WAR IN EGYPT.—RESOLUTION. (Hansard, 25 July 1882)

§ LORD ELCHO
said, he had taken upon himself the duty, possibly very rash, of placing on the Notice Paper, no other Notice being there, the following Resolution:— That this House, while ready to vote whatever Supplies may he necessary for the protection of the Khedive and the security of the Suez Canal, is not prepared, having regard to the position of England as a great Mussulman Power, to enter upon a War for the restoration of the authority of the Khedive in Egypt, unless in conjunction with the Forces of the Sultan. He had had no intention on the previous night of taking part in that debate. He had listened with rapt attention to the Prime Minister as he unfolded the policy of the Government; and it had only occurred to him that morning, in reflecting upon the extreme gravity of the situation, to make the Motion which he was about to make. He was aware of the responsibility incurred by any private Member who ventured in any way to obstruct, or to put himself in opposition to, the policy of Her Majesty's Government. In all great national crises true patriotism required that everybody should support the Government; and he had not the slightest desire, in the few words which he should feel it necessary to say in support of his Resolution, to cast back at the Government any of their previous sayings and acts when in Opposition. It would be easy to make some severe remarks in that way; but he did not think it would be patriotic or a course that ought to be indulged in. It was only because he was deeply impressed with the gravity of the situation that he ventured to put himself forward at all. The situation was, indeed, a grave one; first, with regard to our position in reference to Europe; and, secondly, our position in connection with the general question of Egypt itself. What had they hoard from the Prime Minister'? They had heard, what they knew well enough before, that his sole object had 1688 been to bring about a Concert of Europe, and that, if possible, England should act conjointly in its effort to put a stop to the state of anarchy in Egypt; or that, if England should act alone, she should, at any rate, be acting as the mandatory of the other Powers. They had heard from the Prime Minister that not only had they failed to bring about the Concert of Europe, but that the mandate had not been given to England by Europe conjointly, although he said the Government was satisfied with having what they believed would be the "moral support" of Europe, and they had nothing more than that. Failing to obtain this concerted action, failing to obtain the mandate, and having only the "moral support" of Europe, the House felt justified in questioning the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government. Then, had the Government been more successful with regard to France? Certainly not, so far as the internal affairs of Egypt were concerned; for although, to a certain extent, Franco had gone along with England in all these transactions, at last she had broken away altogether, and absolutely refused to send a single soldier to intervene for the restoration of order in the East. All Franco did was to put herself on an equality with—or, rather, on a superiority to— England in the matter of the protection of the Suez Canal. Thus the result of our European Concert appeared to be that the British cat should take the chestnuts out of the fire, the other Powers subsequently determining what ultimate arrangements should be come to. Whether this question was regarded from its present point of view, or with a consideration of possible complications in the future, the House should beware of taking any step in the dark. The Prime Minister had said that the object of the intervention was to save this country of Egypt from military anarchy and from military crime. Were they quite sure that the sympathies of Egyptians as a nation, as a people, and as a religion were not upon the side of Arabi and his Party rather than on the side of the Khedive, whatever he might represent? It was stated in the newspapers that Ragheb Pasha, the Prime Minister of the Khedive, was playing a double game; that he was devoted to Arabi and his Party, and that he had clandestinely issued a Proclamation stating 1689 that England had, without the sanction or the knowledge of the Khedive, declared war against the Egyptian people. It was also stated that a Holy War had been proclaimed in every village and in every mosque in Egypt. This was a serious circumstance, especially when coupled with the information received to the effect that prayers were offered up for Arabi in the mosques of Calcutta, and that the Chief of the Mahomedan religion in Mecca had offered an asylum to Arabi if he should be obliged to quit Egypt. There was a prospect, therefore, of a war between the Crescent and the Cross. He quite admitted the obligation cast on the country for the protection of the Khedive and this security of the Suez Canal, and for these objects he was individually prepared to vote any amount of money and to send any number of men that might be required; but he believed that British responsibility ended there. But as regarded the restoration of order in Egypt and the rule of the Khedive, if the Sovereign of that country (the Sultan) did not think it necessary to do so, he could not see why England should go and do what he should properly do himself. If we had a Turkish force by our side, the Sultan being the legitimate Head of the Mahomedan religion, he should be prepared to go on, because the Sultan would then, as it were, be endorsing our action; but without that he was not prepared to enter into this war, and therefore he made this Motion. He fully felt the responsibility he incurred in doing so; but he was not prepared to undertake, either with a light heart or a grave heart, such a war as the country was now invited to enter upon.

§ MR. SPEAKER
Does any hon. Member second the Motion?

MR. JOSEPH COWEN
said, he desired to do so.

MR. GLADSTONE
The proceeding taken by my noble Friend places the House in a peculiar position. The situation, as he says, is one of very great gravity; and, under these circumstances, he invites the House to bind our hands by a Motion of which even the terms are not before us. They are before us as moved; but they are not before us for the purpose of full comprehension and reflection.

§ LORD ELCHO
I am quite ready to withdraw the Motion now, and bring it on at any time.

MR. GLADSTONE
Well, with regard to that, I must leave it to the judgment of my noble Friend himself. I only point out the difficulty in which we are placed by the fact that such a proposal has been made. My difficulty in acceding to his courteous suggestion, that it should be brought on at another time, lies in this—that it would seem to imply on my part that I thought that at some other time it would be a proper subject for the House to entertain. Now, Sir, I wish to state briefly that I cannot conceive any early phase of this question in which it would be admissible for the House to entertain a proposal of that nature. The proposal is not to abstain from intervention in Egyptian matters. By no means. We are to undertake the defence of the Suez Canal—that is to say, we are to deal with what is symptomatic, while we leave the source and seat of the mischief untouched; that we are also to maintain the personal security of the Khedive, which abolishes all distinctions of principle in this matter, because that implies the carrying forward of warlike measures in Egypt, and leave behind nothing but the question of degree. Then, thirdly, we are to announce that we are ready to make war in Egypt, provided the Sultan, as the Sovereign of the country, will join us. Well, Sir, it would be most unwise, in my opinion, to make a declaration of that kind. Be it remembered that what we are now doing is, excepting as regards the City of Alexandria, making preparations for warlike measures, which it may, and probably will be, necessary to take. But it is impossible for anyone to say at the present moment 1691 what may be the exact position we shall occupy before these warlike measures, which the Vote of Credit is to support, can become practical measures. But reference has been made to the Conference at Constantinople. It may yet result, for all that we know, in more substantive support than perhaps the noble Lord supposes. We are not entitled in any manner to say that the Sovereign of the country—namely, the Sultan, has refused to send his troops to Egypt. I shall be nearer the mark if I were to say that he has asserted, in principle, his readiness to send troops to Egypt. I am not in a position to say that no European Power, other than England, will take part in military measures in Egypt. We are in a condition to say that France will take part up to a certain point. Now, Sir, under those circumstances, I think my noble Friend will see that it is impossible that the House could discuss the question at large upon a proposal of this kind, which ties and shuts us up in the midst of a number of contingencies which may take shape in a short time, but which have not yet taken shape—a Motion which shuts us up to a certain limited proposition, having, as far as I can see, no clear basis of principle to dwell upon, and having no other practical effect than that of greatly hampering and narrowing our liberty of choice, and which will prejudice our means of action. Under these circumstances, I need not say that it is impossible for me to accede to the proposition. We had better be permitted, after negativing that Motion, to go into Committee of Supply.