SUPPLY—FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (VOTE OF CREDIT).

HC Deb 26 July 1882 vol 272 cc1829-902

[SECOND NIGHT.]

SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Question again proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £2,300,000, be granted to Her Majesty, beyond the ordinary Grants of Parliament, towards defraying the Expenses which may be incurred during the year ending on the 31st day of March 18S3, in strengthening Her Majesty's Forces in the Mediterranean."—(Mr. Gladstone.)

MR. HUGH SHIELD

(who was very indistinctly heard said, that the right hon. and gallant Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley) had made a searching criticism yesterday of the conduct of the Government. The debate had extended over a very wide field, and their conduct in a matter which must have been a most difficult business had been unsparingly criticized. The critics, however, had the very great advantage of being able to bring to their task the wisdom which proverbially came after the event. He had no intention of asking the Committee to accompany him over the very wide field which had been opened out in the debate, nor into the conduct of the Government throughout the difficulties in Egypt, which had culminated in the terrible events of the 11th of July. He confessed that ever since the military outbreaks of January and September, 1881, the state of things in Egypt had appeared to him like one of those nightmares which the consciousness of approaching peril brought about. But it ought to be remembered that the difficulties with which the Government had had to contend, and the misfortunes which had happened in Egypt, were mainly the result of the policy of the late Government, and arose from the loyalty with which Her Majesty's Government had abided by the engagements made for them by their Predecessors. It was somewhat remarkable that almost every hon. Member who had risen to address the Committee from the Conservative Benches had taunted the Government with the sacrifices they had made in order to abide by the Alliance which was bequeathed to them by their Predecessors. That was the only observation he proposed to make upon the general subject; and he now intended to address the Committee upon a single part of the subject, to which all the speeches of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite had been addressed, and especially that of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst), and which had for their sole basis the circumstance that the Fleet was Bent to Alexandria unprovided with an adequate landing force. The criticisms resolved themselves into one of two propositions—either it was wrong to send a Fleet to Alexandria without sending at the same time an Army along with it, or the Fleet, being at Alexandria, and being unprovided with an adequate landing force, it was wrong for Her Majesty's Government to allow the bombardment to take place on the 11th of July. But it was at the suggestion of M. do Freycinet that, as a first step, it was desirable for Her Majesty's Government to send ironclads to Alexandria. Her Majesty's Government acceded to that suggestion, at the same time informing the other Powers that they might do the same if they chose. Would any hon. Member suggest that, instead of acceding to the request of M. de Freycinet, Hoi-Majesty's Government ought to have taken up this position, and replied—"No; we will not send a Fleet of ironclads without, at the same time, sending a landing force, to send on shore in case of need." A landing force, to provide for any emergency which might arise, must of necessity have been a largo force, and a moment's reflection would dissipate the suggestion. The situation was just the situation in which it was reasonable to hope that the sending of ironclads to Alexandria might exercise a salutary effect by assuring the Khedive of support, and allaying panic; but to have insisted on sending an Army would hardly have been consistent with our attitude towards the other Powers, and with clue regard to the jealous watchfulness of the Powers in regard to their separate action. He therefore passed by that suggestion, and, assuming that any error Her Majesty's Government might have committed was not an error which could apply to the sending of ships, he came to the question, was it wrong, the Fleet being there on the 11th of July, and being unprovided with a force for landing, to bombard the fortifications of Alexandria? What was the situation? At that time the Fleet was menaced with serious danger. He postulated that fact, and, while he declined to go further with hon. Members who treated that allegation of fact as an odious exercise of power, he could not help regretting the manner in which the hon. Member for Merthyr (Mr. Richard) had discussed the question. No doubt, everything in the nature of war was, to the hon. Member, most deplorable. But, the Fleet being in danger of serious in-jury, there was only one of two courses open to Her Majesty's Government—either to got the Fleet under weigh, as the French Government did in the case of their Fleet, or lay before Alexandria and bombard the forts. It was known very well that the French Fleet steamed out of the way. He had no inclination to make the slightest reflection upon the French Government for the course they took, or to suggest that, from their point of view, it was inconsistent with the conduct that ought to have been expected from them; but, regarding it as their only possible line of action, he would view it in the light of the consequences which it might have entailed upon the Khedive himself. If Her Majesty's Government had taken the same course of action they would have brought themselves within the scope of the eloquent invective which Lord Salisbury addressed to them upon a recent occasion, when he said— You have pledged yourselves to the present Viceroy of Egypt; you have promised to protect his interests and power; you have induced him to place himself in a position of unexampled danger, and you cannot abandon him without meanness incompatible with honour. Therefore, Her Majesty's Government had no possible course open to them, except to remain at Alexandria and bombard the fortifications. And now came the argument of hon. Gentlemen opposite, and especially of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst), who said that the Government ought to have foreseen the particular consequences, and the deplorable consequences, which did follow upon the bombardment. But how was it possible for Her Majesty's Government to anticipate that, after the attacking force had demolished the fortifications, the defending force would proceed to burn and pillage the city? Happily, so far from that being an ordinary incident in civilized war, it was an unheard of incident in history. The right hon. and gallant Admiral opposite (Sir John Hay) brought forward the precedent of Moscow, and based upon it a charge of want of prévoyance on the part of the Government. He would not waste many words in referring to the case of Moscow; but he did not know whether the right hon. and gallant Admiral had the case of Aden in his mind, when he said it was the duty of the Government to send a Military Force with the Fleet. Aden was a fort on the South-West Coast of Arabia, and it was bombarded by a Naval Force, and then taken by soldiers. That case certainly presented an instance in which a Military Force was usefully combined with a Naval Force. But it was idle to suggest that the instance of Aden ought to have conveyed any lesson to Her Majesty's Government.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, the case he had mentioned was that of St. Jean d'Acre, on the 2nd of November, 1840.

MR. HUGH SHIELD

bogged the right hon. and gallant Member's pardon if he had misquoted him. The bombardment of Aden took place just a year before, and he had done the right hon. and gallant Admiral the injustice to suppose that that was the achievement he had alluded to. Nevertheless, the instance of Aden was one that was well worth considering. But the object of the expedition to Aden was not only to attack, but to capture the place. The Sultan had undertaken and promised to cede Aden to the British Government, and it was of the very essence of the expedition that we should send not only a Naval, but a Military Force. But the capture of Alexandria was no part of the design of Her Majesty's Government. And when we bombarded Algiers, in 1810, the attack was made in order to obtain the release of prisoners who had been piratically seized, and who were cruelly confined. That case also was the case of a Mahommedan city, occupied by a Mahommedan population, with fortifications of considerable strength. The fortifications were bombarded; but there was no idea of landing an armed force, and the defending force, after the demolition of the forts, did not proceed to pillage and burn the city. He asked, when did his hon. and learned Friend present the House with that long catalogue of warnings, which he said ought to have apprised the Government of the particular and special results which took place? Not one of those separately, or all of them taken together, in the smallest degree pointed to the pillage and burning of Alexandria. They did point to the necessity of removing the inhabitants, and that Her Majesty's Government had not neglected. That was the only lesson these warnings conveyed to Her Majesty's Government, and he ventured to say it was the only lesson they would have conveyed to the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst), but for the great advantage which he enjoyed of bringing to bear on his task the wisdom which came after the act. If that foresight of the hon. and learned Member, and other Gentlemen who had taken the same line of argument, were not ex post facto, then he said that they were gravely to blame for not having imparted the result of their clairvoyance more fully to the House. He did not know whether the hon. and learned Member for Chatham had attended the important meeting at Willis's Rooms, at which the whole strength of the Conservative Party was present; but from the circumstance that the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) had described it as a "hole-and-corner" meeting, it was probable that he did not attend it. However, the character of the speeches delivered there appeared to be significant, and he would, with the permission of the Committee, read extracts from two of them. Mr. Bouverie said— We have seen an event without parallel in the history of this country—a number of our fellow-subjects, officers and sailors of the British Fleet, have been murdered while a British Admiral with a British Squadron lay quietly at anchor and did nothing to protect them. Again, Lord Salisbury spoke to the effect that— The Arabs were under the guns of the English ships. It was a shame it should be said that not only had one Representative of England been wounded and British officers killed, but that the Admiral of the Elect never budged an inch. He (Mr. Shield) pointed out that if the Admiral had "budged an inch," he could only have done it by firing his heavy guns, and those who urged that course now blamed the Government for the consequences. But he ventured to claim from history a different verdict. He believed, whatever might be the fortune destined to attend our arms, the verdict of history would be that in the long, difficult, and complicated negotiations which had had this unhappy denouement, the objects before Her Majesty's Government had been such that no Liberal Government need blush for them, and that the means they had employed were the best that were open to them, having regard to the great and unexampled difficulties which encumbered their action. They certainly did not enter on this business with a light heart, nor did they underestimate its gravity; nevertheless, they went forward with a good hope that neither in its origin nor by its results would the military action now taken by Her Majesty's Government bring discredit on the English name.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF

said, he should not detain the Committee very long in discussing the question before it, nor should he endeavour to follow his hon. and learned Friend opposite (Mr. Shield) into the question of the necessity of the transactions which had taken place. These things had passed, and they were now entering the phase of immediate hostilities. He wished to ask Her Majesty's Government with what Allies those hostilities were going to be undertaken? It appeared to him that the Concert of Europe had completely disappeared, and that they were entering upon this serious undertaking without a single Ally; in fact, that they were going to do what the Prime Minister had more than once protested against in the case of Austria. Having quarrelled with the Constitutional Party in Egypt, they were going to maintain that Party against the party of action; but they were going to act under circumstances totally different from those which existed on former occasions. When they went into the Crimean War, they did so with the consent of all Europe. They had France as their Ally; they had Austria as a benevolent Ally, carrying her benevolence so far as to occupy the Danubian Principalities; they had the goodwill of Piedmont, the principal independent Power in Italy; Germany as an Empire did not at that time exist, but Prussia was certainly neutral; she did not take part in the hostilities, and any hostility she might have privately felt was neutralized by the feeling shown by the smaller German States. Thus they had Turkey and France as active Allies, Austria as a benevolent Ally, Piedmont as a possible Ally, and it might be said that the feeling of all Europe, with the exception of Prussia, was against Russia. The only opposition to the policy of the late Govern- ment appeared in the declaration of the right hon. Gentleman the present Prime Minister, who said that "Day and night he thought how he could thwart the projects of Her Majesty's Government." [Mr. GLADSTONE: No, no !] He was not speaking with reference to Egypt, but saying that the policy of the late Government was opposed by the right hon. Gentleman. However, what was their present position? France was not entirely with them; Turkey did not seem to go very far with them; and neither Germany, Austria, nor Italy had shown any active interest in their success. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had told them yesterday that he had a right to assume that they had the moral support of the four Powers; but that assumption seemed to be based upon no written document, and if they were to judge from the assumption he announced in the House a few days ago that Austria and Germany considered our bombardment of Alexandria a legitimate act, it seemed to him they could not depend much, in the hostilities they had undertaken, upon the imagination of a Government which could not distinguish between a negative and a positive. The Government and their supporters had informed the Committee that all these difficulties arose from the establishment of the Control; but, as he had pointed out some time ago, the establishment of the Control took place under very different circumstances from those which existed at present. They were at that time the Allies of Turkey; they were endeavouring to restore to Turkey Provinces which she had lost by the attacks of Russia; France had cooperated with us in making the Treaty of Berlin; and the Sultan had deposed the late Khedive at our request. But then there had been no demonstration at Dulcigno, and France had not seized Tunis. The conditions of amity in which the Control was established had disappeared, and Turkey saw in France and England, instead of two Allies, two Powers who had done her a fatal injury. The hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) had yesterday discussed the conduct of Her Majesty's Government towards the Chamber of Notables. But, in his reply, the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Chamberlain) gave no answer to the statement of that hon. and learned Gentleman; indeed, it seemed to him that the right hon. Gentleman had very imperfectly read the Papers on this subject, because he had to be constantly prompted by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The President of the Board of Trade said that he inferred that M. Gambetta had opposed the pretensions of the Chamber of Notables, because that Body had been summoned by Arabi Pasha; but his hon. and learned Friend had shown that immediately after it was summoned by Arabi Pasha the Chamber went against him. On the 14th of September, Consul Cookson wrote— On Tuesday (the 13th) things took an unexpected turn for the better. The relief came from an equally unexpected quarter. Arabi Bey had summoned to Cairo in support of his demand for a Constitution—by which he buoys up his military agitation—the members of the old Chamber of Notables. These gentlemen, to the number of 150, arrived that morning; but they proved more capable of appreciating the true situation than their military allies. Informed of the negotiations going on with Cherif Pasha, they, in a body, went to him and in-treated him to agree to form a Ministry, offering him their personal guarantee that if he consented, the Army should engage to yield absolute submission to his orders. That was on the 14th of September, 1881. Then he came to M. Gambetta's proclamation, in which he opposed any concession to the Chamber of Notables as advocated by Lord Granville. On the 17th of January, 1882, nearly six months later, Lord Lyons, writing to Lord Granville, said— M. Gambetta answered that he had already despatched to M. Sienkiewicz by telegraph a very strong instruction directing him to concert measures with Sir Edward Malet, and to insist upon Cherif Pasha's absolutely rejecting the demands of the Notables, on the ground that they were incompatible with the state of things established in Egypt by international engagements with France and England. M. Gambetta went on to say that he was informed that at Cairo a compromise had been proposed to the effect that the rejection of the demands should be accompanied by an assurance that they should be complied with in 1885, or at some other fixed date. His Excellency had, however, he observed, especially instructed M. Sienkiewicz not to listen for a moment to anything of the kind. The President of the Board of Trade assumed that, in January, M. Gambetta refused to consent to the concession to the Chamber of Notables because, in September, they had been summoned by Arabi, and had at once shown that they were not at all under the influence of that person. But his belief was that the Government were so anxious to obtain M. Gambetta's assent to the Treaty of Commerce that they were willing to throw everything into the hands of France if she showed herself likely to sign that Treaty. They had been informed that Her Majesty's Government were tied down by the Control established by the late Government. No doubt, they had been right in carrying out, as far as they could, the policy of the late Government; but it seemed to him, in view of the fact that they had upset the policy of Lord Beaconsfield in every other respect, that there could be no great harm in modifying the constitution of that Control in obedience to the exigencies of public opinion. But they had, in fact, given way to France, and allowed themselves to be led by the nose, so to speak, by the Controllers themselves. Now, what said Sir Edward Malet? On the 11th of January he wrote to Lord Granville thus— The 31st Article of the new Organic Law of the Chamber of Delegates, proposed by the Government, authorizes the Chamber to express opinions on the Budget, but it gives no power of sanctioning or rejecting any part of it. The Budget is divided into two sections—one disposing of revenues assigned to the service of the National Debt, the other of those revenues which are free. The Delegates of the Chamber, it appears, are unanimous in insisting upon the right in future years of voting this second part, which they contend will in no way interfere with international engagements. At first they asked to examine and vote this part of the Budget of 1882, but the proposal was subsequently withdrawn. Cherif Pasha and the Controllers General are of opinion that if the Chamber is to have the right of voting the Budget, the Council of Ministers, and, therefore, the Control, lose all hold over the finances. It is possible that the Chamber, if it possessed the right, might use it with moderation, but it would be a leap in the dark to confide the power to it before it has in other matters proved its political capacity. On the other hand, the Chamber exists, and will continue to do so unless it is forcibly suppressed, which can only be done by intervention, and this is a last resource which the possible eventuality of the infraction of the Law of Liquidation would in no way justify. It is not impossible that the broach which has thus been created between Cherif Pasha and the Chamber may, if not avoided, ultimately cause His Excellency's resignation, in which case the present Minister of War would be the popular candidate of the National Party for the Presidency of the Council. But supposing the Khedive names a Minister who comes into office on a point on which he at once finds himself at variance with the Controllers, the situation becomes extremely difficult. I confess that rather than this situation should supervene, I would prefer to give the Chamber the right, and to wait until this right is abused before interfering. It must be borne in mind that the Egyptians have distinctly for good or for evil entered on a Constitutional path; that the Organic Law of the Chamber is their charter of liberties. And this charter of liberties, the adoption of which was recommended by their own Agent, and the rejection of which their own Agent said would cause Arabi Pasha to be made President of the Council, the Government refused, at the dictation of M. Gambetta, who, at the same date, said he would not listen to one word of the demand. At a later period, Cherif Pasha having gone, another Minister came into Office—Cherif Pasha having fallen in consequence of the Government truckling to M. Gambetta. They would now see what this succeeding Minister wrote to Sir Edward Malet. Anything more moderate than the document referred to he had never read. It ran thus— The note refers to the whole Budget; whereas, by the terms of the Law of Liquidation, the Budget of Government expenditure is divided into two parts, purposely distinct, the first containing the credits necessary for the service of the Public Debt, the second embracing all the amounts entered to meet administrative expenses. It is beyond doubt that the sole cause and object of the institutions created in Egypt in consequence of the international arrangements, were to guarantee the regular fulfilment of the obligations of the country towards the creditors. The Foreign Governments never ceased protesting in this respect, that it was their formal intention not to mix themselves up in the internal administration of Egypt, which was intrusted to His Highness the Khedive by the terms and conditions of the Imperial Firmans. There is nothing to modify this position. On the contrary, the Organic Law, which is drawn up with a feeling of scrupulous respect for engagements, which Egypt considers sacred, withholds in an absolute manner from the vote of the Chamber, all the credits necessary for the service of the Public Debt; they thus form a charge inscribed, so to say, as a matter of routine in the Budget. Consequently, far from being jeopardized, the interests of the creditors ought once more to be re-assured. In accordance with the Decree of the l5th November, 1879, the Controllers General take rank and place at the Ministerial Council Board with consulting voice; they, therefore, take part in the discussion of the Budget, and give their opinion. The whole Budget will continue, as heretofore, to be discussed at the Ministerial Council. The Controllers General retain the most extensive powers of investigation, and the right of communicating either to His Highness or his Ministers the observations arising from their in- vestigations, but the Government never undertook to exclude the country from that discussion. Can it fairly be blamed for admitting the taxpayers to examine the use of the public funds devoted to, administrative purposes? Is it not a right common to all countries, a primordial right which cannot seriously be denied to the Government of His Highness the Khedive without, at the same time, denying to it the essential prerogative conferred by the Firmans of internal administration for Egypt? However, in view of the misgivings which have been manifested, it has been conceded that the Budget, before coming executory, shall be discussed by the Ministerial Council with the assistance of a delegation from the Chamber of Notables. The Chamber of Delegates has been assembled six weeks; it is eager to enter on a normal procedure, and impatiently awaits the promulgation of its Organic Statute which the Ministry cannot further delay. None of the provisions of that Statute infringe the International Conventions in force. The Government of His Highness hopes that that very promulgation will tend to remove all misgiving, and will, by the absolute reservation of all questions relative to the Public Debt, furnish the Governments of Franco and Great Britain with a fresh proof of its firm determination loyally to observe all its engagements. It relies on the equity and constant goodwill of the two Governments insuring a favourable reception for the preceding explanations. Those were the modest and temperate words of the Egyptian Minister who succeeded Cherif Pasha, who had been turned out of Office because Her Majesty's Government would not allow him to consent to the reasonable demands of the Chamber of Notables. They found that Minister in a calm manner asking them to allow the Chamber of Notables to have those rights which belonged to all Representative Bodies, and the Government were at the same time informed by their Agent that unless this was granted there must be intervention, because that would be the only way of settling the question. Yet, in the face of this, the Government not only refused to accept the demand of the Minister, but even to take it into consideration. He would now ask how they were to take the statement made the other day by the Prime Minister, that "in any arrangement the rights of the people would be taken into consideration?" He would also ask if Her Majesty's Government had at last succeeded in obtaining the assistance of Turkey in the restoration of peace and order in Egypt? If that were not quite arranged, he should think Her Majesty's Government would take means for preventing it, because, naturally, if the Turks went there Her Majesty's Forces would be in a very disagreeable position. He had asked earlier in the day what would be the relative position of the Turkish troops and those sent out under Sir Garnet Wolseley; and he had received to that question one of those answers which the right hon. Gentleman was perfectly entitled to give, but which, like many of his replies, conveyed no notion whatever of his intentions. Therefore, he again asked what the relations of the British and Turkish troops would be? Were they to be settled with Turkey—throwing aside that Concert of Europe which seemed to have disappeared altogether from the political programme of the Government? Or were they to be arranged according to the determination of the Powers? Again, he asked whether the arrangement would include the right of the Chamber of Notables to exercise all those privileges which, as he thought, they had asked for in the most temperate manner? Further, he would like to know what Her Majesty's Government conceived to be the period over which their operations in Egypt were likely to extend? He found that the proposal in the Conference was that the stay of Turkey in Egypt should be limited to three months, unless the Khedive asked that it might continue for a longer time. Had the Government stipulated for a stay of three months; were they going to remain in Egypt for three years, or did they mean permanently to occupy the country? It was supposed that Her Majesty's Government had taken up this Jingo policy for the purpose of eclipsing entirely the policy of Lord Beaconsfield. They knew that on entering upon the war with Turkey, Russia made similar professions of disinterestedness to those made by Her Majesty's Government; yet Russia obtained a large accession of territory by the Treaty of Berlin. Therefore, he asked, what was to be the nature of the operations the Government were about to undertake in Egypt? Then there was the question as to the ultimate position of the Suez Canal. Much had been said at various times of neutralizing the Canal and placing it under the safeguard of a European Guarantee. He had himself advocated that policy at the time of the purchase of the shares; but there were different kinds of neutralization, and he was distinctly opposed to that form of it proposed by M. de Lesseps— namely, the prevention of the passage of ships of war through the Canal in time of war. But, surely, steps could be taken which would entirely remove that difficulty and place the Canal under the jurisdiction of the Public Law of Europe in a manner satisfactory to the nations of the world. In the case of the Canal on the other side of the Atlantic, provision was made by Treaty with regard to its political position, and it was provided that vessels of war traversing the Canal should be exempted from capture in time of war, the protection thus afforded being extended to such distance as might be defined from the two ends of the Canal. If that principle were applied in the case of the Suez Canal we should have the benefit of the Canal in time of war, while, at the same time, there would be no infringement of it by any belligerent. Again, it was a rule of International Law that all vessels of war might enter neutral ports for repairs, but that they must not leave until 24 hours after the departure of merchant vessels under the enemy's flag. Why should not this rule be applied to the Suez Canal? He was unable to see why the same regulations should not apply to the Canal as applied to neutral ports. There was no intention on the part of hon. Members to interfere with the grant of the money necessary for the operations which the Government were about to undertake; but they had a right to expect from them some intimation both as to the future of Egypt under their auspices, and the position of the Suez Canal. In his opinion, peace and order could not be restored to the former except on the basis of popular content, nor could the freedom of the latter be secured without satisfying the legitimate demands of the nations of the world.

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

said, that, whatever might be thought of the conduct of the Government by hon. Members opposite, it was his good fortune to speak on behalf of the Navy, which he felt sure would receive from all parts of the House nothing but praise. The officers, the seamen, and the marines had all admirably discharged the duties assigned to them. Complete as their success had been, the modesty which had characterized them throughout the recent operations was still more remarkable. He would add that what deserved, perhaps, even, more praise than was called forth by the manner in which the ships and men were handled, was the promptitude with which seamen and marines were landed, and the admirable zeal, courage, and judgment with which they discharged the delicate and difficult duty of restoring order in Alexandria. So far, he thought, there would be no difference of opinion that the Navy was free from blame. But in many quarters there was, no doubt, a disposition to attach blame to Her Majesty's Government for their conduct of the Naval operations in the Mediterranean. He need hardly say that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Wigtown (Sir John Hay) had taken a prominent part in expressing his opinion in that sense, because he was never backward when an opportunity offered to attaching blame to the Liberal Party. The observations with which he should trouble the Committee would be, for the most part, in reply to that right hon. and gallant Member. He was under the disadvantage of not having heard the earlier part of his speech; but he found, by a report of it in the newspaper, that he had stated that some of the ships sent to take part in the operations under Sir Beauchamp Seymour were not suited to the work they had to do, and that vessels of a lighter draught ought to have been present. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman went further, and said that these vessels ought to have been present in the harbour, in order to attack the fortifications of Alexandria. He (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman), how-over, ventured to state it as the opinion of most competent Naval authorities, that the ships on the spot, as matters had proved, were the best for the purpose intended—that it required exactly the kind of heavy ships that were sent there to silence the forts at Alexandria.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, his remark had reference to ships required to take the place of vessels which were withdrawn from the places assigned to them by the Admiral.

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

said, his contention was that the ships sent were fitted for achieving the object in view. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman also said that although no detailed official account had been received of the bombardment, yet a pri- vate account had reached him which stated that the Sultan had received a large number of shots before she was able to make any reply whatever to the batteries on shore, which she was charged with silencing, and that it was not until she anchored that her fire became effective. Now, he asked whether it was right for the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, who he was sure would be the last man to cast any slur on the officers and crew of the Sultan, before any official account had been received of what had happened, to hold forth to the world that the ships of the Fleet were so ineffective in the manner in which they managed their guns that they failed to hit the forts before they were themselves struck, as he believed his statement was, 30 times? There was no official information bearing out that statement.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, the hon. Gentleman must allow him to explain that he had said nothing disparaging to the officers of the Sultan, whom he believed to have behaved in a most gallant manner. His statement was that the ineffective firing was due to the swell of the sea; he spoke of that as causing an unstable platform for the guns, which would not have occurred in smooth water in the harbour.

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

said, he thought it would follow, from the statement of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, that the ship being under weigh, and in consequence unable to discharge her duty, some blame would attach to the officer in command for not having brought his vessel to an anchor. He was not prepared to enter into the merits of the question; but he regarded it as unfortunate that a report of this kind, which had no sort of authentic confirmation whatever, should have been used by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman. But the principal allegation of the right hon. and gallant Admiral was founded on the insufficiency of the force employed; he stated to the Committee again and again that the Government had not provided Sir Beauchamp Seymour with a sufficient Military Force for the purpose of protecting life and property on shore, and that allegation was mainly founded upon a despatch of Mr. Consul Cookson, which he quoted, It turned out, however, that the words quoted were not those of Mr. Cookson, but the words of a Memorial signed by some of the inhabitants, which Mr. Cook-son forwarded. The substance of that Memorial was that the small Squadron in port could only silence four of the forts, and that the Admiral's force available for operation on shore did not exceed 300 men. It was upon this that the right hon. and gallant Admiral founded his allegation that the Admiral had not more than 300 men to land at Alexandria. [Sir JOHN HAY: At that time.] That could hardly be so, because he said in his speech that, after carefully examining the despatches published by the Government, he had come to the conclusion that it would be unfair——

SIR JOHN HAY

From what is the hon. Gentleman quoting?

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN

From a report of the speech of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman.

SIR JOHN HAY

It is quite inaccurate.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

The report stated— That on the 16th of June a certain letter was written to Sir Beauchamp Seymour, saying that he was authorized to land a force if required for the protection of British subjects and Europeans. The Committee would observe that on the 16th of Juno the City of Alexandria had 12,000 troops, while the force at the disposal of Admiral Seymour was not more than 300 men.

SIR JOHN HAY

The letter I quoted was from Lord Lyons. I do not object to anything I have said being criticized, but I object to be criticized on a report which I deny to be accurate.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he was content, if the report was not accurate, to fall back on the allegation founded on the so-called despatch of Mr. Cookson. It was true that at the time that despatch was written, the 30th of May, there were in the Harbour of Alexandria only the Invincible and two smaller vessels; but on the day the despatch arrived another iron-clad, the Monarch, and two other vessels were ordered to Alexandria. They joined on the 2nd of June, and on the 5th of June the Alexandra, the Superb, the Temeraire and the Inflexible arrived, the force which they carried being available on the day of the massacre. That being so, he appealed to any Member of the Committee who heard the speech delivered by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman yesterday, as to whether the impression was not conveyed—unintentionally, of course—that the 300 men alluded to in the Memorial forwarded by Mr. Consul Cookson represented the number available at the time of the massacre, and not those available some weeks before the steps were taken which he had described? But the right hon. and gallant Gentleman was not content with quoting the so-called report of Mr. Consul Cookson; he quoted also Sir Beauchamp Seymour, and said that while the Government stated, in answer to Questions put to them, that Sir Beauchamp Seymour had full instructions to land men, if he thought fit to do so, Sir Beauchamp Seymour himself wrote on the 12th of June that he had no intention whatever to land men. And here, again, he wished to call the attention of the Committee to the precise circumstances under which that announcement was made. The massacre at Alexandria occurred on the 11th of June, and it was true that Sir Beauchamp Seymour did not land any force on that day. But in the Papers that had been laid before the House the Admiral gave his reason for this, which was that any attempt to land a force on the Marina would have been followed by most serious consequences. Moreover, Captain Molyneux, in even stronger terms, had stated that, although the troops would have undoubtedly overcome the resistance which would have been opposed to their landing, yet many thousands of lives would have been sacrificed. Although it was unintentional on the part of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, he ventured to say that he had very greatly misrepresented the meaning of Sir Beauchamp Seymour's statement. In discussing the merits of the question as to whether a large force could not have been landed on the day of the bombardment in order to secure Alexandria from the perils which threatened it, he would not enter upon political considerations. The political reasons against that course being adopted had, he thought, been disposed of by the Prime Minister, who pointed out at an earlier period of the discussion that it would have been in opposition to the whole tenour of the policy of the Government if they had attempted at that time to land such a force as would have been required for the purpose. But he would ask anyone who had looked at the map of Egypt and considered the circumstances of the case, how the landing could have been effected? Let it be borne in mind that the only place where this force could have been landed was in Aboukir Bay; that it must have been landed under the guns of the forts, and marched along a narrow strip of land, in order to cut off Arabi and his force from the country beyond. One of two things would then have happened. Either Arabi would have been caught in a trap, and in that case it was probable that a lawless soldier, such as he was, would have committed the most dreadful outrages and pillage in Alexandria; or if, as was far more likely, he declined to be taken in the trap prepared for him, he would have evacuated Alexandria and spread outrage, murder, and pillage over the interior. He did not believe there would have been any means of saving the city from destruction, even if there had been 10,000 men available for landing there. But the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had told the Committee what he would have done under the circumstances. He said he would have sent 10,000 men to Cyprus long before the bombardment was thought of. His plan was then to begin the bombardment in the morning, so as to allow plenty of time; the 10,000 men were to come from Cyprus and to land in Aboukir Bay while Arabi was occupied with our guns, and to occupy the city without any resistance. But was it likely that, while the Fleet was engaged with the batteries, Arabi would have been ignorant of the fact that a fleet of transports two miles off were making for Alexandria? The right hon. and gallant Gentleman, he believed, said that no Naval officer of distinction would approve the course which had been followed by the Government. Now, although he had no right to express an opinion on Naval operations, yet he had some modicum of appreciation of what the result of this plan would have been, and, so far as he could gather from the opinions of competent officers, the plan promulgated by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would have had no practical effect whatever. He had only one other statement of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman's to refer to, and he must apologize for having made his speech so personal. The other statement the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had made was that the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government must have had some idea of what would happen if Alexandria were bombarded. The Prime Minister had said that no one could have foreseen that an Army such as that of Egypt's, with the forts destroyed, no doubt, but still in occupation of the town, could have committed such an act of criminal violence as that they had witnessed; but the right hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir John Hay) had referred to the burning of Moscow as an instance in support of the argument he had used. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman ransacked history for a case, and the one he unearthed was the case of Moscow. Well, a worse case could not possibly have been selected, because the Committee would see what the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had to prove—not that there were cases in which a defeated Army had set fire to a town, but that there had been cases before where an act of that sort had occurred in consequence of there not having been a force at hand strong enough to prevent it. So the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would have them to believe that the Russians burnt Moscow and retired from it because the French were not strong enough to prevent them. He (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) had always believed it had been because the French were in such overwhelming numbers that there was no possibility of resisting them. The argument against Her Majesty's Government was that they did not provide a sufficient force to prevent this act being done; but he contended that no force they could have brought would have prevented it. He thought, therefore, he might safely take advantage of this instance, and say that the argument proved their case, instead of doing anything to disprove it. These were the observations he had to make on the conduct of the Naval operations; but he should like to refer to two points not immediately connected with the matter. He had observed that comments of a somewhat contemptuous kind had been made as to the marines in the Tamar having arrived at Alexandria without ammunition, and the Orontes having arrived without any troops.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, he had not referred to that.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he was not quoting the right hon. and gallant Gentleman; but he thought it right, as he had seen these comments in the newspapers, to state what he know about these matters. As to the Tamar, the explanation was perfectly easy, and it was this—that when the vessel was sent out with a number of marines to strengthen the marines in the Mediterranean Fleet the ships of the Meet were full of ammunition, and, therefore, there was no necessity for sending out any ammunition. Those marines, as it turned out, were used at Alexandria as a separate force; but it was not for that purpose that they were sent. At Alexandria, of course, there was an abundant supply of ammunition for them. Then, as to the Orontes, she was at Malta, at the disposal of the Admiral commanding-in-chief. He was aware that she was empty, and it was by his orders that she was first sent to Cyprus and then to Alexandria. The Government had the most perfect confidence in Sir Beauchamp Seymour, who was a man possessing great knowledge of his Profession and considerable judgment; and though it might not be for him (Sir Beauchamp Seymour) to say it, no doubt the gallant Admiral had excellent reasons for what he did. The Admiralty had not yet heard from him on the point, and he (Mr. Campbell Baunerman) could only conjecture what the gallant Admiral's reasons were. He had not authority to say so, but it seemed to him that the reason for the proceeding was this. At Cyprus there were two large ironclads, the Agincourt and the Northumberland, each with a battalion on board. The Admiral, probably, ordered the Orontes to Cyprus—first, because it could take the troops out of these two ships and make them and the ironclads more comfortable, which was a matter of importance if they were to remain there any length of time; and, next, because that would leave two ships at his disposal for general Naval purposes. So long as they were half-transports and half-fighting ships they were not so useful for Naval purposes. Therefore, the Orontes was sent to Cyprus to get the troops out of the two ironclads, and thus disengage them for Naval purposes. Instead of that, the two ironclads were themselves sent on to Alexandria with the troops on board, and the Orontes accompanied them. That was only a conjectural explanation, although he thought it was a probable and natural one; but, even if it should prove not to be correct, the Admiralty had such confidence in Sir Beauchamp Seymour that they felt quite sure he could give excellent reasons for his proceedings.

MR. T. C. BRUCE

In making the remarks which I intend to address to the House on this subject, I may say, in the first place, that I do not wish to discuss the amount of responsibility which may be distributed between this and the late Government with reference to our interference in Egypt. And I refrain from doing so for this reason, that I think every Government in England, to whatever Party it may belong, is bound by the nature of things to exercise some such interference. What is the position after all? It is, I think agreed by every statesman in this country that we have a very great and paramount interest in the Suez Canal, not only because a very large proportion of the traffic which goes through it is British, but because we are, perhaps, the only nation to which that Canal is a matter of necessity in a time of war, and opposition is thus not only paramount but peculiar. We have heard discussions about the possibility of defending the Canal. It is perfectly certain that in the long run you cannot have peaceable possession of the Canal unless Egypt is at peace, and it would be against the highest interests of this country to allow the intrusion of any Power which might, under certain conditions, become hostile to ourselves. The result is that Egypt is, to a great extent, a protected country. It is not like a free nation with independence of action and responsibility for its own errors. We thus incur a certain responsibility by the very nature of things, and cannot allow Egypt to prove itself a nuisance to its neighbours, and probably a danger to ourselves. We have heard of protected countries before. We know what the result was of the famous Protection of Turkey, to defend her against foreign attacks and not against her own internal difficulties. And if we are placed in that relation towards Egypt, we have certain responsibilities—responsibilities which we cannot entirely shake off—in reference to the government of that country. Now, there were two ways of proceeding under these circumstances. One was, of course, the very simple one of conquering the country. But could we undertake the government of a country, inhabited by a hostile population, and the limits of which are very undefined? Egypt stretches to countries where Europeans cannot work and live, and if you attempt to occupy all of that country, you have to resist an endless succession of tribes, one more savage than another, and it would involve you in constant expense and international embarassment. It seems to me the only course was to enter into some arrangement whereby we could secure such an amount of good government as it is possible to obtain in Egypt, consistent with the nature of its inhabitants, and at the same time to place ourselves in a position of friendliness with all other nations concerned. At the time when these engagements first began the state of Egypt was very peculiar; the state of bankruptcy and confusion has already been stated to the House. That condition offered not only an occasion, but an imperative occasion, for some interference. I know that in this country bondholders are not looked upon with favour; in fact, they are considered in some quarters as no better than landlords, and they are representatives of what French revolutionists call "infamous capital." It has been the practice of this country not to interfere on behalf of English bond-holders, but that has not been the practice of other countries; and if you were to have a settlement of Egypt agreed upon by other Powers, it was absolutely necessary that there should be some settlement of the bondholders' claims. The French Government was particularly interested in that character, as the French people hold very largely; and they were pressed very strongly by the public to defend the rights and claims of the bondholders. Now, if our object were to secure the good government and prosperity of the country, certainly no better means to accomplish that could be invented than a control over its finances which would insure a regular financial administration in that country. The Committee will, I hope, forgive me for entering into some detail on a matter of which I have some personal knowledge. There is one thing which is wanting in the mechanism of all Oriental, and probably of all absolute Governments, and which is of the greatest practical importance, and that is such a control over financial details as is exercized by the Treasury in this country. The Minister of Finance in Oriental countries is the banker—not the controller of the other departments and of the Sovereign. They call upon him when they please. Even, where there is a regular Budget, whenever the heads of departments want more money they go to the Sovereign, obtain an order from him, and those sums are paid without any reference whatever to the general state of the finances of the country. That has been one of the great difficulties in introducing a regular system into Oriental countries. The introduction of the Control was intended to remedy that state of things. The European administrators, having, as they had, an independent position, were able to introduce not only regularity, but also a great reform in the whole financial administration of the country. Sometimes this originates among Eastern people themselves, but only where the Sovereign is a man of great strength of mind. For instance, the Sultan of Turkey has introduced a degree of regularity into the finances, such as has not been known for years; but that is a financial accident, not a regular system. The result of what has been done in this respect in Egypt has been universally admitted to be an enormous increase in the prosperity of the country, as was only natural. It was the natural result, because not only were the burdens on the people to some extent diminished, but they were regulated and defined, and that is a most important point in Oriental finance; for it is not the burdens that do appear, but the burdens which do not appear, that are most important. Not only were the claims of the creditors reduced about 30 per cent, but illegal and arbitrary exactions were almost entirely abolished, and that alone has given to the population of Egypt a sense of security which it has never enjoyed before, I suppose, since the time of Joseph. That is, I believe, the main explanation of the great increase of prosperity which nobody denies, and which has been shown particularly among the lower classes. There has been lately a great importation of timber into Egypt to build houses. The fellaheen never had houses before, and they dared not show that they had wealth enough to get a house, or it would have been seized by the rapacious tax-gatherers. Suppose we had adopted a plan which I have seen proposed, and by passing a self-denying ordinance had wiped out the whole debt; not a single Egyptian taxpayer would have paid one penny less, as the money would have been taken from them all the same, to whatever use it might have been put. That system of Control was carried out by the management of the two Powers most interested in Egyptian affairs. A great many remarks which have been made about the Control do not apply to it at all, but apply to the action of the different Governments, through their Consuls interfering with the government of Egypt entirely independent of the Control. You cannot, in a year or two, reform a country which has been misgoverned for 5,000 or 6,000 years. But the result of the measures of reform which have been adopted, and of the consequent prosperity, has been a greater development of political feeling among the people than has ever been known since they emerged from the condition of slaves, and anything which tends to destroy the new system would, in my opinion, be a very serious loss to the Egyptian people, at well as to the rest of the world. It is perfectly possible, and I hope it is probable, that if the National Assembly, when relieved from the present military tyranny, shows itself to be influenced by feelings of independence and courage, and attains different knowledge of administration, it may be able to supply the place of the Control and of other departments now under European supervision; and no one would he more rejoiced than I should he. But at present our intervention cannot be dispensed with, without destroying all the benefits of what has been done. The House may remember that the National Assembly have declared that they would respect the rights of the Controllers to the revenues applied to the Debt, but that they would claim the control over the rest of the expenditure. What would follow while they are influenced, as they are at present, by the military authority, is that in case the ordinary revenue became insufficient for their objects, they would either have recourse to the hypothecated revenues, or would form a new Debt, which would lead to further complications. Therefore, the resistance offered by the Controllers to the changes suggested in their position, without any experience of how the Assembly would deal with it, was, in itself, perfectly justified, independently of the fact that their position is secure by an international compact. There were one or two points in which the system was badly worked. One was the great excess of European officers employed. To my mind it was absolutely necessary to have European employés taking the principal departments—men trained in good habits of finance and administration. But partly owing to the dual character of the Control, there has been a great increase in the number of subordinate European employés, beyond what I think was necessary or desirable; and it would be much more satisfactory to train up the Natives themselves to fill these posts. I believe the salaries given to the higher officials were not a bit too large. I have had some experience of what you have to pay men of intelligence and probity who go from this country. In one part of the administration of the Revenue of Turkey in which I was concerned, we had only one European, who was at the head of it, and the whole of the rest of the people employed were Natives. There were 4,000 of them, and they worked as efficiently as any body of Europeans would have done. There is another point on which a good deal of jealousy has arisen, and that is the partial exemption of Europeans from taxation. This matter is, however, not so much the result of Control as of the old capitulation. I have never had occasion to speak about Oriental affairs without raising my protest against this. It is a relic of a state of affairs which has passed away. It is unjust to the Natives, and injurious to the progress of civilization. Two days ago when I listened to the eloquent words of the Premier as to his desire to treat Mahom-medans and Christians alike, I hoped that he would take up this subject. It would be an admirable theme for the European Concert. These differences caused a certain amount of irritation; but that irritation was confined to certain classes, particularly those who had been gainers under the old system of government, and I think it might have been altered by judicious reforms. A more serious danger was the discontent of the Army. It had been harshly treated, particularly the officers, for the men are only too glad to get their discharge, even without payment of their arrears of pay. This discontent culminated in the meeting of February, 1881, which was a threatening symptom, and should have been repressed more sternly than it was. I have not alluded to one subject of importance in this matter—namely, the position of the French. On the lines I have endoavoured to explain—the desire of arriving at a solution of the Egyptian difficulty with the adhesion of the other Powers, which appeared to be necessary, the French had to be taken into account. They had a large financial interest in the country; and they had a considerable interest in Egypt besides their financial interest. The hon. Member for Merthyr talked in a disparaging way of the French interest as being sentimental. That may be so; but with some nations the sentimental reason is as strong as the desire for cotton on the part of some hon. Members. I know that at the time the French Government entered into these arrangements it fully realized the objects of this country, and was sincerely disposed to co-operate with us. But difficulties arose, owing to the old traditions of French diplomacy in the East. The traditional policy of all the French Consuls in the East, and of all French Government employés, has been one of jealousy and hostility to this country. This was aggravated by the conduct of what is called the Colonies—that is, the residents of each different nationality, who are animated by far greater jealousy than we are at home, and whose great idea is that the whole power of their respective nations should be exerted in support of their interests and feelings. The difficulties thus created were intensified by the extreme instability of French Governments. I believe that, for several years, the average time in Office of a French Ministry has been under 10 months; and though a Minister may not approve what his subordinates are doing, those subordinates believe that he will not remain in Office long enough to interfere with them. Look at the case of M. de Ring. He encouraged the pretensions of Arabi Pasha, and opposed the French Controller. Thereupon he was recalled, an act which was severely blamed by the newspapers which belonged to M. Gam-betta. Then, when the Council assem- bled the other day at Constantinople, the French Government sent M. de Ring-to take part in the deliberations. That is an instance of the great instability which marked the conduct of the French Government to their employés. But there occurred last year what, to my mind, has been the determining cause of all our trouble, and that was the French Tunisian Expedition. That Expedition produced two results—it stirred in its depths the Mussulman element in Africa against all Europeans, and particularly against those who showed themselves in alliance with France. It was that feeling which turned what was first a Military revolt into a National movement, and gave a most serious extension to the feelings which existed in Egypt before. It had another effect. If you are to deal on friendly terms with a great Mussulman population, there are only two ways of doing it. One is, you may conquer them. When a Mussulman is once beaten he knows it; he says it is fate, and he submits. But, short of that, the only method is by remaining on terms at least of friendship with the leaders of his religion. The one thing which really excites a Mussulman is a feeling which, when we share it, we call zeal; when we do not share it, we call it fanaticism. But whether zeal or fanaticism, it is the very strongest feeling a Mussulman has. That feeling was excited, not by us, but by the French in that unfortunate Tunisian Expedition. In another respect that Expedition was most unfortunate. The great and steady aim of the French Government since then has been to avoid the introduction of the Sultan's power, moral or physical, into Egypt; and from that time forward no proposition to allow him to interfere, either morally or by his troops, has been accepted by the French Government, except after every species of delay. Since then the assistance of Turkey has always been saddled with conditions which would place the Sultan before the public as the distinct Agent of Christian Powers, which would deprive him of any power for usefulness that he might have among his own people. The influence of the Sultan over this part of his Empire is far more religious than political. The Sultan must either interfere by an Army and force, which is to be avoided if possible, or by his moral influence acting on the side of the Powers, and not as their delegate; because if he acts as their delegate he loses over the Mussulman population the whole of his present influence. One of the most unfortunate results of that Tunisian Expedition has been that it has thrown the French Government into a position in which it cannot accept anything which would strengthen the moral position of the Sultan in North Africa. I blame Her Majesty's Government because they have not taken sufficient account of this fact. They have held with the French Alliance, and submitted to them in a course which must infallibly lead to a break-up of the friendly system on which Egypt has hitherto been governed. Our Government has at divers times suggested the intervention of the Sultan. That has been set aside at the instance of the French, not because of the interests of Egypt, but because of the interests of their policy in North Africa. That was never one of the things we undertook to support, and should never have been allowed to exercise the influence it has done in the decisions of Her Majesty's Government. I will not go into a detailed examination of the Papers, which has been already done in this House, and which fully supports my assertion. I only allude to the meeting in September last, because it was the result of that meeting which first alarmed the European community and induced them to restrict their operations. Her Majesty's Government then proposed that a Turkish General should go and endeavour to restore the Army to their allegiance. That proposal was objected to by the French, and abandoned; and then, when the Sultan sent an Envoy, without an Army or any military character, Her Majesty's Government do all they can to diminish the importance of that mission. As a matter of fact, he did a certain amount of good, and he might have done more; but all his relations with the Western Powers were such as to diminish the influence of Turkey. I am not an advocate for the employment of Turkish troops; but I am an advocate for the power which the Sultan might have exercised on those rebellious subjects, and without which an armed conflict was certain to ensue. Then came Lord Granville's despatch of November 4th, which I read with considerable surprise. It was a little too good. It did not mention the real reason for our presence in Egypt. We are there for reasons of our own, which no English Government can neglect. I blame that despatch because it did not mention those interests as the reason. They are not incompatible with the rest of the despatch; on the contrary, we have every reason to wish for prosperity and a good government in Egypt, because it is necessary for our interests as regards the Suez Canal. And stating this openly, it would have had this advantage—that possibly if these reasons had been given the despatch would have been believed. I have seen a good deal of these Oriental peoples; and if you profess greatly disinterested motives they do not raise an echo in the breast of an Oriental. If you showed them there was something you wanted for yourselves, and which would be good for them, they would listen to you; but if you say you are putting yourselves to trouble solely for their good, it is listened to with the same sort of incredulity with which in private life you would hear a man say he was come to buy your goods for your benefit only—you would button up your pockets. That is the main objection to that despatch. I think it was the desire of the amiable Gentleman at the Foreign Office to place a most charming picture of his feelings and wishes before the Egyptian people; it failed because he did not understand them, and because the language of Rasselas is no longer understood on the banks of the Nile. Now we come to another phase of this matter, which is a very important one, and that is the Ministry of M. Gam-betta. M. Gambetta has a will of his own, and, furthermore, he appears to have had a very clear appreciation of the solution of this question in the sense in which he wanted a solution—namely, to accept no interference, moral or physical, on the part of the Sultan. He took it up, and proceeded to act upon it, and the result was that famous Dual Note. That Note contained something like a promise and something like a threat; and there would have been a good deal to be said for it, if the Governments had put themselves into immediate position to execute that promise and to realize that threat. But they did not. The Dual Note produced considerable excitement in Egypt and in Europe, and great indignation at Constantinople; but it was followed by nothing. M. Gambetta took all that passed between him and Lord Lyons, and between Lord Granville and M. Challemel-Laeour, in the most favourable view to his own object. In the famous despatch in which M. Challemel-Lacour stated that Lord Granville had told him the Note was of no use whatever, I have no doubt that the French Ambassador misunderstood what Lord Granville had said. Lord Granville is a very intelligent man, and he must have said not that the Note was of no use, but that it was much worse than useless. In the meantime these statements were made, these expectations were excited, but no action was taken, and the Egyptian people were left contemplating these Powers with no other feeling than, if they were acquainted with English history, a wonder which was Sir Richard Strachan and which the Earl of Chatham. The Note produced considerable disturbance in the minds of European Powers, and was connected both with what we were doing in Egypt and with another fact in the political world, which is a clue to all Continental politics, and that is the jealousy between the French and Germans. There is a rather curious despatch in the French Yellow Book, dated February 10th, from the French Ambassador in Berlin to M. Gambetta. He says— In conformity with your instructions I have endeavoured to become informed as to the disposition of the Cabinet of Berlin with regard to Egyptian affairs. From the intimation I have received, and which I have reason to believe to be authentic, an exchange of ideas has passed between Germany, Russia, Austria, and Italy on the subject of the attitude they ought to assume on the renewal of troubles of the nature of those which occurred in Egypt a few months ago. The conclusion is that the Cabinets are unanimous, although in different degrees, to reject the proposal of any descent on the banks of the Nile, of either English or French forces, and that the solution, which appears to be the only practical one, would be the sending of Turkish troops. The result of M. Gambetta's policy, whatever it might have been, was cut short by his resignation, which was another instance of the extreme difficulty of resting on a French alliance, because in three months the policy of France underwent two changes—one being from the somewhat inert policy of M. Bar-the lemy St. Hilaire to the active policy of M. Gambetta, and the next from the active policy of M. Gambetta to the effacement of M. de Freycinet. There is another despatch in the book of February 16th, from the French Ambassador at Berlin to M. de Freycinet. He says— Prince Bismarck told me that he had been extremely apprehensive when he saw Franco and England taking the initiative by any step which might engage them in military intervention in Egypt, for he was convinced that any action taken under those conditions would produce difficulties between the two Powers, and might even load to a conflict between England and France, which would provoke a disastrous perturbation of the whole world. The German Chancellor added that, in his opinion, the simplest way of getting rid of the Egyptian difficulty was to confide to Turkey the charge of the matter. There is a remarkable change in the tone of those two despatches, which is explained by the change in the French policy. M. de Freycinet still maintained the objections to the introduction of the Sultan's power in Egypt; but he was determined not to move the French Army unless he had an order from Prince Bismarck, to prevent the danger to France of the German Chancellor raising any objection afterwards to what he did. That had been the guiding policy of the French Cabinet ever since. And in all our arrangements and the diplomatic means we have adopted, we have been carrying out the wishes of the French Government, which were to combine an appearance of energy in this matter with a due subordination to the national distrust of their neighbours, which is the guiding policy of the French Government. I believe that in all these negotiations Her Majesty's Government adhered far too closely to the French Alliance, and this has prevented our Government interfering to prevent a danger which was every day growing more formidable, and also prevented their taking those steps which their own judgment indicated. That led to this interminable delay. There is no evidence that at any time the Great Powers of Europe would have had any objection to our taking the necessary steps. The principal object of the Conferences was to obtain the French concurrence, which you have not obtained. There was nothing in the history of Europe to lead anybody to expect that you could possibly have succeeded, and all this delay and disaster would have been avoided had you formed a right judg- ment of the policy of Europe. We held on to the expectation of French help, while events have been growing, and we have lost the assistance we might have had from the Sultan. We have committed ourselves before Europe and Turkey to an intimate union with the nation which has excited the greatest possible hatred in Turkey, and which unfortunately does not possess the confidence of Europe. I do not oppose the Vote; but I do hope, if the grant is made, that the affair will be short and decisive. I trust there will be no diplomatic delays, and no seeking for the opinion of other nations. No other nation is going to fight; but we have undertaken a task which I fear is far more formidable than many think. I trust it will be carried on with vigour, and without any diplomatic hindrances, which can only endanger our success and increase our losses.

MR. RATHBONE

said, he would not attempt to enter into the merits of the interesting speech they had just listened to; but he would point out what he knew, from his experience as a merchant and a shipowner, to be a fallacy, which he believed to be at the bottom of the present difficulty, and which, if not removed, might lead us into further complications when we came to make final arrangements for the restoration of order in Egypt. The fallacy to which he referred had run through a great many of the speeches that had been delivered on the present occasion, and had even found a place in the speech of the hon. Member who had just spoken, notwithstanding his great knowledge and experience of the East. Many of the speakers in this debate had attacked the Government for having attempted, in the first instance, to obtain the Concert of Europe before they interfered, either alone or in conjunction with France, and they did so on the ground that England had an interest in. Egypt and the Suez Canal differing and exceeding, not only in degree, but in kind, the interest of other nations, and they assumed a position which he thought derogatory to the power and independence of this country, and utterly untenable in fact—namely, that the commercial greatness of Great Britain, and her power and her connection with India, were dependent upon the maintenance of the Suez Canal, and, therefore, England had special ground for interference. He should show that, so far from that being the case, other nations rather than England had a special interest, differing, not in degree, but in kind, from that of England. Let him guard himself against being supposed in any way to depreciate the immense interest the world had in the commerce through the Canal. Two sentences would suffice to show what the Suez Canal had done, and what it had not done. It had opened a new way for commerce of infinite benefit to producers and consumers in India and Europe; but it had not specially improved the position of preponderance which England enjoyed as the first commercial nation of the world. Therefore, the position of England, both commercially and politically, could not be struck at by other nations through the Suez Canal and Egypt. It was very important this fact should become known, because, acting on that supposition, the nations of Europe had declined to join us in steps which might have prevented this outbreak in Egypt, or at least made its suppression more speedy. What had the opening of the Suez Canal done as regarded the position of the commerce of England as compared with the commerce of other countries? It had transferred from England that position of immense advantage which she possessed of being the natural geographical depot of the commerce of the East. Let him illustrate this by a single example. When he went, as a youngster, into an East India house to learn business, the cotton of India was collected by Natives, brought down to Bombay in carts, and there it was collected by Native houses, and then shipped by an English house, in an English ship, to an English port, where it was consigned to an English house, warehoused in an English warehouse, insured in an English office, and sold to an English merchant, who bought it for manufacturers in Austria and elsewhere, and then shipped in English vessels for Marseilles, Havre, Trieste, or other ports on the Continent, whence it was distributed to the manufacturers. What happened now? Nearly the whole of that cotton went direct from India to the ports of Southern Europe, and from there sent on to the manufacturers. The manufacturer in Austria could contract, and did contract, with the Native mer- chant in Bombay to supply him direct with a certain number of bales of cotton every week or month, so that the former trade of England was swept away. It was true that some of the cotton still came in British vessels, but for shorter distances, and smaller freight, and it was even difficult to maintain that diminished trade. The same had taken place in other trades. The silk which in his young days was brought to London now went direct to Lyons and other places without coming to the English depot. This had been an immense advantage to the consumers and producers of India and Europe, but it had been of no special advantage to England. This transfer of trade had been mainly in consequence of the opening of the Suez Canal; and had it not been for the immense energy of our people, stimulated by Free Trade and political freedom, incalculable injury would have been done to our trade, and the fate of the cities of Eastern and Southern Europe when the course of trade was changed from them in olden days might have overtaken this country. People said—"Look at the enormous increase that has taken place in the Mercantile Marine of this country through the opening of the Suez Canal." The cause of that, however, was the invention of the compound engine a few years before the opening of the Suez Canal. Steamers superseded sailing ships, and iron superseded wood. England being the workshop of the world, and the financial centre of the world, our shipowners, having been roused to energy by the abolition of the Navigation Laws, at once took advantage of the new state of things. He thought he had made clear that the position of England as a Maritime Power was not created by, and did not depend upon, the SuezCanal. Our communication with India no longer depended upon the Suez Canal. This had been partly shown in the speech of the hon. Member for Hull (Mr. Norwood), and in the letter which he addressed to the newspapers the other day. Without going so far as his hon. Friend as to the speed of steamers, he was advised that it was perfectly possible now to build transports which would take the whole of the coal necessary to carry them straight to Bombay, and which would take on board their cargo of men and matériel, and reach Bombay in as short a time as the present transports did— namely, in 31 days. Surely this was a cheaper way of making ourselves independent of other countries than undertaking to interfere in all cases in Egypt. It was perfectly true that the new transports would go to Bombay in a shorter time through the Suez Canal than they would if they wont round the Cape, providing there was no impediment and danger in the way; but would anybody tell him that in case of a European war in which a country with Mediterranean ports was engaged, we should attempt to send our men and matériel of war through narrow seas exposed to gunboats and torpedo vessels which could issue from the ports? If these powerful transports were sent through mid ocean, where we had many more cruisers than other nations, the transports would be hard to find, hard to catch, and dangerous to follow. He maintained, consequently, that in case of war with any Mediterranean Power it would not be through the Suez Canal, but by the high seas that we should send our matériel and men. Had he not shown that neither our commercial superiority, nor our Naval power, nor our connection with India were necessarily dependent upon the Suez Canal? And what was the bearing of this contention on the present argument? Why, it was that the Government were perfectly right in appealing to Europe, as interested at least as much as we were in the maintenance of peace in Egypt, and in the maintenance of the Suez Canal. It was of the greatest importance that we should avoid complicated engagements with individual Powers in Europe, the difficulties of which had been well pointed out by the last speaker. He hoped we were not so ill-advised as to return to a system of individual alliance, instead of keeping up that great Court of Arbitration which this Ministry, to their great honour and credit, had re-established in the hope of averting war. In voting for the Government on this occasion, he did so on the understanding that as soon as order was restored in Egypt the Government would again have recourse to that great Court of Arbitration, and not enter into entangling arrangements with individual Powers likely to lead to complications and misunderstandings with the Powers themselves, and utterly inadequate, as experience had shown, to protect Egypt from disorder, or to do anything to maintain the peace of the world, which he believed to be the object and intention of the present Government.

BARON HENRY DE WORMS

said, he had listened with considerable interest to the observations of the hon. Member for Carnarvon (Mr. Rathbone), and he must say that the impression those observations left on his mind was that because the hon. Gentleman assumed that the Suez Canal was not a convenient mode of transit for vessels, he came to the extraordinary conclusion that Her Majesty's Government were wrong in interfering with the affairs of Egypt. In his (Baron Henry De Worms's) opinion, the first hypothesis of the hon. Member was utterly and entirely fallacious, and in answer to that hypothesis he would simply read a few sentences from the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Chamberlain) last evening, in reference to the importance of the Suez Canal. The right hon. Gentleman said— There was, in the first place, our interest in the Suez Canal, the great highway of all nations, and the road to our vast Indian Possessions. He had had some figures drawn out for him with respect to it, and he found that no less than £50,000,000 sterling in goods of different kinds passed through the Suez Canal each way annually. In other words, one-seventh of the whole foreign trade of this country passed through the Canal at the present time. The Fleet which was engaged in carrying that merchandize was itself worth £15,000,000 sterling. Of the entire shipping passing through, four-fifths was British. He commended these words to the special attention of the hon. Gentleman; they appeared to carry conviction home, and he (Baron Henry De Worms) was at a loss to understand how the hon. Gentleman, who had such a large experience of the shipping trade, could possibly conclude that the maintenance of the Suez Canal was not of paramount importance to the commerce of the world, and freedom of transit an Imperial, as well as a commercial, necessity to Great Britain.

MR. RATHBONE

I never said anything of the sort. I asserted it was of vast importance.

BARON HENRY DE WORMS

said, the hon. Gentleman had certainly attempted to minimize its special importance to England. If they assumed that goods of the value of £50,000,000 sterling passed through the Canal each year, of which 82 per cent were English, he thought it was clear that England had an immense stake in the maintenance of the Suez Canal. He would, however, leave that portion of the speech of the hon. Member, and pass to other matters which, perhaps, more distinctly bore upon the question before the Committee. First and foremost, he would wish to allude to the speech of the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. That speech was unquestionably one of great ability; but it was more distinguished by what it left unsaid than by what it really said. The hon. Baronet did not condescend to treat the Committee to an exposition of that foreign policy which had led the country to the present disastrous crisis. He simply informed the Committee that it had become necessary for Her Majesty's Government to take certain steps; but, as regarded all the intermediate stages, the hon. Baronet did not give any explanation whatever. Before he made his statement to the Committee as to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the Egyptian crisis, the hon. Baronet adopted a course which was scarcely worthy of the good case which he assumed Her Majesty's Government had. Not content with offering no explanation of the line of policy which had led Her Majesty's Government to the present result, the hon. Baronet endeavoured to throw the whole onus of the present state of affairs upon the late Administration. He referred, in the first instance, to the mission of Mr. Cave in 1876, but of that mission he was not able to say more than that it was entered into with a very useful intention—that was to say, with a view of looking into the accounts of Egypt. But when he came to the mission of 1879, he said he should be able to establish the fact that that particular mission to Egypt was fraught with political rather than with financial importance, and he proceeded to prove his position in a very remarkable way. He said there were two considerations submitted to the Commissioners who were then appointed—M. Joubert and Mr. Rivers Wilson. One of the considerations affected the distribution of the revenues of the country. That the hon. Baronet did not complain of in a political sense; but the other consideration had regard to the administration of the National Debt of the country, not administration in the sense of the word in which it was usually accepted, but in a mere book-keeping sense—that was to say, the Commissioners were called upon to look into the State accounts with a view of putting them in order—and that, the hon. Baronet argued, was a political interference on the part of this country in the affairs of Egypt. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, however, did not mention at the time one fact, and that was that one of the Commissioners who went out to Egypt for that purpose was a Liberal ex-Cabinet Minister—a man of great ability, but who certainly would not have accepted the mission had it been of a political, or anything other than of a purely financial, nature. It was hardly fair to assume, under these circumstances, that this purely financial action was a distinctly political one, and that, as a result of it, we had now been reduced to the unfortunate crisis in which we found ourselves. The hon. Baronet used another argument which was still more remarkable. He said the Commissioners, Messrs. Rivers Wilson and Joubert, were clearly appointed politically, inasmuch as they were allowed to have a seat in the Councils of the Khedive. But the hon. Baronet forgot to mention the fact that that appointment was not made by the Government, but by the Khedive himself, with a view of affording such facilities as might be in his power to the Commissioners for the purpose of setting to rights, if possible, the accounts of Egypt. The hon. Member for Merthyr (Mr. Richard) and the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) declaimed loudly against the war; they said it was undertaken in the interest of the bondholders. They argued that the interference or investigation which took place in 1879 had led to the present crisis; and as, in their opinion, the present crisis was likely to terminate in war, they came to the exceedingly illogical conclusion that, because Mr. Rivers Wilson and M. Joubert were appointed to look into the finances of the country, this war was undertaken in the interest of the bondholders. There were no nations who were not interested more or less in the finances of other countries. Their argument was refuted with great vigour by the President of the Board of Trade. A more ridiculous fallacy or indefensible proposition was never submitted to that House than that because a country had a large pecuniary interest in another country, therefore it was precluded from interfering to protect its own interests. He had already said that the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his long and able speech of yesterday, presented to the Committee no actual defence of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and he (Baron Henry De Worms) was prepared to prove that assertion. He would take one point which was of very great importance. It would be in the recollection of the Committee that some short time since he ventured to ask the Government what were the opinions expressed by two of the Great Powers of Europe—namely, Germany and Austria, as to the course which had been adopted by Her Majesty's Government. The answer he received from the hon. Baronet (Sir Charles W. Dilke) was to the effect that both Germany and Austria had approved the action of Her Majesty's Government in the bombardment of Alexandria. Not feeling perfectly satisfied as to the accuracy of the answer, he repeated his Question two days later, and the answer of the hon. Baronet then was that Germany, at least, so far from expressing approval, had done exactly the reverse. ["No!"] Well, had not expressed her approval. A few days later the hon. Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland) put a similar Question with regard to Austria, and the answer was very much in the same groove. As a matter of fact, the official organ of Austria repudiated the statement that a full approval had been given by Austria.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

asked what the hon. Member meant by official organ?

BARON HENRY DE WORMS

said, he meant the official Gazette.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, that what had been quoted was the language of the diplomatic despatches.

BARON HENRY DE WORMS

said, the communications were printed in the official Wiener Zeitung, and he understood the Government of Austria had not expressed their absolute concurrence with the policy of the Government, as the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had led the Committee to believe. Be that as it might, it would not have been out of place if the hon. Baronet had told the Committee what were the exact relations between the Great Powers and Her Majesty's Government at this moment. If hon. Members looked back they would find that the whole foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government had been based upon what they might now call a myth—the Concert of Europe. The European Concert had been the pet hobby of the Prime Minister ever since he assumed Office. It had been preached to them perpetually; but he was bound to say that the present form of the European Concert was, like a novel form of music, more distinguished by its discord than by its harmony. It was evident that if European Concert on this particular question had ever existed it existed no longer. It was not necessary he should investigate the particular reasons which had led to the alienation of England from many of the Great Powers. Those reasons were not difficult to find. If they remembered some of the utterances of the Prime Minister, such as "Hands off!" applied to Austria, and the "antihuman specimen of humanity !" applied to Turkey, they could understand why the Concert of Europe had not been maintained. The result was that now, when we needed European Concert, we found ourselves isolated and alone, and, therefore, it showed the inherent weakness of his case when the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs dared not face the facts. The hon. Baronet had glossed over the relations between this country and France. In the able speech which they had just heard from the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Mr. T. C. Bruce), the hon. Member put, as clearly and as fairly as it was possible, the reasons which led him to consider that the extraordinary subservience shown to France was fraught with great danger to this country. No one more than himself would desire to see the most perfect entente cordiale between two nations so intimately bound up together as England and France; but he was bound to say that the extraordinary line of policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government with regard to France led one rather to the conclusion that the Government had no exact ideas of their own, but that originally they depended upon France for ideas. It was perfectly clear, that however much the two countries were bound together, however desirable in the interest of civilization it was that France and England should remain on the best possible footing, it was impossible that two countries who had not and could not have the same interest could always have the same policy. That was an axiom of politics, and one which, unfortunately, the present Government had neglected. The interests of France and England were not identical, and, as was pointed out by the hon. Member for Portsmouth, nothing could have been more dangerous, in this particular crisis, than for us to go hand-in-hand with France, who, by her action in Tunis, had offended the Mahommedans. The origin of the whole of these complications might be found in the Dual Note, and that Dual Note was inspired by France. It was no sooner written than it was not acted upon, and what was the result? It begot in the minds of the Egyptian population distrust, and it strengthened the hands of Arabi Pasha. The next step we took was the Ultimatum de jure, but not de facto. Her Majesty's Government endeavoured to prove they did not send the Ultimatum. The actual Ultimatum originated with Her Majesty's Representative at Cairo, and was afterwards accepted by the Government in the Despatch of the 25th of May. The Ultimatum was to the effect that Arabi Pasha should be deprived of his power and banished. Was he deprived of his power and banished? No; he was reinstated and decorated by the Sultan, and France and England were ridiculed. What was the next step in which we went hand-in-hand with France? It was the "Self-Denying" Protocol, which the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister had tried to explain away. When he (Baron Henry De Worms) asked the Prime Minister the other day whether we were not prevented, by that Protocol, from taking any particular course for the security of life and property in Alexandria after the bombardment, the Prime Minister said that was so; but, subsequently, the right hon. Gentleman said that he did not mean it was the effect of the Protocol, but that certain words had been incorporated in the proceedings of the Conference as to "sole action." It was not necessary to point out how extremely illogical the conclusion of the Prime Minister was, because, as a matter of fact, if this "Self-Denying" Protocol was the reason why we did not send troops to prevent the massacres in Alexandria, how was it that now, this "Self-Denying" Protocol being in existence, we could send troops? As a matter of fact, this "Self-Denying" Protocol was merely a clause introduced in the proceedings of the Conference, and this clause was introduced, not at the instigation of England, but at that of Prance. Here there were four facts in support of the argument he advanced—that blind subservience of Her Majesty's Government to that of Prance had mainly contributed to bring about the present disastrous crisis. First of all there was the Dual Note, then there was the Ultimatum, then the Protocole de Désintéressement, and then the sending of the Fleet, also suggested by Prance. The first resulted in distrust, the second in ridicule, the sending of the Fleet resulted in massacre, and the result of the "Self-Denying" Protocol was the destruction of Alexandria. These facts alone wore quite sufficient to show that the Government were, to put the more charitable interpretation, misled by the views which they entertained with regard to the identity of our interests with those of Prance, It appeared to him that, step by step, disregarding all the warnings alike of our own officials, and, he might almost say, the dictates of common sense, we had gradually and certainly come to this terrible state of things. In the masterpiece of the greatest of Italian poets, he was struck with a passage which appeared to him to convey very accurately the position of Her Majesty's Government—Virgil, pointing out to Dante the unfortunate beings whose principal sin would seem to have been their indecision, and their having done neither good nor evil, but who were, notwithstanding, juston the verge of the Inferno, said— Non ragioniam di lor, ma guardaé passa. Her Majesty's Government, through their indecision, stood on the brink of that dark abyss, and had gradually led this country into a dangerous and complicated war. Her Majesty's Opposition could for the moment but look and pass on, waiting events. He did not think it necessary to pursue the course adopted by many hon. Members, and discuss, word for word, the various despatches which were to be found in the Blue Book on this question. He did, however, think that one great reason why the unfortunate result which they now deplored had been arrived at, was the love which Her Majesty's Government had always shown for empty demonstration. It was thought, when the Fleet arrived off Alexandria, that its presence would have such a moral effect upon the Egyptian people that peace and order would at once reign supreme. The policy of the Government was like that adopted by the Chinese and Japanese of old, when they painted hideous faces on shields with the view of frightening their enemies. We had, step by step, drifted into war, of which no one could foretell the end. There was every reason why no loyal Englishmen should wish to embarrass Her Majesty's Government at such a moment as the present—["Oh, oh!"] Hon. Gentlemen said "Oh, oh!" but he should be the last to embarrass the Government; but, on the other hand, he should not be doing his duty to his constituents or to that House were he to debar himself from what he considered perfectly honest and legitimate criticism of the policy which had led to the present result, and the policy of the Government which could be best described as a policy of "Letting I dare not wait upon I would."

MR. GOSCHEN

I do not propose to make many observations on the speech of the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, but wish to address myself to a very different speech, coming from the Benches opposite—the speech of the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Mr. T. C. Bruce), who, in a closely-reasoned argument, full of the responsibilities of the present situation, made a very considerable contribution to this debate. With regard to the speech which we have just heard, I must say it was full of those contradictions which we notice in so many of the speeches of hon. Members opposite, and with respect to which I may have a word or two to say presently. I wish to know, is it the desire of the Conservative Party we should act alone in Egypt, or is it their desire that we should act with other Powers; and, if it is their desire we should act with other Powers, who are the Powers with whom they desire us to act? Those are questions which I think may fairly he put, and with which I propose to deal myself. I think the Committee will see the great embarrassment under which Her Majesty's Government—and, indeed, any Government in Office at a time like this—must labour if they are to fight more or less with their hands tied. They cannot speak of foreign Powers as hon. Members opposite speak of them; they cannot speak with the freedom of independent Members; and they cannot comply with the natural desire which is felt by hon. Members in this House that at every stage the complicated negotiations which are at present being pursued should be made public. Other Powers maintain their secrecy and conduct their negotiations undisturbed by Parliamentary inquiry; and, therefore, I think allowance must be made for Her Majesty's Government in that respect. I might put it in this way. It is a game at "whist" they are playing, and they are expected to lay their cards on the table, while the other players may reserve to themselves the secrecy of their own hands. In speaking of other countries, I shall claim the same privilege of speaking with freedom as hon. Gentlemen opposite; but it will not be in the sense of being discontented with the relative position which this country is occupying at the present moment in the Councils of Europe. The hon. Member who has just sat down spoke of the alienation of other Powers from England. What Power is alienated from England? To what single despatch can hon. Members opposite turn to prove that we are alienated from any Power? Why should hon. Gentlemen wish to turn to any despatch of the kind? Why should they wish to prove that this country has alienated either the goodwill or the respect of the other Powers of Europe? I maintain, and I am prepared to show, that at the present moment this country does enjoy the confidence of the other Powers of Europe, and that it does enjoy it because the Powers believe in the clean-handedness of this country. An hon. Member—I think it was the other hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff)—yesterday said that the other Powers of Europe were suspecting that we had got sinister designs on Egypt. I do not believe that that is the view of the other Powers of Europe. I believe they have convinced themselves of the entire sincerity of England in this matter. Much has been said with regard to France; and we may bear in mind at the present moment that every word which is said with regard to an alliance or an understanding with that great nation is said at a time when that nation itself is in the midst of a great crisis, and when one of the great questions which are before the French people and the French Chamber is the value of an alliance or understanding with England. That is one of the points which is now submitted to French public opinion, and, therefore, under the circumstances, there is a great responsibility attaching to hon. Members of this House who discuss these difficult and delicate relations. I have seen the report of a debate which took place not 10 days ago in the French Chamber, and that report should be read by hon. Gentlemen who think there is no respect or regard for England in Europe. The debate turned upon the value of an understanding with this country, and from all sides of the Chamber there was a feeling expressed that an understanding with England was one of the sheet anchors of French prosperity, and one of the sheet anchors of the future of France, and was, indeed, a matter which was not to be lightly disturbed. I do not say that because the French desire an alliance, that alone is a reason why we should sacrifice any English interests to that alliance; but it is a fact to which we are entitled to call serious attention. And let me ask the Committee at what moment is it that the French desire an alliance with England? Five or six or ten years ago one would have said that the French nation would have been indignant and angry at any isolated action of England in Egypt; one would have said that any shot fired by English guns in Egypt, if the act was not done in company with France, would thoroughly estrange the relations between the two countries. That was the prophecy. The interests of both countries in Egypt had always been acknowledged; and I commend to the recollection of those who talk lightly of our acting alone in Egypt that it has always been a doctrine received in France—a traditional doctrine of French policy—that there could not be any isolated action of England in Egypt. Well, then, I say it is a remarkable fact that in the face of this tradition, in the face of this doctrine, England did act alone in Egypt. And what is the result? That France is alienated or angry? Not at all; but that our action is followed by a debate in which the English alliance is still considered as the sheet-anchor of France. Much has been said about the subservience of England to M. Gambetta. But anyone who reads the French papers will see that precisely the same charge was launched against M. Gambetta, and that he and his Colleagues have been represented as the dupes of the wiles and the astuteness of the English diplomacy. But, perhaps, as it was said in France that Lord Granville always had the better of the French Ministers, it is only natural that the same thing should be said, mutatis mutandis, in England. But unless there are Members of this House—I hope there are none—who read the newspapers in order to find something that may tell against ourselves, anyone who reads the papers in a proper spirit will see that the action of Her Majesty's Government has been appreciated in France, and that where we might have expected opposition and reproach, we have met with nothing but commendation. And I would have said as much, did time permit, with regard to the question of the alienation from us of the other Powers of Europe. If the Committee will allow me I will now turn to some other portions of this great controversy, which may truly be said to extend over so much ground that it is impossible for any hon. Member to deal with it in all its phases. I do not propose to enter into any of the controversies which have been initiated with regard to the bombardment of Alexandria, or the number of troops that Her Majesty's Government ought to have sent during the several stages of the proceedings which have culminated in the position in which we find ourselves now; but I wish, and the Committee will expect mo, to say something on the subject of the Joint Control which has been introduced into the discussion of this question. But, before I come to that point, let me say this, that the key of the position of the Government appears to me to be the fact that anarchy in Egypt is dangerous to the best English interests, and anarchy in Egypt is a thing which cannot be suffered to exist, if we pay due regard to the best interests of our country. That is no new doctrine. Some hon. Members speak as if the importance of Egypt to England had only been discovered since there were Egyptian bondholders, since the making of the Suez Canal, and since the Khedive owed us £200,000. But if we consult the history of the country we shall find that our position in Egypt has always been a matter of supreme importance to England as a nation. An hon. Member asked yesterday why we were in Egypt? Well, we have been there in one form or another for a very long time, indeed, before any of these recent transactions, and partly because we have been invited there by the Rulers of the country themselves; and Egypt, as has been well stated to-day, has long been under our quasi-protection. It is not an independent country. Its relations with Turkey are most peculiar. But the various Governments of Europe have always claimed a locus standi in Egypt different from that claimed in any other country in Europe or elsewhere. I should like to say a word upon that point; but before I do so I regret very much that I must for a moment turn aside to the speech that I understand was made yesterday in my absence by the hon. Member for Wick-low (Mr. M'Coan), which cast aspersions on the transactions of a firm to which I once had the honour to belong. The speech of the hon. Member does not appear to have been fully reported; but I am not going, on the invitation of the hon. Member, to offer any explanations or apologies for the transactions of that firm.

MR. M'COAN

One word of explanation. I cast no aspersions, but simply stated historical facts, in support of which I gave figures and dates. I cast no aspersion whatever, but I left the Committee to draw their own conclusions.

MR. GOSCHEN

There is a peculiar way sometimes of stating figures and dates; but I wonder why the hon. Member singled out the particular firm to which I once belonged, to drag it before the Committee. I will show the way in which the hon. Member put his facts and figures. He spoke of the nominal amount of the loans, and compared it with the actual sum which found its way into the State Treasury, and he asked what had become of the difference; and the insinuation, I understand, was that the difference had gone into the pockets of—[Mr. M'COAN: No, no !]—or had stuck to the hands—a most offensive expression—but I understand it was the expression used by the hon. Member——

MR. M'COAN

I never used the words. The right hon. Gentleman is misrepresenting what I said.

MR. SERJEANT SIMON

I heard the words myself, and I told them to the right hon. Gentleman.

MR. GOSOHEN

These loans were issued at a discount to the public. And let me illustrate the case by an example. The price for 100 francs of French Rentes at present is about 80. If a loan were now to be made for France, it would, of course, not be issued at 100, but would be given to the public at 80; therefore there would be a discount of 20 percent, being the difference between 80 and 100. An analogous discount, going to the public, was included in the sum which was supposed by the hon. Gentleman to have stuck to the hands of the negotiating contractors. That was the way in which the figures were put, and the inferences of the hon. Member are entirely and absolutely erroneous. I turn now from this digression to other and more important matters. I went in 1876 to Egypt, as the Representative of the bondholders, and I went there on the distinct understanding that my political action was to be in no way fettered by that mission, and that I should not be expected to do anything to conflict with the political interests of my countrymen. I was determined that on a honorary mission I would not compromise either my own position, and still less the position of my country, in regard to such matters by any action of my own. When I arrived in Egypt, and established what is called the Control, the Powers of Europe had already interested themselves to obtain a locus standi in Egyptian finance. A few months before my arrival the then Viceroy signed a Decree establishing an institution called the Commission of the Public Debt, and invited the Governments of Austria, Italy, and France to nominate Representatives to that Commission of the Public Debt. These Representatives had been nominated by these Governments, and, therefore, the Committee will bear in mind that at that moment there were European Governments with a locus standi in Egypt at the invitation of the Khedive himself. It is also important to bear in mind the position of the International tribunals in Egypt. The case has been put as if the Control first involved this country in Egyptian affairs; but before the Control was established these tribunals had been created, composed of Judges nominated by various countries of Europe, and the English Judge had been in office for some time, and was performing his functions. The arrangement had been made, and I will now show the Committee the effect of these International tribunals. In May, 1876, the power had been given to the these tribunals to summon before them even the Minister of Finance, and any creditor of the State going before them, had a locus standi as such, and could sue before English, French, Italian, and Austrian Judges. Therefore, this so-called interference in Egyptian financial matters already existed before the establishment of the Control. There is a little incident long since forgotten which I may call to the recollection of the Committee. It is a fact that a creditor of the State had, at that moment, seized public property, and was suing the Viceroy before that tribunal. I do not say this to defend my action or the full share I took in founding the Control, but I think it right that the country should know that the so-called Financial Protectorate existed before the Control was established. The Control itself may be attacked or defended on two grounds; either in its relations to the public of Egypt, or in its bearing upon the relations of the Great Powers of Europe with the Egyptian Government. As regards its effect on the population of Egypt I might say much, but I shall say very little; for there has been almost universal testimony from both sides of the House and even in "another place," both from the Leader of the House of Lords and the Leader of the Opposition, that it has worked for the prosperity of the Egyptian people, and to that fact testimony has been borne, not only in all parts of the House, but in all the news arriving in this country from Egypt. I believe that Arabi Bey himself admitted to Sir William Gregory, that the Control was an institution which had conferred great benefits on the country. I am relieved, therefore, from the necessity of saying more as to its effects on the population of Egypt. I may, however, say this, that a clause was carefully inserted in the Decree relating to the Controllers, the object of which was to insure the specific protection of the taxpayers against unauthorized exactions. Those who were in the House a few hours ago must have heard the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Mr. T. C. Bruce) who sits above the Gangway, bear testimony to the efficiency of the arrangement in having lightened the taxation of the fellahs in Egypt and relieved them from the abuses to which they had been exposed. I stated, when I returned from Egypt in 1876, that the then Viceroy never for one moment held out a hope that if there was any diminution in the interest of the Debt there would be the slightest relief to the burdens imposed upon the taxpayers of Egypt. A true word has been said in the debate to-day, that if the Control had been entirely swept away and the whole Debt wiped out, it would by no means follow that the Egyptian taxpayer would under a disorderly military régime pay one cent less than he pays at the present time. It has been said very prominently—for the responsibility must be thrown on some-one—that it was myself, although acting as a private individual, who established this Control. Well, however that may be, I am entitled to examine—and I do it in no spirit of apology, but simply in the spirit of explanation—how far the Control, established in 1870, involved Her Majesty's Government. I say it did not involve them at all. Lord Derby did not appoint a Controller; even the French Government did not appoint a Controller; but they nominated one, and he was chosen and appointed by the Viceroy himself. There is only one quotation with which I will trouble the Committee. In one passage of the Decree relating to the establishment of the Control, the Viceroy, speaking of the Controllers, says—"They are to be accountable only to us." The Controllers were to be accountable to nobody else, as they did not depend upon the Commission of Foreign Governments. There was another phrase— The Controllers General, who are to take part in the preparation of the Budget, are not to encroach on the functions of the Ministers, who will remain the solo judges of the necessity of the services. The Controllers did not involve Her Majesty's Government in any way. I stated at the time to the bondholders that the appointment of a Controller by the Government would be contrary to English views and habits. Referring to the desirability of having an English Representative of the bondholders on the Commission of the Public Debt, I stated that although the Viceroy might nominate such an English Commissioner, I did not believe the English Government would send such a Representative to Egypt, as it was contrary to English views and habits. I say that much to show that I may be responsible, as a private individual, for having secured the Control which, I believe, to have been most conducive to the welfare of Egypt, but that I do not consider that Her Majesty's Government were at all involved by the arrangements to which I was a party. It was my conviction at the time that the interests of the Egyptian taxpayers and the interests of the creditors were not hostile, and that both were united in the establishment of honest and orderly administration in Egypt. That was nay conviction at the time, and it has been proved by the result, for order and regularity in the administration have contributed much to the prosperity of the country. I am responsible for what I have done in union with my French Colleague; but I am not responsible in the slightest degree for establishing a Control by the English Government which would involve that Government in the action taken by the Controllers. Such, then, is the story of the Control. If the Committee will permit me, I will now turn for a moment to another point, and make a few remarks upon some of the causes which have disturbed the progress of that comparatively orderly state of things which was established in Egypt. But it occurs to me that I ought first to say one word with regard to the English and French employés. Before the Control was established at all, there were already innumerable English, French, and other foreign employés in the Government of Egypt, and they were there not in what are properly called administrative departments only. The term includes a number of men with technical knowledge, such as engineers and others who have got such special training as only Europeans acquire in the first instance. Further, it ought to be borne in mind that when in a country like Egypt a disorderly state of things is brought to an end, and good order introduced, it is not in the first instance that Natives can be got to do the work. It is part of the duty of Europeans to see that the Natives should be trained to the work, and taught to do it afterwards; but at first Natives cannot do it. I turn now to the question how the present difficulties have arisen, and what were the influences and agencies at work in Egypt and elsewhere. I think, in the first place, that an orderly Egypt, with finances comparatively flourishing, with a strong direct control over the Pashas and over the Government, and with an improving commerce, might not have been a perfectly agreeable thing in another quarter. And when we are pressed to secure the moral support of Turkey, I think I am entitled to say that I have never seen any moral support from the Ottoman authority that tended to secure financial or any other control. The new order of things in Egypt was a thorn in the side of another Power. I have been informed, and with good reason believe, that the Turkish newspapers were told to be exceedingly careful in their comments upon the rising prosperity of their co-religionists in Egypt. The state of things established in Egypt did not, from the point of view that it was good, or from the very virtue of the system, if I may so say, secure it that support and sympathy from the Suzerain Power which, under other circumstances, one might have expected. Then, in the country itself, testimony has been borne that many abuses were curtailed, and the curtailment of abuses sometimes creates enemies to the system which has introduced the reforms. In Egypt there were a number of influences at work which were hostile to the Control. I think I may, with all respect to the Committee, venture on the comment that, in many of the speeches we have heard, too much stress has been laid upon separate acts, such as the Dual Note, and that while objections have been taken here and objections there, the general causes which produced the alarming events in Egypt have not been sufficiently considered. The hon. Member for Portsmouth (Mr. T. C. Bruce), in his excellent speech, alluded to one or two of these causes, and I am able, in some respects, from absolute knowledge, to confirm what he said. He spoke of the effect of the Tunisian Expedition upon the feelings of the population of Egypt. When I come to this part of the question, though I would wish to speak with all respect of France, I must say I think a tremendous responsibility has followed from the action which that country took with respect to Tunis. The hon. Member for Portsmouth was perfectly right in saying that this attack, as it was considered, upon the Mussulman element in Tunis, inflamed the Mussulman element in Egypt, and created suspicion where there was little suspicion before. I am not now inventing arguments, but I will tell the Committee facts which were brought to my notice when these matters occurred. I had letters from Egypt stating that the populace was saying—"The French have taken Tunis; it is absolutely certain that the English will take Egypt." They thought that was a perfectly rational result. They had not got a knowledge of the English Government, or of my right hon. Friend at the head of it, or they would have known that such a solution was most improbable. But they thought it was perfectly natural that as there had been a beginning on the part of France in seizing Mussulman territory in Tunis, we should follow it up by putting our hands on Egypt. I do not wish in this debate to introduce controversial matters, but it would be contrary to historical accuracy if I were to omit the fact that the taking of Cyprus by England also had its effect. It acted in this way. We took Cyprus, the French took Tunis; so they argued our turn was coming again, and we should take Egypt. There is great confidence in the sincerity of the English Government; but there is no doubt that—I was going to say the seizure of Cyprus—but I will say the Cyprus arrangements did affect, to a very considerable extent, the Mussulman mind, and that the Native Egyptians did not think themselves so safe against annexation to England as they had been before. This is not a digression, but it comes, I think, within the purview of the Committee. I do not think that the hon. Member for Portsmouth was quite correct when, speaking of the difficulty of the French and the Sultan acting together, he set that down simply to the Tunisian Expedition. The Tunisian Expedition was rather the result of the suspicion France entertained of the movements of Turkey. The suspicion of a Panislamic movement contributed greatly to the action of France. The attitude was this, and I think I am an impartial witness on the question. If ever a foreign Government took action at an inopportune moment, it was when the French took isolated action as regards Tunis, at the very time when a Conference was sitting at Constantinople. But I do not think that the French Government acted from financial or corrupt motives. They very likely believed earnestly that there was danger to be feared from Tripoli, and that the Sultan had for some time been raising a fanatical Mussulman feeling in various parts of his Empire. I am bound to say that it afterwards came before me personally that what was called a Party at the Palace, if not the Turkish Government, were doing their best to inflame and stimulate Mussulman feeling in Africa and elsewhere. Now, I have said that the action of the French in Tunis was one of the causes which led to excitement in Egypt; it is also true that there is much evidence to show that efforts have for several years been made by influential people at Constantinople—people connected with the Government—to stir up fanaticism. Among other circumstances that came to my knowledge, I learnt that pamphlets to the number of 40,000 were distributed at Mecca—that great gathering-place of pilgrims from all parts of the Mussulman world. The Dutch received similar information with regard to their Mussulman Possessions; and it seems that an idea, perhaps not an unnatural one, had been formed in the minds of the Rulers at Constantinople, that they ought to try, by increasing the authority of the Caliphate elsewhere, to indemnify themselves for the loss of territory in Europe. They hoped, in fact, that in many parts of the Empire they would be able to emancipate themselves from Western influence. And now the Committee, if they have followed me, will see that we may have to deal with feelings which have been purposely roused with a deep political object, and we must guide our course accordingly. This is not a financial question. We have to consider the attitude of this country towards the East in general; and when Her Majesty's Government go forward with the difficult work which they have undertaken, I trust they will have the sympathy of the country. We have undertaken that work in the same spirit as that in which we undertook the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, not as the representatives of the Cross against the Crescent, not with any desire to increase the fanaticism which unfortunately exists, but simply as the champions of order and civilization; the champions of order who are unwilling to allow the banishment of all Western influence, which has laid hold, and which most people of this country wish should lay hold, of many parts of the Empire of Turkey in order to improve the position of its population. Is that to be thrust back 20, 30, or 40 years? I can assure the many Members who sit on this side of the House, and who take an interest in such matters as the Slave Trade, the better government of Eastern Roumelia, and the position of the Christian populations in Armenia—objects which have long been dear to many Members of the Liberal Party—that those objects would not only be compromised, but in all probability frustrated for ever, if England were to allow herself, by what I must call the terrorism of massacre, to be driven out of Egypt. Let me emphasize that expression, "the terrorism of massacre." That has been the policy of the Military Rulers of Egypt. They have said—"We have hostages for the conduct of the European Powers, and we will slay all Europeans on whom we can lay hands if our terms are not granted." What, I ask, would be the position of England, of Europe, of Christians in all parts of the Mussulman Empire, if the fear of such a terrorism were to hamper us in the action which we must take for the defence of the interests of our country? Where should we be in Syria and Damascus and in Armenia? I do not speak of India, because we are agreed what would be the effect in India. But this is not only a question of India or affecting trade, but it is this. Is the West to be thrust back by the East? That is one of the questions which may have to be decided. That is one of the questions before Europe at the present moment; one of the issues which is before this Committee and the Govern- ment. Under what conditions is the Government to undertake that task? I come back to the question with which I ventured to open my observations. Are we to go alone; are we to go with Allies, and, if so, with what Allies? Now, it appears to me that, whenever the case is put that the Government is going alone, the charge is made that we are isolated; and whenever the case is put that we are going with Allies, the charge is made that we are hampered and embarrassed. Well, now, I think the critics of the Government ought to elect which course to take. It appears to me there is much to be said on both sides. The hon. Member who spoke last exclaimed, "What co-operation have you got?" I should have thought it would have been more satisfactory to hon. Members of that section to which the hon. Member belongs to have said England should undertake this task alone, and does not require the co-operation of other countries. Do they believe we require the co-operation of other countries? I may frankly state my own opinion as to what I believe would be for the greatest advantage to the Government and the greatest convenience. And that is, as far as regards Military and Naval operations, that England should go alone; but we should go alone with the goodwill and cordial support of other Powers; that we should not act alone so distinctly or arrogantly as to make the other Powers of Europe mistrust us. But I am not dissatisfied with the position in this respect in which we stand. The other Governments do not oppose us, but give us their cordial support and leave us to conduct operations alone. I have been perfectly candid in my statement. I wonder whether right hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition Benches will favour the Committee with a distinct statement of what they think the Government ought to do. There is one point in the speech of the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Mr. T. C. Bruce) which I wish to notice, because I think it was almost the only part of his speech with which I do not cordially agree. He said there were two ways in which we might act with Turkey. We might, he said, either have an armed force from Turkey, or their moral support; and the hon. Member, if I understood him rightly, put the case thus. We do not wish for the Army of Turkey to come with us; but we blame the Government for not having secured the goodwill and moral support of the Suzerain. I wonder whether that is an argument adopted by any largo section of this House. I think I know what the moral support of Turkey is. The moral support of Turkey is Dervish Pasha. He was sent to Egypt to give precisely that moral support which my hon. Friend recommends. And another feature of the moral support of Turkey is the decoration of Arabi. I should like to know what would be the object of Turkey in giving her moral support? Will she give it us out of Platonic friendship, and towards what object? Will she give it towards the reform of Egyptian Administration; towards establishing a Chamber of Egyptian Notables when the Constitution in Turkey is in suspense? While I will not go so far at this moment as to say that I regret that the Turkish Forces have been announced as being likely to co-operate, yet I should prefer that we should ourselves act first; and, whatever action the Government may take, I trust they will not suspend their operations on account of these delusive or procrastinating efforts of Turkey to act with us at the last moment. Her co-operation would simply be an embarrassment. The Committee will remember the objects which the Government proposes to effect in Egypt; and let us take care that, in whatever alliance we make, or whatever arrangements we pledge ourselves to, we may retain sufficient liberty of action, at the end of those tremendous efforts which it may possibly be necessary to make, to have our English policy in Egypt carried out for the benefit of all, and according to those principles for which we contend. But it is said, "We are alienated in Europe," and the policy of the Government is generally talked of as weak and vacillating in this matter. I should like to ask what Power of Europe do those critics who bring those charges most admire? In whose shoes would they like us to stand as far as these matters are concerned? In regard to France, the position of France is desperately difficult; and I will admit to the full the difficulty which our Government has had to contend with, and that it is almost impossible for them to secure at the same time the goodwill of Turkey and the goodwill of France. That is a question of great complexity. I do not wish to speak dogmatically; but if you wish to secure alliance with either of these two countries and the goodwill of one or the other, in what direction ought this country to look? Egypt is a matter of great and supreme importance to us; hut Egypt does not constitute the whole of European politics. There are other questions, and questions which are very delicate. Allowance must he made for Franee as regards her great military neighbours. I believe Franee looks on the matter in this light. The critics of the Government speak of our being isolated, but we have, at all events, no enemy on our frontier; but allowance must be made for French uncertainties and difficulties in this respect. We may send an army to Egypt, and our coasts will still remain secure; but French politicians may hesitate, and I believe do hesitate, not from the point of view of any misunderstanding upon the Egyptian Question—do not seek for the cause where it does not exist—but they hesitate because they are not prepared to send a large body of troops away from home in consideration of other possible eventualities which, as the hon. Member for Portsmouth said, are never absent from the minds of Frenchmen before they send away from home a body of troops. Another difficulty has been alluded to; it is the existence of excessively weak Governments in Franee—weak in this sense, that they do not command a sufficient majority to secure a continuity of policy. With all those difficulties, will it be wise to take advantage of those difficulties and show anything but perfect goodwill towards France? I think not; and I do not believe it would be for the interest of England that France at this moment should feel herself driven, by the necessities of her position, into joining those four Powers who are always exercising a kind of watchful attitude towards her. Hon. Members speak of the European Concert. It is not only our Government that desires to act with other Powers. That principle is now introduced into European politics; it may be that sometimes one Power is excluded, but what is the connection between Austria, Germany, Russia, and Italy but a kind of Concert of a large part of Europe? And all recognize the value of dealing with questions in that way, and of having them placed before them. Now, let me answer one objection. It is this. If this matter is, as you say, of grave danger to European civilization, why do not Germany and Austria take the same view? Hon. Members opposite, and the critics of the Government in the Press, and abroad, and elsewhere, are very candid when they speak of any English Government. What are the views and the feelings with which Germany and Austria are inspired? They do not look at the Egyptian Question from the narrow point of view of the settlement of the Eastern Question; but Germany looks at the position of Turkey as an invaluable position in a conflict which she might have either with Russia or France. Turkey lies in a position that if there were a conflict between Germany and Russia, Turkey would be an invaluable Ally; and if there were a conflict between Germany and France, the Mussulman element in the North of Africa might be an element to which she would look for support. Austria follows Germany. She has difficulties enough also in her way, and she is required, under serious conditions, to maintain a very reserved attitude on the Eastern Question. Under these conditions, I decline to be guided by the example of those two great Central Powers in determining what is the duty of England, whose position is totally different; and what we wish for, and what has been announced by the Government, is this—that in those countries they should recognize the paramount interests of England and France. They make no conditions whatever, and we are in this position—that having consulted them, they are in a good humour; whereas, if we had stood aloof, in the event of embarrassments arising, we should not have known what their attitude would be. Hon. Members scoff at the Concert of Europe; but it has rendered efficient service to the cause of peace in Europe, and it has strengthened the position of the Government, and they have consulted the other Powers of Europe. Now, I will not prolong these observations; I will only make one more remark, and it is this. Having this severe struggle on our hands—I do not think anybody in this House disguises the gravity of the struggle—having it on our hands, it will contribute enormously to our power and our reputation, if foreign Governments believe that it is one England that is acting, and it is not two Englands with which they have to deal. I mean this. If they know that, whatever criticism there may be on the past, there is continuity of policy in this matter, whatever Party reigns supreme, then the position of England will be infinitely strengthened in the Councils of Europe. There was a time—not so many years ago—when our controversies were mainly limited to domestic affairs, and their influence did not extend much beyond domestic questions; but that is changed now. Having held a responsible position abroad, I know the full effect of doubts as to the existence of unity in England. If a Foreign Power thinks it has only to deal with a section or a Party, and that England, as a whole, is not at its back, the Government will be seriously weakened. But it will be immensely strengthened, not in a political sense, but as the Representatives of the country in carrying out its objects, if it is understood abroad, as I hope it will be, that no such difficulties or disunions exist in regard to our Egyptian policy, and that even if it should happen that the present Government should fall and another take its place, the same policy on this question will be pursued. With regard to what is to follow after the impending struggle shall have been concluded, I agree with the view that when Egypt is restored to order we should evoke Native aid in governing the country. I am content with the declaration the Government have made with regard to the future of Egypt, and I cordially hope that their action will be for the benefit of Egypt, and that their efforts will be crowned with success in securing increased order and prosperity in the East.

MR. BOURKE

rose to continue the debate.

MR. M'COAN

asked to be allowed to make a personal explanation in regard to an observation which had been made by the right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen)——

THE CHAIRMAN

said, he had called upon the right hon. Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke).

MR. M'COAN

said, he imagined that, as a question of right, he was entitled to make a personal explanation.

MR. T. P. O'CONNOR

rose to a point of Order. He wished to ask the Chairman if it had not been the inva- riable practice of the Committee to give precedence to an hon. Member who wished to make a personal explanation?

THE CHAIRMAN

If the hon. Member for Wicklow (Mr. M'Coan) intends to confine himself strictly to a personal explanation, he can, with the indulgence of the Committee, be heard; but he is not entitled to reply to the remarks of the right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) after I have called upon another right hon. Member.

MR. M'COAN

said, he had stated, on rising, that he wished to say a few words of personal explanation. He believed that he had a right to do so, and if he had misapprehended his right, he regretted it.

THE CHAIRMAN

There is no question of right in the matter; but the hon. Member may be permitted, by the indulgence of the Committee, to make a personal explanation.

MR. M'COAN

said, he would ask the indulgence of the Committee to allow him to make a personal explanation. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Goschen) had complained of a speech he had neither heard delivered nor seen reported. He based his complaint on some of his (Mr. M'Coan's) remarks, which seemed to have been communicated to him by the hon. and learned Gentleman sitting next to him (Mr. Serjeant Simon). He (Mr. M'Coan) questioned the accuracy of the words which had been reported to the right hon. Gentleman; but that was not the point he had to deal with now. In referring to Egyptian finance last night, his object was not to attack either the right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) or his firm, but to show that Egypt, in its dealings with European financiers, had suffered very hardly, and that the case of the bondholders was neither so strong nor so weak as some persons thought. He had said that in respect of the three loans contracted for by the firm of which the right hon. Gentleman was then a member, amounting to a total of £12,000,000, the Egyptian Treasury only received £9,000,000 in cash, or its equivalent. He did not intend to insinuate—he would have been fatuous or foolish if he had—that the firm had put that balance of £3,000,000 into their pockets. He said nothing of the kind. But, making ample allowance for the discount usual in these cases, there still remained a margin of £785,000, which, according to his understanding of the transaction, could only have gone into the pockets of the contractors. He did not say that last night, but he said so now. [dries of "Order!"]

THE CHAIRMAN

The hon. Member is now introducing new matter.

MR. BOURKE

I am quite sure there was one observation which fell from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) with which the whole Committee will sympathize, and that is the observation he made in referring to his own personal position in regard to the Control in Egypt. I myself happened to be at the Foreign Office at the time when the right hon. Gentleman went to Egypt; and, being acquainted with what occurred at that time, I must be allowed to say that I can entirely corroborate the statement he has made. It was fully understood that whatever he did in Egypt should not pledge or commit him to any political action hereafter. The observations which have been made by the right hon. Gentleman in reference to the Control could not but have been listened to by the Committee with great interest. I shall, however, if the Committee will allow me, say two or three words upon that subject in the course of the observations I propose to make. The right hon. Gentleman has asked one or two questions which I should like to answer in the first instance. He said he should like the question answered, whether hon. Members on this side of the House desired the English Government to go to Egypt at the present moment, with or without allies? And he added that there was much to be said on both sides of the question. Now, I do not think that is a question we on this side of the House are called upon to answer. What we wish to know, to use a common expression, is with which horse the Government really desire to win? It is we, and not they, who have a right to ask that question. From reading these Papers, I am greatly inclined to fear that we are going to Egypt without Allies; and that, instead of obtaining the Concert of Europe, we are in danger of falling into isolated action. For my own part, I have no objection to the Concert of Europe being carried out to the greatest and fullest extent. I have never said a word against that Concert, either in this House or anywhere else; but I am against sacrificing, for the Concert of Europe, the vital interests of England. The right hon. Gentleman, in his remarks in reference to the Concert of Europe, has, I think, been rather hard upon our old friend Turkey; and I very much doubt the prudence of the right hon. Gentleman, if he wishes at this moment to effect the good, which I am sure he does wish, in speaking of Turkey in the way he has. The right hon. Gentleman said the moral support of Turkey, which some persons said we had lost, and which everyone on this side of the House says we ought to gain if we can, is summed up in Dervish Pasha. Now, we cannot forget that that moral support has been invoked by Her Majesty's Government, but invoked at a time when it is almost too late to do any good; and, therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of any supporter of the Government to say it is a mistake to invoke the moral support of Turkey. Passing from that matter and the observations of the right hon. Gentleman, I have, in the first instance, to say that we should have been very glad indeed if we could have separated this discussion upon the Vote of Credit now before the Committee from the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and no person can feel more strongly than I do the critical position in which the Government now finds itself placed. I quite agree with the observations of the right hon. Gentleman that it is, above all things, necessary, at this moment, at any rate as regards the practical support about to be given to the action of the Government, that the country should present to Foreign Nations an attitude of entire unanimity. With regard to the question of unanimity generally, and the observations of the right hon. Gentleman on that subject, I will only make one remark, that when we on this side of the House were in Office, those sentiments were not so common as they are now. They are sentiments which I most cordially endorse; and I hope, in the few observations I am about to make, I shall say nothing that can in any way be deemed contrary to them. I am not anxious to say anything that can aggravate the crisis in which the country now finds itself, or to excite alarm. There can be no doubt that the power of England is amply sufficient to crush the man whom the Government speak of as a military adventurer, and the cause of all our troubles in Egypt. But, at the same time, there are questions looming in the future in regard to our relations in the East—questions that will arise in all probability out of the operations which we are now undertaking, and which I feel to be of the greatest moment both to India and this country. Therefore I, for one, would have been perfectly happy to have given a silent vote on this vote of Credit, and not to have said a word about the policy of Her Majesty's Government, were it not for the speeches which have been made from the Government side of the House. I allude particularly to the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government, and of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles W. Dilke). Those speeches have been made, and, considering that I represented the Foreign Office under the late Administration in this House, I might have been thought afraid, and shirking my duty, if I had not, notwithstanding the short time that remains to-day for a reply, risen to take part in the discussion. It has been very often said, both in this House and out of it, both by the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government and by the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the present Ministry inherited the Control in Egypt from their Predecessors, that policy having been established and encouraged by us. Now, Sir, as a fact, I have not the slightest objection to that; but, as an innuendo, it is erroneous; because, not only do the Government desire to prove a fact about which there is no question, but, by way of innuendo, they desire to show that we are responsible for the present deplorable state of things. It is one thing to inherit a policy, and another thing by mismanagement, by imprudence, by vacillation, and by weakness, to allow that policy to lead you into the difficulties in which you find yourselves, and for which we say the Control is in no way responsible. I have no fault to find with the description of the Control given in the interesting speech of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I accept the statement made by the hon. Baronet on that subject—that the Control did bring us into political relations with the Government of Egypt. A Control, to be of the slightest service in Egypt, must bring us into relations with the Government of Egypt. That is an absolute necessity, and it has been proved over and over again, during the discussions which have taken place between the Controllers and the authorities of Egypt, that it would be perfectly useless to give two European officials the nominal power of control, unless you gave them, at the same time, power to bring before the Government the financial condition of every great institution in the country. What, for example, could be the value of giving a nominal Control over the Customs, the Excise, the railroads, or any other institution in Egypt, if, at the same time, you allow the Army, the Navy, or any other Department to fall into financial extravagance and disorder? After trying again and again a different course, the late Khedive admitted that it was absolutely necessary to give financial control to the European Controllers over the institutions of the country. But, Sir, the hon. Baronet went a great deal further than to say that the Control had been the cause of our present difficulties; because he asserted that our position in Egypt was imposed on us by necessity, by Treaty-right, and also by duty altogether beyond and beside. He showed that it was imposed on us by necessity, owing to our position in India and our relations with the Suez Canal; and he contended that it was also imposed upon us by Treaty-right, on account of the arrangements we had entered into at the time of the pacification of the Levant; and by duty, because we were bound to ameliorate the condition of the population of Egypt as much as possible. If that be the case with regard to our position in Egypt, it carries us much further than the most ardent supporters of the late Government say the question of the Control ever ought to have carried us, or ever did carry us. It has been proved over and over again, in the course of this debate, that there is ample authority for saying that the Control was not the real source or cause of the difficulty in Egypt. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen), who has just addressed the House, and certainly my hon. Friend behind me (Mr. Bruce), pointed out in what manner they considered the establishment of the Control had been of benefit to Egypt. I have also to acknowledge—and I do so with great pleasure—that part of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain) which deals with this part of the subject; because the right hon. Gentleman has stated that there is no connection between the Control and the difficulties that have arisen in Egypt. If that be the case, I hope we shall hear no more of the insinuations that have been made as to the Control having been the cause of the present embroglio. But here I would make one more observation, and it is, that if hon. Members will only recall the circumstances, it will be seen that the Egyptian difficulty, as far as this country is concerned, originated with the Consuls and Consuls General, and that the Control, whatever else may be said with regard to it, had a very Small share in the creation of the troubles that have lately arisen out of our relations with that country. The fact of the matter is, that Her Majesty's Government, as far as they can be said to have inherited a policy from their Predecessors with regard to Egypt, inherited a peaceful policy. They inherited, not only a peaceful policy, but also a promising policy and a progressive policy; for the previous Government left Egypt a peaceful, a progressive, and a promising country, and for more than a year after we quitted Office, Egypt continued to be peaceful, progressive, and promising. Sir, Egypt had been saved by Her Majesty's late Government from a condition of national bankruptcy; and nobody can deny that this was one of the results of their action. The Commission of Inquiry which followed upon the mission of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) showed, in the most unmistakable manner, that Egypt was suffering from every species of bad government from which a country could suffer. There was no Department in the State which was not in a condition of disorder; and the arbitrary power of the Khedive was shown to be the cause—the despotic cause—of all the evils then apparent in the Government of Egypt. The arbitrary power of the Khedive of Egypt may, therefore, be considered to have been the cardinal cause of the abuses which prevailed in all the Departments of the State; and it was not until the Khedive, by an arbitrary act which all the Powers of Europe condemned and protested against—it was not until the Khedive, by that arbitrary act, displayed a determination to return to his old courses after the Control had been established, that Her Majesty's Government proposed to the Sultan that the Khedive should be deposed. Sir, I believe that the policy of the late Government in this respect was a righteous policy. I believe that if Her Majesty's present Government had exhibited the same firmness, if they had acted on the same lines as their Predecessors, they would not have found themselves in their present position. Such was the state of the Government of Egypt that taxes were levied against the law, and under no authority from the Government. In fact, the taxes wore levied under no rational system that was over heard of before, and sometimes were extorted from the people in the most illegal manner. Occasionally a whole village would be taxed en bloc; sometimes individuals would be taxed at the caprice of the tax-collector. The taxes were also gathered at irregular times and seasons, and forced labour was carried out in a most harsh and tyrannical manner; while, in the case of the Army, the recruiting was proceeded with in a most objectionable way, and by the most capricious mode of selection. Even after money had been given by the unfortunate fellaheen for exemption from service, and often after large and exorbitant sums had been paid to secure immunity from the liability to serve, those who had made these payments were, nevertheless, obliged to undergo Army service. Again, the Irrigation Tax, which is a tax absolutely essential to the prosperity of Egypt, was levied in the most unfair and unjust manner, especially upon the poorer taxpayers; and the Khedive—the late Khedive—announced his intention of appointing Mr. Rivers Wilson Minister of Finance; he also announced an intention to give up all personal control over the finances of the country, with a view, as he said, of incorporating Egypt in the European system. It was not until the word of the late Khedive had been broken to Mr. Rivers Wilson that Her Majesty's then Government adopted the strong measures which they took with regard to the Khedive. There is an idea abroad that the Marquess of Salisbury nominated Mr. Rivers Wilson as Finance Minister; but this was a mistake. In point of fact, the Marquess of Salisbury, on the contrary, did exactly the reverse with regard to Mr. Rivers Wilson. When the Marquess of Salisbury was first asked by the Khedive to nominate a European to take the post of Finance Minister, with a seat in the Egyptian Cabinet, the Marquess of Salisbury declined—absolutely declined—to do so; and it was entirely at the instance and by the action of the then Khedive that Mr. Rivers Wilson was appointed. Well, Sir, when the Minister was dismissed, the Control, which we have heard described by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen), was re-established, and, as has been stated, proved most beneficial to the interests of Egypt. I say, therefore, with regard to that Control, that Her Majesty's present Government, so far from inheriting difficulties created by the Control, inherited, when they came into Office in 1880, a position of prosperity in Egypt which they would not have inherited had it not been for the establishment of the Control. The year 1880 was marked by pro-gross, and in that year Her Majesty's Government inherited a peaceful policy; and it was not until long after they had come into Office that the calamitous state of things we are now discussing began to show itself. The incidents connected with these calamitous events have been fully detailed by previous speakers in this House; and I should be abusing its indulgence if I were to go into them again at any length. Therefore, I shall not allude to them beyond what may be necessary in order to explain my meaning with regard to the policy of Her Majesty's Government. From September last, down to the present time, Egypt may be said to have been in a position of rebellion; and all the events that have taken place in that country subsequent to that time have been, as a matter of fact, the consequences of the military rebellion which has there been going on. The incidents of that rebellion include the forced promotion of the officers at the instance of Arabi Pasha, the forced placing of Arabi himself in office, the convocation of the Chamber of Notables without the consent of the Khedive; all these were steps in that military revolt which I will not weary the House by describing. But, Sir, I may say that until a very short time ago no steps were taken by Her Majesty's Government which appear to have had the slightest effect on that revolt. Now, considering the position we have always held in Egypt, this must be regarded as very extraordinary. There was one striking and remarkable point of agreement between Arabi, the Khedive, and Mr. Cookson—namely, that the Sultan should be appealed to; and it was arranged that Arabi was to protect life and property pending the issue of an order from the Sultan. The Khedive applied to the Sultan for 20 battalions of soldiers, and Mr. Cook-son said the only thing to be done was to ask the Sultan to send a Special Commissioner. Thus we have these three authorities concurring in the principle that an appeal should be made to the Sultan. The French Government then made a representation to the English Government with regard to the course that should be pursued, and it has already been pointed out to the House that the French Government set itself absolutely and entirely against any intervention, moral or physical. The British Government had no clear idea of the course that ought to be adopted. They said over and over again that all foreign intervention was undesirable, and determined, as far as they could, to prevent it; but, at the same time, they considered it to be without doubt that, if necessary, the influence of Turkey should be employed. I recollect very well the excitement that went on at the time, and which existed at the Court and the Palace, with regard to the course Her Majesty's Government were taking in reference to the Porte; and we see, by the Papers that have been published, that the Sultan was much mortified when he found that Her Majesty's Government were determined to take the French view of the matter. But there seemed to be some hesitation in the mind of Lord Granville as to the course that should be taken, because the French Government persuaded him to take a view which, I conclude, he was not at first inclined to take; for the French Charge d' Affaires went down to Walmer, and succeeded, without the slightest difficulty, in turning Lord Granville round to the view entertained by the Govern- ment he represented. Well, Sir, there is also very good evidence of Mr. Malet's opinion when he went to Constantinople from this country, having been exactly in the position occupied by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen)—namely, that he went straight from Her Majesty's Ministry to the Sultan's capital, He described, in his despatch of the 21st September, 1881, to Lord Granville, his first interview with the Sultan on the position of affairs in Egypt. Mr. Malet, in that despatch, says— I said that naturally the situation in Egypt had given rise to my being consulted by Her Majesty's Government as to the course to he pursued there in case the insubordination of the military should continue, and that I had expressed the view that the remedy lay with His Majesty as Suzerain of the Khedive; that I had expressed this opinion because it seemed to mo to be the only one which could be in harmony with the general policy of England towards Egypt, which was distinctly not one of aggression; that our only object was to maintain tranquillity and good government in the country which was our highway to India; and, therefore, if armed repression should unfortunately become necessary, it seemed to me it ought to be employed by the Sovereign Power. We can understand that it was very natural for the Sultan to be mortified and deeply hurt when, after hearing this from the Gentleman who had been sent out from England by Her Majesty's Government, and who had used the expressions I have read to the House, he found that the Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to take the course then pursued. I think I can imagine what the Sovereign of Turkey must have said on the subject at this time. He doubtless asked himself whether he was Sovereign of Egypt or not, because if he were Sovereign of Egypt he had a perfect right to act in Egypt in the way he proposed to act; and, if he wore not Sovereign of Egypt, the two Western Powers were acting towards him with bad faith. The French newspapers, as we know, were at this period full of the most harsh observations with respect to the action of the Turkish Government, and were swayed by an ambitious policy in North Africa. And this was the unfortunate time that the English Government went out of their way to ally themselves wholly with the policy of France. My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Mr. T. C. Bruce) and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Gosehen) have each made reference to the subject of Tunis. I shall not attempt to repeat what has been said by my hon. Friend (Mr. T. C. Bruce), and shall only say that I agree with every word that has fallen from him in relation to that topic. Tunis was no affair of ours; but with regard to Egypt, if the French Government, fortunately or unfortunately, chose to embark in any adventurous policy in that country which had the effect of rendering them unpopular in the East, I think it would have been very easy on the part of Her Majesty's Government to have pointed out to the French Government that, with respect to Egypt at least, it would be impossible for us not to take into consideration the position which France had made for herself in relation to the Turkish population by her policy at Tunis, and to have told the French Government fairly and broadly that we could not, unless we saw very good reasons for it, follow her in the policy she had marked out for herself. Sir, I am as anxious as anyone can be for a good understanding with France. No one who has the slightest knowledge of foreign affairs can fail to see how desirable it is that this country should go hand-in-hand with France as far as it is possible to go, and that France should be powerful in Europe and continue to exercise that influence which she has always exercised. This is the opinion which I have always entertained; but I do not find in the Papers before us the slightest indication of any expostulation or remonstrance on the part of Her Majesty's Government with the Government of France as to the course she ought to pursue. On the contrary, they seem, to have been perfectly satisfied with the course France was disposed to take. Whenever M. Gambetta asked for anything or expressed an opinion, Lord Granville immediately assented to it. Whenever Lord Granville made a suggestion,M. Gambetta accepted or rejected it. The Sultan, as we know, proposed at this time to send a Commissioner to Egypt, and accordingly a Commissioner was sent. The Egyptian Government was advised to oppose that Commissioner, who had gone there on a perfectly peaceful mission; they were advised to oppose any interference on the part of that Commissioner, or on the part of any Foreign Power, and our Ambassador at Constantinople was directed to urge upon the Porte the recall of the Turkish Commissioner, although the effect of his mission was admitted to he good. This procedure naturally mortified and stung the Sultan to the quick, and we have every reason to assume that if the Commissioner had been allowed to stay he certainly would have produced some effect in composing the state of things which had arisen before there was so strong a feeling of hostility to the Sultan acting under British influence as has since displayed itself. But not only did we take this course; we also said that if the Commissioner were not recalled ships of war would be sent by England and France. The impolicy of this proceeding, which was taken as a threat, was commented upon by Mr. Malet at the time. He said it produced a bad effect, and suggested that the sending of war vessels should be postponed, as it would tend to create alarm; and, Sir, although it has been said that the Fleet went to Egypt for the purpose of protecting life and property, it certainly performed its duty with regard to life and property in a very curious way, because it had only been there a few hours when Her Majesty's Government announced that it would be withdrawn if the Turkish Commissioner were withdrawn. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain), in his speech of last evening, made use of these words:— There is no inconsistency in our having said that we sent the Invincible to Alexandria to protect British life and property, and our having also said we would withdraw the Invincible as soon as the Turkish Commissioner was withdrawn. But I ask, why withdraw the Turkish Commissioner at all? The Turkish Commissioner was doing very effectual work, and the impolicy of such an act was abundantly proved by later events. There is no mention whatever of Lord Dufferin's opinion; and I was very curious to see what was Lord Dufferin's report with respect to this point; but I cannot find among the Papers any despatch in reference to the subject. Well, Sir, we know that Her Majesty's Government are always speaking about the Concert of Europe, and I took an opportunity of gaining for myself at that time a knowledge as to what was the opinion of the Powers on the subject. The result was that I had no doubt whatever that there was not an agreement, or anything approaching to an agreement, on the step then taken by Her Majesty's Government. In fact, they could not see why that wanton and useless insult should have been thrown upon the Sultan, because it was to be looked on in no other light, and they did not understand what was the object of the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government. Well, Sir, at that time we know the Native Press became extremely hostile both to the Government of England and to the Government of France, and from that period the Sultan could no longer regard England as being friendly to the Porte. Lord Granville seems to have arrived at the opinion that it would be desirable to write a despatch such as would have the effect of calming the public mind. Consequently the despatch of November the 4th was written. I may here say that I have nothing to find fault with in that despatch as far as it goes; hut the criticism I wish to make is that that despatch does not take duly into consideration all the interests we have in the East. I repeat, however, that I quite concur in it as far as it goes, and do not wish to express any hostility to it. I believe it had a good effect in Europe, and the effect it had in Egypt was also salutary. The Khedive was cheerful, we are told, about that time; and although he appointed Arabi Pasha Minister of War, we are, I think, under all the circumstances, entitled to say that the despatch of Lord Granville was a wise and politic one. But, Sir, an event took place in Egypt which is said to have had the effect of greatly disturbing the mind of M. Gambetta, and that was the assembling of the Chamber of Notables. M. Gambetta consequently sat down and wrote that famous document which is known as the Dual Note. This was accepted by Her Majesty's Government without the slightest hesitation. Now, what, I ask, was the use of that Dual Note? Her Majesty's Government say that there was no difference between that document and their own despatch. If this were the case, I ask again, what was the use of writing it?

It being a quarter of an hour before Six of the clock, the Chairman left the Chair to report Progress; Committee to sit again To-morrow.