HC Deb 10 August 1882 vol 273 cc1384-400
LORD ELCHO

rose to ask the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether, before engaging in military operations, other than such as may be necessary for the defence of Alexandria, the protection of the Khedive, and the security of the Suez Canal, they will endeavour to ascertain the true state of feeling of the Egyptian Nation? The noble Lord said, he proposed slightly to amplify his Question, and with that view he should conclude with a Motion. He felt constrained to apologize for the course which he was about to take; but he was so deeply impressed with the gravity of the situation in Egypt that he could not forego making a few observations on the subject. Look where they would, the situation was grave—there was darkness all around. He had no wish to open up the question of the general policy of Her Majesty's Government, or to enter into the general Egyptian Question. All he wished to do was to get a distinct and clear expression from the Government as to whom they were at war with. The first part of the present military operations consisted of the bombardment of Alexandria. Two reasons were given for that bombardment—namely, the protection of the Fleet, and the necessity of asserting their prestige after the murders that had taken place. The bombardment was followed by the despatch of troops to Egypt—not by any declaration of war, because there was no Power against whom they could declare war; but the reasons given for the despatch of troops were, as he understood, the necessity of putting a stop to, or crushing, military lawlessness, of restoring order where anarchy prevailed, and of restoring the authority of the Khedive. The Prime Minister had said at the Mansion House on Wednesday evening— It is true that we have gone to Egypt with the Forces of this country in the prosecution of the great interests of the Empire which it is our duty to cherish and defend. Nothing could give him greater pleasure than to see his right hon. Friend coming forward as the defender of their Imperial interests. He admitted that, in the absence of the action of the Sovereign of that country, the Sultan, whose proper duty it was to maintain order, it might be right and just, considering the interests which England had in Egypt, and considering the necessity of making the Suez Canal secure, that they should endeavour to put a stop to military lawlessness, and restore order in that country. But what he wanted to know was this—was this question in Egypt simply one of military lawlessness and anarchy, or had they to deal, as was much more likely, with the Egyptian people? Now, how was the evidence? Was there any evidence one way or the other? He asked his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the other day whether he could contradict or confirm the statement that a public meeting had taken place in Egypt to demand administrative reforms. His answer was that they had no information. On the 29th of last month another great meeting was held. Those present determined to support Arabi Pasha. Were they men of straw? A list containing the signatures of those who approved of the meeting included the names of the Minister of the Interior, 10 Princes, many Pashas, the Armenian Vicar, the Vicar of the Maronites, the Vicar of the Orthodox Greeks, the Grand Rabbi of Cairo, and Notables of all parts of Egypt. It might be said that in giving their signatures they acted under the duress of bayonets. There was no proof of that. As far as they knew, there was no evidence that it was not an absolutely free assembly of Egyptians. He was not aware that they had made any "Rules of Procedure" in Egypt, and he had not yet heard that in Egypt they had established the Caucus; and, therefore, everything tended rather to show that it was an absolutely free expression of free men managing their own affairs in that country. They had the testimony of an English gentleman who had arrived at Alexandria from Cairo that the meeting was held with open doors; and, in the absence of anything more distinct and definite, he thought they were justified in assuming that they were dealing with the Egyptian people as a whole. But there was one other authority he knew of to support the opinion that they were dealing with more than a mere army of rebels, and that was the authority of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister himself, who, in his speech at the Mansion House, said— I do not deny that there is in Egypt something besides a military tyranny; and— There are a section or class of men in Egypt who now wish to help the military tyranny which prevails. Who was this section? Unless it could be shown that all the important personages who signed the determination to which he referred—all the local magnates, all the Ministers at Cairo, and all the heads of the Native religion—were not acting freely, he was justified in saying that the section and class to which the right hon. Gentleman referred was practically the whole of the Egyptian people. His right hon. Friend would doubtless ask him—"What do you wish us to do? Do you wish us to stop in our military action altogether? Do you wish 30,000 men to be kept idle in Egypt, and that no further step should be taken?" That was not what he wished at all. What he wished was this—that the Government should proceed with their despatch of troops and the Military Convention with the Sultan, occupy all the strategic points on the map at once, and, having done that, they would be in such a strong position that they would be able to find out what was the true state of affairs, and what course it was necessary to take in regard to them. If, after having done that, they found that it was simply a matter with regard to a rebel colonel and a mutinous Army, they would find that the affair would suddenly come to naught; but if, on the other hand, they discovered it to be the national will of the people, then they had no right to interfere in order to prevent that national will being carried out. If the people of Egypt had good ground for their objection to the Khedive—and it was plainly shown that they had—then Her Majesty's Government had no right to support the Khedive, and should allow the people of Egypt to manage their own affairs. For his part, he should be glad if it could be shown that Her Majesty's Government were justified in taking action for the restoration of order in Egypt; but he hoped they would not act unadvisedly or hastily. In taking the course he had he was aware that he was likely to render himself unpopular, because, at the present moment, the nation was bent more or less on war; but he hoped the Government would not listen to the irresponsible advice that they obtained by the yard through the columns of the British Press, because, if they did, they would be prepared to put all Europe up in arms against them, to risk bringing the whole Mussulman population of the world against them, and to treat the Turkish Government of Egypt as if it had no existence. The simple object he had in putting his Question was to give them an opportunity of stating with whom they were at war; whether it was a rebel colonel and a mutinous soldiery or the Egyptian people? The noble Lord concluded by moving the adjournment of the House.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF,

in seconding the Motion, disclaimed any intention to embarrass the Government in the military operations which they had undertaken. But, while desirous of assisting the Government to carry the war to a successful issue, he would like to hear a statement from them as to its exact objects. They were at that moment employed, he supposed, in conjunction with Turkey, in suppressing an insurrection on the part of Arabi, who thought to depose the Khedive. He could conceive that they might be very much bound to support the Khedive, because he undertook the government of Egypt at their request, and had shown himself all along to be a loyal ally. At the same time, he could not conceive, if the people of Egypt really objected to him as their Sovereign, that they had any right to retain him there against the consent of the Egyptian people. When they recommended the King of Greece in 1864 they did not undertake to maintain him in Greece, but made stipulations by which, in case Greece wished at any time to get rid of him, he should have ample provision for a living. If, in the same way, it were found that the present Khedive was repugnant to the Egyptian people, this country was bound to secure, not merely the safety of his life, but an ample provision befitting his dignity. What he wanted to know was, what the Government intended to do in Egypt? They would probably not find it difficult to suppress Arabi; but, after that, were they going to maintain the occupation of Egypt indefinitely, or to establish some form of popular government which would enable it to remain independent of foreign occupation? He could conceive nothing more dangerous than a British occupation of Egypt for the purpose of establishing Prince Tewfik, unless, at the same time, Europe was given to understand that the occupation would last no longer than was necessary to establish such a form of government as would be acceptable to the people of Egypt, and enable them to maintain order without any foreign intervention whatever. A great part of the recent complications had arisen from the action of the Government on every occasion being influenced by France. It was the object of France to suppress the popular movement in Egypt. The Chamber of Notables professed no desire to interfere with the international obligations of the country, and asked no more than was the right of every Representative Body; yet, when Cherif Pasha asked the Government of this country to suggest some compromise, no notice was taken of the request. He would not go into the question of the Debts, because that had been settled by the Control; but he could not help expressing his anxious wish that the Control would not be established in the form in which it had hitherto been conducted. These were matters on which everyone must feel anxious. They were anxious to know what was the policy of the Government in this intervention—whether they had any policy as to the future? They were anxious to know whether they were going to attempt to do what was impossible—namely, to re-establish the status quo ante; or whether they really and truly intended to establish such a state of things in Egypt as would, while maintaining the internal obligations Egypt had entered into, establish the liberties of the Egyptian people on a firm basis?

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—(Lord Elicho.)

MR. GLADSTONE

There is some difficulty on raising a great question of this kind in narrowing the issue, and the tendency is that the discussion, when once opened, should extend itself to a much wider field; and my noble Friend the Mover of this Motion will be able to see how this proposition is illustrated by the far greater scope of the speech of his Seconder, who entirely, in seconding the Motion, passed away from everything that was contained in the Question that gave rise to it, and really supplied a text upon which, if the House were so inclined, we might renew the debate of four nights which we had, I think, during the week before last. Well, now, Sir, I sincerely hope that the House will not accept the invitation which has thus been given; and I say that, not because I object to the spirit of most of the remarks of the hon. Gentleman who seconded the Motion. On the contrary, I commend his sympathies with the Egyptian people. It is a fair and proper question, indeed, to raise, whether, in conjunction with any Proclamation from the Sultan, or in connection with the commencement of the full operations contemplated, it may be right for Her Majesty's Government to convey a distinct and formal assurance in a shape likely to become known to the Egyptian people as to the nature and extent of the objects which we contemplate. I may, perhaps, draw the attention of the hon. Gentleman and of the House to a circumstance which is worth remembering. The subject has not escaped our attention, and, under the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, the Commander of the Fleet has already conveyed to the Khedive of Egypt distinct assurances upon those questions. Undoubtedly, at a later stage those assurances might be repeated and enlarged by someone with larger authority than that of the Admiral of the Squadron; but an assurance from him seemed the best adapted to the earlier stages of the proceedings. Sir, I must decline to enter at the present moment upon a definition of the objects of the military operations now proceeding; but I can go so far as to answer the hon. Gentleman when he asks me whether we contemplate an indefinite occupation of Egypt. Undoubtedly, of all things in the world, that is a thing which we are not going to do. It would be absolutely at variance with all the principles and views of Her Majesty's Government, and the pledges they have given to Europe, and with the views, I may say, of Europe itself. With respect to the Chamber of Notables, I must, in passing, say one word. That question is a question in respect to which our conduct and our exact proceedings have never been laid before the House. It may be necessary to lay them before the House; but as the proceedings were in some respects joint proceedings, I cannot at present give a definitive answer as to producing the Papers. I only wish to point out that the House is not at the present time in possession of the evidence that would be necessary in order to enable it to form a conclusion upon the conduct of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the Chamber of Notables. There is one part of the remarks of the hon. Gentleman which I heard with unfeigned regret, and which I cannot help thinking, on reflection, will inspire him with some misgiving. He stated, and stated very fairly, that we were under very great and strong obligations to maintain in Egypt the position and authority of the Khedive, who has been placed in his present position with the very highest sanction and authority, and who has been completely faithful, under very difficult circumstances, to the obligations under which he came when he assumed them. Therefore, the hon. Gentleman most fairly and justly says that we are greatly bound to maintain the authority and position of the Khedive; but he goes on to say that if we should find that the Egyptian people were not in favour of his remaining in his present position, then it is a matter with which we have to do to see that a respectable and ample provision is made for him during his life. Now, Sir, why raise that question? If we wish to maintain the authority of a Ruler, one of the most unfortunate and left-handed methods of setting about it is to refer to contingencies before us not founded on the reasons of the case. Undoubtedly, if such language were adopted by the Government, instead of being, as I must say it is, repudiated by the Government, if the tendency was to give the impression that we were not, after all, more than half in earnest, if we were to give the impression that we had some secondary purpose—some latent idea—on which we intended to fall back, in case of need, with the view of bringing about a totally different state of things—

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF

What I meant to say was that we were certainly not bound to maintain the Khedive by an indefinite occupation.

MR. GLADSTONE

I am very glad to accept any explanation which the hon. Gentleman makes for the purpose of obviating the inferences which may be too hastily drawn from his speech with regard to the position of the Khedive. The reason I do not speak fully on the question of the final arrangements with regard to Egypt is not because I differ from the hon. Gentleman, when he says that he thinks, after all that has now taken place, the re-establishment of the status quo ante can no longer be regarded as the definite and adequate purpose with which we are to move and to conduct our military operations—in that I agree with him, and I admit that the larger field of consideration is of necessity open to us—but it is because it would not be expedient at this stage of affairs that we should attempt to anticipate by declarations—necessarily delivered in a crude and in an immature condition of the evidence—that we should endeavour to anticipate by such declarations the results, which, according to our own positive engagements, must be arrived at with the intervention and under the authority of Europe, and which never could be adequately founded on the simple conclusions of any single Power in Europe. I pass now to the Question put by my noble Friend, and to the argument by which he supported it. It would, perhaps, be wrong in me to complain of my noble Friend giving the sanction of an old Member to this practice of moving the adjournment after he has so frankly admitted that it is a course requiring apology. I am thankful to believe that the time is near at hand when apology will no longer be necessary, and when the House, by positive and resolute methods, may take security against its occurrence. I fully admit to my noble Friend that he is justified in demanding from me an explanation of any words used by me at the Mansion House, and I will give him that explanation. He says I admitted that in Egypt we have something to deal with besides the Military Party. I am willing to give him that admission, and it is an admission which I think will be readily perceived to be really inherent in any attempt to describe thoroughly the facts as they are in Egypt with reference to its recent history and its present condition. There is no doubt that if we go back to the period antecedent to the establishment of the Foreign Control, we come upon a state of things when the cultivators of the soil in Egypt, who, like the cultivators of the soil in Ireland, may be said almost to form the bulk of the nation, were subject to a system of abominable oppression. But wherever there is oppression there are oppressors; there are instruments of that oppression; there are people who profit by it, people who live by it; and it is the oppressors of the people who most resent interference, and who most readily avail themselves of any opportunity that may offer for complaining of the means by which the interference is effected, and who are most ready to enter into any measures, whatever they may be, for the purpose of bringing back a state of things which was to them a paradise, but which to their fellow-countrymen was more like a hell. Those are the gentlemen whom I fully admit to be the allies of Arabi Pasha and of the Military Party. I need not go back upon the discussion of the question of the Foreign Control, which I have endeavoured myself to treat in what I may call an historical sense—that is to say, to recognize its advantages and its disadvantages. Its disadvantages have been that it might be represented, and not only so, but it might in some respects be said to be an interference with the fair rights of the Egyptian people, and a limitation of the development of their future institutions; but we must not forget the fact that it had considerable apology and justification from the state of things to which it applied, and that it is beyond all question that great practical benefits resulted from it, and from the substitution of European for Oriental methods in the administration of finances and the levying of taxes in Egypt. That is one thing which accounts for the nature of the very limited scope of the admission which I made when I said that something besides the Military Party might be found in support of Arabi Pasha. Then I come to the evidence which my noble Friend has given and to the question of the evidence which he has demanded of me. He desires that we should endeavour to ascertain the true state of feeling of the Egyptian people, but he does not desire that without limitation; because he says that he considers it right that we should take all the measures necessary for the defence of Alexandria, for the protection of the Khedive, and for the security of the Suez Canal, and I think he explained that to mean that we might take into our own possession the principal strategical points of the country. Well, I think if we take into our own possession the principal strategical points of the country we shall have very little occasion to quarrel with my noble Friend as to the limitation which he imposes upon us in respect to ascertaining the feeling of the people of Egypt; for after we have obtained the principal strategical points of the country we shall be in a condition, without prejudice to any of the objects that were in view, to make any inquiry we please into either the feeling of the Egyptian people or any other subject. But the matter is a serious one; and I wish to challenge the mode which my noble Friend takes of presenting what he appears to think is adequate evidence of a feeling of the people of Egypt favourable to Arabi Pasha and his confederates, for he is not the only one, after all, with whom we have to deal. He has a knot of other persons around him who find a considerable portion of the brains that are engaged in these mutinous and mischievous operations. I am very sorry that my noble Friend has found it his duty to raise a discussion at the present time; because, undoubtedly, although I do not anticipate very serious public mis- chief from it, I think the mind of this country is pretty well made up on the subject of the rights or wrongs of the quarrel in which we are engaged. [Mr. O'DONNELL: No, no! and cries of "Hear, hear!"] I am very glad, therefore, to think that my noble Friend does stand, to a great degree, in that respect in an isolated position. I do not mean to say that there are no differences of opinion with regard to the question of intervention in the affairs of Egypt—that is quite a different matter—but I mean I believe the mind of the country is well made up in general as to the necessity, and as to the justice, of the cause which we have in hand, and is yet more clearly made up on the question whether it is or is not with the concurrence of the Egyptian people that we are now going in conflict. My noble Friend thinks he has evidence to produce, and he produces the evidence, and quoted from journals published under the permission of what I may call the rebellious and military Government in Cairo, which gives accounts of certain meetings and treats them as representing the sense of the people. I believe my noble Friend would find that these very same journals are the journals which have seriously reported for the information of the Egyptian people the sinking of the British iron-clads before Alexandria; and which, when Moubarek Pasha came down to Alexandria and saw for himself the British iron-clads afloat, propagated the story likewise for the information of the Egyptian people that the original iron-clads had been sunk, and that they were a new set which had come to take their places! That is the evidence drawn from such a source. The fact is that a system of falsification is employed wholesale in Egypt with reference to the Khedive, with reference, of course, to the English, and with reference to whatever obstructs or impedes the plans of military violence. I think it is not difficult to understand that such a system of falsification may prevail, when it is borne in mind that falsification has been carried, avowedly and unquestionably carried in the case of this Military Party in Egypt, beyond, I believe, any point it has ever been known to reach in the history of the world. For that Party did not scruple to falsify the most sacred of all obligations in war—namely, those attaching to the use of a flag of truce, and while pretending to have pacification in view, not only had no such purpose, but used the hours gained by the employment of that flag of truce for the base and abominable purpose of conflagration and looting. [Mr. O'DONNELL: No, no!] I believe I am speaking of a matter subject to no dispute, but which is absolutely as certain as is the bombardment of Alexandria. My noble Friend asks what evidence we have that we are not at variance with the sentiments of the people of Egypt. Well, Sir, those who know that those who decline the authority of Arabi Pasha are dismissed from their offices and imprisoned; those who know that Arabi Pasha has set aside the authority of the Notables; those who know that we have a large body of European and British residents in Egypt—and if I except the unfortunate case of Mr. Blunt, which it is not for me to explain, who, I believe, still remains under the delusions which have been formed—I believe there is not one among these, even including gentlemen who were formerly inclined to take a more favourable view, who has the smallest idea, or who does not emphatically repudiate the idea, that Arabi Pasha and his confederates are the representatives of the National movement. I think I am bound to say that, besides those residents, we have the testimony of official men—those connected with the Consulate and those connected with the Control, gentlemen of high position, of high character. [Mr. O'DONNELL: No! and cries of "Order!"] I affirm that Sir Auckland Colvin, Sir Edward Malet, Mr. Cartwright, Mr. Cookson, and the various other gentlemen who have been connected with the official representation of this country in Egypt, are gentlemen of high character. The gentlemen I have named are all competent and fair witnesses, and we may fall back with confidence upon their testimony were it necessary. But the matter does not rest with them; there are public men of high character in Egypt—Egyptians, Mahomedans, men known to the world—who have borne high office in Egypt. Is there one of these men who has given the smallest countenance, direct or indirect, to the cause of Arabi Pasha? Some of them are men of well known character and reputation. There are Riaz Pasha, who was at the head of the Egyptian Govern- ment; Cherif Pasha, who was at the head of the Government only dismissed a few months ago; Sultan Pasha, the head of the Chamber of Notables, and a Mahomedan of the highest influence and best character. There is not one of these men who has not been found on the side of the Khedive in support of his lawful authority. It is really too late to raise a question of this kind, because the conclusion we have arrived at, and on which we are acting, is not a British conclusion alone; it is the conclusion of all Europe. Europe has met together at Constantinople, and Europe has by its united voice and by its united appeal to the Sultan declared that the Power which has paralyzed the authority of the Khedive is an unlawful, a rebellious, and a mischievous Power, and has appealed to the Sultan to put it down by force of arms. Surely, under these circumstances, it is late for any Member of the British Parliament, not only when his country has definitely acted, but when Europe has acted and has delivered its own deliberate conclusion, it is too late to ask the question whether Arabi Pasha is or is not the representative of the Egyptian nation. I hold that the authority of the united Powers of Europe and the evidence afforded by their conclusion are the highest and the most conclusive of which the case admits, and it absolves us from the necessity of a minute discussion of this or that—evidence I need hardly call it—gossip or tittle-tattle, and those figments which newspapers, under the domain of military violence, would seek to palm off upon the world, representations which were thoroughly and entirely false. That is my answer to my noble Friend. We have not the results of formal inquiry, of which the case does not admit; but we have a mass of moral evidence, supported by intelligent testimony of every character and from every quarter unvaried and unbroken, and supported by the responsibility of every Government; it is a known, patent, and notorious fact that we have the judgment of the whole civilized world. That is my answer with regard to the Egyptian people. I trust the ulterior development of this question and the conduct and policy of this country will be such as to verify the assurance with which we have entered into the struggle we are about to commence—namely, that we are not making war against the Egyptian people; but that we are determined to put down those who are oppressing the people of Egypt, those who are, in our opinion, not only contemning the lawful authority of the country, but are likewise engaged in machinations contrary to liberty, having for their certain result, were they to succeed, the revival of all the abominable abuses and oppressions which formerly debased the condition of that country.

SIR GEORGE ELLIOT

said, he had listened with interest to the statement of the Prime Minister, and he was able from personal knowledge to endorse it. He knew the eminent Egyptians who had been named, and knew that they joined in the strongest condemnation of Arabi Pasha. On the other hand, as to those whose names had been mentioned by the noble Lord as having assembled at Cairo, many of them were Turks, many had shared largely in the distribution of what the late Khedive had at his disposal, and he did not wonder that it was their desire to restore a former condition of things. With regard to the people of Egypt—to those who cultivated the soil, and on whom the wealth of Egypt mainly depended—it was out of the question to talk about the representation of these people. They were not prepared for it, still less were they ready to fight for it. He felt sure that they would rather be under the protection of this country than that any other kind of Government should be imposed upon them. He did not, however, say that Egypt ought to be put under the Government of this country; but during the last few years there had been a great improvement in the condition of the country. Messrs. Baring took off no less than 34 taxes that were oppressive to the people. He hoped they would be of one mind in the House, and that they would strengthen the hands of the Government, for on our success depended the security, peace, and well-being of the Egyptian people, as well as the security of our own communications with the East.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, he rose to challenge almost every statement that the Prime Minister had made. He admitted that there never was a question which was subject to such gigantic falsification, and he was sorry that the Prime Minister was the most eminent victim of it. No doubt it was asserted that the Go- vernment were acting for the benefit of the Egyptian people, but Lord Granville did not assign that as the reason for objecting to the Notables voting the Budget; he said that it was not compatible with the pecuniary interests on behalf of which Her Majesty's Government had been acting. What were those interests? Who were the gombeen men for whom the Government had been acting? On their behalf the Control had imposed forced labour on classes formerly exempt from it. In 1879 our Consul General reported that three months after the reinstatement of the Control it was found necessary to exercise pressure to get in the taxes which were pledged to the Commission. All the facts were set forth on the authority of Blue Books in the admirable exposure of the horrible policy of England, in Egypt made in the pamphlet, Spoiling the Egyptians; a Tale of Shame, by J. Seymour Keay, and if the facts were appreciated by the people of this country the policy of the Government could not stand for a day. Three months after the establishment of the Control, the state of Egypt, or of the poor in that country, was exceedingly wretched. The fellaheen were oppressed and severely treated; large numbers of Europeans had become possessed of their property, and the whip and bastinado formed part of the necessary equipment of every tax-gatherer. And those exactions were enforced in the interest of those who had lent the Egyptians large nominal sums, of which but a small part found its way into the Egyptian Treasury. The Joubert-Goschen mission was a triumph of usury not excelled in the most horrible imaginings of usurious excess. The Prime Minister had quoted Cherif Pasha on his side of the argument; but he challenged the right hon. Gentleman to prove that a single eminent Egyptian had been in favour of the bombardment. The real casus belli was the rejection by the Control of the claim of the Chamber of Notables to vote the Budget. Our Consul General told the President of the Chamber (Sultan Pasha) that the claim was an infringement of international engagements, and refused to enter into any compromise, though that solution of the difficulty was earnestly desired by the Chamber. Sultan Pasha, by the way, in appealing to the Consul General for a compromise, took occasion to observe that the policy of the Chamber was moderate and friendly, and was not dominated by the Military Party, and on this point completely contradicted the statement of the British Government. Now, he would not defend the Military Party, though they had their grievances as against the Control; but everyone who knew anything of soldiers would sympathize with the 2,500 Egyptian officers who were placed on half-pay while their pay was in arrear, and while the demands of the Europeans were being satisfied to the last penny. As the Prime Minister said—and the admission was most remarkable—the policy of the Government in regard to the Chamber of Notables had never been laid before the House. He thought it most discreditable that this crucial question, which was at the root of all the difficulty, should not have been discussed. It was mere nonsense to say that the difficulty originated in the relations between the Government and the Egyptian Army, and to suppose that the presence of our Fleet in a fortified harbour justified the bombardment. He should like to know whether a peremptory note would be sent ashore if the guns of such a place as Cronstadt threatened the anchorage of a British Squadron? ["Question!"] That was the precise question. He had a right to show the logical futility of the plea that the Government acted in self-defence, as alleged by the right hon. Gentleman. Again, he disputed the assertion of the Prime Minister that England had the moral assent of Europe. Neither the moral nor the immoral assent had been given. A diplomatic game was in progress at Constantinople; but the Press of Europe, except the organs of M. Gambetta, who had such close relations with certain Members of the Government, was practically unanimous in condemning our action. Then the right hon. Gentleman told the House that he could distinguish between the case of Arabi and that of the Mussulmans throughout the world. But the excitement of the Mussulman world increased every day, and the latest news was that the policy of the Government had borne fruit in Syria in a riot between Mussulmans and Christians at Beyrout. He found in the Beyrout correspondence of The Allgemeine Zeitung of Augsburg a statement that throughout Syria the Mussulman feeling was unanimously and excitedly in favour of Arabi. Thus the Government had sown the seeds of conflict between Mussulmans and Christians in Syria, as well as in Egypt, and an outbreak might be expected at any moment. This Egyptian Question was the subject of much mystification. The Prime Minister was as confident to-day that Arabi did not represent the Egyptian people as he was 12 months ago that the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) did not represent the Irish people. In no long time the right hon. Gentleman would see his mistake. Whatever became of Arabi Pasha, whether he was killed in the field or hanged by Her Majesty's Government, the champion of nationalities, it would never again be possible for the European Control to extort £10,000,000 of taxation from a wretched population of 5,000,000. Whatever the result, the English and French Control would never be re-established. Whoever gained, the pirates who had bombarded Alexandria would never gain. In The Standard of the previous day there was a record of an amusing incident. According to that account, a gentleman sent to Sir Beauchamp Seymour informing him that an unexploded shell was in his drawing-room, and a party was sent from the Inflexible, who carefully took it out of the house. He did not think, after that, it could be said that all the shells fell into the fortifications—indeed, it showed the truth of what he had urged as a notorious fact, that a large part of the conflagration of Alexandria was caused by shells which fell in the town.

Question put, and negatived.