RESOLUTION. [ADJOURNED DEBATE.]

HC Deb 25 March 1881 vol 259 cc1938-2036

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Question [24th March], That, in the opinion of this House, the withdrawal of British troops from Southern Afghanistan in the present critical state of affairs in that country will not be conducive to the true and permanent interests of India."—(Mr. E. Stanhope.)

Question again proposed.

Debate resumed.

Lotto GEORGE HAMILTON

said, they had had the advantage of hearing, in the, course of discussion, several very able speeches made from the other side of the House, especially by the lion. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the hon. Gentleman the Member for Leeds (Mr. Herbert Gladstone). He hoped the latter hon. Gentleman would allow him, as an old antagonist in another arena, to congratulate him on the success he had achieved on the first occasion of his having addressed the House. In all these able speeches there was, however, a very remarkable defect, and that was that they were not applicable to the Motion which was before the House; for in all these speeches—in the remarkably dexterous speech of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as well as the others—it was assumed that the Motion proposed to pledge the House irrevocably to the perpetual occupation of Candahar. Now, he (Lord George Hamilton) would candidly admit that, so far as he himself was concerned, if any such Motion were made, he should have grave doubts as to its expediency. There was an obvious disadvantage in coming to an irrevocable decision, and he should not be willing to support such a Motion. But the Mo- tion related merely to the time at which the Government insisted on evacuating Candahar. The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for India, in answer to a Question last night, said he had given the Government of India the utmost discretion as to the time and manner of carrying out the evacuation of Candahar; but he (Lord George Hamilton) felt bound to say that that statement was not borne out by a careful perusal of the Papers, and particularly of those that were produced yesterday. On the contrary, the noble Marquess spoke in the most peremptory tone of the importance of evacuating Candahar, and the Government of India showed that the time for evacuation was very much limited in consequence. Mr. Rivers Thompson, in that masterly Minute, stated that he was strongly opposed, not to the evacuation of Candahar, but to the precipitate action the Government had taken in a peremptory manner, and to the promulgation of their decision without waiting for the advice of those who were responsible for the Government of India. He said that he deprecated the peremptory character of the despatch, which forced their action in a matter which necessarily demanded very delicate handling. He added that the question of time was all important, and that if sufficient time had been given to the Indian Government to mature their arrangements, Abdurrahman might have been established at Candahar; while now it was almost certain that when he got there, Ayoob Khan would try to drive him out, and the probable result would be that his authority would be overthrown, both in Candahar and Cabal. The hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles W. Dilke) stated that the Government had some claim on the consideration of their opponents, on account of the enormous difficulties of the task of re-constituting a stable Government in Afghanistan. Well, he (Lord George Hamilton) quite agreed that their task was a difficult one. He could conceive no task requiring higher statesmanlike qualities than the construction out of the shifting and unreliable elements of Afghanistan of a stable Government; and, therefore, if the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) had, after full consideration and consultation with the Indian Go- vernment, laid down certain principles of action which were calculated to secure that result, he should have been quite ready to have subordinated his own opinions, even though he might be disposed to disagree with what was proposed. But the hon. Baronet made use of a rather curious argument. He said that the late Government failed to establish a united, friendly, independent Afghanistan. That was true; but what the late Government now contended was that because they failed in their attempt to establish a friendly, united, and independent Afghanistan, that was no reason why they should give their sanction to measures which, in their opinion, must establish a united, hostile Afghanistan. The hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. P. J. Smyth) was always eloquent on the question of nationalities; but it was unfortunate that before the delivery of his speech, in which he drew a graphic picture of a population welcoming a Ruler, he had not duly weighed the significant answer of the noble Marquess to the effect—" We have received information from Colonel St. John, Political Officer at Candahar, and he states that if Abdurrahman comes with a sufficient number of troops, it is just possible his assumption of authority may not be resisted." With a sufficient number of troops! Why the same thing might be said of the Czar at Warsaw and the German Emperor at Metz. But that was not the whole difficulty. When Abdurrahman undertook to govern Cabul he never undertook to become Governor of Candahar. The Ameer was at present in great difficulties in Cabul. His army was hardly large enough to enable him to hold his position there, and yet they were going to force him to bring the troops which were necessary for maintaining order in Cabul to Candahar, the inevitable result of which would be the overthrow of his authority. In the remarkably dexterous speech of the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State, he ridiculed, amid cheers from the other side of the House, the notion of Russian intrigue; but that line of argument was, he (Lord George Hamilton) maintained, very inconsistent with the earlier part of the hon. Baronet's speech, because therein he claimed special credit to the Government for having adhered to the policy of all preceding Governments, which was, that in all circumstances Russian influence should be excluded from Afghanistan. Further, he had to remind the House that when the hon. Baronet was a private Member, no one showed more conclusively and with greater knowledge the danger of Russian intrigue. But now, since he had become the authoritative exponent of the policy of the Liberal Government, he seemed to think it his duty to ridicule the danger and repudiate his former appreciation of the importance of this aspect of the case.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

Will the noble Lord quote the passage in which I ridiculed that?

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON

said, he had not the speech by him; but he took at the time a note of the words, and, undoubtedly, the hon. Baronet, though he might not perhaps have used the word "ridicule," put together a. number of words which conveyed to the House an impression that there was nothing to be feared from Russian influence. It struck him (Lord George Hamilton), however, as an inconsistent argument for anyone to use who attached cardinal importance to the exclusion of Russian influence from Afghanistan. For his own part, he would admit that he did not at present apprehend any danger from the invasion of India by Russia. If Russia were to equip an army sufficiently largo for the purpose we should, he believed, have ample notice to prepare to meet it. So far as he knew, no Member of the late Government ever put forward in support of their policy any immediate fear or dread of Russian invasion. But the danger to India of the establishment of Russian influence in Afghanistan had been insisted on by every Viceroy and every Secretary of State for many years past, and by no one more emphatically than by Lord Lawrence, who not only indicated the shape the danger would assume, but also the remedy by which it was to be met. That noble Lord's remedy was, that they should stop the advance of Russia, either by negotiation or by a threat of war. He asked any hon. Member, who had studied the advance of Russia in Central Asia during the last 20 years, whether it was possible to stop that advance by such means? The people of this country would, he thought, always submit to any sacrifice that a war might demand, when that war was made for some great object, for the maintenance of the Empire, for the national unity, or for some question admitted to be of great importance; but he did not believe it to be possible to persuade the people of this country to assent to a policy which at any moment might involve them in war with Russia, because Russia, in that quarter, happened to annex a certain number of square miles in Central Asia, or in some other locality which they never heard of before. To such a war they could not, in his opinion, be reconciled. The danger was too remote, and the object too small to justify sanction being given to such a policy. Well, then, could they stop the advance of Russia by negotiation? The right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government had, when in Office before, obtained a very definite assurance that there was no intention on the part of Russia to advance on Khiva. They knew what had happened notwithstanding that assurance. The hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State told them last night that the new Czar, on ascending the Throne, had caused General Skobeleff to be re-called. Well, but what did the hon. Baronet mean by the word "recall?" It was a word capable of more interpretations than one. Did it mean in this case that the General was recalled because he had done something which the Czar did not approve? Had the hon. Baronet any authority which would enable him to state that General Skobeleff had been displaced from his command because the Czar disapproved of his conduct in carrying out the campaign? For his part, he did not doubt that the Czar was most pacifically disposed towards us; hut, on the other hand, might it not be said that he might have re-called General Skobeleff to consult him as to what was the best means likely to push on the Russian advance in Central Asia? He did not blame the Russian Government, he should say, for not being able to control their servants in their advance in Central Asia. No Government was so dependent upon its civil and military officers as was an autocracy, and for this reason, that no one intervened between the head of the Government and the people they governed except the Civil and Military Services. They should remember, too, that it was engrained in the Russian Civil and Military Services that it was the destiny of Russia to advance till she reached her goal, and that there was nothing to interpose between that tradition and the opinion of one individual, he being for the time Emperor of Russia. Therefore, you had on the one hand the steady influence of this tradition, and on the other the casual and intermittent influence of the reigning Emperor, if that chanced to be on the side of control. They must, therefore, come to the conclusion that Russia would continue to advance, and it was perfectly clear that it was not by war or by negotiation that the advance of Russia in Central Asia would be stopped. Allusion had frequently been made to what was known as Lord Lawrence's policy. Now, Lord Lawrence, when Governor General, had a singularly able Council. Including Lord Lawrence himself, there were five men who signed the despatches which had been referred to. Of those five, three only were now living—namely, Sir Henry Maine, Sir Richard Temple, and Sir John Strachey—and every one of those men approved the policy which Lord Lytton adopted. And why did they do so? They did so, not because they had changed their opinions, but because the policy which was known as the policy of Lord Lawrence had irretrievably failed. Let them take the policy of Lord Northbrook, and they would find that towards the end of the noble Lord's Viceroyalfy his deliberate policy was that, in the, event of the Russians occupying Merv, it would be absolutely necessary to enter into a definite understanding with the Ameer of Cabul and to place a British Resident at Herat. Was that, he asked, in accordance with the policy of Lord Lawrence? There was nothing in common in the action of succeding Viceroys except a desire to abstain from internal interference in Afghanistan; but their external policy was regulated and controlled by the advance of Russia alone. Well, then, if they could not stop the advance of Russia in Central Asia by war or by negotiation, how were they likely to exclude Russian influence in Afghanistan? Practically, Russia was as near Herat as if she were at Merv. She had established her rule in Turkestan, and overcome, whether Sovereigns or nomadic Tribes, every single Native Power between herself and Afghanistan. In every case, the Russian Government preceded their expeditions by a declaration that annexation was not their object; but in every instance annexation had followed. In every case the Power about to be attacked had implored assistance from the British Government; in every case it had been refused. They had this further fact before them, that, in almost every case, Russia had excused her annexation by an allegation as to the ill-treatment of her subjects. The hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State said that Russia had lost prestige because she had thrown over Shore Ali. If that were so, why was it suggested that we should do the same thing in the case of Abdurrahman? If we did, would not the same result—the loss of prestige—follow? It seemed to him dial if while Russia advanced as the British retired—if we allowed our railway to be destroyed as they advanced theirs—the contrast between the action of the two Powers must inevitably lead to the loss of our prestige. The Indian Government had received instructions to evacuate Candahar, while they had reason to believe that, with the exception of Major Baring and the Viceroy, the Government of India were opposed to the policy which. was sought to be forced upon them. In his; Lord George Hamilton's) limited experience there had not arisen a question as to which it was more necessary to have full and complete information from the Government of India; but, until last night, they had not been afforded a scrap of information. As the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for India would not give the House public information, he was obliged to make the best use he could of private information. He believed that when the question now under the consideration of the House was brought before the Council of India, and when Lord Ripon attempted to raise the question of the policy of evacuation, he found himself in a minority of 1; but, that after a formal discussion, the Viceroy, so far from influencing the opinions of the Council, was himself influenced by their opinions, and he found himself in a minority of 0. He had asked the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for India the other evening whether, as the Papers had disappeared in some mysterious manner, he would telegraph to India, with a view to obtain, for the information of the House, the purport of those opinions? The noble Marquess had declined to do that, on the ground that the value of those opinions would be diminished by telegraphic abbreviation; but it was not easy to understand the course he had taken, inasmuch as it was entirely opposed to Papers, the opinions of which were so valuable that they could not be summarized. The question that occurred to him was as to the best means to be taken in order to keep Russian influence out of Afghanistan, if it was decided by Her Majesty's Government that such a policy was necessary or advisable. How were they going to do it? The country certainly had had, within the last two years, a bitter experience of what ought not to be done in the way of policy as far as questions like the present were concerned. He frankly admitted that it had been shown that, in the invasion of any country, it was much easier to destroy than to construct; but if it was wished to avoid the necessity for invasion, the reason for invasion must be removed. The cause of the invasion in 1878 was an affront offered to us by the Ameer of Cabul, and that was done because Russian Agents were at Cabul. He was not disposed—nor was it necessary for the purposes of his argument—to inquire as to the reasons which led to the alienation of the Ameer of Cabul. It was sufficient for him to know that the alienation took place, that the Ameer afterwards lent a too willing ear to Russian advice; and they might fairly conclude from the past that whenever the relations between Russia and England became strained, Russia would be sure to use Afghanistan as a means of embarrassing us. If the Ameer was alienated by a policy of timidity, and Russian influence thus allowed to enter, it was absurd to suppose that it could be excluded by a hasty "skedaddle" from Candahar. He admitted the difficulty of the task which. Her Majesty's Government had undertaken; but it was to his mind perfectly clear that if once they let in Russian influence, and if it should become paramount in Afghanistan, there would be only one alternative, either to acquiesce in it and its injurious effects, or to drive it out of the country by force of arms. And which would the Government adopt? He regretted the course which the exigencies of the Liberal Party had forced upon the noble Marquess, because he (Lord George Hamilton) felt that the policy he had pursued, and the peremptory orders which he had given, were not dictated as being the most beneficial arrangements for India; and also because, in his view, the present was a favourable opportunity of making political arrangements which would have had a beneficial effect on the political future of Afghanistan. Suppose that if they had said to the Ameer of Cabal that they would keep Candahar until they were perfectly certain that the Native Ruler to whom they would hand it over was a friend of their own, and was able to comply with the conditions on which they would hand it over; that before they retired they would complete the railway from Sibi to the Frontier station; that they would keep a certain garrison there, and then leisurely retire; and, at the same time, give a distinct and tangible assurance to the incoming Ruler of Candahar against Russian aggression. If that course had been taken, England would have been able to make good her words whenever either condition on which they handed over Candahar was infringed, or it was attempted to introduce Russian influence; and just in proportion to the increase of English influence in Afghanistan would be the decrease in external interference, either Russian or Native. Such a suggestion must often have been offered to the noble Marquess. Why had not that course been followed? The only excuse he could offer was that the Government had not taken that course because the Liberal Party, at the last General Election, committed themselves to a theoretical policy, which was almost certain, in his view, to lead the country into danger, if not disaster. Therefore, the noble Marquess would not adopt it. In the speech which he last night addressed to the House, the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs mentioned, in support of his view, the opinions of the military and political officers and officials of India; but he omitted to say that there was and had been, for some time past, a difference in view as to the Frontier policy of this country in regard to our Indian Empire, whose Frontiers were peopled by individuals of very different races and views. There were certainly various views on this point among officers and officials in various parts of the Empire; but no particular importance was to he attached to that difference of opinion, because the persons who differed in opinion were stationed on widely divergent points, both geographically and politically. With regard to the retention of Candahar, however, it appeared from the Papers before them, that Sir Robert Sandeman, and all the military and political officers, were in favour of it. The question of cost had been raised as an argument against the retention of Candahar; but he could not admit its validity, because he thought every hon. Member who had examined the facts must know that most of the Estimates made were largely beyond what was likely to be the actual cost. What would be the expense? Sir Henry Norman put it on record that 20,000 men would be the necessary force; but Sir Frederick Roberts said that 13,500 would be sufficient—thus knocking off one-third of the former Estimate. Double allowances would be necessary for the Native troops, but not for the British. It was an error to suppose that the troops would have to be additional to the usual force, for it appeared that though 55,000 men were employed in Afghanistan during the war, there was no appreciable increase in the Indian Army. Well, were Indian finances in such a deplorable condition that they could not stand that small increased outlay? Why, they heard that the surplus Revenue In India wouldt his year be about £4,300,000. They had heard something about additional taxation; but he had a strong impression that taxation was less in India now than it was 10 years ago. As far as the sources of revenue were concerned, the salt duty had been referred to, and, as far as the was concerned, he thought it was not out of the way to suppose, as many of the advocates of the reduction which had been already made did, that the increased consumption of salt would make up for any reduction that might result from the reduction of the duty. That was almost entirely due to increased consumption. If the Finance Minister of India would act upon the experience which had been gained during the last few years, he might slowly reduce the salt duty in a way that would lead to no diminution of the revenue; for there would be a much greater consumption, and the revenue would be remunerative in proportion. So with public works; the annual charge for them would be followed by an increased revenue. There were other matters which showed a prospect of surplus revenues. Some years ago an income tax was imposed, which, Carlyle had said, affected the shrieking units and not the dumb millions. In consequence, however, of the action of the right hon. Gentleman the Postmaster General, that tax had been repealed, and a licence duty substituted, which affected many of the dumb millions. To pretend, therefore, that Indian finance would not permit of the retention of Candahar was perfectly absurd. Without asserting that India was in a financial position that could justify extravagance, he believed that within the next three or four years there would be a sufficient Indian surplus which would amply justfy the policy recommended by his hon. Friend with regard to the retention of Candahar, for, at all events, the next two or three years. The Report of the Commission upon the Indian Army showed that it would be possible to reduce the military expenditure by £1,200,000; and, if the noble Marquess had reversed his policy, and been peremptory in directing the Government to carry out those economies, and given some discretion in evacuating Candahar, in his (Lord George Hamilton's) opinion, they would find themselves in a much better position than they were both politically and financially now. Her Majesty's Government had recently announced their intention of making a present of £5,000,000 to India, not-withstanding the glowing accounts they now thought fit to give of the financial position of that country. That sum was given not as a matter of necessity, but of policy; not because it was required by the condition of Indian finances; and it was absurd to come down last week and say that the expenditure of a small portion of that sum would place the finances in perpetual confusion. The change that the opinions of Her Majesty's Government had undergone since they came into Office with regard to the financial position of India was certainly astonishing. A little more than a year ago they were exclaiming that India was on the verge of bankruptcy; and now they were congratulating themselves on the fact that she was in an extremely prosperous condition. He had been much struck last night by the position that had been taken up by some Members of the Liberal Party, who had congratulated themselves upon the superior morality and honesty of the present Government as compared with the late Government. That House, however, had had a specimen of the morality and honesty of the present Government laid before them last night, when Her Majesty's Government opposed the Motion of the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. E. Stanhope) on the ground that Indian troops had no right to be at Candahar—that the country did not belong to India, and, therefore, on grounds of morality, they proposed to give it up. That was an intelligible proposition; but, then, almost every Member of the Government concluded his speech with the remark that "we could always re-occupy Candahar whenever we chose to do so." The fact was, the evacuation of Candahar was but one of a number of steps which the Government were taking for the execution of their policy in Afghanistan; and it was a policy to which they on that side of the House objected. It was evident, from the Despatches that had been laid upon the Table of the House, that Her Majesty's Government were anxious to give to Abdurrahman Khan a guarantee, which was nothing more nor less than their old Friend Lord North-brook's guarantee of 1873. He would not say that that guarantee was not worth the paper upon which it was written, because Lord Northbrook would not put it into writing. The noble Lord opposite the Member for Winchester (Viscount Baring), the son of the distinguished man who had held the post of Viceroy of India, last night had challenged any hon. Member on the Opposition side of the House to show that Shere Ali had been alienated from the Indian Government previous to the acceptance of Office by Lord Lytton. He (Lord George Hamilton) ventured to accept that challenge. He would mention a little circumstance which occurred before Lord Lytton went to India. As soon as he received Ids appointment, he sent for the whole of the Papers relating to past transactions. He went most carefully over them; and he (Lord George Hamilton) would never forget the result of a conversation which the noble Lord had with him. "I am perfectly certain," he said, "from the insolent tone in which Shore Ali addresses Lord Northbrook, that the flirtation between Cabul and Tashkend is much closer than you have believed, because otherwise no one in the position of the Ameer would venture to address the Viceroy of India in the language which he used." It was quite evident that the Russian Agents were at work in Cabul. In 1873, Shere Ali sent an Envoy to see Lord Northbrook at Simla. He had previously had a conference with Lord Mayo at Umballa. In that conference, the question of a guarantee against Russia was never raised, as was clearly admitted by the Duke of Argyll. That Nobleman was doubtless a great orator, but he was an impetuous Scotchman; and he had one defect, which was, that when he hail once got an idea into his head there was no possibility of getting it out of it again. In 1869, Shere Ali asked Lord Mayo for an unconditional internal dynastic guarantee against Russia, which Lord Mayo declined to give; but he never alluded to Russian aggression, and in 1873, without mentioning the subject of the internal guarantee, he simply asked for assistance against Russia. The Duke of Argyll apparently believed that the Ameer asked in 1873 for the same thing that he had asked for in1869. There were two sets of Papers in reference to that matter, one set in 1878 and the other in the following year. These latter contained the more confidential part of the negotiations; and it was only by putting the two sets together that the strict sequence of events could be observed. If hon. Members would bear in mind the dates, they would see how conclusive his case was. On July 12, 1873, Lord Northbrook was asked by the Ameer's Envoy to give him in writing an assurance of protection against Russia, the Ameer being dissatisfied; and Lord Northbrook then commissioned Mr. Aitchison, the Foreign Secretary, to see the Envoy and communicate with him. On page 13 of the Afghan Papers, No. 3, 1879, was a record of the interview held on July 20, between the Ameer's Envoy and Mr. Aitchison, when the Envoy represented that in the conversation of July 12 between the Viceroy and him-self— Invasion or aggression on the part of the Turkomans, Khiva, Bokhara, and ether countries under Russian influence, had been alluded to, but Russia had not been specifically mentioned. The reply of Mr. Aitchison was— There seems no objection to specify the case of an invasion by Russia in the paper to be eventually given to the Envoy. On July 24, Lord Northbrook telegraphed to the Duke of Argyll the purport of the interview— Ameer of Cabool alarmed at Russian progress, dissatisfied with general assurance, and anxious to know definitely how far he may rely on our help if invaded. I propose assuring him that if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations we will help him with money, arms, and troops, if necessary, to expel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity. On July 26, the reply was sent— Cabinet thinks you should inform Amir that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it; but you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external affairs."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, 1878, p. 108.] Four days afterwards was held the final interview between the Viceroy and the Ameer's Envoy; and it was stated in Mr. Aitchison's Minute of what passed on that occasion that— The Envoy pressed that the contingency of aggression by Russia should be specifically mentioned. in the written assurance to be given to the Ameer. To this his Excellency replied that, setting aside the inexpediency of causing needless irritation to a friendly Power by such specific mention, the suggestion was one that could not be adopted, inasmuch as it implied. an admission of the probability of such a contingency arising, which the British Government are not prepared to admit in the face of the repeated assurances given by Russia."—[Ibid. p. 114.] And now, to make the case as complete as possible, he need only make one more quotation. Four years afterwards, at Peshawar, the same Envoy gave an account of the interview of July 12, 1873, and said— As regards the name of Russia, which I mentioned in connection with aggression, it was owing to an observation made by Lord Northbrook in the interview of the 12th July, who said, It is necessary that the Ameer should he informed that, since the country of Afghanistan is a "buffer" between the territories of the English and Russian Governments, it is therefore advantageous for Hindustan that Afghanistan should be strong and independent.' Therefore, since he called Afghanistan the buffer against does this, or not, prove the aggression of Russia? Ultimately the Viceroy observed that 'even a friendly Government can become art aggressor. But the English Government, considering the repeated. certain a assurances which they have received from the Russian Government. cannot entertain any likelihood of it.' After hearing. this, I remained silent, because I thought that unity and friendship between Governments is a matter of the greatest importance."—[Ibid. p. 205.] Now, the whole of that passage showed conclusively from the writings of the Duke of Argyll himself that he had misled the Cabinet by not knowing what the proposal of Shere Ali was, and induced them to come to a decision which they never would have come to if they had known all the circumstances. The telegram of July 26, 1873, was necessarily nonsense, because it spoke of the possibility of maintaining a settled policy in reference to a question that had never before arisen. The causes of Shere Ali's disaffection were clear, and the change that came over his mind was very noticeable. In 1872 he had accepted from the British Government a subsidy of £100,000; but in 1876, after the Simla Conference, he refused to accept a farthing, although he was in great want, and declined every proposal and suggestion that was made. It was admitted that the two things that turned his mind against England were, in the first place, Lord Northbrook's refusal to give hint in writing a guarantee against Russia; and, secondly, Lord North-brook's action in protesting against his ill-treatment of his son, Yakoob Khan. He (Lord George Hamilton) considered the Government of that day had acted inconsistent. Having given him to understand that in case of necessity they would assist him against Russia, they refused to reduce the agreement to writing, while, having pledged themselves not to interfere in his internal affairs, they prevented him from killing his son. But the Ameer's Envoy had at last received from a Liberal Government a material guarantee. The other day, in Calcutta, he was presented with a large quantity of children's toys, and the House might imagine the impression that would be made in Candahar on his arrival there with a box of toys in one hand and in the other the Duke of Argyll's assurance of July 26, 1373. The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for India would, he hoped, shake himself free front all prejudice in the matter, The question was, what would be the effect upon the mind of the Ameer, now of giving him assurances of friendship, and, at the same time, precipitately retreating from Candahar? It seemed to him that of all questions that had arisen during the past few years with reference to India, there was none which, if wrongly decided, could bring greater evils in its train than the one under discussion. He had always thought that the day would come when it would be a great problem to know how to maintain the connection between England and India. He believed that India ought to be capable of self-defence, and that if advantages were taken of the opportunities which now presented themselves, it was possible to confer upon her, in a political sense, practical invulnerability. If we boldly showed the Afghans that, in order to cultivate their friendship, we were willing to take upon ourselves an additional risk and guarantee, we could, to a certain extent, secure them; but if we retreated just when Russia was advancing, how could we expect to succeed in our endeavours to exclude Russian influence?—With regard to another matter, the right hon. Gentleman the Postmaster General had, in a recent speech, drawn a distinction between an Imperial and an Indian war; and he had inferred that the war, being imperial, was not also Indian. He (ford George Hamilton) contended, on the other hand, that they were both the same; that England practically had no great interest in the Eastern Question, except as far as it affected her possession of India; and that any war that concerned the security of India was therefore necessarily Imperial. To say to the contrary seemed to him to be making use of words that were meaningless. We had established an Empire in which lived one-sixth of the human race, and the whole power of our autocratic Government which we had set up was based on an Act of Parliament of a self-governing people, living in an island thousands of miles away. We had conferred inestimable benefits on India; but our retention of India had imposed upon us heavy obligations; and that being so, was it wise to go against the whole official opinion in India for certain Party exigencies? If this withdrawal brought about the disaster which Mr. Rivers Thompson had proved by un- prepared to meet the cost out of our English Revenue? If not, what right had they, because the Liberal Party was disunited, to force this policy upon India? His language might appear too strong; but he thought he could justify it. One of their cardinal points on the hustings was that all the troops must be withdrawn from the Frontier. It was not the policy of the Government; but the policy which the Radical Party advocated was that all our troops should go back, regardless of the obligations the Viceroy lead incurred, and should leave our friends behind to be massacred. ["Oh, oh!"] He was afraid that hon. Gentlemen opposite had not read the leading organ of the Radicals in London. The Daily News said yesterday— Our only course, therefore, is to let it be clearly known that Candahar will be evacuated on a certain day. We must say to Abdurrahman, 'Whether you come or not we shall go.' The responsibility for what happens after we are gone does not rest on us. He would apologize. The writer did not suggest that all our friends should be left behind to have their throats cut, for he, wont on to remark- It is, of course, understood that in the evacuation of the city those persons who have been friends of the British occupation will be allowed to accompany toe army if they desire to do so. The article concluded thus— The contingency of Ayoob Khan taking possession of the city is one there is no need to contemplate On that he would observe that a distinguished political officer told him he had lately received news from Afghanistan, to the effect that the moment we left Ayoob Khan would drive Abdurrahman out of Candahar, and cut the throat of every man, woman, and child that had, in any way, been favourable to us. If that occurred, should we invade Afghanistan again or not? He should probably be told that the supporters of the Motion were animated by a spirit of aggression and blood-thirstiness; but he thought it was admitted by all who had. read Indian history that our Empire had conferred inestimable benefits on the populations under our control. No one, he thought, would dispute that the continuance of our rule in India meant a steady advance in the material pros- perity and happiness of 250,000,000 people. If that were so, then it was in no spirit of selfishness, of panic, or of aggression, but in the truest interests of humanity, that they objected to allow the foundations of our Indian Empire to be sapped and her bulwarks to be abandoned.

MR. FAWCETT

said, that among the many references by the noble Lord (Lord George Hamilton) to his noble Friend (the Marquess of Hartington) there was one which he would not allow a single moment to pass without noticing. The noble Lord had made the gravest charge which could be made against a Secretary of State for India when he said his noble Friend was not going to decide, on Indian considerations, an Indian question of paramount importance, but that the decision would be determined by the exigencies of Party. [Opposition cheers.] He (Mr. Fawcett) knew perfectly well that when hon. Members opposite thought calmly of what they were cheering, they would admit there was no Member of that House against whom such a charge could be made with so little foundation. There was no one, he ventured to say, whose character stood higher in the estimation, not only of Liberals, but of Conservatives than the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for India for straightforwardness in politics; and it was absolutely impossible to believe that he would stir one single step to injure India for the sake of Party. The noble Lord opposite said the Liberal Party were disunited; but it was not long since that they were taunted with being a "mechanical majority." They were, at all events, united in approval of Her Majesty's Government with reference to Candahar. The noble Lord began his speech by paying a well-deserved compliment to the speeches delivered last night by the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles W. Dilke), the hon. Member for Leeds (Mr. Herbert Gladstone), and the noble Lord the Member for Winchester (Viscount Baring). But the most conclusive compliment that could be paid to those speeches was to observe the marvellous effect they had in changing the entire tone of the Opposition. The noble Lord began by saying—"Remember that what we are advocating is not the per- manent retention of Candahar; all that we want to do is to whittle this issue down to an occupation of a few months or a year or two." But the noble Lord could not keep long on that tack, and he soon went on to describe the perpetual advance of Russia, which, he said, was urged on by the uncontrollable force of a traditional destiny. If that uncontrollable force were urging her oil, the retention of Candahar, in the minds of the Opposition, could not be whittled down to a question as to whether it should be given up now or a few months hence. It had been repeatedly asserted that, by leaving Candahar, we should be doing great injustice to certain of the inhabitants who were extremely anxious that we should stop there. What evidence was there of this? He (Mr. Fawcett) thought he should be able to adduce some specific evidence on the other side. Whenever retention of occupation or annexation was proposed, we were always told that such a step would benefit the people. This was what we heard when the annexation of the Transvaal was proposed. Unfortunately those statements misled a majority in that House, and hon. Members knew what a heavy penalty we were now paying for the acceptance of these statements. What evidence was there that the people of Candahar wished us there? Every Indian statesman of eminence, from Lord Lawrence downwards, had told us that the Afghan people loved independence with a perfect passion; and Sir Frederick Roberts said—"The less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us." He might here make a remark, in reference to the statement of the noble Lord opposite that the people of Candahar were Afghans. What did Sir Frederick Roberts say about Russian influence in Afghanistan? He said that— Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan, or invade India through it, we should. have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interests if we avoid all interference with them in the mcantime."—[Afghanistan (1881), No. 1, p. 71.] And again he said— I would not shorten by one single mile the length of the difficult path which Russia would have to traverse, and. I would not shorten by one single mile the network of difficulties in which she would. be involved. In the speech of the hon. Gentleman the late Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. E. Stanhope) last night, and that of the noble Lord that evening, there was one notable omission; there was not one word said as to the justice of the step which the Government were urged to take. It was virtually implied that wherever British interests led us, there we had a right to go. Now, a most specific promise was made to the people of Afghanistan that we would not annex a square inch of their territory except for the purposes of self-defence; and what, he would ask, would be thought of British morality in Afghanistan and elsewhere if the Government yielded to arguments in favour of the retention of Candahar, one of the principal of which was the commercial importance of the Province they were urged to annex? If they proposed to annex some barren rocks, they might put in the plea of self-defence; but it was absolutely impossible to maintain that plea when the English people were told in that House, and out of it, that if they retained Candahar they would bring about a great development of trade and commerce in that part of the world. And then, what about the feeling of the Afghans themselves in this matter? It would be absurd to suppose that they would view with more friendly eyes our retention of Candahar than the French viewed the annexation by Germany of Alsace and Lorraine. To return to the military question. Sir Henry Norman's Estimate of the cost of occupying Candahar had been characterized by the noble Lord as being too high; but surely hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, with their experience of the Afghan and Abyssinian Wars, had some reason to doubt the probability of military Estimates erring on the side of moderation. He (Mr. Fawcett) had authority to say that Sir Henry Norman's Estimate was considerably below that of the present Commander-in-Chief in India, and also below that of the late Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick Haines. In fact, Sir Henry Norman omitted all reference to the cost of keeping up communications between Candahar and the present Frontier of India, which every military authority declared to be necessary. Sir Frederick Haines, whose Estimate of the force that would require to be kept at Candahar was greater than that of Sir Henry Norman, said that for many years to come the cost would greatly exceed the revenue we should obtain; and Lord Napier of Magdala, again, foreseeing a difficulty in getting Indian troops to serve at such a distance from their homes, declared that for the garrison at Candahar a special rate of pay would be necessary. Now, if they embarked upon the boundless sea of special pay, there was scarcely any limit to the expenditure that might be incurred. Lord Napier of Magdala further said that at least half the cost of the occupation ought to be borne by England; and the hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. R. N. Fowler), going a step further, said he should not have the slightest objection to England bearing the whole cost of it. Now, after the opinion he (Mr. Fawcett) had expressed that England ought to bear a portion of the cost of the Afghan War, no one would suspect him of wishing to throw a shilling of unnecessary expense upon India. That war was undertaken avowedly for Imperial as well as Indian purposes. The late Prime Minister told the House of Lords that their decision on the subject would animate England and encourage Europe. Well, he (Mr. Fawcett) not unnaturally protested against the people of India alone having to pay for the animation of England and the encouragement of Europe. But the proposal to share the cost of the occupation of Candahar between England and India was wholly different in its character, and one which, in his opinion, ought to be strenuously resisted. There was not the shadow of an excuse for the retention of Candahar, except for the defence of India, and if they once made England contribute directly to the defence of India; they would give a most disastrous encouragement to extravagance. There were no bounds to which the military expenditure of India might not go if those responsible for governing India could, at will, dip their hands into the Imperial Exchequer. Such a proposal, in his opinion, ought to be resisted even more in the interests of India than in the interests of England. But let them look for a moment at the proposal from the English point of view. People talked lightly of an extra £1,000,000 or £2,000,000 being thrown upon the English taxpayers at the present time. He did not wish to take an alarmist view of the position of England; but was the English agricultural interest, for instance, whether regarded from the point of view of the landlord, the tenant farmer, or the labourer, able to bear a halfpenny of unnecessary burden? Was it not well known that many of our industries had every day to contend more keenly with foreign competition, and that every additional farthing imposed on English trade unfairly handicapped the producer? But if that was true with respect to England, what, he would ask, was the condition of India? The noble Lord appeared to speak lightly of £1,500,000; but while that sum would represent here but an addition of ¾d. in the pound to the Income Tax, what did it, he would ask, mean in the case of India? It was true that there the number of persons to be taxed was great; but their poverty, too, was so great that, in order to raise lately the sum of £1,500,000 for the Famine Fund, it had been found necessary to impose a tax on incomes of 4s. a-week; while as to equalization of the salt duties referred to by the noble Lord, what was it except a lowering of duties on some of the richest Provinces of India, and an increase of the burdens of the poorest, in Madras and Bombay, to the extent of no less than 30 per cent. The noble Lord, however, called that a policy of equalization; but what had been done with the proceeds of the taxation? The present Government had been taunted with breaking their promises; but all the promises they had ever broken sank into insignificance compared with the promise the Party opposite gave when they solemnly told the people of India that if they would bear that cruel and crushing tax not a penny of it would over be spent for any other purpose than in the relief of the famine; whereas, before 12 months had elapsed, the proceeds were spent in a war of aggrandizement. But it was said that the people of India wished that Candahar should be retained. Could it, however, he would ask, be fairly supposed that any people in the world would wish that funds which they had devoted to the relief of famine should be devoted to such a purpose as the retention of Candahar? As to the Income Tax, he (Mr. Fawcett) would tell the noble Lord why he had opposed it. It was because everyone in authority had said that such a tax was unsuited to such a people as that of India, and that it possessed one of the greatest defects of all taxes, that white it cost a considerable amount of annoyance, it yet brought back a comparatively small amount to the State. He had opposed that tax, because he knew that it had been objected to by the best and wisest of statesmen. In a passage which had often been quoted, Lord Canning had said that, danger for danger, he would rather incur the responsibility of governing India with half the existing European Army than encounter the discontent which the Income Tax produced. Lord Mayo, endorsing that opinion, expressed. it to be his opinion that the tax, at the time it was imposed, produced among all classes of the community an amount of discontent which it was impossible to over-estimate. But the noble Lord opposite went on to contend that those who sat on the Ministerial Bench had changed their views with regard to Indian finance. Now, for his own part, he had felt it impossible to exaggerate what might be the state of that finance if the career of a Government had not been closed which involved the country recklessly in an enterprize which ended by costing it £15,000,000 instead of £6,000,000; and if he had changed his views with regard to Indian finance, it was not because he thought the opium tax a less uncertain source of revenue than he did a few months ago, or the salt duty a less onerous burden on the poor, or that an Income Tax reaching incomes of 4s. a-week ought not to be imposed except in a case of extreme necessity, but because he and his right hon. Friends near him knew perfectly well that all Indian finance required was care, thrift, and the surrender of an ambitious policy, and because they believed that that care and thrift would be practised by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for India, who had given proof in the despatches on the Table that he, for one, would not be a party to launching India into a sea of trouble by moving beyond our Frontier. Again, complaint had been made about the Indian Council not having been consulted, and it was objected that the question of retaining Candahar was going to be decided upon, because three Minutes of Members of the Council of the Viceroy were missing; but the policy which led to the retention of Candahar was decided, not when there were three Minutes missing, but when neither the Council of the Se- cretary of State nor that of the Viceroy had been consulted at ail. Besides, it would be recollected that the Afghan War was begun before the English people had obtained the Papers necessary to enable them to express an opinion on the subject. The noble Lord had. referred to the opinion of Lord Lawrence. Now, he (Mr. Fawcett) had enjoyed the intimate friendship of that great and distinguished statesman, with whom he had repeated conversations, and whom he recollected saying, as well as if it were only yesterday, while he held the Blue Book containing the Afghan Papers in his hand—" If we had only had those Papers three weeks ago, before war was declared, I am convinced the English people would never have sanctioned its declaration." It ill became, therefore, he thought, hon. Gentlemen opposite to quarrel with the conduct of his noble Friend in reference to the absence of Papers on the present occasion. A good deal had been said in the course of the discussion about one place or another being the key of India. Lord Beaconsfield had made the latest discovery that the key was London; but he (Mr. Fawcett) would venture to tell the House that, in the opinion of a great and distinguished statesman, the key was finance. That was the opinion of Lord Canning, who saw India through the troublous days of the Mutiny; and his noble Friend (the Marquess of Hartington), in one of his despatches, stated that the security of India was to be looked for in good government and the development of her resources. He was confident that that opinion would obtain the support of the House and the country. The late Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. E. Stanhope) had characterized the policy of the present Government as one of masterly surrender. He supposed that the hon. Gentleman insinuated, in that expression, that the Government were lacking in courage. In his (Mr. Fawcett's) opinion, however, true courage was best exhibited by showing that we were determined to retrace steps taken in the path of injustice. It had been said again and again by the supporters of the Motion that the issue which would be decided that night was one of great importance. In Ids view it would be almost impossible to exaggerate the importance of that issue. Whatever might be the nature of the measures or financial reforms that might be passed in the next few years by the present House of Commons, he (Mr. Fawcett) believed that that Parliament would be most gratefully remembered, and that it would be considered by posterity to be one of its best, if not its very best, achievements, that it had afforded to every elector in the Kingdom an opportunity of showing, by the rejection of the Motion, that he had an influence in electing a Parliament which had the power to determine that wrong once done need not necessarily be continued, and that injustice, once committed, would, if possible, be redressed.

MR. ONSLOW

said, he must profess himself to be one of those who were of opinion, both on political and financial grounds, that Candahar ought to be permanently occupied. The right hon. Gentleman the Postmaster General said that evidence was wanted to show that the population of Candahar preferred British rule to the rule of Ayoob or Abdurrahman. He (Mr. Onslow) would refer the right hon. Gentleman to the last paragraph of the Minute by Mr. Rivers Thompson, who said there that a few mouths of Native government would vastly increase the numbers of those who wished for British rule in Candahar. In that opinion Colonel St. John was said to share, and his views were contained in one of those documents which had unfortunately miscarried. Another point made by the right hon. Gentleman was that if troops were kept in Candahar they must have extra pay. He admitted that might be so for the present; but he held that we ought in time to be able to recruit among the Candaharis soldiers who would be as loyal as any recruited in India; for there was no reason why they should not be as trustworthy as the Punjaubis or Sikhs who were now in our service. With reference to the opinion of Sir Richard Temple in 1868, quoted by the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles W. Dilke), he must be allowed to say that the views of Sir Richard Temple on the policy of "masterly inactivity" had greatly changed since that time, the reason of the change being the change in the policy of Russia, who had shown us and the people of Afghanistan that she could very soon get to their country, if she should so wish. But he would remind the House that it was not only the opinions of Sir Richard Temple which had been changed by circumstances; but the opinions also of a large number of officers, who had at one time advocated the policy of masterly inactivity. He hoped the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Hartington) was not going back to that policy, for that policy had done an enormous deal of mischief in India. The expression "masterly inactivity" was, in fact, more properly described as being a euphemistic term for "mischievous indolence." The expression first appeared in an article in The Edinburgh Review, written by Mr. Wylie; but he (Mr. Onslow) had been informed by Mr. Wylie himself that the expression had not been used by him, but had been inserted in the article by the editor of The Edinburgh Review. He would nut quote Mr. Wylie's remark when referring to that circumstance, as his language was not Parliamentary. The policy of the late Lord Lawrence, at whose instigation that article was published, embraced the recognition of any conqueror who might come to the front in Afghanistan. A pulley such as that was, in his (Mr. Onslow's, opinion, an encouragement to bloodshed, as it was a direct inducement to any who could muster a sufficient following to try his hand at defeating any Ameer whom we might recognize. Lord Lawrence, in 1868, said that for many years to come we should not see a solitary Cossack across the Oxus, and yet only 10 years after the utterance of those words the Russian Mission was seen at Cabul. In pursuance of our policy of "masterly inactivity," the two brothers of Shore Ali, who had been recognized as Ameer, were permitted to leave India, where a monthly stipend had been given to them, and where they had been living as political refugees, and actually allowed to fight Shore Ali. Shore Ali, in the end, prevailed, after a succession of severe battles and much bloodshed. He only mentioned that as an an instance of the policy of "masterly inactivity." Lord Lawrence's own account of his policy was that we should not be too hasty, but await the development of events, and for the time being recognize Shore Ali as Ameer, and show clearly that we should not actively interfere with the struggle that was going on, but leave the Afghans to settle their own affairs. He would, however, point out that Lord Lawrence did interfere in Afghanistan, because he allowed the two brothers of Shore Ali to leave their abodes in India for the purpose of fighting Shore Ali. He (Mr. Onslow) believed for himself that the policy of "masterly inactivity" after the recent action of Russia, would be fatal to our rule in India. The surrendering of Candahar would be also fatal to our rule in India; and he could not help thinking that even Lord Lawrence himself, if he were alive, and had seen the Cabul Correspondence, and had known how much farther Russia had advanced towards Herat, would have modified his opinion. Indeed, in 1868 he urged the desirability of coming to some understanding with Russia, and said that we ought not to allow Russia to interfere in Afghanistan or any State contiguous with our Frontier, and that the advances of Russia had produced in the minds of Europeans and Natives an exaggerated estimate of the resources of that Power. In fact, Lord Lawrence saw clearly the danger of Russia's advances; but he did not wish in any way to interfere during the term of his Viceroyalty. He wished to remind the House that as far back as 1819 a Russian General stated that if Russia were at Khiva, she would shake the superiority of the masters of the sea, even in their Indian possessions. Even now the whole commerce of Afghanistan and the countries North of India was in the hands of Russia; indeed, the commerce of the whole of Central Asia was in her hands. Turning to the subject of the late war, he thought they ought to find out who was really responsible for the late war, and whether Lord Lytton was its real author. Lord Northbrook had said—he (Mr. Onslow) thought it was in his Winchester speech—that he had endeavoured to carry out the policy of Lord Mayo and Lord Lawrence, not merely because it was a successive policy and it was desirable to maintain continuity of action, but also because he thoroughly approved it. He would endeavour to show that he did not carry out that policy, but a very different one. Lord Lawrence for years set his face against a single soldier, either Native or European, for any purpose entering Afghanistan. Lord Northbrook, however, was on the point of sending troops into the country, and would have done so, but that he was prevented by the Duke of Argyll. The House may recollect that now famous telegram to the Secretary of State in which he expressly uses the words "troops" to assist Shere Ali if need be. Then, when Shere Ali was detaining his son, Yakoob Khan at Cabul, and Lord Northbrook wrote to him on the subject, Shere Ali resented the interference, and asked him why he should interfere between father and son. For his own part, he thought there was wisdom in Lord Lawrence's remark, when it came to his knowledge that Shere Ali had, some years before, behaved to another son in exactly the same manner, that the Afghans, in their domestic relations, ought not to be judged by the standard of Christendom. Then Lord Northbrook proposed to send a British officer to Cabul to settle boundaries; but permission was not granted. The Ameer also refused to allow Colonel Baker to pass through the country on his way between Teheran arid India. The whole of this policy was in direct opposition to that of Lord Lawrence, for the latter had over and over again maintained the impolicy of sending any European officer, no matter for what purpose, to Afghanistan, for this simple reason—that the mission of such an officer would be looked upon as an interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. A similar refusal was made in the case of Sir Douglas Forsyth. Altogether the attitude of Shore Ali to this country had been unfriendly and cold since the meeting at Simla in 1873. He did not, therefore, believe that Lord Lytton was responsible for the late war. It was, in reality, a legacy arising out of the blunders of his Predecessor. It had been said that the war was not popular amoung our Native subjects in India. He (Mr. Onslow) knew, however, as a fact that it was popular, and was warmly supported by every Rajah in the country, and that nearly all of them had volunteered to send troops with the British Army. Sir Henry Norman had asserted that Candahar would not add one iota to our security in India. That was a broad assertion. The manner of obtaining Candahar, and quitting it now that we had got it, were two different matters. Without entering into the former question, he would say that the possession of Candahar was a great security for our moral prestige in India. To retire from it now would be looked upon by the Natives as a sign of great weakness, and that we ought to retain it at almost any price. It was said service at Candahar would be unpopular; but the same thing had been said before now about places in India and in Burmah. Did they think if they retired from Candahar it would strengthen their position in India? Would the moral effect be good or bad? Would the people of India be more proud of British rule when they saw our Army withdrawing behind the Indus merely to appease a certain political Party in England? He denied that by remaining in Candahar they would be obliged to mix themselves up in the affairs of Cabul; and he maintained that until there was settled rule at Cabul they ought not to leave Candahar. If they retired now they would court bloodshed and disaffection among the people, many of whom would be handed over to almost certain death from Ayoob Khan, who would not be inclined to deal kindly to those who had assisted our Generals when he himself beseiged Candahar, and who had, since then, become accustomed to our rule. Certainly there ought to be a sufficient guarantee for the preservation of the lives of the Candaharis who had been loyal to us, for it would be cruel of a Christian country like England to leave them to anarchy and murder. But the noble Lord could give us no such assurance, the word had gone forth, go you must, never mind the consequences. At present the people between Candahar and Sibi were perfectly friendly to the British, and why? Because they saw how good British rule was as compared with Native Rulers. We had nothing to fear in India; the people were prosperous and contented; therefore there was no danger in that quarter, if the troops remained a year or two longer. He would not maintain Candahar, however, unless they made a line of railway from India. This would develop commerce and have a civilizing effect on the people. Moreover, it would be essentially necessary to open up the communication between Sibi and Candahar, in order that we might compete in trade with Russia. No doubt the retention would entail an increase in the number of troops for a time; but when the railway was completed, a single extra man would not be needed, as recruits might then be obtained in the neighbourhood of Candahar, and oar garrisons now on the Afghan Frontier he much Therefore, in the long, run, he held there would be no necessity for an increase. If we retired precipitately from Candahar, he did not see how we could prevent that country from again becoming a scene of anarchy and confusion. It was a somewhat extraordinary fact that, although soon after the present Government came into Office the noble Marquess the Secretary of State wrote to India calling for a Report on the subject of Candahar and of our leaving, Afghanistan, no Report should have come to the present day. At least. the only Report they had had was a despatch from the Viceroy in Connell, which was placed in their hands yesterday. The House would do well carefully to peruse that document, which seemed to him an urgent appeal to Her Majesty's Government to hold their hands, and not to be in such indecent haste to leave Candahar. Such a dangerous course was, in his opinion, only a part and parcel and a consequence of the Mid Lothian election campaign of the Prime Minister. It was a procedure dictated by Party spirit; but he warned the Government against making India the battle-field of Party warfare, and against committing one of the most fatal mistakes ever made in that country by any Government.

MR. BRETT

Sir, I must ask the House to grant me the indulgence which it always generously accords to those who address it for the first time. Before touching upon the general question, I should like to make one remark in reply to an observation which fell from the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton). The noble Lord has told us, from private information he has received, the story of what he says occurred at all informal meeting of the Viceroy's Council. At the first meeting he distinctly stated that there was a difference of opinion as to the retention of Candahar between the Viceroy and his Council, and that the Viceroy was left in a minority of one. At the next meeting the Viceroy did net convert, but was converted by his Council, and was now in favour of remaining at Candahar. Well, the noble Lord has not a monopoly of private information, and from private information which I have received, from a higher source than that which is relied on by the noble Lord, I can say that there is absolutely no foundation for that statement, and. that Lord Ripon is not, and never has been, in favour of remaining at Candahar. I have listened with attention to the speeches which have been delivered by the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Stanhope) and others during this debate, who think that the course which Her Majesty's Government are taking is fraught with danger to the security of the Indian Empire; and I must say that, although I appreciate the force of some of their arguments, my opinion formed previously as to the wisdom of abandoning Candahar has remained unchanged. As I understand the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire, the two arguments on which he chiefly relies, although they are supplemented by several considerations of, as I think, minor importance, are these—First, that to abandon Candahar will render more easy the advance of Russia towards India; secondly, that the sovereign charecter, or, as it is called, the prestige, of British rule in India would suffer by the evacuation of that city. It is true, perhaps, that Russia is the rival of England in Central Asia, and that she is advancing by a series of rapid conquests from the North towards the Southern seas. It is probably true that her object has ever been, and still continues to be, to establish her authority upon the shores of the Mediterranean as well as of the Persian Gulf and that, although baulked in her object, and frustrated on many occasions, she adheres to her policy, and is unlikely to fail in achieving it. It is an undoubted fact that, although for centuries her progress was slow, during the last 20 years she has advanced with rapid. strides, especially in the direction of the North-West Frontier of India. So far the state of things is sufficiently grave; but when we come to the year 1878, it reveals a state of things more serious still. The late Government, owing to proceedings about which there is much difference of opinion, and which are altogether foreign to the question raised by the Motion of the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire, found that the difficulties which had arisen between this country and Russia in Europe had led the Russian officers in Tashkend to attempt a diversion in favour of Russia by intrigue in Afghanistan. It is asserted that the late Ameer, Shere Ali, was induced by letters from military authorities in Central Asia, and by Russian officers despatched to Cabul, to break off those friendly relations with the Indian Government, which had, up to that time, not uniformly, but, on the whole, existed, since the accession of that Prince to the Throne of Afghanistan. I am perfectly aware that there are many who deny that this statement of the facts is accurate; but I think we shall do well, at any rate, to admit that the state of things which is asserted by the late Government to have existed in 1878 might occur at any moment; for, unless we are ready to concede this, we lay ourselves open to the retort that we have not recognized the full strength of our adversary's case. At the same time, I think we should carefully examine what was the significance of the Russo-Afghan Alliance in 1878. Was the danger as formidable as it appears to hon. Members opposite? If we look back to what occurred at Cabul in 1878, it is impossible not to be struck by the difficulty which the Russians encountered, even though Shore Ali was bitterly offended with Lord Lytton and his Government. I cannot help thinking. that even then, had Lord Lytton acted with the most ordinary prudence, there is but little doubt that the attempts of the Russian officers to disturb our relations with Afghanistan would have been frustrated. There is, at any rate, this to be said, with regard to the future, that after the failure of Russia to keep her engagements with Shore Ali, and after the rude lesson which the Afghan tribes have been taught by Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick Roberts, hon. Gentlemen opposite ought to be ready to admit the probability of an offensive alliance between Afghanistan and Russia to be considerably diminished. But even if we assume that an intrigue undertaken by General Kauffmann could be successful, to what would it amount? It is, perhaps, conceivable to some hon. Members that he would prevail upon the future Ruler of Cahill to attempt an invasion of India by the aid of such troops as those which defeated General Burrows at Maiwand. Does that danger appear a very formidable one to hon. Gentlemen opposite? I put a question a short while ago to an officer who is well acquainted with the Afghans and our Indian Army; and who, I may say, is in favour of retaining Candahar. I asked him whether it was not illusory to talk of the best-armed and best-drilled Afghan force as a danger to India; whether Ayoob Khan could have moved the force with which he beat us at Maiwand into our country for lasting operations. And he replied that the Afghan Army as an invading one is, of course, an absurdity. Any further intrigue by the Russians in Afghanistan must be based upon some more material consideration than an attempt to stimulate the future Ameer to advance into the Punjaub. In order to be dangerous, intrigue must be strengthened by the presence in Afghanistan of a largo Russian force. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson) said, last night, that he did not believe in the possibility of a Russian invasion of India; but he said that he did feel that past experience justified him in believing in the probability of Russian intrigue in Afghanistan. Well, I think we have a right to ask what hon. Members really understand by Russian intrigue in Afghanistan; and what was the danger which they consider likely to result from it. If I were forced to choose—and I think the choice would lie between two great evils—whether we should see India invaded in the course of the next 10 years by a Russian Army, or Candahar annexed at the present time to the Indian Empire, I should prefer the annexation of Candahar. But if I were asked to choose between the annexation—at the present time—of Candahar, and a recurrence of Russian intrigue—not 10 years hence, but next year—in Afghanistan, by General Kauffmann, or whoever may command the Russian Armies in Central Asia, I should most certainly select the latter alternative. And for the reason that, as I before observed, Russian intrigue in Afghanistan, though extremely objectionable on various grounds, cannot be considered dangerous by any reasonable man, unless it is followed up by powerful and effective action. And I cannot refrain from pointing out to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin that he has not shown how intrigue by Russia in Afghanistan would be prevented or neutralized by our occupation of Candahar. But it has been said, if we keep Candahar, we have nothing to fear from intrigue, or even from invasion by Russia. Well, I think that it can be said in answer to that statement:—First, that we have no reasonable ground for fear even if we do not keep Candahar; and, secondly, that the great military authorities, whose opinions are so frequently quoted on this subject, have not formed them—not one of them, so far as I know—on military grounds alone. Take, for example, the Minute of Lord Napier of Magdala, and it will be found full of political, moral, and even financial considerations. I am prepared to make an exception in favour of Sir Edmund Hamley, who in his famous lecture, delivered three years ago, did consider this question from the strategical point of view only. And what was the result? Sir Edmund Hamley discussed the probabilities of an invasion of India, and these are the words he used— Now, when we remember what an invading Army of India implies—that it shall bear with it the means of passing the Indus—that it shall be prepared. to encounter the forces of our Indian Empire—and that, thus formidable in numbers and equipment, it must rely for supplies on the path through which it has issued, we shall form some idea of the difficulties which would encompass an army in its attempt to enter India by these routes; and these difficulties I will ask you to bear in mind when I recur to this part of the subject. Let us next see what conditions another part of the theatre may present. But first let me pause to say what I understand by an invading Army. Not all the assembled forces of the Afghans—not such a Russian force as we saw lately assembling on the Frontier of Bokhara—not such an army as Persia can at present send forth—any or all of these would fall far short of the requirements of such an enterprize. But I will suppose that Russia has completed those improvements in her communications which we know she persistently contemplates: that she has united the Caspian and the Aral by a railway; or that, combining with Persia, she has made a convenient way from the southern shore of the Caspian to Herat; that the Ruler of Afghanistan has thrown in his lot with them; and that within the fortified triangle Herat, Candahar, Cabul, the dispositions for this great undertaking have been brought deliberately, with all the aids of military science, to completion. We may be assured that an invading Army of India, such as we cannot afford to despise, will be no improvised force, no barbarous horde, but truly formidable in numbers, organization, and leadership. These are the conditions under which, in the opinion of Sir Edmund Hamley, an invasion of India might be attempted, and I do not think even the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) will say that these conditions will be realized within any distance of time which we can reasonably measure. And Sir Edmund Hamley goes on to say that, assuming such an invasion to take place, he would consider Candahar a valuable strategical position. But his statement is so qualified that I think almost every Member of this House would be ready to acquiesce in it. These are his words— As I have said, I should feel confident of the result even in the Valley of the Indus; I think our position vastly improved by the occupation of Quetta; but I should think it all we could desire if we occupied Candahar. Sir Edmund Hamley confined himself strictly to the points on which he was best qualified to speak. I confess I do not attach as much importance to arguments from authority, as do some hon. Members opposite, on a question of this kind. Any ordinary man, with a little common sense, if he chooses to take the trouble, is just as well able to form a right judgment upon it as the most experienced soldier. The authority of experts appears to me only decisive on questions of fact, or of inference so strong that it amounts to fact. But if we are to be influenced by authorities, they must be content to be bound by the limits of their own special qualifications; and Lord Napier's opinion on the trade of Candahar, or on its probable revenue, is not worth more than that of anybody else. Is it not a fact, I should like to ask hon. Gentlemen opposite—and Sir Edmund Hamley admitted it as far as he was concerned—that these opinions by military authorities in favour of retaining Candahar are in reality hypothetical—that is, they demonstrate what would be the best scientific Frontier under conditions which do not exist, and under circumstances which may never arise. I have reminded the House of Sir Edmund Hamley's estimate of the force it would require to invade India with any hope of success. But Lord Lytton, in 1876, believed that with 5,000 men he could successfully undertake the conquest of Afghanistan; and with 30,000 men he would not have hesitated to attack the Russian possessions in Central Asia, either with or without the leave of the Ameer of Cabul. But experience taught him, when his military reasoning had failed, that nearly twice 30,000 men were required to hold, not the whole, but merely the Eastern half of Afghanistan; and when a further expedition was contemplated—only 12 months ago I—in the direction of the Bamian Pass, military considerations forbade it. Can we not justly infer from these facts how great the difficulties of the Russian Generals would be, whose advance would be through the Trans-Oxus deserts; through hostile tribes of Pathans in front, and with semi-hostile Turcomans in rear, into plains watered by that river, of which Sir Edmund Hamley said that— He thought there was no spot in the world where we could make such a military display of strength at short notice as on the Lower Indus. I should like to be permitted to say a few words upon the second of the two arguments which I think strongest in favour of remaining at Candahar. I mean that in which it is said that by withdrawing we shall lower the sovereign character of British rule in the eyes of the Native population of India. This, Sir, is very much a matter of opinion, and I am bound to say that I take a somewhat different view of the effect which our retirement from Candahar will have upon the Native mind. The Natives of India—at least, those whom it is important to influence—are not so ignorant and ill-informed but that they can appreciate the motives which actuate Her Majesty's Government in resolving upon the abandonment of this district of Afghanistan. Perhaps if we had retired immediately after Sir Frederick Roberts' victory at Candahar our motives would have been less easily comprehended. But it is now clear to everyone that we have for six months held the country without any difficulty, however trifling, and that no Afghan force could undertake, with success, to molest the Army now at Candahar and on the line of communications. They understand that, if we chose, we could stay just as easily in Candahar as in Rawul Pindi, but that we do not choose; and I believe that they appreciate our motives. They recognize that we deny that such a step is necessary, and that, not being absolutely necessary, our remaining there would be to place a useless burden upon their poorer fellow-countrymen. I cannot believe that the prestige of England will be lowered in the opinion of Natives who recognize these considerations, and that they do recognize them no one who is acquainted with the tone of the Native Press can for a moment doubt. I have endeavoured to refute the arguments which are used in support of the contention that we ought to remain at Candahar, rather than to reiterate the reasons which have probably induced Her Majesty's Government to decide on its abandonment; and I have done so, because it appears to me that it is not for us, who wish to retire—that is, to take the ordinary and natural course to explain our reason for taking it. But the burden of proof obviously lies on those who wish this country to go out of her way to annex a large Province in Central Asia; and my contention is that hon. Gentlemen opposite have failed to prove their case. I was surprised to hear the terms in which the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Dublin University described Candahar. He called it a "great citadel," and "the granary of Central Asia." I am not sure he did not say it might become the "garden of the world." His information has, I fear, been derived from some Oriental novelist, rather than from the soldiers who have been forced to reside for many months, much against their will, in the city, which is magnificent only in the imagination of the right hon. and learned Gentleman. The late Prime Minister has told us that it is absurd to talk of Candahar, or Herat, or Merv, as the key of India; and I cannot help feeling that hon. Gentlemen opposite must see that the late Prime Minister is right when he asserts that the key of India is not some squalid town in Central Asia, but the great city in which the noble Earl himself resides. The question, therefore, of remaining at Candahar is, from the point of view of the late Prime Minister, of importance; but not of vital importance. I merely offer this remark as a consolation to the hon. Member for Eye, for whose obvious sufferings the House must feel some sympathy; and I merely suggest to him that if after all he is right, and the Government are wrong, the Leader of his Party, when he reminded him that this is a mere question of outposts, held out to him a hope that the evil is not irremediable. There is, however, from the point of view of the hon. Member for Eye, this to be said in favour of the course of Her Majesty's Government being the right course, and that is that on two separate occasions, when it was in the power of hon. Gentlemen opposite to retain Candahar, they decided to retire from it. The vote, therefore, which a few weeks ago was taken in "another place," no doubt, condemns the policy of Her Majesty's Ministers; but it doubly condemns those Ministers who were in Office whan the Treaty of Gandamak was signed, and when the arrangement with the Wali, Shere Ali, was made. It was observed, not long since, by the late Viceroy of India, that the Only grounds on which the Government acts in retiring from Candahar are those of finance and morals. There are not many hon. Members sitting on this side of the House who will agree with that statement of the noble Lord. The grounds on which the Government objects to remaining at Candahar are, I believe, grounds of high policy, involving all those manifold and complex considerations which decide the acts of powerful States. Important as it is when taken as a part of our case, I cannot look upon which I may be permitted to call the £ s. d. policy alone as decisive of any course which is worthy of statesmen. At any rate, we are justified by experience in believing that an annual expenditure of £2,000,000—however inconvenient it might be—would not stand in the way of a policy which appears to any Ministers who may for the time he serving the State necessary for the public safety. Financial considerations alone never have governed the policy of this country, and let us hope they never will. But, if I may be permitted a retort upon the late Viceroy of India, I should like to observe that there are many occasions in history when political judgment has been sacrificed to military opinion; and never, so far as I know, with good effect. The most notable and recent instance was when Prince Bismarck was notoriously opposed to the annexation by Germany of the Rhine Provinces, an act which was forced upon him by the high military authorities who had brought the war to a victorious issue. Is there any Englishman of sound judgment who believes that those stipulations of the Peace of Versailles, by which Alsace and Lorraine were wrested from France, have proved or will prove advantageous to Germany? I agree with a great authority that the desire and the efforts to increase its territory are the signs of life in a nation; but it must not be for- gotten that human desires and human efforts are circumscribed; and history teaches us by notable examples that there is a limit beyond which the strain of Empire cannot be borne. No one, Mr. Speaker, can suppose that there is any advantage of a positive kind to be gained by the annexation of Candahar. The demand of hon. Gentlemen opposite is based upon the ground that, by doing so, we shall have established a check upon the movements of Russia. I have not endeavoured to go over once more the arguments which have been already so ably stated why—even if the necessity for our remaining at Candahar were more clearly proved than it is—we might well hesitate to remain there. I have tried to show that the necessity does not exist. No doubt, it can be effectively and truly said to retire from Candahar is not a policy. I admit that that is so. It may further be said that to remain at Candahar is a policy; but that I must respectfully beg to deny. It appears to me that just as to retire from Candahar can only be called part of a policy, so to remain there is only the part of a wider scheme. And for this reason—that, if we remain at Candahar, further questions of great interest and complication immediately arise. For example, whether we retire from Candahar or remain there, the pertinent inquiry can be made— "Will you allow Russia to occupy Herat, and, if not, how will you prevent it?" I merely use this as a simple illustration, in order to show that the policy of this country in Central Asia, beyond the Frontier of India, cannot be encircled by the walls of Candahar. And the House must forgive me if I remind hon. Members opposite that, in the opinion of the late Viceroy, it was scarcely to be bounded by the Hindu Kush. The real question which the Government have had to decide has been the policy to be pursued in the future with regard to the external relations of India on her North-Western Frontier. As to whether or no Candahar is to be retained is merely a portion of that policy. We have not at present the whole policy of the Government before us, and no opinion can be formed justly of its merits; but this we know—and the great majority of this House and of the country are satisfied of its wisdom and expediency—that that policy does not include the maintenance of from 15,000 to 20,000 British troops at and about Candahar. The House must recollect that in 1878 the Indian Government were placed in a position of great difficulty. They were called upon to decide how to meet the contingency of war with Russia on the Frontiers of India. At the instigation of the late Government, who preferred not to meet it directly by remonstrance, they decided to meet it indirectly by an attack upon the dominions of the Ameer of Afghanistan. That policy has hardly proved a conspicuous success. The next act of the late Government was the Treaty of Gandamak, which was doomed to speedy and gloomy failure. A third time they failed by the arrangement with the Wali—as Lord Lytton has himself admitted—to conceive a policy which could bear the tension of six short months. Why, then, should hon. Members, after those three experiments, be so confident of their own powers to effect a settlement of this question? I must thank the House for having borne with me so long. I believe that there is a policy which can and will be pursued with effect towards Afghanistan and Russia. It is not, I regret to say, the policy of Lord Lawrence, for that is made impossible by recent events. It is not the policy of Lord Lytton, for obvious reasons. But it is a policy which can honourably be initiated by Her Majesty's Government, and which will, if loyally carried out, I trust conduce to the peace and security of the Indian Empire, and to the enduring prosperity of this country.

MR. DALRYMPLE

said, that the House was indebted to his hon. Friend (Mr. E. Stanhope) for bringing forward the Motion, if only because it had given to several hon. Members of great ability an opportunity of addressing the House for the first time, and the speech which had just been delivered laid the House under a fresh obligation to his hon. Friend. He had, at first, been at a loss to understand the opening remarks of the Postmaster General; but he fancied he detected in the extravagant eulogy which the right hon. Gentleman had passed upon the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India a sign of repentance on the right hon. Gentleman's part for having himself, in his free-lance days, been a thorn in the side of Under Secretaries and officials generally. However that might be, he (Mr. Dalrymple) did not know anyone who stood in less need of defence than the noble Marquess, whose fairness in political life contrasted favourably with others who sat near him on the Treasury Bench. The analogy which the right hon. Gentleman drew between Candahar and the Transvaal seemed to him most unfortunate, considering how many Members of the Liberal Party had supported the annexation of the Transvaal; and the absence of Papers, of which the right hon. Gentleman made light, though it was a constant subject of complaint on the part of the Liberal Party when in opposition, was really a most important matter. If it had been shown, for instance, by the production of despatches containing communications with Abdurrahman, that the Government had taken steps to assure themselves of his being able to hold Candahar after the departure of our troops, their position would have been, to some extent, vindicated. He could hardly, indeed, imagine anything more important than the negotiations in regard to the position of Abdurrahman. What he most complained of was the random character of the policy which the Government had adopted in their determination to quit Candahar, throwing responsibility upon the Indian Council at one time, and at another time treating their opinion with indifference. The Members of the Government did not even seem to be fully informed as to what was about to be done; for while the night hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury, a short time ago, did not contemplate as imminent the evacuation of Candahar, the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India stated shortly afterwards, in correction of the right hon. Gentleman, that the English troops were on the point of leaving the country. The right hon. Gentleman the Postmaster General had complained of the statement that the policy of the Government was affected by Party considerations; but he (Mr. Dalrymple) contended that a Party character had been imparted to the debate, as for ninny days an Amendment hid been on the Paper in the name of the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arthur Arnold), and then, at the last moment, the question of his hon. Friend was made one of confidence in the Government, so that it became impossible to prevent the question being considered as one of a Party character. For his part, he wished that the discussion could have been kept free from Party considerations, as he believed that, in that case, the question would have been more fairly, calmly, and impartially discussed. The Government had, however, by the course they adopted, taken care that such should not be the case. They all knew that the policy of retirement from Candahar was shadowed forth in a despatch of the noble Lord in May last, when he had not been long enough in Office to give an opinion on this great question. Change of policy in reference to Candahar on the part of the late Government had been referred to by hon. Members on the other side; but the change was entirely owing to change of circumstances. He (Mr. Dalrymple) would not detain the House with further quotation of the opinions of Indian authorities; but the case of Sir Donald Stewart required special notice. In April, 1870, that distinguished man had given an opinion in favour of retirement from Candahar; whereas it was well known that in July, 1880, he, for excellent reasons, changed his mind, and now advocated its retention. He did not mention that for the purpose of magnifying Sir Donald Stewart's present opinion; but he (Mr. Dalrymple) observed two things. In the first place, Sir Donald Stewart could not any longer be quoted as an authority in favour of retirement, because his second opinion had obviously cancelled his first. The other consideration was that a change of circumstances had led to that alteration of the opinion of Sir Donald Stewart, and a change of circumstances in like manner Lad dictated, in the time of Lord Lytton, a policy different from that of previous Viceroys. He complained, however, that the present Government did neither one thing nor the other. The Government did not retain Candahar itself, and did not take measures to insure that any settled form of government should be left behind. He believed if Candahar was left without any Ruler who had a fair chance of holding his own a terrible, state of things might ensue. It was only those whose eyes were dazzled by a great Power into blindness of vision, who could say that even when circumstances altered there should be no change of opinion. The remark had been recently made that if England changed her policy, other countries—Russia, for example—ought to be able to do the same. But Russia changed her policy in cases where distinct pledges that she would not do so had been given and that was a course in which he hoped this country would not follow her. He had asked the other evening, what would be likely to happen if we withdrew our troops from Candahar before the troops of Abdurrahman arrived; but, as there happened to be several Questions in reference to Candahar on the Paper, the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India said he would answer them all together, and he had, unfortunately, been answered in gross, and consequently got no answer at all. He feared the Government, by their policy and by not insuring, to some extent the position of Abdurrahman, or some other Sovereign, were paving the way for intrigue and mischief of a most perilous kind. As reference had been made to the absence of opinion from the Viceroy's Council, he would only say that he thought it was very unfortunate, to say the least, that these opinions were not before the House, and that they were discussing that question in the absence of important documents. "The Spanish Fleet you cannot see, because it is not vet in sight." The opinions of the Viceroy's Council they had not received, because they were not despatched. On an occasion like the present it was most essential that the fullest information should be before the House; and if the Government had been willing, he thought it would have been possible to have had a brief opinion from the Council of India telegraphed, giving a plain "aye" or "no" on this important matter. It was, however, clearly understood that those opinions were not favourable to the policy of the Government. The hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles W. Dilke), speaking last night, and making the announcement with the air of mystery which accompanied Foreign Office communications of no importance, said he regarded the recall of General Skobeleff to St. Petersburg as necessarily involving a change of policy on the part of the present Czar of Russia in the direction which he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) desired; but it was possible it meant a further step in the contrary direction. It could not be denied that the Members of the Government took very light views of their responsibility in the matter; while as to making the question one of morality, he thought the morality involved in it was of a most doubtful character. Lord Derby, the other day, said that we could always return to Candahar when we chose, if we should evacuate it, and that was supposed to be a very gratifying and assuring statement, though it seemed to dispose of the claim to morality implied in the present retirement. But could we return to Candahar with great ease if we threw over our friends there, and those friendly tribes in the neighbourhood of Pishin who had been so loyal to us during the late campaign? It was not easy to get to Candahar under any circumstances; and it would be much less easy in time to come to traverse a country occupied by tribes who had trusted to our pledges, and whom we had afterwards deserted. He observed that if any hon. Member, especially if he were a young Member of the House, desired to raise a cheer, he had a fling at prestige. He did not attach much importance to prestige; but he thought they had better take care, while protesting against a military spirit—a spirit of bravado and bluster, of which he confessed that at present he saw few symptoms, though, for Party purposes, they were represented as being prevalent—lest, while protesting against these things, they were imperilling confidence in their fidelity to national engagements, and doing injury to the cause of truth, of honour, not to say of justice.

Ma LAING

said, there bad been such a remarkable change of front on the part of hon. Gentlemen opposite that it was difficult to know what the issue was the House was debating. Did it mean that those who supported the Motion, knowing that they must be defeated both by numbers and by argument in the House, knowing that the public opinion out-of-doors was against them, and finding by experience that all the efforts of the Patriotic Association were like flogging a dead horse—had not got the courage to nail their colours to the mast, but wished to minimize their defeat by showing that the issue was a trifling one? He would accept the issue as being the permanent occupation of Candahar, and consider what that would cost, and whether it was worth the cost. Very little had been said on the subject of cost, except some weak attempts which had been made to disparage the Estimates given by some of the highest authorities. The question of cost turned entirely on the extent of the force that would be required for the occupation; and, speaking on the basis of his personal experience of Indian affairs, he did not think Candahar could be retained with a Corps d' Armée of less than 20,000 men. It was not merely the occupation of a single outpost like Quetta, in a friendly country; but a whole Province must be occupied, and that in the midst of a hostile population, for, practically speaking, we had not a friend in the country surrounding Candahar. That fact would necessitate a large force of effective soldiers being maintained there, and we should be obliged to station troops not merely at Candahar, but at a number of minor garrisons in the surrounding country. Taking everything into account, the estimate of 20,000 men by Sir Henry Norman, and of 21,000 odd by Major Baring, was demonstrably a very low and moderate estimate of the force that would be required, and the smallest force that would enable us to hold the position securely would be some 20,000 men. It must also be remembered that that force would have to be relieved every two years from a distance of 1,500 miles These were minimum estimates, applicable to quiet times only; but supposing there was Russian aggression, or that Persia, instigated by Russia bribing the Ruler of Herat to make a demonstration on our Frontier, or a hostile movement at Cabul, these 20,000 men would not be sufficient, but would have to be nearly doubled; and was not the occupation of Candahar meant to be merely the first step to Herat? In the event of a Russian advance we must inevitably occupy Herat; and if he were told that Russia was menacing that city, he would be the first to say we must meet her boldly. Therefore, we should be no longer masters of our own motions if we retained Candahar. But it was Candahar, and not Herat that was in question; and he could state with confidence that the cost of maintaining such a force would, on the average, be £100 for each man, or a total sum of £2,000,000 per annum, being £1,000,000 more than the same number of troops would cost in India. But even that sum would not be sufficient, for there would be many sources of extra expense, and this Esti- mate made no allowance for fortifications, barracks, military roads, hospitals, and those various contingencies which went to swell up the military Estimate. What revenue should we derive from Candahar to place against that large expenditure? The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Mr. Gibson) had told them the other night that Candahar was a sort of Eastern Gibraltar, and that it was the key to the commerce of the whole of that part of Asia, and that it had a large revenue. The whole revenues of Candahar and of the surrounding district, comprising an area as large as the United Kingdom, however, amounted to only 20 lacs of rupees or £200,000 a-year, which would be manifestly insufficient to pay the civil expenses of the occupation. It had been said that the troops to be maintained at Candahar would not be an addition to the existing force in India, but would be provided out of that force. What use, however. would 20,000 men stationed at Candahar be to India in the event of an emergency arising in that country? The retention of the city meant the locking up of 15,000 or 20,000 men, who, in the event of any outbreak in which their assistance was required, instead of being, available, would require help themselves, as the Afghans would take advantage of our misfortunes to harass us. If, on the other hand, we could afford to lock up 20,000 men in Candahar, surely our existing Army in India must be 20,000 too large, and ought to be reduced. That was a very serious question, because it involved saddling India with a permanent expenditure of £2,000,000 a-year. They were told India was so rich that she could afford all that expenditure; but he challenged that statement. It was true that there had been many favourable circumstances lately in Indian finance, and that the Revenue had shown additional elasticity; but, nevertheless, he maintained that the financial condition of India was still one of considerable embarrassment and tension, and certainly an additional £1,500,000 or £1,000,000 in the cost of the military establishments could not he regarded as a mere flea-bite. How, he asked, could they expect English rule to be popular in India if such. taxes its were new posed were to continue? Was India to be the only country in the world which, when the Revenue expanded, was never to get any remission of taxes? If, instead of occupying Candahar, they could save the £2,000,000 a-year in military expenditure, they might then be enabled to repeal the licence taxes, to level the salt tax down instead of up, and to remove import duties altogether. But that could net be done so long as the surplus revenue was to be spent in large and expensive military operations outside, rather than in remission of taxation. What did they really hope to get by the retention of Candahar? He supposed they thought they would in some way or other check Russian advances in Asia. Now, was there any real reason for this exaggerated fear of Russia; and even admitting its truth, would the occupation of Candahar assist them? His reply to both these questions was in the negative in talking about the great advances of Russia, it seemed to be forgotten that, during the last 50 years, we had advanced in political and military strength and position in Asia enormously more than Russia had. In that period we had swallowed up British Burmah, the Punjaub, Scinde, Oude, and Nagpore, which might very well be set off against any advance on the part of Russia. What had the policy of the invasion of Afghanistan done for us? The people of Herat, who, a few years ago, led by an English officer, had resisted an attack which might have been dangerous to us, would welcome the advance of Persians or Russians in hostility to us. We had thrown these people into the arms of Russia, and while professing to he afraid of Russian intrigue we had effectually assisted it by severing from Afghanistan, and ourselves occupying, one of its most important Provinces. A well known Russian Professor of the anti-English school, one of the leaders of what was called the Forward or the Pan-Slavonic Party in Russia, had written a pamphlet in which he stated his views of the relative policies of Russia and England in India. The writer said that Russia wanted to be in such a position that if she had a quarrel with England in Europe she could oblige us to send troops to India rather than Malta or Constantinople. He explained that while the hereditary policy of Russia had been to defend the Eastern Christians it had been ours to support Turkey. But with a Liberal Government had come a suspension of that policy on our part, and there was no reason why we should not he friends. He added, however, that Mr. Gladstone was not immortal, and Governments were apt to change; and as, with a return of the Conservatives, there might be a renewal of differences, Russia ought still to be able to make diversions on the side of India. He then said that the invasion of Afghanistan and the occupation of Candahar were the best things that could have happened to favour Russian designs, and that we had so far divided and alienated the Afghans that it would be easier than before for the Russians to find allies among them. The reasoning of that anti-English Professor was in accordance with common sense, for if we wanted a strong Afghanistan the worst thing that we could do was to disintegrate it. After all, the question of Candahar was only a subsidiary one, arising out of the conflict of two policies, the forward policy and that of prudence and self-reliance, which had been described as one of "masterly inactivity." If we had adhered to the latter policy during the last few years, we should have saved many millions in money and thousands of lives. In addition to that, there was also a moral question to be considered in the retention of Candahar. Was it just? He, for one, felt humiliated when he saw England made to assume, especially in the eyes of heathen and weaker nations, a position which they must all feel to be wrong in itself, and of feeling that they were not twice armed by having their quarrels just. The old English policy of standing still in manly self-reliance was properly a Conservative policy, and among modern statesmen it was identified with the name of Sir Robert Peel.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

said, that if the old English policy had been to stand still, he did not know how we should have obtained our Empire. The hon. Member for Orkney(Mr. Laing) appeared to be blind enough to believe in the words of a Russian Professor, who traced the differences between England and Russia to the defence by the latter of the Eastern Christians. Was not Russia extremely well paid by the acquisitions of territory she had made every time she had come to their defence? We were not, as had been said, spending £4,000,000 or £5,000.000 a-year on re-productive public works, but only £2,500,000; and the amount of that error of statement was more than the difference that the retention of Candahar would make to the finances of India. In speaking of the difficulty that world have arisen at the time of the Mutiny if we had had forces locked up at Candahar, the hon. Member for Orkney overlooked the obvious answer that might be given to his observation in the increased facility of communication that had been brought about by the construction of railways since the Mutiny. Without the least doubt, it was now easier to get a force from Candahar to Delhi than, at the time of the Mutiny, it was to get a force from the Punjaub to Delhi. What on earth, then, was the value of arguments founded on that hypothesis? The Government gained great advantage in this discussion from the fact that those who were advocating retirement from Candahar were really influenced by two different and wholly inconsistent theories—one they held, but did not avow; the other they avowed, but would, he believed, never act upon. The first theory was, that all we had to do was to retire behind the Indus, and let the Afghans fight the matter out among themselves; and the second was, that we ought to retire from Afghanistan, and, while we did so, to exclude all Russian influence in that country. He admitted that, unless we governed India justly, we should probably not stay there, and we should not deserve to stay there; but to say that a sufficient defence of our Indian Empire would be to govern her justly was simply clap-trap. Good actions, except in fairy stories, were not rewarded in that plain way. As matters stood, we had already taken some substantial measures—we kept 90,000 men there, we had spent many thousands of pounds on barracks and fortifications, we had constructed there a network of railways. chiefly with the object of military communication; and it was quite clear, therefore, that every Government relied, and rightly relied, for the purpose of maintaining our hold on the country, on something besides the justice of our cause. But the maintenance in India of 90,000 men, and the construction of railroads were, he contended, insufficient without that prestige by which the English name in India had hitherto been accompanied, and which the present Government had already within the short period of a year done so much to diminish on three Continents. They should, however, recollect that that prestige was equivalent to money and men, that it meant an army without recruiting, and all the advantages of victory without the shedding of a drop of blood. We had kept our Indian Empire solely by prestige; and if we could not keep that prestige at all, a larger garrison than 90,000 men would be necessary. He was quite aware the Members of the Government admitted that it was necessary for the security of our Indian Empire that we should exercise some sort of control in Afghanistan, and that Russian influence should not be allowed to pass beyond its borders. But if we retired step by step as Russia advanced, how was that control to be maintained? It had been over and over again said, by the advocates of the policy of "masterly inactivity," that the countries which lay between our Frontier and the old Russian Frontier were so barren that it would not be worth the while of Russia to conquer them; but she had conquered them without having, as had been predicted, weakened herself. Up to the present time she, in her conquests, resembled an investor who laid out his money on unremunerative work in the hope that something remunerative would follow. She had conquered deserts; she was consolidating her base, from which she could make future conquests. Her profits were yet to come, and she would ultimately advance to Herat and Candahar. The progress of such a country in Central Asia would be by slow degrees, and it would be impossible to say at what particular point in that progress a Minister could come down to that House and ask it to declare war against her because of her advance. And if she could not be stopped in Europe, could she be stopped in India? If Russia wanted to take some decided stop in that quarter, she would await the time that was most convenient to herself and seize upon the point which she thought most important. If we allowed Russia to secure a base of operations in Asia, and to choose her own time for action, she would practically have Southern Afghanistan, Quetta, Pishin, and the Bolan Pass at her mercy. It had been said that if we were to hold Candahar, we should be involved in the intricacies of Afghan politics; and Lord Derby had argued that if we were to allow a hand to be entangled in the machinery of Afghan politics, the arm would inevitably be entangled also. But the Government admitted that we could not allow Afghanistan to be wholly uncontrolled, and, consequently, the hand of the Government was already as good as entangled in the politics of that country, and so Lord Derby's argument was not of much avail. It was admitted by hon. Members opposite that, on the whole, the weight of Indian official opinion was in favour of the retention of Candahar; but it was urged that this support ought to be discounted, because military official opinion in India was almost always in favour of advance he admitted that allegation; but contended that the Indian Services had generally, if not always, been right in advocating a policy of advance. Would any hon. Member, at the present time, recommend our withdrawal from Oude, from Scinde, or the Punjaub? Yet, the retention of those Provinces had been advocated by the Military Service, on the very same grounds as those upon which the argument for the retention of Candahar was now based; while their evacuation was advocated at the time by a minority of Indian authorities, just as there was a minority on this occasion, represented by Sir Erskine Perry and Sir Henry Norman. And, in the former case, who were right? Why, the Services, in their recommendations of annexation, had, in fact, always been right. He should be glad to think that the Government were actuated solely by considerations of economy and morality, such as had been advanced in the course of the debate; but he could not help feeling that the retirement from Candahar was due mainly to the speeches which had been delivered at the last Election, and not to any considerations of policy. If that were so, and if the disasters which he feared would follow this melancholy retreat came upon the country, it would be a bitter reflection to think that they had committed an error which could have been avoided, and the consequences of which had been foreseen. He could not help thinking that, after all, the debate was a very hollow affair, because the Government had taken the most ample precaution that the evacuation should be beyond recall before the opinion of Parliament could be taken upon it.

MR. BRYCE

said, he wished to point out the difference in the language now used by the supporters of the Motion from that which they had used in advocating their Afghan policy two years ago. When a similar Motion had been brought forward in "another place," those who there proposed it argued only, not that Candahar must be retained, but that no sufficient grounds had been shown for retaining it. And now in this House those who formerly defended with so much boldness and self-satisfaction the whole plan of the Afghan War, were found protesting that they did not wish to raise the general question of the permanent occupation of Candahar, but merely the question as to whether that was the proper time at which to withdraw from it. In reply to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson), who asked was that the moment at which England should retire, he (Mr. Bryce) would say that to do a just and wise action there was no time like the present. There was no moment at which England could, with greater advantage, withdraw from Candahar than when her troops had just performed in Afghanistan a brilliant series of feats of arms, which established the military supremacy of this country, and when a Government was in power which enjoyed the full confidence of the country, and which was likely to remain in power sufficiently long to make its policy steady and permanent. Much use had been made in the debate of the word "prestige." Hon. Gentlemen opposite seemed to think that the idea involved in that word was that one must always be bullying and blustering, and that if a State had forcibly taken possession of anything, it ought to be retained at all hazards. He held that of all kinds of fear there was none so contemptible and dangerous as the fear of being thought afraid—nothing so likely to lead men against their better judgment into perilous enterprises. He would not attempt to estimate the weight of this argument from prestige, for it was too vague and imponderable. It was said that the opinion of India as regarded the power of England would be injuriously affected by this measure; but he would content himself with asking whether it was not more likely that the prestige of England would be raised by our faithful adherence to our promises, if, after declaring that we did not enter Afghanistan for the purpose of making annexations, we retired without making any? He could not conceive anything better calculated to give us additional claims on the loyalty of the Native Princes in India than the knowledge that we voluntarily retired from Candahar, in fulfilment of declarations made when the war began. As to the argument founded on the wealth of the district, those who knew it best told us that it would not pay more than one-fifth of the cost of the civil administration. As to its military advantages, some of the best authorities who desired to see it retained proposed that our troops should be stationed in cantonments 10 or 12 miles away from the city. It was by no means a strong and easily defensible position. We must look with great suspicion on the prospects held out of a remunerative trade—especially as those prospects were dwelt on by military men, who only had recourse to the commercial argument because they felt the weakness of their cause so far as strategical considerations were involved. The fact was that Russia already absorbed the whole commerce of Central Asia, and the population was much too sparse and the country too poor to afford any scope for commercial enterprize. In all Afghanistan there were only 4,000,000 of people in an area of 280,000 square miles. The only reason which really actuated the advocates of annexation was fear of Russia—a most unworthy fear; for he could not understand why a Party which arrogated to itself the title of "patriotic" should always be the Party that had the lowest opinion of the power and the greatness of England. ["No, no!"] Lord Beaconsfield had told them that the key of India was in London, and this remark was far nearer the truth than the discoveries of that key in Herat, or Merv, or Candahar. But the real secret of our power in India was the character England had won for its vigour, its energy, and its courage; and as long as England retained those qualities there was nothing to be feared from Russia. No one who knew both England and Russia would dream of comparing either the power or the moral influence of the latter with those of our own country. There were two main reasons why we should not retain Candahar. The first was, that it would he easier to defend India from our own Frontier than at a point 400, or 500, or—if we wont on to Herat—900 miles away. The second was, that the invader of the country would incur the implacable hostility of the inhabitants. The advocates of retention argued that wars would be prevented by the adoption of their policy. That policy, however, would involve us in permanent war with Afghanistan. Two questions had been addressed to the Government by speakers on the opposite Benches. The first was—If Candahar is given up, what will you do with Afghanistan? In his opinion, the way to deal with Afghanistan was the way in which it had been dealt with in the years preceding the disturbances introduced by the late Government—namely, by reverting to the policy of Lord Lawrence, which retained the Afghans in a state of tacit but friendly dependence, while letting them fight out their intestine quarrels. The other question was—Why did the Government feel bound to carry out this policy of retirement? Was it not in obedience to the pledges given at the General Election? In reply, he would ask another question—Why should the Opposition be so anxious to retain Candahar? The late Government had many policies; but this was not originally one of them, for it was not till the last moment when they had to retire from Cabul that they bethought themselves of keeping on Candahar. It was because the late Government, having lost everything they fought for, and having become sensible that the war was a mistake from beginning to end, grew anxious at last to have something to show for the money and lives they had expended. Their successive policies had failed. Lord Lytton's Frontier of the Hindu Kush; Lord Beaconsfield's "scientific Frontier;" the Frontier to be protected from Cabul itself, had all successively disappeared. Now it was desired so to involve the country in the policy of aggression that it should appear that the policy of the late Government had met with national approval. There was a hope, on the other side of the House, that the Liberal Party might be drawn into complicity with this war—that they might be put, so to speak, in the position of receivers of stolen goods. But it was too late for this. The country had emphatically repudiated and condemned the Afghan War altogether; and all the arguments which had been so convincingly used against the Afghan War, as a whole, were equally good against the retention of Candahar. Speaking as an independent Liberal, he was glad to believe that the Government were now endeavouring to carry out the pledges which they made at the hustings. Those pledges were—that unjust wars should be stopped as soon as possible; that needless annexations should be restored; that the safety and prosperity of India should be secured by promoting the contentment and loyalty of the people of India; that the Government should not by going in search of imaginary dangers thrust us into real ones. The action of the Government, both as regarded the Transvaal and Candahar, had gone far to remove any suspicion that they were not going to carry out those pledges. Someone had said that the Liberal Party was disunited. So far from being disunited, it had never been more united than it was upon this question—united, not only in that House, but throughout the country. It had perfect confidence in the present policy of the Government; and he believed that the country would to-morrow applaud the action of the House when it spoke to-night the last word of condemnation upon a war with regard to which history would have only one question to ask—whether the folly of it exceeded the wickedness, or the wickedness the folly?

MR. BOURNE

said, he wished to recall the attention of the House to the character of the Motion before them, and that was whether the proposal to abandon Candahar in the mode suggested by the Government met with their approval, and to that, he thought, they should give a distinct answer in the negative. His noble Friend the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton) had been accused of whittling away the subject before the House. He (Mr. Bourke) had listened very carefully to the speech of his noble Friend, and he observed no such tendency in his remarks. Now, the view he took of the question, and he had had an opportunity of studying it upon our Indian Frontier itself, was that no person who had ever visited that Frontier could help feeling that the subject was not only one of deep interest, but one which might, at any time, involve us in great difficulties. There was no use appealing to the inconveniencies which an advance might cause us in respect of finance. There was no use appealing to the increased Estimates which such an advance might necessitate; because, if it were right that it should take place, all the money which we expended upon the advance would be expended, not for aggression, but for the safety of India. No matter how prosperous our finances might be, and no matter under what condition the internal state of India might be, nothing would relieve us, under certain circumstances, from dangers upon our North-West Frontier. He had always thought that the distinction which some hon. Gentlemen drew between the policy of "masterly inactivity" and the policy of "advance," was one which could not be sharply defined, but was one of decree. Lord Lawrence laid down most distinctly that, although he believed his policy to be the best on the whole, yet there were circumstances connected with the advance of Russia which would oblige us altogether to abandon that policy, and not only to abandon it, but to go to war with Russia in all parts of the world, The whole of the case rested, in his (Mr. Bourke's) opinion, upon the dangers which might result to India from the changed relations which had taken place of late years between England and Russia, and also between England and Afghanistan. He need only remind the House that one of the first axioms which had always been laid down as applicable upon all English statesmen, was that there must be no Russian influence in Afghanistan—that the influence of this country must be paramount. That principle had been acknowledged over and over again by the Russian Government itself; and he might also remind the House that it was the corner-stone of the policy of 1865, which had been so often praised. When Lord Mayo, in that year, brought about a good understanding with Russia, the very essence of that understanding was that Russia was not to intrigue with Afghanistan. They had, at that time, the assurance from Russia that she did not intend to intrigue in Afghanistan. What was the result of that? Tranquillity in Afghanistan for many years. It resulted also in the most important agreement that ever was made between this country and Russia with regard to Afghanistan, because the agreement of 1872 between England and Russia was one which promised a lasting peace between all the three parties; and that was that the boundaries of Afghanistan should be acknowledged, that the Ameer should abstain from aggression on his neighbours, and that Russia should not advance upon him. From its very nature, that agreement suited all parties. It suited Russia, because what she wanted at that time was to be at peace with Afghanistan. He need not remind the House how England had been disappointed in that—how, before this agreement had been signed more than a few months, Russia showed decided intentions of annexing Khiva; and in 1874, just before Lord Granville went out of Office, he made representations to Russia upon this subject. It would also be in the recollection of the House that Count Schouvaloff denied that there was any intention of annexing Khiva. Notwithstanding that, Khiva was annexed, and a Treaty was made with Khiva of a very remarkable nature. That Treaty was worthy of remark, because, from the remarks of the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs last night, it would almost appear that if Khiva had been taken by Russia, it had been given back. The fact was, that absolute control was obtained by that Treaty over Khivan territory, and Khiva was fined heavily. After the conquest of Khiva, Russia did a still inure dangerous thing, as far as we were concerned, because all the time that she was informing the Foreign Office that she had no intention of making any advance towards India, she was making advances in a direction which had more influence on our position than anything else in Central Asia. Those who had studied the question would see that not only had Russia now annexed a large portion of the Attrek Valley, which had hitherto been claimed by Persia, but also annexed a large part of a most fertile district, about 70 miles in breadth by about 200 or 300 miles in length, which afforded her a good recruiting ground. The result of all that was simply this—that by the annexations which Russia had made within the last few years, and which she had completed within the last few months, the whole of that Tur- Koman country had been swept into the Russian territory, and she had at her command several hundreds of thousands of the best horsemen in the world. Then he came to the changes which had taken place with regard to Afghanistan. He would not now enter into the question of their changed relations with the Ameer; but the corner-stone of the late Government's policy was that their relations with Afghanistan were to be friendly, and he said that there was ample justification for the war in Afghanistan, in consequence of those changed relations. If hon. Gentlemen had read General Roberts's despatch, describing the condition of military affairs at Cabal when he arrived there, they must have been struck with the enormous power that he found the Ameer had developed within the last five or six years. He had raised and equipped 68 regiments of Infantry and 16 regiments of Cavalry; he had 300 guns; a large arsenal, with skilled artizans, where those guns were made; and he (Mr. Bourke) had heard from eye-witnesses that nothing could be more efficient than were the guns made in that arsenal. The Ameer had also an enormous number of rifled cannon, a large quantity of breech-loading muskets, with gunpowder and all the other warlike stores necessary for a large army. All those stores and munitions of war could not have been prepared in a short time, and it was the opinion of General Roberts that it must have taken at least six or seven years to collect them together. When, therefore, they came to take that, in connection with the correspondence that was going on between the Russian Governor General and the Ameer, with the unfriendly character of the Ameer's communications with the Viceroy of India, with the Jehad that was preached long before the Russian Mission went to Cabul, and with the Russian Mission itself, he thought that nobody who gave a dispassionate attention to the subject could come to any other conclusion than that the Ameer had entered into a hostile alliance with Russia which was absolutely inconsistent with those relations between England, Russia, and Afghanistan which every statesman of eminence had held should and must exist between those countries. Now, hon. Gentlemen on his side of the House wanted to know from the Government something which they had often asked for, but had not yet been told, but which he hoped they would learn before that debate closed—namely, what arrangements were to be made with Afghanistan before we left Candahar; because if we were going to leave Afghanistan altogether to the mercy of Russia, to make whatever bargains she chose with regard to her external relations, he did not think the country was prepared to endorse that policy. The hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had made much of the trump card about the first step of the new Czar having been to recall General Skobeleff. He (Mr. Bourke) should like to know very much when that General was recalled; also whether the Russian troops had been re-called; how it was that that announcement came to be made last night in the middle of that debate; and also whether the negotiations or communications with our Ambassador at St. Petersburg on the subject would be laid before the House? The hon. Baronet held up to the House the example of Russia with respect to her conduct in Khiva and Bokhara, and also with regard to China. He (Mr. Bourke) was quite willing to join issue with the hon. Baronet on that point, and he would ask him, whether it was not the fact that, in all those cases Russia, before she gave up one single portion of her conquest, took very good care to secure that her influence should remain paramount, and that order, and not disorder, should remain behind? It was the whole point in this case. Now, what was the position of Candahar? Was it not certain that, if civil war ensued, it must entail upon us difficulties far greater than any of those we had to deal with in Afghanistan? He did not say that it was necessary to annex Candahar. What he complained of was the hasty way in which it was proposed to abandon it, and which might involve us in danger. The hon. Baronet said we had retired from Cabul, and we had not met with such dangers, and, therefore, why should we expect dangers by a retirement from Candahar? The difference between Cabul and Candahar was very great. When Sir Frederick Roberts left Cabul, he had every reason to suppose that Abdurrahman would be able to preserve order there. Could any honest man who was able to give an opinion upon the subject say that we could expect the same at Candahar? All the Candaharis were averse to Abdurrahman, and were friendly to his rival. Under these circumstances, he asked the Government how they could hope that Abdurrahman had any prospect of establishing a settled Government in Candahar? If he could not do so, how could they tell what difficulties might not arise? They had remained at Candahar two years; and, now that they were going away, he was certain Her Majesty's Government had chosen the most unfavourable time for withdrawing from the position—a time when, being masters of the situation, they had a great opportunity of establishing a settled Government at Candahar, and making arrangements of a lasting character. With regard to the strategic position of the place, the hon. Baronet had remarked that our military authorities always gave military opinions on political grounds. The observation was more smart than correct. Almost all military men who were connected with the Government of India and connected with military operations in Afghanistan had given military opinions of the value of Candahar. Candahar commanded every single point between Herat and Khiva; and Sir Garnet Wolseley had expressed the view that whenever Russia went to Herat, we must go to Candahar, unless we intended to give up India, or to allow it to be taken from us. Every person, Sir Garnet Wolseley among them, said that if we were to meet the Russians at all, Candahar was the place to do it. It was clearly better to meet invaders at Candahar than on the plains of India, because, in the first case, we should be able to intercept them before they reached any of the Passes; whereas if we waited for them in India, there would be 800 miles of Frontier to defend, and no one could say through what part the enemy would approach. Another of the main objections to the Motion was founded on the ground of expense; but he (Mr. Bourke) would ask whether we were as yet in a position to say what the actual expense would be? He could not set himself against the opinion of so eminent a man as Sir Henry Norman, for whom he had the greatest respect and regard; but, at the same time, it was to be remembered that there were also other authorities of equal weight. Without impugning the accuracy of Sir Henry Norman's estimate, which was very probably correct, he would only repeat that we wanted far more information on the point than we already possessed. The hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing) had most elaborately calculated the number of men wanted for the occupation of Candahar; but, according to Sir Frederick Roberts and other great authorities, no addition to the Indian Army would be required, and the cost would only be the difference between the expense of maintaining them in India and in the Provinces. That view also agreed with our experience two or three years after the annexation of the Punjaub, when the Government, in its Minute describing the progress of the Province, pointed out that the establishment of the Army and the cost of the Frontier garrisons remained just as they were before the crossing of the Sutlej. On that analogy, therefore, it did not seem probable that the Indian Army would need to be increased. Again, several objections had been urged to our occupation of Candahar, even for a short time, on the ground that the Afghans would never submit to invasion by Russia. That contention was not strengthened by recent events, and it was a fact that a Russian Corps d' Armée was on the Oxus long before the Mission to Cabul. It was to be remembered, too, that the bribes that Russia could offer were enormous. Whenever she chose, she could act upon Afghanistan as effectually in a friendly as in a hostile manner, and would be able to inflict on us all the annoyances from which we desired to guard ourselves. He wished to add one word on another point. The Indian Government had not indicated their own opinion on the matter. Lord Ripon was understood to take the same view as the Government, and perhaps the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for India (the Marquess of Hartington) would be able to state precisely what Lord Ripon's view was; but, at all events, they had the opinion of those very eminent Indian officials who, so far from agreeing with the Government, deplored the fatuity of their policy. Under those circumstances, and considering that in all probability the step Her Majesty's Government were now about to take would lead to civil war in Afghanistan, and if it did that we should be obliged to return and to spend more money than if we remained there, believing that it was absolutely essential that our relations with Russia should be placed upon the same foundation as they were before, and that that could be done only by our remaining at Candahar and establishing good government there, he would certainly vote for the Motion.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

The right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down (Mr. Bourke) did himself a slight injustice when he said, on rising to address the House, that he should have little to say, and that he would detain the House only for a very short time. He has given us a good deal of very interesting information, and I can hardly think that in the period of 40 minutes, during which he spoke, he occupied too much time. It will hardly be desired that I should follow the right hon. Gentleman through the somewhat discursive statement he has made with reference to the progress of Russia in Central Asia, and our relations with Afghanistan during the last 10 or 15 years. There were, however, one or two statements of the right hon. Gentleman, referring to more recent events, which struck me with some surprise. I Was surprised to hear the right hon. Gentleman say that the security of Abdurrahman at Cabul upon our retirement, and the general acceptance that he met with there, were partly owing to the march of General Roberts's force from Cabul to Candahar. If the right hon. Gentleman had been in the House last autumn, and had heard the piteous appeals made to me not to allow General Stewart's force to leave Cabul, at the time Abdurrahman was about to take possession of it, I think the right hon. Gentleman would hardly have been of opinion at that time, at all events, that Abdurrahman's position was immensely strengthened by General Roberts's march from Cabul to Candahar. The right hon. Gentleman seems to think that the statement made by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, last night, with regard to the policy of the present Emperor of Russia, and the order given for the recall of General Skobeleff, has been made by the Russian Government for some political purpose connected with this debate. Now, I do not think that my hon. Friend attributed any very great importance to the statement which he was able to make; but he thought it was one, and I think it was one, which was satisfactory to the House. And it may be an additional satisfaction to the right hon. Gentleman to know that that information did not reach Her Majesty's Government from the Russian Government, or from Her Majesty's Ambassador in Russia, but from a totally different and a totally independent source. I hope, therefore, the right hon. Gentleman will no longer think that that information was given for the purpose of influencing the decision of the House to-night. The right hon. Gentleman, in the beginning of his speech, undertook to prove a somewhat difficult proposition. It is one to which I may be obliged to refer by-and-bye; but I do not think he entirely succeeded in proving the proposition which he laid down, that there is only a difference in degree in the policy of advance and the policy of "masterly inactivity." No doubt, Lord Lawrence and the other authorities who advocated a policy of "masterly inactivity," which I believe means remaining within our own Frontier unless imperatively called upon to go out of it—no doubt, Lord Lawrence contemplated the possibility of being obliged by Persia, or some other Power, to fight Russia under certain contingencies. But what has never been contemplated, and what Lord Lawrence never would have encouraged if he had been alive this day, was a policy of advancing beyond our own borders into Afghanistan, not for the purpose of meeting a foreign enemy, but for the purpose of establishing our influence in Afghanistan itself. The right hon. Gentleman said he had no intention of whittling away any part of the Resolution moved by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Stanhope). We may very well acquit him of any intention to whittle away that Resolution, for a milder Resolution of censure to be brought forward by a great Party, and made the subject of a Party debate, it is impossible to conceive. I think it must have been somewhat of a disappointment to his Friends—it certainly was somewhat of a surprise to me—to find that, after the nightly interpellations addressed to me during the whole of the Session, and which I always supposed to have for their object that we ought to remain, and remain permanently, at Candahar—it is certainly a surprise to me to find that we are now only asked to share in the expression, that, "in the present critical state of affairs in Southern Afghanistan, it is not conducive to the true and permanent interests of India" that we should withdraw from Candahar. It is not only a surprise to me, but I think it will be a disappointment to some of the members of the Patriotic Association, who have recently been holding two or three enthusiastic meetings, and passing very strong resolutions, in which I have never observed any reference to anything but the permanent retention and annexation of Candahar. And I think the result must also be a disappointment to the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett), who has on the Paper a Motion, which, I fancy, very much more accurately expresses the views of the Patriotic Association than the extremely mild Resolution moved from the Front Opposition Bench. The Resolution has not been moved exactly in the usual form in which a Party attack is made. It forms only a part, and I may say the weakest part, of the Party attack. When the policy of a Government is attacked, it is generally the custom to assert that the policy is wrong in itself, and that it is put into operation at a wrong time. But right hon. Gentlemen opposite have not the courage to say that they think the policy of Her Majesty's Government is wrong in itself; they have nothing to accuse us of or to allege, except that it is carried out at the wrong moment. If we had any doubt as to the views of the Opposition, it would have been disposed of by the speeches which have been made. The hon. Member who moved the Resolution did, undoubtedly, bring forward a great many arguments which appeared to tend in the direction of the permanent occupation of Candahar; and many hon. Al embers who have spoken on that side of the House have done this in the course of their speeches. But, at the same time, every Member who sits on the Front Opposition Bench has been very careful, although he has argued in favour of the permanent retention of Candahar, to put in a few words of caution, in order to say that, after all, what he meant was that we were not to leave Candahar immediately. If this is all that we are to be censured for, I must point out to the House that the censure appears to me to be directed against the wrong persons. If it is only the retirement at this moment that is to be censured, it is not Her Majesty's Government who ought to be censured, because Her Majesty's Government have never given any express directions that any immediate retirement from Candahar is to take place. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson) was, last night, extremely severe on the style of some of the despatches which I have addressed to the Viceroy of India. He described them as extremely energetic and dictatorial. Well, Sir, what are the directions contained in that most dictatorial despatch of the 11th of November? I find that we desired his Excellency to keep steadily in view the paramount importance of effecting such withdrawal at the earliest suitable date; and afterwards, in discussing what might take place after our withdrawal, I went on to say that it appeared doubtful whether the position of Abdurrahman was yet sufficiently established to enable him to resume the government of Candahar; or, if he were, whether the people were prepared to accept his authority. I certainly did not dictate to the Government of India that they should offer Candahar to Abdurrahman. Then, in the conclusion of the despatch which the right hon. Gentleman quoted as containing important instructions, I stated that I felt it my duty to place on record, in the plainest and strongest terms, the opinions which the Government entertained on the most important question at issue, and to express the disapproval with which they would view any measure involving a permanent occupation of Candahar by British troops. As far as any expression is contained in that despatch, it might have been agreed to by any Member sitting on the Front Opposition Bench. I do not mean to say that the arguments in the despatch are entirely consistent with the arguments they have employed; but, at any rate, they are not inconsistent with the extremely mild Resolution they have brought forward. If the Censure of the House is really to be directed against immediate withdrawal from Candahar, the censure ought to be pointed at the Government of India, with whom they say they en- tirely agree, instead of against the Government at Home, who are made the real objects of their attack. Do not let the House suppose for a moment that I complain of the action of the Government of India, or of the promptitude with which they have given effect to the instructions they received from home. The Government of India see, what apparently right hon. Gentlemen opposite do not see, that every day's delay at Candahar makes ultimate retirement far morn difficnlt; that every day's delay adds greatly to the arguments in favour of remaining in Candahar. Yes, if the occupation is indefinitely prolonged, great expense must be incurred in fortifications; barracks must be erected for the accommodation of the troops; the railway must be completed; relations must be entered into with the Chiefs of the neighbouring districts; and when all these things are done, the difficulties of withdrawing would be greatly increased. ["Hear, hear!" from the Opposition.] Then, what is the meaning of the argument that this is the wrong time? I can understand some of the hon. Gentlemen who are cheering me. I know that the hon. Member for Guildford does not want to say that we are going away at the wrong time. He wants to say that we ought not to go away at all; but that is not what his Leaders say. Then, I say, in answer to hon. Members opposite, that every one of these considerations which increase the difficulty of a withdrawal, if it is postponed, are so many arguments in favour of withdrawing at once, if we are to withdraw at all. Then, for what purpose is the occupation to be prolonged? We are told that it ought to be prolonged until Abdurrahman has consolidated his power, and we can be certain that a strong Government has been formed. But I maintain that so long as we remain at Candahar, no strong Government in Afghanistan is possible, and the chief difficulty which Abdurrahman and his Predecessors, for the matter of that, have always laid before us has been the want of money and resources. Do you think that you are improving the position of Abdurrahman at Cabul and enabling him to strengthen and consolidate his power if you remain in the occupation of the Province which, according to your own representations, is the richest and most fertile part of the country connected with Afghanistan, and is the part which has constituted the greatest pride of the Afghan Sovereigns? Is that the way in which you propose to aid and consolidate the power of Abdurrahman and to strengthen his Government? The fact is, it has been known from the outset that no Ruler could be firmly established at Cabul, or that the people of Cabul would ever willingly accept a Ruler at Cabul, who consented that the Province of Candahar should be severed from the Ameership of Cabul. We are told that when we go away anarchy will ensue, and that it will be made an excuse, a pretext, and a justification for Russian interference. If anarchy is to be the excuse for Russian interference and invasion, Russia posesses that excuse for interference and invasion now. In the very part of the country where you profess to be most apprehensive of Russian interference and influence and intrigue—at Herat—ever since the day when, by our action, Afghanistan was dismembered and its Government broken to pieces, from that day anarchy of the most frighful and hideous description has existed without intermission at Herat. How do you propose to stop it? Does your occupation of Candahar enable you to stop it? It has continued during the whole period of your occupation of Cabul; it is continuing now during your occupation of Candahar. Our presence at Candahar does nothing in the world to stop the continuance of anarchy at Herat. Perhaps it was proposed to avail ourselves of our possession of Candahar to go to Herat, and to put an end to the anarchy which existed there. ["Hear, hear."] "Hear, hear!" says the right hon. Member for Wigtown (Sir John Hay). We are at Candahar; but that fact does not offer any proof of an early retirement, such as is contemplated by the right hon. Member for the University of Dublin, if we remain there now. Then, what does remaining there mean? It means more expeditions; it moans a new occupation, a new agitation for our remaining at Herat, such as has been got up for our remaining at Candahar; it means new difficulties in the recruiting of our Indian Army; new and increased expenses; and a nearer approach to the permanent occupation of the whole of Afghanistan. Then, I do not see that the argument about confusion and anarchy on our departure from Candahar goes for very much, because I have shown that anarchy is rampant and rife at Herat now; and I do not think that any hon. Gentleman opposite has yet proposed that we should go to Herat in order to put a stop to it. If Russia wanted such a pretext as a justification for her interference, she possesses all the justification for interfering at Herat which could possibly be produced by any amount of anarchy that may follow our departure from Candahar. I am very far from saying that it is not possible, that it is not even probable, that there will be disturbance, that there will be fighting, and that there will be bloodshed after our departure from Candahar. I should like to know when in the history of Afghanistan the Ameership to the Throne has been transferred from one Possessor to another without disturbance and without bloodshed; and I want to know what there is in our mission there to prevent that disturbance and bloodshed? This time the anarchy and confusion have distinctly been brought about by our own action. I do not know whether, under any circumstances, it was possible for any Successor to have peacefully succeeded the late Ameer Shore Ali; but it was absolutely certain, in the state of things which we had brought about in that country, that a peaceful succession to Shere Ali was impossible. If hon. Members below the Gangway opposite look with such horror at the loss of life and the prospect of fighting in the hitherto peaceful country of Afghanistan, perhaps it would have been better if they had thought of some of these consequences before they sanctioned the invasion of Afghanistan and before they supported the action which broke up the only Government which could possibly exist in Afghanistan. I must say that I look with some suspicion upon those tender-minded people who look with such horror on the possibility of a little Afghan blood being shed by Afghan people, when I cannot recollect having seen any such tenderness on account of the much more considerable loss of life which has ensued in consequence of our own victories there. It appears that the slaughter of a few hundreds or of a few thousands of Afghans may be a matter of perfect indifference to us so long as it is only taking place in pursuit of a scientific Frontier; but if it takes place in settling their own differences amongst each other, in their own way, then the result is to be looked upon with horror by every Member of this House. Do hon. Gentlemen suppose that if we remain at Candahar it would be possible to put up Abdurrahman, or some other Chief, to rule in Candahar; and that then, after supporting him for a time, we should have settled affairs all over Afghanistan, and, having planted a garden in the Province of Candahar, we might then retire and leave our protegé to rest upon his own resources? I believe that any idea of that kind would be an absolute delusion. It may not be very flattering to our vanity; but there is one thing which Sir Frederick Roberts has recognized, and which, I think, it would be better for us to recognize too, and that is that the Afghans do not like us. The more they see of us the less they like us; and Sir Frederick Roberts acknowledges frankly the fact that no Ruler appointed by us, who is acting as our Agent, or who rests upon our support, or who owes his authority to our military assistance, has any chance of maintaining his position when we withdraw. I am very far from prophecying what may take place at Candahar when we depart. I should have been sorry to have prophecied what would take place at Cabul when we left in September. What might take place at Cabal was not a consideration that prevented us from thinking it right to withdraw our troops from Cabul. The late Government considered it not only right, but absolutely necessary, that the troops should be withdrawn from Cabul at the earliest possible moment. If a Ruler could be established there in the meanwhile, so much the better; but, Ruler or no Ruler, the troops wore to come away before another season. And, in my opinion, the only chance for the establishment of a Ruler in Candahar or Cabal, or anywhere else in Afghanistan, is to follow the precedent adopted at Cabul. There we did not instal the Ameer, but we left the field clear for him. We told him that on a certain day our troops would leave Cabal. A communication was made with the principal people of the place, and with the Chiefs of the neighbouring Tribes, and Abdurrahman was informed that if he was there ready to undertake the go- vernment of the place we were willing to leave the field clear for him; but that, in his turn, he must rely after our departure upon himself and his own resources. I believe it is in that way, and in that way only, that it is possible for Abdurrahman, or any other Native Ruler, with any chance of permanent success, to be established in Candahar after our departure from that place. I believe the experiment which we tried 40 years ago of recalling Shah Soojah, and leaving him behind us to trust to his own resources, will never succeed in Afghanistan. The result will never be accomplished of making a Hindostanee an acceptable Ruler to the Afghan race. Then we are told that we have given certain pledges, and that in the course now proposed to be taken we are violating those pledges. But, even if any pledges had been given, I cannot but think that the conduct of the inhabitants of Candahar has been such as to absolve us from them. The conduct of the people of Candahar certainly does not seem to show that they are very grateful to us for anything we have done in their interest. Since the address of Sir Donald Stewart to the Chiefs and the people of Candahar, several things have happened. There was the desertion of the troops of the Wali, Shere Ali; there was the rising of the whole country against the Wali; and there was the massacre of our retreating Army in every village through which they passed. That does not show that the people of Candahar and the neighbourhood were extremely grateful to us for the pledges we gave them; but it shows what little confidence we would be able to place in the people under our protection in Candahar itself. When the remains of General Burrows' brigade returned to Candahar, and it became evident that the place was going to be besieged by the forces of Ayoob Khan, what was the precaution which General Primrose considered to be absolutely necessary for the internal security of Candahar? It was to turn out of the town every man of Afghan race. The people who had anything to fear—people who were capable of taking sides, and of interfering with our successor—have conferred no friendship or benefits on us, and have never acted in any way towards us to give them a claim upon our protection. As to the peaceable, industrial, trading classes of Candahar, I do not believe that Abdurrahman—who has shown himself, it may be, not a very powerful, but as far as we have had any acquaintance with him a sensible and astute, person—I do not believe that Abdurrahman, or even Ayoob Khan, would lend himself to such a needless, gratuitous, and suicidal act of folly as to wreak vengeance upon the industrial classes of the community, who only served us like they would any other persons who were their masters in Candahar. The people in need of protection are the ruling and dominant race; and they, as I have already stated, have established no claim upon us. The few who have, in any way, identified their fortunes with ours, can do as was done in the case of the retirement of the British troops from Cabul—namely, retire with our troops. I have not heard that a single man in Cabul has suffered. Every man who knew that he was in the slightest degree obnoxious did retire with the British troops; and in the case of a change of Government, I do not know how such things can be avoided. So much, then, as to the question of the time of withdrawal and the advantage of protracting the time. I cannot say that I can conceive any fault is to be found with the decision which the Government of India have come to, with the full concurrence of Her Majesty's Government at Home, that when a permanent occupation of Candahar is not to be maintained, the sooner it is put an end to, consistently with making the necessary arrangements, the better. The right hon. Gentleman who last addressed the House (Mr. Bourke) asked, as several other hon. Gentlemen have done, what is the opinion of the Viceroy? I think it has also been asked why no despatch containing the opinion of the Viceroy and his Council appears in the Papers which have been presented to Parliament? Well, Sir, I have previously stated all that it is possible for me to state on this subject to the House. I have said that from the time of the defeat of Ayoob Khan by Sir Frederick Roberts, or—referring to telegrams, I find even earlier than that—from the moment when the inability of Shere Ali to establish his power in Candahar, except with the direct support and under the direct protection of British bayonets, was made manifest—from that moment the Viceroy has been in communication with me as to the necessity or policy, under the altered circumstances, of maintaining the arrangements which were come to with Shere Ali in regard to the measures that ought to be taken. I regret to say that these communications are of a confidential character, and they are not such as I am able to lay on the Table of the House. In a very few minutes I will show the House why they are of that character, and the reason why they are of a confidential nature, and why they have not assumed the form of public documents. After a long communication between the Viceroy and myself, the Viceroy stated his opinion that an expression of the views of Her Majesty's Government on the subject would be desirable, and that expression was conveyed to him in the despatch of November 11th. I will state now why it was that these documents were treated as confidential and not as public documents. It is not, in my opinion, in the least degree damaging to the case of the Government to admit, what is perfectly well known to every Member of this House, that on this question the Government of India were not unanimous. It would have been a very extraordinary thing if they had been. The House must recollect that the Council of the Viceroy does not resemble a Ministry—that it does not consist of a Government bound together by a community of political opinions on all questions. The Viceroy changes from time to time—sometimes, as in the last case, that of Lord Lytton, on account of political changes at home; at other times owing to the mere lapse of time. But when the Viceroy changes, the Members of his Council do not change; and I do not suppose that any Member of this House would expect that the able men who form the Council of the Governor General would change their opinions with every change of the Viceroy. Keeping that fact in mind, let us inquire who the Viceroy's Council were in September last, at the time this question was considered. Of whom did the Council consist? It consisted, in the first place, of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick Haines, who was pledged in the very deepest manner to the whole policy of the war, and who had been one of the strongest advocates of every part of Lord Lytton's military policy. He had been the strongest advocate of every different phase of the warlike policy of Lord Lytton. It was not very likely that Sir Frederick Haines would suddenly change his opinion and agree with the Viceroy that it was not desirable to remain at Candahar. The Financial Member of the Council (Sir John Strachey) was equally committed to the policy of Lord Lytton. Among the remaining Members of the Council there was Mr. Stokes, a lawyer of great ability, but to whose political opinions I do not know that it is necessary we should attach very great weight. He had also been a party to the whole of the policy which led to the Afghan War. Then there were Mr. Rivers Thompson and Mr. Gibbs, both of whom were Members of the Council appointed by Lord Lytton. They gave the warmest adherence to the whole of policy of Lord Lytton, as they were naturally pledged to do, and they were not likely to depart from the lines he had laid down. There were two other Members of the Council, one of whom was Mr. Aitcheson, who has been referred to in the course of these debates, I think by the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton). Mr. Aitcheson, who had had great experience as Foreign Secretary to the former Government of India, was a provisional Member of the Council at the time, and he entirely agreed with the Viceroy in his opinion that Candahar should be abandoned. [An hon. MEMBER: Which Viceroy?] With Lord Ripon. Then there was Sir Donald Stewart, the new military Member of the Council, who also entirely agreed with the Viceroy in his opinion as to the want either of military or political necessity for the permanent retention of Candahar; but who, nevertheless, had been so prominent an actor in all the recent transactions in Afghanistan, that it was not likely, or to be expected, that he would be entirely in favour of the immediate withdrawal of our troops from Candahar. Unfortunately, Sir Donald Stewart's Minute is one of those which are missing; but I have received a telegram to-day in reference to Sir Donald Stewart's opinions. I believe that hon. Gentlemen opposite, or, at any rate, some of them, do me the credit of thinking that I have in some way spirited away these documents. [Cries of "No, no!"] Insinuations of that kind have certainly been made by some hon. Mem- bers opposite. I can assure them, however, that I am extremely sorry that I have not got this Minute of Sir Donald Stewart, because, although I know that he does not entirely agree with the policy of an immediate withdrawal from Candahar, he is altogether opposed to our retaining that place permanently, and his opinion is one which I should have liked to lay before the House. With reference to the Minute of Sir Donald Stewart, without any application whatever on my part, I have to-day received a telegram from the Viceroy in which he says— It seems that Stewart has been charged with inconsistency with regard to his two Candahar Memoranda, and he begs me to say that he always has been and still remains of opinion that our occupation of Candahar is undesirable on military and political grounds. What he regretted in his second Memorandum was the occurrence of a rapid change in the course of policy deliberately adopted, although, personally, he did not approve of that policy, Well, Sir, such is the composition of the Council of the Viceroy, and we were perfectly aware of the opinions that were held by the Viceroy, and of the different opinions that were held by the majority of the Members of his Council in August and September last. Under these circumstances, it was thought that no authoritative expression of opinion could be given to such an invitation as, under ordinary circumstances, would have been addressed to the Government of India to express their opinion on a question of great and important policy. We knew perfectly well that the only despatch which it would have been possible for the Government of India to send home in answer to any invitation from us on this subject would be one that included a number of conflicting Minutes, stating the individual opinions of every Member of the Council; and that the question must ultimately, under any circumstances, be settled at home. When the Viceroy, in reply to confidential communications, gave me as his deliberate opinion that it would be best the Government of India should receive the expression of the views of the Government at Home, I ask the House whether it was my duty to refuse to give them that expression, and to say—" Oh, no; we cannot tell you what our opinion is until we receive the opinions of your Council, which we know already is absolutely and irreconcilably divided upon the question?" That despatch was re- ceived in India early in the Session. It was perfectly possible that they thought that the instructions as to time, or as to any other part of the policy, were too imperative, or were in some way wrong. It was, likewise, perfectly possible for the Government of India to have answered that despatch before the time came for finally settling the decision that was to be arrived at. But the Government of India did not consider that it was necessary to answer that despatch. I am not to be held responsible for that. They contented themselves with reporting the proceedings they had taken in order to comply with the instructions of Her Majesty's Government at home, and it was not until the 2nd of February that the despatch which was laid upon the Table yesterday was written. It was accompanied by the Minute of Mr. Rivers Thompson, which has created so much apprehension in the minds of some hon. Gentlemen opposite. I consider that the course which Her Majesty's Government have taken in the matter does not require any further defence, and does not require any palliation. I must say that I have been somewhat surprised that I should have been so sharply rebuked for the attitude we have assumed towards the Government of India, when I recollect the way in which the Government of India has been treated on former occasions, when right hon. Gentlemen opposite were in Office—when I recollect that the unanimous opinion of the Government of India on such an occasion as the repeal of the Cotton Duties—it is certainly surprising to me that so much importance should be attached by these Gentlemen now to the opinions of the Council of the Governor General of India. I recollect that in the time of Lord Northbrook—when Lord Northbrook was Viceroy—the opinion of Lord Northbrook and a unanimous Council was over-ruled by Lord Salisbury, and, in spite of their entreaties and repeated remonstrances, they were ordered to persevere in the policy against which they had unanimously protested, of sending a Mission to Cabul, and thereby beginning the policy which has led to all these disturbances and difficulties. When I recollect these things, I am somewhat surprised that we should have been attacked as we have been for not having obtained the opinions, which we knew were not unanimous, of the Council of the Viceroy of India, as at present constituted. I must say I regret the extreme importance which seems to be attached by some hon. Gentlemen opposite to this subject. Whether the policy of Her Majesty's Government is right or wrong is a fair matter for discussion; but it appears to me greatly to be regretted that there should have been so much exaggeration of tone in the way in which this question has been spoken of in many quarters. It is spoken of as if the safety of India depended on the occupation and possession of an outpost, which, after all, is only an outpost, and one which has been considered unnecessary by every Government until the spring of last year, which the late Government were in possession of in 1879, and which they subsequently abandoned. My hon. Friend the Member for Hertford referred to the question of prestige, and said he thought that in India prestige was of very tangible value in money and in men. I am quite ready to admit that if, by prestige, you mean the idea which prevails in India of the moral and material power of this country—the power of the ruling race, and the knowledge that it is our intention and resolve to maintain that power—if you mean something like that by prestige, then I think it is a very valuable commodity. But I think you may easily exaggerate the importance attached to the word in the minds of the Natives of India, who, I think, look upon things from very much the same point of view as we do ourselves, and who, I believe, are not so much influenced by sentimental ideas as some persons suppose. But is it possible to conceive anything more calculated to lower the idea of the Natives of India in regard to our power, and our confidence in our power, than the state of nervous alarm into which we are constantly throwing ourselves whenever we hear of a Russian movement in Central Asia, or the enormous and exaggerated importance which is attached to the possession of an outpost on our own Frontier which we abandoned a few years ago? But if this is not a question of enormous importance, so far as defence is concerned, I think it is a question of very great importance as regards policy. This policy of remaining at Candahar, if it were adopted, would be a decided break in the policy which has been pursued in India by every Government for the last 40 years. Some hon. Members who have spoken appear scarcely to be aware of what the retention of Candahar indirectly involves. It involves the holding not of a mere military position, but of an enormous Province, estimated by Sir Donald Stewart as being one-fifth larger than England and Wales. Do not suppose for a moment that we are holding that Province now. We are holding Candahar, and we are holding a small tract of country around Candahar, together with a belt of territory through which our line of communication with India runs. Hon. Members cannot suppose for a moment, if we remained in Candahar permanently, or until it might suit right hon. Gentlemen opposite that we should come away from there, that it is possible to go on as we are now doing. We are holding the centre of the Province; but the outer portions of it, extending to Persia on one side and Beloochistan on another, are under no kind of government whatever. They are in a state of absolute anarchy. If anarchy means want of government, they have no government. They are accustomed to be governed from Candahar, and they are not being governed from Candahar. If we are to settle down at Candahar, therefore, we must either give up that outlying territory to adjoining States, or take it over and administer it ourselves. But the difficulties would be altogether different from the administering of a small district. It is not only the extent of the Province which we have to govern that constitutes the difficulty. The borders of that Province are very imperfectly defined, and we should be brought into collision with wild and Undisciplined tribes. We know by experience what that means. We should have raids, quarrels, and expeditions to punish; in fact, we should be in a state of perpetual hot water. Well, Sir, the avowed object of the greater part of the supporters of that occupation is that we should be in Candahar for the purpose of interfering in the affairs of the people—that we should legislate their affairs, and that we should show that we are present and powerful, while Russia is far off. But that exercise of influence and that interference will bring us into constant quarrels, until, in vexa- tion and sheer weariness of spirit, we should be driven to put an end to that state of things by the adoption of a policy of annexation of the whole country. Well, Sir, I have said that while the Motion, and part of the speeches of right hon. Gentlemen opposite, point only to a temporary occupation, most of the speeches of hon. Members in support of the Motion point to direct and permanent occupation. What are the arguments in favour of permanent occupation? We are told that Candahar occupies a commanding position; but the late Viceroy of India, the present Leader of the Party which desires the permanent retention of Candahar, in a Memorandum which has been published, says of Candahar— Though we can never allow Candahar to fall into the hands of a rival Power, and political or special military considerations may make it necessary for us to occupy that town, I do not consider such occupation would actually strengthen our western frontier."—[Afghanistan (1881), No. 2, p.9.] That is the opinion of Lord Lytton, as expressed in the Memorandum, which has evidently been drawn up with all the technical knowledge which could be obtained from the military resources at the disposal of the Government of India. It is clear from this that Lord Lytton, in 1878, did not attach much importance to Candahar as a commanding position. I think it desirable that the House should know a little of what were Lord Lytton's plans in 1878. I have been attacked for having published this Memorandum. I think Lord Lytton himself said it was a very unpatriotic thing to do, letting, as we did, all the world know what were the plans, in 1878, of the Government of India. Well, I do not think it was a very unpatriotic thing to do; for although it was not known previously that certain speculations were entertained by the Government of India, still these speculations, or speculations very like them, had frequently been published by enthusiastic individuals, and all the suggestions made in the document were already, I have no doubt, at the disposal of Russia. What make me still more convinced that there was no Want of patriotism in publishing the Memorandum is that I am informed it was published in the columns of The Times as general information, and it would not, I think, have been so published without the authority of Lord Lytton. But what was the plan unfolded in this Paper? It is evident that it was no suddenly conceived scheme, on the arrival of the Russian Mission at Cabul, but one which bears marks of the most careful study and consideration, and which was, I have no doubt, under the consideration of the Viceroy and his military officers from the very first moment he set his foot in India. Now, what was the Frontier which Lord Lytton recommended as necessary? The House must recollect that in this Memorandum Lord Lytton is supposed to take credit for a good deal of moderation, and instead of recommending a more extended Frontier, which might have been favoured by some, Lord Lytton was more moderate, and recommended an inner line. And what is this inner line? It rests upon a central bastion, or line of defence, and that consists of a triangle formed by Cabul, Ghazni, and Jellalabad. These are the points of the central bastion which Lord Lytton considered as necessary to our defence. But this was not sufficient. Lord Lytton must have his outworks; and he, therefore, proceeds to discuss the three groups of roads by which India is accessible from Central Asia. He thinks it would possibly be better not to meet Russia north of the long and difficult passes in the mountains, but to wait for her until she had struggled through them. It appears, also, that in Cashmere our officers were to be instructed to extend our influence. The inner line which Lord Lytton recommended, and which he said would form a convenient Frontier, would have extended 700 or 800 miles, and it would, in his opinion, have been, on strategical and military grounds, perfectly defensible; but here, unfortunately, political considerations intervened to disturb those which were purely strategical, and, accordingly, Lard Lytton says that Herat, although it would give no additional strength, and would be, in fact, an inconvenient out post, was yet of such political importance that it was necessary that our line of defence should be diverted, so as to include it. It may, perhaps, be said that Lord Lytton and his military advisers never thought of occupying the position which he sketched out with British troops. It was only a line, perhaps, ultimately to be taken up, and which our Ally the Ameer was to hold for us for a time. The Memorandum is not quite so explicit on that point as on some others; but it is, at any rate, clear that an occupation by force was contemplated by Lord Lytton, who said that it was difficult to imagine a more commanding strategical position, and that whenever the moment of collision with Russia should arrive, it must find us in possession of it—as friends and allies of the Afghans if possible—but firmly established there in any case. The ways of arriving at this consummation are then discussed. The noble Lord said— If the Ameer proves hopelessly estranged, and we fail in all efforts to win him, we must take immediate steps to neutralize his hostility and to secure our interests. The best course then open to us would probably be to aim at dethroning him, and replacing him by a candidate more favourable to ourselves."—[Afghanistan (1881), No. 2, p. 14.] Such were the speculations of the late Viceroy in 1878—the trusted exponent of the views of the late Government. I want to know, if this great and magnificent scheme has been completely and utterly abandoned, what necessity there is for this infinitesimal part of it? I was astonished to hear the late Viceroy, in "another place" the other day, say that he attached supreme importance to the possession of Candahar. We see what importance was attached to that in 1878; he did not attach any importance to it at all. Why is it of supreme importance now? To establish, we are told, our influence in Afghanistan. What is the meaning of establishing our influence in Afghanistan? I will tell the House, so far as I am able to observe, what I think is the meaning of it. We have established influence in Afghanistan on the precise spot where we can stand, and not one foot beyond. That is to say, an influence beyond and down to our military occupation; but it is not an influence of a friendly or beneficial character. It is an influence of a hostile character, and not only of a hostile character, but one of bitterest hatred. It is an influence which unites tribes as nothing else can unite them, and of a bitterness which brings down upon us from time to time the whole fighting power of Afghanistan, and induces them to invite the assistance of Russia or any other Power. We have had experience of this sort of influence of occupation. We have had experience of it at Cabul, where everything appeared to be quiet, when all of a sudden, with hardly any warning, with scarcely a day's preparation, the whole country side was swarming with armed men, of whose existence we previously knew nothing, and General Roberts and his troops had to retire from Cabul and take refuge in the citadel. No doubt, General Roberts defeated these hosts in the open field, and if he had not done so he could not have maintained himself long in the field. They are not an organized army; but for a temporary rush—for a rush which may sweep away anything but the strongest and best prepared military force—a national uprising such as that we had then to confront is one of the most serious and dangerous character. There are other instances of the rising of a whole country when we were opposed, not by an army, but by the whole force of a nation—when General Stewart was attacked; and again, when General Burrows was overwhelmed at Maiwand. I do not say that, in spite of all this, occupation may not be possible if you bring to the attack the necessary forces and make the necessary sacrifices. I do not say, if you continue these efforts long enough, you may not in time crush out all the spirit of a people; but when you have done that, although you may have obtained a Province and gained some of those strategic positions upon which Lord Lytton sot his heart, you will have destroyed the spirit of the people—that spirit of independence of a people, which, if properly used and turned to account, would be the best protection you could desire against the invasion of an enemy. Well, Sir, I do not deny that Candahar may have strategic importance; but I have some difficulty in reconciling the present opinions entertained by some high military authorities with others they have given at different times, and with the general principles they have laid down as applicable to different occasions. I find that General Roberts, who is a strong advocate of retention, in arguing about another part of the Frontier, says if Russia is to attack us, why should we not make her march as far as possible away from her base of operations, through this difficult and inhospitable country? Recognizing the force of the observation with regard to the Kuram and the Khyber Passes, I do not see why it does not equally apply to Candahar. I amt prepared to admit that the possession of this outpost may be of strategical importance; it may be desirable, if ever we have to fight for India, that we should have it; but I maintain that it must, in strategy, as in all other matters, be of immense importance to retain our freedom of action; and it is far better not to be compelled to fight under circumstances which we cannot foretell, or fight in any position such as Candahar, 300 miles from our own Frontier. If it is even to be a valuable outpost for the defence of India, it will be far more valuable—and only valuable in the case of our having to hold and keep or occupy it—if we do so with the assent and goodwill of the Afghan people; if we go among them, not as enemies and aggressors, but as the defenders of their independence, as well as of the safety of our Frontier. The noble Lord the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton) ridiculed the sentiments of morality expressed on this side of the House by Members who said we ought to go away from Candahar now, because we do not want it; and that we could always go back again, if we could go back under circumstances of any value to us. We go away now because we do not want Candahar, and because we have no right to be there; but if we go back, we shall do so with the assent and goodwill of the Afghan people, to defend them against some other Power. And I do not believe, as some Members seem so ready to believe, that the Afghans would make such sacrifices to maintain their independence, and surrender immediately on the first Russian advance. I regret that I should detain the House so long, and I shall have to leave much unsaid. We have heard a great deal about the Russian advances, and about how they are to be met. Many great authorities have changed their opinions on this subject; but the general principles laid down by these authorities, when they held other opinions, seem to me quite as sound and their arguments quite as powerful as when they were first laid down. But it is not quite the fact that all these authorities have changed their opinions. I think some hon. Members last night spoke of Sir Erskine Perry as if he had never been anything but an Indian Judge. I doubt if they were aware that he had been a Member of the Indian Council, and, therefore, may be qualified to judge of political judges. Sir Robert Montgomery, the distinguished Lieutenant Governor of the Punjaub, was considered a great authority, and he holds as strong as ever the opinion that an advance on Afghanistan to meet Russia would be the greatest mistake we could make. Sir Neville Chamberlain, whom I saw the other day, authorized me to say that, in his opinion, the retention of Candahar would be the greatest mistake we could make, and mainly on political grounds. I regret that we have lost the support of many distinguished authorities who used to agree with us. The late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and also Secretary of State for India (the Marquess of Salisbury) used to be one of the strongest defenders of the policy of "masterly inactivity;" and I recollect reading in this House a despatch written by the late Chancellor of the Exchequer, a good many years ago, in which he spoke of the advances which Russia was making, and, apparently, would continue to make, but in which he did not see any cause for the slightest alarm or anxiety. Now, however, the right hon. Gentleman seems to think that the advances of Russia have reached that pitch which ought to cause a great deal of alarm. I can thoroughly understand the opinions of men like Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir Bartle Frere, and others, who have always been in terror of Russia's advances, and have advised us to take steps to stop them. But what I cannot understand is the changes of opinion of statesmen who have always foreseen the advances which Russia would make; who said their policy would depend upon those advances; but who, nevertheless, when these advances have taken place which they foresaw, think it necessary to abandon that policy. I am sure the House would not desire that at this time of the night I should go into the controversy—the unnecessary controversy—which has been raised about what Lord Northbrook did or did not do to alienate Shore Ali. I think the noble Lord the Member for Winchester (Viscount Baring) made a spirited defence of his father last night. I have been rather struck by the fact that the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex, and the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin, and others, who have spoken on the alienation of Shere Ali, have never thought of going beyond the time of Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook. With the departure of Lord Mayo the history is always stopped; and I have not heard one word said about the negotiations which took place between Lord Lytton and Shore Ali, and which may, in our opinion, have had something to do with the alienation of Shere Ali and the disturbance of our relations. But I venture to say that the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex, in the elaborate address which he delivered on Lord Northbrook's dealings with Shore Ali, did not attempt to prove that Shere Ali was intriguing with Russia. He said Shere Ali was alienated; but he did not attempt to show that he intrigued with Russia before July, 1876, when Lord Lytton began his operations. [Lord GEORGE HAMILTON expressed dissent.] The noble Lord did not prove any intrigue between Shere Ali and the Russians until the date at which the negotiations between Lord Lytton and Shore Ali about sending an Envoy began. But the noble Lord ridiculed Lord Northbrook's promises, and said we had nothing more to offer Abdurrahman than Lord Northbrook had to offer Shere Ali in 1873. What more has anybody to offer? Lord Lytton, although he asked a great deal more, never offered anything more, and never proposed to offer anything more when the Mission of Sir Neville Chamberlain was sent. The pledge which was to be given to Shere Ali has always remained substantially that which Lord Northbrook offered; and it appears to me that it is all that any British Government, having any regard to its responsibilities, can fairly offer to the Ruler of Afghanistan. We are asked now, if we are going to abandon the policy of our Predecessors, and if we are going to give up Candahar, what is our policy, and how are we going to fulfil the pledges given to Abdurrahman, and exclude Russian influence? There is no necessity to go beyond the declarations made by Lord Northbrook, and by former Liberal Governments. Russia knows that Afghanistan is held by us to be outside the sphere of her influence; and, up to a short time ago, Afghanistan know that we held that principle. What has been the effect of our proceedings upon the Afghans it is difficult to say; and what confidence they may feel in our precautions against Russia is extremely doubtful; but Russia knows now that the present Government holds Afghanistan to be outside the sphere of her influence. If I am asked what we are going to do when Russia interferes, I can only say that I can conceive nothing more unnecessary than to lay down a cut-and-dried policy with regard to contingencies which have not arisen. Russia has never interfered in Afghanistan by military operations. She has never touched in her military capacity one particle of territory which has ever been held by Afghanistan; and if Russia has interfered diplomatically, she has never done so until she believed she was on the brink of war with you in Europe—until by the fault, as we think, of the late Viceroy, but, as you think, of Lord Northbrook, Shere Ali had become entirely alienated from us. Under these circumstances, it is not necessary to say beforehand precisely what strategic positions or what measures you were going to adopt. Russia knows perfectly well that any interference, militarily or diplomatically, in Afghanistan means the rupture of friendly relations with this country, and she knows that we hold ourselves justified in resisting such interference by any means in our power; by any means that may be most convenient and most suitable at the time. It is not necessary to say beforehand whether those means would be war in Europe or Asia—war by our own troops, or war by the assistance of Afghan levies. Russia knows perfectly well that we hold ourselves free, and that we are prepared to give effect to those assurances and those professions we have always made. You want us to trust, as Lord Lytton trusted, to a scientific Frontier, and to conciliate the Afghan people by taking possession of all their principal places, and of the débouchés of all their principal Passes. We do not intend to trust to a scientific Frontier; we do not intend to look only to mountain Passes and strongholds. We think that some attention should be paid to the fact that these mountain Passes and strongholds are held by men, and are inhabited by men of whom the strongest characteristic is their deep and strong attachment to their independence. We think that we will try to teach them once more that we ourselves respect that independence, and that in our own interest, and for the protection of our own Frontier, we will assist them to maintain that independence against any corner from whatever quarter he may come.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

Mr. Speaker—Sir, I can assure the House that it is with unfeigned reluctance that I rise to trespass upon it at this late hour; but I feel it would be quite impossible for me to allow the House to go to a division upon the remarkable speech we have just listened to from the noble Marquess without recalling their attention for one single moment to the real issue which lies before us, and with which he has dealt with great ability, but, I venture to say, in a manner most excellently calculated to confuse the perception of the House and divert attention from it. Sir, I admit that in the opening words of his speech the noble Lord took a somewhat different line, and a juster line, than that which had been taken by his Colleagues in the course of this and previous discussions. They—and I especially refer to the speech of the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles W. Dilke), but also to other speeches—rather strove, as it seemed to me, to fasten upon my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. E. Stanhope), and upon the Motion he had submitted to the House, a wider meaning than that Motion bears, and a wider meaning than he had attempted to give to it. The noble Marquess took a different line. He complained not that the Motion was too wide, but that it was too narrow; not that the censure was too severe, but a great deal too mild. He could not conceal his wonder that we should have thought it necessary to bring forward a censure of so limited a character. I will explain in a moment why we gave to this censure the character which it bears; but let me say that if the Motion was of so limited a character, and if the censure was so mild, surely it would have been a better course for the noble Marquess to have met the Motion which he thought so narrow, and to have answered the objections which appeared so trivial, and to have called the House to support him in the answers he thought it right to give. I venture to say that the noble Marquess has given no answer to the Motion which has been submitted. He has talked a great deal about other things, and it was very amusing and interesting—"C'est magnifique, mais ne c' cst pas la guerre!" Now, why do we challenge you? We challenge you because we take the ground which the Government themselves have taken. In the Speech which Her Gracious Majesty was advised to make at the opening of this Session we find this paragraph— The war in Afghanistan has been brought to a close, and, with the exception of the Candahar force, my troops have been recalled within the Indian frontier. It is not my intention that the occupation of Candahar shall be permanently maintained; but the still unsettled condition of the country, and the consequent difficulty of establishing a Native Government, have delayed for a time the withdrawal of the army from that position. That was the view taken at the time the Queen's Speech was delivered. There have been a good many changes since then, not only in Afghanistan, but in other parts of the world, and I am not at all sure that we might not with advantage be favoured with a revised edition of that Speech. But, so far as this particular point is concerned, the Government ought either to tell us that they have now changed their mind, and that they no longer hold the view which they held when they penned the sentence I have read, or they should tell us that they think the time has arrived for a settlement of the Government of Afghanistan, and that the proper time has come for the withdrawal of the Army from their present positions. My hon. Friend has challenged them upon that particular point, and he has challenged them by a declaration which he asks the House to affirm, though we do not suppose it will affirm it. We shall clear oar consciences, at all events. We declare— That, in the opinion of this House, the withdrawal of British troops from Southern Afghanistan in the present critical state of affairs in that country will not be conducive to the permanent interests of India. I ask you has anything been shown to answer that statement? We have been told that the ideas which we have with regard to the fears entertained as to the advance of Russia and other matters of this kind are wild and chimerical, and that the mode in which it is proposed to meet the danger is altogether unwise and injudicious, and that it is opposed by high authority, and by the sentiments which have, at former times, been held and enunciated by some amongst ourselves. It is interesting and useful for us to discuss these matters; but we complain that we are never told how the Government intend to meet the particular difficulties which we put before them. We want an answer as to the effect of the withdrawal of our troops from Candahar at the present moment. I do not shrink at all from entering into the larger discussion, though I am sorry that I should be called upon to do so at so late an hour, because I know it is impossible to enter fully into the discussion now, and unless I do so I am aware my observations will be held to be imperfect. Perhaps it is necessary that some words should be said in regard to what is called the change of my opinion and that of some others. The time to which reference is made is the time when I myself was Secretary of State for India, and when Lord Lawrence was Governor General. I was then in the closest possible relation with Lord Lawrence. I knew by private and official correspondence Lord Lawrence's views on this particular point, and I was thoroughly of opinion that the view of Lord Lawrence as to the impolicy of making an advance on Quetta beyond the Frontier of British India was a sound view. But that was under a state of things wholly different from the state of things which now prevails; it is not that my opinion has changed, it is the state of things that has changed; and when we are quoting Lord Lawrence and what is called the policy of masterly inactivity, allow me to say that that policy was not confined to a simple determination to sit still within our limits and to take no steps beyond them. On the contrary, it was a policy which was founded upon premisses and principles going beyond that point, because not only was it the policy of Lord Lawrence to keep within our own Frontiers as far as our own troops were concerned, but I assert, in spite of all that has been said by the noble Lord and others, it was his policy to maintain a proper and legitimate British influence in Afghanistan. It was his policy to exclude Russia from any interference with the Afghan people; it was his policy to strengthen, as far as possible, the de facto Government of Afghanistan; and it was his opinion that we should, with reference to Russia, make such diplomatic arrangements as would insure her not interfering with Afghanistan, and that we should give her to understand that if she gave us any trouble there we would attack her in Europe. Are we to go upon those principles now? In the first place, is not one great factor in Lord Lawrence's policy entirely taken out of the case—I mean the existence of a strong, united, and friendly Afghanistan which should be exempt from Russian influence? Can anybody who knows what the history of the last few years has been say that there is any longer a possibility of such a factor being brought into consideration? We are told that Russia was not to blame—that she was in her right when she made the movement in Afghanistan which caused us so much uneasiness, because Russia was then in a condition of strained relations with this country. We are told that, although the overtures she made to the Ameer were of a character hostile to us, she was perfectly justified in making them. Well, but if she were justified, that proves our case; it proves that though you are not afraid of Russia when you are at peace with her, and when you have no objects that are at all adverse to her's, yet that if you ever come into difficulties with Russia, if she ever wants to embarrass you, it is in her power to interfere with you in a very inconvenient way in Afghanistan. When we talk of the interference of Russia in Afghanistan, we do not mean what the noble Lord was talking about just now. Did you ever hear, he says, of a Russian force invading Afghanistan? No; of course not. That is not what we are afraid of. What we are afraid of is the intrigue of Russia and the possible friendly intervention of Russia with Afghanistan—friendly to some Rulers there, but unfriendly in a very deadly way to the British Power. Now, we have a great population in India for whom we have become responsible. The hon. Member for Westmeath (Mr. P. J. Symth), who always enchants us with his eloquence and courage, told us we were altogether wrong in our Indian policy from the days of Clive and Warren Hastings down to those of Dalhousie and Lytton. This is a question we might discuss on other occasions; but we cannot conveniently do it now. Hon. Gentlemen opposite justly contend that we must look to our obligations to the people of India, and that we must consider that, being placed in the situation in which we are, it is our duty to preserve them, as far as possible, in peace and happiness and contentment. Now, our contention is, that if you allow danger and mischief to come close to your Frontier, and if you allow Russia to advance and make overtures there, and to stir up mischief in that country, you will produce serious evil there, and you will produce disorder and discontent and anxiety amongst our people in India. Well, now you say that these are views of alarmists, and of those people who want an excuse for enlarging our Dominions. I do not know anybody who wants to enlarge our Empire. I can only say for myself, it is that which I most shrink from, if it can be in any way avoided. But I will not appeal to an alarmist; I will appeal to an authority which cannot in the least be suspected in this matter. I will appeal to Lord Lawrence. Lord Lawrence himself always held the opinion that if there was any danger whatever that the tribes or Chiefs in Afghanistan would shake themselves off from our influence and call in the assistance of any other Power—Russia more especially—then it would be our duty to interpose. I dislike reading anything to the House, and especially at this hour (1.20); but what I have here is so interesting that I will read it, although I have read it to the House on a former occasion. It is a portion of a private letter written to me by Lord Lawrence at the time I assumed the Office of Secretary of State for India; and I think the House will feel that it is not inexpedient or out of place to read it now, inasmuch as it refers to the state of things existing in Afghanistan at that time, and to the state of things which will be reproduced the moment we leave the country now. Sir, at that time there was a great contest going on between Shere Ali and, I think, Abdurrahman himself; and Lord Lawrence, writing to me on the subject, said— Hitherto we have steered clear of all Afghan troubles; we allow the contending factions to fight out their own battles with their own resources. Then he gives his view of the position of Shere Ali, and goes on to say— He has now sent down one of his Envoys to the Commissioner of Scinde; but until I hear what this gentleman has to say I can come to no definite conclusion. Now, it is one thing to leave the Afghans alone to fight out their own battles, and to stand by when others are interfering. I do not think there is much to choose between the two parties in Afghanistan. I do not think that either of them is in the least degree to be trusted if any strong inducement were to arise. I do not think that any one Chief, if he were to obtain supreme authority, could count on retaining it for six months. Lord Lawrence thought— It would be the best course if Shere Ali adopted the policy I have indicated. I shall tell him that, although we have taken no part on the other side, we still cannot consent to send him aid to support Herat; we will recognize him as Ruler of Herat; but if he should resolve to call in the aid of Russia and Persia, he would compel us to give assistance to the two brothers who are now in possession of Cabul. Lord Lawrence again communicated with me; and so strongly did he appear to feel the necessity of keeping Russia out of the field, that he was prepared, if assistance were given by Russia to one pretender, to give his assistance to the other. Lord Lawrence felt that it was absolutely essential that Russia should be kept out of Afghanistan, even at this inconvenience of giving assistance to one of the pretenders. Now, let me ask these questions. Does anyone suppose that if we retire to-morrow from Candahar there will not be a struggle between the two Chiefs Abdurrahman and Ayoob Khan? Does anyone doubt that Ayoob Khan has as good a chance of obtaining success as Abdurrahman? Does anyone doubt that there will be a struggle between the two relatives, which will almost certainly lead to the beaten party invoking the aid of Russia? Does anyone doubt that when that takes place we shall be called upon to interfere and take some part in the quarrel? We want to know what is the view of the Government of what we should do in that case. The noble Lord tells us he means to sit still; but does he really mean that? What of the language of the Government in the Queen's Speech? What is the difference in the position now—why is it that it is now reasonable to do that which it was not safe to do then? You will have a most serious responsibility cast upon you if you withdraw from Candahar; and, as far I can see, you have not made out for yourselves at all clearly the answers to the questions you will have to meet. You may say you will leave these things to settle themselves by a process of natural selection; but the natural selection, as has been already said, will be the Russian selection—the power will be selected which gives assistance first. If we are to sit still within our boundaries, we shall only allow an appeal to be made to the Power that is ready to give assistance. And does anyone doubt that that assistance will come from Russia? I have no doubt there is a desire on the part of the Russian Government that the present Czar shall do nothing to interfere with the proper relations between England and Russia with regard to Afghanistan. The late Czar, too, had every desire not to interfere with those relations; but he could not help it, and the present Czar will be in the same position. Do you trust to your being strong enough to prevent the interference of Russia in the affairs of Afghanistan? Well, but if so, what is to happen? Are we to go back again? You have had a pretty good experience of what it costs to fight your way into Afghanistan, even with advantages which you would not have again. You have had the advantage of being able to say to people dissatisfied with the Cabul Government—" We will deliver you from the yoke that you dislike." You have had from them assistance that enabled you to execute great military operations in Afghanistan. You have with great difficulty got there; but you will have a much more difficult task if, after having gone out and, perhaps, having been out some months, you attempt to force your way in again. You may find that preparations have been made against you, and that your friends are embittered by your desertion. Something has been said about prestige, and we have been asked what prestige means. I do not attempt to give a full definition of it, and I do not wish to prophesy; but I will venture to say that your prestige will seriously suffer if you get the character of being people who are ready to abandon your friends, to whom you have pledged your assistance—to abandon them to the enemies from whom you professed to deliver them. There are many ways in which your prestige would suffer; and I believe that your retirement now would lead to a thorough misconstruction of your action. It would not be believed that you retire now because there has been a General Election in England, and the Liberal Party are in power. We are told that that is the solution of this question—that a united Liberal Party feel dissatisfied with the conduct of the late Government, and insist that the policy of that Government shall not be carried out. But will you get that belief out there? What will the Candaharis, the Cabulis, the Punjaubis, or the people of India know of the exigencies of Party in England? They will know as little of the real merits of the case as the humble elector referred to by the right bon. Gentleman the Postmaster General. "But," says the right hon. Gentleman, "the humblest elector will have the satisfaction of thinking that by his vote he has supported this act of justice and honesty." Well, I have no doubt that the British elector would at any time be ready to give a vote in favour of what he believes to be for the sustainment of justice and the national honour; and I am not for a moment disputing that this consideration was pressed upon many of them, at the time of the General Election, under circumstances of misrepresentation and misconstruction. We have denied, we have all along denied, and we do still deny, that there is any truth in the allegation that we undertook an unjust war. We say it was an unfortunate war that was forced upon us; but I will not go into that question at this moment. What I want to ask is this—Is it wise, is it safe, is it possible, that we can govern a country—at a distance from us of half the globe, and with a population of 250,000,000, whose circumstances are as different as light from darkness from the circumstances of the average electors in this country—on principles that are to make the whole of our Indian policy depend from one six years to another upon the result of a particular Election? I undertake to say that in adopting such a course you are attempting one of the rashest and maddest feats that are possible. The people of India will not understand that this is simply a question upon which the Liberal Party are united; and how will they be able to understand the few words sent by telegram giving the result of this debate? Remember how much is at stake, and what is likely to be the effect upon their minds of the withdrawal from Candahar. They will point to the reverses you have met with, and the difficulties you have experienced, and will say you have found your resources unequal to the task you have set yourselves. We are told that the disaster of Maiwand has been entirely wiped out by the brilliant and successful march of Sir Frederick Roberts. Yes; that is perfectly true if you remain, with the results of that march and victory still in your possession; but if you retire from the battle-field, though your success may be fairly set against the defeat of Maiwand, it will remain in the minds of many people of that country, and will be impressed on them effectually from without, that though you were successful in action, your strength was insufficient to enable you afterwards to reap the fruits of your success. The disasters of the first Afghan campaign in 1841 were wiped out by subsequent victories; but the impression left on the Native mind by the British defeat was greater than that left by British successes. As you lose your prestige—if it is thought you have begun to retire, feeling yourself unable to hold your own, then ten-fold will be the prestige of Russia, who is advancing, and whose advance, moreover, is heralded and magnified by every one of rumour's thousand tongues in the bazaars, the Courts of the Native Princes, and elsewhere. The story will go forth that England has begun to retire because she feels herself unequal to the great task which is involved in an expenditure of £1,500,000, and because she is shrinking from the great burden that is thrown upon her shoulders. Depend upon it that when that comes to pass, unless you are prepared finally to retreat from a large part of that Empire you hold in India, you will not escape from that expenditure, but will, on the contrary, have to incur a still larger expenditure on the force you will have to employ in the defence not only of your Frontiers, but of your rule in India itself. The hon. Member for Leeds (Mr. Herbert Gladstone), in his able speech last night, told us that he looked forward to the continuance of the Liberal Government in power for the next 20 years. Well, should they remain in power, and should they continue to carry out their present policy, I am afraid that at the end of that period there will be very little of the British Empire left for them to govern. I must apologize for having detained the House so long upon this question. We are about to come to a vote on which we shall be defeated; but we cannot help that. We think it to be our duty to raise our voices and to protest against a policy which we believe and are convinced is risky, dangerous, and unsafe. We leave the responsibility upon the Government. But we say the Government have failed to lay upon the Table of the House, or to inform those opposed to them, with anything like the amount of information we have a right to demand. If you like to say that these matters are to be dealt with by Governments, Councils, and Indian authorities, well and good—let them take the responsibility; but if you take the line which we are now led to believe you are about to take, and if you are acting not on the mere responsibility of a Ministry, not on the advice of Viceroys and Councils, but on the mere promptings and exigencies of Party, I confess it seems to me the result will be disastrous.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 216; Noes 336: Majority 120.

AYES.
Alexander, Colonel C.	Birkbeck, E.
Ashmead-Bartlett, E.	Birley, H.
Aylmer, Capt. J. E. F	Blackburne, Col. J. I.
Bailey, Sir J. R.	Boord, T. W.
Balfour, A. J.	Bourke, right hon. R.
Barne, Col. F. St. J. N	Brise, Colonel R.
Barttelot, Sir W. B.	Broadley, W. H. H.
Bateson, Sir T.	Brodrick, hon. W. St. J. F.
Beach, rt. hn. Sir M. H.
Beach, W. W. B.	Brooke, Lord
Bellingham, A. H.	Brooks, W. C.
Bentinck, rt. hn. G. C	Bruce, Sir H. H.
Beresford, G. de la P.	Bruce, hon. T.
Biddell, W.	Brymer, W. E.

Burghley, Lord	Hamilton, Lord C. J.
Burnaby, General E. S.	Hamilton, I. T.
Burrell, Sir W. W.	Hamilton, right hon. Lord G.
Buxton, Sir R. J.
Cameron, D.	Harcourt, E. W.
Campbell, J. A.	Harvey, Sir R. B.
Carden, Sir R. W.	Hay, rt. hon. Admiral Sir J. C. D.
Chaplin, H.
Christie, W. L.	Helmsley, Viscount
Churchill, Lord R.	Herbert, hon. S.
Clarke, E.	Hermon, E.
Clive, Col. hon. G. W.	Hicks, E.
Close, M. C.	Hildyard, T. B. T.
Cobbold, T. C.	Hill, Lord A. W.
Coddington, W.	Hill, A. S.
Cole, Viscount	Holker, Sir J.
Compton, F.	Holland, Sir H. T.
Coope, O. E.	Home, Captain D. M.
Corry, J. P.	Jackson, W. L.
Cowen, J.	Kennard, Col. E. H.
Cross, rt. hon. Sir R. A.	Kennaway, Sir J. H.
Cubitt, rt. hon. G.	Knightley, Sir R.
Dalrymple, C.	Lawrance, J. C.
Davenport, H. T.	Lawrence, Sir T.
Davenport, W. B.	Lechmere, Sir E. A. H.
Dawnay, Col. hn. L. P.	Lee, Major V.
De Worms, Baron H.	Legh, W. J.
Dickson, Major A. G.	Leigh, R.
Digby, Col. hon. E.	Leighton, Sir B.
Dixon-Hartland, F. D.	Leighton, S.
Donaldson-Hudson, C.	Lennox, Lord H. G.
Douglas, A. Akers-	Lever, J. O.
Dyke, rt. hn. Sir W. H.	Levett, T. J.
Eaton, H. W.	Lewis, C. E.
Egerton, Sir P. G.	Lewisham, Viscount
Egerton, hon. W.	Lindsay, Col. R. L.
Elcho, Lord	Loder, R.
Elliot, G. W.	Long, W. H.
Emlyn, Viscount	Lopes, Sir M.
Ennis, Sir J.	Lowther, hon. W.
Estcourt, G. S.	Macartney, J. W. E.
Ewart, W.	Mac Iver, D.
Ewing, A. O.	Macnaghten, E.
Feilden,Major-General R. J.	M'Garel-Hogg, Sir J.
	Makins, Colonel W. T.
Fenwick-Bisset, M.	Manners, rt. hn. Lord J.
Filmer, Sir E.	March, Earl of
Finch, G. H.	Master, T. W. C.
Fitzwilliam, hon. C. W. W.	Maxwell, Sir H. E.
	Miles, Sir P. J. W.
Fletcher, Sir H.	Mills, Sir C. H.
Floyer, J.	Monckton, F.
Folkestone, Viscount	Morgan, hon. F.
Forester, C. T. W.	Moss, R.
Foster, W. H.	Mowbray, rt. hn. Sir J.R.
Fowler, R. N.	Mulholland, J.
Fremantle, hon. T. F.	Murray, C. J.
Freshfield, C. K.	Newport, Viscount
Galway, Viscount	Nicholson, W. N.
Gardner, R. Richardson-	Noel, rt. hon. G. J.
	North, Colonel J. S.
Garnier, J. C.	Northcote, H. S.
Gibson, rt. hon. E.	Northcote, rt. hn. Sir S. H.
Giffard, Sir H. S.
Goldney, Sir G.	O'Donnell, F. H.
Gore-Langton, W. S.	Onslow, D.
Gorst, J. E.	Paget, R. H.
Grantham, W.	Palliser, Sir W.
Greene, E.	Patrick, R. W. C.
Greer, T.	Peek, Sir H.
Gregory, G. B.	Pell, A.
Halsey, T. F.	Pemberton, E. L.

Percy, Earl	Stanley, rt. hn. Col. F.
Phipps, C. N. P.	Storer, G.
Phipps, P.	Sykes, C.
Plunket, rt. hon. D. R.	Talbot, J. G.
Powell, W.	Thomson, H.
Price, Captain G. E.	Thornhill, T.
Puleston, J. H.	Thynne, Lord H. F.
Rankin, J.	Tollemache, hon. W. F.
Rendlesham, Lord	Tottenham, A. L.
Repton, G. W.	Tyler, Sir H. W.
Ridley, Sir M. W	Wallace, Sir R.
Ritchie, C. T.	Walrond, Col. W. H.
Rodwell, B. B. H.	Warburton, P. E.
Rolls, J. A.	Warton, C. N.
Ross, A. H.	Watkin, Sir E. W.
Round, J.	Watney, J.
Sandon, Viscount	Welby-Gregory, Sir W.
Schreiber, C.	Whitley, E.
Sclater-Booth, rt. hn. G.	Wilmot, Sir H.
Scott, Lord H.	Wilmot, Sir J. E.
Scott, M. D.	Wortley, C. B. Stuart-
Selwin-Ibbetson, Sir H. J.	Wroughton, P.
	Wyndham, hon. P.
Severne, J. E.	Yorke, J. R.
Smith, A.
Smith, rt. hon. W. H.	TELLERS.
Stafford, Marquess of	Crichton, Viscount
Stanhope, hon. E.	Winn, R.

NOES.
Acland, Sir T. D.	Bruce, rt. hon. Lord C.
Agar-Robartes, hn. T. C.	Bruce, hon. R. P.
Agnew, W.	Bryce, J.
Ainsworth, D.	Burt, T.
Allen, H. G.	Buszard, M. C.
Allen, W. S.	Butt, C. P.
Allman, R. L.	Buxton, F. W.
Amory, Sir J. H.	Byrne, G. M.
Anderson, G.	Caine, W. S.
Armitage, B.	Cameron, C.
Armitstead, G.	Campbell, Sir G.
Arnold, A.	Campbell, R. F. F.
Ashley, hon. E. M.	Campbell-Bannerman, H.
Baldwin, E.
Balfour, Sir G.	Carbutt, E. H.
Balfour, J. B.	Carington, hon. R.
Balfour, J. S.	Carington, hn. Colonel W. H. P.
Barclay, J. W.
Baring, Viscount	Cartwright, W. C.
Barran, J.	Causton, R. K.
Bass, A.	Cavendish, Lord E.
Baxter, rt. hon. W. E.	Cavendish, Lord F. C.
Beaumont, W. B.	Chamberlain, rt. hn. J.
Biddulph, M.	Chambers, Sir T.
Blake, J. A.	Cheatham, J. F.
Blennerhassett, Sir R.	Childers, rt. hn. H. C. E.
Blennerhassett, R. P.	Chitty, J. W.
Bolton, J. C.	Clarke, J. C.
Borlase, W. C.	Clifford, C. C.
Bradlaugh, C.	Cohen, A.
Brand, H. R.	Colebrooke, Sir T. E.
Brassey, H. A.	Collings, J.
Brassey, T.	Collins, E.
Brett, R. B.	Colman, J. J.
Briggs, W. E.	Colthurst, Col. D. la T.
Bright, J. (Manchester)	Cotes, C. C.
Bright, rt. hon. J.	Courtauld, G.
Brinton, J.	Courtney, L. H.
Broadhurst, H.	Cowan, J.
Brooks, M.	Cowper, hon. H. F.
Brown, A. H.	Craig, W. Y.

Creyke, R.	Henry, M.
Cropper, J.	Herschell, Sir F.
Crum, A.	Hibbert, J. T.
Cunliffe, Sir R. A.	Hill, T. R.
Currie, D.	Holland, S.
Davey, H.	Holland, J. R.
Davies, D.	Holms, J.
Davies, R.	Holms, W.
Davies, W.	Hopwood, C. H.
De Ferrieres, Baron	Howard, E. S.
Dickson, J.	Howard, G. J.
Dilke, A. W.	Howard, J.
Dilke, Sir C. W.	Hughes, W. B.
Dillwyn, L. L.	Hutchinson, J. D.
Dodds, J.	Illingworth, A.
Dodson, rt. hon. J. G.	Inderwick, F. A.
Duckham, T.	James, C.
Duff, rt. hon. M. E. G.	James, Sir H.
Duff, R. W.	James, W. H.
Dundas, hon. J. C.	Jardine, R.
Earp, T.	Jenkins, D. J.
Edwards, H.	Johnson, E.
Edwards, P.	Johnson, W. M.
Egerton, Adm. hon. F.	Joicey, Colonel J.
Elliot, hon. A. R. D.	Kingscote, Col. R. N. F.
Errington, G.	Kinnear, J.
Evans, T. W.	Labouchere, H.
Fairbairn, Sir A.	Laing, S.
Farquharson, Dr. R.	Lambton, hon. F. W.
Fawcett, rt. hon. H.	Law, rt. hon. H.
Fay, C. J.	Lawrence, Sir J. C.
Ferguson, R.	Lawrence, W.
Ffolkes, Sir W. H. B.	Lawson, Sir W.
Findlater, W.	Laycock, R.
Firth, J. F. B.	Lea, T.
Fitzmaurice, Lord E.	Leake, R.
Fitzwilliam, hn. H. W.	Leatham, E. A.
Flower, C.	Leatham, W. H.
Foljambe, C. G. S.	Lee, H.
Foljambe, F. J. S.	Leeman, J. J.
Forster, Sir C.	Lefevre, right hon. G. J. S.
Forster, rt. hon. W. E.
Fort, R.	Litton, E. F.
Fowler, H. H.	Lloyd, M.
Fowler, W.	Lubbock, Sir J.
Fry, L.	Lusk, Sir A.
Fry, T.	Lymington, Viscount
Gabbett, D. F.	Lyons, R. D.
Gladstone, rt. hn. W. E.	Mackie, R. B.
Gladstone, H. J.	Mackintosh, C. F.
Gladstone, W. H.	Macliver, P. S.
Glyn, hon. S. C.	M'Arthur, A.
Gordon, Sir A.	M'Carthy, J.
Gourley, E. T.	M'Coan, J. C.
Gower, hon. E. F. L.	M'Intyre, Æneas J.
Grafton, F. W.	M'Kenna, Sir J. N.
Grant, A.	M'Lagan, P.
Grant, D.	M'Laren, C. B. B.
Grenfell, W. H.	M'Laren, J.
Grey, A. H. G.	M'Minnies, J. G.
Guest, M. J.	Magniac, C.
Gordon, R. T.	Maitland, W. F.
Hamilton, J. G. C.	Mappin, F. T.
Harcourt, rt. hon. Sir W. G. V. V.	Marjoribanks, Sir D. C.
	Marjoribanks, E.
Hardcastle, J. A.	Marriott, W. T.
Hartington, Marq. of	Martin, R. B.
Hastings, G. W.	Mason, H.
Havelock-Allan, Sir H.	Massey, rt. hon. W. N.
Hayter, Sir A. D.	Maxwell-Heron, J.
Henderson, F.	Meldon, C. H.
Heneage, E.	Mellor, J. W.

Milbank, F. A.	Samuelson, H.
Molloy, B. C.	Seely, C. (Lincoln)
Monk, C. J.	Seely, C. (Nottingham)
Moore, A.	Sexton, T.
Moreton, Lord	Shaw, W.
Morgan, rt. hn. G. O.	Sheridan, H. B.
Morley, A.	Shield, H.
Morley, S.	Simon, Serjeant J.
Mundella, rt. hon. A. J.	Sinclair, Sir J. G. T.
Noel, E.	Slagg, J.
Nolan, Major J. P.	Smyth, P. J.
O'Beirne, Major F.	Spencer, hon. C. R.
O'Brien, Sir P.	Stanley, hon. E. L.
O'Connor, T. P.	Stansfeld, rt. hon. J.
O'Conor, D. M.	Stanton, W. J.
O'Gorman Mahon, Col. The	Stevenson, J. C.
	Stewart, J.
O'Shaughnessy, R.	Story-Maskelyne, M.H.
O'Shea, W. H.	Stuart, H. V.
O'Sullivan, W. H.	Sullivan A. M.
Otway, A.	Sullivan, T. D.
Paget, T. T.	Summers, W.
Palmer, C. M.	Synan, E. J.
Palmer, G.	Talbot, C. R. M.
Palmer, J. H.	Tavistock, Marquess of
Parker, C. S.	Taylor, P. A.
Pease, A.	Tennant, C.
Pease, J. W.	Thomasson, J. P.
Peddie, J. D.	Thompson, T. C.
Peel, A. W.	Tillett, J. H.
Pender, J.	Torrens, W. T. M'C.
Pennington, F.	Tracy, hon. F. S. A. Hanbury-
Philips, R. N.
Playfair, rt. hon. L.	Trevelyan, G. O.
Potter, T. B.	Verney, Sir H.
Powell, W. R. H.	Villiers, rt. hon. C. P.
Power, J. O'C.	Vivian, A. P.
Price, Sir R. G.	Vivian, H. H.
Pugh, L. P.	Walter, J.
Pulley, J.	Waterlow, Sir S.
Ralli, P.	Waugh, E.
Ramsay, J.	Wedderburn, Sir D.
Ramsden, Sir J.	Whalley, G. H.
Rathbone, W.	Whitbread, S.
Reed, Sir E. J.	Wiggin, H.
Reid, R. T.	Williams, B. T.
Rendel, S.	Williams, S. C. E.
Richard, H.	Williamson, S.
Richardson, J. N.	Willis, W.
Richardson, T.	Wills, W. H.
Roberts, J.	Wilson, C. H.
Robertson, H.	Wilson, I.
Rogers, J. E. T.	Wilson, Sir M.
Roundell, C. S.	Wodehouse, E. R.
Russell, C.	Woodall, W.
Russell, G. W. E.	Woolf, S.
Russell, Lord A.
Rylands, P.	TELLERS.
St. Aubyn, Sir J.	Grosvenor, Lord R.
Samuelson, B.	Kensington, Lord