Egypt is the great highway between this country and the East, and that our interest in that highway is at least four times as great as those of all the other nations together; and if we clearly show the world that we are unselfish with respect to the administration in the future of Egypt, and have no wish to obtain any Protectorate over her, I think it will not be unreasonable when, by force of arms, we shall have made Egypt cease to be a Military Power that we should have the most honourable part in the settlement of Egyptian affairs. Sir, I shall not dwell at greater length upon this part of the subject; but I think it will be expected from me, after these general declarations as to the objects we have had, and those which we still have, if I say a few words with reference to the more strictly military questions which are involved in the Vote of Credit, so far as the operations of the War are concerned. I will not, in the first place, repeat the arguments which have been put with such remarkable force by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as to why we should not have sooner engaged in these operations; but there are one or two points connected with that subject which I should like to make quite clear to the Committee after what passed in the previous stages of the debate, and especially on the first day. Now, I was pressed somewhat unreasonably on that occasion with respect to an answer which I had given some days before, in reply to a Question put by the noble Lord opposite about the employment of a certain Major Tulloch, and the advice which he was supposed to have given to Admiral Seymour. The noble Lord, and I think one hon. Member from Ireland, pressed the Question home to me to an extent which I confess made me doubt whether I was wise in refusing to state what I said I ought not to state. My noble Friend asked whether, referring to the statement in The Times, which used Major Tulloch's name, he had advised with the view to avoiding the perpetration of atrocities, that there should be a force to land when the bombardment took place. Well, Sir, the Question having been urged, I thought it would be a simple and natural course to send this telegram to Admiral Seymour—"Did Major Tulloch warn you against bombardment without landing troops?" I did not say anything more than that, except that I asked for a reply at once, and the answer which Sir Beauchamp Seymour sent us was—"No; decidedly not." I think that answer puts an end to the story about Major Tulloch. Another detail has been alluded to, with respect to the movements of the Army, which requires some explanation. Three charges have been made both in and out of the House, with the object of showing stupidity on the part of those who managed military affairs. One of these, relating to the arrival of the Marines at Alexandria without ammunition, has been conclusively disposed of by the Secretary to the Admiralty. With regard to the second charge, that the Orontes arrived at Alexandria empty, it has been shown that she did not go there at all. A third charge is that a battery of Artillery had been landed without horses. This last charge is quite true. A battery of Artillery from Malta was landed without horses. They could not have been landed with horses, because they had none. In other words, they were Garrison Artillery. As a matter of fact we have no Field Artillery either at Gibraltar or Malta; and when it was necessary to send troops to Alexandria, we despatched a battery of Garrison Artillery, armed with four 40-pounder guns, and these guns have done extremely good service. This, I think, disposes of the last question as to the stupidity of the Government in small points of detail. But I think it will be expected that I should give the Committee some information on questions connected with the strength of this Expedition. These are already subjects of inquiry proposed to be addressed to me by hon. Members. Nevertheless, I think it would be more satisfactory for me to make a statement with reference to them on the present occasion. I want the Committee clearly to bear in mind the difficulties that have been found to exist on previous occasions in sending out with despatch forces satisfactory in point of numbers and other conditions. On the present occasion we have been able to send out such a force in a manner which has, I believe, on the whole, proved acceptable to Members on both sides of the House. It will be in the recollection of the Committee that last year I proposed a somewhat different method of organization for our regiments; and the basis of that proposal was that, instead of our regiments being exactly of the same strength, we should raise the regiments at the top of the rota to the strength of about 1,015 men, and that those regiments should be liable to be treated in the same way as other regiments in reference to service abroad. I said I hoped we should be in a position to send out, when necessary, the First Army Corps in such a condition that volunteers from other regiments would not be required to complete its strength. That, to a great extent, we have been able to do. Of course, in raising the strength of regiments from 600 to, say, 1,000 men, this additional strength must be made up by volunteers from other regiments, or recruits. But we had so arranged, if we had not had the present disturbances, that the regiments at the top of the rota would have been in a thoroughly prepared state for war—that is to say, that they might have gone out without receiving assistance by drafts from other regiments, or by drafts from the Reserve. We have not, of course, had time to complete that arrangement; but we have been able to send out the whole of the First Army Corps, consisting partly of home battalions, and partly of battalions from the Mediterranean Stations, brought up to their full strength in almost every case by men of the Reserve belonging to the respective regiments. At the same time, we have called out about 10,000 men of the Reserve, 2,000 or 3,000 of whom will form a reserve in our Mediterranean Colonies, available to go on service immediately, and the remainder will be drafted to regiments at home, so as to strengthen the force left behind in the Mother Country. I wish these arrangements to be clearly understood, because there seems to be still an impression abroad that we have not been able to dispense with the old system of getting volunteers from other regiments. But we have been able to do this; we have carried out the plan in which our Predecessors in Office took so great a share, although, on this account, we do not claim for ourselves any particular merit. With the exception of raising the strength of certain regiments, to which I have referred, to 1,015 men, all that we have done is simply to carry out the plan initiated by our Predecessors. I think the Committee will rest satisfied with this—that whatever faults there may be in connection with the system, before long, so far as the organization of regiments goes, they will be put on a proper footing. We shall be able to send out a force which, with the Indian troops, will amount to 30,000, leaving out the 20,000 Reserve men, who can be called to the Colours. It is evidence of the gradual progress of reform that we have been able to effect this, and I think the Committee and the country ought to be congratulated upon it. I should like now to explain the arrangements we have made to secure the health of our soldiers. We are entering upon a campaign in a country not necessarily unhealthy, but one in which sanitary arrangements ought to be carefully studied, and I think those who are responsible have devoted themselves to this subject with great zeal and great success. My right hon. Friend behind me will, perhaps, excuse me for being as clear on this point as I always wish to be on economical questions of this kind; but we have come to the conclusion that one of the first instructions ought to be that while extravagance should be avoided, there could be no worse form of economy than starving the sanitary arrangements. I am able, then, to inform the Committee that two hospital ships have been provided, and that we are sending out 800 men of the Army Hospital Corps, together with a very large staff of doctors. Amongst other arrangements for securing the health of our men, I may mention that special measures have been taken for preserving them from a peculiar form of ophthalmia, to which Europeans are very liable in Egypt. I have also been asked to state that we are sending out a body of nurses, both to the hospitals and depots; and in other respects—with regard to which I shall always be happy to satisfy any hon. Member—we are taking every possible precaution against the sanitary dangers of Egypt. We have, for instance, set at rest any possible doubt as to the supply of water by adopting what appears to be a most perfect system. With respect to clothing, we have studied with great care the conditions of service in the climate of Egypt, and I believe we have satisfied every requirement under this head. With regard to tenting. It is necessary that the tents employed should be different from those ordinarily in use, and it is now some weeks since the needful arrangements in this department were set on foot.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

Will the tents be double?

MR. CHILDERS

They will be double—marquees and hospital tents. We have also provided means of transport that I believe will be sufficient for all purposes, and respecting which I shall be happy to give any information that is desirable later on. I may mention that this subject very closely occupied myself and Colleagues during a period of four or five weeks before the other arrangements were made. I will now say a few words as to the amount of the Vote. My right hon. Friend opposite asks me whether we have taken a sufficient amount of money; and the suggestion is that we have not provided for the full time the war is likely to last; and that we may have to come to Parliament for further supplies. The length of the campaign is, of course, a matter of great doubt; but after studying the circumstances which are likely to influence its duration, and after consulting the responsible officers, particularly Sir Garnet Wolseley, we are satisfied that prudence, based on probability, only requires that we should ask for the sum of £900,000 for Army purposes connected with this Expedition on the assumption that the operations will be concluded within two months. If, however, the war wore unfortunately to drag on for a longer time, we should then, doubtless, have again to apply to Parliament. I am not one of those who think that the best way of dealing with these matters is to ask for a sum far in excess of the probable requirements, and then to say you will repay the surplus. The fittest way, in my opinion, is to make the best estimate you can of what is likely to be required, and frankly to communicate it to Parliament. Then, if the estimate is exceeded, I believe Parliament will more readily grant the further sum required than if an unnecessarily large demand had been made at first. The noble Lord asked me a question with respect to vacancies at the War Office owing to the absence of certain officers engaged in the campaign. Assuming that the campaign only lasts for three months, that is a period which does not exceed the term of leave often taken by officers at the War Office in the ordinary course of business. Sir Garnet Wolseley's place will be filled during these three months by a distinguished general officer. The work of Sir John Adye has also been similarly arranged for, and the departments being exceptionally strong, owing to the good selection which we found when we came into Office, I think it possible to carry out the business which has to be transacted without importing into them other officers.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

The Intelligence Department?

MR. CHILDERS

The hon. and gallant Member refers to Sir Archibald Alison. I told the House that we did not intend to employ two general officers, and it would, therefore, be quite absurd now to appoint a fresh head of the Intelligence Department. At this point I should like, if the Committee will allow me, to say a word on a matter which the War Office and the Admiralty consider to be of great national importance in connection with an expedition of this kind. I would appeal to the Press, through this House, to be cautious as to what it discloses in relation to matters connected with the campaign. During the campaign in the Transvaal I made a similar appeal, and it was, I confess, fairly responded to. But I already notice in the reports which arrive from the correspondents of newspapers—newspapers not alone of small circulation, but those of the first standing also—a want of caution in the indication of operations which, considernig how rapidly the telegraph carries back anything that appears in the Press here, cannot but be attended with bad results. I trust, therefore, that those who are responsible for the management of newspapers will exercise due discretion with regard to the reports I have alluded to; I hope they will be careful to excise from them every statement that even in a small degree indicates the intentions of military commanders, and thereby interferes with what they are contemplating for the public advantage. I will add that I have not the slightest objection to the presence of newspaper correspondents at the seat of war. On the contrary, I think their presence there a good thing, amongst other reasons, because it is likely to have a good effect upon the officers responsible for the conduct of the war; and, therefore, we shall on this occasion make arrangements similar to those which were made on past occasions under which correspondents of newspapers will be allowed to accompany the Army in the field, but with the necessary restrictions as to the conveyance to their journals of the injurious information to which I have alluded. Although no man detests war more than I do, yet when it becomes necessary to resort to it I sincerely believe that its miseries are not lessened by it being sluggishly carried on. On the other hand, the greatest mistake we could commit in connection with the undertaking we have now embarked in would be to send out our troops precipi- tately without proper arrangements being made as regards stores and other matters, which in every war are quite as important as the fighting men. To those who have criticized the Government for not having been quicker, I reply that we shall do the work more thoroughly by doing it more deliberately. I owe my thanks both to the officials of the War Office and the India Office for the skill with which they have carried out the preparations for the Expedition. With very little excitement and very little notice, we have collected in a few days a force of 30,000 in addition to the force in the Mediterranean; and I have the fullest confidence in the General who is to command and the officers who will be associated with him, as well as in the gallantry of the British soldier, which causes me to believe that they will thoroughly rise to the height of the great task they have before them.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

said, that everyone would agree with the concluding words of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. He did not propose to follow the great speakers who had exhausted the subject financially, morally, immorally, historically, diplomatically, and in every conceivable way; he rather should confine his observations to that portion of the subject which had been dealt with by the right hon. Gentleman. He believed that every impartial man who had looked into the Blue Books must have come to the conclusion that throughout these transactions, to put it in the fewest possible words, procrastination had been mixed with hesitation and supplemented by vacillation. He believed Her Majesty's Government had been more or less the dupes of the Turk as well as the humble followers of France, and that, like Mr. Micawber, "they had been waiting for something to turn up." He assured the right hon. Gentleman that he had not risen for the purpose of carrying on a disagreeable controversy, or casting reflections upon Gentlemen on the opposite Benches; but this was a time when, before all things, Members ought to recollect that they were Englishmen, and that they were bound, as far as they were able, to support the Government, however strongly they might feel—and he confessed he did feel it—that this war, with all the expense and bloodshed attending it, might have been avoided. But he would pass on to the present and future of the military situation. He did not think the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister quite apprehended the point which hon. Members on that side of the House had urged. Their point was that the Admiral ought to have had a sufficient force at his command for any purposes that he might have thought it desirable to carry out in connection with the bombardment which had taken place. Now, he had heard it stated by those who knew Egypt well that a small force of 5,000 men might have landed without difficulty upon the peninsula which ran between the two lakes, and on which the railway was carried. If these 5,000 men had been landed at the time the bombardment was taking place, it was considered that the Egyptian Army, thoroughly demoralized by the great loss of officers and men, would have been caught, as it were, in a trap; and that, had the isthmus been properly defended, they would have been compelled to surrender. He did not intend to put forward that view authoritatively, notwithstanding that it was the view taken in military quarters, and had, as he believed, been advocated by Dervish Pasha himself. Of course, it was necessary to the success of that plan that the Admiral should have had the necessary force at his command. But that was not the case. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, in the course of his speech, said it would be a gross insult to the Conference which was sitting had this landing taken place. But he would like to know how it could be a greater insult to the Conference to land troops at the time of the bombardment, than to land them five or six days afterwards, when the Conference was still sitting? If troops could be landed after the bombardment they could surely have been landed at the time it was taking place. He could not, for the life of him, see that the Conference could have resented this, judging from their subsequent action; nor had he heard that any kind of protest had been made against the landing of our troops, or against our holding Alexandria during the time we had been in possession of the city. However, the subject was an unpleasant one, and he had no intention of pursuing it. As the result of all that had happened, we were about to enter upon an Egyptian campaign at the very worst season of the year. It was almost impossible that the force we were about to despatch in the course of a week or 10 days should arrive before the beginning of September. Now, it seemed to him, notwithstanding what had fallen from the Secretary of State for War, that the Government, throughout these transactions, in consequence of their policy of procrastination, hesitation, and vacillation, had been in very considerable doubt as to the course which they should adopt. First of all, notwithstanding the existence of that lately-constituted and most able Department—the Intelligence Department—it did not seem that the Government were in possession of sufficient knowledge as to the climate, diseases, means of communication in Egypt, or oven of the class of troops best fitted to servo there. Considering that these Egyptian difficulties had extended over the last year and a-half, the Intelligence Department must have been aware that there would shortly be a campaign in Egypt, and that the Government would require exact information as to the best time of the year for undertaking it, the proportions of White and Black troops that should compose the forces, and other matters, such as the means of transport, about which there seemed to be a great amount of uncertainty at the present moment. It was understood that the Life Guards were sent out without horses, and that in all probability they would have to be mounted on donkeys. He had asked the Secretary of State for War whether there was any truth in the report that the War Office had bought 5,000 mules in the South of Europe, and the reply was that there was no foundation whatever in the rumour. When he heard that he was exceedingly sorry, because he could see that his right hon. Friend had not really calculated what was likely to take place. The purchase of mules was a most essential matter. It was only horses of a certain kind that could live in Egypt; and, therefore, if the Life Guards, or any considerable body of troops, were despatched to that country, it was most necessary that a sufficient number of mules should be at hand. The right hon. Gentleman now said that 500 mules had been bought for the present, and that the War Office could lay their hands on the rest; but when the question was asked in the House he said there was no foundation for the rumour that a purchase had taken place. It was an extraordinary thing that the Orontes should have arrived without troops, and the Tamar without ammunition. He hoped they were not about to repeat the story of the great disaster which happened in the Crimea. It was perfectly true that a great deal had taken place since then in the way of thoroughly reforming our Departments, inside and outside the War Office; and he hoped and believed that such a calamity as occurred in the Crimea was, at the present time, impossible. But, having regard to what had taken place politically and diplomatically, the want of preparation, and the waiting on Providence for what might happen on the part of the Government, he confessed he was very nervous when he read the story of the Orontes and the Tamar. The statement of his right hon. Friend had, however, re-assured him. His right hon. Friend had the great faculty of painting everything couleur de rose, and far be it from him to throw a darker shade upon the picture he had presented to the Committee. But he thought it right to ask the Government if they had calculated all the difficulties with which they would have to contend? He had cut from a newspaper a paragraph, which described what the state of the country would be, a month hence, in these words— It is well that the people at home should recognize the importance of rapid action in Egypt. The Nile will soon he up, and all the ground will be flooded; then comes the period of falling water, with universal mud and chance of fever. We ought to be already on the march to avoid the consequences of September. The expedition to Egypt under Sir Ralph Abercrombie, in 1801, consisted of 13,000 or 14,000 European troops. A very good reason existed for sending out White troops on that occasion—namely, that they had to fight European troops; but we did not send them out in September, we sent them in March, and the whole affair was over before the rising of the Nile took place; and, consequently, there was nothing to be looked to like this state of universal mud and the chance of fever. Now, he would like to know from his right hon. Friend, who was surrounded by the best mili- tary advisers, what would be the position of the English troops, supposing there should be a great inundation of the Nile, and that Arabi Pasha proved himself a greater commander than we took him to be. How would it be possible for us to move a man from Alexandria? If the country were flooded, we should have 24,000 men cooped up in the city, sweltering under a hot sun, attacked by fever, and a prey to ennui. The probable result of this would be great discontent and a large amount of crime, and the troops would either have to be re-embarked, or recourse would have to be necessary to the punishment of death, because, as flogging had been abolished, it would, under the circumstances he had described, be otherwise impossible to maintain discipline. This was probably a matter which his right hon. Friend had taken into consideration. They had received an account the other day that some of our soldiers had looted a Palace belonging to the Khedive. The story had no foundation; but, supposing it had been true, the men could not have been imprisoned. They must have been shot, and the consequence would be the stirring up of a great amount of public opinion against the Government. He was glad to hear from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) that we were, on the whole, on good terms with the European Powers, a fact which he had previously doubted. They were told that the alliance with France, if it was not cordial, was not otherwise, and that it was possible that they would have the French as helpers and co-operators in the field; but it was a matter of regret that since that statement was made there had been a report that the Vote for the French Naval Demonstration would not be acceded to by the Chambers. If that were true, it seemed to him clear that we should have to go single-handed into this great and unfortunate contest. Again, if we were to judge from the organs of public opinion in Italy, the attitude of that country was anything but friendly at this moment. He made this remark, however, without having read the diplomatic despatches upon that point. Then we had Turkey diplomatizing. He need not ask what the support of Turkey, morally or otherwise, was worth, because the Prime Minister had constantly told them that he had no confidence in Turkey.

MR. GLADSTONE

When did I say that?

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

In the Mid Lothian speeches.

MR. GLADSTONE

Quote them.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

It was well known that the right hon. Gentleman was anxious to drive the Turks, bag and baggage, out of Europe, a phrase which he afterwards explained as referring to the Turkish officials.

MR. GLADSTONE

I have asked the noble Lord to quote that passage from my speech. He has entirely misstated what I said.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

Turkey was diplomatizing at the moment; but the Prime Minister had so poor an opinion of Turkey, that that did not signify.

MR. GLADSTONE

I did not say so.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

said, he had understood the right hon. Gentleman to say so. He would, however, pass the matter over. His object was only to show that we were not at all certain at that moment of the actual support of any single European Power. There might be a general feeling that it was a very good thing that England, at this moment, should put her hand out and take the chestnuts out of the fire. He dared say that was so; indeed, he had no doubt of it, and that we should only get that kind of moral support. As far as material support was concerned, there was very little chance of it—not that he cared particularly for material support—and he would tell the Committee why. He had had the honour of serving during the last part of the Crimean War, and he knew very well that the feeling of the English officers and men at that time was not in accord with that of the French and Sardinians. He recollected a certain passage in Mr. King-lake's work, The Invasion of the Crimea, with regard to Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud after the Battle of the Alma. Mr. Kinglake stated, in so many words, that had Marshal St. Arnaud given that support to Lord Raglan which Lord Raglan had a right to expect, the Allied Forces, immediately after the Battle of the Alma, would have marched directly upon Sebastopol, and, in all probability, the conclusion of the war would have been brought about very much earlier than it actually was. Lord Raglan, with that admirable tact and that perfect knowledge of men which he possessed, did not make this in anyway a personal complaint; but he (Lord Eustace Cecil) knew, from information he had received, that Lord Raglan felt the matter very keenly. He knew, also, that after the Battle of Inkermann there was a considerable amount of ill-feeling between the two Armies, because the French, whether rightly or wrongly, did not support their Allies as cordially and as completely as it was thought they ought to have done. He had no wish to go back upon these old stories, or to make any insinuation against the French; but it was necessary, for the sake of his argument, to say that there was a feeling, after the Battle of Inkermann, that the Frenchhad not come up in support of the English troops as they had a right to do. That was the result of having allied nations with Armies working in the field together; and he believed it was the feeling of every officer who served in the Crimea that if ever we were called upon to take the field again he would prefer, if possible, to serve alone. He had, therefore, no regret, in a military point of view, that we were going to undertake this expedition to Egypt single-handed. We should be more likely to take the chestnuts out of the fire satisfactorily to ourselves, and we should not be subjected to the jealous or carping criticisms of our neighbours. Whatever might become of Egypt we should have to bear the brunt of the battle, and we should have the right hereafter of settling the affairs of that nation. He desired to say one word as to the troops whom it was proposed to send out. He had alluded to the Life Guards; he did not know why they should be sent out, except for the attack which had been made upon them by an hon. Member. He had no wish to say anything derogatory of those gallant troops. He knew that they did good service at Waterloo, and he was satisfied that they would do good service in Egypt; but he confessed he did not understand why men 6 feet 2 inches high should be sent out without their horses, for the only purpose, as far as he could understand, of riding Egyptian donkeys.

SIR ARTHUR HAYTER

remarked, that the Life Guards, like any other Cavalry, would go out with their horses.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

said, he was very sorry to hear it. In that ease, it was much to be feared that very few of the animals would ever come back again. What he wanted to know was, why Her Majesty's Government were going to send out to Egypt this enormous force of 24,000 men, seeing that at the Battle of the Alma, when we were fighting the whole of the Russian Empire, we had only 27,000 men. Was it known that we never sent so large a force out before, since the days of the Crimea and the Peninsula? And why we should send out a force of that nature, for the purpose of fighting some 10,000 demoralized Egyptians, he could not for the life of him understand. The only way in which he could understand the matter was this—that the Government wanted to occupy the country afterwards. If that were so, he warned them that their occupation would prove to be a very costly affair; and after the country had been inundated, and they had had the horrible months they had been talking of, he should like to know how many of their Army and of their black horses would ever come back again? It seemed to him that, if ordinary common sense were used in the matter, they might send out a certain number of White troops; that would be all well and good; but the large number of the forces ought to be Native troops from India, who were far better fitted to endure the climate, and who would be far less costly. The only reason he could understand why these Native troops had not been sent to Egypt was that there were very few to send. And why were there few to send? It was because the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India (the Marquess of Hartington), whom he did not see in his place at that moment—and there were very few who entertained the opinion of the noble Lord now—it was because the noble Lord had been steadily reducing the Native Army for the last year or a year and a-half. It might have been supposed that as this Egyptian Question had now been going on for about the same period, affecting, as it did directly, the great Empire of India, and leading, perhaps, to a general European war, the reduction of the Indian Army would have been about the last thing the Go- vernrnent of India would have thought of entertaining. Nevertheless, he understood that a reduction had taken place of about 9,000 or 10,000 men. Those 9,000 or 10,000 men were seasoned soldiers, whose services would have been of the greatest advantage to Her Majesty's Government at this moment. Through having taken this course they were now compelled to send out some 24,000 men from among the best troops we had; and there was a chance, when they reached Egypt, of finding themselves cooped up in Alexandria, and, instead of being food for powder, becoming food for worms. He desired now to say a word or two in regard to the question of expense. The question of expense was not a matter that could be passed over. In January, 1854, Lord Aberdeen, being then Prime Minister, moved in the House of Lords for a Vote of Credit for £3,000,000, and it was then supposed that the Guards would go to Malta and come back again with return tickets. But they all know that a serious and costly war followed, and in the month of December of the same year Parliament had to assemble. The war itself lasted for a year or a year and a-half, and, instead of costing £3,000,000, the country had, in the end, to pay something like £100,000,000. The next expedition of a considerable character was that to Abyssinia. The Government asked for that Abyssinian Expedition £2,000,000, and proposed to send out 10,000 men. The whole Estimate of the cost of the war was £3,500,000. The Estimate was moved by right hon. Gentlemen who agreed with him in politics; and they all knew, after it was proposed by Mr. Ward Hunt, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, how severely it was criticized, and how in every way it was pulled to pieces. He believed that the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister was one of the critics.

MR. GLADSTONE

No; I was not.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

said, he had no wish to misrepresent the right hon. Gentleman.

MR. GLADSTONE

I voted with the Government for the Vote.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

remarked that if he was wrong he was glad to be corrected. Certainly, the Estimate was criticized by the Opposition, and by right hon. Gentlemen who ordinarily agreed with the Prime Minister in politics. He was quite certain that many criticisms were made upon what was termed the bad Conservative finance, and Lord Sherbrooke (then Mr. Lowe) complained that they were very bad Estimates.

MR. GLADSTONE

That was afterwards.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

Afterwards! No doubt, the Estimates were very much criticized afterwards. The Government asked for £3,500,000, of which only £2,000,000 were to be spent in the year for which the Vote was passed; but it was well known that, in the end, the Abyssinian War cost £9,000,000, although it was only to be an expedition of 10,000 men, who were to be removed from Bombay to Abyssinia, and were then to march for some 200 or 300 miles into the country. Somehow or other, how the money was spent nobody ever appeared to know. The result was that the country had to pay no less than £9,000,000. Now, what was it that Her Majesty's Government proposed to do at this moment? They were to move a force of 24,000 men to Alexandria, and the Committee were told that it would also be necessary to move a further force of 10,000 men from India. He thought the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India had fixed the Indian contingent at that figure; and now the right hon. Gentleman opposite came down to the Committee and asked the House of Commons for a Vote of Credit for £2,300,000. This, be it remembered, was to cover the expense of an expedition consisting of a force of 24,000 White troops and 10,000 Native Indians. The matter was a very important one, and he asked the Committee to consider it seriously. The whole of the extra taxation would be thrown upon one class of the taxpayers—namely, the income taxpayers, and there was no doubt that there would be a heavy bill to pay in the future. No other class would be called upon to pay a farthing, and he was exceedingly sorry for it.

MR. GLADSTONE

We had a precedent for that course.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

said, he was glad that a precedent could be cited; but he regretted that the whole of the country was not to be made to feel the burden. The sum which they might be required to spend in the future was a very important matter, and it was per- fectly clear that the policy of Her Majesty's Government was to throw the whole of the burden upon one class of the taxpayers. It was for this reason he was urging now that it would have been far wiser if a larger number of Coloured soldiers were sent out who, if he did not understate the case, would cost not more than one-third of the expense of sending out English soldiers. He did not think the Government or the Committee had sufficiently taken into consideration what a very expensive article the English soldier was. He recollected the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), in one of the first speeches he delivered, informing the House with truth, some years ago, that the English soldier cost £100 a-year. He (Lord Eustace Cecil) had some experience in the provisions, clothing, and other matters connected with the British soldier; and he was satisfied that he did not in the slightest degree overstate the case when he asserted that since the right hon. Member for Bradford made that statement the sum of £100 a-year. which had been put down as the cost per man, had gone up to £130. The Black soldier was not only far better suited to the climate of Egypt, but he lived for a great deal less, and cost considerably less in consequence. The expense of keeping him in Egypt would be very much less than would attend the enormously costly expedition which Her Majesty's Government had decided upon sending out. He did not pretend to say for what reason this large force of men had been fixed upon, unless it were to show that we were able to send out a corps d'armée. He was glad to find that the Government were in a position to send out a corps d'armée. It had been said there were grave doubts whether we could send out half that number of men; and, considering the garrison we had at this moment in Ireland, it was creditable to the military authorities that they were able to collect so large a number of troops and send them out. But le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle; and he could not conceive why we should send out this enormous force for such a campaign, unless it was intended to march all over the country and occupy it. It certainly was not required if there was any likelihood of the troops being cooped up in Alexandria, where they would meet with every kind of misfortune in the shape of disease; and he could not for the life of him understand how it was that the Government had decided upon sending out such a force. He hoped some explanation would be given by the Secretary of State for War, and if such a force was really required, the proper place to find them would be India; and India was quite as much interested— nay, even more interested—than this country in maintaining the Suez Canal. The least we might have expected was that the Indian authorities should have provided the men. He should also like to hear something as to the sanitary arrangements which had been alluded to by the Secretary of State for War, whom he regretted to see absent from his place. It was quite right that the sanitary arrangements should be attended to; but although he thought our brave soldiers should have every possible want supplied he did not think they ought to be furnished with luxuries. He had heard of all sorts of things being sent out, such as veils and spectacles.

MR. GLADSTONE

To guard against ophthalmia.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

They would guard against ophthalmia, no doubt; but it was only under certain circumstances that ophthalmia arose, and, as he had said before, it was not necessary to provide the troops with luxuries. All that was required was to see that their legitimate wants were attended to. He did not say that in a few cases the articles ordered to be sent out might not be necessary; but there was no necessity for a largo or general supply of them. No doubt, when they consulted the Medical Department, one gentleman would say—"Such and such things are required," while another medical officer wouldsay—"We must also have such and such articles, "and so the matter went on. Having had to do with old stores, he knew what it was that happened when all these things went back again into the stores. If any particular articles were absolutely needed they should be supplied without stint; but the experience of former days proved that many of the articles directed to be supplied were really not wanted, and were only to be regarded as luxuries. He was satisfied that the House of Commons and the country would grudge no expense for the preservation of the lives and health of the soldiers; but it was quite absurd to waste money in stores that were not required. At any rate, there should be some limit, and the Government ought not to send out more than was absolutely necessary to supply the wants of the men. Otherwise, all he could say was that their estimate of £2,300,000 would turn out to be much too small. What happened when the Vote of Credit for £6,000,000 was voted when the late Government was in power? It was often said that the Vote of Credit for that sum was most extravagant, and yet the Government did not move a man. Her Majesty's Government came down now and asked Parliament for£2,300,000, and they proposed to move 24,000 men. What portion of that sum they were going to apply to the removal of Indian troops from India to Egypt still required explanation. It was always a disagreeable task to make criticisms of this sort, and all he could say was that upon that side of the House hon. Members felt they were bound, and he hoped they would give the Government every support in the emergency in which they found themselves placed. But in giving them full support they would reserve to themselves the right they undoubtedly possessed of criticizing the way in which the Government had brought the country into this great mess—for he could call it nothing more. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, through his very long political life, had passed through many changes of scene, and had filled many different positions. Indeed, speaking of the right hon. Gentleman with the greatest possible respect, he did not suppose there was a single position in connection with the Government of the country which the right hon. Gentleman had not filled; and it now remained to be seen whether he would be a successful War Minister. He would assure the right hon. Gentleman that while economy was always to be studied efficiency was the first thing to be secured. The truest economy was to obtain everything that could be required, to have all their reserves and all their stores in the best possible order, and, in whatever part of the world their services might be required, to employ those troops who were the most fitted for the purpose and occasion. It was because he believed that Her Majesty's Government had not exercised all the judg- ment they ought to have done that he very much feared and apprehended some disaster might arise—not a disaster over which we could have any control, but a disaster brought about by fever and disease, to which, above all other men, White troops were subject in tropical climates.

MR. VILLIERS-STUART

said, the noble Lord who last addressed the Committee seemed to be apprehensive that they were choosing the very worst time of the whole year for their operations in Egypt; but, as a matter of fact, the summer season was by no means unhealthy. The heat was not oppressive, there was a cool north wind blowing, and it was not until October that the inundations began to retire, and the mud banks appeared. The country then did become unhealthy, as he knew from experience. But they must hope that the military operations would be over long before the unhealthy season set in. The noble Lord also anticipated that they would have to march of 180 miles from Alexandria to Cairo; but it would be a most perverse thing if they preferred a march of 180 miles from Alexandria through the mud to a march of only half the distance across the Desert from Ismailia. There were other matters touched upon by the noble Lord which he had to refer to later on; at present he wished to refer to some remarks which were made from these Benches. An hon. Member on this side of the House (Mr. Rylands) levelled at the Government a charge which he thought was one of the most cruel and most unjust that could have been made—namely, that the guilt of the bloodshed in the massacre of the 11th of June rested upon the Government, be-cause that massacre was the consequence of the sending of the Fleet into Alex-audrian waters. He was in a position to state that the arrival of the Fleet had nothing to do with the massacre. It happened he had received letters from friends of his who were residents of Cairo; these letters were written before the Fleet arrived at Alexandria, and in those letters it was stated that Arabi was sending out emissaries to work up the religious fanaticism of the people and to foment hatred towards the Europeans, and it was also stated that that was so well known in Alexandria that there the presentiment had established itself in the minds of the foreigners, especially the Maltese, that such a rising and such a massacre as had occurred would take place. Only the other clay he was informed by Mr. Cookson, the Vice Consul at Alexandria—and it showed that not only the Europeans, but the Natives, were looking forward to that massacre—that the conduct of the Natives had become so defiant and so insolent that oven the Arab pedlars, when hawking their wares, carried this notice—"Buy, oh! Christians, buy today; for you won't be here to buy tomorrow." That was before the arrival of the Fleet, and the result showed how thoroughly well grounded were the anticipations of the Europeans and Natives. He believed that if it had not been for the presence of the Fleet the disaster would have been far more terrible and complete than it was; had it not been for the asylum offered by our men-of-war, every European might have been massacred. Surely there was no hon. Member in the House who would blame the Government for sending the Fleet to Alexandria, or who would maintain that it was our duty to have left our countrymen there to their fate. If the Fleet had a right to be there, it also had a right to take measures necessary for its self-preservation. The earthworks and the guns on the sea front were directed against our ships, and against nothing else; therefore Sir Beauchamp Seymour had as good a right to destroy them as a man had a right to strike a pistol from the hand of the man who aimed at his life. Complaints had been made that a sufficient military force was not sent out to prevent the burning of Alexandria and the escape of Arahi. But it would have been impossible for us to have foreseen long enough beforehand that the burning of Alexandria would take place, because it would be remembered that at the very last moment it was hoped that Arabi would be as good as his word, and would discontinue the fortifications. It would have taken a long time to have sent out a sufficient force to have cut off Arabi's retreat. The neck of land of which the noble Lord spoke was occupied by the city itself, and it would have required a very large force indeed to have extended itself over the miles of country in the rear of the city, and to have taken up a secure military position. We had not time, under the circumstances, to send out the force required. He had heard a parallel drawn between the burning of Alexandria and the burning of Moscow; but there was nothing in common between the two instances. The burning of Moscow had an object and a pur-pose—the object was a patriotic one— namely, to cause disaster to the invading Army of Napoleon by destroying its shelter. The burning of Alexandria could have no military advantage whatever to the men who perpetrated it— it was simply an act of savage ferocity. Speeches had been made from the Benches near him during the debate which were remarkable for florid oratory; but they showed a great deal of ignorance of the people and of the country which formed their subject-matter. In those speeches there were many professions of attachment to the Government and admiration for the distinguished statesman at the head of the Government; but from no part of the House did such vehement denunciation of the policy of the Government come as from these Benches. They must only hope that the bark of hon. Gentlemen was worse than their bite, and that what was said was intended more for their constituents than for this House. He would not go into the abstract question whether intervention or non-intervention was the proper course. As a matter of fact, Her Majesty's Government had not the choice open to them; they found that the intervention was an established fact, and they had to make the best of it. The Control was established, and he believed it was established with the approbation of the great majority of Englishmen, It had been brought as a charge against the Government that they had. interfered in the development of the National movement in Egypt; hut, having been acquainted with Egypt for many years, and having been there for some months last winter, both in the lower and upper regions, and having had opportunities of acquainting himself with the feelings and views of the people, he could assert most positively that in the interior of the country there was no sympathy with Arabi and his claims. The farmers and peasantry appreciated the benefits of the Control; they appreciated the vast improvements in their position and circumstances that had resulted from it— the diminished taxation, the increased personal liberty, the freedom from exactions by the bastinado, and the better administration of justice. After the Control was established there was a degree of prosperity which had never been witnessed before in Egypt, and the people in the interior would have been only too glad if that happy state of things had been allowed to continue. He was bound to say that although the people in the interior had no sympathy with Arabi, it was otherwise in the cities—in Alexandria and Cairo—and for the reason that there the people had profited very much by the extravagant and reckless expenditure that had gone on previous to the days of the Control. As may be very easily supposed, the Control had very many enemies, because it introduced a system of rigid economy and retrenchment, and it displaced many Europeans and Natives who had previously occupied very profitable positions. Worse still, it found an enemy in the Army, because regiments were disbanded and officers were dismissed, and expenses were cut down in all directions. The governing classes in the Provinces also resented the Control, because it took out of their hands the power of the bastinado which they had hitherto wielded. Last, but not least, the Sultan became an ememy of the Control, because those splendid bribes which had found their way into his Treasury under the late Khedive ceased under the Control. It would be easily understood, therefore, how formidable this array of enemies of the Control was. Arabi was encouraged by another class—the Italians and the Germans—and he (Mr. VilliersStuart) had ample opportunity of seeing their operations in Cairo. He saw the development of their intrigues; and he watched with great interest how the Italians and the Germans, animated by a jealousy of France, encouraged Arabi, who was also encouraged by certain Englishmen who were deceived by his sham patriotism. He made these statements from personal knowledge, and he could assure the Committee that there was nothing in the nature of a true National movement in the present revolt. Arabi and his followers were animated by far more sordid motives. The ingredients he had mentioned formed the intrigue of Arabi, his instrument was the Army, and his purpose was the overthrow of the Control, and the promotion of his own ambitious ends. His earliest step was the increase of the Army, and the whole tendency of his movement was retrograde from the very first; and, as it developed, its selfish character became more and more pronounced, and more and more mischievous. Hon. Gentlemen opposite appeared exceedingly anxious to throw Egypt back again into the hands of the Turks; but he doubted whether they had considered what the consequences would be. Under the system of European Control, enormous improvements had taken place in the condition of the country. Twenty-five years ago its population lived in a state of abject slavery. His blood had often boiled at the ill-treatment and oppression of the people which he had witnessed; but he confessed that during the whole of last winter, while he was there, he did not see the bastinado used in a single instance. It was obvious the Control had developed the liberty of the Egyptians instead of being adverse to it. When he first knew Egypt the practice was to extort the last penny that could be extorted; the tax-gatherers were not guided by the amount that was honestly due in the way of Imperial taxation, but they demanded from the fellaheen every farthing they could wring out of him by torture. It was, therefore, a mistake to suppose that the bondholders were answerable for the present state of affairs. It was quite the contrary. Although much more was now paid annually as interest on the debt, yet, as a matter of fact, it was now levied equitably, and actually a smaller amount was extorted from the people than under the old régime. If Her Majesty's Government had been influenced by a wish not to adopt the retrograde policy of giving the Turk a stronger hold in Egypt they deserved the approbation of all right-minded men. The Government had been pursuing a most enlightened and statesmanlike course, and he should regret extremely if the force of circumstances defeated their intentions. Hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House had insisted upon the right of the Egyptians to govern themselves, and no one sympathized more thoroughly with that sentiment than he did. He sympathized entirely with the Egyptian people. He took a very great interest in them, and if he believed that leaving them to themselves at this crisis would promote the cause of freedom amongst them, he should be very sorry for this country to interfere. But he believed that directly opposite consequences would follow. He believed they would be bound hand-and-foot under a most cruel and crushing military despotism; he believed that nothing could be more thoroughly fatal and destructive of the interests of freedom than to allow the present state of things to continue. Egypt might be considered to be peopled by two races— the governing race and the subject race. The governing race differed even in colour, and were either of Turkish or Arabian origin; whereas the great mass of the population were coloured people, the descendants of the ancient Egyptians. The government of the Turk, wherever it had been tried, had been nothing better than a curse upon the countries over which it had extended. From a European administration they might expect better things. What he was anxious to impress on Gentlemen who were opposed to intervention at present was that it was not a question between Native government and government by foreigners, but between the government of the Turks and the government of the Europeans. Gentlemen who said that men preferred to be governed badby by their own countrymen rather than well by foreigners had no conception of the cruelty, oppression, tyranny, and misgovernment which prevailed in Egypt before the Control. He had seen Egypt at its worst under Turkish despotism, and under the rule of the bastinado, and he had seen it at its best—only a few months ago— under European administration. It was impossible to exaggerate the striking contrast there was between the two states of things. If intervention was wrong in principle in the present case it seemed to be justified by the result. He had often been asked by the people in the interior whether there was any chance of England taking possession of the country, and they had asked the question whilst groaning under the system of oppression which prevailed. They had seemed to hail with joy the prospect of being under English rule, and they looked upon it as a bright future indeed compared with the dark lot under which they now lived. It was the unanimous opinion of those who knew Egypt that the only remedy for its evils was to replace Turkish despotism by European administration. The hon. Member for Merthyr (Mr. Richard) had spoken of the drain on the resources of the country which the payment of the interest to the bondholders caused. He would point out that, although there had been very grievous financial mismanagement, it must not be supposed that the whole of the large sums which were contributed by the bondholders in this country were altogether wasted. On the contrary, most important public works were undertaken with the money. Twelve hundred miles of railways were constructed—embankments, bridges, and irrigation works were carried out; and, besides that, the cotton cultivation was developed and the sugar industry created with the money. Those industries were the fruits of the loans, and they contributed to increase the Revenue of Egypt very largely. He had no hesitation in saying that the increased revenue from those causes went a good way towards covering the amount of interest paid to the bondholders. It was too late to talk about non-intervention. It would be simply disgraceful if England did not intervene, if England now turned a deaf ear to the cause of humanity, and left the country, for the good government of which it had made itself responsible, a prey to anarchy and ruin. He was convinced their true policy was to promote, if possible, the total separation of Egypt from the curse and blight of Turkish rule. The only hope for the real independence of Egypt lay in its being trained and prepared under European tutelage for free institutions. He believed there was good stuff in the Native Egyptian race; he knew they had good qualities—industry, docility, patience, and intelligence. Only give them time and good government, and they might yet become a free, self-governing, and an independent people. He believed England was undertaking a noble mission, and that it would be successful. He believed they would lay the foundations of the future independence of Egypt, and that the result of their action would sooner or later be to relieve Egypt of the curse of slavery under which she had for many centuries groaned. Holding these sentiments, he should give his most hearty support to the Government in this matter.

MR. JUSTIN M'CARTHY

agreed with his hon. Friend (Mr. Villiers-Stuart) in his detestation of Turkish rule in Egypt, and in the belief that it would be a misfortune if Egypt were to be again subjected to Turkish rule. He did not, however, understand how his hon. Friend supposed that by the vote he was now about to give he would assist Egypt to obtain her national independence. The hon. Gentleman praised Egypt's virtues, he praised her patience and her industry, he admitted her claim to independence, and for that reason he supported a Vote to enable the Government to carry war into the country, to destroy its towns, and to put down any representative leaders they might have. He agreed with his hon. Friend that the Control, whatever act of policy created it, was productive of decided material advantage to Egypt. Taxes and all other imposts were arranged, under the Control, upon a definite and distinct principle. The poor man knew exactly what he had to pay, and in every way a material impulse was given to the prosperity of Egypt. But his hon. Friend seemed to have forgotten that during all this time the old system of Turkish rule was working actively in the interior; that the Control in no way interfered with the police of Egypt, and a great many of the old evils were as rife as they had been before the days of the Control. In some parts of the country it would be found that the Slave Trade was carried on as openly as ever. The Control had, however, done some practical and substantial good; but that was not exactly the question the Committee had to consider now. What they had to consider was, in fact, whether the Control, no matter what its merits, was worth the tremendous costs and sacrifices it seemed to have brought with it; the question was whether that policy which led to the bombardment of Alexandria, to the murder of Christians, and to a condition of war, was surrounded with advantages which outweighed these evil effects. It was useless to endeavour to deny that this was strictly and distinctly in its origin a bondholders' war. It was as much a bondholders' war as was the Mexican campaign under the Emperor of the French. Did anyone a year and a-half or two years ago suppose there was the slightest danger to the free navigation of the Suez Canal? There was no question, as there could not have been any question of the safety of the Suez Canal. Was the war made for the sake of the prosperity and independence of the Egyptian people? He listened with pleasure to the most interesting, instructive, and able speech of the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Mr. T. C. Bruce); and he was greatly pleased with the remark the hon. Gentleman made as to the ideal profession of generosity and benevolence and general philanthropy made by Lord Granville in his despatches. He did not think anyone would pretend to say we had gone into this struggle merely for the sake of doing good to the Egyptians. The undoubted fact was, we had been drawn into this quarrel step by step because of the entanglements of the bondholders. The recent quarrel with Arabi Pasha and with the Chamber of Notables was about the Control and the safety of the Debt. We demanded the right to withdraw from the Chamber of Notables any consideration whatever of the Budget. They claimed the right to go in for the whole Budget, or so much of it as did not involve the foreign Debt; but we contended that, if we did not watch over the whole expenditure, over the whole government and condition of the country, it might come to pass that some Egyptian policy might imperil the revenue of the country, and thus imperil our Debt. We made our Debt a matter of paramount consideration. The welfare of the country and the progress of the people were matters of inferior moment. The one thing we insisted on, and the one thing they resisted, was our right to have our Debt at any cost. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) thought it necessary to remind the Committee yesterday, in his very able speech, that interference in Egyptian affairs was not of recent date. The right hon. Gentleman referred the Committee to the early days of Mehemet Aliand Ibrahim Pasha, and the Committee were to infer that in those times European and English interference in Egypt was acknowledged. The very minutest instruction in history was required to show that English interference in Egypt did not begin with the establishment of the Control; but the difference between the interference of old days and that of the present day was very marvellous. Formerly our interference, whether right or wrong, was one of policy. We were not then tied to the sleeves of the bondholders; there were no bondholders, and there was no Egyptian Debt then. It was not then in the power of a knot of men, looking after their own concerns, to drag us into a struggle such as the one in which we were about to enter. He held there was a great and marked distinction between the past and the present. Formerly interference in Egypt took place at the instance of great and distinguished statesmen; but in the recent affairs we interfered at the command of stockbrokers and money jobbers. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Chamberlain), in his recent speech, paid a high tribute to the virtue and patriotic earnestness of the Chamber of Notables- He confessed he was somewhat anxious to hear how the right hon. Gentleman would bear himself in the new character of imitation Jingo. He did not seem to enjoy the part; in fact, he got through his part reluctantly and with as little success as possible. The right hon. Gentleman paid a high tribute to the independence and patriotic feeling of the Chamber of Notables, because they set themselves strongly against the feelings and purposes of Arabi Pasha, and because they, and not us, were responsible for the second Dual Note, the Dual Note demanding the exile of Arabi Pasha. The right hon. Gentleman was rather severe with someone who had dared to throw the blame and responsibility of the Dual Note upon Her Majesty's Government. He said the hon. Gentleman who had done this must have paid little attention to the Papers before the House, or he would have known that the Dual Note was sent at the request and suggestion of the Chamber of Notables themselves. The right hon. Gentleman denied that the Ultimatum was an Ultimatum; let them, therefore, call it a penultimatum. Whatever it was, the President of the Board of Trade contended it was nothing of our doing; but it was done at the instigation and instance of the Chamber of Notables. He (Mr. M'Carthy) had taken the pains to read the Papers, voluminous as they were, with some care; and he could not find a line suggesting that the Chamber of Notables recommended the sending of the Ultimatum. On the contrary, it seemed to him that the whole thing was got up on this side of the water. It was M. de Freycinet who concocted the idea of demanding the removal of Arabi Pasha and his Colleagues, and we went with him so far. We afterwards drew back a little, and instructed our Agent in Cairo to do nothing and to say nothing which would prevent the removal of Arabi Pasha. We had some hesitation in going the whole way; but at last we did, and even further than the French were inclined to go, and we forwarded to the Egyptian Government that Ultimatum, or whatever it was, which so vigorously demanded the exile of Arabi Pasha. Arabi Pasha refused to retire from his position, or from the country. Much of the historical interest of the present events centred round the career and character of Arabi Pasha. He would not venture to say what estimation the man had formed of his own position; but he might say he happened to be in Cairo for a considerable part of last winter, at the time when many of the events mentioned in the Papers took place, and he formed some idea of what was passing. In an Eastern country it was difficult to get any knowledge of what was passing in the Native mind. There were some things one could see with the naked eye; one could easily tell whether a man was popular or not with his own people. The present Khedive was not very popular even with the Native population. The Khedive, when he went out driving in the great public drives, as he did two or three times a week, was always received with the most marked attention and courtesy, with loyalty and deference, by all the Europeans and strangers; but he was treated with marked coolness by the Native population. On the contrary, when Arabi rode in the city or suburbs he was received with adverse comment by almost all the foreign population; but he was received, as anyone could see, with favour and enthusiasm by the Native population, down to the donkey boys in the street. He must confess he was rather surprised to hear the hon. Member for Waterford (Mr. Villiers-Stuart) excuse recent events by saying we could not possibly have been prepared for the events which took place, for the first massacre led to the bombardment. If there was one thing that was plain amongst all foreign Consuls in Cairo during all last winter, and he in-eluded some of our own Consular officers in that number, it was a conviction that the moment interference reached a certain point there would be massacre in the great cities of Egypt. He was told that himself again and again in Cairo, and he asked the Representative of one Power if the matter was made known to the English Government; and he assured him that, so far as his own conjecture went, the fact had again and again been impressed upon their knowledge. The common talk and common feeling in Cairo might have afforded some reason why we at home should have known that in drawing too finely the circle of our interference we should bring about, as a necessary consequence, a massacre of Europeans and Christians in some of the towns of Egypt, and that it was our duty to take some measures to guard against such an occurrence. But to return to the position of Arabi. Whatever he might have been in the beginning it was quite certain we had made him a great man, a great hero with his countrymen. From the moment he appeared in any prominence on the political stage, by a kind of instinct all European public opinion had been directed against him, and had made a set against him, and had singled him out as the representative man and spokesman of that cause, to the head of which he was then only trying to push himself. He should not judge of Arabi's sincerity; but certain it was, if he was the Representative of Islam, in the minds of the people of the country we had done more to place him in that position than any efforts of his own. Arabi did not begin by being in the wrong. On the contrary, Sir Edward Malet admitted that his first grievance—his grievance about the Army—was well founded and just. The men were starving. Arabi, seeing the great incursion of foreigners—indeed, the whole land swarmed with them—and seeing the movement of the French in Tunis, no doubt came to the conclusion that there was an organized attempt on the part of Europe to deny the Egyptians any control over their own country. However that might be, Arabi steadily became powerful, and the public opinion of Europe was unanimously against him. He was set down as an adventurer, a man of blood, a man in every way to be condemned, and European public opinion would hear of no other conjecture. He was opposed to the ideas of the European Powers, to many of their schemes, and they set out with the determination to hold him responsible for everything evil that might occur. The Powers might, perhaps, have been somewhat better instructed if they had consulted the Native Press in the country; but they started their operations by suppressing the Native Press. There was one journal supposed to be the organ of Arabi Pasha, and two or three other Native papers, and we set to work to suppress their publication. The Native Press in Cairo was not very enlightened—it might not even be very high-minded or very safe as an authority; but, at least, it was better than nothing, better than absolute darkness, as a means of getting to know something of what was going on in the Native mind. In one of the despatches of Sir Edward Malet to Lord Granville, on the 31st of October, he said it had been his duty on several occasions to call Cherif Pasha's attention to the increasing virulence of the Native Press, and he had urged Cherif Pasha to use his authority to prevent the dissemination of ideas which preached distrust of Christians and misrepresented the action of France and England towards their Mussulman subjects. The Native journal, El Bourhan, in one of the articles of which Sir Edward Malet complained, said— Up till now we have treated foreigners with all courtesy, and even as if they belonged to a superior creation. Seeing this, they have concluded that our day is past, and resolved to make as much profit as they can out of us. Under pretence of civilization, they have attracted many of our countrymen into their own lands, where every kind of vice is unchecked. Their object in this is to imbue their minds with strange ways and habits, which will cause them to forget their language and their religion. In this way, foreigners hope to get possession of Egypt without fighting for it. And then there followed an anecdote on the evils of wine drinking. The El Hedjâs, after much indiscriminate praise of the Arab race, gave an extract from a newspaper published in Yemen, to the effect that Europeans had begun to publish journals in Arabic which aimed at creating divisions among the Arabs. It went on to say that, if they wished to divide them, they would like to see their co-religionists, who were now under the domination of England, France, and Russia, in a condition more satisfactory than the misery they now endured. This country pressed upon Cherif Pasha the necessity for suppressing these organs; but Cherif Pasha replied that French papers published in Cairo were in the habit of using much stronger language against the Egyptians, and if he suppressed the Native papers he would have to suppress the French papers. L' Egypte had insulted Mahomedans by speaking of Osman as the "fanatical descendant of a false prophet." He would ask the Committee if the conduct of the Powers in regard to the Press reflected credit on our honour? He asked if that was the way either to get to understand the Native mind, or to obtain the respect of the Native population of Egypt. In Egypt we were doing paltry work of that kind—work which no one would venture to suggest in Europe, work we had denounced, over and over again, in terms the most indignant and most eloquent. In Cairo we had prevented the publication of papers which contained nothing whatever but a most reasonable and proper defence of Arabian principles and Egyptian politics against the attacks of strangers. He supposed the articles he had referred to were the worst which could be picked out; surely Sir Edward Malet did not pick out the least offensive. Was it to be wondered at that, under a system of this kind, Arabi Pasha, whatever his own merits, came to represent in the Native mind something like the cause which he professed, and which he sought to represent? In an official document, signed by both Controllers, it was said that the Chamber of Notables, which under the Reign of the late Khedive had given innumerable signs of servility, did not hesitate to claim rights incompatible with their position, and had gone so far as to compel the Khedive to change the Ministry which had his confidence. It was held that we were bound to interfere in order to put down such- an intolerable assertion of independence. Was it at all strange that it should occur to the people that they were only meant to be crushed when, in place of a servile Chamber, they had got an independent Chamber? We compelled the course taken by Arabi Pasha. We made him a hero and a leader in the eyes of his countrymen. The other night the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Chamberlain) talked in a strain with which they were a little more familiar in the days of Lord Beaconsfield, a statesman whom the right hon. Gentleman did not regard with much commendation and approval. The President of the Board of Trade reminded the Committee that we were a great Mahomedan Power in the East, and, therefore, bound to look carefully after the safety of our Indian Empire. Was the course we were now pursuing likely to strengthen our position as a great Mahomedan Power? Was it not certain that day after day we wore making Arabi Pasha more and more recognized as the champion of Islam? It was the fact that many of the Natives in our own Dominions were being converted to the Mussulman faith; and, therefore, by the course we had adopted in Egypt, a new danger and difficulty was arising. We went on from bad to worse, until we sent our ships to Alexandrian waters. Then came that massacre which was talked of and prophesied as a certain result of our interference. He was not an advocate of interference, unless under the extremest national necessity; he certainly would not go so far as to say there were not occasions when a nation must interfere, for her own sake, in the affairs of a foreign country. We wore now obliged to go on. We were to go on at the most unfavourable time of the year, through a most difficult country, and under circumstances when a single loss on our part, or a single successful skirmish of Arabi Pasha's forces, would fill all the Mahomedan mosques throughout the world with hope and passion. He confessed that even if he were not a devoted admirer of non-intervention, he should doubt very much about giving Her Majesty's Government this Vote of Credit. They had not shown themselves much more fitted for making war than they showed themselves fitted for making peace. Her Majesty's Government had acted as Spenser's knight acted; they had listened to doubt, and they had yielded to delay, and now they found themselves in the presence of the Giant Danger. They would not go much further without seeing across their path the shadow of that yet more terrible monster, the Giant Disaster.

MR. LABOUCHERE

said, the calm and quiet aspect of the Committee en- abled him to address some observations to the Chair. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. M'Carthy) who had preceded him was great as an orator, as an historian, and as a novelist; but he thought the hon. Member had drawn on his imagination for the character he had given Arabi Pasha. They knew perfectly well that most eminent men in the world were very frequently great patriots; and they also knew that military adventurers always called themselves patriots in order to advance their own ends. They knew little of the career of this Arabi Pasha; but they did know that he had designedly massacred Europeans in Alexandria, and had deliberately burnt down one of the noblest cities of his native land. There were Gentlemen on the Ministerial side of the House—Gentlemen with whom, upon domestic matters, he (Mr. Labouchere) generally agreed—who had taken an exceedingly strong view of the action of Her Majesty's Government with regard to Egypt. He perfectly understood their position, and he sympathized with them in their general objections to interference; but it seemed to him that in this particular case they had laid down a general rule that interference was wrong, because, in their opinion, this was a bondholders' war. He entirely denied that this was a bondholders' war. If it were a bondholders' war, he was sure that not only would the voices of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) and the hon. Member for Merthyr (Mr. Richard) have been raised against it, but the Prime Minister and others on the Treasury Bench would have been found refusing to have any connection with it. He did not wish to go into all the details of the Control; they had been gone into very clearly and fully by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen). But the Committee must remember that our relation towards this Control was mainly caused by the fact of the French having claims against the Egyptian Government based upon debts owing to Frenchmen. The French had always held that they had a right to force the country to pay its debts. The French were prepared to interfere in Egypt alone if we did not join them. He was not in the habit of lauding right hon. Gentlemen opposite for their conduct towards any other Power; but he thought they were per- fectly justified in their action in Egypt. It must not be supposed that the Control was established exclusively in the interest of the bondholders; in fact, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon went there to reduce the Debt. The right hon. Gentleman's orders were to establish a sound financial administration in Egypt; and, if he might compare what the right hon. Gentleman did in Egypt with what had been done in the House of Commons, he would say the right hon. Gentleman established a Land Law in Egypt by which the land taxes were properly adjusted. Before the Control was established, as much was exacted from the people as could be forced out of the wretched fellahs; but the right hon. Gentleman stepped in. He ascertained what the people could live and thrive on, and then said—"So much you shall pay; the interest to the bondholders shall be reduced, and you shall not be called upon to pay more than the exact amount that you are charged for in the taxes." The scheme, therefore, was not introduced essentially for the benefit of the bondholders, for by it the amount paid to them was reduced. He would ask his hon. Friends who sat near him, what would be the effect of the vote they proposed to give if that vote were successful? The effect would be that the English nation would have to withdraw entirely from the position they now occupied in Egypt. He did not believe that even his hon. Friends desired such an event. Whatever might be said with regard to the initiation of these acts in Egypt, he believed that if we were to withdraw at the present moment we should not only act in a contemptible manner to the Khedive, but in a contemptible manner in the face of Europe. India would not be worth one year's purchase. He was not a great believer in prestige; but if we were to retire after our men had been massacred our Empire in the East would not be worth a year's purchase. Most of the speeches that had been made in the present debate had come from the Leaders of the Conservative Party; but it seemed to him that hon. Gentlemen of that Party had been in a somewhat difficult position. They had criticized the conduct of the Government, but each of them had done so from a very different point of view. What was the charge brought by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bourke)? He said that we had been too friendly with France, and not sufficiently so with the Sultan. Under the circumstances, he (Mr. Labouchere) did not think we could act in too conciliatory a manner towards France, and we now perceived the effect of our action. We saw that France was irate with us because we were going to take a more active part in suppressing this revolt than France herself. The right hon. Gentleman said with regard to the Sultan we were too conciliatory, and then complained that we had not acted with sufficient energy. Who prevented us from acting with energy? Surely not the Sultan; and, as far as he could gather from the right hon. Gentleman's speech, he would have us act without regard to the Sultan; but, knowing the necessity for complaining of something, he complained of the Government for not being sufficiently conciliatory to the Sultan. The hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff), who was always complaining that he was not a Baronet, took the same line as the late Under Secretary, but went a little further. The hon. Member was fond of discovering mare's nests, and he thought he had one which he would submit to the Committee. It was this. There were, as everybody knew, negotiations with France for the continuance of the Commercial Treaty, and we were acting with them in regard to Egypt. He said it was evident that the Government truckled to France, and made a species of corrupt bargain with France, saying that if France would give in on the Commercial Treaty, then England would allow France to do exactly what she liked in Egypt. Except in the hon. Member's own mind, there was not the slightest connection between the Commercial Treaty with France and the action of England and France in Egypt. The hon. Member for Longford (Mr. M'Carthy) contested the fact that Sultan Pasha had looked at the Memorandum of the 25th of May, to which reference had been made. The President of the Board of Trade stated that that Memorandum emanated from Sultan Pasha. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs also said so; but the hon. Member for Longford said he did not find it in the Blue Book. He (Mr. Labouchere) could understand that, for it took place at Cairo, and if Arabi had known of that despatch Sultan Pasha would have been in danger of his life. Did anybody mean to say that the Notables and Arabi were at any time acting together? He entirely denied that; and he found that soon after that Ultimatum the Ulemas and the Notables went to the Consuls of France and England and said they were in fear of their lives from Arabi. Moreover, as the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had pointed out, when it came to an independent vote there were 67 Notables voting against Arabi and nine for him. How could it possibly be said that Arabi and the Notables wore ever acting together, except at some particular moment when Arabi was practically holding a pistol at their heads? Hon. Gentlemen had pointed out that there was some inconsistency in the action of the Prime Minister and the Liberal Party. [Lord EUSTACE CECIL: Hear, hear!] The noble Lord said "Hear, hear!" but, if he remembered aright, that noble Lord, early in the evening, showed how much he knew about the subject by citing a speech of the Prime Minister, and said, if it was not precisely as he cited it, probably he had an incorrect copy of it. A very incorrect copy he had. The noble Lord said the right hon. Gentleman had, in that speech, insisted on the Turks being driven, bag and baggage, out of Bulgaria. If the noble Lord would look at a correct copy, he would find that the Prime Minister gave a long list of Pashas and others, and he remembered at the time exceedingly regretting that the Prime Minister did not go further and urge that all Turks—not only Bimbashis and others, but all Turks—should be driven, not only out of Bulgaria, but out of European Turkey. What was the charge of inconsistency? The Prime Minister protested against the Government of Lord Beaconsfield, not because it did interfere with Turkey, but because it did not; and he urged that it would be desirable for England to join with Russia, and call upon the Turks to govern better in Bulgaria and other parts of her Dominions, and pointed out that the Turks would be gainers by that. The result proved that the right hon. Gentleman was right. The reforms were made in Bulgaria; and not only did those Bimbashis go out of Bulgaria, but all Turkish officials. Therefore, if the advice of the right hon. Gentleman had been fol- lowed, it would have been far better for Turkey. But, as he had said before, he was delighted to see the campaign of the right hon. Gentleman against the aggressive policy of the late Government. But he confessed that he was sorry to see that, far from being a persistent advocate of non-intervention, the right hon. Gentleman was somewhat in favour of occasional intervention—from his point of view, rather too much in favour of it, because he was not a believer in the European Concert, and the habit of considering ourselves part and parcel of the moral police of Europe. He did not believe it was our business to interfere in any case unless our interests were absolutely concerned. The hon, and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) complained that the Government acted with duplicity. Duplicity between an English statesman and a Turkish Pasha ! The right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) had stated that, from the fact of Members having to speak openly in the House, they were putting themselves in the position of a man playing whist with his hand on the table; but when they had to play whist or a game of politics with Turkey, they were in a different position. Turkey was like the Heathen Chinee. We could not trust Turkey. She was so base and vile, and so ready to cheat on the first occasion, that it was not, in all probability, as the hon. and learned Member for Chatham had said, that there was duplicity on the side of England, but duplicity on the side of Turkey. He confessed there was some point in what hon. Members said, that a small amount of energy was shown at first. He did not agree that we had made a hero of Arabi Pasha; but he did believe that we gave Arabi an opportunity of figuring as a hero by not taking active steps at first. He thought hon. Gentlemen had a fair case against the Government when they complained that no troops were at hand to land after the business of the Fleet was done. He knew it was said that that could not be done, because the question of whether we could land troops was being discussed in the Conference; but as we had, without a mandate, bombarded the forts of Alexandria, it followed, as a necessary consequence, that we should have taken steps to prevent what we might have supposed would take place from the reckless character of Arabi. At all events, there ought to have been a sufficient number of troops to land in the great European Square, where most of the Europeans were collected. But what was the real answer on this point? The real answer was that a good and great statesmen was not the man who made no mistakes, but the man who made the fewest mistakes; and he must say, the Leader of his Party having made these mistakes, that the Leader of the opposite Party would probably have made more. The Prime Minister had defended, to a great extent, the course of action he pursued, on the ground that he was obliged to take that course in order to act consistently with the action of the previous Government. That was to say, that a state of things had been produced when he came into Office that rendered it necessary for him to go on, step by step, until the bombardment and intervention in Egypt took place. That was a somewhat dangerous argument to use, considering that we should occasionally have Conservative Ministers in power, as he believed that, when they were in power, they would get us into entangling engagements abroad. It would be a great mistake when, after great trouble, they had been turned out, the Liberals should be bound to keep their engagements. He would take the case of Armenia. Lord Beaconsfield signed a Treaty, agreeing in all cases to defend Armenia against Russia, provided certain reforms took place in Asia Minor. Evidently those reforms had not taken place; and, if they had, did the right hon. Gentleman say he would maintain the Treaty? [Mr. GLADSTONE: Yes.] The right hon. Gentleman said "Yes;" but it was a terrible thing, and only showed that the Liberals ought to strive and struggle to keep the Conservatives out of power. The right hon. Gentleman said "Yes;" but he could scarcely agree with him that a Liberal Government must carry out in every particular case the general engagements of their Predecessors, and that they could not renounce their engagements. Be that as it might, he should not vote for the Government, simply because the Government was forced by the attitude assumed by the Conservative Government to go on, step by step, until they reached intervention in Egypt. He considered it absolutely necessary to maintain a supreme and paramount influence over the Canal, and that it was impossible to maintain that influence unless we also had a paramount influence at Cairo. The hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire said one day in the House—and he thought the House was wrong to laugh at the statement—that the Canal connected two seas, and ran through a desert. That was the whole truth of the matter; the Canal did run through a desert, and the nearest point to this desert was Cairo and the Valley of the Nile, and England could not maintain herself on the Canal without maintaining her paramount influence in the Valley of the Nile. He had never been able to make out whether hon. Gentlemen opposite regretted that France had not taken part with us. He himself was rather glad France had not. For a long time there was a strong feeling in France that she ought to make a great display in Egypt. So far as he could make out, that was because Napoleon had made a great display in Egypt; and he believed that, as England had far greater interests in Egypt than France, France was no longer willing to go to war for an idea, but was willing to leave it to us to occupy the position which we thought we ought to occupy in Egypt. But he should like the Leader of the Opposition to say definitely whether he was in favour of the Sultan intervening by sending troops into Egypt or not. He thought it would be a most serious danger to us if the Sultan were to send troops into Egypt, and that it would be most undesirable that the Sultan should do so. As the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon had pointed out, the position of the Sultan was very different now from when we first asked him to send troops. It was pretty clear that the Sultan had been intriguing more or less with Arabi. He (Mr. Labouchere) knew that after Arabi had organized the massacre of Europeans the Sultan sent him one of the principal decorations of his country; and before we entered into a species of military partnership with Turkey we ought clearly to understand from the Sultan whether he was a foe of Arabi or not. And he could not understand how we could recognize Turkey as an ally in Egypt until Turkey not only declared Arabi to be a rebel, but stripped him of his decoration. He would go a step further. He hoped the Government would seize this opportunity to cut away the relations between Egypt and Turkey. Why did that relationship exist? It existed through our folly. We must remember that the Egyptians threw off the supremacy of Turkey under Mehemet Ali, who fought a great battle in Syria, and became master of the situation, and insisted that she should withdraw from Egypt. The Suzerainty of Turkey continued to exist, and was, he believed, at the bottom of all these evils. The position of the Sultan was perfectly anomalous, and he could only compare it to the position occupied by the Pope in regard to Naples in past times. Whenever an intrigue took place in Naples the men who wanted to alter the Government fell back on the political Suzerainty which the Pope held over Naples. By having on the one side the Khedive, and on the other side the Sultan, two antagonistic parties were connected. Whenever anyone wanted to go against the Khedive he immediately commenced to intrigue with the Sultan; and it must be remembered that the solo relation of the Sultan with Egypt was this—the Sultan received no money in tribute; he could not properly recall the troops from Egypt, though he had done so once; and the sole relation was that, under Ismail, it was calculated that at least £1,000,000 sterling was extorted in the shape of black-mail from Egypt, and went, to a certain extent, into the pockets of the Sultan and the Sultanas, Eunuchs, and others in Constantinople. So long as the Sultan exercised this Suzerainty whenever anyone wished to act against the Khedive he would think it worth his while to bribe the Sultan. He had been told, and he believed rightly, that the origin of these troubles was the sending of £100,000 by Ismail to Egypt to buy two or three Black regiments. Ismail was to be declared a kind of Khedive; but his heart failed him, and Arabi, having those regiments in his hands, commenced to intrigue with the Turks, and so, little by little, he had acquired his present position. He should vote in favour of the Government. He did not know that there was anyone more strongly opposed to intervention than he was, speaking of the general term; but he really believed this intervention was absolutely necessary if England was to remain the great Empire she was. If she did not interfere now he believed further and greater troubles would arise, and larger amounts of money would have to be spent henceforward. He was glad to think that this was an intervention not to impose a foreign rule in Egypt or a despotism in Egypt; and he believed the Prime Minister, as he had said he would, would make it his business to see that the National feeling was developed.

SIR GEORGE ELLIOT

said, he would give a slight narrative of what had taken place for the last nine or ten years in Egypt. He had been in the habit of visiting Egypt every year for the last 14 or 16 years in the winter months. He had had an opportunity of witnessing what was going on in that country since the establishment of the International Courts of Control, and, in his opinion, a most important change had been effected by the introduction of those Courts. He was in Cairo when the right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) was exerting all his energies to organize and carry out a scheme for regulating the payment of the bondholders. The right hon. Gentleman was not sent by any Government; but he was the Representative of the English bondholders in conjunction with M. Joubert as the Representative of French bondholders; and he thought he was correct in saying that these two gentlemen did their utmost on behalf of the bondholders. He was not aware that they relaxed any part of the interest that the country was to be subject to; but he remembered very well how hard he had pleaded to have the interest reduced. It was in 1879 that Major Baring and some other gentlemen, after two years of the Control, discovered that it was impossible for Egypt to pay this high rate of interest. There was a discovery of what was called the floating debt, which had to be dealt with, and Major Baring was, he believed, actually sent by the Government—at any rate, he had the authority of the Government—and he recommended the reduction of the interest from 6 to 4 per cent. That reduction was accepted, and reduced interest had been paid. Major Baring was the authorized agent of the English Government at that time. For his own part, he was proud to be associated with and to support the Party who, when in Office, instituted the Control which had worked so well. The country was now about to intervene in the interest and for the good of the people of Egypt, and, therefore, he was prepared cordially to support the present policy of Her Majesty's Government. There was very little doubt that the present difficulty in Egypt was due, in a large degree, to a want of firmness on our part in not dealing sooner with Arabi Bey. Still, there was a difficulty in the way of that, because his experience had shown him that there was always distrust on the part of the people of anything we did in connection with France. He believed, however, that our action in Egypt would result in the consolidation of a good understanding between the two countries. It appeared to him that the campaign in Egypt, whether it proved to be a short or a long one, would be no easy task, and he could not help thinking that if the Government were to obtain the moral support of the Sultan to the extent of proclaiming Arabi a rebel, and offering so much, he would not say for his head, but for his body, it would have more effect upon the Mussulmans, and bring the war to a speedier conclusion than any other mode of action. From his own observation, he could state to the Committee that while the Egyptians hated the French, they had no great objection to the English. The French abstention, therefore, caused him no regret; on the contrary, he thought it was a subject for congratulation, because nothing was more calculated to disarm the followers of Arabi Bey than the fact that the settlement of affairs in Egypt was undertaken by England single-handed. The opinion of Ali Pasha, a man of education, with whom he was personally acquainted, was that if the Khedive could be induced to grant freedom and amnesty to the officers of Arabi they would leave him, and he did not know any person whose opinion in a matter of this kind was more to be relied upon. With this view he concurred in the full belief that if our action was prompt we could, so to speak, encircle the rebellion and crush it. He would also impress upon Her Majesty's Government the necessity of having a sufficient number of locomotives at Suez as well at Alexandria, an arrangement which would enable the troops speedily to take up a safe position. It must be remembered that September and October were the two worst months in the year for mili- tary operations, that the Nile was at its highest in September, and that if Arabi Bey were badly disposed he might do a great deal of mischief by flooding the country and keeping it a long time under water. Had it been possible, he would have preferred that 10,000 or 15,000 men should have been sent from India, for the reason that they would have been much better able to endure the climate of Egypt, and in consequence a much smaller sacrifice of life might have been expected. However that might be, he thought that the sooner our force arrived in Egypt the better to counteract the influences that were at work, and to re-assure the loyal inhabitants of the country and to secure their support. It was not necessary for him to dwell upon the facts that we were parties, with others, to the general administration of Egypt, that we had an enormous business interest in the Canal, and that in consequence it was impossible for us to allow that great international highway to be imperilled by the continuance of a state of anarchy in Egypt. His contention was that as long as Egypt was in a state of peace the Canal would be unendangered, and that its management by external intervention was not necessary. Our object being the re-establishment of peace in Egypt, he again ventured to suggest the advisability of obtaining from the Sultan the declaration concerning Arabi Hey to which he had already alluded, and then, with prompt and judicious action, he believed our object would be speedily achieved without aid from the soldiers or ships of other Powers.

MR. BRYCE

said, he did not deny that the position was a grave one; but he thought, if it were closely examined, it would be seen that the support which he and other hon. Members on those Benches now gave the Government was not inconsistent with the principles they held in 1880. He agreed with the general principles laid down by the hon. Member for Merthyr (Mr, Richard) and the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson). He agreed with them in considering that the moral law ought to be supreme with nations as well as with individuals, and in several other axioms they had laid down. But he also felt that these generalities were not enough to solve practical questions. They must examine the facts of the case, how the situation had been brought about, and what it was likely to result in before those principles could be applied. It was at this point that he was obliged to part company with his hon. Friends to whom he had referred. He said, if the situation were looked into, there was no course open to them but to support Her Majesty's Government, although he agreed that, had the present situation been entirely created by the present Administration, this support could not have been given. At what point, he would like to ask his hon. Friends, would it have been possible for Her Majesty's Government to have changed the policy of their Predecessors? When they came into Office in 1880 they found the status quo established. What was before our eyes at that moment—the present hostilities—had sprung from the seed sown by the late Government in 1879; and he submitted that since the present Government took Office there had been no point at which a departure from the policy of their Predecessors could have taken place. When the Liberal Party came into Office, they found that the new Khedive had just been established by the action of the late Government; that a great deal of capital had been embarked in Egypt on the faith of that condition of things; that the Control was working well and with increased benefit every year to the Fellahs; and notwithstanding the hon. Member for Carlisle had quoted a statement to show that they were suffering from the taxation, he reminded the Committee that this only referred to some years before 1879, since which time the condition of the agricultural population of the country had largely improved. No departure, then, could have been made at that time from the policy of the late Government; nor could it have been made after the first military revolt in September last year, or after the second military revolt which occurred in the present year. He was bound to acknowledge that there was such a thing as continuity in foreign policy. [Opposition cheers.] Hon. Members opposite would say by those cheers that the Government had broken the continuity of the foreign policy of the country in the case of the Transvaal and Afghanistan. But he reminded the Committee that in those instances our position was very different from what it was at that moment. When we considered it advisable to withdraw our troops from Candahar there were no European Powers to say that we were changing our status towards them; and, again, we were in a position to do in the Transvaal what we deemed to be right without incurring the reproach of any other Power. Perhaps he should be told that this continuity might have been departed from by slow degrees—that we might, so to speak, have edged out of our position with regard to Egypt. But it must be remembered that there was the French policy of the time to be considered; and on that point hon. Members seemed to make the mistake of supposing that the attitude of France was the same as it was now, whereas it had entirely changed. And, moreover, if it had been proposed to alter our policy before the face of M. Gambetta, it was perfectly well known that England would never have tolerated a step that would have left Franco sole arbitress of affairs in Egypt. Again, after the Fleet had once gone into Alexandrian waters, and after the massacre of the 11th of June, it would have been impossible for us to retire. We could not separate our position in Egypt from our position in the East; and he ventured to say that after the 11th of June for our Fleet to have moved would have been to put the life of every Christian European in the city at the mercy of Arabi Bey. Much as he deplored the necessity for the subsequent action which had taken place, and terrible as had been the bombardment of the forts, yet he was obliged to acknowledge that it was unavoidable if the authority of the West was to have been vindicated. A Circular had been received that morning by hon. Members, which had been also distributed amongst the commercial classes of the country, tending to prejudice the question by representing it to be a matter of money only. But he pointed out that there was no question in this case as between the National Party and the bondholders. Their position was entirely outside the matter; and he trusted that the interest of the bondholders would not be allowed to influence the arrangements which would ultimately be made. For his own part, he did not believe there were three Members of that House who would vote for a single gun being fired in Egypt to protect the interest of these persons. He did not mean to deny that the policy of the Government might be open to criticism in matters of detail. They had heard a great deal of criticism upon despatches of the conventional kind that they were accustomed to on these occasions. It seemed to be a matter of course, when a subject of this nature was under consideration, for hon. Members to take this or that despatch and say—"You might have done better had you acted in such and such a way;" but this, he contended, ought not to blind one's eyes to the real features of the case. For these reasons they were about to give Her Majesty's Government their moral support, and he thought this should be made clear at once, because they knew that the country at large was still hesitating and doubting as to what the nature of our foreign policy should be; and he believed, in cases of this kind, that instead of Members taking their tone from the constituencies, the constituencies would take their tone from them, and would be guided by the support which the Government received. He supported the policy of the Government because he believed it to be peaceful and honest; he did not say it might not be improved, but he maintained that it was eminently not a policy of aggression. The desire of the Government to preserve this character for their policy had laid them open to the charge, on that side of the House, that they had not struck hard enough or soon enough; while the criticism from all the other Benches was that they had not been sufficiently bold and high-handed. It had also been charged against the Government that we were isolated in this matter; but he pointed out that this position secured for us the great advantage of not being embarrassed by any doubtful ally. With regard to France, they might regret that they were not to have the support of that country; but he considered it would be much easier for us to make the necessary arrangements as to the future of Egypt without the assistance of that country. He believed we should be much less embarrassed in the future if we made no statement as to our policy beyond that which was demanded by the exigency of the moment. Hitherto that policy had been dictated by the highest motives, and he trusted it would not be long before we should see this country coming out of the strife into which she was entering, not only in strength, but purity and consciousness of right.

MR. CHAPLIN

said, he rose a few minutes ago to follow the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere). He would not, however, enter into the question raised by that hon. Member as to whether the Suzerainty of the Sultan over Egypt was to be maintained or abolished in the future. That was a question of the utmost importance which arose upon the immediate issues before them; but it seemed to him (Mr. Chaplin) that it was wholly unnecessary, if indeed it were not altogether impolitic, to express an opinion upon it just now. He was glad to learn from the hon. Member that there were, at all events, two points, in his opinion, on which the Conservative Party had established their case. It was satisfactory to learn that there was at least one Member sitting upon the Benches below the Gangway on the Ministerial side of the House who had appreciated the fact which he (Mr. Chaplin) had ventured to state to the House a short time ago—namely, that, as far as the interests of England were concerned, for all practical purposes the Suez Canal was Egypt and Egypt was the Suez Canal. The hon. Member raised another point as well. He put this question to the Government—"If it was right for you, without a mandate from the Powers, to protect your Elect, why was it not also right for you, without a mandate, to protect the subjects of the Queen?" He (Mr. Chaplin) ventured to say that that was a question which the Government would find it very difficult to answer. No doubt, the Government had not yet satisfactorily answered it; but he believed the day would come, and that before very long, when the English people would require and demand an answer. The hon. Member who had just sat down reminded them that the main question really before them that night was, whether they were or were not going to give their support to Her Majesty's Government? And he (Mr. Chaplin) did not hesitate to say that, in his opinion, their first duty on this occasion was most undoubtedly to support by their votes the Motion made by the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, and to place unreservedly at the disposal of the Government the means which they on their responsibility came forward and told the Committee were necessary for the maintenance of the honour and interests of England. Under circumstances such as these, as Englishmen, as patriots, as men who held the honour and interests of their country as their first consideration, it was obvious that they had no alternative—that they had only one course to pursue. But, while they were prepared on this occasion to give their support to the Government, and to place at their disposal the means for which the Government asked, they must also claim this— namely, the full right to reserve to themselves, if they thought fit, the power of criticizing and, if need be, censuring the policy which had been pursued. He was bound to say that he thought they had already many cases of complaint to urge against the Government. The position of affairs in Egypt was now, and had been for many months, one of great anxiety and concern to all hon. Members who sat on the Opposition side of the House; and it was a fact that not only for weeks, but for months past, appeal after appeal had been made to the Government to give them information, and that nearly all those appeals had, until a recent period, been made in vain, and the consequence of that had been, that this vast question, to all intents and purposes, had been entirely removed from what might be called the jurisdiction of Parliament. Whatever they might think of the general policy which the right hon. Gentleman had pursued, he (Mr. Chaplin) thought he could congratulate him at least upon this—namely, the prudence which he had exhibited, in the interests of the Government, in the time which he had selected for the taking of this great debate. He (Mr. Chaplin) remembered that one of the points made by the right hon. Gentleman, some few years ago, when complaining of the policy of Lord Beacons-field, was this—that for securing the escape of a great question from the vigilance of the public, there was no expedient parallel to that of postponing the discussion of it until the dying hours of the Session. Well, he (Mr. Chaplin) ventured to think that was a charge which was infinitely more applicable under existing circumstances, and which could be made with infinitely greater justice with regard to the course which the right hon. Gentleman himself had thought it right to pursue. He (Mr. Chaplin) would not dwell that night upon the desperate and harrowing condition of affairs in Egypt which had been described to them by the Prime Minister himself. Nothing that he (Mr. Chaplin) could say, nor that any Member of the Committee could say, could add to the horrors of that description, and what he would ask hon. Members to consider for a few minutes was, how and by what manner of means things had ever been allowed to come to such a pass as that; and on that point he was bound to say that the right hon. Gentleman himself, while professing the utmost frankness to the Committee, gave them scarcely any information whatsoever. And the scanty stock of information they obtained from the right hon. Gentleman had not been materially added to, as far as he (Mr. Chaplin) had been able to gather, by any single speech that had been made since by any Member of Her Majesty's Government. The general impression which he had gathered from as close a perusal as he had been able to give to the Papers that had been laid on the Table, was that there appeared to him to be three distinct periods in which the English Minister, Lord Granville, found himself placed in a position of considerable difficulty, and there had been three distinct propositions for dealing with the Egyptian Question. There was, first, the policy of the joint intervention by England and Prance, which was the policy advocated from the first by M. Gambetta. There was, secondly, the policy of Turkish intervention, which was, from first to last, throughout the whole of this question, steadily advocated by Sir Edward Malet; and then there was the third policy, the negative policy of M. de Freycinet, which was, under all circumstances, to resist any Turkish intervention. He (Mr. Chaplin) might be asked whether there was not a fourth policy—what was the policy of the English Minister for Foreign Affairs? Well, he (Mr. Chaplin) declared that, after searching carefully through the Papers, he was utterly unable to discover that, at any moment, from first to last, the English Foreign Minister had ever had any definite or settled policy of his own. The first period of difficulty of which he (Mr. Chaplin) spoke appeared to him to have commenced from the time when Arabi Bey, on the 9th of September, 1881, demanded the dismissal by the Khedive of Riaz Pasha, the convocation of a Representative Chamber, and a considerable addition to the Egyptian Army. Well, when these demands were made, the Khedive found himself powerless to resist them, and appealed, very properly, to his Suzerain for support. But what happened under these circumstances? As far as he (Mr. Chaplin) could gather from the Papers, Lord Granville first appeared to waver in that direction; at all events, he favoured the sending of a Turkish General to Egypt; but to that, and to any Turkish intervention whatever, M. de Freycinet offered a decided opposition, and Lord Granville dropped the intervention by a Turkish General like a hot potato. The Sultan was naturally very mortified at that. In conversation with Lord Dufferin, the Sultan made use of a statement which appeared to him (Mr. Chaplin) so statesmanlike that he would ask the permission of the Committee to read it. He would not read many despatches. The Committee would remember, perhaps, that last night the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade made this remarkable statement, that the Papers showed conclusively that from first to last the English Government had solicited the intervention of the Sultan. Why, he (Mr. Chaplin) had never heard a statement made in the House of Commons which was more diametrically opposed to the facts, as revealed by the Papers laid on the Table. Complaints had been made of too frequent and too copious quotations being made from the Papers; but when statements of this kind were made by Members of the Government—statements that were diametrically opposed to the facts—it was absolutely necessary for Members to offer quotations in reply. On September 19, Lord Dufferin wrote to Lord Granville in these words. He said— Upon this I observe that I am glad to learn that His Majesty does not contemplate taking so precipitate a step as the sending of troops to Egypt without consulting with Her Majesty's Government, and that, although I had received, as yet, no instruction, I had reason to know that your Lordship would consider such a proceeding inopportune. The Sultan replied in words to this effect, though evidently mortified; he said that Great Britain had great interests in Egypt which he was quite prepared to recognise, and so had Turkey, and those interests he would make great sacrifices to maintain; that England was a great Mussulman Power, and that the friendship and co-operation of Turkey must he necessarily most advantageous to us. He must ask the Committee to allow him to quote one more despatch in answer to the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade. On page 135, Paper 7, he found these words— In order not to add complication to the state of things, the two Governments have thought it right to instruct their Ambassadors at Constantinople to recommend the Porte to abstain from all intervention and all interference in Egypt; and that in spite of the statement of the President of the Board of Trade. There were other statements in the despatches of the same nature. The French policy at that time appeared to be that the French Government appeared to desire a joint military control by Prance and England; but it appeared that Lord Granville objected for reasons that he said had been stated to the French Government, although what these reasons were he (Mr. Chaplin) was totally unable to say, as he had failed to find a single one of them in the Papers. The first period of difficulty he had alluded to came to an end by two despatches, one from the English Minister, and the other from the French Minister, in which they recorded their views of the situation, and the different interests which, according to them, both of them had in the condition of Egypt. He now came to the second period of difficulty in which Lord Granville was placed, and that appeared to have begun shortly before the Chamber of Notables was summoned. M. Gambetta, who was a man of great decision of character, as well as of ability, evidently foresaw the possibility of difficulties arising when the Chamber was convoked; and he accordingly proposed to Lord Granville to take steps, in conjunction with France, to deal with those difficulties. [Interruption.] He (Mr. Chaplin) should be very much obliged to the Committee for silence.

MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT

I rise to call your attention, Mr. Chairman, to the fact that the hon. Member for Stockton (Mr. Dodds) is carrying on a loud conversation and interrupting the hon. Member.

MR. CHAPLIN

said, he was sure the hon. Member was not interrupting him intentionally, and he should be obliged to him for silence for a few minutes. This proposal of M. Gambetta resulted in the Joint Note. He (Mr. Chaplin) did not wish to say anything about that document that night, further than it was accepted by M. Gambetta, and presented on the 8th of January. But, here, unfortunately, a new difficulty arose, because, although the policy of M. Gambetta was decided upon that point, owing to one of those sudden political changes which frequently occurred in some countries, and more often, perhaps, in France than in any other, the Government of the day in France vanished out of view, and M. Gambetta was replaced by M. de Freycinet. Well, what was the view of M. de Freycinet? He was by no means in favour of an active and decided intervention of that character, and he communicated his view to Lord Granville without delay, although he accompanied the communication with the naÏve statement that he was bound to admit that he did not know much about the subject. Well, what was the position that an English Minister should have taken under such circumstances? He should have said to M. de Freycinet—"My position is different to yours. I have pledged myself to the Khedive—I have put my hand to a despatch granting him my support under certain conditions. Are you prepared to fulfil that engagement? If you are, well and good—let us go hand-in-hand; but if you are not, I must take a decided course in accordance with my pledge, and must adopt some line of my own." When M. de Freycinet declined to pursue the policy indicated by Lord Granville, he (Mr. Chaplin) must say there were two courses open to the English Minister. He might then, if he had thought fit, have appealed to Turkey and asked her to intervene; and, failing Turkey, he might, of course, have intervened himself. But here arose a further complication. The Porte protested vigorously against this Joint Note, and not only that, but forwarded its protest to the other Powers of Europe, who made an Identic communication. This appeared to have had a great effect on Lord Granville, for immediately on the receipt of it, though little indeed, if anything, had been heard on the subject before— though the policy up to that time had been a French and English intervention —Lord Granville immediately fell back on the Concert of Europe. Well, he (Mr. Chaplin) was bound to say that even then Lord Granville appeared to have adopted that policy in a very halfhearted and undecided manner. They must remember that time was of the first importance. Well, what happened? Count Munster, the German Minister, made a representation which was tantamount to this—that there had better be a Conference without delay. Lord Granville, however, said—"Nothing of the kind; it would be exceedingly premature." What happened then? A number of more or less feeble attempts were made by Lord Granville to induce France to agree to a Turkish intervention, and things went on in this kind of way until at length the Ultimatum was presented, and it became absolutely necessary that a Conference should be summoned. A Conference was summoned; and, in his (Mr. Chaplin's) opinion, whilst making all allowances for the great difficulty that he quite acknowledged the Government had had to contend with, it was to the determination to refer the Egyptian Question to that Conference, and to the delay in summoning the Conference, that the terrible position in which they were now forced was entirely owing, and that the present period of difficulty was to be met by the English Government. Whatever might be their views as to the wisdom of the policy of referring Egyptian questions, under ordinary circumstances and in ordinary times, to the Concert of the Powers of Europe, he did not hesitate to say that. for his part, he was firmly convinced that under all the circumstances of the case—under the pressing, and urgent, and immediate exigencies of the case—to refer these questions to the European Conference at the time at which they were referred was most dangerous. It appeared to him to have been the greatest mistake the Government had made, judged by its results? What had been these results? What had they gained by referring this question to a Conference, and what was it they had asked? Their gain had been a negative one; they had not gained what they sought—Turkish intervention. They had not gained the concurrence of France, except in so far as the Suez Canal was concerned; they had not even got the mandate of Europe; but what the right hon. Gentleman was able to tell them he had got, or rather what the right hon. Gentleman was able to say was, that he "thought they had secured the moral support of the Powers." The right hon. Gentleman was not even sure of that; and against that, what had they lost? He (Mr. Chaplin) said they had lost that which, under all circumstances, was the most priceless possession in the world, and that was time. What had been the effect of this loss of time? It appeared to him to have been this—that, in the first place, if they had had troops at the proper time they might, undoubtedly, have stopped the massacre at Alexandria. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, again, had made a most extraordinary statement on this point the other night. He (Mr. Chaplin) must again refer to the right hon. Gentleman's words, because they were once more so diametrically opposite to the facts. The right hon. Gentleman had answered an hon. and learned Member by saying that in the sense in which the word was ordinarily used there never had been a massacre since the bombardment, and in consequence of it. Well, he (Mr. Chaplin) should like to meet that statement, if he might be allowed to do so, by a quotation from a letter which he had seen that day from Mr. Cornish— whose name must be pretty well known by this time as that of a gentleman who had rendered the country such splendid services in Alexandria. He (Mr. Chaplin) would set the authority of Mr. Cornish against that of the President of the Board of Trade. What did Mr. Cornish say? Why, he said— I went into the town (Alexandria) on Friday morning, that is, immediately after the bombardment, and a more sickening sight I never beheld. Several corpses, terribly mutilated, were still lying about. And yet the President of the Board of Trade, with all the information which he either had, or which, if he had not, certainly ought to be at the disposal of the Government, had the assurance to get up in the House of Commons and say that there never had been any massacre since the bombardment, or in consequence of it. Now, what was the second thing this country lost by loss of time? He answered, without the slightest hesitation, that they lost the chance of averting the second massacre, and the second destruction of Alexandria. He would quote Mr. Cornish again as his authority. That gentleman, in his letter dated July 18, said— All went on very well until the firing ceased on the second day's bombardment, and the troops and the rabble were in full retreat; but when they found that the firing had stopped many of them went back into the town, and then the work of pillage and firing began. Was it not evident from that, that if the mere effect of the firing of the Fleet had driven the rabble and soldiery out of the town, that if the firing had continued and a certain number of troops had been landed we might have effectually prevented the second massacre and destruction of Alexandria? The right hon. Gentleman the other night spoke of the impossibility of preventing that; he said, "I know not what force of men would have been sufficient. I know that 10,000 men at least would have been required." He (Mr. Chaplin) had been informed, for it was many years since he himself was in Alexandria, and, therefore, he could not speak from personal recollection; but he was informed on good authority that there was only one means of escape from Alexandria, and that was between the sea on the one hand and the Mahmoudieh Canal on the other, and that the guns of the Fleet would have absolutely covered that piece of ground. If the Government had not tied their own hands by the Conference, they might, by landing a small body of troops, have caught Arabi like a rat in a trap, and the whole thing would have been over by now. And what was the third thing they lost by this loss of time? He had said they would have cut off Arabi Bey—there was no doubt about that. And if they had cut off Arabi, he would not now have been in the position of vantage which was leading us into this war, and which might turn out to be a war of great difficulty, and possibly one of danger. But, more than all, anarchy would not have prevailed in Egypt at the present time, and there would not now be re-enacting the scones that were enacted during the Indian Mutiny. He had listened to the speeches which had been delivered on each side of the House that night, He had heard what had fallen from the hon. Baronet (Sir George Elliot), and what had been said by other hon. Members, and he defied any Member of the Committee to say now whether the war would be a short or a long one. All he knew was this, that unless they were able to bring the matter to a conclusion within a very short time indeed, it would be impossible for the Government to re-establish order in Egypt for months to come. And what did they think was likely to be their position in India if the war should be prolonged, and if Arabi was allowed to pursue his way unchecked, and if those horrible scenes which were said to be taking place in the centre of Egypt continued for any length of time? He confessed it seemed to him to be a matter of the greatest peril. Did they not think there was some danger of the contagion spreading and of the possibility of similar disturbances taking place in India? They had seen such disturbances before, and he knew of no reason why, if circumstances were favourable for them, they should not occur again. The only excuse of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister was that his hands were tied by the Conference; and what he (Mr. Chaplain) wished to ask the House of Commons was this—what right had any English Minister to place himself in such a position and to tie his hands in such a way that he was not able to give assistance to the subjects of the Queen, although they were being massacred within sight of Her Majesty's Fleet? That, then, was the general result of the information which he had been able to acquire from the Papers with regard to the present position of affairs which, to his intense astonishment, he had heard the Secretary of State for War, before the dinner hour, speak of as a most successful result. All he could say was that if the policy of Her Majesty's Government had been so successful up to the present time he sincerely hoped it would never be so successful again. He could only come to the conclusion, whilst he desired to make all allowances for the difficulty in which the Government had been placed, that the immediate difficulties they had to encounter in Egypt were really owing to the indecision and procrastination of Her Majesty's Government. They must not tell him that their difficulties were owing to the Control. That argument, he thought, had been pretty well disposed of already. It was true that the Control was established during the Administration of the Predecessors of right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Ministerial Bench; but they must in fairness remember that during the time Lord Beaconsfield's Eastern policy was in the ascendant, the Control—as Her Majesty's Government had themselves admitted—had done much for the regeneration of Egypt. It had proved to be a blessing and a boon not only to Egypt, but to the whole of the civilized world; and if, unhappily, it was true— and he, certainly, was not there that night to deny it—that since the accession to Office of the present Government the influence of England with the Suzerain of Egypt, in that part of His Majesty's Dominions, had considerably waned, in all fairness they ought to attribute it not to the fault of the Control, but to the complete reversal of the policy of Lord Beaconsfield, which, up to now, had been their never-ceasing boast. When he thought of the results of that reversal, when he called to mind some of the proceedings of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, in days not very long gone by, when he remembered how political principle, political honour, political consistency had been sacrificed to nothing but the interests of Party— ["Oh, oh !"]—well, he challenged any one of them who dared do so to get up and deny it—when he remembered all these things, and when he compared their crusade against Lord Beaconsfield with their speeches, and their policy of to-day—which had been denounced, and denounced by none more strongly than by those to whom they had turned in appealing against Lord Beaconsfield— when he thought of these things, and when he remembered also that within this short period of that reversal of the policy of Lord Beaconsfield, amongst the first fruits of the reversal had been rebellion in Ireland on the one hand and ruin in Egypt on the other, he confessed he was filled with grave misgivings for the future. He could not help thinking that the Prime Minister felt something of this himself, for he had observed the other night that the right hon. Gentleman began to recant some of his former opinions with regard to Turkey. He (Mr. Chaplin), to his great surprise the other night, heard the Prime Minister describe himself as having always been the friend of Turkey. And when the right hon. Gentleman had said that, a dim recollection—in which he supposed he must have been mistaken— came into his mind, and he thought once more he could hear the Prime Minister describing Turkey and her people as "the one great anti-human specimen of the human race throughout all the world." Was that friendship? If it was the part of a friend to denounce his friends in that kind of language, then all he (Mr. Chaplin) could say was that the right hon. Gentleman and he differed very much as to what friendship meant. But he did not wish to pursue this theme any further that night; and although he had ventured, as he thought hon. Members were in duty bound to do, to criticize the policy of the Government and to point out what he believed to have been their errors in the past in order that those errors might be avoided in the future, he did not desire either to weaken the bands of, or embarrass, the Government at the present time. ["Oh!"] Well, whether hon. Members believed it or not, he could assure them that he had no desire to weaken the hands of the Government at this moment, and for this reason, that they had to consider the future as well as the past. It was in the future that were involved not only the immediate issues of the war in which they were now engaged, but also the ultimate settlement of the Egyptian Question. He was not one of those who could enter with a light heart into the war in which they were now engaged; but, on the other hand, he had an almost boundless faith in the spirit, the resources, and the power of England and her people when for her cause she had a good one, and if only she were led by her rulers with courage, with wisdom, and with unfaltering decision. In this instance, he believed—nay, more, he knew and was assured—that they had a good, a righteous, and a just cause, and he hoped that the other conditions of success would not be lacking. The campaign itself was, necessarily and properly, entirely in the hands of the Administration, and, for all he knew, they were about to enter upon it unaided and alone. For his part, he did not quarrel with that. On the contrary, he thought it was the best thing, probably, that could have happened to them; but, that being so, he did most sincerely trust that they would take care of this— that now they were embarked in this gigantic enterprize, once for all the interests of England should be permanently and effectually secured in that part of the world, and that in doing that they would remember the, to thorn, pregnant words of His Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, that while they were among the greatest of European nations they were also "a great Mussulman Power."

MR. O'CONNOR POWER

trusted the Committee would be disposed to listen to a few temperate observations on this subject, notwithstanding the excitement that must have been created by the powerful speech to which they had just listened. He had no Party purpose to serve; yet, in the observations which he would ask the indulgence of the Committee to put before them, he would, at the outset, call their attention to the peculiar difficulty under which every private Member laboured who attempted to discuss the question of the foreign relations of this country in the House of Commons. He had been sitting, like other hon. Members, for the past two or three months in expectation of what was to come on the subject of our relations with the Sovereign of Egypt; and he had noticed that, from day to day, Questions were addressed to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and to the Prime Minister for the purpose of eliciting such information as would enable the House and the country to ascertain what were their intentions with regard to the Egyptian Question. He made no charge of conscious concealment either against the right hon. Gentleman at the head of Her Majesty's Government or the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; but he described simply his own impression when he said that he had been unable to ascertain, from the information which had been from time to time vouchsafed, the tendency of the policy of England in that part of the world. How were they situated now? They were told beforehand that the public interest would not permit of the communication of such information as would enable them to form a judgment on this subject; and, day by day, they found themselves getting more and more involved in serious complications, until the hour had arrived when the Government felt called upon to draw the sword; and then, when the sword was unsheathed for the purpose of maintaining the honour and the interests of the country, hon. Members were accused of something akin to treachery if they ventured to discuss the action of Her Majesty's Ministers. He would ask hon. Members—and, if he thought his humble voice would reach the people of England, he would ask them too—were they satisfied with the limited control which they were able to exercise over the foreign relations of this country? Information was kept from them in the first instance; then their patriotism was appealed to when active operations were commenced, and they were told that anything like free discussion and independent criticism would embarrass the Government. The policy of Her Majesty's Government was to be gathered from the Papers which at length had been laid before them, and the exposition which Her Majesty's Ministers had vouchsafed. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce) a while ago had raised his (Mr. O'Connor Power's) hopes by the character of the exordium to his speech, because he had undertaken in the first sentence to prove that there was no inconsistency whatever between the present position of the Liberal Party in supporting the policy of the Government in making war in Egypt and the position occupied by the Party in 1880. His hopes had been raised by the promise of his hon. and learned Friend at the commencement of his speech; but he (Mr. O'Connor Power) appealed to those who hoard that speech whether they were not disappointed at the utter failure of the hon. and learned Member even to approach anything like a proof of the proposition he had laid down at the beginning? Those of them who, up to that moment, had been disposed to look upon the accession of the Liberal Party to power as an indication that the policy of Jingoism could never again prevail in the foreign affairs of this country must have been very much disappointed by what they had heard on the subject during this debate. The right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government, in his speech the other evening, had laid very great stress upon the fact that the Government was guided and controlled in their policy by what they called inter-ternational engagements. The right hon. Gentleman did not stop in that speech to pronounce any opinion of approval or disapproval of the nature of those international engagements; and, in describing the attitude of the Government, he said that they were obliged, by the circumstances of the case, to frame their policy in reference to those international engagements. Well, he (Mr. O'Connor Power) would like to know whether, when engagements of that kind were formed, they were intended to be perpetual? He should like to know what it mattered to the people of this country whether their foreign affairs were administered by a Conservative or a Liberal Administration, if a Liberal Administration that succeeded a Conservative one was bound to pursue the very same policy? If he recollected anything at all of the issue which was put before the constituencies in 1880, it was distinctly the issue of the foreign policy of the Conservative Government; and to say now that they wore bound hand and foot to the results of that policy, and that they could make no departure whatever from the engagements that were entered into, was simply to say that a great deal of eloquent indignation was wasted upon the hustings, and that it had produced no profitable results to the people of this Empire. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) put this view of the present Ministers in the strongest possible light, because, he said, it was necessary to impress foreign Governments with a sense of the continuity of English policy. Now, he (Mr. O'Connor Power) asked for how long had Liberal Ministers considered it to be their duty to adhere to the policy of their Predecessors? He would ask where was the justification for the strong language they employed in denouncing that policy a little more than two short years ago? Well, the Prime Minister dwelt also in his speech on the value of the European Concert; but it was a singular circumstance that while the Conference representing the Powers of Europe was still deliberating upon these grave matters Her Majesty's Government took the determination of the question into their own hands. The Conference was not dismissed when they were bombarding Alexandria; and it seemed to him that their profession of regard for the European Concert jarred somewhat with the determination which they had formed. And it appeared to him, also, that if international right and International Law was to be scrupulously observed in their policy in Egypt, they must consider themselves at the present moment not so much at war with the Egyptian Army, and whatever portion of the Egyptian people that Army represented, as at war with the Sovereign of Egypt—the Sultan of Turkey. He could not see where their right to bombard Alexandria commenced, unless they believed that their relations with the Sovereign of Egypt—the Sultan of Turkey—justified them in adopting that policy. When the Prime Minister came to deal with the criticism, which he anticipated, in consequence of the failure of the Government to protect British subjects from massacre, the right hon. Gentleman declared, in a manner which he (Mr. O'Connor Power) could not at all appreciate, that the Government would have been disloyal to Europe, and would have acted in contravention of their own professions, if they had landed any men——

MR. GLADSTONE

Not if we had landed men.

MR. O'CONNOR POWER

said, he should like, then, the right hon. Gentleman to inform him in what connection these words were used? It seemed to him (Mr. O'Connor Power) that they were employed in rebutting the accusation that the Government had failed in their duty to protect British subjects from massacre.

MR. GLADSTONE

The hon. and learned Gentleman asks me in what connection the words were used, and I will tell him; but I should have thought, if he had heard the speech, he would have known the connection. They were to be taken in connection with the landing of such a force as it would have been our duty to propose in order to cope with and to overcome the Egyptian force under the Egyptian Commander, which was represented to us to be certainly between 10,000 and 15,000 men.

MR. O'CONNOR POWER

asked whether it was not right to infer from that explanation that, in the opinion of the Prime Minister, the size and effectiveness of the force affected the question of International Law at stake? It was as much a breach of International Law to land 20 men for aggressive purposes as it was to land 10,000. Therefore, he could not understand how Her Majesty's Government were able to defend their policy in Egypt, commencing with the bombardment of Alexandria, and other measures of force they had been since obliged to adopt, on the theory of self-defence. He was sorry, also, to be obliged to complain of the vague and uncertain terms in which the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister described the objects which, he said, the Government had in view in their recent proceedings. The right hon. Gentleman said one of those objects was to assert international right; but he (Mr. O'Connor Power) had watched and waited and waited and watched with considerable anxiety for one single sentence on what he believed to be the root of the difficulty—namely, not international right, but national right. The Prime Minister could not have made a speech in the last Parliament on a subject of foreign policy in which the Sovereign power of the Sultan of Turkey was affected without calling their attention to the claims of the rising Nationalities of the East; but, either by design or by accident, there had not been a single reference made that would lead them to believe that the right hon. Gentleman sympathized with whatever there was of a National Party amongst the Egyptian people. They were told, also, that the protection of the Suez Canal was merely an incident, and that the chief object the Government had in view was to put down anarchy in that country. Well, now, did Her Majesty's Government consider themselves bound by engagements or by a sense of duty to preserve order in the East? Would it undertake that responsibility; and, if it was prepared to act for the restoration and the maintenance of order in Egypt whenever the peace of that country was threatened, would it act in the same spirit towards the countries on the frontiers of India? It was in language not very different from that that many of the advocates of the policy of the late Conservative Government defended the invasion of Afghanistan. They said that the independence of that country was threatened by Russia, and that, therefore, it was necessary that English power and English influence should be asserted in that country. It seemed to him that when the Government claimed that they had no selfish object in view in this movement in Egypt, and told the Committee, at the same time, they were fighting in defence of their interests, there was a manifest inconsistency. Wherever they had interests they had selfish objects. But they wore told that though their interests in Egypt were tremendous, they were acting in that country in a spirit of absolute unselfishness. It seemed to him that the step the Government had taken in reference to Egypt was a very serious one; and if it did not mean the ultimate establishment of an English Protectorate over that country, he humbly submitted that their policy was a very false one, and a very unwise one, and one that would entail great sacrifices upon our people without producing any corresponding advantages. But if their policy was to establish that Protectorate, why had not they the manliness to avow it? He could imagine Her Majesty's Government adopting the "bag and baggage" policy in regard to Egypt as far as the rights of the Sultan in that country were concerned. He could imagine Her Majesty's Government repairing to some extent the wrong they had already done by doing something to develop the principles and habits of self-government amongst that population, and ho, for one, would not regret to see the protection of Her Majesty's Government substituted for that of the Sultan of Turkey, if such a change was believed to be absolutely necessary for the prosperity of the people. But he said that, if that was the tendency of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, why did they not manfully avow it? The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had told them, in reviewing the history of the Control in Egypt and English interference, that England did not force herself upon Egypt, but that she had been encouraged to go by the Egyptian Government. Well, then, what was it which had given rise to the discontented party which supported Arabi Pasha? It was their dissatisfaction with the conduct of successive Egyptian Governments in truckling, as they believed, to foreign influences rather than relying upon their own people. It might be true that the Egyptian Governments had encouraged English influence at one time and French influence at another time, and to that extent they had alienated the sympathies of their own people. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in order to conciliate those who had some respect for the doctrine of nationality, had said that Her Majesty's Government did not at all object to the National movement in Egypt until it became a military movement. What did that mean? He did not object to the National movement until it became a powerful one, because it was only when it became a military movement that it was able to exercise any influence on the Councils of either the French or English Governments. In destroying the power of the Army they were destroying the only organized authority in Egypt. Talk about the friendship of the Khedive, the Khedive could not be anything else but friendly to them. He was a puppet in their hands, and to justify their conduct by the approval which His Highness might express of their policy was simply to take courage and consolation from their own self-esteem. The Committee had received so many assurances that this measure had not been undertaken in the interests of the bondholders that he supposed they must be persuaded that that was the real state of the case, and he was of the number of those who had failed to understand why, if the Government could not guarantee the investments of its citizens at home, it should be expected to guarantee them abroad. So far as that part of the question was concerned, he was glad to see that upon no side of the House had anyone the courage to get up and defend the proposition that the Government would be justified in guaranteeing a foreign investment. They had heard a great deal about what Europeans had done for Egypt—they were told that the Control established over the finances had had a very sound effect, and that it had, to a certain extent, promoted the prosperity of that country. That might be so within a limited period; but was it or was it not the fact that, until our influence began to be a power, Egypt was a country free from debt. Was it not the fact that the Debt of Egypt was a very great burden upon the population? He maintained that to say that they were to form their opinion of the conduct of England, to-day at war with Egypt, by a reference to what had happened within the last three, four, five, six, or ten years, was to take a very narrow and a very unfair view of the subject. Even within that limited period, however, it was undeniable that the Control, which was financial in 1876, became political as well as financial in 1879; and he should like to know whether it was not a natural feeling on the part of the Egyptian Army, and of those who were qualified to speak for even a section of the National Party in Egypt, that this discontent should grow proportionately as the Government insisted on imposing their Control on them? They not only established a Control in the first instance that discharged the duties of a National audit, but they went further, and practically seized upon the administration of the finances of the country; and then they thought that the Egyptian Army, the only party representing National feeling, was to be satisfied with this condition of affairs. They had chosen to take a very different view of their duty, and he would tell the Government they would find the consequences would be very serious indeed before this terrible business had been brought to a conclusion. He had ventured to make these observations be-cause the attitude which Irish Representatives were supposed to take with regard to the foreign policy of this country was very much misunderstood. He believed the time had gone by when it was the desire of any section of the Irish people to profit from the foreign difficulties of England. In times gone by, when the Irish people had not only just cause for discontent, but just cause for rebellion, he could imagine the justification of the sentiment which declared that England's difficulty was Ireland's opportunity. He did not believe in that sentiment at the present hour; and he was sure no Member who had expressed an opinion on this question had spoken with greater sincerity than he did when he said he had ventured to obtrude himself on the attention of the Committee from no desire whatever to weaken or embarrass in the slightest degree Her Majesty's Government. He hoped he should never, by his voice or vote, support a policy of aggression, no matter with what professions that policy might be inaugurated. At the same time, he trusted he should never be suspected of the crime of advocating a cowardly policy. He did not believe in a policy of universal surrender. He believed in a spirited foreign policy when they were satisfied they were embarking in a just cause; and he believed that the highest interests of this Empire could best be promoted by encouraging National sentiment, not only in every part of the Empire itself, but amongst those populations in whose relations we were from time to time obliged to interfere. He thought that the unfortunate complications which had arisen in Egypt might have been avoided by some timely conciliation of the National spirit. If things went on now; if this war—for war it was at last—should be protracted, it was plain to everyone that we should have, in addition to the hostility of the Military Party in Egypt, the hostility of most of the Egyptian people, because we should have carried desolation and ruin into their homesteads and across the face of their country; we should have done what the British Army did in Afghanistan— left behind us memories of wrong and suffering which would survive all the arguments by which the Government now defended their policy, and these memories would, in a future day, accumulate and constitute a more terrible danger for the strength of the British Empire than the temporary difficulties with which we were now called upon to deal.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

The Committee are about to come to a vote upon one of the most important questions which has been submitted to the British Parliament for many a long year. I do not think there is any doubt as to the general feeling which will be expressed by the vote to which we are presently invited to concur. There can be but one desire on the part of every Member of the House, and that is to support as far as possible the Government in the policy which they have recommended to us, if we can be satisfied it is right and sound. But it is not possible for us altogether to divest ourselves of the responsibility that lies upon us, before we give a vote of this character, of satisfying ourselves of the conditions under which it is to be given. There is no inconsiderable number of Gentlemen, usually supporters of the Government, who do not in their hearts like the policy which is submitted to them, but who yet feel themselves obliged to support it—some from Party fidelity, some from their general confidence in the Government, and others because they feel that it is a choice of difficulties that lays before them, and that their choice must turn to that which will cause the least embarrassment to this nation as a whole. I say there is no small number of those Gentlemen who are prepared now to vote this sum of money to the Government, and thereby approve of their policy. I say that on our own side of the House there is a large body of Gentlemen who are prepared also to support the Government with their votes—to support them in a policy which they are, as we believe, about to initiate—but who are far from feeling that confidence in them, and satisfaction with their proceedings hitherto, which is to be found on the other side of the House. But in this case we must endeavour, so far as possible, to divest ourselves of Party feelings and Party recriminations, and to look upon so great a question as this from a large and national point of view. I entirely agree with what fell from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschon) yesterday as to the very great importance of our maintaining a national policy in matters of foreign affairs; but I am bound also to make this observation upon that statement, that if we are to maintain a national, or, so to speak, a continuous policy in foreign affairs, the policy which is submitted to us for our countenance and support must be recommended to us upon broad national grounds, and upon principles which we can ourselves see and approve. Now, what I feel with regard to the conduct of this discussion—I refer especially to the speech of the Prime Minister when he introduced the Vote—is this, that the issue is put upon far too narrow grounds, and that we are asked to vote upon special pleas which are applicable, or appear to be applicable, to the circumstances of the moment, but which certainly do not afford anything like a ground for a national policy. The right hon. Gentleman differs very much from the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to whom I shall have to refer subsequently. The Prime Minister took a very different line from the Under Secretary, and advanced in support of the policy which he recommends one or two special pleas, to which I wish to draw attention. In the first place, there is what I may call the Control plea. He pleaded that the Government were not free in this matter; that they were bound by the policy which they inherited from their Predecessors, and that it was in consequence of that, and of the proceedings which had flowed from it, that they found themselves now obliged to recommend these measures to the House. The hon. and learned Member who has just sat down, and other supporters of the Government, gladly caught at that kind of argument, and are ready to throw upon the late Government, and especially upon Lord Salisbury in the last year of the existence of the late Government, a certain responsibility which seems to give especial reason for our action. I say that if that were true, and that if the conduct of Lord Salisbury in this matter were truly represented, it would be far too narrow a ground to base such action as we are now called upon to adopt. If the policy which the present Government found in existence, and which they say was inaugurated by Lord Salisbury, was wrong, why did they not abandon and change it? But if right, why do they now come and throw dirt upon it? In fact, it is entirely misrepresented. The hon. and learned Member for Mayo (Mr. O'Connor Power) has re-echoed much that has fallen from the Treasury Bench when he said the change made in the system of Control in 1879, as compared with the Control in 1876, was this, that it turned the Control from a financial to a political Control. That is an entire mistake. I call it an entire misrepresentation. I wish to know if the right hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members can tell us where that distinction is to be found, and in what respect it has affected the operations of the Control since that date? The change made in 1879 was merely this—the Control, which was purely of a financial character, established for good reasons in 1876, was suspended during the period that there was a mixed European Ministry. But when that mixed European Ministry was terminated by the arbitrary dismissal of Nubar Pasha by the late Khedive—when that was suddenly terminated—the Control revived, and it revived in precisely the same form in which it had been in 1876. But then came the important question whom to employ. Lord Salisbury found that the French were going to nominate a Controller who was to act for the French Government, who was to act as the Representative of France, and the question was, whether it would be possible for England to abstain from doing the same thing with regard to the Controller who was to act on behalf of England? It was quite obvious that if we were to run pari passu with France; if we were not to leave that predominance to France, which the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce) told us we ought not to leave, it was absolutely necessary that we should place ourselves as far as possible on the same lines with France. And then came the question as to the decision that these Controllers should be irremovable, except with the consent of their Governments. The whole matter turned upon that. What was this Control for? It was to enable the finances of Egypt to be properly directed and properly administered; and if there was always a power in the Sovereign arbitrarily, upon the slightest ground, to dismiss those who were managing the Control, obviously the Control might break down at a most critical point, and, therefore, the late Government agreed to the insertion of that provision. But, at the same time that we did so, feeling how important that change might be, and how necessary it was that there should be no mistake as to the position of the terms, we insisted upon the introduction in the new Decree of September, 1879, of a modifying provision, and that provision was the 3rd Article of the Decree, and it was to the effect that the Governments of France and Great Britain consented that, for the present, the Controllers General should take no part in the direction and administration of the financial services, but should confine "themselves" to communicating either to "ourselves"—that was, the Khedive or to "our Ministry"—the observations to which their investigations may have given rise. In that way, we entirely confined these gentlemen to watching the financial progress and fair working of the finances, depriving them of any power of interference with administration. Well, we have hardly heard anything about the Controllers. I dare say not half the Members of the House are aware of even the names of the Controllers. The question has been rather between Sir Edward Malet and the French Consul. Of course, the Controllers had a very important duty to perform in keeping the finances straight; but, at the same time, you have had the difficulty of this Military Party and insurrection to deal with, and in all the proceedings that have taken place it has been with the Agents and Consuls General that these questions have been discussed, and the difficulty has arisen. Just let me call the attention of the Committee for a few moments to the history of our dealings with Egypt. That history goes far beyond either the Decree of 1879, or that of 1876. Remember what the record of Egypt is. Remember she is not a State that has grown, like most of the European States, but she is the creature of European Concert. She was placed, in point of fact, in her present position by the consent of the Powers in 1840, and from that time there has always been a considerable watchfulness observed in Egyptian affairs by the Consuls of European Powers. It was against the irregular interference of the Consuls that the efforts of Nubar Pasha, the most distinguished and most valuable Minister Egypt had had for many years, were directed—he was desirous of getting rid of this irregular interference of the Consuls, and of substituting for it an International Tribunal. When the International Tribunal was once established, you then came to all the difficulties which arise in connection with the debts of the State—embarrassments of the most serious and political character were produced. It was to get rid of these embarrassments that the financial Control was mainly established. It was established, no doubt, at the instance of the Representatives of the bondholders; but it was maintained especially with a view of preventing political complications, such as would have arisen if the International Tribunal had given judgment, and there had been no means of check, and if the finances had been left in the state of confusion in which they were at that time. The condition of confusion in which the finances of Egypt were before the institution of the financial Control system, was bad for all parties. It was bad for the Fellaheen, because they were heavily taxed; it was bad for the Rulers of the country, because it was demoralizing; it was bad for all Europe and the civilized world, because it left open so many opportunities for intrigue and embarrassment. Now, Sir, I wish to ask—Is the Prime Minister, and are the Government, prepared to say that the action of Lord Salisbury, in 1879, was really, in their belief, the cause of the difficulties which have arisen? Can the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister trace those difficulties—can he put his finger upon the course which those difficulties have pursued, and show that any blame attaches to Lord Salisbury? No; it is really impossible to do so. There is another plea which the right hon. Gentleman put forward. He said—"We have had to give advice step by step, and our advice has been followed, and therefore we are bound to take the consequences." Well, but what we complain of is that the Government did not give wise advice, that they did not give good advice. If there was to be any advice, if Egypt was bound to follow it, it was incumbent upon our Government to give good and sound advice. There is another plea put forth, and it is one the Committee will do well to observe, for it is a good illustration of the mode in which this case is put before us. The plea to which I refer is that of self-defence. I think that if the Committee is called upon to take up a question of this sort, and to engage in so large an enterprize as this, on the ground that it was necessary, in self-defence, to fire our guns at the fortifications of Alexandria at a particular time, all I can say is that an insult is offered to the common sense of the Committee. The Government are attempting to make war upon peace principles, and such an attempt always must fail. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister tells us what is his theory with regard to self-defence. His theory is that if our ships come into the Harbour of Alexandria, and if the guns of the fortifications are, placed in position and pointed against them, the ships have a right to fire in self-defence, for fear the guns would fire and damage and sink the ships. I should like to know what Arabi's idea of self-defence is. Suppose Arabi were to apply the argument of the right hon. Gentleman to his own case, might he not say—-"We were in Alexandria, we had a right to be there; we saw the British and French ships coming in with their formidable armaments, and coming in in a significant manner, taking soundings, and otherwise taking up a position that it was in their power to destroy the fortifications and the town itself; were we not entitled to exercise our measures of self-defence; were we not entitled to defend ourselves against the ships which were coming against us?" I do think that arguments of this sort in support of so great a proposal as that which we have before us tends to weaken rather than strengthen the case. They are, in fact, cob-web arguments. Let me point out another thing. If these arguments are sound ones, the right hon. Gentleman must bear in mind that the course of his arguments reflects very severely upon the conduct of his Ally, the French, because they, too, were connected, and more than ourselves, with the Control arrangements; they, too, through their Agents, had given advice, step by step, and very often their advice prevailed over ours; they, too, were in the position of having their ships subject to the possibility of being fired upon from the forts. And this really is the theory which is put forward by the right hon. Gentleman as that which ought to be adopted. Now, the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs used arguments of a very different character and of a very different calibre, and though there are some points in the hon. Gentleman's speech with which I should not be disposed to agree, and against which I should enter my protest, I am bound to say that the arguments which he used do form the foundation of a policy which we can recognize as one with some substance in it, and one capable of being taken up as a national policy, and one which may be used continuously. The hon. Gentleman said there were three grounds upon which we had right to interfere. There is the ground of necessity, because we have to guard our road to India, and we have to guard all those great interests connected with the East, which were so well enumerated by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) yesterday; there is the ground of Treaty right; and there is the ground of the duty which we owe to the people of Egypt, which, no doubt, is one that weighs heavily upon us; and of our duty to keep the high road through Egypt to the East as clear as possible from disturbance; and of our duty to promote, as far as possible, the peace and tranquillity of the country over which we have so much influence. I recognize in these principles, principles which are capable of being taken as the basis of a National policy, and they are principles which I am quite prepared to accept and agree with. We talk of intervention; but there are different kinds of intervention. There is intervention for the sake of making war for an idea, which we sometimes hear of; but that is a kind of intervention which we ought to be very careful not to be led into. I should protest against intervention of that character altogether. Then there is intervention to fulfil stipulations we have entered into with foreign nations, where you are bound by engagements and are bound to exercise your rights. Then there is a third kind of intervention— namely, on behalf of our own interests, which, I admit, requires the greatest care, because it is easy to fall into an unjustifiable interference; but, on the other hand, that is a simple and intelligible principle which every nation recognizes and knows what it is about, and will understand, and will know how it is dealing with you, and if you interfere for your own interests they can reckon with you and know what is likely to be your course; whereas, if you interfere on special pleas and shadowy ideas on the general fitness of things, nobody knows what to make of it, and what your next turn may be. Under these circumstances, I think the Government are quite justified in saying that where there exists in Egypt an organization—if I may call it so—an organized Military Party which is disturbing and destroying the country and all good government, and producing such havoc amongst the interests in that country, we are in our right, and not only that, as a matter of duty, we are bound to take such steps as we can in order to put that party down. So far, I agree with the Government; but I am quite unable to agree with a great deal said by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He glides altogether over the miscarriages and shortcomings and mistakes that have been committed in the course of the last six or seven months. That is our point. We are prepared, as matters stand, to go with you and support you on the ground of National interests; and, on the ground of duty, we are prepared to support you in the undertaking which you have engaged in—that of putting down this anarchical and disturbing Military Party; but we are quite unable to clear you of mismanagement and of confusion in the way in which you have brought this about. I hope there is nothing unpatriotic in saying that I think it is not at all unreasonable that those who are looking on independently, and who are prepared, and desire above all things, to support the Government in any patriotic proceedings, should criticize the faults which appear to them to have been committed in the course of events which have led us up to this point. We do not desire to go minutely into those matters. We have had enough of it; and it is getting too late to go into them. But, speaking generally, I would say, looking to the choice the Government had in the beginning of this matter; looking to the many forces there were conceived to be on our side—there was the Khedive, he has displayed throughout these proceedings an honesty and courage which deserve the highest praise at our hands, and render it possible for us to reckon entirely on his support in what has to be done; then there was the Chamber of Notables, the Notables representing, as they did, the true National Party in Egypt, as much as anybody can represent a different National Party from that represented by Arabi— they might have been made good use of to prevent and stop the evils which arose. Then you have the influence of the Porte. I never knew a case in which an influence like that of the Porte was so wantonly sacrificed as in the proceedings which have taken place. Whether it was owing to these uncertainties and hesitations, or to the influence of your Allies, I do not now inquire; but the right hon. Gentleman seems to think that because I do not ask this question I have no opinion as to the course which has led to the present position. But I am looking to the result of all this. With the possibility you had of making use of all these instruments—of the Khedive, of the Notables, of the Alliance with Prance, and the Concert of Europe—if you chose to call upon them, what has been the result at which you have arrived? The right hon. Gentleman and his Colleagues attach the highest importance to the Concert of Europe; and yet I observe that whenever an expression is used as to going into this war alone, there is a cheer from all parts of the supporters of the Government who prefer the isolated action of England to the Concert of Europe. We have been asked, two or three times over, a number of questions which I do not think it is at all right that we should attempt to answer; but there was one question which the right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Gosehen) asked, and which was asked also by the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere). They said—"Wo must call upon you, the Opposition, to tell us what you complain of? With which horse will you win? Do you complain of the Government for isolating England or for hampering England?" I would take both horses, because the Government have accomplished at the same time the feat of hampering and isolating us. You could not have a stronger instance than the non-landing of troops in order to prevent the calamities at Alexandria. You were there isolated; you were there firing at the forts two or three days, with the spectacle of all those horrors that were going on, and yet you could take no steps to prevent them, and for the reason that it would have been grossly disloyal in the face of the European Concert to have taken necessary measures for preventing all that happened. Now, we have got refinement upon refinement, because, as I understand, it would not have been disloyal to the European Concert if you had landed an insufficient number of men; but it would have been disloyal if you had landed a sufficient number of men. The whole thing turns upon that. You might have landed a few hundred men—perhaps 1,000; but when it came to 8,000 or 10,000 men, you were there stopped by this Conference and this Concert, which, after all, does not even give you a mandate. I say we are perfectly at liberty to fight; but the Government have isolated us and driven friends from us at a critical moment, and hampered us in the action we are to take. With regard to our advice to the Khedive, he must sometimes have felt a difficulty as to what he was to do, for while he was receiving all this advice from us, we were weakening his authority with his people, and making him the poor tool of a foreign nation, and the further you went the worse it was for him. That had nothing to do with the Control; that was the action of the Consul General, acting under the orders of the Foreign Office. There was never any talk of dismissing any of the Controllers; but it would have been fair for the Government to have said they found it embarrassing and thought it right to make such changes as they thought necessary. They never thought of that. It was always the action of the Consuls of the two Powers, acting under the direction of the Foreign Office. Now, with regard to the position of Arabi himself. Had you dealt with him, or had it been found possible to deal with him firmly and vigorously at first, he never would have grown into the power he now is; and you must take good care that you do not by mismanagement in the future let him grow into greater power. At present he is at the head of a Party which we can speak of as the Military and Insurgent Party. He is not at the head of the National Party, but take good care that his Party does not become the National Party. That is the danger you have to guard against, and it is one of a very serious character. I do not wish to go into the question of your dealings with the Porte. We have had enough of that for the present, and there is no object to be gained in discussing this matter further. I think that is a point upon which we had better throw the responsibility on the Government of determining what course they should take. I am aware we are touching upon very delicate ground. A question has been put to us from the other side which, I think, we should be wrong and unpatriotic to attempt to answer, especially with our limited information; but I do think there have been several occasions upon which we can at once put our fingers as calculated to destroy and alienate the influence of the Porte if you had desired to use it, and which undoubtedly led to very great confusion. I do not say anything about that matter of the sending of the ships to Alexandria; but in regard to the Dual Note, was there ever anything more calculated to irritate the Porte than the manner in which that Note was presented? What was the effect? It produced all that jealousy in Europe which has been an embarrassing condition with us ever since. What did M. de Freycinet say to us three days ago in the French Senate? He said a Note had been presented which was expected to work great wonders, but it had lamentably failed and excited distrust throughout Europe. Under that influence the four Powers drew closely together. That was all the ad-vantage you got. What possible advantage you got nobody could see; what disadvantage you got is shown by the words I have referred to. The question of calling the Conference at Constantinople without the Sultan's consent, and the question of sendingiron-clads against the protest of the Porte; all these are questions of mismanagement for which we must hold the Government responsible. I am not prepared to say that their decisions in some cases, where they appeared to us to be wrong, might not have been justified by matters with which we are not acquainted. I do not desire to be too critical upon questions of that sort; but I do say we have every reason to be unsatisfied and even dissatisfied with the general result of the policy the Government have been pursuing, and which they have been allowed, so far as any Parliamentary action is concerned, to pursue for six or seven months, and which has culminated in such a state of things as that we now see. If you leave the Government responsible, as you are bound to leave them, if you abstain from interfering at every turn with their policy, you must judge by the result, and you must say that, judging roughly by the result in the present case, the case lies very much against the conduct pursued by the Government. I do not desire to pursue that line of argument longer. I am very sorry that it was necessary for us oven to appear to be carping at the Government at a moment when they seem to have the need of all the strength which the country can give them. For my part, I am quite prepared to re-echo the words of the right hon. Member for Ripon, that England ought to speak with one voice in this matter. I am quite aware of the great importance of the task before them. I am aware of its great difficulty and great delicacy. It is one which, so far as an immediate object is concerned, we may look at without any great anxiety. With regard to the attainment of the first object, I have no doubt that the power of England will be amply sufficient, if properly put forth and directed with energy and wisdom, for the accomplishment of the important object of putting down this insurgent force. I regret extremely that so much time has been lost in undertaking that duty. I earnestly hope that more time will not be lost than is necessary, because there is a tendency in these things for difficulties to accumulate and grow, and I hope we shall be able to act before they have grown stronger. But when I say we shall be able to deal with such a force and task as that without difficulty, I cannot but see that there are many other dangers that lie beyond that. The matter does not rest merely in the putting down of this force. We are moving on very delicate ground, and in the midst of many and serious complications. We have to consider not only the attitude of other Powers, not only the great difficulties of the question and the possibility of arousing Mahommedan feeling throughout the East; we have to consider not only all these things, but we have also to remember that we have also a settlement ultimately to be arrived at still before us; and in whatever blows we have to strike we must remember what the settlement is to be in the end, and how far what we do will complicate the settlement. We are anxious, as far as we can, to maintain and support the National policy; but if we are to support it, it must be a policy founded on intelligible principles, and principles having in them the character of permanency, and which are not merely temporary means, or anything in the nature of hair-splitting reasons, and that we should be convinced that the policy we are pursuing will be consistent and in accordance with our general duties and obligations, as also for the true interests of both countries. If that is the spirit in which we are going forward, I care not myself whether we are to go alone or with friends. If it is found that it is best for us to go alone, why alone we shall be prepared to go, and there will be no flinching on the part of Englishmen in the contest. There will be great indignation if, after all the sacrifice we are called to make, and all the risks we are to run, a good result is not arrived at. I cannot believe there will be any fault in us. The heart of England is sound, and the ready voice of her sons will be given in support of the Government if they are proceeding upon sound principles, and with adequate firmness and courage. But we must not be supposed to be subject to sudden and unaccountable delays, or to some revolu- tion of feeling, and liable to be told that we have always been wrong, and acting contrary to proper principles, and that the Military Party is, after all, the National Party, and that Arabi is not a rebel, but a patriot. I hope a spirit of this kind will be responded to, and done justice to, by the spirit of the Ministry whom we are prepared now to support; and I am sure that the vote which will be given to-night will be found adequately and truly to represent the feeling of the nation.

MR. GLADSTONE

I have observed that a great distinction is to be drawn between the charges made against Her Majesty's Government in the course of this debate. Some of them have been entirely vague and general, such as those of the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, when he speaks of their mismanagement, errors, and confusion, and such as those who complain of their indecision and hesitation and procrastination. All those are the stock phrases of the Opposition. I should waste the time of the Committee if I did more than meet them with a general negative. But it is only fair to admit that on certain points charges of a much more specific and more definite character have been made, which it is our duty more particularly to notice. And do not let it be supposed that we deprecate criticism upon our conduct. The right hon. Gentleman could not but be aware that this has been considered the fairest possible occasion for tracing conduct to causes, and for examining what has been the action of the Governments who have been concerned in bringing about the present state of things in Egypt. I hail that criticism; it is the duty as well as the privilege of the House of Commons; but I object to the course of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, who resents extremely our going back upon any share he and his Government had in bringing about this state of things in Egypt, and is determined that, under no conditions, shall we be allowed to examine his action. The right hon. Gentleman the late Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Bourke), fatigued with his oration, has wisely retired from the House; but I am afraid I must take the opportunity of making some remarks upon what he said. One of his arguments was—"We handed over to you Egypt quite quiet, and now it is disturbed." It certainly was a bold definition of the law of post hoc, propter hoc. We might as well say—"In 1874 we handed over to you Turkey perfectly quiet, and in 1875 it was disturbed." Egypt has not been so quiet as the right hon. Gentleman supposes, for in 1879— that is, in the time of the late Government—the first symptom of the aggression of the MilitaryParty, which was favoured and probably made practicable by its being able to plead that it was a reaction against foreign interference and influence with the Government of that country—the first case of military émeute took place in 1879. The right hon. Gentleman resents extremely my reference to the establishment of the Control by Lord Salisbury in 1879. The hon. and learned Member for Mayo (Mr. O'Connor Power) stated roughly, but I think with great accuracy, what took place in 1879. The hon. and learned Member stated that before 1879 the Control was financial, but in 1879 it became political. That is entirely denied by the right hon. Gentleman. [Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: No.] But here is a despatch of Lord Salisbury's, dated November 8, 1879, in which he endeavours to remove the difficulties and jealousies he had excited in the minds of other Powers by the Control he had established, and when he had rejected the proposals of Count Karolyi, that the Austrian Government should have a share in it. He said— I observed to Count Karolyi that the action of England, though her interests were largely commercial, was dictated in the main by exclusively political considerations. And Lord Salisbury refused Count Ka-rolyi's proposal, because, he says— Any international government of Egypt I thought quite impossible. He speaks of the government of Egypt, and said Austria was not to be admitted, because that would have made it international. While Lord Salisbury speaks of the government of Egypt, and though the late Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated yesterday that it was necessary to have command over every institution in Egypt, the right hon. Gentleman now says it was not political Control.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

That is not the question.

MR. GLADSTONE

The first question is, was it a political Control? I assert it was not so in 1876, because the Government were not concerned in it. The fact that the Egyptians chose to establish foreign Controllers, which was an arrangement attended with great benefit to the people of Egypt, was not of necessity an arrangement entailing foreign intervention, because they retained the right to dismiss those Controllers; but in 1879 you deprived them of that right to dismiss those foreign Controllers, and you brought foreign intervention right into the heart of the government of Egypt, and established, in the strongest sense of the phrase, a political Control. Now, Sir, it is necessary for me, after the denial of the right hon. Gentleman, to show how completely his assertion is contradicted by the language of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whose Colleague he was. But do not let it be supposed that I overlook the benefits of the Control or the difficulties which, I believe, the late Government mot with at the time when they established it, and when they had to do exactly what we have had to do ever since—that is to say, to make a choice between the greater and lesser difficulty, and by accepting the lesser to avoid the greater. The right hon. Gentleman says that I ought to have dwelt more on the topics of general necessity and of our national interests, and he finds great fault with me for not having done so. But I adopted what appeared to me the shortest and most conclusive way of establishing my case, and stated that, apart from the consideration of general principles, we found a position established in which we had become the counsellors of the Khedive, involved in all the interests and proceedings of his Government, parties to the carrying of it on, and without the possibility of escape from the consequences to which its carrying on might lead. The right hon. Gentleman says that the Control never led to difficulties in the course of this controversy. But is he aware that the objections of the Controllers to the scheme of the Notables was the main cause of the failure of that scheme? Not that I think it prudent to say it would have been accepted without amendment; but their objections to the Control of the Notables were what made it on the one hand most difficult for England to give any support to the scheme, and on the other hand tended to throw the Notables into the hands of Arabi Pasha, and to give him that pretext of representing national feelings and aspirations which it had been his main object to acquire. Every apology is to be made for that Control; great benefits have resulted from it to the cultivators of the soil in Egypt; but that must not be permitted to keep out of view the fact that that Control did establish distinct intervention in the heart of the Egyptian Government, and thereby laid the foundation of almost certain dangers. Then, says the right hon. Gentleman, "Why did you not give it up?" But he ought to know—and if he does not know I must remind him—that the Control was not established as two engagements independent of each—one by France and one by England. Besides being an arrangement with England, it was an arrangement between France and England, having practically the nature of a political covenant; we were bound to France in respect of that covenant, and we could not recede from it. I believe I have now stated the case of the Control impartially, admitting its benefits, and admitting the difficulties under which the late Administration lay with respect to its establishment. At the same time, there comes out in strong and clear relief the danger of establishing in any country—and especially where there is a rising popular National feeling—a system of intervention in the heart of affairs of the National Government, which is always, in the view of the people, an odious object, and which gives to any adventurer—as it has done in this particular case—and to any revolutionary party, a fulcrum or a standing-ground for the advancement of their designs. It was not, therefore, on the grounds which the right hon. Gentleman supposes that I disclaimed general arguments with regard to interference in the affairs of Egypt, and that I resorted to this method of proof; but because, as I say distinctly, we had absolute engagements upon us as to the government of Egypt, which made it our duty to act as we have done—taking our share of responsibility in advising in the difficult circumstances through which the Khedive had to pass, by which we have arrived at the present state of the case. Now, Sir, I will not dwell for more than a very few moments upon the charge reiterated by the right hon. Gentleman—that we did not land troops in order to prevent the ruin which took place in Alexandria. I am rather astonished at the misrepresentation by the right hon. Gentleman of what was said by me. He says I stated, refining upon refinement, that the distinction turned upon the number of troops. I suppose the right hon. Gentleman thinks in saying this that he is making a true representation of my meaning; but, Sir, it is as far as anything can possibly be from the statement I made. I said it would not have been compatible with our engagements to prepare a force for the invasion of Egypt. Amongst the suggestions on this subject which have been made, is that contributed to-night by the noble Lord the Member for South Essex (Lord Eustace Cecil)—namely, that it might have been possible, by landing a force at Aboukir Bay, to occupy the isthmus or nock of land which separates Alexandria from the mainland, and to intercept the Army in that city. But, Sir, if that were required to be done, it would have been an operation which could not have been undertaken by any Government in its senses, except after the preparation, with all its equipments, of an invading force. [Mr. CHAPLIN: Why not?] Because it would have been totally at variance with the principles of our policy. We recognized the title of Europe to be consulted in that matter—[Colonel STANLEY: Hear, hear!]—a subject which offers the right hon. and gallant Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley) the occasion for a cheer, or, at any rate, of a significant intimation of dissent. Is that a strange proposition for me to make now? Has the right hon. Gentleman forgotten the Treaty of Paris, and that the Treaty of Paris, except so far as it is modified by the Treaty of Berlin, is still in force; and that by the Treaty of Paris everything political or territorial affecting the dominions of the Turkish Empire is matter for the common concern of Europe? We should have been guilty of breaking that Treaty had we presumed to take upon ourselves without reference to Europe the preparation of an invading Army. Therefore, I adhere to the remark I made that it would have been, first of all, inexpedient, inasmuch as it would have upset utterly our plea that we were taking action in self-defence; and, secondly, that we were forbidden by International Law and high, international policy from passing by the views of Europe in this matter. Hon. Members seem to have forgotten that the work of conflagration and pillage was carried on under a flag of truce, and that it would not have been possible by the landing of any force to have prevented what took place. The hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) persistently urged that we were throughout these transactions surrendering everything to France. Now, I wish the Committee to bear in mind that the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down charges upon us that we did not regard the subject from a sufficiently high point of view; but I could wish that he had recollected what was our greatest and most imperative duty in approaching this question of Egypt. Sir, we had to bear in mind that the Crimean War, which involved the greater part of Europe and cost 500,000 lives, arose out of a dispute about the access to holy places; we had to recollect that the Russo-Turkish War arose out of a local disturbance in the mountain districts of Herzegovina; neither of the countries where these events occurred being so sensitive as Egypt may be said to be; and the great duty incumbent on us was to take care and strive with all our might that whatever contention should arise with respect to Egypt should be a contention in and for Egypt alone, and that under no consideration should that local difficulty be allowed to grow into a European struggle and, probably, into a European war. Now, I ask hon. Gentlemen to read the Papers presented to Parliament in the light of these considerations, and then I think they will cease to cavil at the exact phraseology of this or that Note, and as to whether it was right of us to give way on this or that point, or at this or that particular period in deference to the views of the Government of France. It is quite true we did give in on a variety of points and on a variety of occasions to the views of the Government of France, and I contend we were right in giving way, because to break with them would have been a far greater evil and a far greater wrong than anything we have done. Were our concessions barren of any ultimate effect? I admit it would have been advantageous if we could have secured an agreement between the two Governments on every point and at every period in these negotiations; but let us see if the principles on which we acted with reference to the Government of Prance have proved to be barren in their results. Our principles, or rather the points which we highly appreciated, were that the action of Europe should be invoked; that Tewfik Pasha should be firmly and unequivocally supported—that is to say, his title unequivocally recognized; that Turkish intervention should be considered as preferable to every other; and that popular liberty in Egypt should be brought within the terms of international engagements. It is perfectly true that on these points we were not quite in unison with the Government of France; it is true that on some of them we made concessions at certain periods; but it is also true that, by the temperate and conciliatory course of Lord Granville, this effect was produced upon the Government of France—that later if not earlier upon all these great points France ceased to be in any degree at variance with us, and adopted the great cardinal principles which we ourselves had so long urged, and which I have placed before the Committee. Every one of these, as certain stages of the negotiations were reached, became the basis of French action in Egypt. Sir, I think this is a very important result. It is said that France has been exceedingly wrong in the matter of Tunis. My right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) touched in his speech of last night upon this very delicate subject; but my right hon. Friend touched upon it in a spirit of equity and impartiality which I hope will command for his observations candid consideration wherever they may be read. It is easy to begin to raise little objections here and there to the conduct of France in this case, and it is easy to say that France was in a false position in Egypt on account of what she had done in Tunis. But, unfortunately, when you have carried back the argument as far as Tunis, it does not stop there. It goes back beyond Tunis. It goes back to inquire who opened the door to Tunis? And it goes back to the Anglo-Turkish Convention and the occupation of Cyprus. And those who blame France for what she has done in Tunis must consider what inducement on the one hand, and what provocation on the other, had been administered to the policy which she carried out. We have endeavoured to act in the spirit of our engagements to France, which my right hon. Friend opposite well knows to have been close and binding in their nature. I will not enter now into the question fairly raised by the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere), who asked whether such engagement should last for ever? It has been said that inconvenience resulted from our adherence to these international engagements; but, even if that be so, I would rather undergo great inconvenience than set a fatal precedent by laying down a lax doctrine on the obligation of observing them. But I am quite sure that it is a sound principle to draw a distinction with regard to the position of a Government in relation to the policy and engagement of its Predecessors. The hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) brought himself up with this admission, which he had great difficulty in making. Undoubtedly, of all questions I have ever become acquainted with, this has been far the most mo-mentuous, on account of the great number of different authorities we have to deal with, and from the difficulties existing between those authorities. There were jealousies; there were varieties of opposition; there were second intentions; and there were separate interests involved. We had before us the Khedive, the Sultan, our great Ally France, and Europe at largo. Well, Sir, it was our duty to harmonize, to the best of our ability, these various and, in many cases, divergent Powers; and I am glad to say that, whatever else may be said, I believe it to be undeniable that English influence has throughout the course of these transactions been that middle influence which has been seeking to bind all into one harmonious whole, and to prevent the collisions or strong divergencies which might otherwise have occurred. Sir, I think we are not entirely without our reward. We have at the present time a clear and well-defined position; and if the Conference has produced but a negative result, it has, at any rate, effected this— that every Power represented there is satisfied of our loyal and unselfish mode of dealing with the Egyptian Question. Every one of those Powers looks at least with goodwill on the course which we have taken, and every trace of international jealousy has been effaced from the mind of every Government in Europe. I say that this, although a negative, is an all-important, result. It is very easy to say—"You ought to have broken off from France." But that is a serious proposition. It is not the power of France that England fears; it is the long experience of her friendship, continued through half-a-century without a breach, and of the great good that has been wrought for Europe by means of that friendship, which makes it the duty of the English Government well to consider its course before it breaks with France. The effect of breaking with France must have been a sharp conflict in Egypt, where the two countries would have been divided into separate camps, and, as I believe, a general European war. There is no point upon the surface of the globe where you have to deal with more susceptible materials than this country of Egypt, connected, as it is, by geographical position with the jealousies and interests of every country of the civilized world. The consequence has been, then, that as regards Europe every trace of jealousy has been removed, and that which we call moral assent is substituted in its place; and jealousies, be it remembered, are apt to grow into positive and substantial acts of hostility. In respect of France nothing can be more complete than the accord which now exists. The right hon. Gentleman and all the House must feel how the difficulties of these negotiations have been aggravated by the occurrence of more than one political crisis in France during a short period of time, and by the passing, as it were, of a variety of shades over the tone of the French Government in connection with those Ministerial changes, and with popular and Parliamentary action, which is no less lively in that country than it is in this. But, still, whether we look to the Government that is now in power, or the Government that was in power before it, as, I may say, apart from Ministerial changes, we have not the slightest reason to apprehend that, even if the exterior form of action be not the same—if France, in the exercise of her independent judgment, arrives at some conclusions different from ours—the harmonious feeling between the two countries, or their united purpose, will be in the least impaired, or that anything but the temper which has hitherto obtained will govern their international relations. With reference to the Sultan, let me say, in respect of the valuable speech of the hon. Member for North Durham (Sir George Elliot), that I entirely agree with him in the recommendation which he made that we should endeavour to procure from the Sultan some proclamation which would at length effectually define his position with relation to Arabi Pasha and his party. I was much struck with the pertinacity with which the hon. Baronet dwelt on that subject, and we entirely agree with him in the feeling he has expressed; and, further, I am able to say that I believe every Power in Europe is of the same mind, believing that it is required absolutely as a necessity of the situation that the position of the Sultan in regard to Arabi Pasha, which has been compromised by various circumstances, should be defined by a proclamation that would leave no possibility of mistake upon the minds of men, and which will have the effect, we trust, of obviating what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devon has justly observed is one serious danger of the present case—namely, the danger of its being made to partake, in the least degree, of the character of a religious war. That is, of course, what the rebellious Chiefs are endeavouring to import into the controversy, and that element, of all others, the most poisonous and most mischievous, we must endeavour to counteract. Lastly, I think we may say, with respect to the Khedive, that for months past it has been a matter of great uncertainty whether even his personal title was recognized by those who took part in the consideration of this question. That controversy, I believe, has now been brought to an end, and I earnestly hope that the Khedive will now reap the reward of his manfulness and integrity in the support of all Europe, and in the best support which England can give him. While I admit that you may exercise small criticisms, if you like, on this or that despatch, or this or that expression, in which we have deliberately compromised, for the moment, some sentiment that we ourselves entertain on account of that which we felt to be our duty to our great Neighbour with whom it was our duty to act in unison—while I make that ad- mission, I say, fix your minds on the dangers that overhung the paramount interests which it was our duty to keep in view. These greater dangers have been obviated, and a clear field and an open stage of action has been obtained; and I think you will find that it has been by no small difficulty that these obstacles have been surmounted, and that you are in the position to look on yourselves, on the one hand, as free to use your own power without restraint or without interference, and, on the other hand, you can do it in full possession of the confidence of the other great States of Europe, because they believe your action is honest, loyal, and directed to beneficial ends. In the course of this debate I have heard various declarations—very well-meant declarations—and appeals as to the value of national unity on the question of foreign policy, and, sometimes, when these declarations have been made, there have been reference to what took place in the time of the late Government, and when, unhappily, that national unity was not always attained. And I wish we could clearly understand one another as to what this national unity is or ought to be. It appears to me that there are some in this House who are disposed to push the doctrine to this point—that when a question of arduous foreign policy arises, it is the duty of all men to silence their own judgment, and their own consciences, and blindly follow whatever may be the action of the Government of the day. Now, is that the meaning, or is it not? Is that a principle which can be sustained, or is it not? I am not prepared to give my adhesion to that doctrine. I claim for myself the liberty, always admitting the responsibility to be very great, of offering opposition to any foreign policy of which I strongly and heartily disapprove; and I hope hon. Gentlemen opposite will do the same thing. We would not ask them to support Votes for purposes of which they disapprove. If they think this Vote is asked for a purpose of which they do not approve, or that it ought to be impeached in point of policy or right, let them oppose it—let them do what Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright did at the time of the Crimean War, and for which we thought more highly of them than we should have done if they had suffered their sentiments to be concealed in silence within their hearts. Let them do what Pox did, as Burke and Lord Chatham did during the time of the American War; but do not let them lay down the sluggish doctrine that Englishmen are blindly, like sheep, to follow the action of the Government, or to give their votes in silence to that which they in their hearts condemn. No; let this question be tried on its rights. I believe it is being tried on its rights. I believe that while you claim with perfect justice and freedom your title to judge us in the past, yet you feel there is something besides the past that we have to deal with—that we must look forward to the future, and that you must give us your support, that at this moment the nation throughout all its borders is giving us its support, because they see we are engaged in an enterprize which we desire and mean to follow with all our energy, and in which we trust it may be granted to us to labour for maintaining the interests of the Empire, for promoting the welfare of the Egyptian people, and for doing honest work towards the establishment of the peace and order of the world.

MR. O'DONNELL

(who was frequently interrupted by cries for a division) said, he would not trouble the Committee with more than a very few words; but he had several observations to make which he considered it his duty to put before the Committee, and which would not be averted by these interruptions. He had been inclined to be sorry he had not caught the Chairman's eye earlier in the evening's proceedings; but now that he had heard what purported to be a full explanation of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, but which he had some special reasons for believing not to be a complete explanation of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, he was not sorry that he was obliged to address the Committee at this late hour, and under these unfavourable circumstances. He did not rise for the purpose of indulging in any lengthened criticism of the speech or speeches of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister. He did not rise, though under other circumstances he should have much wished to do so, to criticize the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen), who, to use an Irish phrase, sought to represent the international gombeen man in this transaction. Strongly as he felt that the charges made against Arabi Pasha by the Prime Minister were, to use something like the right hon. Gentleman's own moderate language when speaking of the Leader of the Opposition, directly the reverse of the facts, he did not intend to criticize the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. He (Mr. O'Donnell) might have been tempted, when the Premier reminded them this evening that Egypt was such a singularly sensitive part of the universe, to have pointed out to the House the delicate manner in which the right hon. Gentleman had treated that sensitiveness. [Cries of " Divide !"]

An hon. MEMBER: Move the adjournment.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, he wished to know whether the Government were going to allow the Committee to come to a vote on this subject in ignorance of the fact that, instead of England enjoying the moral consent of Europe, and being allowed to use its power, as the Prime Minister had just now informed the Committee, without any restraints, owing to the entire confidence which Europe placed in the English Government, the mandate of Europe had sent Turkey as an intermediate to watch the British Government, and that Turkey had accepted that mandate? He wanted to know whether it was to be excused, on the ground of official reticence, that the Foreign Office should be in possession—as he was informed it was—of the formal and solemn consent of Turkey to send an Army into Egypt, and yet should neglect to communicate a single word with regard to that important fact to the Committee? He wanted to know under what conditions, with what scope, with what guarantee, was the Turkish Army to appear in Egypt and remain there? He wanted to know, and he thought the Committeo had a right to know, and, he maintained, it was the duty of the responsible Opposition to insist upon knowing, what was going to be the action of Her Majesty's Government in face of the presence of the Turkish Army in Egypt? Were Her Majesty's Government going to relax their warlike efforts, and to allow Turkey to carry-out the mandate of Europe, and to restore peace and order in Egypt by its forces? Or, on the other hand, would Her Majesty's Forces be employed in Egypt without regard to the presence of the Turkish Army? Whilst Turkey was authorized to use the Turkish Army in Egypt, by the mandate of Europe, to restore order, were Her Majesty's Force's to be employed in more bombardments, in further expeditions and invasions, in warring against the Native Egyptian Forces without allowing any opportunity to Turkey to restore order, according to the mandate of Europe? He wanted to know—the Committee had a right to know—why they had not had an explanation, or even an admission, of this fact up to the present? Why had they not had the slightest intimation of the fact? Why had the Government apparently sought to obtain a Vote of the Committee by keeping back a knowledge of the most grave and serious, and important fundamental fact of the whole situation? He was entitled to ask whether Her Majesty's Government would assist or oppose the entry of Turkish troops into Egypt, and whether or not they were satisfied with that solution of the question? If Her Majesty's Government resolved to oppose the entry of Turkish troops into Egypt, would they, or would they not, incur responsibilities to the European Concert? Were Her Majesty's Government prepared to attack the European Concert as well as to attack Arabi Pasha? He was entitled to ask, and the Committee were entitled to know, all these things, and in order to enable the Prime Minister to answer, he would move that the Chairman report Progress.

Motion made, and Question, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again,"—(Mr. O'Donnell)—put, and negatived.

Original Question again proposed.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, he rose for the purpose of asking Her Majesty's Government whether they had received a Note from Turkey accepting the mandate of Europe to send an Army into Egypt; and whether Her Majesty's Government meant to explain their policy in regard to that Note before asking for the Vote the most important part of the explanation of which would have been left unsaid?

MR. GLADSTONE

What I wish to say, in answer to the question of the hon. Gentleman is, that the House is aware of the restraint under which we lie with respect to the present position of affairs. But I can say this, in the most positive manner, that nothing has happened which, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, in the slightest degree affects their duty to request this Vote from the House of Commons, or to prosecute the undertaking on which we have entered.

Original Question put.

The Committee divided:—Ayes 275; Noes 19: Majority 256.

AYES.
Acland, C. T. D.	Cavendish, Lord E.
Aguew, W.	Cecil, Lord E. H. B. G.
Ainsworth, D.	Chamberlain, rt. hn. J.
Alexander, Colonel C.	Chaplin, H.
Allen, H. G.	Cheetham, J. F.
Allen, W. S.	Clarke, J. C.
Armitage, B.	Clifford, C. C.
Armitstead, G.	Cohen, A.
Arnold, A.	Corbett, J.
Asher, A.	Corry, J. P.
Ashley, hon. E. M.	Cotes, C. C.
Aylmer, J. E. F.	Courtauld, G.
Balfour, Sir G.	Courtney, L. H.
Balfour, J. B.	Cowper, hon. H. F.
Baring, T. C.	Cropper, J.
Baring, Viscount	Cross, rt. hon. Sir R. A.
Barnes, A.	Cross, J. K.
Barran, J.	Crum, A.
Barttelot, Sir W. B.	Currie, Sir D.
Bass, Sir A.	Davenport, H. T.
Bass, H.	Davenport, W. B.
Baxter, rt. hon. W. E.	Davies, D.
Bective, Earl of	Davies, R.
Bellingham, A. H.	Dawnay, hon. G. C.
Birkbeck, E.	De Worms, Baron H.
Blackburne, Col. J. I.	Dickson, Major A. G.
Blennerhassett, Sir R.	Dilke, Sir C. W.
Blennerhassett, R. P.	Dillwyn, L. L.
Bolton, J. C.	Dixon-Hartland, F. D.
Borlase, W. C.	Dodds, J.
Brand, H. R.	Dodson, rt. hon. J. G.
Brassey, Sir T.	Douglas, A. Akers-
Brett, R. B.	Duckham, T.
Briggs, W. E.	Duff, R. W.
Bright, J. (Manchester)	Dundas, hon. J. C.
Brinton, J.	Dyke, rt. hn. Sir W. H.
Brise, Colonel R.	Earp, T.
Broadhurst, H.	Ebrington, Viscount
Bruce, rt. hon. Lord C.	Ecroyd, W. F.
Bruce, Sir H. H.	Edwards, H.
Bruce, hon. R. P.	Egerton, Adm. hon. F.
Bryce, J.	Errington, G.
Buchanan, T. R.	Evans, T. W.
Burnaby, General E. S.	Fairbairn, Sir A.
Buszard, M. C.	Farquharson, Dr. R.
Butt, C. P.	Fawcett, rt. hon. H.
Buxton, F. W.	Feilden, Maj.-Gen. R. J.
Buxton, Sir R. J.	Ferguson, R.
Campbell, Lord C.	Findlater, W.
Campbell, J. A.	Fitzwilliam, hon. W.J.
Campbell, R. F. F.	Fletcher, Sir H.
Campbell-Bannerman, H.	Flower, C.
	Foljambe, C. G. S.
Causton, R. K.	Forster, Sir C.

Fort, R.	Mason, H.
Fowler, H. H.	Milbank, Sir F. A.
Fowler, R. N.	Monk, C. J.
Fowler, W.	Morgan, rt. hon. G. O.
Fry, L.	Morley, A.
Gibson, rt. hon. E.	Morley, S.
Gladstone, rt. hn. W. E.	Moss, R.
Gladstone, H. J.	Mowbray, rt. hon. Sir J.R.
Gladstone, W. H.
Glyn, hon. S. C.	Mundella, rt. hon. A. J.
Goschen, rt. hon. G. J.	Murray, C. J.
Gower, hon. E. F. L.	Nicholson, W.
Grafton, F. W.	Nicholson, W. N.
Grant, A.	Noel, E.
Grantham, W.	Northcote, rt. hn. Sir S. H.
Grenfell, W. H.
Grey, A. H. G.	Northcote, H. S.
Hamilton, right hon. Lord G.	Norwood, C. M.
	O'Brien, Sir P.
Harcourt, rt. hon. Sir W. G. V. V.	Onslow, D
	O'Shaughnessy, R.
Hartington, Marq. of	O'Shea, W. H.
Hastings, G. W.	Otway, Sir A.
Hay, rt. hon. Admiral Sir J. C. D.	Paget, R. H.
	Paget, T. T.
Hayter, Sir A. D.	Palmer, C. M.
Heneage, E.	Palmer, J. H.
Henry, M.	Parker, C. S.
Herschell, Sir F.	Pell, A.
Hibbert, J. T.	Pender, J.
Hill, T. R.	Phipps, C. N. P.
Holden, I.	Plunket, rt. hon. D.R.
Holland, Sir H. T.	Portman, hn. W. H. B.
Holland, S.	Potter, T. B.
Hollond, J. R.	Pugh, L. P.
Holms, J.	Puleston, J. H.
Howard, G. J.	Pulley, J.
Howard, J.	Raikes, rt. hon. H. C.
Inderwick, F. A.	Ralli, P.
James, Sir H.	Rankin, J.
James, W. H.	Rathbone, W.
Jenkins, D. J.	Reed, Sir E. J.
Jerningham, H. E. H.	Rendel, S.
Johnson, rt. hon. W. M.	Repton, G. W.
Kennard, Col. E. H.	Richardson, T.
Kinnear, J.	Ritchie, C. T.
Labouchere, H.	Robertson, H.
Lawrence, Sir J. C.	Rogers, J. E. T.
Lawrence, W.	Rolls, J. A.
Lea, T.	Round, J.
Leake, R.	Russell, G. W. E.
Lechmere, Sir E. A. H.	Samuelson, B.
Lefevre, rt. hn. G. J. S.	Samuelson, H.
Leigh, R.	Sclater-Booth, rt. hn. G.
Lindsay, Sir R. L.	Scott, M. D.
Lopes, Sir M.	Seely, C. (Lincoln)
Lubbock, Sir J.	Severne, J. E.
Lyons, R. D.	Sheridan, H. B.
M'Arthur, A.	Shield, H.
M'Arthur, W.	Simon, Serjeant J.
M'Clure, Sir T.	Sinclair, Sir J. G. T.
M'Coan, J. C.	Slagg, J.
M'Intyre, Æneas J.	Smith, rt. hon. W. H.
M'Kenna, Sir J. N.	Smith, E.
Mackie, R. B.	Stanley, rt. hon. Col. F. A.
Macliver, P. S.
Magniac, C.	Stanley, E. J.
Maitland, W. F.	Stanton, W. J.
Makins, Colonel W. T.	Stevenson, J. C.
Mappin, F. T.	Stewart, J.
Marjoribanks, E.	Stuart, H. V.
Marriott, W. T.	Talbot, C. R. M.
Maskelyne, M. H. Story-	Talbot, J. G.

Taylor, P. A.	Whitley, E.
Tennant, C.	Wiggin, H.
Thornhill, T.	Williams, S. C. E.
Tillett, J. H.	Williamson, S.
Torrens, W. T. M'C.	Willis, W.
Tottenham, A. L.	Willyams, E. W. B.
Trevelyan, rt. hn. G.O.	Wilmot, Sir H.
Vivian, A. P.	Wilson, Sir M.
Vivian, Sir H. H.	Winn, R.
Walrond, Col. W. H.	Wodehouse, E. R.
Walter, J.	Wolff, Sir H. D.
Warton, C. N.	Woodall, W.
Waugh, E.
Webster, J.	TELLERS.
Whalley, G. H.	Grosvenor, Lord R.
Whitbread, S.	Kensington, Lord

NOES.
Burt, T.	Power, J. O'C.
Callan, P.	Redmond, J. E.
Collings, J.	Richard, H.
Illingworth, A.	Sheil, E.
Lawson, Sir W.	Storey, S.
M'Carthy, J.	Thompson, T. C.
Nelson, I.	Wedderburn, Sir D.
O'Connor, A.	Wyndham, hon. P.
O'Connor, T. P.
O'GormanMahon, Col. The	TELLERS.
	Biggar, J. G.
O'Kelly, J.	O'Donnell, F. H.

Bill read a second time, and committed for Monday next.