HC Deb 17 March 1881 vol 259 cc1255-348

SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

(1.) 134,060, Number of Land Forces.

MR. CHILDERS

I rise to move that the total number of men on the Home and Colonial Establishments of the Army, exclusive of those serving in India, for the financial year 1881–2, be 134,060. That number differs from the number shown on the Estimate by 850, the total number shown on the Estimate being 850 less than the number now asked for. But I have to explain, in reference to that additional number, that we have thought it right to follow the Report of the Controller and Auditor General in respect to the principle on which the numbers are voted, he having laid down in the last Report that the number to be voted should be the number anticipated in any given month in the year, the previous practice having been to vote practically what had been the normal number on the Establishment for the year. That rule has been in force for some time. I do not take on myself at this moment to say which is the better of the two rules. I think it would require more time for consideration than I have yet been able to give to the matter. The Report of the Controller has been before us for a very short time; and I should not like to ask the Members of the Committee, who take a great interest in the question, to tie themselves by either of the two rules. But in deference to the Report of the Controller General, and until the matter has been discussed by the House, we thought it better to err on the safe side; and therefore I have included the 850 additional men whom, we anticipate, will be employed in the month of April, and possibly of May, in South Africa. They consisted of a Cavalry regiment, which we are, for the time being, adding to the British Establishment in India. We have also strengthened the depots to the extent of 350 men. This is a Vote only in connection with the number of men; and I would ask the Committee to postpone the questions raised by the Controller General until after we have had the Report of the Committee of Public Accounts. There is no other question connected with the men which I need mention now; but I would ask the Committee, if they have no objection, not to take any discussion upon Army Organization, or upon our general proposals, on the Vote for men, but to take it on the Votes for money, which will follow. I may take this opportunity of saying that I cordially concur in what fell from my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Treasury yesterday, who, in my absence, told the right hon. Member for South - West Lancashire (Sir R. Assheton Cross) that, although we are discussing Vote 1 tonight, we shall be anxious indeed to solicit the opinion of the general Committee on the Main Question embodied in the Estimates, and in the Memorandum I laid upon the Table a few days ago. But I propose to connect that printed Memorandum which has been laid on the Table, and what I then said, with the special Financial Business of the Committee. I hope that it will be understood, even after the discussion of to-day, though I trust I may be able to elicit from the Committee a favourable view of the general question, that still there will be, undoubtedly, further opportunities afforded for discussing in detail the several recommendations we have made to the House. The new recommendations would not take effect until the 1st June next; but, of course, if they were favourably received on the whole in the discussion that is about to take place, the preliminary steps would be taken to bring them into operation on the 1st July. There is no intention, however, of standing in the way of the House in having still further discussion on all these details. Perhaps I may say that the recommendations we make in regard to Army Organization, and in other respects, hardly require legislation at all, as the points upon which they require legislation are most unimportant, because all the changes can be effected in the usual way under a Royal Warrant. But this does not in the least restrain me from asking the House to give us their advice in this matter; and every recommendation we receive from the Committee, I need hardly say, will be received with great gratitude by us. No doubt, we propose large and considerable changes, and I hope that those changes may be criticized—indeed, I know they will be criticized—in a friendly spirit, and I hope they will be fully criticized. I can only say, for my own part, that I shall attach the greatest importance to the criticisms I receive on them, both in this House and elsewhere. I trust that, after this explanation, I shall be allowed to take the Vote for men without a debate upon the general question of Army Organization. After that Vote is disposed of, the Vote for money will be proposed; and I have no doubt that that will give rise to an interesting debate, which will occupy a considerable portion of the time of the Committee. I beg to move that the Land Forces of the Crown at Home and Abroad for the financial year 1881–2, consist of 134,060 men.

COLONEL STANLEY

I do not rise for the purpose of attempting, in the slightest degree, to raise any debate; but merely, as far as I can, to clear the ground from that which is now encumbering it. The important discussion will, I presume, be taken on the Vote for the payment of the men. I wish to take the earliest opportunity of saying that with respect to the matter that has just been referred to by the right hon. Gentleman opposite—namely, the remarks which the Auditor General thought it his duty to make last year, and again in the Report which was placed in our hands this morning, I intend to take an opportunity, at the convenience of the Government on going into Supply, of calling attention to the subject; because, although not large in itself, it involves grave Constitutional questions on which no judgment has yet been pronounced by the House. Circumstances have been brought to light by the Reserve Act, and especially by the Army Discipline Act of 1879, which, I think, render it desirable that these questions should be determined by authority; but I do not want to encumber the ground with them now, and I do not intend to make any reference to them in the course of my remarks, except cursorily. I cannot, however, allow the matter to stand altogether one side; and I therefore would give Notice that, on the earliest occasion, I shall call attention to the question.

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

said, that some time ago he had given Notice that he would move a reduction in the number of men. But after the appeal which had been made by the Secretary of State for War, he was perfectly willing to postpone the remarks he wished to make until they arrived at the Money Votes.

COLONEL LOYD LINDSAY

said, he had been anxious, before the Speaker left the Chair, to make some remarks in reference to the formation of a Corps of Mounted Infantry; and he believed that the right hon. Gentleman was perfectly prepared to hear the remarks which he had intended to make. The proper opportunity for raising the discussion would, undoubtedly, be on the Vote for men; but he presumed he must yield to the appeal which had been made by the right hon. Gentleman. He believed that he would be unable to raise the matter upon the ordinary Estimates as the question entirely related to the men, and not to the pay. He was, however, quite willing to waive the subject, in order that the right hon. Gentleman might proceed with the Votes.

MR. CHILDERS

said, he should not object to the hon. Gentleman raising the question later on, upon the Motion for going into Committee of Supply. There might be opportunities for raising it even in Committee of Supply.

LORD ELCHO

said, the right hon. Gentleman would correct him if he was wrong; but he thought they would be able to raise a general question of that character upon the Vote for the payment for salaries.

Vote agreed to.

MR. CHILDERS

I have now to move— That a sum, not exceeding £4,436,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge of the Pay, Allowances, and other Charges of Her Majesty's Land Forces at Home and Abroad (exclusive of India), which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1882. On this Vote perhaps I may be allowed to repeat again what I said just now, so as to connect with this Vote the Statement which I made to the House the other day. In that speech, and in the Memorandum which has been printed and circulated, I have embodied full details of all the proposals which have been made, in addition to some further details, which I did not explain to the House in moving that Mr. Speaker do leave the Chair. What I should like to add to what I then said, so that the matter may be fully before the Committee, is a remark or two upon the purely financial questions which I very carefully avoided bringing before the House on the previous occasion. I stated to the House the general effect of the proposals which we make as to Army Organization, both in respect of officers and men; and I summed up the financial results to India and this country, comparing, of course, the normal state of things under previous Warrants, and the normal state of things under the Warrant which is to give effect to the policy of the Government. But I think I ought now to give a little more detail in respect to the financial changes which we propose, showing the difference of financial charge which will follow upon our proposal. I shall first give to the Com- mittee the effect of the changes and transfers from one Vote to another as far as they relate to Vote 1. The Committee will see that the Vote is considerably less—less, I think, by a sum of £143,000—than the Vote for last year; and it might at first sight be imagined that we were reducing the charge for the pay of the Army by £143,000. That is not the case. The principal item of that charge is a transfer from Vote 1 to other Votes of the charge for the honorary colonels of regiments. The honorary colonels of regiments have been considered hitherto to be on the establishment of their regiments; and I put it very clearly the other day. At any rate, it is very clearly expressed in the Memorandum I have laid on the Table how in future we propose to deal with general officers, both in respect to what is equivalent to half-pay and their retired pay. But I ought now to say that, as far as the Estimates are concerned, the effect is this—We have transferred from Vote 1 the entire charge for this purpose, which is £185,000 gross, or £135,000 net, after deducting what falls upon the Revenues of India; and the result of the change from a system of paying general officers £450 a-year, with £100 a-year, in some cases, good-service reward, and then suddenly raising them to £1,000 a-year—the change from that would in the end effect a very considerable economy in consequence of a great reduction in the total number of established generals, though, in the first instance, it would lead to an increase of charge. That increase of charge I think I mentioned the other day; it would amount to about £20,000 a-year. If you take the items in Vote 1, Vote 18, half-pay, and Vote 19, retired pay, it will be found that the sum for those three charges last year was £315,000, and this year it is about £335,000; so that we have estimated for an increase of charge of about £20,000, and that originates in this way. At present, all the major generals and lieutenant generals almost at the top of the list are in the receipt of only £450 a-year coming in from those Votes, and they rise suddenly to £1,000 a-year. Of course, if you give to all these officers, as we propose to give, the option of the present system, or the revised system, all who elect to take the present system would remain for a time at the lower rate—namely, £450 a-year; whereas those who elect the new system would at once receive the better rate of half-pay, and if they retired, of retired pay; but they would lose that pay which they would otherwise get if they were patient enough to remain on the list as at present. We have to take an account of all that, and, therefore, for the moment, there would be an increase of charge. That increase, to the extent of £20,000, we have provided for in the present Estimates; and we have also provided for a similar increase with respect to colonels and other officers to the extent of £15,000. This comes later in the Estimates; but as these Votes are so intimately connected with Vote 1, I have thought it more convenient to make this statement to the Committee now. The immediate effect would be an additional charge of £35,000. I may say that the increased charge for non-commissioned officers in Vote 1, as to which I have given the fullest details extending over a page and a-half, is about £45,000. The increased charge for the additional men is also about £45,000, the two amounting together to £90,000. On the other hand, there is an economy, under several small Votes, of £16,000 from reduction of supernumerary officers, £12,000 for fewer number of senior lieutenants, £10,000 for extra hospital and prison stoppages, and £35,000 from a reduced number of horses. But, on that point, I ought to say that this Estimate was prepared before the additional Cavalry was sent to South Africa, and, undoubtedly, in that respect, it would be necessary, in all probability, to have later a Supplementary Estimate; but that is not certain, because there would be, in other respects, a large saving. These sums added together, with the reduction upon the Vote of the charge of the honorary colonels, is a net decrease on the Vote of £142,000. There is another point which I think it may be convenient for the Committee to understand. It is purely a question of figures, as to which I was asked a question after my Statement the other evening. The question asked was, whether any additional Vote would be necessary in consequence of the altered regimental establishments of officers, which I explained then, and which were enumerated in the Memorandum? No, Sir; it will not be necessary. The greatly reduced numbers of which I then gave the figures will give, in spite of the additional number of higher ranks, an economy amounting altogether to £64,500 a-year; and that, we estimated, will be quite sufficient for the necessary transfer of a larger number of mounted officers, and also of a larger number of supernumerary officers, and will, undoubtedly, exist for some two or three years. Therefore, if hon. Members will refer to the substituted sheet delivered to-day, which is in the Vote Office, they will find on each page, or under each head provided in the substituted sheet, that there is a margin between the Vote as originally proposed and the Vote as necessary now for a fixed Establishment, and that that margin will be sufficient to cover the charge for the number of supernumerary officers. Perhaps I may be allowed to say, upon that point, that I am taking the greatest care to provide, with respect to that margin, that all reasonable claims and vested interests shall be carefully preserved. To reduce suddenly the number of entries into the Army by the entire amount of the reduction of officers would be a harsh proceeding; and, therefore, we make the reduction gradually, with full regard to the promises and reasonable expectations that have been held out. I am not aware that there is any other point in connection with Vote 1, or any other financial question, which I need explain at the present time. Of course, I shall be prepared, later on in the evening, to answer whatever questions may arise. There is one single question, which I know is a matter of some interest, to which I may refer. My right hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Stanley) hoped to complete a very necessary change before he left Office; but it has fallen to my lot to effect it. At any rate, I obtained much useful information from him upon the subject. I mean the final abolition of the "Stock Purse" in the Guards, having regard to their reasonable expectations and their vested interest in the Stock Purse. I am happy to say that the information collected by previous Secretaries of State for War has enabled me to propose definitely and finally to abolish the Stock Purse system, and to take care that both the commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers should have what is reasonable as regards their interest in the Stock Purse. In respect to the disbursements and payments from the Stock Purse, I am happy to say that we shall be able to be not only just, but even generous, to the subalterns in the Guards, who, under the former system, were kept starving for a considerable time, until they reached the very considerable advantage of a share in the Stock Purse. What these advantages are is shown in the Memorandum. I think I have now given the Committee sufficient material to enable them to discuss the Vote in connection with what I said the other day; and I beg now to move the Vote for the Pay and Allowances.

(2.) Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £4,436,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge of the Pay, Allowances, and other Charges of Her Majesty's Land Forces at Home and Abroad (exclusive of India), which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1882.

COLONEL STANLEY

I do not intend, on the present occasion, to dwell upon all the points of interest which have been enumerated by the right hon. Gentleman in the remarks to which we have just listened, and in his Statement the other night. I hope he will do me the justice to believe that I abstain from doing so, not from any want of respect either to himself or to the importance of the measures which he is advocating, but in the public interest, in order to save a loss of time, and to make most of the short time that is left for us on the present occasion. I am only sorry that my right hon. Friend the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote) has not been present, so that he could have stated what is his opinion of the economical tendency of the financial proposals of Her Majesty's Government, compared with those of the late Government. Except in a very humble way, I never, for my own part, aspired to the reputation of a financier, although it has been my lot at various times to be connected with all three great classes of the Estimates of the country. If I were disposed to take any credit to myself it would be when I found, as on the present occasion, that the right hon. Gentleman opposite, with his great reputation as a financier, and the desire which Her Majesty's Government naturally have to keep down all unnecessary expenditure, has not been able to bring the Estimates down to the level of those formed by an Administration which it has been the habit of some persons to denounce as extravagant and expensive. Putting that on one side, I will merely say that I am glad the right hon. Gentleman has thought it consistent with his duty boldly to ask the House for the sum which he thinks necessary in order to keep the Army in a state of efficiency. I think I am only stating that to which I think the Committee will, for the most part, agree when I venture once more to say that I think the right hon. Gentleman, pleased, as he may have been, by the congratulations he received the other evening, when he first explained the nature of his proposals, must still feel even more satisfied with the general approval which these proposals have met with during the period which has elapsed since.

I had intended, if I had had an early opportunity, to have brought before the House the important point which has been raised by the Auditor General's Reports in respect of the number of men voted; but as this is to be dealt with on a future occasion, perhaps the Committee will allow me to pass it by, and to review, very briefly, those points on which I think it desirable or right I should offer a few remarks. If I seem, perhaps a little unduly, to go back to that which has passed in former years, probably the Committee will be kind enough to extend to me their forbearance, on the ground that there was no discussion upon any Army question last year after my right hon. Friend acceded to Office. This is the first occasion in which it has been fitting or right that I should point out what was the position of the late Government in respect to certain of these Army changes, and show how, in their judgment, the then condition of affairs had to be met; what steps they intended to take, and in what condition they left the matter for my right hon. Friend. It is not necessary to go back to matters which happened in 1870 and 1871. Many of those who took prominent parts in those debates are still, happily, Members of this House.

Speaking in general terms, and following the division into which the right hon. Gentleman has separated the two questions, I may say that Lord Cardwell dealt with matters of Army Reform, for the most part, in two distinct branches. First, that which related to service; and, secondly, that which related to what was called, under a somewhat ambiguous phrase, the localization of troops. In 1871 and 1872 the question fully occupied the attention of this House. The matter was discussed fully and amply; and there was a general feeling on the part of the House, and I believe also on the part of the country, in favour of some such system as that proposed by Lord Cardwell. That scheme was ratified by a majority of this House, and so far became a part of the established military system of the country; but it is very well known that it was a system that was far from complete when my right hon. Friend, now Lord Cranbrook, acceded to Office in 1874. My noble Friend had then to consider what course be should take—whether we should proceed on the lines laid down by Lord Cardwell, or whether it was desirable to adopt any other scheme for the welfare of the Army. Happily, we were not, in the year 1874, hampered by pledges of repudiation, given when in Opposition; and, therefore, it was not thought necessary, immediately on our accession to Office, to upset that which had been done by our Predecessors. We thought it fair and right to endeavour, as far as possible, to work loyally the system which had been laid down, which the country and Parliament had accepted, and to see whether that system could not be worked out in all its details to a successful result; but, in saying that my noble Friend only proceeded on the lines laid down by Lord Cardwell, I do not wish it to be understood for a moment that, during the years he held the Seals of the War Office, there was any one year in which important questions connected with the Army remained undealt with. On the contrary, the great questions of deferred pay for the men, of improvements in the recruiting regulations and in armaments, in works, and the great questions of promotion and retirement as affecting the officers of the Army, the localization arrangements, and many other questions, fully occupied my noble Friend during the period he held the Seals of the War Office. But it was felt all along that one of the principal matters which affected the Army throughout was the relations between the various officers in the country, and their connection with the localization scheme as laid down by Lord Cardwell. The bri- gade depôts which had been established in various parts of the country, and of which, at that time, some 60 or 65 had been commenced, were intended to be centres of instruction and places where the forces were to be brought together. On every hand questions of recruiting, the reserve of stores, of arms, and other difficulties connected with the brigade depôts met my noble Friend face to face, and had to be dealt with in some way, at an early period of my noble Friend's administration. It became his duty to consider whether these depôts were not too numerous and needlessly expensive, and whether they should not be consolidated, and some part of the expense in capital and maintenance saved to the country. At the time Mr. Gathorne Hardy, now Lord Cranbrook, came into Office, it was found that, for the most part, all the contracts for work at those depôts had been entered into, and that it would only be throwing money away to abandon them. But my noble Friend, wherever opportunity occurred, thought it would be well to avoid, as far as possible, the capital expense involved in entering upon buildings and other works in connection with subordinate depôts. That was the condition of affairs up to 1876. At that time the Committee was appointed which has gone by the name of the Militia Committee. It was appointed to consider various subjects connected with the Militia and the brigade depôts, and, indirectly, it touched upon all those questions which had been left undecided. I need not refer now, except upon some small points, to the Report of that Committee, because I think it is one of the Papers which my right hon. Friend has laid upon the Table, having caused it to be re-printed. But I may say on behalf of that Committee, over which I had the honour to preside, that the Report, important as it is in many respects, carried additional weight from the fact that it was the unanimous Report of a very large Committee. Every shade of opinion was represented on that Committee. Perhaps I may be allowed to state who the Committee were. It consisted of the Duke of Bucceleuch—who certainly cannot be accused of revolutionary tendencies—Lord Exeter, Lord Limerick, Colonel Corbet—well-known to us in this House for many years as a man of great ability and indefatigable energy—my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Sunderland (Sir Henry Havelock-Allan), General Herbert, General Taylor, Sir Garnet Wolseley, Colonel Bulwer—who at that time held a subordinate place at the Horse Guards, but who is now Inspector General of Recruiting—Colonel Greaves—now Adjutant General in India—and myself. That Committee, reflecting as it did every shade of opinion, produced a Report which was practically unanimous; and I am bound to say that it is even now a pleasure to look back upon the unanimity the Committee displayed in all the steps they took, and the earnestness of their desire to arrive at a satisfactory Report. They had to consider, among other things, Lord Cardwell's arrangements in 1873—in the General Order issued by Lord Cardwell, I think, in April, 1873, with reference to the establishment of linked battalions. These linked battalions were to be constructed by forming two single battalion regiments of the Line into one. In every district throughout England they were linked together; and under that General Order officers and men were appointed or enlisted into a regiment that was to form pat of a brigade, and they were absolutely interchangeable between the linked battalions as much as if they had been a single regiment. Of course, as is well known, in the double battalion regiments the transfer of men and officers from one regiment to another already existed. With these linked battalions were coupled two Militia regiments, and the whole had their centre of instruction at one of the depôts—the depôts consisting normally of four companies, two from each battalion, and the two linked battalions. We felt this was not a system which ought to be continued. There was, I am afraid, a good deal of friction between the battalions of which each of these brigades was composed; and we came, as it will be found in page 77 of the Papers now laid before Parliament, to the conclusion that the only way to deal with this subject was either to separate them, or else to amalgamate them completely into one regiment. It was pointed out that the word "brigade," which occurred instead of the term "service," was wholly inapplicable. We inquired into the subject very carefully, and found that most regiments—there were some exceptions—attached importance to the designa- tions by which they were known—that is to say, their title and special designation, far more than to the actual number of the regiment. In paragraph 15 of the Report, it will be seen that many regiments in times past have changed their numbers; and the Committee, in commenting upon that fact, said— We consider that the number assigned to a regiment signifies comparatively little, and there is reason to believe that if battalions were allowed to retain their own distinctions, esprit de corps would be preserved, even when they formed part of one 'territorial' regiment—and we think it might confidently be expected that if the territorial designation were judiciously chosen, so that, as far as possible, the several nominal distinctions should be comprised within it, after a time an enlarged esprit de corps would grow up, and that the men of the 'territorial' regiment would look back to the traditions of former campaigns with no less pride than their predecessors. I am glad the right hon. Gentleman now proposes to carry that into effect, and cannot help feeling gratified that even after this lapse of time the recommendations of that Committee have been found to be those most practicable and the best under the circumstances; and I hope I have enough public spirit, even though it has not fallen to my lot to carry out these changes, to be glad that they are to be carried out by one whom I respect so much as the right hon. Gentleman opposite. Still, with regard to these territorial regiments, great as are the changes proposed, they are not all that we recommended in our Report, and there is a point with regard to the depôts upon which I shall have to touch hereafter. Perhaps I may be allowed to state now, in a few words, why these arrangements were not carried out in the time of the late Government. This Committee, which assembled in 1876, reported in the autumn of that year, and its recommendations were considered in the spring of that year. So far as my recollection serves me, the details were under discussion during the whole of the early part of the year 1877. As to what happened in the latter part of the year I am not so able to speak personally, for at that time I was absent from the War Office, and when I returned a new position of affairs had arisen. We were then in a state of warlike preparation; indeed, very nearly approaching a state of actual war. The Reserves had been called out, and we felt that the time was not one for dealing with so great an organic change in the Army as the recommendation of the Committee undoubtedly involved. We thought it was better to wait for the experience which the calling out of the Reserve would afford us, and did not wish hurriedly or rashly to do anything which might in the slightest degree affect the status—always difficult to be determined—of the Reserve men when called out. But, in the autumn of 1878, these questions were further considered, and, to a certain extent, progress was made; but, as the Committee are undoubtedly too well aware, in the spring of the following year the Zulu War broke out, and it was my duty, in presenting the Estimates on the 3rd of March, at once to comment upon the grave disaster which had necessitated an increased expenditure for sending out troops to Zululand. I ask the Committee to consider that up to that time we had had nothing but hypothetical and conjectural experience as to what the working of Lord Cardwell's system would be. It was always objected to the plans of Lord Cardwell that they were wanting in elasticity, and that there was not, perhaps, sufficient margin left in some cases to provide against those very evils which had occurred in the Crimean War—namely, the denudation of battalions at home by battalions in the field. On the 3rd of March, 1879, I found it my duty to call attention to the working of the system in Committee of Supply, and upon that subject I said— I think it right to speak with frankness about a fact which has been brought before the eyes of most men within the last few days—namely, that the short service system and the localization system have not removed the difficulty of which we have always complained, and still experience, of having to transfer men from one regiment to another. Almost all the commanding officers, although, comparatively speaking, they are used to see their men pass from them, feel the loss very much; and both commanding officers and regiments suffer unduly when those men are taken from them and transferred to other regiments. I do not wish to complain, or say that these matters could have been foreseen. I then went on to say— I shall, in a great degree, rely upon the assistance of a Commission or Committee, which I am prepared to appoint, consisting of officers high in the Service, by whose practical experience I shall endeavour to be guided, and by which, without departing from the general lines of the scheme which the country has adopted, we may, perhaps, be able to supplement it, and to supply, in some small details, the deficiencies which now exist."—[3 Hansard, ccxliv. 44–5.] Upon that, as soon as instructions could be prepared, the Committee known as Lord Airey's Committee was appointed; and, in referring to that Committee, I cannot speak in too high terms, both of the industry with which they prosecuted their investigations, and the unremitting zeal with which they followed up the defects to which they were asked to address themselves. Some exceptions have been taken to that Committee having gone beyond their instructions, with regard to which fact I am bound to take the whole responsibility upon myself. My wish was to find out the whole truth, and I felt it my duty to impress upon the Committee the necessity of ascertaining the defects existing in the system, and of endeavouring, as far as possible, to point out the manner in which they could be remedied. Another reason for the postponement of the carrying out of the territorial system was its undoubted unpopularity with many persons in the Service. I have sometimes found that officers used to the existing rules of the Service have apprehended difficulties with regard to changes which, when carried out, have not involved the terrible consequences at first anticipated. But in this matter there was a sufficient general feeling to make me hesitate; and I therefore asked Lord Airey and his Colleagues to consider if they, from a military point of view, could suggest some scheme by which the defects, that we were only too well aware of, could be removed, and by which better arrangements could be made for the future. But the Report of the Committee was unfortunately delayed from time to time, and only reached me after the General Election had become a certainty, and when I felt that the large questions involved should await the incoming of the new Parliament. Anyone who has read the Report of Lord Airey's Committee will see that it raises questions of great importance, and certainly not such as could be decided offhand by an out-going Minister. To have decided them would clearly have hampered his successors; and, that being my view of the case, I thought it advisable to take no action upon the subject, but to leave the question to the right hon. Gentleman who would succeed me. I must ask pardon of the Committee for addressing them at such length upon this point; but they will understand that I am anxious to show the position not only of myself, but of my Colleagues, in relation to this great matter of Army Organization. I have endeavoured to make clear to the Committee our position last year; and I wish now to make one reference to the Report of the Militia Committee; and, in calling the attention of the Committee to the question of depôts, I may be, perhaps, allowed to exclude from discussion one part of the subject—namely, that relating to the question of the number of men at the depôts being larger than that voted by the House. Setting apart for a moment that Constitutional question, I wish to call attention to one of the most important recommendations of the Militia Committee, and to ask my right hon. Friend opposite whether he has considered that question; and, if so, in what mode he proposes to deal with it, or whether we are to understand that the proposal with respect to the depôts represents his temporary ideas only? By Lord Cardwell's plan it was intended that while one battalion of a regiment should be abroad the other should be kept at home. There was a complicated scheme laid down to provide for events which might happen during what was called a great war. The Militia battalions of the brigade were to act as feeders to the two Line battalions. In that case it was assumed that both battalions would be abroad at the same time, and that the Militia battalions were to take their place; the depôt was to be brought up to its full strength of 800, and other large changes of the kind were to remain in sequence. All these changes it was easy to recommend; but they involved large questions affecting the policy of the Government; and it is perfectly obvious that the logical sequence to the proposition made by General MacDougall's Committee would have been that, even in a small war, if we found ourselves obliged to detach an extra battalion from England, we should be obliged to call up an extra Militia battalion to take its place. That, however, could not be done; and it was pointed out in the 37th paragraph of the Report of the Militia Committee that— It seemed desirable to add to the existing regulations some means by which the depôt could be expanded, so to speak, automatically whenever both line battalions of one brigade are abroad at the same time and are both likely to be absent for any period from the country. It was observed that there had been eight or nine wars of various dimensions during only two of which had the Militia been embodied; and the Committee then went on to suggest that— When two battalions were ordered abroad, it should be within the competence of the Secretary of State at once to raise the depôt to the strength of 600 men from 100, with the view that the depôt should be of sufficient strength to feed both Line battalions without calling for volunteers outside the brigade. Now, I suppose that if there is one thing which is heart-breaking to all concerned, it is that of making up the strength of a regiment by volunteers from other regiments. It is naturally heart-breaking to the officers who have devoted their time and experience to the careful training of men to see them taken away from them, while it tends to destroy that esprit de corps, which it is, to a greater or less extent, the desire of all of us to see preserved in the Army. Accordingly we thought that if the depôts were to be increased the emergency should be met by other arrangements. Now, I do not trace in the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman anything approaching to the recommendation of the Committee with regard to the carrying out these regulations. I believe he proposes merely to increase the depôts of certain regiments upon which he thinks the largest demands will be made. Now, I want to point out the essential difficulty which there is in this matter. Under present arrangements you cannot, in the case of a depôt of 100 men, get 400 or 500 men to fill up a draft. The question of increasing the depôts is, therefore, by no means so small or technical a matter as at first sight it appears to be, and the difficulty is due to that want of elasticity which weighed down a great deal of the good in Lord Cardwell's system, and under which we have been labouring for many years. If, therefore, the right hon. Gentleman is able, by adding to his proposal, to do away with the present difficulties in respect of the depôts, I feel sure that, whatever difficulties he may have to overcome, he will find the result must compensate him for his labour and toil. The other great division of Lord Cardwell's reforms was that of the length of service of the men. I think, with regard to that matter, the decision must rest with the Executive. We know it is entirely within the competency of the right hon. Gentleman to make the proposed regulations if he thinks fit; and although I have no disposition to quarrel with the terms which he, no doubt upon the best advice, has fixed for the extension of service, I should certainly be quite ready to go to the limits he has proposed, if not to go a little beyond them. I suppose that no one wants to go back to long service or anything like life service; and I have found, as a rule, that there is no desire to keep the private soldier—I am not speaking of non-commissioned officers—longer in the ranks than 17 or 18 years. If you keep him longer he is of comparatively little use, and you bring yourself face to face with the question of pensions. The matter, however, is one which rests with the Executive; and I think my right hon. Friend will find, although, perhaps, I should have preferred nine years' service with the colours and six in the Reserve, that his proposal inasmuch as it extends the period of service, will meet with a very general approval. But, above all things, it is, in my opinion, advisable that the Executive should be as little as possible hampered by Acts of Parliament in matters of this kind. And it was with the idea of the desirability of changes being made from time to time as vacancies took place, and as recruiting flagged or prospered, that we took powers, in the Army Discipline Act of 1879, that the hands of the Secretary of State should be loft as free as possible, either in enlisting a recruit for long service or sending him to the Reserve, always, of course, within the 12 years' service. With regard to enlistments, I desire to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, in practice, the various changes made in 1879 have been found to work well or not? The Committee will remember that the main object of the Act, under the enlistment section, was to make enlistment a matter of perfectly free contract between the man and the State; that the recruit was also to have the opportunity of getting out of this bargain within a reasonable time on the mere repayment of the expenses incurred by the State, and that that provision was introduced with the view of getting rid of the otherwise formidable number of deserters, of whom it was said that many left the Service by desertion because they could not get out of it in any other way, having taken a dislike to it during the first two months of their service. I should like some reference to be made to this point by my right hon. Friend. Although, of course, we cannot expect finality, I hope the system introduced in 1879 is working fairly and widely. My right hon. Friend has made also an important change in deciding not to enlist men under the ago of 19. I wish I could be sanguine with regard to the result of this proposal. It is all very well to speak of an equivalent where the age can be determined, which will mean a certain chest measurement and so forth; but I am afraid there will always be an extraordinary coincidence in the current ago at which recruits present themselves and the minimum age at which they are taken. I hope, however, the right hon. Gentleman will take care to get the article of the quality and description that he wants. I will endeavour to pass very briefly over certain other points in the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman. There is one of them relating to the promotion of officers, which, however much I desire to approve the scheme of the Executive in respect to Army matters, I cannot altogether agree to. In this matter I can not help thinking that the right hon. Gentleman has been misled by a desire for symmetry, as well as the natural desire to cut down what at first sight appears to be an extravagant and exorbitant list of generals; but that, perhaps, he may not secure the full result anticipated. This question was fully considered some time ago, and the point was raised whether the Establishment of generals should be cut down to the number actually required under the regulation for filling up posts occupied by officers of that rank. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman will be able to lay upon the Table of the House any actuarial calculation showing what is the expectancy of a general officer, both under his proposal and the former state of things. But I am bound to say that I have received from many quarters representations from general officers, who all seem, upon the principle, I suppose, that "hope springs eternal in the human breast," to think they will be chosen as colonels of regiments, and who nearly all include the pay attaching to that rank amongst their possible emoluments, and to whom the state of things proposed does not appear to be as favourable as that under which they are supposed by the right hon. Gentleman to have languished in times past. The position seems to me to be analogous to that which sometimes occurs in the Navy, for where you have a small list of officers the task of selection for command is rendered doubly invidious. If you have 100 men, and want to employ 10, the 90 cannot reasonably feel that they have been overlooked; but if you have a list of 15 from which to select 10 the five men who are not selected will take it to heart and linger under a sense of grievance or wrong. That is a difficulty which has occurred in the sister Service; and I hope, as far as possible, in the application of these warrants, every consideration will be given to the reasonable expectations of general officers. May I also say that I look with some apprehension, particularly in a Service constituted as ours, upon the diminution in the number of regimental subalterns. It is, perhaps, unavoidable; but, at the same time, it seems to me undesirable that this should take place at a time when we have daily complaints of the difficulty of finding good non - commissioned officers, and especially when we remember that the young subalterns of the present day work hard, and do their utmost to perform the work that was formerly done by older officers. This point is one which I think should not be overlooked. The proposal of the right hon. Gentleman may be necessary for the purpose of promotion; but I think it well that we should be quite clear as to whether this promotion will remedy all the difficulties which the right hon. Gentleman anticipates. It is extremely difficult, however carefully actuarial calculations may be prepared, to adjust them to the actual affairs of life, and it may be proved that the expectations of the officers with regard to their chances may not be realized; nevertheless, it is desirable that we should know that in this matter of promotion the right hon. Gentleman has convinced himself by careful study and accurate information that its effect will be such as he was led to ascribe to it when he introduced his Statement to the House, and that there will be that diminution in the number of compulsory retirements, which will be, for the most part, a matter of satisfaction to all concerned. But if the right hon. Gentleman means that the officers whom it is intended to keep in the Army are only to be upon the unattached list, I am afraid he will not find that he has produced in fact that satisfaction which he has been led to anticipate; and I therefore ask him to furnish us with information upon this matter, and to give us an assurance that he has closely examined the point. There is another point to which I will briefly refer in connection with the subject of the diminution of officers. I believe the measure which was the work of the late Government for the establishment of a reserve of officers has added a very valuable class to the Service, which will be available in time of war. Already some advantage has been taken of it, and I believe one of the officers who fell in action recently had been an officer who, owing to family circumstances and position, had left the Service, but whom a love of honour and adventure attracted back, through the "reserve of officers," to the ranks which he had quitted. He is, perhaps, the first one of the reserve of officers who has fallen in action; and I think the present no unfitting occasion to pay a tribute to the devoted spirit which characterizes British officers even after they have left the Army, and to their willingness for service. It was thought that under the operation of Lord Cardwell's plans the first captains of Artillery and Engineers, when promoted, would, on reaching their position, retire and make way for others; but it was found in practice to be the case that these officers having succeeded to a better position, naturally did not look on the Service with disfavour, but remained in it. As it is quite possible that Line officers may be similarly actuated under the present scheme, I hope the right hon. Gentleman has made himself sufficiently acquainted with this matter. As I am aware that many hon. Members are prepared to speak on the subject of the position of quartermasters and riding-masters, I will only add the expression of my opinion in favour of this excellent class of officers. It is satisfactory to him that my right hon. Friend has made some improvement in the position of quartermasters; whether the plan will work out advantageously, however, is, perhaps, a matter of doubt in my mind. But I am bound to say it would, in my opinion, be better not to touch the question at all, than do so in a manner that would not be satisfactory to the officers affected by the change. I had hoped to hear that the quartermasters were to have a substantial increase of pay and improvement of their position, and probably the riding-masters also. All I will say, however, on that point is, that if the right hon. Gentleman finds his proposals are not so liberal and generous as he, no doubt, imagines they are, he will not be precluded from extending them. There are many other questions which might be pursued with advantage; but the detailed consideration of which I will now postpone. For instance, that relating to the Army Medical Department, about which the Committee would wish to know that the arrangements made have resulted in a sufficient supply of officers. I will, however, enter upon this question in detail upon the Vote. I am glad the right hon. Gentleman has been able to give effect to the labours of my hon. and gallant Friend the late Financial Secretary, and those who preceded him in clearing up the very difficult matter of the Stock Purse, and placing it on a fair and equitable footing. I will ask the right hon. Gentleman to give us the assurance that when the Vote for Ordnance Stores is reached he will not discourage full discussion upon that important question. Again, I am particularly anxious that the question of breech-loading, into which we went last year, and to which a great deal of attention has been directed, should be dealt with. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will give the assurance that this has not been lost sight of, and that the question is being worked out in practice, as well as considered by the Ordnance Committee which has been appointed. Above all, I hope it will be bound in mind that while the Committee are sitting time is going on, and that other nations are not arming their ships with the class of guns made a few years ago. I trust, therefore, when we reach the discussion of these matters, the right hon. Gentleman will be able to state what progress has been made. Again, the subject of magazine arms is being followed up in other countries with great assiduity, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will he able to say that it is receiving his best attention. There is another point upon which I wish to ask a question, and perhaps I can more conveniently ask it now, putting it in the form of a separate query. It is as to the assimilation of uniforms between the Line and the Militia. As many officers, it is well known, are now joining the Militia for the purpose of passing into the Line, it suggests itself whether it would not be well, in order to save expense, to young officers, to allow them, in anticipation of what was to take place in July, to get the clothing, whatever it might be, in which they would hereafter have to appear. I ask pardon of the right hon. Gentleman and of the Committee for having so long intervened between the Government and the Vote; but the right hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members will see that this is the first occasion on which I have been able to explain in detail the position of the late Government in respect to many of the important changes which are now proposed, and for that reason I hope I shall be excused by the Committee. The changes which the right hon. Gentleman suggests are changes the importance of which no one can deny, and I am not disposed to underrate them, or to under-estimate the difficulty the right hon. Gentleman must meet with in regard to the formation of his territorial regiments, and the many other changes connected therewith; but what I hope the right hon. Gentleman will give us to understand is that those changes, important as they are, are not to be looked upon as final measures, but rather as a means to other measures which are to follow hereafter. I am quite aware that, although the Service does not lightly adopt every new idea, and although an instinctive common sense—rough if you please, but not on that account the less genuine—shows us where foreign ideas cannot be grafted into the working of the military institutions of this country, those persons have much misrepresented the Service who have said that it is opposed to progress or advancement in military science. I am quite sure that all who approach these questions in an earnest and single-hearted spirit will find that spirit responded to on behalf of the Service itself. I believe that the officers of our Service, yielding as they do to no officers in gallantry, will yield to the officers of few Services in devotion to that which they believe to be for the good of the Army and of their country. I believe there is no demand which the right hon. Gentleman can make which will be otherwise than thoroughly well responded to by the bulk of the officers; and, although it may have been at times the fashion to leave out of sight and look down upon the earnest work done by regimental officers, I am quite sure that the right hon. Gentleman, as he finds occasion to go more closely into matters relating to the Army, will not withhold from them that tribute and meed of approbation which undoubtedly for many years their exertions have well merited. Credit is due to the officers of Her Majesty's Service for the cordial manner in which, whenever they hear it pronounced by the firm lips of authority that certain changes have become necessary, they have accepted those changes and worked them in with all the best traditions of the Service, and endeavoured honestly and loyally to give effect to them. I trust that this will continue to be the case, and that the right hon. Gentleman will find his efforts for the benefit of the Army responded to in that spirit; and it is with an earnest desire to see those great reforms—great as they are in themselves, yet proving only the forerunners of other reforms to come—carried out to their logical conclusion, that I again tender to the right hon. Gentleman my earnest congratulations on the able statement which we have heard.

COLONEL COLTHURST

said, that to him it was a matter of great regret that the right hon. Gentleman had omitted an important matter from the proposed reforms. No one felt the value of the changes which the Secretary of State for War was about to introduce more than he (Colonel Colthurst). Inducements had been given to non-commissioned officers to re-engage themselves for pensions, and, so far, he had sought to remove the canker that was eating into the Service; but the right hon. Gentleman had disregarded the recommendations of Lord Airey's Committee, and also, he might almost say, the consensus of military opinion, by declining to allow even so small a percentage as 25 per cent of soldiers, not non-commis- sioned officers, to re-engage for pensions. Lord Airey's Committee had submitted to 124 officers commanding battalions and depôt brigades this question of the reengagement of private soldiers, and 90 out of that number had expressed themselves in favour of allowing 20 per cent of the men to re-enlist for pensions. Some of the most distinguished generals were in favour of the retention of a certain proportion of private soldiers in the Army. Lord Napier of Magdala, for instance, spoke most favourably of the plan. Sir Patrick MacDougall, who might be considered the most earnest advocate of the new system, was in favour of 20 per cent, including officers, being allowed to re-engage. He was aware there were others, and amongst them some distinguished men—Sir Garnet Wolseley, for instance—who took a different view of the relative value of old and young soldiers. Sir Garnet had declared his readiness to go into a campaign with regiments entirely composed of young soldiers; but he ventured to think that, distinguished as Sir Garnet Wolseley's services had been, they had not been of a nature to warrant his opinion in this matter being looked upon as infallible. The campaigns that officer had been engaged in, owing, no doubt, to his own talents, but also to circumstances, had been short, and had not afforded that experience which was necessary to obtain acceptance for his opinion on such a point. On the other hand, Sir Frederick Roberts, who had had the experience of a severe campaign in Afghanistan, where the endurance of our soldiers had been tested beyond anything that had happened of late years, had distinctly stated that regiments composed of young soldiers were worth very little indeed, old soldiers being so much better fitted for difficult and arduous service than young ones. Anyone who had had the honour of commanding a regiment must be aware that there were a large number of men in it who did not possess the educational abilities which were now required for promotion, and who, therefore; could never rise from the ranks. These men might be most valuable, and their presence in the regiment after long service, in time either of peace or war, would be a most valuable factor in the stability and efficiency of the regiment. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would re-consider the matter. He had said that this question of pensions was one for the consideration of the Executive Government; but he (Colonel Colthurst) would put it to him that there was no better inducement they could offer to men to join the Army than fair pensions, and that no money could be better spent in the country than that spent in giving those pensions to a certain number of old soldiers, whether they were non-commissioned officers or privates. He would not further trespass on the time of the Committee, but would commend this matter to the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government. There was a question, again, of the quartermasters. These men had a grievance which had not been quite met; but the matter would be brought before the Committee by others better than he could bring it before them, consequently he would not say much about it. He trusted, however, that the grievance would be redressed. When the warrant officers were appointed there were a certain number of quartermasters in the Army Service Corps; and the warrant officers, therefore, had reasonable hope of becoming quartermasters in a certain number of years. The establishment of quartermasters, however, had been suddenly reduced, there being now, in fact, 35 in excess of the requirements. The position of the warrant officers was worse than it used to be. It was anomalous; they did the duty of officers, and yet they had to live with the men, and had no right to married quarters; they had to travel with the men and billet with the men, and had even to sleep in the same beds with the privates; they had not a sufficient allowance for servants, and could not get servants, owing to the duties the privates had to perform. He trusted that their case would be taken into consideration, if not at present, at any rate on some future occasion.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

was certain there was no one who had listened to the Statement of the Secretary of State for War a fortnight ago but must have felt that in it were contained measures of the greatest importance to the Army, and also measures deserving the most serious consideration of the Committee and the country. He ventured to say—and in that he differed a little from the right hon. and gallant Gentleman who had spoken from the Front Opposition Bench (Colonel Stanley)—that changes should not be made so rapidly and so often, because they were perfectly aware that unless the men knew exactly what were the ditties they had to perform they would not so readily enlist. When people thought that changes were coming about, recruits came in but slowly; the recruits liked to be fully aware of the conditions on which they were entering the Service. They had to thank his right hon. Friend for the statement he had placed on the Table, and which every hon. Member had received, and which showed the changes which he proposed to carry out. Those changes were, first with regard to the short service, secondly with regard I to localization, and lastly with regard to retirement and the promotion of officers consequent upon the abolition of Purchase. But, before he went into either of those changes, he would thank the right hon. Gentleman for the kind expressions he had used towards the Auxiliary and Reserve Forces, and for those honours which Her Majesty had been graciously pleased to intimate she would confer upon them for services rendered. These honours would be fully and gratefully accepted by the officers on whom they were to be conferred. There was One point with regard to the Volunteers, and only one point, which he wished to allude to, and that was as to their going into the Reserve. Now, he, for one, entirely disagreed with that proposal, and would point out that the Volunteer Force was formed for the defence of this country, and for that alone. The training of men in the Volunteers, worked as it had been by the greatest spirit, was yet not a training which would fit the men for the work of the Reserve which they might be called on any day to perform. More than that, these men were engaged in performing certain duties and employments in their different occupations, which duties they were thoroughly acquainted with, and if they were to be liable to be called out at any time by going into the Reserves, what would their employers say, and would they not look on the Service in a very different light to that in which they looked upon it at present? Let the Volunteers remain as they were now for a great, a good, and, he hoped, a most useful purpose. Do not attempt to alter them from what they were. It would be found that, in cases of great emergency, we had a body of over 200,000, men who had endeavoured, and were endeavouring, to learn their duty thoroughly, who were exceedingly good shots, and who in time of need might be of great service to the country. Turning to the system of short service, that system, no doubt, had been approved of by some and condemned by others; and, while he thought that the right hon. Gentleman had done wisely in dealing with the short service, yet he did not think he had dealt with it quite in a satisfactory way. They all knew perfectly well that it took a considerable time to make a good, useful, and efficient soldier; and if anything was needed to prove that, it was these small campaigns which had recently taken place in which our soldiers had been engaged. These small campaigns had clearly shown how lamentably deficient we were in good shots, and what a long time it took young soldiers to get properly and efficiently used to the Martini-Henry rifle. Another point was the necessity of training officers in connection with full complements of men, because, under the present system, they did duty with only a handful of men; and the result was that when they were in campaign they felt the want of experience, and were unused to the conditions in which they had to operate. He would venture to say that, looking at the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman to increase the time for service in the Colonies and in India to seven years, with a possibility of its being raised to eight, he believed that the right hon. Gentleman would get an equal number of men if he were to say he would take them for eight years for foreign service. If the right hon. Gentleman were bold enough to say that men should be enlisted for foreign service for eight years—and he was going to say for eight years in the Reserve, but then there was the question of pensions—and he believed there were men who would enlist under the colours for eight years, and eight years in the Reserve—he ventured to say that the right hon. Gentleman would have a better class of men to deal with than he had at the present moment. [Mr. CHILDERS said, the period would be eight years in the Indian Service.] That was so; but the facts were not clearly enough shown in the Statement. He understood by the scheme a man might go to the Colonies and then to India, and then there might be a difficulty as to his knowing the exact time he had to serve; and if there was one thing a man hated more than another it was uncertainty upon that point. He considered it would be much better for a regiment to go out 1,000 strong for eight years instead of going for 16 years, as proposed, which must be very hard upon the Staff and other individuals, as they could not be classed as proposed by the right hon. Gentleman; in fact, he did not see how the battalions were to be relieved. When such wars as the Zulu War, or the war now going on in the Transvaal, occurred, they had to get more men; and they would find they had not enough battalions at home under the system they were now asked to pronounce to be the best system going. He should like to know that in future there would not be such a break down of the system as there had been lately. They knew what had been stated with regard to the short service; and what was the effect in the country of a speech delivered at the Mansion House by a distinguished officer; they also knew what had been the effect of the article in The Nineteenth Century, written by another gallant officer. The officers of the Army felt that the gallant officer who had written in The Nineteenth Century had made a great mistake when he condemned them wholesale for not wishing to do their duty. ["No, no!"] Well, anybody who read the article would see that he was only stating the fact. He had in his pocket at that moment a pile of letters complaining of that article; and he was firmly convinced that the hon. and gallant General would never have written the article if he had known the pain that he was creating by so doing. He differed entirely from the hon. and gallant General, who showed in his article that he had never had experience as a regimental officer in command of a regiment. If he had had that experience it would have taught him the value of regimental officers, and the anxiety of those officers to learn their duty. It was this that created the esprit de corps which distinguished the Service, and which enabled an officer to depend upon his troops—for an officer knew what his men would do when he had thorough confidence in the regiment, and the regiment in their officers. The top stone of the right hon. Gentleman's scheme, and the best thing in the whole of his proposals, was that relating to the non-commissioned officers. That would recommend itself to the Committee and to the country, because the right hon. Gentleman had clearly shown that he knew what was the backbone of the British Army. Nothing could be more important to the men, or give better results, than that a non-commissioned officer should have the opportunity of saying whether he would serve for 21 years or not. If the men knew that they might rise to the rank of serjeant, and receive a pension after 21 years' service, we should have more prospect of getting the better class of recruits the country was anxious to obtain. Experience had shown that we had now in the Reserve many men who would have availed themselves of the opportunity of serving for 21 years if the system had allowed them. We had seen the men of the Reserves tramping the country; and he would put it to the Committee whether that was a creditable thing for an Empire like ours? By improving the prospect of obtaining a pension they would get a better class of men; and the men they wanted to get were those who would be able to return to some good occupation when they left the Service. These men who were now tramping the country were the men who would have been willing to serve in the Army for a far longer time than that for which they were enlisted. When they became strong and well-trained, they made really good soldiers; but when we turned them away after three years, not only did we injure the Army, but did the men a great injustice. With regard to the localization scheme, he was not going to discuss it at that moment. He knew there were many heart-burnings about doing away with the title of the old regiments. It had, by anticipation, annoyed, and he had been going to say disgusted, a large number of people; and he did not think the territorial titles would be used very long. When commanding officers came to send home their statements, the numbers alone would, in a short time, be given. The right hon. Gentleman, he thought, had made a mistake when he had increased the number of kilted regiments; for the greatest difficulty was at present experienced in getting men to fill up the vacancies in the Highland regiments. His own county regiment, the 35th, at the depôt at Chichester, with the 107th, had enrolled a large number of recruits. They had more recruits than they wanted, and what happened? Why, these men who had enlisted into the Royal Sussex Regiment were, because men were wanted elsewhere, sent to Scotland and put into kilts. The Lowlanders from his county, accustomed to the furze bushes of their own district, were sent up and put into kilts, perhaps the very last thing they desired when they enlisted. Did the right hon. Gentleman mean to say that the depôt centres were to furnish all the recruits for the two battalions of the Line and the two battalions of Militia? because if he did not the whole system again would break down. In many counties there was only one regiment of Militia, and he wished to know whither he was going to raise the other regiment? The question was an important one, and one which ought not to be passed by lightly, because it must be borne in mind that this scheme would be on its trial. Another consideration was that of the Reserve, especially the Militia Reserve, which was, no doubt, very valuable, but which he held should be entirely and absolutely distinct from the Militia regiments. And he also considered that, in case of war, both the Army and the Militia Reserves should be absolutely made use of. At present, they were no use; and the Government would have to beg, borrow, or steal from other regiments to make up a battalion. But they ought to make the Reserve at each depôt so complete that it would fill up the battalions; and whenever they drew from the Militia Reserve they should enlist a sufficient number of new men into that Reserve at once. Those were points well deserving of the consideration of the right hon. Gentleman. Then there was another important point, and that was the question of the First Army Corps. We had had a First Army Corps before; but, when wanted, it had never been found to be in an efficient or complete state. What the country required was an Army Corps fit to embark at any moment, with commissariat, transport, ammunition, &c., all complete, and that was what he understood that the right hon. Gentleman intended to provide. But if occasion occurred, would some of the regiments be sent abroad? [Mr. CHILDERS: No.] He (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) was glad to find that the Corps was to remain intact; but, if so, the Government, he feared, would have to take men away from other regiments, and he would like to know where they were to come from. He did not see that we were going to benefit by a single additional man; and what he wanted the right hon. Gentleman to explain was how he would keep up the flow of numbers in the regiments, and how he would secure that we should always have regiments fit and in good order ready to embark at a moment's notice. He urged that we ought to have a Corps d' Armée always complete, and that there should be a Commander of that Corps d' Armée with other generals under him, so that we might feel that we had some men who were capable of taking command. There were many men who had not yet had an opportunity or chance of taking command, but who might be sent abroad to-morrow to take command in the field. This was one of the first considerations the Secretary of State for War ought to take into account. Then there was the question of the commissariat and transport. Unless the Army Corps was complete in every respect it would not be ready for service. What was wanted was an Army Corps complete at every point. There were one or two more important points, especially with regard to the officers. He most deeply regretted that the right hon. Gentleman was going to curtail the number of officers. It might be taken as a broad fact and a general rule that there should be three officers to every 100 men; and when we saw in the Franco-German War the effect of the loss of officers, and when we remembered the shortness of officers in our own campaigns, even in the last Afghan campaign, and when we considered the differences of climate which our officers had to undergo, was it wise to curtail the number of officers simply to reduce the expenditure? The Army was the great insurance for the country. Let us pay for it manfully and honestly, without any waste, but not cut down one of the most important things in the Army—the number of the officers. Then there was the question of the two lieutenant-colonels and four majors for an Infantry regiment; and he should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman what the second lieutenant-colonel was to do, and what the four majors were to do. There was something which, he hoped, was a visionary flash, about double companies; but he hoped nothing of the sort was contemplated. If men were to be made majors they should still command their companies, as captains and lieutenant-colonels did in the Guards. It was important that each man should command his own company, the great consideration in the Army being to make each officer responsible for the part he commanded. If they gave officers the credit of keeping their companies in order they would do much to strengthen the esprit de corps of the regiment. Then, why were Cavalry regiments to have only one colonel? Had the right hon. Gentleman considered what would be the effect upon Cavalry colonels; or, having two in the Infantry and only one in the Cavalry, how unfair it would be to Cavalry officers with regard to promotion? As to the two Infantry colonels, he must point out that no man would command a regiment more than two and a-half years; because, after five years, each colonel would be put on the shelf, and if a major got his promotion to lieutenant-colonel in a regiment of which a colonel had had command for two and a-half years, he would have to wait two and a-half years before he got command of the regiment; and then he could only retain the command for another two and a-half years. He would venture to say that the most mischievous thing ever done was the introduction of the five years' service for colonels. He believed it had done more mischief than anything else that could be imagined. It had been good for promotion; but if a man had a regiment put into his command on its return, say, from India, for five years, he had barely time to get it into good order, when he had to leave, and his successor got all the credit. More than that, it seemed to be thought that if a man had command of a regiment for five years he had learnt all he could learn. He thought that was not the case; and if they put a man on one side, in what position was he when they called upon him to do duty again? The right hon. Gentleman had been but a short time at the War Office, and he had tried to make himself acquainted with Army matters; but there were so many details that he would defy any man who had not been there for a number of years, and who had not had considerable experience, to master all the details of those matters. It was only by free discussion of the right hon. Gentleman's proposal that the subject could be brought before the Committee or the country. He wished to give the right hon. Gentleman credit for what he was going to do for quartermasters and riding-masters; but with regard to the general officers he must point out one consideration. Major-generals might be retired, after a certain number of years, on £700 a-year, though they might be receiving good-conduct pay, and believed that they would in future get commands of regiments. It was deserving of consideration that every man was now to be put on precisely the same level, whatever he might have done, or however deserving an officer he might be. He made these remarks with no carping spirit, but with a desire to assist the right hon. Gentleman, and he must press strongly upon him the importance of eight years' service, and as long a time in the Reserve as possible, and in the case of war another year's service, because the longer we could secure men who had been inured to a soldier's life the better it would be for the country. He wished the right hon. Gentleman every success; but he urged him fairly to consider the matters he had mentioned, believing that in making the scheme as perfect as possible he would have done more than he first thought of doing for the benefit of the Service and the interest of the country.

SIR HARRY VERNEY

also wished to make a few suggestions to the Secretary of State for War. He thought the right hon. Gentleman would agree that whatever was necessary to enable a soldier to do his duty ought to be given him by the state, and that it was hard upon soldiers that when they went to sea they should have to pay for their own sea kits. They ought to have their sea kits supplied to them. Of course that would involve considerable expense; but we must recollect that our Army and Navy were the cheapest insurances of the objects most precious in the world. Then, as to the men's gloves, why should the soldiers have to pay for them? If they were necessary for the proper performance of their duty they ought to be supplied to the soldiers. Events of the last few months had put our country in a much worse position in the eyes of Europe than it was ever before. He ventured to say that the defeats we had suffered had lowered our military estimation, and that made it all the more important that our Army should be rendered as efficient as possible. Higher requirements of capacity in all branches of the Service would render the Army more interesting to the officers and to the men, and we should get a better class of men into it in consequence. Then, with regard to the officers in the Intelligence Department. In other armies they had the opportunity of seeing large masses of men together, and the greatest possible care was taken in giving them opportunities of studying for their Department; but in our "Intelligence Department" we had only eight officers. At Berlin he had found more than 40 in the Ober Stat. And what was the reason of Sir Garnet Wolseley's successes in the Red River Expedition? The fact that we were acquainted with the country. That war cost something under £100,000, and the reason why the Abyssinian War cost so much more was our ignorance of the country. The Intelligence Department was one of the most important Departments for the welfare of the Army; and, although the officers engaged in that Department were admirable officers, it was certainly one which was of a very limited description compared with what it ought to be. In our defeat at Isandlana the General in command did not know where the enemy were; but if he had had a perfectly organized and efficient Intelligence Staff, he would have been aware that the enemy were near him, and he would not have sustained that lamentable defeat—the first of our South African disasters. Then, with regard to shooting. At present we had only one shooting station—Shorncliffe. At one time we had also Fleetwood. We ought to have several ranges where the men ought to be taught accurate shooting, and encouragement given to the best shots. There was hardly any respect in which our men were so defective as in accurate shooting. We had, no doubt, suffered very much from that in past wars; and in the Transvaal our enemies were much better marksmen than our men. As to the non-commissioned officers and privates, he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would allow some of our old soldiers pensions. There were many duties in the Army which young men could not perform nearly so well as old ones; and he thought it would be desirable to allow some of the old soldiers to complete their 21 years' service, and so insure a pension. Also there were many small offices under Government which old soldiers and old sailors could perfectly well fill; and he thought Members of Parliament ought to be willing to distribute such little bits of patronage as fell to them among men who had served their country, and who could perform the duties required as well as civilians. Another point he wished to mention was the uniforms of officers, which he thought ought to be plainer than they were. When the French and German Armies met at Sedan, the French officers were covered with Orders and lace, while the German officers were very simply dressed; and when the French Emperor surrendered his sword, the contrast between the highly-ornamented officers of the French Staff and the plainly-dressed officers of the German Staff was most remarkable. He approved of the principle of selection for promotion, believing that above a certain rank there ought certainly to be selection. That would throw a great responsibility on the Commander-in - Chief; but the Commander-in-Chief ought to be willing to take that responsibility in this matter. He was largely dependent upon the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General and the Military Secretary; and he thought that five years' service in those offices was not sufficient for those three officers. They could not learn their duties, making themselves acquainted with the capacity and qualifications of every officer above a certain rank, in less than three years; and that left them only two years in which to be able to inform and guide the Commander-in-Chief in ins selection of officers for important commands. He had a strong opinion that great injustice was done to the Guards in not sending them upon foreign service, and urged that they should have an opportunity of learning their duties under fire, which was the only way in which they could become really efficient soldiers.

GENERAL BURNABY

said, the matters they had now under consideration were the numerical force of the Army and its cost. In order to appreciate whether the numbers included in the Estimates were the relative proportions which the country should possess, it was desirable to review the forces that each Continental nation was capable of bringing into the field. The Estimate of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, in Schedule A, asked for a total number of 624,972 men, the present effectives, according to the last Returns, being 575,262; but the European Armies, including our own, were capable of bringing into the field 9,500,000. Consequently this country was only prepared to bring about 500,000 men into the field, as against the 9,000,000 supplied by the other European nations. Foremost among the Armies of the Continent was that of Russia, which, according to statistics supplied to him not long ago by the Military Intelligence Department of the State, numbered 2,500,000. The Austrian Army numbered, in round numbers, 1,300,000; the German Army, 1,700,000; and the French Army 1,080,000. Many hon. Members would be surprised to hear of the organization by which Italy was able to bring into the field, if an emergency should require it, no less an Army than 1,800,000 men. He had now named the principal and the largest Armies of the Continent; but it might be interesting at this moment to state what the numerical organization of the Turkish Army was compared with that of Greece. Turkey was prepared to bring into the field some 365,000 men, whereas Greece was not prepared to place in the field more than 24,000 men. Any force above that number that might be brought to bear at the present moment in the emergency which appeared to be threatening would be undrilled levies. He therefore thought, under all the circumstances, that England might congratulate herself upon not abstracting from the labour power of the country, and thereby fettering the industry of the country, for military purposes than absolutely seemed necessary. It now behoved him to enter into the consideration whether, under the modern appliances of warfare, and bearing in mind the vast possessions of the Empire, its extensive Frontiers, and their great distance from the Home basis of operations, the present strength of the British Army was sufficient. No doubt the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War considered it unnecessary to make any material increase in the establishment of the force; and with this preface, he (General Burnaby) would now make a few remarks upon the Papers which the right hon. Gentleman had placed in their hands. In the first place, he begged to thank the right hon. Gentleman for the clearness with which the Papers had been prepared by him and placed before the House. They made the whole matter perfectly intelligible; and he thought the clearness with which everything was now explained overcame, in a great measure, if not entirely, the complaints in regard to the delay of the want of adequate Reports. The Memorandum prepared by the right hon. Gentleman was distributed a few days ago. Looking at it categorically, he found the first portion of it concerned the stamina of the men. He thought himself that with regard to the stature of the men the chest measurement had not been sufficiently considered. He had always thought, and he thought so still, that it was advisable to apply the minimum of 34 inch chest measurement which was required in the Guards to a minimum stature of 5 feet 7 inches. No men, he thought, should be enlisted who were less than 34 inches in chest measurement. He believed it was now the practice, when a man under 5 feet 8 inches was enlisted, if he had a chest measurement of 33 inches to accept him. [An hon. MEMBER: No; 34 inches.] He thought it would be found, by reference to the General Order, that what he stated was really the case; if not, he was glad to hear of the improvement. He came next to the obliteration of the facings of some of the regiments. It was proposed that the facings of the English regiments should be of one colour, and of the Welsh regiments of another, and this would avoid a great deal of trouble to those who had to deal out the facings which had hitherto distinguished the various regiments. His friend, Colonel Hudson, who had had a great deal to say in regard to the organization of the clothing of the Army, once complained that there were no less than 17 different shades of green cloth, and the colonels of regiments were particular about having them of the proper shade. Personally, he was sorry to see that the facings were to be obliterated, and for this reason—the difference in the facings was of very great importance when several regiments, on some particular occasion, found themselves intermixed with each other, and had to rally. The distinction between the different facings, under such circumstances, enabled the men to rally upon each other more readily, and enabled their captains and section commanders to bring them together with much greater facility. He remembered a particular instance of this when he was commanding seven or eight battalions at Chobham at one of the Autumn Manœuvres. The men were in several lines of entrenchments on which an attack was made; and on that occasion, when these seven or eight battalions had to retire, and of necessity to do so, in an intermixed state, and rally preparatory to re-forming, the distinctive colours of the facings aided them materially in doing so. He might mention that in the Army of the United States they found it an advantage to have outside their great coats and outside their uniform, when on active service, a distinctive piece of cloth of particular shapes and colours—sometimes a diamond, sometimes a square, sometimes a trefoil which designated the particular brigade, division, and Corps d' Armée to which the men belonged. He sincerely trusted that the obliteration of the facings would not have a prejudicial effect; but he was very much inclined to believe that it might have. With regard to the colours and the carrying of them into action, he knew that there was a difference of opinion on the subject. He believed that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had received confidential Reports from the various commanding officers of regiments; but it was a subject in which the public also took great interest. Under the new system of drill, half-battalions had been brought prominently forward; and according to the new arrangement the Queen's colours were to take their place with the right half-battalion when it was separated from the other half-battalion, and the regimental colours would accompany the left half-battalion. This arrangement threw a great anxiety and responsibility on the commanders of battalions, by doubling the responsibility. Under the old system the two colours were kept together. He was of opinion that only one colour should be taken into action and the other left at home, and whether the colour so left should be the Queen's or the regimental colour was only a matter of Departmental detail. Personally, he should be sorry to see our regiments not taking one colour into action. With regard to the supply of small arms, it would be found that the number of revolvers dealt out to the English Army was very much less than that supplied to foreign Armies. If our officers attached to the United States Ministry had reported to the authorities of the Intelligence Department properly it would be found that a very large number of pistols had been sent both to the Russian and German Armies; that, in short, every officer and non-commissioned officer, and the entire Cavalry of those Armies were armed with revolvers of a very superior make. The hon. and gallant Member for Maidstone (Captain Aylmer) had raised the question of magazine guns. He (General Burnaby) knew that, as a matter of fact Russia of late had been buying magazine guns of superior make very largely, both for their naval and territorial service. These guns loaded from the feed fired 21 shot without reloading, and were of a very different description to those hitherto used. It was very necessary for our military authorities to take into serious consideration the advisability of enlarging the number of revolvers issued to British troops, and likewise to consider whether a certain number of them should not be supplied with magazine guns. He now proposed to make a few remarks with regard to the pay proposed to be given to non-commissioned officers. He, in common with every Member of the Committee, was led to consider whether that pay was conducive to the retention of the non-commissioned officers, and whether the inducements held out to these men in the shape of pay and pension was just and proper. When the Reserves were called out in 1878 he held the distinguished command of the Grenadier Guards, with an establishment of 5,950 men of all ranks. He was very particular, in making a record of the men who rejoined the regiment from the Reserves, to know what occupation they had when called out, and how much they were earning. He found that the average they were earning, irrespective of the 4d. a-day reserve pay, was precisely £1 1s. 5 3/7d. a-week. He also made it his duty to ascertain whether the men were able to resume the employment from whence they came, and he learned that in the great majority of cases they were able to do so. Allowance must be made for the time of the year the Reserves were disbanded, inasmuch as those who did not obtain their old employment were engaged in the harvest then going on, and on this account the average weekly earnings were slightly increased to £1 2s. 7 1/10d. Now, if they wished to obtain the services of good noncommissioned officers for the Army the men must be properly compensated. The Return from which he had thus quoted he would gladly place in the hands of the right hon. Gentleman and his Staff, inasmuch as it would assist the Department in arriving at what should be the pay of the non-commissioned officers of the Army. That was an important point, for the non-commissioned officers, and especially those in the Cavalry, were indispensable in carrying on the régime of our Army,—our small and useful Army as it had been termed—and this particularly with a short service system. He was disposed to think that the right hon. Gentleman had proposed a step in the right direction in respect to the length of service. Whether the step was as big as it might be was a matter of doubt even amongst his own comrades. Some years ago the country awoke, in its wonted spasmodic way, to the fact that her national defences were inadequate. At that time we had one of the little Cape wars on our hands—wars which were at once distressing and inglorious. In The Life of the Prince Consort it was said it must not be forgotten that it was for attack that England always bad used her forces, and most probably would always continue to use them, on the principle that the best parry is a vigorous attack, and that, for the purposes of attack, it is not well that our regiments should be drained of their oldest soldiers; and the late Duke of Wellington wrote to the Prince Consort that the life and soul of a regiment, company, or squad, was the old soldier who had served for 10 years and had attained 27 or 28 years of age. He (General Burnaby) had bad some experience in these matters, and he thought it very indispensable to have a certain proportion of old soldiers in a regiment to leaven the young men. The example of old soldiers, whether at home or on active service, was most beneficial, and it was always made a point in the Brigade of Guards that a certain number of old soldiers should be quartered at the recruit depôt, so that by their example and demeanour they might lead the young soldiers in the right way. It was felt that they had not got that sufficiency of old soldiers which they believed was essential. He now came to the establishments of the regiments, and would venture to compare them with those existing at the time of the Crimean War—no doubt a more favourable time than the present. At that time the Brigade of Guards were sent out; but what happened? They went out 1,200 strong; but during the war they had to send out drafts amounting to another 1,200 to replace those previously sent. It was interesting to remember what they were able to do in 1878—only a few years ago—when the Brigade of Guards prepared a brigade for the emergency which was then on the tapis, and which threatened war. The 2nd battalion of the Grenadier Guards was ordered to get ready and place itself upon a war footing. It searched for its Army Reserve men, and found it had 54. It then applied to the first battalion for 212 men, and to the third battalion for 211; 477 men, therefore, were required to bring the battalion up to its war establishment. The total number of inefficients then serving in that single battalion was 259. A certain number of these were pronounced disqualified from youth, and likewise from age. He and those officers of the Guards whom he had consulted, and with whom he was in daily relation, believed their system was not the most economical system, or one conducive to having a body of men ready to take the field upon any emergency. The system tended to the retention of useless men for pension. The Committee knew full well how tenaciously a man who had served, say 16 years, would persevere in the Service when he knew that after 21 years' service he was entitled to a pension. He was afraid that not only in the Brigade of Guards, but throughout the Army, there were a great many useless men. It would, however, considering their length of service, be a most ungracious thing to cause them to re- tire unless they were given something to satisfy them. Nothing did so much harm to our recruiting system—and it must be borne in mind that that system was purely voluntary—than to send dissatisfied men, or men with a grievance, back to their native villages. Of this he might be permitted to give an illustration, which he thought would not be uninteresting. It so happened that a desire was expressed in his native county—Leicestershire—that, upon a certain occasion, all the men in the county having medals should assemble and dine together. He ascertained that there were about 500 of such men, and of this number 450 assembled. They represented the actions of England from Corunna and Coomassie, and from this fact alone it can be easily conceived how interesting the gathering was. There were some villages which sent several men, and he was anxious to ascertain why these villages with so many veterans had not contributed more recruits to the present Army. He learned that it was in consequence of some grievance these veterans had that no men belonging to their villages would enlist. From the experiences of the old soldiers the young men of the place thought the Army was shabbily treated. That was why it was important that proper attention should be paid to the claims of the retiring men. It ought to be remembered that the very proper reforms proposed by the right hon. Gentleman were to be carried out at the expense of a great reduction of officers. The reforms were important and beneficial; but the nation ought to contribute to them, and not merely the officers. He had already shown that the number of men in the Brigade of Guards, found inefficient when an emergency arose, was large. It was not only large when the emergency of 1878 took place, but it was likewise large when they had to send two battalions to Canada in 1861. In the time of the Crimea the country was unable to supply the regiment with proper drafts, and recourse was had to foreign mercenaries. For the purposes of defence we no longer required foreigners; but it must be carefully considered whether the price paid to our Army was such that upon an emergency we need not take alarm. He had instanced that 1,200 Grenadier Guards were sent to the Crimea, and what happened in their case he was confident occurred in the case of many regiments. Reinforcements were required to the extent of 1,258. They went out in February, and the Home battalions were unable to make the supplies demanded of them as many other battalions were. It was in the spring of that year the Emperor of the French came over to this country; he forgot now at what station his Imperial Highness arrived in London; but the Brigade of Guards were desired to furnish a complimentary guard of honour. Such was the number to which the Guards were reduced that two or three omnibuses had to convey them by a roundabout route from Charing Cross—supposing that was the station at which the Emperor arrived—to the second point at which the Guards were required to present arms. It was not desirable the Guards should be reduced to such straits, and he wished to avoid it in the future. It was, however, upon other grounds he suggested the Brigade of Guards should be made into three regiments of nine battalions in all, three in each—namely, Grenadiers, Coldstreams, and Scots Guards; so that there should always be one division stationed at Aldershot, undergoing training, to which he attached considerable importance. In that case there would be one division always ready for service, another in support, and one into which the young men unable to take the field would be transferred. He was quite aware the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers) would say this would be expensive in the shape of a few more officers; but they had their recruiting establishment at Caterham, and they had sufficient non-commissioned officers who should be able to carry on the Staff duties without any increase in their number. They would then be able to feed the service battalions. He hardly liked to suggest it; but there was one Highland regiment which had been left out in the cold. He did not know how it would like to be included in the arrangement he suggested by forming the 3rd battalion to the Scots Guards; but he might mention that the 3rd battalion of the Grenadier Guards emanated from a battalion of Marines; and he, who had had the proud distinction of commanding the 3rd battalion of Guards appreciated that fact. There was another point to which he wished to direct the attention of the Secretary of State for War, and that was that the Guards felt they had no opportunities of taking part in those Border or Frontier wars in which England was often engaged. Officers might volunteer and be accepted; but non-commissioned officers and privates in the Guards had volunteered; but they were unable to obtain foreign service, and that was a matter of very grave consideration. It was only last week a deserving old noncommissioned officer of the Grenadier Guards—his name was Mallender—sought to obtain that which otherwise he would have had a pretty good chance of getting, it was the post of one of the Yeomen of the Guard. "Have you any medals," he was asked. "No," he replied. "Well," he was told, "we only want men with medals, so that they may appear with them in the corridors." He (General Burnaby) assured the Committee the officers of the Guards felt they had not had an opportunity, for the last quarter of a century, of taking part in any campaign. The only other subject upon which he would now speak was that of the quartermasters. He considered the quartermasters had been well dealt with; but they had a grievance. They felt, as he had previously mentioned, that the right hon. Gentleman was taking out of the four corners of the Estimate a big corner from them. Whether they were right or wrong he would not say; but they argued that the difference of service at which they should retire—namely, from 48 to 55 years of age, would give the right hon. Gentleman £290,000 to devote to other purposes. They might be wrong, but that was what they maintained; and if the Secretary of State for War could clear up the point it would be extremely wise for him to do so. They believed that to their detriment the right hon. Gentleman had enriched himself, and enabled himself to do those things upon which he so justly prided himself. Then the quartermasters of Artillery said that the good-service pensions were taken away in 1865, and transferred to the Coast Brigade. Whether that was intended to be only temporary, inasmuch as it was an innovation, had never appeared in the explanatory official notes. If the pensions were to revert to the quartermasters of the Royal Artillery he believed they would be satisfied. On the other hand, if they were taken away altogether, it would be felt as a great hardship by men who believed they performed duties more onerous than their brethren of the Coastguard Brigade.

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON

said, that he had a few remarks to make on the proposals of the Secretary of State for War, as to Army Organization, short service, and compulsory retirement. He regretted that the Memorandum on organization issued on the previous day had not been forthcoming at the commencement of the Session. He could see no reason why that had not been done. It was so intricate that hon. Members had really no opportunity of duly considering its details. It was proposed, in the first place, that four aides-de-camp to the Queen should be appointed from officers of the Volunteers. Nobody could object to that. But it was further proposed that four Knight Commander-ships and 25 Companionships of the Civil Order of the Bath were to be "reserved for officers of the Militia Forces." He would like some explanation of this proposal. He should like to know what, in future, would be the Militia Forces, because, as the Militia was to be amalgamated with the regiments of the Line, and these were to form one regiment, he could hardly suppose that in future they would be called Auxiliary Forces. Did the expression used mean that these honours were to be "reserved" from others, or that they were to be created in addition? If these honours were to be given to the Militia, why should they be of the Civil Division of the Order? If the Militia were to be amalgamated with the Army, what an anomaly it would be to have part of the regiment receiving the rewards of the Military Division of the Bath, and the other part the rewards of the Civil Division. If that were intended the separation which had hitherto existed as between the Line and the Militia would still be maintained; and he could see nothing in the proposed arrangement that would tend to the benefit of the Militia or of the Line. Again, he saw that after 15 years' service non-commissioned officers of the Line were to be liable to be transferred to the permanent Staff of the Militia battalions. He trusted the Secretary of State for War would reconsider this step, because, in his opinion, there could be no greater error than to transfer the non-commissioned officers of the Army to the Militia, where they would be relegated to work to which they were totally unaccustomed. If they were good soldiers he should think it better for them to remain in the Army and receive a pension. He trusted that some means would be found to allow the old soldiers to extend their service beyond 12 years, notwithstanding that the Memorandum restricted this to artificers and musicians, because he was of opinion that a leavening of old soldiers was most valuable to a regiment. Again, he was utterly at a loss to understand the arrangement with regard to the maintenance of the strength of the battalions for Home and Colonial service. The regiments sent out on relief would be reduced by 150 rank and file, and he desired to know how these men were to be disposed of. In referring to the statement on page 7, which related to the command of regiments, he should confine his remarks to the Infantry, which, although the other branches of the Service were, of course, most important and necessary, constituted the backbone of the Army. He found there were to be two lieutenant-colonels and four majors added to each regiment. Now, he wished the right hon. Gentleman would state on what principle that addition was to be made? He assumed that the Infantry of the Line was formed in that mode which was most suitable for attacking and defeating the enemy. It was with that object they were maintained by the country. A few years ago the method of attack had been altered, and it was then arranged to place each half of the battalion under the command of one major; both attacking and working as different bodies under the general control of the commanding officer of the regiment. That was now the general system of attack, and it was, as he believed, a good one. How, then, was that system to be carried out when the regiments had four majors instead of two, as he presumed, under the two lieutenant-colonels? Formerly there were two majors under one lieutenant-colonel; but now there were to be four majors under two lieutenant-colonels. He would also like to know what were to be the duties of the two lieutenant-colonels and the four majors. In what way, again, were the old captains of the companies to be employed? The work to be cast upon the majors of the regiment, in addition to their other duties, and of which explanation was given, appeared to him to be more than any one man could perform with efficiency. He trusted the right hon. Gentleman would afford an explanation upon that point, and would point out to him that the officers of the Army were looking forward with intense interest to the explanation that would be given. They wanted to know if they were to be relegated to inferior duty, and if so, what that duty would be. Again, on page 5 of the Memorandum he found that in future the regiments going to India and other places abroad were to remain out of the country for 16 years. That was a point of the greatest importance, and he could hardly think the right hon. Gentleman had considered it in all its bearings. It was said that the officers and men were to return after eight years; but, if that was to be the case, he asked how could there be any saving of expense? He certainly could not see that the new system would effect a saving of expense. As a friend had remarked to him, all that would be saved would be the expense of sending backward and forward the regimental plate chest. He could not think the system a good one under which a regiment would be in India practically for 32 years, during which time it would be shut off from the Colonial service of the country. The right hon. Gentleman said he did not like the local corps in India; but he (Sir Alexander Gordon) must point out to him that the system of sending regiments to India for 32 years meant really local service in its most objectionable form. If the right hon. Gentleman would prepare a roster of foreign service for a regiment during the next 50 years, he would see how the system would work. For his own part, he had grave doubts that it would work satisfactorily. He trusted the right hon. Gentleman would have the roster which he suggested prepared. The next subject he would refer to was that of compulsory retirement, concerning which he thought the proposals of the Secretary of State for War were of the most alarming character. At the time when Mr. Gathorne Hardy was Secretary of State for War, the system of compulsory retirement now in force was first proposed. He had given that system his opposition in Committee, and had endeavoured to point out how fatal a sys- tem of retirement it would be. The country now had only an experience of four years of the system, and it was found to be intolerable. It was, as the officers in the Service said, most unjust for the officer and unwise for the State. Under it the very officers whom the State ought to retain were sent away to make room for young gentlemen fresh from the nursery. Therefore, he trusted that compulsory retirement would be abolished. The right hon. Gentleman had, however, said he would not reduce the number of captains; he only intended to reduce the number of majors, colonels, and generals. It appeared to him that the remedy was worse than the disease, for it was much worse for a man to be forced to retire a major than as captain. The captain might engage in commerce or take up any other occupation; but, as a rule, the major could not do so. Turning to another subject, he entirely concurred with the remarks of the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) about Scotch regiments. He thought at one time that he might live to see the day when kilted regiments would be done away with, as unsuitable for a soldier's dress. But he never expected to live to see the day when four additional kilt regiments would be added to the English Army, and he was quite amassed to see it. He would tell the Committee how it stood with the Gordon Highlanders. The 75th regiment was allotted to be joined with the Gordon Highlanders. It would be found, from a Parliamentary Paper laid before the House in 1878, that the 75th Regiment then had one Scotch officer and 38 Scotch non-commissioned officers and men, and the 750 other men were all Englishmen and Irishmen, and yet they were going to put these men into kilts and make them fight our battles. Was that a practical system? He had worn the kilt, and he knew its advantages; but if he had to sleep in a ploughed field, which soldiers had sometimes to do, give him anything else but the kilt. Some hon. Members, perhaps, had seen the Aberdeenshire Militia at the Salisbury Review, on which occasion they were probably the finest regiment in the field. They were then in trousers, amid their smartness was much admired. Subsequently, however, the officers developed an ambition to appear at a ball in kilts, and ultimately they got the whole regiment into the kilt. What was the consequence? The regiment had not been able to raise a second battalion. How, then, could the Aberdeenshire Militia find, as it was proposed, recruits for the 97th and 75th Regiments? Nobody ever saw a Highlander wearing a kilt for his own pleasure; nor following the plough dressed in a kilt. One never saw a Highlander wearing a kilt unless he had put it on to please an Englishman in whose service he was. The proposal of the right hon. Gentleman would make it necessary in time of war, when calling for volunteers to replace losses, to give an entirely now kind of dress to men who had been accustomed to wear trousers; and, therefore, he trusted it would not be carried out. Coming next to the question of the length of service, he was an advocate for a service of seven or eight years. His objection to the present system was not that it was one of short service, but that men were induced to go into the Reserve after three years. For his own part, he thought a man should not enter the Reserve before he had served six years. After he had gained that amount of experience he might be called a soldier; which certainly could not be said of the man who had only served three years. The right hon. Gentleman had told the House, on a former occasion, that the average age of soldiers was greater now than it was in 1871; and he stated that in 1871 there were in the Service 190 men per 1,000 under the age of 20, whereas, now, there were only 106 per 1,000 under that age. He therefore concluded he had, on the whole, men of a more suitable age for the Service. But this was arrived at by including the men who went in for three years' service. Under the present system, then, we had young men fighting the battles of the country, and old soldiers quietly serving in the Reserve. For this reason he thought the right hon. Gentleman, upon examination, would find his argument a little fallacious. He had, he thought, been carried away, to seine extent, by the theory which prevailed in the War Office, where there was one idea, and one only, that short enlistment was everything, and they were cramming that down the throats of the people of England at all hazards. The right hon. Gentleman told them it had been found that a long service system and a short service system would not work together, because men would not enlist for long service if they could enter the Army for a shorter period. But he had forgotten to mention that, in 1871, Lord Cardwell gave this Order— General Order, No. 62. Until further orders enlistments for the Foot Guards and Infantry of the Line are to be short service enlistments—namely, for six years' Army service, and six years' service in the Reserve. No wonder, then, that short enlistments prevailed, because men were not allowed to enlist for long service. Short service enlistment went on until 1874, and in 1873 another General Order was issued, that— The proportions in which enlistments for long and short service respectively are in future to be made in the several branches of the Service, under Clause 67 of the Army Circular of 1874, are as follows: … Infantry, 25 per cent long service, and 75 per cent short service. That showed how completely the right hon. Gentleman was mistaken in what he said. He held in his hand a tabular record from the year 1870 to the present time, from which it appeared that in 1870 there had been 14,000 men enlisted for long service, and 8,000 for short service. In the next year, 1871 (the Order was issued in May), the numbers were 5,000 long and 8,000 short service. In the following year, when men could not enlist for long service, there were only 522 elistments for long service, and 9,000 for short service. The number of enlistments for long service continued to diminish until 1874, when long service was open to recruits, and it then jumped up to 1,444, which showed the anxiety of the men to enlist for long service. In the next year the number was 2,043. So it went on in 1875, 1877, and 1878; butt strange to say, in the last-mentioned year, though the Inspector General of Recruiting wrote that he had great satisfaction in being able to report so favourably of recruiting, the number of recruits having been more than sufficient to fill the vacancies in the ranks, in spite of the satisfactory report as to the results of recruiting with the long and short service joined together, an order was actually given out to the effect that the long service in the Infantry was to cease altogether, and from that time nothing but the short service was to be allowed. He thought, therefore, the right hon. Gentleman had been a little in error when he led the House to imagine that the short service was so popular that men would not enlist for the long service, because, really, recruits were prohibited from enlisting for the long service. As to compulsory retirement, the subject was a very important one. It was stated in page 7 of the Memorandum that majors after three years, lieutenant - colonels after five years, and general officers after five years, if unemployed, were to retire—retire completely, and to be no longer considered as belonging to the active Army. Let him point out a few reasons why this was objectionable. There were no less than 272 field officers in the Army, 54 of whom must retire every year. How were they to be employed, where were the employents? And yet, if they were not employed, they would cease to belong to the Army. He had gone into this matter very hurriedly, the Papers having been given so recently; but he had, nevertheless, ascertained that there were 60 field officers holding Staff appointments. Out of those 60 Staff appointments no less than 29 were now filled by officers belonging to the Artillery, Engineers, Cavalry, and Guards, which left only 31 appointments for Infantry officers, or about half the total number. Out of 21 colonels of the Staff—a most important post below that of a general officer—according to the official Army List, 17 were held by officers of the Artillery, Engineers, and the Guards, the remaining situations, four in number, being all that were available for officers of the Infantry of the Line. How were these officers to be employed when there was no opportunity for them to obtain employment? and yet they were told that if they were not employed they were to be considered officers not worth keeping in the Army, and were to be sent about their business. Then, it was constantly being found necessary by the commanding officers to keep the men employed on these Staff appointments beyond the legitimate period of such employment; and that was necessarily detrimental to the few Infantry officers waiting to get appointments, who, if they did not get those appointments, were turned out of the active Army. He trusted the right hon. Gentleman would consider and work out all these matters himself, and would not trust to others to supply him with information. There were 33 brigade majors in the Army, and out of these appointments no loss than 16 belonged to the Engineers, Guards, and Artillery, and only half the whole number were left for the Infantry of the Line. He trusted he was not wearying the Committee; but there was just one point more to which he wished to allude. He had asked some time ago whether the right hon. Gentleman would give them the revised Estimates dealing with the Infantry of the Line. They had been given; but he had only received a copy of them since he had been in the House, and consequently had only been able to make a cursory examination of them; still, he had investigated enough to discover one of the most remarkable financial operations he had ever known. He had believed that the new system would be more expensive than the old system; but the right hon. Gentleman had assured them that it would be cheaper. He had doubted it, and had found from the revised Estimates that it was expected that the Infantry of the Line, under the new system, would cost £2,188,082, as against £2,134,827 under the old system. That was an excess for the new system of £53,250; but, to his astonishment, he found, on looking at the total sum in the revised Estimate, that it was the same to a single shilling as that of the old Estimate. He should like to know how this result was obtained. The "extras," that was to say, "additional pay," "deferred pay," to officers of brevet rank, which, in the old Estimates, was put down at £213,643, was put down only at £173,916, and by that curious manipulation of accounts the total sum under the old and the new Estimates were the same to a shilling. He hoped the Financial Secretary would explain this remarkable financial problem in the course of the evening.

COLONEL ALEXANDER

While I gratefully acknowledge the generous concessions which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War has made to the quartermasters in the way of progressive promotion, I must express the great disappointment which I and others feel at the very inadequate nature of his proposals in other respects, more especially as regards the pay of those officers. Many hon. and gallant Gentlemen who have served in the Army or in the Militia are doubtless aware of the onerous and multifarious duties devolving on regimental quartermasters. Without going too much into detail, I shall not be far from the truth in asserting that those duties comprehend everything relating to the clothing, equipment, provisioning, sanitary condition, and transport of the troops. One witness told the Militia Committee that— It was impossible to get on and have things done as they ought to be done without an efficient quartermaster; while another witness stated before the same Committee that— To enable him to move his regiment to Aldershot at 24 hours' notice he would require a first-rate quartermaster. A third expressed an opinion that the quartermaster was more indispensable even than the adjutant. But perhaps the most valuable testimony to the great importance of the quartermaster's duties is to be found in the Report of the Militia Committee over which the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the late Secretary of State for War (Colonel Stanley) so ably presided, in which it is stated that— The qualifications for a quartermaster are special, that combatant officers able and willing to act as quartermasters are not easily found; and that— The Director of Clothing in his evidence has shown that deficiencies of stores are not unlikely to occur when an acting and irresponsible officer has suddenly to take or to give over a large number of stores. It is, therefore, somewhat strange that some of the most hard-worked and most responsible should be, at the same time, the most underpaid officers of the Army. More than one quartermaster has said that he was much better off as a noncommissioned officer than when obliged to maintain the position of an officer. But, even so, till within a very recent period the quartermaster had some prospect of bettering his position. He could, and not infrequently did, attain the position of paymaster, and there are now in the Pay Department officers, with the rank of major or captain, still serving, who began their commissioned career as quartermasters. But in 1877 the Pay Department was re-constituted, mainly, as I understand, with the view of pro- viding for the combatant ranks an adequate flow of promotion, and the quartermasters were prospectively excluded from the Pay Department. As if this was not enough, insult was added to injury when, in February, 1880, a Warrant was issued re-constituting the Ordnance Store and Commissariat Departments, by the provisions of which the officers of those Departments, who had previously been included in a general list, were divided into two sections, termed respectively "superior" and "subordinate," the unfortunate quartermasters being relegated to the latter. To be ignominiously branded in this way the quartermasters, naturally, resent as an unmerited stigma and affront. To give the Committee some idea of the miserable pay received by quartermasters, I will contrast it with the rate of pay given in the Pay Department. A is a Paymaster; B an Infantry quartermaster. A receives on appointment 15s. a-day; B 8s. 2d. After 10 years' service A receives—1 a-day; B 13s. 6d. quartermasters, too, are liable for contributions to the mess, from which paymasters are entirely exempt. Well, Sir, that being so, how does the right hon. Gentleman propose to remedy these admitted grievances? He says he has taken up the case of the quartermasters, and is going to make "substantial additions" to their pay; but I venture to think that on examination these "substantial additions" will be found very unsubstantial and unreal. The right hon. Gentleman gives, it is true, on appointment an increase over the present rate of 10d. a-day; but the ultimate increment to be reached on the completion of 15, instead of 12 years' service, as at present, will amount to the magnificent sum of 4d. a-day! An increase of pay which might, perhaps, be given to a private soldier, but which it is absurd to offer to an officer. There is a slight improvement in the pension, which is to be £200, instead of £184 10s., as at present; but it should not be forgotten that combatant officers, who have not a tenth part of their labours and responsibilities, may claim the same pension as quartermasters after a service of only 20 instead of 30 years. It has been said that the duties of Paymasters are more important and more responsible than those of quartermasters; but to this statement I have no hesitation in giving an unqualified denial, for whereas the duties of a paymaster are comparatively light and intermittent, the greater portion being performed by the Paymasters' clerk, those of a quartermaster are constant and laborious; while, as far as responsibility is concerned, the stores which a quartermaster has in his keeping represent a much larger sum of money than a paymaster, who pays by cheque, usually has in his possession. It is sometimes asserted that quartermasters do not succeed as paymasters; if that is the case, why are quartermasters of the Army, transferred to the Militia, required to perform pay duties without remuneration? There is only one other point in connection with this subject to which I desire to draw the attention of the right hon. Gentleman—I mean the position of Army quartermasters transferred from brigade depôts to the Militia, to whom are assigned many extra duties, including pay duties, although without extra pay. Those quartermasters of Militia, also, whose regiments are at head-quarters, are deprived of lodging money, as well as allowance for servant, because they are expected to avail themselves of the miserable accommodation usually to be found at a brigade depôt, and to employ as servant an untrained recruit. I now leave the case of the quartermasters in the hands of the right hon. Gentleman, feeling sure that, having done so much to improve the position of the non-commissioned ranks, he will not turn a deaf ear to the respectful remonstrances of officers who, be it remembered, have sprung from those ranks, and who are among the most meritorious in Her Majesty's Service. One word on brigade depôts, many of which are not yet formed. These brigade depôts, on which you have lavished £3,000,000, are failures, costly failures, and are universally condemned. General Willis, commanding the Northern District, giving evidence before Lord Airey's Committee, said that— Brigade depôts, as at present constituted, afford the worst possible school of instruction for young officers, and that the difficulty of getting battalion drill causes, officers and noncommissioned officers to deteriorate in this respect. And he added—"These brigade depôts are not very happy—are, in fact, very dull—places." The tie between brigade depôts and the Militia is often extremely slender, for Colonel Walker, commanding the Borderer's Militia, being asked to define it, said—"We occasionally send them some grouse." The right hon. Gentleman proposes to foster a sentiment of connection between the Line and the Militia by converting silver lace into gold, and by giving territorial titles. In connection with this subject, I may mention that I have a copy of a letter dated 31st August, 1782–99 years ago—conveying to all Infantry regiments His Majesty's pleasure that county titles should be given to them— In order that a connection between the corps and the counties should be cultivated, which might be useful in furthering the success of the recruiting service. I trust that the attempt of the right hon. Gentleman to establish territorial regiments may be more successful; but I fear, with Sir Lintorn Simmons, that it will not add a single man to the Service. Some of the territorial titles, too, are very cumbrous and unwieldy. How is the "Royal Cumberland and Westmoreland Regiment," for instance, to be addressed on parade? Sir Garnet Wolseley asked a witness before the Militia Committee whether the 4th Regiment did not like to be addressed on parade as "King's Own;" but I have heard of a General Officer who became so impatient at hearing every word of command prefaced by the words "King's Own," that he exclaimed—"Never mind, Sir, who owns the regiment; but go on." I think, with the hon. and gallant General the Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon), that the right hon. Gentleman may experience some difficulty in filling the ranks of the new kilted regiments, for there is a Memorandum, dated "Horse Guards, April 7th, 1809," directing five regiments to discontinue the use of the kilt— As the population of the Highlands of Scotland is found to be insufficient to supply recruits for the whole of the Highland corps on the establishment of His Majesty's Army, and as some of these corps laying aside their distinguishing dress, which is objectionable to the natives of South Britain, would in a great measure tend to the completing of their establishment, as it would be an inducement to the men of the English Militia to extend their services in greater numbers to those regiments. Sir, I fear that it is not only the men of the English Militia who dislike the kilt, for Lord Charles Kerr stated before the Militia Committee that the Perthshire Rifles did not volunteer freely for their affiliated Line battalions, because those battalions wore the kilt.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK-ALLAN

observed, that the relations which had been established by the changes of the last few years had culminated in the alterations now being made by the Chief Secretary for War between the Line and the Militia. The proposals of the right hon. Gentleman were an historical continuation of the suggestions made in the first instance by the Localization Committee in 1872, by Lord Cardwell's Committees in 1871–2, by the Committee presided over by the late Secretary of State for War in 1876, and by the alterations made by the Committee in 1878. With respect to the general drift of the improvements introduced, he thought, as they had been judged by the country, they were in the main improvements upon what had gone before. There could be no doubt, for instance, that the increase of service which had taken place, whether from six to seven years with the Colours and seven with the Reserve, or seven with the Colours and five with the Reserve, must tend to the improvement of the Service. During the last few years, from a desire to increase or bring the Reserve up to its proper strength, the strength of the Army had been sacrificed almost entirely. Sir Frederick Roberts had recently related some of his own experiences with regard to one regiment. He could not follow that General in all his strictures on short service, because it must be recollected that in the case of regiments which went to India in 1874 and 1875 there were special reasons for those great defects which were afterwards manifested in 1877 and 1878. The right hon. Gentleman had wisely seen that it was essential to increase the effective strength of our Establishment by strengthening the Reserve. In 1872 and 1873 there were changes contemplated, based on the linking of two Line battalions to each other, and with them two Militia battalions; and on the expansion, under certain conditions, of a brigade depôt to the effective strength of 600 men. The defects pointed out in the short service were due to the fact that the suggestions of the Localization Committee of 1872 were, shortly after the return of the late Secretary of State for War to Office in 1874, almost lost sight of. The defects upon which Sir Frederick Roberts had dilated could be traced to the fact that in the 18 months or two years previous to the particular regiment of which he spoke being sent to India, its effective strength, instead of being kept up, was in three instances cut down. Then, in the Zulu War, in 1879, five battalions were suddenly sent out. The deficiencies of those battalions had been dilated upon ever since; but the fact was, every essential principle recommended by the Short Service Committee of 1872 was forgotten in the preparation of those battalions. Their establishments were cut down repeatedly; they were changed from the highest position on the roster and put lower down; then, subsequently, when they were sent abroad, no means were taken to fill up their places. On the embarkation of those battalions he had pointed out that the War Office, under the Act of 1871, had power to fill up the gaps in the regiments, which had been shortened to the number of 1,400 men. The Secretary of State for War had replied that he was advised by the Law Officers of the Crown that the power did not exist, or, if it did exist, only enabled him to take the men for six months. He had pointed out, further, that there were two ways in which that difficulty might have been avoided; and subsequently, on the 12th June, 1879, the Secretary of State for War, in answer to a Question, had stated that the Law Officers had since discovered that he would have been justified in filling up the gaps. He would ask any hon. Member of that House what he thought would have been the result if, instead of resorting to the volunteering system, which tended to break the hearts of every adjutant and commanding officer by taking drafts from several regiments, the 1,400 men had been taken from the Reserve? When the men were called out two months later they were adverse to responding, and when they heard that the Secretary of State for War was in doubt as to whether he could call upon them, they hung back. It was rumoured that they had only to wait a sufficient time, until the Government were in difficulties, to have a large bounty offered to them; and consequently, when in July of that year they were called upon, only 120 responded. He was glad that the right hon. Gentleman had determined to enlist recruits of not less than 19 years of age, for enlistment at a premature ago had been a bottomless pit of waste into which the whole Service had fallen during recent years. We had been enlisting young men who were nominally 18 years of age, but were really only 16½ whereas foreign Services never took a man of less than 20 years of age. In Germany, Russia, Austria, and even in France, it was the invariable custom to take the flower of the population for military service; and it was a farce for us to attempt to follow the short service system, unless we followed the true principles of short service, beginning with men of an effective age. It was totally fallacious to attempt to apply any real test to the age of recruits, and the only way of being certain that we got men of effective age was to throw the whole of the responsibility on the medical officers, in order that they might enlist no man who, in their opinion, from his physical qualities, size, weight, measurement, and general appearance, would not be fit for service in the field within 12 months. Unless that plan was adopted the short service would be a failure in the future, as it had been in the past. Then, with regard to the formation of the Reserve. The right hon. Gentleman must not forget that his changes would lengthen the service of the soldier. There would be a tendency to decrease the number of the Reserve. He had fixed the service of the Reserve at from six to four years, but he (Sir Henry Havelock-Allan) feared it would fall to three years; and it was impossible to look back on the history of the Reserve without acknowledging that the promises held out in 1871 had not only not been fulfilled in their entirety, but had been fulfilled only in a very small degree. In March, 1871, Lord—then Mr.—Cardwell, in introducing the short service system, said— The result will be that, if we get 32,000 recruits on the present strength of the Army, it will give us a first Army Reserve of 178,000 strong, and will, besides, ultimately place among the people at large more thin 400,000 trained men under 51 years of age."—[3 Hansard, ccv. 129.] How had that promise been fulfilled? Had we got 178,000 in our Reserve? Shortly after he entered that House he wrote an article in The Fortnightly Review, pointing out that the outside figure that the Reserve could attain was 41,000. The calculation of the present Secretary for War coincided with that almost exactly. Lord Cardwell's expectation was to be fulfilled in 12 years. We were now within two years of the end of that period; but in the General Annual Return for 1880, it appeared that the Reserve in 1879 had reached only 16,000. This year it had reached 19,000; and he believed the right hon. Gentleman believed that it would reach 22,000 in the next 12 months. If the figure of 41,000 was reached he should be very much surprised; but, at all events, Lord Cardwell's Estimate was postponed, not to 1883, but to 1894. The object of the changes that had been made, no doubt, was to feed our Army so as to keep it up to the requirements of the present time in the event of a European campaign. Linked battalions and territorial regiments aimed at that object; but unless the right hon. Gentleman met the one existing deficiency, that purpose, would not be fulfilled. It was intended that the linked battalions should supply one battalion in the field in the case of a European war; and it must be remembered that we should always be under the disadvantage of having, at least, one-half of our Line engaged in India or in the Colonies. Therefore, in the event of a European war, all we could expect to put into the field would be 42 or 48 battalions. How was our full strength to be kept up? It could only be done by our arranging that in three battalions at home—two Militia and one Brigade depôt—every man should be available to feed the battalions on foreign service. But at present he did not find any trace of an arrangement by which any one soldier of the two battalions at home would be transferable to feed the Line battalion abroad, except those who had been engaged in the Militia Reserve. In 1878, he had urged the Government to increase the Militia Reserve; but that was not done, because the Militia Reserve was regarded as a temporary expedient, intended only to feed the Line Reserve. We were in exactly the same position now, except for the slow increase of 3,000 or 4,000 a-year. In 1878, when the men were called out, 13,000 out of 21,000 were in the Militia Re- serve; and for many years to come, he thought, we must look to the Militia Reserve as the main Reserve. If this were not done, the elegant structure which the right hon. Gentleman was erecting would be without its keystone, and, for want of cohesion, it would fall to pieces. At present we had a Militia Reserve of about 30,000 men, although in recent years it had fallen to 25,000 or 26,000. In 1878 it stood at 28,000; but, in consequence of a certain want of liberality with which the men were considered on their return after being called out in that year, the numbers fell off. He advised that in future an effort should be made—not by compulsion—to enlist as many men as possible who would be willing to enter the Militia Reserve with a view to foreign service in certain contingencies. He also thought the Militia bounty should be increased from £1 to £3 a-year, and that the men should only be liable for war service in the event of really great European emergencies. If that were done, he thought there would be a chance of obtaining, in perhaps five years, an effective Reserve of 70,000 men. Until that plan was adopted, no advance would have been made such as this country desired when it adopted the short service system in 1871. He also advised that a certain per centage of old soldiers should be allowed to renew their engagements, as had been done with regard to the non-commissioned officers, in order that those men might have an ensured career before them. The non-commissioned officers were not alone the strength of the Army. There was a large class of men, less numerous now, perhaps, when education was so general, who entered the Service without looking forward to being non-commissioned officers, but who were fond of a soldier's life; and if a proportion of them were allowed to extend their service to 21 years, he believed that would tend greatly to consolidate the Service. That opinion was held by officers of the highest experience; and by a Bill that would shortly be introduced in the French Chamber a similar system would be proposed for the French Army. France had established a special pension of 1,000 francs (£40) for a certain portion of old soldiers extending their service to 21 years. Another point was the proposal to reduce the Establishment as regarded general officers. It was proposed to reduce the number of those officers down to 140. Many of them were not of advanced age, but in the prime of life, and of great experience; but the right hon. Gentleman demurred to them, and the new arrangement in regard to employment would have the effect of sending into retirement a large number of men who had an experience unsurpassed in any other Army in the world. Most of these officers had served in the Colonies and in every quarter of the globe, some of them for long periods; and those upon whom the change might come with the heaviest and most crushing effect were those who were created general officers in 1877 and 1878. He believed there were some 70 or 75 officers, who were quite content with their position of colonels, who were not too old to continue to serve as colonels, and who had acquired long experience as regimental officers, but who were subsequently made general officers. The effect of this change would be to place them on the shelf for life. On the whole, he believed the change would not be found to be of advantage; and it must be recollected that, however carefully it might be worked, the Establishment which it was supposed to fix would be a small one. It might happen under the new scheme that a contingency might arise in which it would be necessary for the General to move a whole Corps d' Armée, in which there might be 450,000 armed men under arms, and, from want of experience, he would be found totally inefficient and altogether unsuited to discharge the duties. He thought this was a matter that deserved the right hon. Gentleman's attention. Although they might cut down the Establishment to what would suit the halcyon days of peace, they must, at the same time, keep it in such a position that it would be fitted for a time of war, and the country must have general officers ready for service in exceptional circumstances. His own impression was that in order to keep up the Indian Army and our own Army the Establishment proposed by the right hon. Gentleman would be found to be inadequate. Then, again, the economy which the right hon. Gentleman looked forward to was only remote, and depended on the gradual falling in of an allowance of £1,000 a-year. At present there was a small difference, and the duration of that difference would depend upon the rapidity or slowness with which this reduction was carried into effect. He hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would not think that these remarks were in the nature of carping criticism. On the contrary, they were made with a sincere desire to secure the efficiency and welfare of the Army. There could be no doubt that regiments deteriorated materially by a long period of foreign service; and full weight being given to the representations which had been made in this respect, it bad been decided in 1862 that the full period of foreign service should be 12 years. The right hon. Gentleman now proposed to go back upon the old system by making it 16 years. It was supposed that there might be economy in bringing the men home in successive batches of 100 or 120 men every few years instead of allowing them to return home in a full battalion at the end of their term of service. He confessed that he failed to see that any economy would result from the new arrangement. He did not believe that any benefit would be derived from the change. It would be found, as in previous years, that when regiments had been localized for a long time in a foreign country, whether in India or in the Colonies, they became to a certain extent deteriorated in their tone; and it would be better to complete a regiment to its full strength on going to India, to keep it up to its full strength, and to bring it home at the end of its term of service. There was only one other point—namely, with regard to the increase in the depôts of the regiments serving abroad. The right hon. Gentleman was reverting to the original recommendation of the Committee of 1872, inasmuch as the first 12 regiments were to be reduced to a strength of 950, but only 800 sent abroad, a depôt of 150 being retained at home. He was afraid, however, that one of two things must happen—either that the depôt would be totally insufficient to keep up the strength of the regiment abroad, or else it would be necessary to increase the depôt very materially. He believed it would be an immense improvement to increase the depôts to 250 men instead of 150. By that means during the last few years of service the battalion abroad would not have to draw on any other battalion at home, and the efficiency both of the battalion abroad and the depôt at home would be secured. With these limitations, he was of opinion that the changes proposed by the right hon. Gentleman had been adopted after full and careful consideration of the recommendations made by the experienced officers who composed Lord Airey's Committee, and that they would effect very great improvements. In the course of a few years he thought the country would be ready to pronounce the opinion that short service had not been a failure, but had given to the Service everything the country had a right to expect.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

said, that after the exhaustive remarks they had heard in the course of the debate, he was afraid the patience of the Committee was exhausted, and he would therefore be as brief as he could in the observations he proposed to offer. He congratulated the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War on having been able to pass through all his difficulties; and he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would be satisfied with the criticisms which had been passed on his scheme. So far as he (Lord Eustace Cecil) was concerned, he could assure the right hon. Gentleman that, although he should have to say some serious things about the scheme, on the whole he mainly approved of it. He thought that a great deal of the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman would redound to the advantage of the Army, and he hoped to that of the country also. Before proceeding to criticize the scheme of the Government, he wished to go back to a portion of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman at the commencement of the evening; and he was induced to do so by the remarks which had been made by the hon. and gallant Member for Sunderland (Sir Henry Havelock-Allan). The position of the late Conservative Government was, from his (Lord Eustace Cecil's) point of view, a purely tentative one—that was to say, that they entered upon Office fully appreciating all that had been done for the Army by Lord Cardwell, but, at the same time, neither approving nor disapproving. They wished to give the new arrangements a full and fair trial; and they had done so, as far as he knew. But what the result of the trial was was not fully shown until the Zulu War. The hon. and gallant Member for Sunderland spoke of the way in which the Reserves had been handled, and intimated that very little had been done in utilizing the Reserves and sending them out to Zululand. Now, the position of the Government at that time was an exceedingly difficult one. The law did not allow of the Reserves being hastily pressed into the Service, and it was, therefore, impossible to utilize them as much as might have been desired. For example, there was no power to call out the Reserves; it was a necessity that they should be asked to volunteer. As the hon. and gallant Gentleman said, the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown was taken at the time, and fully bore out that view of the case. The gist of the hon. and gallant Member's remarks was this—that there were manifest defects in Lord Cardwell's scheme. To that conclusion they had all arrived. Then, the difficulties of the Government in sending out the Reserves to Zululand were very great; it was impossible to send them out, in as prompt a manner as was required, at a moment's notice. He would pass on now to some of the remarks which had been made in regard to the Militia Committee and Lord Airey's Committee. His right hon. Friend (Mr. Childers) had spoken at some length upon the Militia Committee, and had categorically named the Members of that Committee. But with regard to Lord Airey's Committee his right hon. Friend had not said very much, and there was an evident desire to deprecate the efforts of the gallant Officers who sat upon it. No comparison, however, had been drawn between the two Committees; and he (Lord Eustace Cecil) wished, although not by way of depreciation, to draw the attention of the House to the composition of the two Committees. The Militia Committee consisted of three generals, three colonels, and five commissioned officers; whereas Lord Airey's Committee consisted of eight general officers and three colonels. Therefore, when they were dealing with questions of Army Organization, the balance of authority and experience was clearly with the latter. Another remark which had been made was that Lord Airey's Committee were not unanimous. He was perfectly aware that on one or two subjects they were not; but on many most important questions they were—such as the term of service being too short, the want of inducements to non- commissioned officers to remain in the Army, and the question of volunteering from one regiment to another. Against the practice of linking battalions, 10 out of the 11 Members composing the Committee were agreed, and the only Member who disagreed was Sir Patrick M'Dougall. Against brigade depôts, 7 out of 11 were agreed. He merely mentioned these facts to show that on almost all the main points, except brigade depôts, Lord Airey's Committee were practically unanimous, and that the principal dissentient—Sir Patrick M'Dougall—for whom they all had very great respect, had already committed himself to the views of the original Committee on which he served with Sir Garnet Wolseley. Although Sir Patrick M'Dougall's presence on Lord Airey's Committee was necessary, and he did good service there, it was impossible to overlook the fact that Sir Patrick M'Dougall had already been committed, and that he was hardly able to form a fair and unbiassed judgment. So much for the composition of the two Committees. He now passed on to the question of short service. He should be very sorry to commit himself to one year, two years, or three years. There was so much difference of opinion upon these subjects that he would rather leave it to the Executive to judge. He thought the Executive were the only people who could judge; but there had always been the greatest difficulty in the last few years, and his right hon. Friend knew it as well as anybody else, in obtaining soldiers for anything but short service. Men would not enlist for long service. If they tried to get men for long service they failed. That being the case, they must obtain the men they could get, and they must get them to enlist for as long a period as they were willing. He only hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would be successful in obtaining soldiers who would enlist for seven or eight years; but he thought it was quite possible that the recruiting had been as successful as it had been, simply because the British labourer and the artizan had got used to the idea of short service, and it would be a very difficult thing to knock it out of their heads. He would pass on next to the question of the promotion and pay of non-commissioned officers. They had heard a little about it; but he did not think there was any difference of opi- nion in regard to it on either side of the House. That which was recommended by his right hon. Friend, in the course of his able speech, was universally approved—namely, that they should give as many inducements as they possibly could to non-commissioned officers, who were really the-back bone of the Service. He was very glad that his right hon. Friend had taken up the ball, and that he proposed to give a very large increase of pay and promotion to the noncommissioned officers. He would remind the right hon. Gentlemen of the Committee on which they had both sat some years ago. The hon. and gallant Member opposite (Sir Henry Havelock-Allan) was a Member of that Committee also, and they came to a general determination that, under the circumstances, to encourage the entry of non-commissioned officers into all the Departments of the Government, where it could possibly be done, would be a very good thing. There were from 900 to 1,000 appointments in connection with the Commissariat and the Ordnance Stores, and a beginning had been made in the way of employing non-commissioned officers in those branches of the Service. He hoped the experiment would be continued, and that it would bear satisfactory fruit. Advantage might also be derived from the employment of noncommissioned officers in the gaols and in the Civil Departments generally, wherever an appointment of a fitting and lucrative character became vacant. He also hoped that the question which had been brought up over and over again of the manner in which non-commissioned officers were received at places of public entertainment would receive the attention of the right hon. Gentleman. It would be a good thing if Her Majesty's cloth were much more honoured than it was at certain places of entertainment. and also upon the railways of the United Kingdom. Soldiers were constantly travelling, and he could not conceive why they should not be courteously treated, or why any prejudice should exist against them in the present day. He proposed to touch upon the question of the Reserves very shortly indeed; but he might take the opportunity of saying something more about them when the Vote for the Reserves came on. He entirely agreed with what the hon. and gallant Member for Sunderland had said. He looked upon the Militia Force as one of the most valuable branches of the Service we possessed, and he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would be able to bring up the Militia to the numbers voted by Parliament. The necessity for doing this was too much lost sight of. Year after year certain numbers were voted for the Militia; and when they came to look at the list, they found that so many had been taken off from one cause or another that the strength of the Force had been cut down by 25 or 30 per cent. If it was possible, the list should be brought up to its full strength. His right hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Stanley) did something in that way in his last year of Office. It would, he thought, be a source of great gratification to the House and the country to find that this valuable Force was being kept up to its full strength. Then, in regard to the Reserves, there was another very important point. They might talk as much as they pleased about having in a certain number of years 30,000, 40,000, 50,000, or 60,000 men; but unless they kept up a certain number of regular forces year by year they could not possibly have the Reserve they wished for. Every year a certain number went into the Reserves; but it was still necessary to keep up the supply of raw material, and he wanted to see the War Minister coming down to that House and calling upon them to keep up the Reserves for the purpose of offence and defence. It was absolutely necessary to have so many Regular soldiers; but, unhappily, the Chancellor of the Exchequer came in when the question of cost was involved, and they had also to meet the alarmists, the economists, and the philanthropists. The philanthropists, as they all knew, would have no Army at all. The hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) was, no doubt, in favour of having no Army at all. Then came the economists, who wished to cut down all the expenses by one-half; and next the alarmists, who would double the Estimates at once. He knew the difficulties which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had to encounter in all these matters. No doubt, it was very difficult to please everybody; but, putting all crotchets aside, it was most essential that there should be a regular number of Forces, so as to ensure an efficient Reserve. He should be very glad if they had a few more particulars from the Ordnance Committee in regard to experiments. It was most desirable that Parliament should know what the Ordnance Committee were doing, and that their Report should be delayed for as little time as possible. He knew that experiments were in progress when the Conservative Government left Office, and if the right hon. Gentleman would look into the matter he might be able to hasten the Committee in coming to a conclusion. So, also, with regard to the supply of the Martini-Henry rifle to the Militia. Questions were constantly being asked upon that matter, and he understood that as the old arms wore out Martini-Henrys' were being substituted. He would not ask the right hon. Gentleman to issue them this year; but he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would bear in mind that it would be a good thing for the Service if steps were taken to secure a more rapid issue of this description of arms in future years. He thought the Militia and Volunteers ought to be put in the same position as the Regular Forces. Then he came to the question which had been already mooted this evening, and on which he was afraid he did not agree with the right hon. Gentleman—he meant the age at which recruits were to be enlisted. He admitted, with the right hon. Gentleman, that 19 years of age was very much better than 18, as 18 would be better than 17 or 16; but his right hon. Friend said he hoped in a short time to be able to advance the ago to 20. Why not do that at once? He did not see why it was not possible under present circumstances, and he thought he should be able to show by figures that it was possible to enlist recruits at 20. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Sunderland (Sir Henry Havelock-Allan) had very properly pointed out that no foreign recruit was enlisted under that age; and when they considered that the foreign Armies were far larger than that of this country, how much more incumbent was it upon them to have a really efficient Army which could go out to any climate and engage in any service? That was not the case now, and he was afraid it would not be the case so long as they did not enlist men at 20. No man ought to be sent to the Tropics under 21 or 22. He should be glad to see the number of men—Regulars and Reserves— actually required for offensive and defensive purposes laid down by some authority. Committee and Commission had assembled year after year; but he had never yet seen in any one of their Reports a statement as to the number of men that military authorities laid down was necessary for this country to keep up as an offensive and defensive Force. If they once knew the number of men actually required for the purposes of our large Empire, for the purposes of our Reserve, for the purposes of offence and defence, they would go to the root of the subject, because then all the rest would follow in similar proportion. It was very simple indeed to come to a conclusion as to the number of Reserves they could have, or as to the number of the Force they could send out, if only they would come to the conclusion that our Empire here or our Empire there required such and such a Force, whether it be Military or Naval. But this conclusion had never been come to, and he was afraid that until it was they would never be able to thoroughly grapple with the subject of England's military requirements. They might go on arguing year after year, they might go on saying—as a number of people did say—that we had not sufficient soldiers and sailors, and all because the thing had never been thoroughly inquired into by a competent authority. He only threw this out as a suggestion. He had mentioned it to military gentlemen of great experience, but he had never received a satisfactory answer. Again, there could not be two opinions that whatever material they had for raw recruits, it ought to be good and sound. By good and sound material he meant men of 20 years of age, 35 inches round the chest, and at least 5 feet 5 inches in height. He believed they could get recruits of that quality; and if they could only feel that the soldiers were of that stamp, they would not have half the panic and alarm or hear half the wild talk they now did about our defective Army. He might be told they could not get men such as he had specified. It might be true; but, if it was true, they must cut their coat according to their cloth. If it was true that English soldiers were such expensive articles that they could not be obtained in sufficient numbers, they must look elsewhere. They must have more Coloured troops than hitherto. He recollected the time when the Hottentots the Cape Mounted Rifles, and the Ceylon Rifles, were a very valuable portion of the British Army, and he was very sorry they were done away with. He should be very glad to see a large number of such troops—officered, of course, by Whites—who were capable of doing service in South Africa, or indeed anywhere they might be required. The employment of foreign troops was a very old system. According to Gibbon, the ancient Romans used to enlist men of one nationality and send them to garrison the towns and provinces of another nationality, and he (Lord Eustace Cecil) thought a greater number of Coloured troops, who could be obtained at a considerably cheaper rate than the British soldier, might do most useful service in various parts of our enormous Empire. He had said there would be no difficulty in enlisting the required number of men at 20 years of age. He did not think there would—that was to say, if the right hon. Gentleman's estimate of 25,000 was a correct one—but he could not refrain from throwing little doubt upon that estimate. Lord Airey's Committee was of opinion that 36,000 men would be required to keep the Army up to its proper state. It might be that the extra two years' service now proposed would make a certain difference, but he did not think it would make as much difference as 11,000. Let them suppose, however, that 25,000 recruits were required. He found, according to the Report of Lord Airey's Committee, that in 1878 there were 28,035 recruits, and of these 14,500 were over 20. It was proved by evidence given before Lord Airey's Committee, that we lost at the rate of £500,000 a-year by young soldiers—by their desertion, misconduct, and one thing and another. There had been made another curious calculation which the right hon. Gentleman, no doubt, remembered. It was computed that if a recruit were enlisted at 18, he cost the country before he became effective, in the Cavalry, £144, and in the Infantry £135. If a man were enlisted at 19 years of age, as the right hon. Gentleman now proposed, he would cost, before he became effective, in the Cavalry £101, and in the Infantry £96; but if he were enlisted at 20 he would cost, in the Cavalry £58, and in the Infantry £57. Now, that showed that, notwithstanding the extra sum that might be required to obtain men at 20 years, there would be an enormous margin of saving; and he could not help believing that when the right hon. Gentleman reduced the matter to figures, he would see that if 10,000 men at 20 years of age were required above the 15,000 enlisted in 1878, they might be easily obtained. He mentioned this circumstance, because he believed it was really in the mind of the right hon. Gentleman when he said he hoped to be able very shortly to advance the age to 20. Now he would go to the question of territorial regiments. Some of the objections were, no doubt, sentimental; but it was impossible for a man like himself, who had had the honour of serving in one of the best regiments of Her Majesty's Line, to look upon the scheme which was now proposed with indifference. He could not help thinking that those glorious units of the British Army—if he might so term them—were shortly to be turned by one stroke of the pen into territorial vulgar fractions. He could not help thinking that the right hon. Gentleman had been somewhat posing in two characters. He had been trying to assume alternately the character of the Archbishop of Canterbury and of Lord Penzance, for he was endeavouring with one hand to give the nuptial benediction to many ill-assorted pairs, and on the other hand he had been pronouncing a decree of judicial separation at the same time and with the same voice. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman might succeed; but he was confident there must be, and would be for a great length of time, a considerable amount of jealousy. The Militia Committee in their Report hoped that a new esprit de corps would spring up within a short time. The short time might be 10, 15, or 20 years; and what was to happen in the meantime to the battalions bound together perhaps against their will and working possibly inharmoniously, as he was afraid many of them would? What was to happen? There would be a constant sore and grievance. There would be the feeling that one regiment was the Cinderella, doing all the hard work at home in training raw recruits to be sent out, when effective, to serve in the ranks of the sister battalion abroad. In some cases, his right hon. Friend proposed to obliterate both the name and the number. The right hon. Gentleman laid a certain amount of stress on the name, but none at all on the number. He could not agree with him in that respect. The 43rd Regiment, in which he had the honour to serve, was to be completely obliterated both in name and number. He assured the right hon. Gentleman that he was mistaken when he supposed that numbers were not prized by regiments. These numbers had gone through a baptism of fire, and that baptism was not forgotten; but, on the contrary, it was the proud boast of everyone in the regiment, from the colonel down to the youngest recruit, and it was impossible for these old associations to be easily erased from memory. He would now, however, pass from what were sentimental objections to those of a practical nature. Territorial regiments would have all the objections of linked regiments until that period had arrived—10, 15, 20 years, or, perhaps, a generation—when a new esprit de corps grew up. Volunteering and drafting would go on as now; there would be little or no esprit de corps; and possibly, although he hoped not, they would have, on account of the mixed composition of the force, many scenes enacted similar to that on Majuba Hill on the 2nd of March, which was so graphically described in The Standard. The correspondent of that journal wrote— One of our great sources of weakness was in the mixed composition of the force. The 350 men upon the hill belonged to four different corps, and did not work easily or steadily together, as they would have done had they belonged to the same regiment, and had been accustomed to work together and rely upon each other. He did not understand why they were to have an enormous establishment of officers. He must not be understood to approve of the late linking system—he never did approve of it—but he thought 10 or 15 officers to 50 men was a very large proportion of officers to men. He did not quite know what would become of such a large number of officers, whether such a number was to be kept at the depôt perpetually, or whether some fresh distribution would be made. It seemed at present to be a waste of force. His right hon. Friend proposed to reduce the number of subalterns. It would be advisable to send some of these surplus officers to the battalions in the field. The brigade depôts would require some alteration, and he could not help thinking some money would have to be spent in making them larger. The original idea of affiliation waste have one regiment and two Militia battalions in depôts. The public generally thought that at some time they would all be brought together. If he understood the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman properly, he meant to have something like 50 battalions localized in India for 16 years, or, as some people believed, for 32 years, or even for 50 years. This was a point upon which there was a great deal of misunderstanding. He had read the passage in the right hon. Gentleman's speech to several people, and to high military authorities, and he was bound to confess that many of them were very much puzzled by it. It had not yet been satisfactorily explained, and he would be extremely glad, if, in his reply, the right hon. Gentleman would clear up the question of localization of regiments, showing how long the head-quarters would be in India—whether it would be for 16 or more years—what was to be the exact number of reliefs, three or four regiments yearly, or only one. Then they came to the financial effect of the proposed changes. He did not think they would know what this effect would be for some years; certainly they would not know it this year. He recollected perfectly well that many years ago—he believed it was more than 20 years ago—the present Chief Secretary for Ireland (Mr. W. E. Forster) calculated, much to the astonishment of the then House of Commons, that every British soldier cost something like £100 a-year. It was a great many years since then; the Army Estimates had been discussed very often in the meantime; and it was computed that now the cost of the Army was £116 per man per year. He should show it was a great deal more. The cost of the French Army per man was £45; that of the German Army, £45; and that of the Army of Italy, £41. These sums were very small indeed; but it must be recollected that there was no conscription in this country, but that service was strictly voluntary. Still, the cost of the British soldier now, as compared to what it was 20 years ago, was enormous, and he would show the Committee why. He did not speak from any Party point of view, and he would not go back to the old story of 1871; he simply wished to give them the totals of the money spent in recent years upon Army reforms. Whether those reforms were good or not was a matter which the country must determine for itself; but, perhaps, the Committee and the right hon. Gentleman would for a moment consider whether the country had got full value for the money spent. The cost of Lord Cardwell's reforms were:—For Army purchase of commissions, £8,000,000; for brigade depôts, £3,500,000; for waste on short service, £3,500,000; and for the retirement scheme of officers, capitalized, £10,500,000—in short, £25,500,000 had been spent in 10 years, or nearly £3,000,000 a-year. If they took this expenditure into account, and added it to the present Estimates, they would find that the British Army was costing something like £135 per man. Of course, the pay of effective men and officers cost very much less than that. He regarded the proposed promotion of captains and majors as a temporary but very expensive relief. It was a temporary relief, because, as had been pointed out by two or three hon. Gentlemen, they would have the same difficulty in regard to field officers by-and-bye, and eventually there would be a greater retired list. In fact, the Reserve officers would grow, and they would be found very costly. He was very much struck indeed when he looked back, recollecting, as he did, what Lord Cardwell's promises were in regard to short service. He found that in 1871–2 the amount of the non-effective Vote was £2,297,500; in 1874–5—it took a jump—it had fall in to £2,187,500; and in 1880£1 it reached £2,743,400; while in 1881–2 it was as much as £3,019,600—that was to say, it had increased nearly £750,000 in 10 years. Lord Cardwell promised that short service would reduce the number of out-pensions; but they would examine what was the state of the Out-Pensions Vote. In 1871–2 it was £1,262,900, and in 1881–2 it was £1,386,500—that was to say, it had gone up in the last 10 years about £120,000. It seemed to him they ought to have had some advantage from short service before this. There were some points affecting the position of captains, who, it appeared, were able to retire after the age of 43 with unattached majority, upon which the right hon. Gentleman, he thought, would do well to throw light. Finally, there was the proposal to reduce the number of subalterns, of whom there were not too many already; and this subject, on account of its difficulty, he trusted would receive very careful attention.

MAJOR NOLAN

said, they were told that about 41,000 men could be obtained for the Reserve under the present system of six years' service with the Colours and six in the Reserve. Whether that calculation was correct or not, he was satisfied the proposed system would reduce the numbers. That was a matter of very great importance, and was sufficient to convince him that a step was being taken in the wrong direction. Parliament were always forgetting the lesson taught by the Franco-German War—of keeping four men in reserve for every one in active service. The Government appeared to think that two men in reserve were sufficient. For his part, so far as the short service system was concerned, he did not believe the 120,000 short service men would be a match for 100,000 long service men. The great argument in favour of short service was that it produced a larger Reserve; but he quite agreed with the noble Lord opposite in saying the question was, How to get men when they were unwilling to enlist? That was, no doubt, the true position, although it had not been honestly acknowledged. The way to get more men was to give them better pay; and the Government had, he believed, at any rate, taken a step in the right direction, by increasing the pay of non-commissioned officers. But the pay of the soldier was only 14s. 6d. a-week, or £38 a-year, a sum below the average earnings of an ordinary working man. This was not the case in all regiments, as was stated by the hon. Member for Leicestershire, who said that the men serving in the Guards received about £1 1s. a-week. However, the average weekly wages of labourers was 19s. a-week. Therefore, as we only paid the soldier 14s. 6d. a-week, he held that he was paid 3s. or 4s. a-week too little. When men who might be available for the Service changed their place of abode, they went, of course, for the most part, to the large labour markets in the North of England; and the effect of the system was, that when we got men for the Service, we generally caught those who were not even worth 14s. 6d. a-week. We were under-paying the men, and at the same time did not allow them to leave the Army when they wanted. He believed the right system would be to enlist men for long service, with better pay, and then to allow them to go into the Reserve at the end of a year if they wished. Nothing could, he thought, be more foolish than to force out the good soldiers of the Army and to keep men of the worst character.

CAPTAIN AYLMER

thought it right to point out that the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman had not met with general approval amongst officers of the Army. The arrangements, however, with regard to lengthening the period of service, and the increased pay of non-commissioned officers, had, he thought, given satisfaction. He could not but think that the right hon. Gentleman had sacrificed efficiency in reducing the number of senior officers in the Army. With regard to the subalterns, he found that if the plan with regard to them were carried out they would have no chance of promotion under 20 years' service. Another fault in the scheme was the reduction of the number of generals to 140. It seemed to him that the colonels of an age at which they had a right to expect, in a few years, promotion, would not reach their next step in their lifetime. He felt sure the present or future Secretary of State for War would have to ask the House for some change in the proposed system. The scheme was, in his view, a fanciful one, made to catch the eye; but which, when put into practice, would, he thought, break down. He regretted that the right hon. Gentleman had only seen his way to give the quartermasters an increase of 4d. a-day in their pay, when they had reason to expect more.

CAPTAIN O'SHEA

said, he believed the officers in the Army were now, as a body, more favourable to the scheme. He regretted, however, that the right hon. Gentleman was about to reduce the Cavalry by a number of men fully equal to the strength of a regiment. He considered the establishment of Cavalry altogether inadequate; and suggested that, inasmuch as it took as many years to make a perfect hussar as it took months to make a perfect trooper, the regiments at home below those first for service on the roster ought to have a strength of 600 men to 300 horses. There ought to be no advantages in pay in favour of officers in the Royal Horse Artillery over those in the Cavalry, and there was no reason why the command allowance of lieutenant colonels of Cavalry of the Line should not be assimi- lated to that of officers commanding the Household Cavalry. He objected to increasing the number of kilted regiments, and condemned the absurdity of dressing up a regiment like the 75th, in which the Scotch element was insignificant, in what was sometimes supposed to be a Scotch garb. He recommended the case of the riding-masters to the further consideration of the Secretary of State for War.

CAPTAIN MILNE-HOME

said, he desired to allude to the promotion of regimental corporal majors of the Household Cavalry and the regimental sergeant majors of the Line to the position of warrant officers. He was assured that regimental officers had thought upon that change very seriously, and he was himself of opinion that it would not be wise to make that promotion. The arrangement would place the men in a difficult position. They would no longer be able to consort with the non-commissioned officers of the regiment, and they certainly could not do so with the officers. Therefore, for their own comfort and for the benefit of the Service, he thought it better their position should remain as at present. He would also like to see facilities given to old soldiers to reengage as privates, as well as in the capacity of non-commissioned officers. An intermixture of older men in the ranks was required in order to keep the younger men in their places. Besides this, they were useful as officers' servants, orderlies, &c. On a former occasion he had brought the case of the riding-masters before the House, and he had now to thank the right hon. Gentleman, not only for what he had done in their behalf, but for having bracketed them with the quartermasters in the scheme presented a few days ago. He was afraid that in certain quarters invidious comparisons had been made between these classes of officers, both of whom had very responsible duties to perform. They had very valuable property to look after; the quartermaster having to look after stores, clothing, and the like, and the riding-master to train the horses and men. There was one point of great importance to Cavalry officers—namely, that of forage, the stoppages of which were to be abolished, while corresponding deduction was to be made from the pay of each officer. This arrangement would make little or no difference to those who kept all the horses, for which they were entitled to draw forage at the reduced rates. Every Cavalry officer was compelled to keep two chargers; while those above the rank of lieutenant were entitled to draw forage for more than two. A captain, for example, for three, and a field officer for four. The new arrangement dealt hardly with the poorer officers, who might prefer to keep only those horses obligatory on them, by at once docking their pay of the present forage stoppages in respect of horses they were permitted to keep or not as they liked. This was unjust to the officers in question, and he trusted the right hon. Gentleman would give the matter his consideration. He trusted the right hon. Gentleman would, under any circumstances, preserve to the Cavalry regiments their regimental majors, who, according to the plan now proposed, were to be taken away. He acknowledged the ample justice the right hon. Gentleman had done in the case of the purchase officers. The scheme they were discussing gave to the widow of an officer killed in action or wounded fatally, a pension equivalent to the saleable value of that officer's commission, and the scheme was retrospective to November, 1871. In the name of the purchase officers, he thanked the right hon. Gentleman for this act of justice.

COLONEL LOYD LINDSAY

did not propose to detain the Committee more than a few minutes; but he should be sorry to allow the occasion to pass without saying a word or two on such an important matter as the introduction of a new scheme of this sort. He would only refer to three points, although the right hon. Gentleman had dealt in his speech with a great many more than this number, and those points were—first, the period of service; secondly, the localization scheme; and thirdly, the pay and retirement. The latter, or retirement scheme, was one which, in his opinion, was open to some amount of criticism, although, as to the period of service and as to localization, the plan of the right hon. Gentleman met with his hearty approval. For his own part, having served for a short period in the War Office with the late Secretary of State for War, he believed that the principle of localization was a good one, that it was based upon a good founda- tion, and that it had the cordial sympathy of the country. Some hon. Members might say that this was of no great importance; but it seemed to him to be of considerable importance that the scheme should be in harmony with the feeling of the country. We must always remember that our Army was an army of voluntary enlistment; therefore, he hoped that in carrying out the localization scheme the right hon. Gentleman would do his best to make the Service as popular as he reasonably could. The point was one which he did not think had been raised before during the discussion, and he was only desirous of introducing those matters which had not been already debated. The right hon. Gentleman, he trusted, would do what he could to make the Service popular, and, from his high position, encourage the officers to do likewise. Ours, as he had said, was a popular Army, and as such it was undoubtedly subjected to considerable blots which were constantly being pointed out. One of the great blots, and one which he was astonished not to see more frequently noticed, was the blot of constant desertions. It was to him a most painful thing to think that so many men were constantly deserting from our Army. What could be the cause of it? Sometimes he felt that it was owing somewhat to the mode in which the soldiers were treated; and as a ease in point he would refer to the practice of shutting the men up at 10 o'clock at night, and locking the doors, which could not but be most objectionable to them. This rule might be relaxed. He believed he was right in saying that something had been said by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers) as to increased facilities for obtaining leave, and this he looked upon as a step in the right direction. Then, as to drill, there was a great deal of unnecessary labour that the men had to undergo which might very well be done away with; for instance, they could, without difficulty, be relieved of the uncomfortable burden of carrying their knapsacks when marching. It could not be necessary for the men to carry these knapsacks. These were only two little points; but they were points in the direction of which considered that the Service might be made much more agreeable amongst young soldiers—for it was amongst the young ones that we had these nume- rous desertions. The localization system was, and deserved to be, popular; and he claimed, as advocates of it, those people who said so much about esprit de corps and attached so much importance to it, for the esprit de corps, which was already strong in the regiments, would become stronger when those regiments were more intimately associated with the counties from which they took their name. In proof of this, he had only to point to the pride the counties took in their Militia regiments. The localization feeling was strong in the country; and if they carried it still further, and made their Line regiments participate in the great advantages which the counties were quite ready to give, the result would be found to be eminently satisfactory. On this point he wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman—and he considered it was a fair question to put to him—whether he really intended to endeavour to carry this localization scheme out, because it seemed to him that half-measures in connection with these matters would not do? Very often the counties did not know their Line regiments, as they did not come to them. Often had he been to the barrack-yard of the depôt centre of his own county, and all he had seen there had been a number of unfortunate young recruits being drilled into a state of half-silliness, with a number of old pensioners outside. This was the only acquaintance they had hitherto had with the localization scheme. Those brigade depôts were built at very considerable cost during the time of Lord Cardwell, as the late Secretary for War had stated, and in 1874 the new Government found them already built; £3,000,000 had been spent on them, but, costly as they had been, they were now only monuments of misapplied money—they had done no service. He trusted the Secretary for War would carry the localization scheme into full operation, even though, by so doing, some further outlay was necessary on the depôts in order to make them fit and proper for the reception of the regiments. It would be of great advantage to have their Line regiment quartered in the county from time to time, so that they might see it, become acquainted with its condition, become acquainted with its officers, and really become connected and identified with it in a manner of speaking. When the Line regiment went to Aldershot, the Militia regiment should take its place. One word about the period of service. He was very glad the right hon. Gentleman adhered to the 12 years' period of enlistment. There was no particular magic in that period, which was the longest time they could keep a man in the Service and send him back to civil life full of health and strength and activity, and with capacity for civil employment, without giving him a pension. The only reason, it seemed to him, wily the 12 years was held to was this—of being able to send the soldier out fit for civil employment. The alterations made in the scheme as to the distribution of service—so many years with the Colours and so many years in the Reserve—seemed to him thoroughly good and proper. Another year longer with the Colours at home, and two years longer with the Colours in India, were as much as they could properly give; and he entirely approved of the proposal. But there was one point the right hon. Gentleman had not cleared up—namely, he had not told them how he was going to make amends to the Reserve for the slight amount of injury he inflicted on it by keeping men eight years in the ranks instead of six. The right hon. Gentleman told them he was going to allow a certain number of Reservists to extend their service to 16 years upon a smaller amount of Reserve pay; while, on the other hand, they were removed a certain stage further off the possibility of being called upon. He (Colonel Loyd Lindsay) did not feel very sanguine as to the success of this scheme; but he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would be able to establish a satisfactory Reserve. He quite approved of allowing a certain number of men to go into the Reserve after a certain number of years' service. It was carrying out the plan which his right hon. Friend (Colonel Stanley) had adopted when in Office, and he believed it would work exceedingly well. He had a suggestion to make with regard to the formation of a new and efficient Reserve, and he hoped the Committee and the right hon. Gentleman would take it into their serious consideration. He wished to point out the immense advantages which the Volunteer staff of adjutants and sergeants would have for drilling a Reserve throughout the country. This Volunteer staff formed the most perfect machinery they could possibly have, as it entirely adapted itself to the tastes and habits of the people, the drill being given at the most convenient and acceptable time; and not only was the drill given at the period which was most convenient, but the body was thoroughly elastic and thoroughly popular—as was demonstrated by the readiness of the Volunteers, after a day's work, to come and go through an evening's drill. Soldiers look upon the drill as an infliction, whilst the Volunteers looked upon it as a pleasure. They had the machinery in existence, and it was maintained at great expense. Why, therefore, should they not make use of it for drilling and training the Reservists? He would like to go further than this, and see a certain number of the Volunteers, who were recommended by their officers and passed by an Inspecting Officer as thoroughly efficient men, admitted into the Reserve, receiving 6d. a-day or £9 a-year—a splendid piece of pocket-money, which would enable them to draw the very best men in the country into the Reserve—namely, the agricultural labourers, whom the commanding officers were always sighing to get hold of, because of their acquaintance with the pick and shovel and their handiness in the field. The men they enlisted now were townsmen, very few agricultural labourers offering themselves; but if they allowed the squire or the clergyman of a country district to recommend Volunteers for the Reserve, and were to take them in on receiving a satisfactory report from their officers and the Inspecting Officer, the Government would find that they would get into the Reserve the best men it was possible to secure. These men would engage to serve in any campaign for which they might be required. No doubt, they would form a novel Reserve; but he maintained we must seek some novel Reserve, for we could not depend on the Army and Militia Reserve. He should like to see some novel form of Reserve of this kind formed, and had no doubt, if his suggestion were adopted and worked out, it would be found of immense advantage. It would induce many men to join the Volunteers, and afterwards the Reserve, who, if things remained as they were, would never join either Force.

MAJOR O'BEIRNE

had just one observation to make as to the period of service in India. The right hon. Gentleman had extended it to eight years; but such a service was not sufficient, and he very much regretted that the right hon. Gentleman had not extended service with the Colours to 10 years. Three years would have to be taken off in the case of the young soldiers, for they might be enlisted at 19, but could not go to India before they were 20, and were then not fit for service until they had had sufficient training and experience. This would make the service in India six years instead of eight. It would be preferable to fix the period at 10 years instead of eight. It could not be said that eight years' service in India would frighten recruits, because the Indian Service was popular. He dissented from the observations which had fallen from some hon. Members with regard to the so-called Reserves. The Reserve in this country, compared with those of other countries, was a sham and a humbug—here it was a sham, but in Germany it was a reality. The Reserves ought to be called out from time to time for drill and training. With regard to promotion, he thought it ought to be by seniority, and not by selection; and as to non-commissioned officers, the right hon. Gentleman had made a very material change in the regulations, and one which had been desired for a very long time. The change had not come a day too soon; but the right hon. Gentleman, in dealing with this matter, had made a great omission in allowing non-commissioned officers to remain subject to a great restriction. These officers were not allowed to be out until 1 o'clock a.m. without a pass, and this, he considered, was a hardship. The discipline in this particular ought to be relaxed. As to the territorial system, as was shown in the Report of Lord Airey's Committee, and as many of the best authorities had declared, it ought to be condemned. It did not add a single additional effective soldier to the Army.

MR. CHILDERS

I desire, in the first place, in reference to what has just fallen from my hon. and gallant Friend, to say that in replying to some of the remarks which have been made in the course of the evening I do so on the clear understanding, which I have already expressed, that further opportu- nity will be given for discussing these matters. All that I will say on the general question is, that the proposals have been favourably received, and that we will do our best to advance the measures necessary in order to enable us to bring those proposals into operation by the 1st July. Speaking generally, I have paid close attention to the debate; and I have heard several suggestions from hon. Members on both sides of the House which deserve great attention, and which have very much helped me and those who are associated with me in arriving at a conclusion as to the best means of carrying out some of the details of the scheme. I never look on anything in connection with these matters as final; and, no doubt, the criticism which has been offered, and which is the result of great experience on the part of hon. and gallant Gentlemen, will enable me to amend some of the details of the scheme. I have to thank the Committee for the kindly way in which, as a rule, they have alluded, some to the whole, and some to part, of my proposals. The hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon) has been the only Member who has damned the whole thing completely. I am sorry that the hon. and gallant Member has not a single good word to say for the scheme; but he stands quite alone in his severe condemnation. I know the hon. and gallant Member's good nature; and, possibly, the severity of his criticism may be taken as showing his desire to think kindly of the measure—the desire of one who criticizes first and approves afterwards. I should not think for a moment of going through in detail all the suggestions that have been made this evening. Time would not allow it; and I should only be wearying the Committee if I endeavoured now to answer speeches which have taken six or seven hours to deliver, and which have touched almost every detail contained in the Memorandum I have placed on the Table. There are, however, two or three salient points to which I must refer; and I will endeavour to express myself as clearly as I can in reply to specific questions that have been put to me as to parts of my plan, which, hon. Members say, were not clearly developed either in the speech in which I stated it to the House, or in the Memorandum I have submitted. My right hon. Friend opposite has asked me a very pertinent question, to which I will endeavour to make my reply as clear as possible. He said, taking the figures as I stated them the other day, and as they are in this Memorandum, that I had not clearly expressed what ought to be the strength of the depôts in a particular contingency, that contingency being the fact of both battalions being abroad in the event of a great foreign war—not of one of those minor wars which we all know have disturbed so much the normal state of things during recent years. The right hon. Gentleman said there seemed to be a hiatus in my plan, and he asked me whether I could give my views on the question, or whether he was to consider the matter postponed for another year. Other hon. Gentlemen, I think, also alluded to this question; and, in as few words as I can, I will make the point clear. The regiments which are to form the first Corps d' Armée are to be 950 strong, with a depôt of 150, followed by others also 950 strong, with depôts of similar strength. In the event of the Corps d' Armée being called abroad, each of those regiments can throw off at once 150 of their men into the depôt, and thus strengthen the depôt up to 300. With b regard to the question of resorting to the Volunteer system in the event of those regiments staying abroad for any considerable time in small wars, the Government propose to follow the suggestions made by the Committee to which I have referred, who expressed the opinion that the expansion of a depôt should be effected in three waysôby recruits from other depôts, if they could be spared; by calling the volunteers from Line regiments and other territorial regiments. That should only be resorted to when it cannot be helped; but on the two occasions, since I took Office, when it was necessary, first, to provide five regiments for sudden despatch to Afghanistan, after Maiwand, and next, to send what was really a large Army to South Africa, we sent the men required without calling for recruits. That is, I think, so far satisfactory. The third proposal of the Committee was that the Army Reserve should be called up, and that has been done with perfect success. I also agree with the right hon. Gentleman in thinking that if two battalions of a regiment are called abroad, one or two Militia battalions of the regiment should be embodied; and I have under consideration the propriety of submitting to Parliament a proposal for enabling the Government, in the event of one of those smaller emergencies—which cannot be regarded as a national emergency or a public danger—to provide the funds for embodying the necessary number of Militia. If the three courses I have quoted are supplemented by this plan, the operation will be complete, and the Government will be able to deal with emergencies with perfect success. Then, with regard to the Indian reliefs. It has been proposed to substitute relief by drafts, to a greater extent than hitherto, for reliefs by whole battalions. I will assume that a regiment is on the Indian roster, consisting of 820 men, or whatever its strength may be, and requires every year to be filled up, under the eight years' system, by drafts of 140 or 150. What we should propose is, that that process of relief by drafts should go on steadily, and instead of keeping the officers, as they are now likely to be kept, 12 years abroad, keeping them eight years, so that officers could be exchanged from the other battalions—not all at once, but from year to year with the drafts. It would not be necessary to do more than relieve the men by an equivalent number of drafts, so that during the next 16 years the relief by drafts will go on precisely to the same extent, and until both regiments have done full service in India, it would not be necessary to relieve the whole regiment. If the regiment were one which would have to go from the Indian roster to the Colonial roster, it would come home en bloc, and would be relieved by a regiment from the Colonial roster then at home. The result will be that, considering the comparative number of the regiments, 50 in India and 20 in the Colonies, instead of there being a large number of regiments relieved every year as a whole they will be relieved gradually, and the result will be a great saving of the finances of India. Something like this was proposed from India some years ago, and I propose to carry it still further. We believe this is as moderate and reasonable a system as can be adopted for improving the financial arrangements of India, and securing that neither men nor officers shall be in India longer than eight years. The hon. Member asked how it was I had spoken of eight years as the possible service in India, when enlistment could not be expected for more than six years? The Memorandum stated that the Secretary of State for India and the Secretary of State for War might extend the service in India up to the whole period, and it is a fair calculation that a reasonable number of soldiers would remain for eight years; but the average would not be for more than six years. Then I have also been asked by several hon. Members what is the exact meaning of the proposed increase in the number of field officers. I will take the Line regiments as typical. Do we mean, I am asked, to establish simultaneously what is known as the double company system? We are almost the only country in Europe which maintains the small company system—in France, Germany, Austria, and Italy, the companies are very much larger than ours, and the battalions are organized accordingly. I am asked if we propose to double the companies as we double the field officers. We leave that question exactly where it is; and there is no question upon which military opinion is more divided than upon this. We do not propose to unsettle or settle that question at all. But it is our object to get rid in a very simple way of the grievance of compulsory retirement, which is inevitable under the present arrangement. If you leave regimental organization as it is now, you must have an inordinate and cruel retirement from the rank of captain. That will be minimized by our proposal. Under the present system only 231 captains can become majors; but under our proposal 513 can become majors; and that will be a great relief to the state of things which weighs heavily on all ranks of the Army. The tendency of the feeling that a captain must leave the Army at 40, whether he likes it or not, cannot add to the efficiency of the Army; and I have the concurrence and the strong approval of my military friends in this proposal. I am asked whether the pecuniary expenses of the general officers will be altered by the proposed changes. The difference is so slight that it is not worth consideration. The expectancy of an officer becoming a general officer is something under £700 a-year, and it will remain at £600 and something a-year. The hon. Member who asked that question was not sure whether I was right in effecting that reduction, and he gave as his reason that it was more invidious to choose from a small list than from a large list. I admit that; but you are more likely to find efficiency in a small number than in a large number, considering the changes that take place year after year. I am also asked whether the scheme with respect to the establishment of officers will not bring about a serious diminution in the number of subalterns in the regiments. Another hon. Member came to my rescue by complaining of the large number of officers for depôts. The change we propose leaves the regiments pretty nearly as they are now. There will be one subaltern less in a regiment abroad than there is at present. There are now 17 in every battalion abroad; there will, in future, be 16. One of the 17 we shall, in future, make a captain, and the captain will be an adjutant, so that the number of officers will be the same abroad as at present. The present number in the battalions at home is 13, including the adjutant; in future, the number will be 12, excluding the adjutant. With regard to the objections to our proposal respecting quartermasters, I fancy some little agitation has arisen through the words I used the other day, rather than from the words of the Memorandum. Quartermasters will be granted a higher rate of pay after 12 years' service, and on the completion of 20 years' service, and not less than 10 years as quartermasters, they will receive a pension, and after 12 years' service quartermasters may become captains. I quite agree with one remark made by the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), as to the importance of not making frequent changes; and I can assure him that what I am anxious to do is to build up a system which shall be tolerably homogeneous, in the hope that it will last some time. I offer the scheme as a whole, rather than as a mere change on one or two points in Army Organization. With respect to the veto of the Secretary of State, to which the hon. and gallant Member objects, that is only intended to enable the Secretary of State to decide judicially in the event of the colonel of a regiment objecting to the re-engagement of a non-commissioned officer. That veto is absolutely necessary; but it will be exercised only in that way, and not upon financial considerations, in order to deprive a man of his pension. The proposal respecting Cavalry regiments is a matter of internal economy, which I shall, perhaps, best deal with by saying that it is the result of very careful consideration. I am doing all I can to induce my colleagues in the different Departments to give as much of their patronage as they can to non-commissioned officers—or rather to attach such conditions to service under them that, whenever it is feasible, non-commissioned officers and petty officers in the Navy may be employed; and I shall be very glad of any assistance I can get in this House in that direction. My right hon. and gallant Friend opposite asked me whether I would add to the battalions of Guards. I am afraid I cannot hold out any hope of that. With reference to the four relief regiments having depôts of only 50 in our present organization, as those battalions have 150 recruits whom they can throw off when relieving regiments abroad, it would be perfectly safe to leave those four as proposed. That is a detail thoroughly understood in the Army, and is one as to which there will be no difficulty. It has been suggested that I should increase the Militia Reserve bounty, and raise the Reserve to 50,000 men. This suggestion has been made in connection with the idea that the Army Reserve will not reach the numbers contemplated; but I never heard of the 178,000 men to which some reference has been made. I have always understood that the Army Reserve was to reach a much more modest figure than that. I have put it down at 44,000; but I think there is no doubt that, with the scheme I propose of a second Reserve, the Reserve will reach 60,000, and that will be sufficient for all the requirements of a double battalion in the event of a great war. I am very strongly in favour of increasing the Reserves, and there are many other improvements which might be considered and carried out if we had the money. I have been asked by the noble Lord opposite (Lord Eustace Cecil) if we intend to take any steps in reference to the general issue of Martini-Henry rifles. No doubt that is a question of great interest.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

asked if the right hon. Gentleman had made in- quiries in regard to the experiments at Shoeburyness?

MR. CHILDERS

Yes. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Clare (Captain O'Shea) put a question to me as to the reduction of Cavalry. It is true that there is a small reduction in the Cavalry; but it is intended to strengthen the first regiments for service. There will, however, be a slight reduction of Cavalry and also of Artillery. I am obliged to my right hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Colonel Stanley) for the generous support he has given to the main part of our proposal; and perhaps I may be allowed to conclude by saying that I cordially agree with him, and with one or two other hon. Members who have spoken, in the hope that we may be able to take steps to make the Army more popular than it is now. I firmly believe that there is no service in the world, no employment in the world in which men should be able, if steady and sober, to get on so well as in the Army and Navy of this country. The Navy has reached the popular position which that great Service deserves. From all I hear, the progress made in the Naval Service in the last 20 years has been to give the Navy the position which it ought to have; and we are able now, I believe, to reach those parts of the population where good sound lads can be got whose families hold good positions in the country, and to induce them to enter the Naval Service, which is now looked up to with respect throughout the country. I am afraid that we have not yet reached the same point in the Army, but we are making progress. The imputations against the Army are, to a great extent, unjust; but we hope that we may be able, by such suggestions as those which have fallen from my right hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Stanley), and others who have taken part in the discussion to-night, to make non-commissioned officers feel that they hold positions in which their comfort is considered, and in which they can satisfy their friends that they occupy as good positions as any other persons of the same influence and power in the country. I can assure the Committee that as long as I hold my present position it will be my endeavour to do my best in these directions. I may add, also, that I do not at all entertain those ideas which my right hon. and gallant Friend so well refuted to day as to the character of the officers of the Army, and especially the regimental officers of the Army. So far from it, I am anxious to do all I can to assist the regimental officers of the Army, who have been called the backbone of the Army, although I do not like the word, for the whole Army is the backbone—but who, at any rate, form an important part of the Army. I thoroughly believe that we have in the Army abundance of men who are quite prepared to appreciate the necessary changes which took place in organization and in administration 10 years ago, and which have been, to some extent, followed up since. I do not believe that the Army has retrograded. On the contrary, I have full confidence that Her Majesty and the country are well served by the Army.

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON

asked what duties the new majors were to perform?

MR. CHILDERS

I have undertaken that the vested interests of all officers shall be carefully considered. I think I am within the mark when I say that whereas, under the present system, 6 out of 1,000 officers become generals, in future the proportion will be 7 in 1,000. In regard to what has been said by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon), I may say that there are two prevalent ideas—one in favour of double companies with a major and a captain to each, and the other in favour of regarding the senior captains of single companies as majors. For the present, the duties of majors will remain unchanged.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolutions to be reported To-morrow;

Committee to sit again To-morrow.

COLONEL STANLEY

Will the right hon. Gentleman state when the Army Estimates are likely to be taken again?

MR. CHILDERS

I am afraid I am not at present in a position to state until I can have an opportunity of consulting my Colleagues.

COLONEL STANLEY

It will not be before Easter?

MR. CHILDERS

No. Certainly not.

House adjourned at a quarter before Two o'clock.