SUPPLY—ARMY ESTIMATES.

HC Deb 07 August 1882 vol 273 cc983-1045

SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

(1.) £562,700, Volunteer Corps.

(2.) £229,500, Army Reserve Force.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

said, that it was a very difficult thing, at this period of the Session, to go at any length into the story of the Army Reserve in the present state of the Army. It would be admitted, he thought, that on the 7th of August to have a Vote of such great importance brought before the Committee was a matter which deserved the serious consideration of any Government, be that Government what it might. If hon. Members would look round at the present condition of the Committee they would see that it was impossible for a person to make those remarks upon such a Vote as this which he would have been willing and anxious to make at an earlier period of the Session. But he was bound to say it appeared to him necessary, notwithstanding all the difficulty of the case, and notwithstanding his great desire to say nothing which might reflect in any way upon the present condition of the Army, that he should refer to one or two points. In doing so, however, he would avoid raising any of those great questions which, he would venture to say, could not be left to sleep very much longer, but would have to be raised, and raised in very strong terms, at some future time. He should like to point out for one moment that whereas Lord Cardwell— then Mr. Cardwell—who first introduced the present system 12 years ago, had promised them that by this time they would have a very large Army Reserve—50,000, or, he rather thought, 60,000 men—[Lord ELCHO: 80,000.]—it appeared that they only had 26,000. The premises on which Mr. Cardwell started were very fallacious; but, be that as it might, Lord Cranbrook, who succeeded him, and the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley), who was also Secretary of State for War in the last Parliament, most honestly, and, he (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) thought, too faithfully, carried out those provisions which Mr. Cardwell inaugurated in 1870. This was a question which they could talk about and deal with in no Party sense, because the right hon. Gentleman the present Secretary of State for War (Mr. Childers) had only steadily followed the same lines on which those who had preceded him had gone. If, however, hon. Members would look at the results as they had been attained up to the present time, they would not be able to say that they had been a great success. If they remembered what they were promised, and if they inquired what had been the result, they would naturally inquire why those promises had not been fulfilled. In the first place, he must state—and he did not suppose the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would contradict him—that the right hon. Gentleman had the other day declared that nine-tenths of the Army at home must always be under one years' service. That was a very grave and serious statement for a War Minister to make. When the right hon. Gentleman told them he was going to form a First Army Corps, which corps was to be complete in all its details, and when they recollected that our system had been derived, more or less, from the German system, and when they remembered the Army the Germans mobilized in less than a fortnight, and when they saw the time it had taken the right hon. Gentleman to send out the present Army Corps to Egypt, they had, he thought, some reason to think that their system was not absolutely perfect. He remembered that the right hon. Gentleman stated that he had gradations of regiments which could be easily filled up; but he found that it took 10,000 men of the Reserve—the very flower of the Reserve, as he understood it, because they were men who had been put in the Reserve since 1881—to complete the First Army Corps. The country might very well have expected that a First Army Corps could by this time have been sent abroad absolutely perfect, and that any vacancies could have been filled up without having recourse to the Reserve. What was the meaning of "Reserve?" Why, it meant that the men were in reservation, and not that they should be made the very first to be sent out in the First Army Corps. If this war in Egypt should turn out not to be the easy military promenade through the country that some people seemed to think it would be, and if they should have to send out another Army Corps, where, he would ask the Secretary of State for War, was that Army Corps? No doubt they had it on paper; but an Army Corps on paper was of no use to us as a nation. What they wanted to see was that a Second Army Corps was absolutely preparing; and he should say that if there was likely to be a difficulty, and if it was probable that the war would be of some duration, the rest of the Reserves ought at once to be called out, so that if it was absolutely necessary the Second Army Corps could be sent to Egypt without delay. If that Second Army Corps was to be—as it ought to be—formed, it should be formed at Aldershot, and placed under the officers who would have to command it in the field, so that the officers might know the troops they had to deal with, and the men might know the officers. There was another point on which he wished to speak, although he did not desire to go too closely into it. What bad the right hon. Gentleman been obliged to do in the Mediterranean? Had he been able to send out men who were 20 years of age—absolutely 20 years of age—and had be sent out none that were under that age? That was a question which be (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) thought he had a right to ask, because so much had been said on that point. If he were rightly informed—of course he was liable to err, but he bad taken every means in his power to test the accuracy of the information—it was the fact that if the men had had the proper chest-measurement, and had been absolutely effective in other ways, their age had not been taken into account at all, and they bad been sent out as fit and proper soldiers, capable of doing soldier's duty. That was a point on which they ought to have some answer from the right hon. Gentleman. He did not raise the question because he feared that their men would not fight well. He was convinced they would fight well, and that they would do their duty well and properly; but it was their age that would be against them, and anyone who knew anything about a campaign would agree with him that in a climate like that of Egypt, with the quantity they would have to carry and the work they would have to perform, none but seasoned troops ought to be called upon. It might be, and he hoped it was, that these men were not at present to go beyond the stations of Gibraltar and Malta; but even if that were the case a time would probably come before long when they would have to be sent on to Egypt. Or be might put it this way—that it was not the intention of the right hon. Gentleman to send these young fellows beyond Gibraltar and Malta; but they might have to be sent on, and. then what would become of all the precautions that had been taken hitherto as to the age of these men? This was a very serious question, and one upon which he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would be able to say that the information which had been given to him (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) was inaccurate. Then they had a little reason to complain, he thought, of the number of men who bad been sent out in the regiments, because, as he understood it, it took four regiments to make a brigade instead of three. The meaning of that was that the regiments were not up to their strength, and that four had to be used where three only ought to be necessary. These were points which showed that they had not so many men to dispose of as they had formerly. He would not go into many of the details on which he bad informed himself, because, on the present occasion, his only desire, in the interest of the Service, was that they should know exactly that they had men fit to cope with all the difficulties and dangers in their way. It was not his desire to throw difficulties in the way of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. There was one thing he could not point out too strongly. He had pointed it out often before, and he would venture to point it out again, and it was this—that much as the right hon. Gentleman had done—and he would give him credit for two important things—namely, re-enlistment of non-commissioned officers, and increasing the length of Service from six to eight years—he had not gone far enough in his modification of the short service system. He (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) was sure the right hon. Gentleman would have to increase the length of service to 10 years. He trusted the Committee would believe him when he said that in a Service such as ours, with duty to perform all over the world, the best men to perform that duty were men who stayed 10 years with the Colours and then five years with the Reserve. If such were the term of service they should have a real Army Reserve in time. They talked of drawing the Militia regiments close to the regiments of the Line; but he was at a loss to see how they were effecting it. He should recommend that they should send the men, after service in the Line, into the Militia battalions. He had also strongly urged before, and he would even do it now, that every Militiaman should be in the Militia Reserve. They would then have a real Reserve, and the man would, for a small annual allowance, be glad, should he be called upon, to serve in any part of the world to which he might be sent. A force composed of such men as these would be most reliable. The country would be able to depend on them; and, besides, this method of forming an Army Reserve would be simple and efficacious. At present, if they were engaged in a war of any duration, they could not be said to possess a Reserve at all. Then he had a word to say on the subject of Cavalry—especially the Cavalry horses. It had taken nearly two regiments to make one full regiment of Cavalry. The Government had never seemed to think of what would happen in war time. They had never had any Cavalry regiments prepared for war. They had had horses that were not fit to go on service. All the old horses, he understood, had been obliged to be got rid of, and they had had very nearly to denude one or two regiments that remained at home, in order to make up the com- plement of horses for one regiment going abroad. Then, this was what he could not understand—he had the greatest admiration for the Life Guards, the Blues, and the 4th Dragoon Guards. Gallant they all knew they were—they all knew they would do their duty and serve their country to the best of their ability; but to send to a country like Egypt their biggest men and their finest horses was one of the most inexplicable things he ever heard of. What Cavalry was it expected that their men would have to contend with? They would have to pursue the Bedouins into the desert, and what was required was a camel corps, or some Native Indian regiments acclimatized and accustomed to this kind of warfare. Such men as they had sent out would, no doubt, have distinguished themselves admirably on the Continent of Europe, and so they would, no doubt, in an African desert; but at what a cost! There was the scheme for the re-organization of the Cavalry, which the right hon. Gentleman had said he did not mean to look at for a year. With regard to that, he (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) would now say what he thought, for if he waited until next year he might be too late. The scheme was, for the formation of a Cavalry Reserve, the most fallacious thing that could possibly be, for everyone knowing what a Cavalry soldier was, was aware that, unless a man rode every year, and had to go through the whole of his duties continuously, he would be of very little use as a Cavalry soldier. To brigade three Cavalry regiments together, as proposed, would mean that they were going to destroy the usefulness of nine Cavalry regiments in the Service, and it would assuredly be a blot on the escutcheon of anyone who brought about such a system. It might be decided to let a certain number of men go into the Cavalry Beserve—namely, called out every year—but do not let the individuality of each regiment be interfered with. If the right hon. Gentleman broke up the regiments, he would not only not have an efficient Reserve, but he would destroy that esprit de corps that had made the British Cavalry the finest in the world. He (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) had made these few remarks now because he would have no other opportunity, and because he considered it so important that our Army should be in an efficient state—which he was sure was also the view of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War.

MR. CHILDERS

said, that no one would for a moment dream of blaming the hon. and gallant Baronet if he had gone a little beyond the Vote before the Committee, for he had been prevented on a former occasion from expressing his views on the subjects to which he had adverted. Besides, hon. Members always listened with satisfaction to the remarks which fell from the hon. and gallant Baronet on these questions. The Committee would remember that though he (Mr. Childers) had laid on the Table a proposal with regard to the Cavalry, which had emanated from three of the most distinguished Cavalry officers, he was far from satisfied that the subject had been fully exhausted, and he had undertaken to look into it, and compare it with certain other proposals which had been alluded to before next year's Estimate. The hon. and gallant Baronet said they should not have a Cavalry Reserve; but with the short service system it appeared desirable, and unless they retained the short service system in some form—and as the hon. and gallant Baronet had, in justice to the Government, pointed out, it bad been somewhat extended—they would not get soldiers at all. If they did get soldiers, it was necessary to retain them, so that their services would be at their disposal after the men had left the Colours. He (Mr. Childers), therefore, would be no party to throwing away the chance of forming an efficient Reserve; but he had not yet thoroughly considered the matter, consequently he would leave it for the present. In the same way he would pass over the suggestion that some of the Cavalry sent to Egypt were too heavy. They had sent three regiments of Native Cavalry from India to be associated with our own Cavalry, so that some would be light and some heavy. He did not by any means think it was an unwise measure to send certain squadrons of the Household Cavalry to Egypt, and those who were only accustomed to see these troops and horses in all their trappings would be surprised if they were told how considerably their weight had been reduced before they were sent out. No doubt it was necessary that they should have some light Cavalry in Egypt; but it was by no means inconsistent with other expeditions made in that country that they should have a certain proportion of heavy Cavalry. And now he would refer to what the hon. and gallant Baronet had said with regard to the Reserves. The hon. and gallant Baronet had not quite accurately quoted what he (Mr. Childers) had said with regard to the necessity, under the present system—and almost under any system—of their having in the regiments a large number of young soldiers. Let the Committee remember the great change in this matter which had been gradually effected during the last few years. Formerly the Government used to sent out regiments to India pretty much as they were made up, containing a large proportion of young soldiers. A great deal of pressure had been put on the Government in that House and in India not to send young soldiers there, and after considerable discussion it was decided that no soldier should go to India as a recruit who was under a year's service, or under 20 years of age. But it was obvious that as the strength of the Line in England and abroad was about the same, if they sent none of the young soldiers to India they would have double their proportion at home. If they had formerly in the Army one-fifth young soldiers, when they cut the Army in two, and said in one half there should be no young soldiers, in the other half there must be two-fifths young soldiers, or double the number that it ought to have. The proportion of young soldiers in the Army at home was not nine-tenths, but two-fifths. Then the hon. and gallant Baronet very rightly complained that the state of the First Army Corps was not now, in the middle of 1882, what he had said last year he would bring it up to. But he had explained distinctly—he could almost remember the words he had used—that they could only raise battalions 600 strong to 1,000 strong by volunteering from other regiments, or by adding a certain number of recruits; and it was evident that as they had only had eight or nine months to build up their First Class Army Corps, till next year there must be an undue proportion of young soldiers. Every month, however, that state of things would be improved—as the year went on the number of young soldiers in the regiments of the First Army Corps steadily diminished, and by this time next year the regiments would have reached their normal satisfactory condition. Those regiments at the top would have no recruits, and those below only a small proportion. But they could not do that all at once, and as they had to add men to bring the regiments up to their proper strength it was inevitable that they must at this moment have somewhat more young soldiers in the regiments than they would have when the regiments reached their normal condition. Even now, however, they had been able to send out to Egypt a First Army Corps without by any means taking 10,000 men from the Second Corps. The number of men it had been necessary to send out to Egypt to strengthen the regiments of the First Army Corps was under 2,000, and not 6,000, so that they had 10,000 men to depend upon—and he was happy to say that they turned out 99 per cent of the whole number. They would be able to send out between 2,000 and 3,000 men—besides these 2,000 he had mentioned—to form a Reserve in the Mediterranean to fill up gaps in the regiments they had sent out. Therefore, of the 10,000 men they had called out they would have 5,000 to fill up the regiments that would constitute the next Army Corps, if it were found necessary to form and send out another. They had been carefully preparing for the formation of the Second Army Corps should it be found necessary to put another Division in the field, and they would be able, out of the 5,000 men, to entirely fill up the gaps in the regiments forming that Division, still leaving a number of Army Reserve men to fill up' any other Divisions that might have to be formed. They had called out about 10,000 men in the First Army Corps, which would be sufficient for their present purposes, leaving about 18,000 more for a Second Corps if it became necessary to embody two Army Corps and to send more troops to the East. In addition to these men there was the Militia Reserve. That Reserve had not yet been touched, and, of course, it would not be touched until the First Army Reserve had been exhausted. The Militia Reserve approached something like 10,000 men, available for filling up the ranks of the Line. That would give something like 30,000 men; and then there was the Militia itself, comprising something like 50,000. He quite agreed with his hon. and gallant Friend as to the Militia itself, and he believed they had done several things which were in the right direction. The Militia at the present moment was in a most satisfactory condition, and he regarded it as a very valuable Reserve indeed. As to the Vote itself, his hon. and gallant Friend said Lord Cardwell had promised that by the year 1882 the strength of the Reserves should be 80,000 men. He had heard similar statements made before, and he had searched all through Lord Cardwell's speeches to find any confirmation of it; but he had been unable to find that on any occasion Lord Cardwell had promised that there should be anything of the kind. And for the very best reason; it was contrary to the nature of the Reserve system. Under that system, as administered by Lord Cardwell, they had as yet hardly a single Reserve man from the Artillery, and hardly a single Reserve man from the Cavalry; and the Line alone, up to the present moment, had fed the Reserve. He was happy to say that they had now reached a substantial condition, and that the 28,000 men of the Reserve had enabled them to complete all the arrangements for the East with satisfaction. There was one word which fell from his hon. and gallant Friend which he felt bound to dispute. His hon. and gallant Friend spoke of the long time the Government had taken to call out the Reserves. Now, he would remind the Committee that, if he was not mistaken, it was only on that day fortnight that the Vote of Credit was proposed, and it would only be upon Wednesday fortnight that Her Majesty's Proclamation calling out the Reserves was issued. Therefore, within a fortnight a great deal had been done. Those who spoke of Germany and other great Continental nations forgot the fact that in those countries the conscription existed, and that it was not necessary to send out the troops by sea. Their mechanism was the simplest in the world; everybody was bound to serve; everybody's address was known, and an Army Corps could be got together at a very short notice. But in this country it was necessary to accumulate large stores to equip the men, and to hire transports. Sixty transports had been sent out and would be sent out to the East during last week and this, and it required a very complicated machinery to move a fully-equipped army to such a country as Egypt, 3,000 miles away. That machinery involved difficulties which were absolutely unknown to any foreign country. He had no wish to make any invidious comparison; but it would be remembered that France experienced extreme difficulty in mobilizing a small force for the Tunis Expedition a year ago, and an immense outcry was raised from one end of France to the other. It ought to be admitted, therefore, that in this country the War Office, with all the disadvantages they had to contend with, had been able, without friction and without noise, and with considerable rapidity, to send out to the East such an expedition as the necessities of the case demanded. He hoped he would be allowed to add that the Reserves ought not by any means to be depreciated, for they had undoubted in a time of trial proved to be eminently successful. Notwithstanding the comparatively small extent of the force of Reserves, it had been steadily increasing year by year, and at the present time its condition was entirely satisfactory. He trusted that now he bad answered the questions which had been put to him by his hon. and gallant Friend the Committee would be allowed to proceed to the Vote.

SIR HENRY TYLER

desired to say a word or two as to the strength of the Essex Rifles, a question in which his own constituents were very much interested. The head-quarters of the regiment had been moved from Colchester to Warley, 40 or 50 miles away. The consequence was that the officers had great difficulty in keeping up the strength of the regiment. In consequence of the barracks at Warley being at so great a distance from the homes of the men, they found themselves unable to get recruits as they formerly did, and they considered their prospects in the future very bad, so far as the keeping up of their strength was concerned. They feared that it might dwindle away to very small dimensions indeed. The strength of the regiment in 1879–80 was 793; in 1880–1 it was 753; and in 1881–2 it had fallen to 699. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would take the question into consideration, and be able to arrange that the head-quarters of the regiment should be removed back again from Warley to Colchester. He was satisfied that if that were done the regiment would soon recover its former strength. The men had always borne a most excellent character, and he certainly thought the case was one which was worthy of the attention of the right hon. Gentleman.

MR. CHILDERS

said, there was one question of his hon. and gallant Friend (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) which he had omitted to answer. His hon. and gallant Friend inquired whether the men who had been sent out to the Mediterranean for active service included men who were under 20 years of age? He was glad to be able to say that there was not a single instance of the kind, and the battalions equipped for service in the field had gone out without a man under 20 years of age. It was, however, the fact that, as formerly, men under 20 had been sent out for garrison duty in the Mediterranean, at Malta and Gibraltar. No men had been sent out for active service in the field who were not seasoned soldiers.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR

said, he was sorry to hear his hon. and gallant Friend (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) complain of the manner in which the Expedition to the East had been sent out. Personally, he felt bound to say, on this occasion, that he did not remember any Expedition that had been fitted out with more rapidity and been carried out with more ability, more smoothness, more carefulness, and more general satisfaction than the present one. Considering the shortness of the time since the War Office received the first warning that it might be actually necessary to move an Expeditionary Force and the period at which the actual removal was ordered to be effected, the Government deserved the highest commendation for the promptness in carrying out the orders. For some time after the intimation was first conveyed that; it might be necessary to despatch troops to the Mediterranean, there was still the hope that the necessity for carrying out the Expedition would not arise, and that the steps which were being taken would prove to be sufficient as simply measures of a precautionary character; but, on this idea not being realized, the men and horses were forthwith despatched in a state of greater completeness than on former occasions. The hon. and gallant Member opposite had made some detracting remarks in reference to the Reserves. Now, he was bound to admit that he was not one of those who had ever taken a sanguine view in favour of Lord Cardwell's proposition. He thought a better plan would have been to adapt the arrangements for forming an Army Reserve to one more closely approaching the German system, without really resorting to the conscription. He had never believed that the Reserves would be got together in the rapid manner some persons anticipated. At the same time, he was now bound to say that the Reserves were even more considerable than he had ever expected; and the country had certainly never previously possessed a Reserve of men available for filling up the ranks of the Army to such an extent as they now had found under the working of Lord Cardwell's scheme. He was, therefore, now of opinion that Lord Cardwell deserved credit for his proposals, and the least the House of Commons could do was to give him credit for their fitness, as the present emergency proved. But he did not think the Reserves would go on increasing at any very rapid rate. The number of the Reserves must depend on the existence of quiet, and facilities for sending men out of active service. He did not believe that the recent changes in the time of service, both in India and at home, would enable them to keep up the supply of Reserves that was desirable for the Regular Army, and it was now an important question to consider whether some plan could not be devised for filling up more efficiently the strength of battalions. Those were kept up in a very attenuated state, ready, no doubt, to be raised to their full established strength, if men could be found: The waste of cadres was now very great, for we had 141 battalions, divided into 1,410 companies, with only about 97,000 privates; and of those fully 14,000 are withdrawn for lance-corporals, hand, pioneers, and other employments, leaving only 83,000 privates, and of those there were many inefficient. He was informed, by the Army Estimates, that 48 of the battalions at present at home were under 560 privates in established strength; and out of that number 37 battalions had only an average of 410 privates. And so long as we main- tained upwards of 70 battalions in India and the Colonies, it was absolutely necessary to keep up the battalions at home at a higher standard than that at present fixed for the 48 battalions. On that ground alone, he had always been in favour of temporarily adding a large number of men to the Army, because he knew that in battalions of only 560 and 410 men they could not count upon having more than 460 and 300 effective. He maintained that no battalion at home ought to be kept with fewer than 600 privates effective for guard duties, exclusive of employed men—band, pioneers, acting corporals, and others. Hence he was of opinion that it would be a wise policy on the part of the House of Commons to increase, even if only for one year, the number of men set down for the present ordinary year's supply. They ought not to regard the cost, because in the state of Europe none of them could say how soon the services of every man they could get for the Army might not be required. He further hoped that the Secretary of State would make ample provision for securing the health and comfort of the soldiers in the field, and to this end that followers be attached to regiments in the field by employiug men so readily obtainable in Egypt. By this means the waste of our costly soldiers from being saved from fatigue duties in the burning sun of Egypt would be prevented; and he must now conclude by stating that he had certainly no fault to find at present with the War Office in connection with the present arrangements. He had never seen an Expedition carried out with such regularity and order as the present one.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

said, there were parts of the speech of the Secretary of State for War which he had been very glad to listen to. He was glad to hear that the Army was in such an efficient state, and that it had been possible to bring together an Army Corps of 30,000 men with such expedition. He was also glad to hear that no man had been sent on active service who was under 20 years of age. That was a question in which he had taken special interest for some years, and he was much gratified at the announcement which had been made. At the same time, he felt bound to express the disappointment with which he had listened to one part of the speech of the Secretary of State for War. The right hon. Gentleman told them the number of men who were about to go to Egypt, and the number of Reserve men who were to go into the Force; but he had not told them how the men who were sent to Egypt were to be replaced. It must be borne in mind that the men sent to Egypt were all men taken from the fighting strength of the country; and he wished to draw the attention of his right hon. Friend to the position in which the Army was in 1879, and that in which it was in 1881, and now. He did not know whether he had given these figures before; but he had placed them on paper with the intention of bringing them forward upon a Vote of this kind, either in regard to the Reserves or to the Militia. He found that the number of Militia in training in 1879 was 115,000; in 1881 it was only 89,000, showing a difference of 26,000 to the bad. The number of Reserve men in 1880–1 of the First Class was 23,000, and of Class 2, 24,000, making a total of 47,000; whereas, in 1881, the total number of both classes was only 35,600, showing a difference of 11,400 men to the bad as compared with 1879. It would thus be seen that, taking the Reserve men and the Militia together, our resources, so far as the fighting strength of the country was concerned, had been reduced, since 1879, by no less than 37,000 men. No doubt his right hon. Friend would say that the Irish Militia had something to do with this result. He knew perfectly well that the Irish Militia had not been called out and trained. He would not go into the reason why they had not been called out and trained; but, such being the fact, he thought Parliament was bound to have full regard to that fact; and now that they were sending out a Force to Egypt, and, possibly, might be beginning a war, although he hoped the necessity for actual war would not arise—still, they knew in regard to Ireland that the country was very much in the condition it was six months ago, to say nothing of the troubles with the Constabulary, which they had heard of that day, and which he sincerely trusted would not be of long continuance. Under all these circumstances, he certainly thought the Government were bound to take into careful consideration any step that would have the effect of diminishing the fighting strength of the country. What he thought the Secretary of State for War should have told them was that the Government were about to take steps either to embody the Militia, or to call out some more of the Reserve men. He was quite aware that that was a question of pounds, shillings, and pence; but he was quite aware, also, that the sum of £2,300,000 which the Government had asked for was a small sum indeed to cover all the expenses he was afraid the country would be put to during the next three months. But, however that might be—however the calculations of the Government might have been made—there was one calculation which he thought was more necessary than any other, and that was whether they were in a position to hold their own at home and abroad. He was, therefore, somewhat disappointed that his right hon. Friend had not stated that he was prepared—indeed, that he had already made arrangements for calling out a certain number of Militia regiments. It might be that their services might not be wanted; but he thought that they should be prepared at all points, and it was not sufficient to be satisfied with what had already been done. They should not be satisfied unless they had another Army Corps ready to take the field. He should like to draw the attention of his right hon. Friend to a very remarkable article which appeared in The Times newspaper not very long ago. He did not propose to read the article, although he had extracts from it in his hand. It appeared in The Times on the 4th of July, and it stated with regard to the Second Army Corps that of the 13 regiments which were to compose the Corps there were not more than 200 effective men in each. Now, that was a very serious statement indeed; but there were a great many serious statements contained in the article, and it had evidently been written under the inspiration of somebody who knew something about the matter, and who desired to make a revelation as to the actual state of things. He only hoped that the information contained in the article would turn out not to be true. But, however that might be, what had occurred at home and abroad since then, and the position in which they found themselves at that moment, really necessitated some consideration of the difficulty they would ex- perience if any further calls were made upon their fighting force. He trusted that either now or to-morrow, when his right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley) put his Question on the subject of the Militia, his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War would be prepared to make a statement which would satisfy everybody that, at all events, he was fully alive to the very critical position in which the country was placed.

MR. CHILDERS

said, he would reply to the questions of his noble Friend at once. In regard to the Militia, he would be able to give some facts in reply to the right hon. and gallant Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley) tomorrow which would show how close they had at hand a force which they could at once embody in the case of necessity. With respect to the Army Reserve, he thought the noble Lord had forgotten what the rule now was. The Second Army Reserve consisted practically of the old enrolled pensioners, and they had run down in number very considerably of late years. They had been allowed to run down, because by law every pensioner was now liable to be called out; and it was, therefore, quite unnecessary to keep up a mere paper Second Class Reserve. On the other hand, the First Class Army Reserve had increased very considerably. Under the system which he had explained last year they were now sending into the Reserve a large number of men after four or five years' service who would not be eligible for service abroad. If it were necessary, the Government would not scruple to advise Her Majesty to call out both the Militia Reserve and the rest of the First Class Army Reserve, which would place at the disposal of the country some 40,000 to 50,000 men.

SIR HARRY VERNEY

remarked, that the country was now engaged in what might become a very serious war; and he was sure that everyone who was anxious for the welfare of the Army would give a careful consideration to every point of importance. The Medical Department of the Army had shown neglect, and ought to be carefully provided; and one of the most important subjects for consideration was that medical men should be attached to the regiments, and not to the stations. No- thing could be of higher importance to the welfare and health of the Army than to make some provision of that kind.

THE CHAIRMAN

I must point out to the hon. Baronet that the Vote now before the Committee is that for the Army Reserve Force, and not the Medical Vote at all.

SIR HARRY VERNEY

Then it would be irregular to raise any question in regard to the services of the Medical Staff upon this Vote?

THE CHAIRMAN

Yes; we are not at present upon the Medical Vote.

SIR ROBERT LOYD LINDSAY

said, it was no doubt the fact, as had been pointed out by his hon. and gallant Friend behind him (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), that the Army Reserve did not grow up as fast as they had hoped it would. He had always contended, that this principle of having an Army Reserve was the right principle. In these days it was essential it should be placed upon such a footing that it could be rapidly expanded in the event of war. His own feeling in the matter was that in the course of a few years they ought to have an Army Reserve of at least 50,000 men. At one time he thought that that result was highly probable; but, unfortunately, the national emergency which had come upon them had dispelled his hopes. Carrying his recollection back to the time when troops were sent out to South Africa, he found that precisely the same thing happened then. The Army Reserves were called out, and again their hopes of seeing the Army Reserve grow were dispelled. The principle was, nevertheless, a sound principle, and he trusted that some mode would yet be adopted by which the Reserve might be further expanded. Before now, he had ventured, both inside and outside the House, to recommend that in the existing Volunteer Force a certain Reserve would be found which would be a most valuable force in the event of an emergency arising. Personally, he had the strongest conviction on the point; but he regretted to say that his brother Volunteer officers did not share in that feeling. Indeed, he knew that his noble Friend on his left (Lord Elcho) had taken a most unreasonable view of the matter. He regretted to say that many other Volunteer officers had followed his noble Friend, and he was obliged to confess that he had not received much support in the view he had put forward as to the Volunteers forming a Reserve. Therefore he would not enlarge further upon the matter now, but would wait until his noble Friend, and those who thought with him, became a little more sensible in regard to the matter. There was another question which he was also desirous of raising. The first source from which the Army Reserve was supplied was men who had served six or seven years with the Colours; the second source to which they looked for a Reserve was the Militia. To the Militia he should like to be able to add the Volunteers; but, not being able to do that, he asked the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to consider whether it was not expedient to feed this Reserve from some other source, and, if so, then the source of which he might well avail himself was the open market. Let any man who could pass an examination in drill, who could show a good physique, and come up to a certain standard in drill, had a good constitution, and should show a good character, appear before any officer the Commander-in-Chief chose to name,—perhaps the colonels commanding the regimental districts—and if they could show that they had been fairly instructed and had a good physique, there was no reason whatever why they should not be included in the Army Reserve. They would draw, he presumed, the pay which an Army Reserve man had, of 6d. a-day, and such men would have the advantage of being able to carry on the ordinary businesses of life. Of course, it was essential that they should not take away men from their ordinary occupations to serve in the Army if there was any help for it. In this way he was quite satisfied that they would be able to get the services of a class of men whom it would be most useful in case of an emergency to pass into the Army. They had, all over the country, a most perfect system of drill instruction, with most intelligent men as colonels, and under them most able adjutants, and a large number of efficient non-commissioned officers, now engaged in instructing the Militia and instructing the Volunteers. If men of this kind were passed into the Army Reserve, they would soon have a very large force, and he believed there would be no difficulty in getting persons who were desirous of doing so to join the Army Reserve in the way he had suggested. There was one advantage in this system—namely, that if the right hon. Gentleman could only show a Reserve of 50,000 men, he would be able still further to extend the period of service, with the Colours. The service at present with the Colours was seven years, and by the adoption of this plan they would be able to add another year's service, which, he believed, would be hailed by a number of Members of that House, who were officers in the Army, as a great boon. As there were so many advantages to be derived from service with the Colours, he thought the Government might go one step further, and make the service with the Colours eight years instead of seven. He could see no drawback to the proposal. The only reason why it was found necessary to send men so early into the Reserve from the Colours was that they wanted the Reserves to grow up. If, however, they could obtain men for the Reserves from other sources, the necessity which now existed of sending men early into the Reserves would be done away with. He did not think it was creditable to their Army administration that, with the large expenditure of £.15,000,000 or £16,000,000 a-year upon the Army, it should require any great exertion to send out an Army Corps, properly equipped, for the war. No doubt, as the right hon. Gentleman said, the Second Army Corps was gradually coming forward, and might soon be in a condition to be sent out, and even a Second Army Corps would be but a very small proportion for the Army to be able to put in the field. He believed there was no more economical way of largely extending their Reserves, and not only was it the most economical way, but it was the most efficient. He was delighted to find that the Reserves were coming up as they were. The men came up most zealously, and in some cases men who had not even been called up had appeared. He thought this was a most encouraging fact; and, for his own part, he was pleased to see it. He must, however, admit that the Army Reserve grew up at an extremely slow pace, and unless something was done to feed it, it would never reach the strength it ought to be. The difficulty lay in the question of strengthening the Reserves, and he believed the plan he had mentioned would be found to work satisfactorily.

LORD ELCHO

remarked, that if he had not been referred to by his hon. and gallant Friend who had just sat down, and by the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Sir George Balfour), he did not think he should have troubled the Committee with any remarks. He considered it necessary, however, to say a word in reference to what had fallen from them. In the first place, he thought the Committee were greatly indebted to his hon. and gallant Friend, behind him (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) for having brought these subjects before the Committee. As the Secretary of State said, the Committee were always glad to hear what his hon. and gallant Friend had to say in regard to the Army, because the remarks of his hon. and gallant Friend, as a rule, were most instructive. The first point raised by his hon. and gallant Friend was the question of the employment in Egypt of big horses; and he (Lord Elcho) had been glad to hear what the Secretary of State had to say about the Life Guards and Blues. The horses had been a subject of much comment, and even of a caricature in St. James Street along with other remarkable caricatures. He had heard men belonging to the Horse Artillery say that, owing to the stride of the horses and their strength, the Blues and Guards worked more quickly with the artillery than any other mounted regiments. Whether they would be able to do that in a climate so materially different from that of this country he did not pretend to say. They were large men and large horses; but the public must not run away with the idea that they were not active and not up to their work. The present discussion had turned upon the question of the Reserves. That really was the whole Army question at this moment. In the year 1870, when Lord Card well introduced his reforms, he practically, in a great measure, got rid of the first line with a view of forming a second line. He maintained that Lord Cardwell had promised them that in the year 1882 they should have a Reserve of 80,000 men. It might not be in Hansard, but he was as certain as he could be of anything that he had heard Lord Cardwell state in that House that the actuaries, by an actuarial calculation, which was a favourite term of Lord Cardwell, had clearly shown that by a certain year—and his impression was that it was the year in which he was now speaking, 1882, although he would not say it was not even 1880—they would have 80,000 men in the Reserves. But whether it was 80,000 or only half that number—namely, 40,000—the intentions of Lord Cardwell had been defeated, and the Reserves, so far as the numbers were concerned, were a signal failure. At the outside, they had only at this moment 26,000 or 28,000. [Mr. CHILDERS dissented.] The right hon. Gentleman shook his head; but they had heard that statement distinctly from the right hon. Gentleman himself, that the Reserves of the Army proper were 28,000. The reason why the scheme had not proved successful was because it had been begun on a wrong footing. If Lord Cardwell had wished the Army Reserves to grow rapidly, what was it he should have done? He should have filled up every existing regiment to its full normal complement, so as to have something from which the Reserves could grow; instead of which, the regiments had been cut down to 500 men as their greatest strength. They had not even been acting like the Irishman who cut off one end of his blanket in order to lengthen the other, for Lord Cardwell had cut off the numerical strength at one end and had not put it on the other. The hon. and gallant General opposite (Sir George Balfour) confessed that he had been somewhat disappointed in the result, and believed that the only satisfactory way would be to adopt the system of conscription. [Sir GEORGE BALFOUR: No.] Well, the hon. and gallant Gentleman referred to that result, and was understood to say that he (Lord Elcho) was in favour of conscription. Now, he wished to state that he had never said a word in that House at any time, although he had taken great interest in Army matters, in favour of conscription. He believed that conscription for the Army was utterly impossible, and was never to be thought of in connection with this country. What he had advocated, and still advocated, and what he believed to be the only sound basis of any system of Army Reserve, was not conscription, but the enforcement of the old military law of the country for home service in the Militia, accompanied by voluntary enlistment into the Army. Whatever they did as regards Army service, they must still look to the Militia as the real basis and backbone of the British Army, and service in the Militia should be made compulsory. Until the Secretary of State for War had the courage to come down to the House with a proposition to revive the old military law of compulsory service in the Militia, and until the ex-Secretary of State for War agreed not to oppose the right hon. Gentleman if he made that proposition, they never would have an efficient Army Reserve. His impression was that the old system was a just one, and that with an extensive Militia Reserve they would soon have an Army of sufficient magnitude for any purpose they could desire. He did not believe they would ever have a sound and sufficient Army Reserve until they adopted some such system. The right hon. Gentleman had promised to look into the whole question. Of course, a time of actual war was not the time for endeavouring to show where their system was not effective; but he hoped his right hon. Friend would carefully inquire into the subject whether he adopted the system of ballot or not. He believed the right hon. Gentleman would soon find that the Militia was the real Reserve for keeping up the strength of the Army, and in order to render it available they must keep it up to its full strength, which unquestionably it was not at the present moment. He had nothing further to say except to refer to what had been said by his hon. and gallant Friend on his right (Sir Robert Loyd Lindsay). There was no more gallant Officer or more efficient Volunteer, or one better acquainted with Volunteer matters than his hon. and gallant Friend; but upon this question of obtaining a Reserve for the Army by getting a certain number of Volunteers to inscribe their names either as regiments or individuals as willing to join the Army when occasion might require, he (Lord Elcho) entirely differed. He admitted that they might get together some 10,000 or 20,000; but they would run the risk of losing 200,000 who were serving for home defence. He would greatly prefer that matters should stand as they did. His hon. and gallant Friend said that he did not propose at present to press this point, but that he would wait until his brother Volunteer officers became more reasonable on this question. He (Lord Elcho) did not think, as far as he knew their feeling, that the Volunteer officers were likely to come round to the view of his hon. and gallant Friend. At any rate, any hon. Member who took an interest in the question would find that it had been thoroughly threshed out before the Committee on which his hon. and gallant Friend sat; and lie (Lord Elcho), as he had been put through his facings by that Committee, was perfectly prepared to abide by the decision at which they had arrived.

SIR ARTHUR HAYTER

said, the hon. and gallant Member for Harwich (Sir Henry Tyler) had asked the reason of the transfer of the Essex Rifles from Colchester to Warley. The reason was that they should have the same depôt centre as their relief battalions, the 22nd and the 44th. The hon. and gallant Gentleman said that the transference had been injurious to the recruiting. No such result had been reported to the War Office by General Bulwer. It was found that out of the total number of recruits raised last year, about 58 per cent were raised in the territorial districts; and the reason was that the regiments which the recruits joined formed part of a territorial system, each regiment being identified with a particular district. The Report went on to state that it was intended to follow up the same system with regard to the Artillery and the Cavalry. It was found necessary, in order to complete the territorial system in Essex, to transfer the Essex Rifles from Colchester to Warley, in order to amalgamate the regimental head-quarters with their linked battalion. The transfer had been made in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee of 1872.

SIR HENRY TYLER

said, he quite understood that it was part of the general plan; but this particular regiment was practically raised from the Eastern Division of the county in which it had its head-quarters, but it had now been moved to the Western Division of the county, with which it had previously had no connection; and the result, he was informed, had been very injurious to the recruiting.

MR. ONSLOW

wished to put one question to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. He was sorry he was not in the House when the right hon. Gentleman made his speech; but he understood that the right hon. Gentleman had stated that 26,000 or 28,000 Reserves had been called out. [Mr. CHILDERS: No, no!] Was that the whole strength of the Reserves? [Mr. CHILDERS: Yes.] Then he should be glad to know how many of these 26,000 or 28,000 men would actually come out?

MR. CHILDERS

said, he had already stated the number who had responded to the call made upon them; and the response had been in the highest degree satisfactory.

MR. ONSLOW

could only repeat that he was very sorry he was absent when the right hon. Gentleman made his speech.

MR. CHILDERS

said, the Government had called out the other day all those who had joined the Reserves since 1881, with the exception of certain men belonging to the Irish Constabulary, and a few others whom it would have been inconvenient to call upon. Out of the whole number called out, 11,300, or, to be strictly accurate, 11,297 had joined. A number of these would join the Colours in Egypt, and a certain number would be employed in making up the strength of other regiments left at home.

MR. ONSLOW

wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman if he could not see his way to require that more of the Army Reserve men should actually join the Colours for service abroad? It had come to his knowledge that many of those who had been called out in the Reserves would join the depots of their regiments, and would, in all probability, never he sent to Egypt or anywhere else. It appeared to him that they should get the best soldiers they could, and that they should not send young and inexperienced troops to the front. He would, therefore, ask the right hon. Gentleman if he would not provide that men who were being called out for the Army Reserve should not stop at home in this country with the depôts or go to Ireland, but should at once be sent out to join the Colours in Egypt. There was another thing it was also necessary he should mention. He happened to know, of his own personal knowledge, that many of those who had joined the Army Reserve fully believed that they were only going to join for 38, or, at the most, 56 days. How such a report had got spread abroad he could not make out; but it was a fact which he knew of his own knowledge. Many of the Reserve men believed that they were not to be called to the front at all, but that they would either have to join their regiment—it might be in Ireland or in some other part of the country—or have to stop with their depot. Now he maintained that it would be far better to send all the men of the Army Reserve, who were men of experience, to the front, and do away with some of the young soldiers. It would be most unfortunate if the country were deprived of the services and the inestimable value of men who had had ample training and were thoroughly seasoned soldiers. The young soldiers might be kept in this country for further training.

MR. CHILDERS

said, he could only repeat what he had expressly stated before, that no young soldiers would be sent for active service to Egypt. The battalions which were now going to Egypt had been very well constituted. Two thousand of the Reserves who had been called out would go to the Mediterranean at once. Of the rest, a considerable portion would go to their own county regiments, which was a very popular matter with the Reserve. There was nothing a Reserve man liked so much as to find himself in his own county regiment. All the details of the employment of the Reserves had been elaborated with great care, and everything had been done which would tend to popularize the calling out of the Reserves.

MR. ANDERSON

said, he had not intended to say anything in the course of the debate, and he should not have done so but for the remarks of the noble Lord opposite (Lord Elcho), who recommended the establishment of compulsory service for the Militia. He felt bound to enter his strongest protest against any such scheme as that. So far as he was acquainted with the working men of this country in the large constituencies, he knew very well that they would not tolerate anything of the kind. They were not only not enamoured of the principle of compulsory service, but he was satisfied they would never tolerate it; and if the time ever came, which he hoped it would not, when the services of the people were needed for coast defence, such a thing as compulsory service or conscription would not be at all necessary. In such an emergency working men would be quite ready to turn out, without being compelled to do so. He could not believe the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers) had any such idea, or that even the right hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Colonel Stanley) entertained such an idea; but he begged to say that if they had they would receive the most strenuous opposition from the working men of the country.

COLONEL CARINGTON

remarked, that he happened to go into the Post Office the other day, when he saw a Circular inviting the Reserve men to volunteer for the Colonies. Now, he thought that that was by no means a wise course, because, as far as he could make out, all the men who responded to the invitation would necessarily be taken from the Queen's Service and placed under the Colonial authorities. It rather sanctioned the belief, and there could be nothing more unfavourable for them, that the Reserve men experienced great difficulty in obtaining employment in civil life. Nothing, in his opinion, could be more injurious to the Service generally.

MR. CHILDERS

said, his answer to his hon. and gallant Friend was that the Circular referred to was sanctioned with a view of encouraging the Cape Colony in the very great sacrifices it was now making in regard to its military arrangements, towards the expense of which this country was not called upon to contribute one farthing. It was considered desirable that there should be a nucleus formed out of the Reserve for a local Force at the Cape. Three hundred men out of the 28,000 which constituted the Reserve were allowed to volunteer for service at the Cape, and leave had already been given to about 200.

Vote agreed to.

(3.) £394,300, Commissariat, Transport, and Ordnance Store Establishments.

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

said, he wished to put a question to the Secretary of State for War upon this Vote in connection with the present Expedition. In almost every one of the Expeditions of the last half century there had been, at first, at any rate, a breakdown in the Transport Service. In the first Afghan War, in the Afghan War of more recent occurrence, in the War at the Cape, in the Crimean War, and in almost every Expedition of any size, with the exception of the Red River Expedition and Lord Napier's advance upon Abyssinia, there had been a lamentable breakdown of the Transport Service. There could be no place in which the Transport Service was of more consequence than in Egypt, especially at this particular time of the year. So far the Service appeared to have performed its duty very well; but he was somewhat at a loss to ascertain how it could be known that the present Expedition was thoroughly equipped with everything necessary for an efficient Transport Service if the troops were to be left on the coast of the Mediterranean in the North of Egypt, with a large portion of the country flooded, it might be, by the action of the Egyptians? If such a thing occurred, they would find themselves detained in one of the most unhealthy places in the world, and many of them, in the end, would die in these Porbonian bogs. The present week or the next 10 days would be of the utmost consequence in the matter of transport, and he believed there were many officers in England at this moment who had evil forebodings as to the satisfactory working of the Transport Service which had been provided for the Army.

MR. CHILDERS

said, he thought it would be imprudent on his part to enter into any explanation of the steps which had been taken by the Government to secure the efficient working of the Transport Service, in the constitution of which peculiar difficulties were anticipated.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR

said, he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would bear in mind the necessity of providing proper means of transport during the operations about to take place in Egypt. Those who were practically acquainted with that country would know perfectly well the great need there was of having a sufficient number of camels for transport purposes. All would remember the many thousands of camels which the Bedouin Tribes supplied for the transport of the goods and luggage before the Railway and Canal were opened. He therefore tendered the advice to the War Office that they should get early possession of a large number of those animals, by entering into timely contracts with the Chiefs of the Tribes, who, formerly, and he understood still, were most friendly to the English. Good rates paid for camels for use, and compensation money for deaths, would attract ample supplies of those useful animals.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

said, his experience always caused him a considerable amount of anxiety at times like the present, with regard to the Commissariat and Transport Departments. So much depended upon the wants of the Army in this respect being efficiently supplied that he trusted the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would be able to make a satisfactory statement to the Committee as to the working of the new Commissariat system, under which, as it was decided a short time ago, Army officers were to be admitted to this branch of the Service. He desired to know whether, under that system, good and efficient Army officers were coming forward in the requisite numbers? The subject was an important one, for this reason—if they did not secure the services of a sufficient number of Army officers, that was to say, if Army officers did not come forward in sufficient numbers at a critical time like the present, through their services being required in the regiments to which they belonged, our Commissariat and Transport Services would run great risk of breaking down. He remembered that in the time of the Crimean War a great deal of difficulty arose from the fact that a number of officers who had been asked to serve in the Commissariat felt it their duty to resign their commissions in that branch and join their regiments, which were ordered to the front. He hoped that nothing of that kind would be allowed to occur again in any expedition in which we were engaged. He again expressed the hope that Army officers were coming forward in sufficient numbers for the Service, and that it was clearly understood they were to remain with the new Service they had elected to join instead of rejoining their old regiments.

MR. CHILDERS

said, he was able to assure the noble Lord opposite that the new Commissariat system was working very well. There was no difficulty whatever with regard to obtaining the services of an adequate number of Army officers for this branch; of course, on the understanding with the officers that they would not be allowed to change their minds, and go back to the regiments they had left.

COLONEL NOLAN

said, the noble Lord the Member for West Essex (Lord Eustace Cecil) had drawn attention to an important point in connection with the officers of the Commissariat branch. The present Vote afforded also the opportunity of calling the attention of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to the position of another class of officers, who were very generally neglected by the authorities at the War Office. He referred to the officers of the Ordnance Store Establishment, a body of men having almost the same duties to perform as the officers of the Commissariat, the only difference being that the former were responsible for the supply of food, and the latter for the supply of ammunition and other matériel to the Army. There was no doubt that these officers had been very much neglected; and he believed the reason of this was that, unlike the Commissariat Establishment, who had a representative officer at the War Office, they had no officer to look after their interests. Everyone knew, and he had always found it to be the case in practice, that where a body of officers of any corps had a representative at the War Office, they were sure to get more consideration shown to them than officers who had no such representative. The subject to which he called attention was not a new one, and it had already been brought forward in that House, and the neglect complained of had extended over the last 21 years. In 1877 an inquiry had been instituted into the position of the Ordnance Store officers, and the Com- mittee reported strongly in favour of the redress of the grievance which was acknowledged to exist. He (Colonel Nolan) brought the matter before the House in 1879. At the time it was admitted by the Surveyor General that the officers had a reasonable ground of complaint; that a feeling of soreness had teen raised with respect to several matters, and that the authorities would remove the grievances of the officers as far as possible. A promise was actually made that the grievance, which consisted chiefly in the fact that the Ordnance Store officers received a less rate of pay and lower rank than the officers in the Commissariat, should be redressed. He admitted that the noble Lord (Lord Eustace Cecil) had taken some very considerable steps in that direction; but he was bound to say he had not gone far enough, and that he had left a great deal to be done by the present Secretary of State for War; and he thought that right hon. Gentleman should go thoroughly into the case of the officers in question, which had been looked after by the Surveyor General under the late Administration. The difficulty with regard to the Surveyor General's plan of dealing with the subject was that under it the men of the Service had to serve so long that they were in a lower position than the officers of the Commissariat Department; and, consequently, when he gave them the same rank as the Commissariat officers, they were still receiving much less pay than the latter. In May, 1882, there were 55 Commissariat officers of eight and a-half years' service as compared with 48 Ordnance Store officers; the number of officers of the equivalent rank of captain being pretty nearly equal. But at the next step a great change took place, and it appeared that there were in the Commissariat 43 officers having the equivalent rank of major, drawing 18s. a-day, as compared with 27 officers only in the Ordnance Store Establishment of the same rank. Moreover, the latter had 27 years' service, as compared with 23 years in the case of the Commissariat officers. Then in the case of the equivalent rank of lieutenant colonel the disparity was enormous, because there were 18 officers of this rank in the Commissariat, and five only in the Ordnance Store branch. It was clear from this statement that it took the Ordnance Store officer a much longer time than it did the Commissariat officer to get to the ranks where he would be better paid. He acknowledged that this grievance would die out in about 20 years under the arrangement effected by the noble Lord opposite; but his point was that a very great disparity existed between the officers of the two Establishments at the present time, which, in his opinion, it was desirable in the interest of the Service to remove. Not only was the question of pay involved in these disparities, but the question of pensions also; and, as matters now stood, the officers in the Ordnance Department would be retired at a lower rank than the officers of the Commissariat, and would consequently receive smaller pensions. He had no desire unduly to occupy the time of the Committee in calling attention to this subject; but he regarded the grievance of the Ordnance Store officers as one of a special character, which should be brought before the Secretary of State for War in the hope that he would do something to remedy it. He admitted that when the country was at war it was not exactly the time to look into these matters; but, on the other hand, in times of peace, the interest of the soldier was very little thought about, so perhaps, after all, the moment was not inopportune for bringing forward this well-founded grievance. He trusted the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would compare the conditions of service in the two corps, and consider whether, in respect of pay and promotion, they might not now be placed on an equal footing. As far as he was aware, there was no reason why any difference should exist to the disadvantage of the Ordnance Store officers, inasmuch as the stores they had to look after were, if anything, more important than those under the control of the officers of the Commissiariat Establishment.

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

said, his hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Nolan) had called the attention of the Committee and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to a subject which he (Mr. Arthur O'Connor) had brought forward in Committee last year. On that occasion the Secretary of State for War promised that he would make inquiries and endeavour to secure the carrying out of the promises of the Surveyor General and the noble Lord on the Front Opposition Bench (Lord Eustace Cecil). He did not know whether anything had been done in that direction or not. But the grievances complained of were just as real and substantial now as they were when last brought forward; and on comparing the two branches, whose services were very much of the same kind, he found that the officers of the Commissariat who had only eight and a-half years' service were receiving as much pay as the officers of the Ordnance Store Establishment who had served considerably longer; that whereas Commissariat officers of 18 years' service were receiving 18s. a-day, Ordnance Store officers who had served five years longer were only receiving the same rate of pay. Again, an officer of the Ordnance Store Department who had 27½ years' service did not get more than 22s. a-day; but 27 years' service in the Commissariat branch would secure a man 30s. a-day and the rank of lieutenant colonel, which was a grade higher than the same period of service would secure for an officer in the Ordnance Corps. It could not, he thought, be denied that these disparities constituted a great and substantial grievance, and called for attention and redress on the part of the authorities at the War Office. But there was another point as to which the Ordnance Store officers complained, and complained now with very great reason, seeing that the country was engaged in war—they complained that they were deprived of titular rank. As an outsider, he was, perhaps, not able to realize the amount of importance which a military man attached to a matter of that kind; but he believed the officers of the Ordnance branch were very sore from the refusal of the authorities to extend to them this titular as well as regimental rank. There were men of long military service in charge of most important branches of the Establishment—men of the rank of major in the Army, who, under the present system were allowed only the title of "Mr." Now, that must not only create a natural feeling of disappointment in the minds of the officers concerned, but, as many military officers, Sir Garnet Wolseley amongst others, concurred in stating, the system carried with it some serious disadvantages in connection with discipline. Soldiers did not recognize the title of "Mr.;" but they would recognize a title which showed at once that the possessor of it was a man of military rank. Having shown, following upon the speech of the hon. and gallant Member opposite (Colonel Nolan), that there still existed well-founded causes of complaint on the part of the Ordnance Store officers, he held that in both these respects they were entitled to demand some substantial fulfilment of the promises given by the late Surveyor General, and to this subject he invited the serious attention of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War.

MR. CHILDERS

said, it was necessarily extremely difficult, in matters of this kind, to give complete satisfaction to those interested; but he had always taken care, where two branches of the Service were concerned whose duties were of a similar character, to see that the various ranks were fairly apportioned between the two Establishments. Now, it was precisely on that principle that the regulations with regard to the officers in the Commissariat and those in the Ordnance Store branch had been made, although he was obliged to admit that if any difference whatever existed between the two Corps in this respect, the officers in the Ordnance Store Establishment had rather the advantage. The pay was the same and the relative rank was the same in both Corps; and, that being so, he was unable to perceive what change could be made. No doubt there was this difficulty, that in adding to the Ordnance Corps older men presented themselves than in the case of the Commissariat Corps. But this was a matter of accident, which must be left to adjust itself. He could not agree to the principle that a higher rate of pay should be given in a Department because the officers engaged in it were older than the officers in another Department receiving the same amount of pay. If that were admitted, the authorities would be called upon to alter the rates of pay in other branches of the Service. He was bound to say, having given the subject due attention, that he could see no remedy for this portion of the complaints put forward by the hon. and gallant Member for Gal way (Colonel Nolan) and the hon. Member for Queen's County (Mr. Arthur O'Connor) that would not produce greater evil than it was intended to remove. With regard to the question of titular rank, although he knew that officers performing duties of this kind as a rule had no titular rank, the direction indicated by the hon. Member for Queen's County was not one in which he should like to move, because, speaking from recollection of what had taken place in the last 20 years, his impression was that already too much had been done in the way of applying military titles to civilians engaged in various branches of the Service.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

said, he had sympathized very much with the officers of the Ordnance Store Department, and under the late Administration a great portion of his time and that of gentlemen under him had been taken up in endeavouring to ascertain, and, if possible, to remedy the grievances in question. Now, with reference to the question of titular rank, there was a strong feeling at the time in the Army itself that gentlemen employed in civil duties ought not to possess military titles, and it was felt that if these titles were extended to persons employed in the Ordnance Store Department they must also be extended to other civil branches of the Army. For instance, there was no reason why, on this principle, doctors and chaplains in the Army should not have titular rank; if it was extended in one direction there was no reason why it should not be extended in another. He was entirely in favour of Army officers maintaining their military rank, and it was fully recognized under the late Administration that the titles which Army officers in the Ordnance Department possessed should not be taken away from them. But the case of pure civilians who had no such rank was entirely a different matter. It was felt—and his experience confirmed it—that neither in the British Army nor in any other Army could titular rank be held by civilians; and, therefore, the only thing that could be done under the circumstances was to confirm the relative rank.

COLONEL ALEXANDER

said, he had listened with interest to the arguments advanced for and against giving titular rank to officers in the Ordnance Store Department, and he was bound to say he was unable to agree with the view expressed by the noble Lord who had just spoken. On the other hand, he felt very much the truth of what had been said by the hon. Member for Queen's County (Mr. Arthur O'Connor). He believed that it was desirable in the interest of the Service that titular rank should be conferred in the case of officers who had duties to discharge of the kind which belonged to the officers of the Ordnance Store Department; and he had, moreover, been frequently assured by quartermasters that titular rank was regarded as even of more importance than increase of pay.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

said, the hon. and gallant Member for South Ayrshire (Colonel Alexander), in referring to quartermasters, was speaking of men who belonged to the Army. His statement was that in the case of civilians there was no reason for giving titular rank.

COLONEL NOLAN

said, he wished to add one or two observations to the discussion before the Vote was finally put from the Chair. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, in replying upon this question of the Ordnance Store officers, had stated that the number of men in the lower ranks of the Commissariat and Ordnance Departments being the same, the disparity of promotion as between the two Corps would in the course of time disappear. He quite agreed that this might be the case, and it was very desirable that the right hon. Gentleman's expectation should prove to be correct; but the prospect afforded little or no consolation to men who were now debarred from promotion by the causes he had pointed out. The figures he had quoted showed that the Ordnance Corps had only five men of the relative rank of lieutenant colonel as against 13 men of the same rank in the Commissariat; they were a conclusive proof that the Ordnance Store officers were very much in arrear at the present time in the matter of promotion, and consequently in respect of pay. He had shown that a feeling of soreness existed amongst the men, and that this arose partly from their being kept so long in inferior positions while changes were made above them. But, besides that, it had been the custom to bring into the Ordnance Corps a certain number of Army officers from other Corps and to place them in the higher ranks. For instance, three officers had been brought in from the Artillery at one time, and although he did not mean to say that it was not right to do so, yet the Committee would understand that the practice necessarily interfered with promotion so far as the other officers of the Corps were concerned. Now, nothing of that kind ever occurred in the Commissariat; all who joined that Corps went into the bottom ranks. This circumstance, taken in connection with the figures he had laid before the Committee, showed that the officers of the Ordnance Corps were very much in arrear in point of promotion and pay; and, therefore, he trusted the fact would not be lost sight of by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War.

Vote agreed to.

(4.) £734,000, Clothing Establishments, Services, and Supplies.

LORD ELCHO

believed he was correct in saying that the English troops sent to Egypt were clothed in red, but that if the authorities had had the material they would have been sent out in grey. If he remembered rightly, the troops that served in India were not dressed in red, but in a dust-coloured material called karkee; and he could not help thinking it would be desirable that the Ordnance Stores Department should keep a supply of this cloth for future use, so that when our troops were sent to hot climates they might be clothed in a manner suited to the country in which they had to serve.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

asked if there was any intention on the part of the War Office authorities to alter the colour of the Army dress?

MR. CHILDERS

said, the Committee which sat to consider the colour of the Army dress had not yet made their Report; and, therefore, no decision had been arrived at upon the question suggested by the noble Lord the Member for West Essex (Lord Eustace Cecil). With regard to the point raised by the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire, the subject had not been overlooked, and he believed a large quantity of karkee had been sent out.

LORD ELCHO

said, he felt some anxiety also about the fit of the uniform. It was most desirable that a soldier should be able to move without splitting his clothes.

MR. CHILDERS

assured the noble Lord the uniform fitted much more loosely than it used to do.

Vote agreed to.

(5.) £1,289,500, Supply, Manufacture, and Repair of Warlike Stores.

MR. W. H. SMITH

desired to have some information as to the supply of Naval guns provided for under this Vote. It would be in the recollection of the Committee that, at an earlier period of the Session, in the discussion which took place on the Army Estimates this matter had been very lightly touched upon, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War merely remarking, with regard to the large sum for which provision was made in the Estimate, that it would hereafter be the subject of a statement to be made by the right hon. Gentleman the present Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant. As a matter of fact, the right hon. Gentleman left to the Chief Secretary the duty of explaining in detail the provision made in the Military Estimates for guns to be supplied to the Navy. But when the Navy Estimates came forward in Committee a few nights ago, the hon. Gentleman in charge of them, while stating that provision had been made for the Navy ordnance in the Army Estimates, could give him little or no information on the subject. It would be in the recollection of his right hon. Friend that provision was made last year for 119 guns, 103 of which were 6-inch guns, eight of 11½ tons, and eight of them guns of 18 tons. But he understood that out of the whole 119 only 32 had been delivered, and that these were 6-inch guns, none of the 11½-ton or 18 ton guns having been supplied. He regarded this as a most unfortunate circumstance, and he believed he was right in saying that not a single new gun had been placed on board any of the ships which had taken part in the late engagement with the forts at Alexandria. The country was, therefore, without what would have constituted a most valuable practical test of the efficiency of the guns in question, and he could not but feel that in this respect the Service had been very unfortunate. He would ask the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War whether the large provision made for ordnance in the Estimates before the Committee included an amount for other guns than those he had referred to, or whether it was, practically, a re-Vote of the money taken last year? Might the Committee calculate on the sum asked for in the present Estimates being actually expended, and the guns delivered to the Navy in the course of the current financial year? He need hardly say that this was a matter of great importance in view of the service expected from the Navy, and in view of their recent experience of the delay in obtaining guns for the Service. There was another matter to which he desired to call the attention of the Committee. When the late Administration left Office, a 43-ton gun was in hand; indeed, he might say that it had made considerable progress towards completion. He believed, however, that it had remained since then very much in an experimental condition. His right hon. Friend (Mr. Trevelyan) had stated in April last that three 43-ton guns would be supplied in December next for the Conqueror—that was to say, that two of these guns would be mounted on board the vessel in December, 1882, and that one would remain in store. They were also told by his right hon. Friend that two of these guns would be ready in March, and six more in July, 1883, so that the eight guns required for arming the Colossus and the other vessel for which they were intended were promised as soon as the ships were in a state to receive them. His right hon. Friend, moreover, said that 10 9-inch 18-ton guns would be ready in July next to be mounted in the turret of the Rupert and on board the Hercules. He sincerely trusted this would be the case; but he had some fear that the expectation of his right hon. Friend might not be realized. He was very anxious to know whether the final trials of the 43-ton gun had been completed, or if that gun was still only in the experimental stage; whether the engagement which was made in April last with regard to the delivery of three 43-ton guns for the Conqueror would be kept; whether the other guns promised would be ready for the Edinburgh and the Colossus; whether the 21 11½-ton guns which were promised for July last, and the 10 18-ton guns also promised for that month, were delivered and were complete; and, further, whether his right hon. Friend was satisfied that the other portion of his engagement with regard to Naval guns would be completed during the course of the present financial year? There was one other point to which he wished to allude. He referred to the carriages for these guns, the manufacture of which was undertaken also by the War Department, and the subject seemed to him to be of great importance. The Admiralty, he believed, were consulted, and had a great deal to say as to the pattern of the carriages to be used; but he was not quite satisfied that the very best carriage was fixed upon in every case, and although he understood that experiments were going on, yet he could not but feel it was a matter of regret that they should extend over such a long period of time. He had, on a former occasion, remarked that as the result of recent conditions the life of a gun at the present time was clearly ascertained to be shortened, and that owing to the heavy charges now in use it had really come to this—that they might wear out the guns they now had before they could get settled the type of the new guns that were to take their place. It was clear that these very large charges did effect a more rapid deterioration of the gun than formerly was thought probable, or even possible. They had. to face, not only the necessity for providing guns which were to be at least equal, if not superior, to those in use in the Navies of other countries—which would be at least equal to the guns that had been used by the Navies of the South American Republics during the last four years, but they had also to provide for the wear and tear of the guns, which would in future be very considerable. He urged these considerations upon the attention of Her Majesty's Government, because anyone of experience in these matters knew that the delay in the completion of ships, caused by the delay in the settlement, first of all, of the guns themselves, then of the charges to be put into them, and, finally, of the other details connected with them, was something almost beyond ordinary conception. His noble Friend the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) had mentioned that the delay in the production of guns was due to the appointment of a number of Committees to consider and report upon them. He (Mr. Smith) did not wish in the slightest degree to cast any reflection upon the labours of Committees whose Reports had, in many cases, been most serviceable and useful to the Governments who appointed thorn; but he confessed to feeling some alarm when his hon. Friend, two years ago, said he would constitute a new Committee to take charge of this important question, and advise the Government with reference to it. His apprehension was that the result of this decision would be that the new Committee would have to go through everything that had occurred before in connection with the question, and that further delay would follow. He was afraid that delay had resulted from the appointment of the Committee. Great as was the experience of its Members, fully entitled as they were to the confidence of the House and the Service, still he believed the kind of work they had to do, the duties thrown upon them, and the immense number of questions put to them, had resulted in delaying the attainment of the great object in view, which was to secure the best gun they could get in practice—not the best gun that could be conceived—and which, within a reasonable time, could be mounted on board Her Majesty's ships. He said it would be a great misfortune if their ships were delayed simply because the guns for which they were being constructed were not ready for them—because gentlemen, whose mechanical skill was very great, and whose experience entitled them to great respect, could not arrive at a decision on points as to which he believed a manufacturer, whose reputation depended on producing the best possible article, would have decided in his own mind long ago.

MR. CHILDERS

said, he was happy to say that Her Majesty's Government had largely increased the provision made in the Department, and the fact that the Vote had been raised was an earnest of what they intended to do in the matter of ordnance. He did not think it would have been possible to avoid appointing a Board to advise the Government on this subject. The whole question of gunnery during the last five or six years had gone through a process of transformation, and the result had been an endless controversy amongst the experts, inventors, and manufacturers; and he believed the Government would not have been able to deal with these movements, if he might call them so, coming from all parts of the scientific world, unless they had been able to avail themselves of the advice of the Board appointed two years ago. They had been obliged to listen to persons who made all sorts of proposals, and to examine their plans, which, as his right hon. Friend would know very well, was a matter of considerable difficulty. The examination of the merits of the Government gun as compared with the gun of the manufacturer had, no doubt, created some delay; but the work of the Board in this respect had been expedited by the introduction of two most able outside engineers, men of the greatest capacity, who could look at the question from the point of view of the manufacturer. On the whole, although he entirely agreed that time should not be unduly expended in deciding upon the type of our guns, he thought the period which had been occupied by the investigations had been more than compensated for by the advantages gained. He might mention to the Committee the great change that had taken place in the gun of the present day as compared with that of a few years ago. The necessity of having a longer gun made it necessary to use large powder and large chambers, and this, in its turn, made it necessary to load at the breech instead of the muzzle. The application of this principle had entirely revolutionized the form of construction of our guns. The consequence of all this was that pressure arose at different points which rendered experiments and a certain amount of delay unavoidable. It did not follow, even if the Estimates were largely increased, or even doubled, as in the present instance, that they could be quite worked up to. He would not go into the details of the question of carriages. His right hon. Friend knew the controversy that had been raised on this subject. It was a matter of dispute when his right hon. Friend presided at the Admiralty, and it had been so ever since, which Department should supply the gun carriages. That question still remained unsettled, and it was one that a good deal of difficulty surrounded. If the Admiralty made the carriages there might, perhaps, be greater speed in production; on the other hand, he did not think it by any means clear that the completion of the whole operation between the two Departments would be expedited. However that might be, he wished to be understood on that occasion not to commit himself to any opinion as to what might hereafter be done. Having made this statement with regard to a practical difficulty that had to be met, he would now reply to the general question of his right hon. Friend as to when the guns would be ready, merely remarking that he did not think that the Service had yet suffered by delay. He believed that by June, 1883, all the 6-inch guns and 8-inch guns that were included in the programme of this year and last year would be completed, and that in all probability the whole of the order for the 9-inch guns would be completed by the end of the financial year. With respect to the 43-ton gun, there were questions of the greatest importance both as to the construction and the carriage for the gun, and he did not think they were in a position to state that all the 43-ton guns that were promised would be completed within the financial year. On the other hand, he believed that the two guns which were promised for the Conqueror next year would be delivered in such time that the vessel would not be delayed. Taking the guns all round, the delay, he thought, had not been of a serious character, and he could assure his right hon. Friend that the arrear which existed had not been caused by any neglect on the part of the War Office, or any delay on the part of the Ordnance Select Committee. It was due solely to the necessity of proceeding with extreme care in the production of guns which were of novel construction; and so far as the guns were concerned, he thought there was every reason for congratulation at the results which had been arrived at.

MR. W. H. SMITH

said, he understood his right hon. Friend to say that the 18-ton guns and 11½-ton guns, which were to be delivered in July last, were not yet complete, but that he hoped to get them in June next year.

MR. CHILDERS

signified assent.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR

remarked that this was the second time within a few days that the question of the guns of the Navy had been brought forward in that House. Indeed, it was a resumption of the same discussion raised last year about the same guns, in number and calibre. Moreover, a dis- cussion upon the subject of Naval guns always took place when the Army Estimates were under consideration. Since he had been in Parliament he could not remember that any Session had passed without the supply of guns for the Navy being discussed, and invariably raised by Members who were usually most interested in the Navy. These repeated challenges proved the existence of a serious defect—that of having the Naval Department dependent on the War Office for their ordnance. When they considered the statement of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. W. H. Smith), calling attention to the present state of affairs in respect to the failures of the War Office to provide guns for the Navy, he thought that all must feel a certain amount of anxiety with regard to the state of the armament of the Navy. The right hon. Gentleman had referred to guns which, although long promised, and on several occasions, yet had not been supplied, and to gun carriages, which were supposed to be made sometimes by the Admiralty, and sometimes by the War Office, but which were not yet ready for the ships. Now, the delay in respect of those carriages, his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War said, was due to various causes. He would, however, take one cause not mentioned, which appeared to him to be at the bottom of the whole difficulty—namely, that the Admiralty looked to the War Office not only to make, but even to pay for, the guns and all equipments required in the Navy; and, no matter what the cost might be, or however urgent or vast the demand, yet the whole expenditure was thrown upon the Army Estimates, and the entire responsibility for prompt compliance with demands was placed on the Secretary of State. Now, he appealed to anyone who knew what the present cost of the Army was to say whether it was fair and just that the Army Estimates should be called upon to bear the expenditure incurred on account of the Navy for their guns, carriages, projectiles, and ammunition of all kinds, even including the new weapon—torpedoes? It was beyond the range of reasonable expectation that unlimited demands by one branch of the Service could be met and paid for by another branch. It was the old story of riding your neighbour's horse with your own spurs. No wonder, then, that there was delay in the production of the guns and all the vast war material for our ships. But the evil went further than this. This pernicious system, which had been so long in operation, had a tendency to render the officers of the Navy indifferent to certain questions of importance connected with the armament of the ships; it also prevented them giving that attention to the subject of the fitness of the guns for the ships, which was so necessary on the part both of officers and men For his own part, he maintained that it was impossible for any Military Department to be efficient unless the whole of the arrangements connected with the organization, the equipment, supplies, and cost of ordnance stores and ammunition were kept under the head of the Service, and unless the officers were qualified to say what was and what was not good work in the armament of stores. One of the results of this present system was a considerable deficiency of knowledge amongst Naval officers on the subject of guns, and their suitableness for the ships. His right hon. Friend would, no doubt, have had opportunities of knowing perfectly well that vessels had been planned without due consideration having been given to the kind of guns they would have to carry—in fact, guns had been made of lengths, dimensions, and form to suit the vessels, instead of the vessels being formed to receive the guns of the most efficient calibre. Further, so little did the two Departments work in harmony that the changes of construction found to be necessary when their armament was completed had cost the country considerable sums of money. With these views, he said it was impossible to have ffiecient armaments in the Navy so long as Naval officers went to the War Office for the guns for the Fleet, and had the accounting and auditing of stores, guns, &c, dependent on the War Office. With regard to the question of carriages, the right hon. Gentleman knew perfectly well that these also had been allowed to be built in the Dockyards of the Navy at the expense of the War Office, and the same remarks applied to them as applied to the guns, with this addition—that these same gun-carriages, planned and made up by the Navy, did not give satisfaction. He believed that neither with regard to pattern nor cost could any satisfactory gun - carriage be pro- vided for the Navy so long as this false system continued; and, therefore, he said, let the Navy supply themselves with guns and carriages—let them, by all means, as the late First Lord had suggested, go into the open market if they thought fit, and buy the whole of the Naval armaments; but let them, above all things, pay for their own guns and carriages, projectiles, ammunition, and stores. The sooner that system were adopted the better, and the House would then get rid of a dispute that had existed for 20 years as to the pattern of gun and carriage to be used. In this period four changes in the Naval armament had taken place in a sudden manner, and ordered to be carried out with a rapidity that no Supply Department could meet. They would then not only get efficiency, but economy, because he was sure, when the charge was put upon the Navy Estimates, and the cost of the Naval armaments for the first time fully known, then the Department would find it necessary to economize by looking after their stores in a far more efficient manner than they had hitherto done. Along with this change must follow the custody of the guns and stores by the Naval authorities. The warrant officers of the Navy would supply admirable storekeepers, of a far higher training for the duties than the War Office could obtain, so that no difficulties need be anticipated in the safe custody of the stores on shore.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

said, he should be glad enough to see the Navy finding its own guns; but he believed there were two difficulties to be overcome—first of all, there was the difficulty of uniformity, which could only be arranged by mutual understanding; and, secondly, there was another difficulty as regarded economy. Upon the latter question he had no desire to set up his own opinion against so high an authority as the hon. and gallant Member for Kincardineshire (Sir George Balfour); but if there were to be two arsenals instead of one he was afraid there would not be much economy. He had risen, however, principally to say that the Committee and the country generally were much indebted to his right hon. Friend sitting near him (Mr. W. H. Smith), and to his right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Childers) for the interesting statements they had made in regard to the guns, and he hoped that progress might be reported, in another sense, before long. For some years this question of guns had been in hand, and he thought the time had arrived when they should come to some conclusion as to the sort of gun they ought to have, so that they might have it manufactured in sufficient quantities, not only to arm the ships, but to protect the land forts if necessary. His hon. and gallant Friend said that the existing guns were falling off. But that was a question of the powder supplied, and it was very much in consequence of the changes in the invention of powder that they were obliged to change the armament of their guns. He did not say this in any way on his own authority, but on that of Colonel Maitland, who delivered a lecture upon the subject before the Society of Arts a short time ago. Touching the question of powder, he should like the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to state briefly what quantity of the new kind of powder they had for the operations of war. That was a very important matter at this moment, and it would, no doubt, be of much interest to the Committee to learn whether, in the opinion of the Government, they really had a sufficient store of the new kind of pebble powder for the operations of war. When the late Government left Office they left behind them no less than 310,000 barrels of gunpowder, and he hoped now that a good deal more was in store, and available if required. All he asked for was a general assurance from the right hon. Gentleman on this subject. He trusted, also, that something was being done in regard to the manufacture of Martini-Henry rifles. He knew that there had been a considerable issue of Martini-Henry rifles to the Militia, which, of course, would have diminished the number in store to a considerable extent; but he wanted to know if the manufactory at Woolwich was working extra time, in order to make up the deficiency and to turn out more rifles than were being supplied some weeks or months ago. In his opinion, it was most requisite that there should be an adequate supply of rifles, not only in store, but for defence purposes, and for actual wear-and-tear. Then, again, nothing had been said as to the Nordenfeldt and Gatling guns. He took it that, as a matter of fact, the Nordenfeldt gun had greatly superseded the Gatling gun. Whether it had superseded it for land purposes he could not say; but for Naval purposes, he believed, there was no doubt about the fact. He should, therefore, be glad to hear whether, as far as regarded Nordenfeldt guns, they were in a good position both in respect to their land as well as to their sea forces. His noble Friend below the Gangway (Lord Elcho) was very much interested in the question of rifled carbines. He did not know what number of rifled carbines they had in store, nor of any of the new patterns which had been lately introduced; but, perhaps, the right hon. Gentleman would kindly inform the Committee. He should also be glad to hear if anything had been done in regard to the magazine rifle, or whether the idea had been completely given up. He was told that a great many authorities differed on the point. Many supposed that the magazine rifle, however ingenious and clever it might be, was not a practical arm capable of being placed in the hands of the troops. Whether that was so or not he did not pretend to say. A Committee had been sitting upon it and upon other matters, and he should he glad to know what the nature of their Report had been. Indeed, he should he most glad to receive any information which the right hon. Gentleman could give on that and the other points to which he had called attention.

LORD ELCHO

said, he had listened with much interest to the remarks of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Kincardineshire (Sir George Balfour), who had questioned both the efficiency and economy of the system under which the Army manufactured guns for the Navy. Unquestionably, the British taxpayer believed that we were a great inventing and gun-making nation. He must feel that we ought to be at the head of the gun manufacture of the world, and that any gun that was used by our Navy or our Army should not be inferior to that of any other nation. Now such, unfortunately, was not the case. He (Lord Elcho) spoke with some knowledge upon the point, because the fact had been stated to him that the conclusion come to by some of our most experienced Naval officers of the Gunnery Department at the historical Concert held at Dulcigno, in reference to the guns of our Navy, was that of all the Naval Powers there representing the Concert of Europe, with one exception, the worst Naval guns were those of the British Fleet. He was, therefore, glad to hear from his right hon. Friend who once held the position of First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. W. H. Smith) that one thing which had been elucidated was that there was some prospect of securing an improved gun for the Navy. When his right hon. Friend was speaking, he (Lord Elcho) had whispered the word "Committee." Now, he quite admitted the necessity of the Secretary of State for War being advised on such questions by a Departmental Committee; but he could not help expressing his opinion that the Committee system was being carried to far too large an extent in the Army. He believed he was right in saying that no other nation now adopted the muzzle-loading system, either in reference to the field gun or the gun for Naval warfare. Originally, we had ourselves adopted the breech - loading system; but a Departmental Committee recommended its absolute abandonment, and, notwithstanding that we had spent large sums of money on breech-loading guns, we returned to the muzzle-loading system. It was manifest in the case of the breech-loading guns that the men in charge of them were less exposed than men who were required to load a gun at the muzzle. If the guns were properly placed in the field, the muzzle only was visible, and a gunner charging a gun at the breech need expose his person hardly at all; whereas the gunner who loaded at the muzzle must necessarily expose his arms and his head, and there was, consequently, greater risk of the loss of life in the case of the muzzle-loading gun than of the breech-loader. Reference had been made to Committees appointed to advise the Secretary of State. He did not know what the result of the inquiries of the most recent Committee was; and he was unable to say whether the Secretary of State had decided that in the case of field-guns they were now to adopt the breech-loading system which other nations had adopted. To a certain extent there was considerable disadvantage in the private inquiries that were now made through the medium of official Committees. He was afraid that it was often the practice of the Secretary of State to appoint a Committee, where, by a little inquiry on his own part, and the exercise of the intelligence which fitted him for the position he held as Secretary of State at the head of the War Office, he would be able to form a judgment for himself. At any rate, in many cases great delay was occasioned by the appointment of a Committee, and much good work was thus prevented from being carried out which might otherwise have been more rapidly accomplished. He thought, also, that when a Committee was appointed, it ought either to be a secret Committee to advise the Secretary of State; or if it was to take evidence, and that evidence was afterwards to be submitted in the shape of a Blue Book, it should be wholly public. The facts should either be kept strictly private within the discretion of the Secretary of State, or should be published in their full entirety. God forbid that he should say the system had been maintained for the purpose of deception; but it would be seen at a glance that it was capable of the grossest abuse. The Secretary of State might appoint a Committee which was half a private and half a public Committee, and might give to the public only that part of the Report which suited his own purposes, keeping back whatever might not suit his own purposes. He did not mean to say that such a thing had ever been done; but he did say that this half-and-half system of public and private inquiry was capable of abuse, and was, therefore, a thing to be avoided. Before he went into the question of small arms, which had been touched upon by his noble Friend (Lord Eustace Cecil), who held the Office of Surveyor General in the late Government, he wished to say a word about gun-carriages. Those who had read the accounts of the bombardment of Alexandria must have observed that the batteries which best stood the heavy fire to which all the batteries were subjected were those which were mounted on the Moncreiff system. By that system the guns were elevated when they were fired, and the recoil brought them down afterwards to a position in which they were out of sight. The Committee would readily see that, if the system were sound, the guns worked in accordance with it possessed a great advantage in regard to the protection afforded to the men and the endurance of the batteries, over the ordinary system of mounting guns, whether in parapet or embrasure. They would all have read that the guns of the enemy which showed the most resistance and stood the longest were guns mounted on the Moncreiff system. He hoped that a complete Report of the result would be sent in by the Government, and that all the facts relating to the matter would be placed before Parliament and the country. He trusted that his right hon. Friend would fully appreciate the value of such a Report. And now with regard to small arms, and the various matters which related to them. His noble Friend who filled the Office of Surveyor General of the Ordnance in the late Government (Lord Eustace Cecil), had referred to the interest which he (Lord Elcho) had taken in rifled carbines. He was inclined to think that his noble Friend had made a mistake as to the nature of his interest in these carbines. He was afraid his noble Friend would think his interest was in having carbines manufactured. It was quite the reverse, because he had sat upon a Committee some years ago respecting this arm of the Service; and they came to the conclusion that it was desirable to have one arm, and one arm only, for the whole Service, whether for the Navy, the Army, the Artillery, or the Cavalry. They were further of opinion that the best arm would be a long rifle, and that it should be carried by the Cavalry instead of the carbine. He presumed that his right hon. and gallant Friend the late Secretary of State for War (Colonel Stanley) was of a different opinion, because when in Office he had spent £45,000 or £50,000 a-year in the manufacture of carbines. He would he sorry to say anything behind the back of his right hon. and gallant Friend which he would not say to his face; but he had already told his right hon. and gallant Friend often enough that to spend £45,000 in manufacturing carbines in the present day was very much like spending the same sum in the manufacture of bows and arrows; for, though accurate at 500 or even 800 yards, they were of no use at all at a distance of 2,000 yards. At long ranges the carbine was altogether useless; and it was, therefore, absurd to go on manufacturing carbines and arming our Cavalry with a useless weapon, when they might be armed and carry with great convenience another weapon which would be efficient at much longer ranges. He believed, if his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War would make an inquiry, he would find that the opinion of competent persons who had considered the subject was that if our Cavalry were armed with a long rifle, similar to the ordinary Infantry rifle, it could be easily carried, and would give them a great advantage over an enemy's Cavalry, at long-range fire, who were only armed with carbines; and against Infantry they would also be better able to hold their own. Whenever they were dismounted they would be on an equality with the Infantry of the enemy; and mounted they would possess an advantage. If the War Office continued to arm our Cavalry with carbines, and some day we found ourselves opposed to Cavalry in the field armed with the long rifle, we should be placed at enormous disadvantage. Therefore, when they were constantly speaking of the good work done by Mounted Infantry, and were seeking to create more Mounted Infantry, it was ridiculous to continue the old system of arming the Cavalry with carbines—an antiquated and comparatively useless weapon. So much with reference to the matter of carbines. He saw in the Vote an item of which he was greatly inclined to move a reduction—namely, the item of £500 for small arms for experimental services. He was inclined to think that this item meant that another Committee had recommended a rifle of a different bore, a totally different rifle to the one which was now in the hands of the Army. He had been long interested in rifle shooting, and no one would accuse him of wishing to see their troops armed with an inferior rifle. He knew the value of the present arm; he knew what it could do. He knew they had been gradually manufacturing them till there was a hope of the present arm being the arm of all the Forces of the Crown—the arm of the Regulars, the Militia, the Volunteers, and the Reserve Forces. He could not conceive a greater waste of money than would take place in producing a new rifle. The new rifle that the Committee had recommended being of a different bore to the present one, new ammunition would be required. He would, therefore, in the strongest way he possibly could, make an appeal to his right hon. Friend to exercise his own judgment in this matter, and not be led astray by the recommendation of the Committee, which would land him and the House in an endless expenditure for an arm which was absolutely unnecessary, considering the excellence of the present weapon. Their present arm shot better than any foreign arm. The reason given for a new rifle was that if there was a smaller bore there would be a lighter bullet, and for the same weight the soldier would be able to carry a greater number of rounds. But the new rifle was to be four ounces heavier than the present arm—a great disadvantage. A further point already touched upon by his noble Friend (Lord Eustace Cecil) was that in reference to the magazine rifle. He believed the attention of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War was being turned to this. He (Lord Elcho) had seen a magazine rifle, which appeared to be absolute perfection—so simple, expeditious, and unliable to get out of order. The Austrian Government were trying it with good results, and he hoped the experiment would be made by Her Majesty's Government, and that instead of wasting money on a new barrel they would spend 8s. per rifle on a magazine. He would like to ask his right hon. Friend what store they had of Martini-Henry rifles over and above those already in the hands of the troops? He would like to say one word more, and that was with reference to inventions. He could well understand how officials were pestered to death by inventors; but there were some inventions to which it would be well to lend a ready ear. One great difficulty in shooting was to judge distances, and apparently, from what they read in the papers, the means of judging distances were greatly wanted in Egypt at the present time. Now, an officer—Colonel Weldon—had been sent over to this country from India with an admirable range-finder, which was not larger than a watch. He had tested it, and he knew how effective it was in ascertaining the distance of any object in the field. This gentleman, who was a Colonel in the Madras Army, had been sent over by the Government of India to show the invention, so valuable they thought it. Colonel Weldon took it to the India Office, but he was sent to the War Office. After passing from one official to another at the War Office, he arrived at the proper Department, and when he showed his invention and gave his name, he was told—"Oh, we know all about that; your invention has been condemned already." Colonel Weldon replied that it must be rather difficult to condemn an invention which had not been seen, except by himself and the manufacturer. "Will you allow it to be tried by the troops?" asked Colonel Weldon. "No, certainly not; nobody shall try anything that has not been passed through this Department," was the reply. He mentioned this to show the difficulties inventors had to contend with, even when they were sent over here officially.

MR. CHILDERS

said, that whatever changes were made after inquiry by experts must be made on the authority of a responsible Minister, and he had never hesitated to take that responsibility where he believed it necessary to make any alterations. He would not go into the question of carbines as opposed to the long rifles used by the Cavalry. Experiments had been made, but he would rather not enlarge upon them at the present time. The noble Lord (Lord Elcho) had referred to magazine rifles, some of which, he said, had entirely succeeded. He (Mr. Childers) did not know that any one had absolutely succeeded; and he was bound to say that, up to this moment, he was not satisfied that any magazine rifle could be advantageously introduced into the Service. The noble Lord asked him of Martini-Henry rifles in stock. Martini-Henry's were now being issued to the Militia, and that had reduced the stock, which ought to be kept up to 300,000. At present there was a fair stock of arms, and more were being manufactured as circumstances required. There was not a large stock of powder, but it was sufficient for all reasonable purposes.

LORD ELCHO

said, the right hon. Gentleman had stated that there were now 300,000 stand of arms over and above those in the hands of the troops. He believed there was some number laid down, and, if he was not greatly mistaken, it was very far above the number named by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War.

MR. CHILDERS

thought 300,000 was the number laid down. Last year there were 347,000 stand of arms in stock; but, in consequence of Martini Henry's being served out to the Militia, the stock had been reduced to 238,000.

Vote agreed to.

(6.) £715,700, Works, Buildings, &c. at Home and Abroad.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

said, it would be exceedingly convenient to the county of Sussex to know how soon the Government were prepared to give up the Militia storehouse at Lewes?

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR

inquired of the Secretary of State when the important military work at the extremity of the Admiralty Pier upon Dover Harbour was likely to be finished? He would also wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether this powerful battery would be affected by the new works which the Dover Harbour Board intended to make? It was proposed to extend the Admiralty Pier 550 feet from the place where the battery was.

MR. CHILDERS

said, he would look into the question of the Lewes Militia storehouse. He was not aware that it was intended by the proposed works at Dover to interfere with the battery. Certainly, if it was likely that the battery would be injured he should raise an objection.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR

said, the most important portion of the defences at Dover was a powerful battery at the end of the Admiralty Pier; and as they now found the Dover Harbour Board desiring to make a great extension of that pier beyond the end where the battery was being formed, he had no hesitation in saying that the proposed extension would seriously endanger the safety of the fort.

Vote agreed to.

(7.) £127,500, Establishments for Military Education.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman a question with regard to the vacancies in Cavalry regiments. He gathered from an answer to a question which the right hon. Gentleman made the other day that the War Office were considering whether they could not take some step with regard to men who passed a fair examination, but who had not come up to the mark that some of the other candidates had come up to. The examinations varied from time to time—for instance, at one time a man, who was certainly equal, and, perhaps, far better than many who had passed an examination, did not get his commission because there were at that particular moment that he went through an examination men who had passed a better examination than himself. Now, it had always struck him that if a man came up to a certain qualifying standard, his name ought to be retained on the list, and when there was a vacancy he ought to have a chance of filling it.

MR. CHILDERS

said, he answered this question only the other day. There had been no deficiency in the number of candidates for the Army generally, although the number of candidates for the Cavalry had been short. That had been remedied to a great extent by a change he had made with regard to Militia candidates. They were anxious, as he had previously said, to see whether in some way or other they could not secure a larger supply of Cavalry candidates; but, up to the present moment, he had not seen his way to do it. He, however, held himself entirely free to make proper arrangements with respect to the supply of Cavalry candidates.

Vote agreed to.

(8.) £36,400, Miscellaneous Effective Services.

MR. FIRTH

said, that, under Subhead "S," there was an item—"Appropriations in aid, £3,550," £3,400 of which represented the fees from visitors to the Tower Armouries. He would like to ask his right hon. Friend whether he saw any prospect of admission to the armouries being permitted free of charge?

MR. CHILDERS

said, the admission to the Tower was free on some days, but not on others. He thought the present system answered very well, and saw no reason at present to alter it.

Vote agreed to.

(9.) £238,200, War Office.

LORD ELCHO

said, he would like to know what was to be done about the military clerks?

MR. CHILDERS

said, he was Chairman of the Committee; but he did not think anything would be done this year.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

said, that the Vote was increased this year by a sum of £16,000. This was always a particularly heavy Vote; and when they saw the Services of the Army very often cut down to meet the requirements of the nation, as far as economy was concerned, they had never seen the War Office expenses cut down. It always struck him that this enormous expenditure in various ways in the War Office might be reduced to a certain extent; he did not say to any great extent, and in no way could it be better effected than had just been mentioned by his noble Friend, because he was satisfied there were many efficient non-commissioned officers who might be employed as clerks in the War Office, and who would consider the pay very excellent remuneration. Even old officers might be employed here with very good effect.

MR. CHILDERS

said, there was no increase on this Vote, but a decrease. The old pay of the War Office was shown, which used not to be the case.

MR. SEXTON

wished to make an inquiry of the right hon. Gentleman with respect to the position of supplementary clerks to the War Office. He found, on reference to the Estimates, that there were 70 of these gentlemen, and all but five were supplementary clerks of the first class, beginning at a salary of £180, and advancing by increments of £10 to a maximum salary of £300. In order to make plain the position which these gentlemen held, he would refer to the 21 principal clerks, who began at a salary of £700 a-year, and advanced by increments of £25 to £900; there were 45 senior clerks, who began at £450 a-year, and advanced by increments of £20 to £650; there were 65 clerks in the upper division, 63 of whom began at £150 a-year, and, by increments of £15, rose to £500, while the remaining two clerks began at £150, and, by increments of £37 10s. triennially, rose to £400 a-year. It was quite plain, in comparison, that the supplementary clerks occupied a very disadvantageous place. The right hon. Gentleman would remember that these gentlemen were admitted upon the open competition system for Civil clerkships; and it was a curious fact that gentlemen who competed at these same examinations in 1870 and the year succeeding, and who were allotted to other Depart- ments of the Civil Service, had since, in consequence of re-organization, reached higher establishment in their respective Offices than these supplementary clerks occupied in their Departments. It was a very unfortunate fact for those gentlemen that were allotted to the War Office, because, had they been allotted to any other Office, they would have reaped considerably greater advantages. Many gentlemen who competed side by side with these clerks in the year 1870, and who failed in the examination, came up in subsequent years, took lower places, and were allotted to other Departments; but they had since reached a higher establishment than those gentlemen who had passed a better examination. There were 171 men clerks in the lower division, who, under the present regulations, would not be admissible to the higher establishment for four years more. He thought it was a reasonable suggestion that as the lower division clerks could not, for four years more, be admitted to the higher division, the higher establishment should in the meantime be thrown open to the supplementary clerks. It was not denied that the supplementary clerks performed their duties well. Many of them, in fact, performed precisely the same duties as the clerks on the higher establishment, who received a much more considerable salary. In point of fact, the present system came to this—that the higher establishment was reserved for new comers, who, it very often happened, were instructed in their duties By the supplementary clerks. He would like to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, since the re-organization of the War Office, two years ago, any vacancies had been filled up on the higher establishment of that Office; and, if so, if they had been filled up from the supplementary clerks—gentlemen already within the walls of the Office, and familiar with the duties of the Office—or whether the vacancies had been filled up by new comers; and, if so, why? Was it to be understood that these 70 gentlemen had to stagnate in this supplementary Department, while persons much their inferiors were admitted to higher salaries? These gentlemen could not regard their position with satisfaction; and if the right hon. Gentleman would say he would take into the higher establishment such of the supplementary clerks who might be proved by experience to be fitted for the higher establishment, he would do that which, while promoting the Departmental efficiency, would be an economy of the public funds.

MR. CHILDERS

said, the suggestion of the hon. Gentleman could not be acted upon. The supplementary clerks had only gone through an inferior examination as compared with the clerks on the higher establishment. He would, however, look into the matter with the view of seeing how far the position of the supplementary clerks could be improved.

MR. SEXTON

said, he hoped that the difficulty which the right hon. Gentleman had seen was not an insuperable one, because it seemed to have been got over in all the other Departments except the War Office; gentlemen admitted in the lower departments of the other Public Offices had reached higher establishment. He should not press the right hon. Gentleman further than to express the hope that any statement which the supplementary clerks might lay before him would receive his attention.

Vote agreed to.

(10.) £26,700, Rewards for Distinguished Services.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

said, it did seem unfair, unreasonable, and unjust, that a man who had received for distinguished services in the field or elsewhere a sum of £100 a-year should be treated in precisely the same way as a man who had, perhaps, in no way distinguished himself. He could not see on what plea that could take place, and he trusted the right hon. Gentleman would be able to afford some explanation.

MR. CHILDERS

pointed out that under the former system regiments received a fixed sum and distributed their distinguished service allowances; but now retired pay had been substituted for regimental allowances. If, in addition to the retired pay, officers were allowed to retain the equivalent of colonelcies there would be a very large increase of charge. Under the present system, as under former systems, colonels of regiments did not draw distinguished service money. He believed that officers under the present system were much better off than formerly.

Vote agreed to.

(11.) £95,000, Half Pay.

MR. CAINE

said, he had a Notice on the Paper last year to the effect that it was undesirable that Members of this House, who were officers of the Army, should any longer be Members of the House if they remained on full pay. When he put that Notice on the Paper there were 13 Members of the House in that position; now there were only five. Eight of them had either left the House or gone on half-pay, and he hoped that by this time next year the remaining five would have followed the example of the eight.

SIR HENRY FLETCHER

said, he hoped the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken, and who did everything he possibly could to upset everything connected with the Service in the way of canteens and other matters, would not be allowed to press his Motion. In his opinion, Gentlemen who were officers in the Army were quite able to do their duty as Members of the House.

Vote agreed to.

(12.) £1,116,100, Retired Pay, &c.

MR. FIRTH

noticed an increase of £18,000 for retired Field Marshals; there were only three more retired Field Marshals this year than last, and therefore he thought this increase required some explanation.

MR. CHILDERS

said, that the increase was balanced by the reduction in the Pension List.

MT. BIGGAR

said, he would like to ask the right hon. Gentleman a question similar to the one he asked last year; it was regarding Major General Tillot. Major General Tillot retired at a time when England was at war in the Crimea, and that was held by Regulations 54 and 55 to disqualify him from promotion. He (Mr. Biggar) was aware that he was entitled to a promotion in rank, but not to a rise in pay. He elected to continue to be aide-de-camp to the Commander-in-Chief, and get decent pay and forego his promotion in rank. As that gentleman applied to get on half-pay, the Committee were entitled to some explanation.

SIR HENRY FLETCHER

said, that, as an old Guards officer who had served during the Crimean War, he must ask the Committee to allow him to say a few words to refute the imputation cast by the hon. Member upon the honour of a brother officer, whose personal friendship he had had ever since the Crimean War. The hon. Member brought forward this question over and over again; it had been answered by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, and by other hon. Members in the House, and it was really quite past endurance that it should be brought up each Session of Parliament, in order that a reflection might be cast upon the character of a gallant gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would bear him out in saying that this matter had nothing to do with the Vote before the House.

Vote agreed to.

(13.) £123,200, Widows' Pensions, &c, agreed to.

(14. £15,500, Pensions for Wounds.

SIR HENRY FLETCHER

said, there was a question which he desired to ask the right hon. Gentleman which, he believed, had been laid before the War Office and also before himself. Was it true that if an officer received a wound when on picket duty he was not entitled to the same allowance as if he received a wound while in front of the enemy?

MR. CHILDERS

believed there was a distinction between a wound received in action and a wound received otherwise.

SIR HENRY FLETCHER

said, it was a very important question. Certainly an officer who had received a severe wound while on picket duty ought to be entitled to the same allowances as if he had received it in front of the enemy.

MR. CHILDERS

said, he would take the matter into consideration.

Vote agreed to.

(15.) £33,800, Chelsea and Kilmainham Hospitals.

MR. DICK-PEDDIE

said, that last year he had put a Question to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War as to whether it was not the fact that Roman Catholic and Presbyterian pensioners were buried with the Service of the Church of England. He had not succeeded in getting a reply last year, and he now repeated the question, hoping that he might be more successful this year. Did the present payment include anything for Presbyterian chaplains?

MR. CHILDERS

said, he was not quite sure as to the latter point; but as to the former point it was quite true his attention had been called to the matter. There had been a case of a Presbyterian in which pressure had been applied to have the Service conducted according to the rites of the Church of England; but as soon as he heard of it he interfered and saw the matter put right.

MR. CAINE

I see an item of £70 here for a Whitster—in addition to a pension of 2s. a-day. May I ask what is a Whitster?

MR. CHILDERS

I believe he is a man-at-arms.

Vote agreed to.

(16.) £1,389,700, Out-Pensions.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR

asked for information concerning the new system of paying pensions through the Post Office?

SIR ARTHUR HAYTER

said, he was glad some notice had been taken of the question of payment of pensions through the Post Office, because there was a friction when it was first established, although the mode of payment was thought very much better. Revised rules were issued, and the result was that the out-pensions in all the 66 districts, with the exception of the Liverpool district, had been paid by the end of the first week in July. The Secretary of State for War had officially recognized the exertions of the officers in the Pay Departments, and he (Sir Arthur Hayter) was glad to say that the new system was now working well.

Vote agreed to.

(17.) £197,700, Superannuation Allowances, agreed to.

(18.) £51,800, Militia, Yeomanry Cavalry, and Volunteer Corps, agreed to.

(19.) £1,100,000, Army (Indian Home Charges).

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

said, that on this Vote he wished to call the attention of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to what he thought was a real grievance on the part of the soldiers. It was this—that when they were sent abroad they were obliged to pay for their sea-kits. Why, he would ask, was a soldier obliged to pay for that which was of no earthly use to him after the voyage was over?

SIR HENRY HOLLAND

inquired whether the Vote included non-effective charges?

MR. CHILDERS

Yes.

SIR HENRY HOLLAND

said, he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would devote some attention to a question which had been brought several times before the Public Accounts Committee by the Comptroller and Auditor General, and that was the question of the payment of arrears for the Non-Effective Services. The matter had now been three years before the Committee, and a careful Report with regard to it had been made by the Comptroller and Auditor General.

MR. CHILDERS

said, he hoped before next year to be able to make some arrangement in the matter.

Vote agreed to.

(20.) £500,000, Afghan War (Grant in Aid), agreed to.