TRANSVAAL RISING.—RESOLUTION.

HC Deb 25 July 1881 vol 263 cc1756-880

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

At the outset of the remarks which I shall venture to address to the House in support of the Motion of which I have given Notice, I should like to refer to some words which fell from the Prime Minister the other day. I then gathered from the expressions of the Prime Minister that but for the attacks which had been made on the policy of Her Majesty's Government this would not, in his judgment, have been a convenient occasion for this discussion, and that he threw upon us rather than upon Her Majesty's Government all the responsibility for any harm that might arise from bringing it on at this time. As far as I am concerned, I venture to disclaim any responsibility of the kind. In the early part of this Session, we abstained, not merely from discussing, but even from questioning the Government upon the subject, because we believed that they would carry out the policy which was laid down in Her Majesty's gracious Speech from the Throne. But when we discovered that that policy had been, in our opinion, reversed, we felt it to be necessary, at the earliest possible opportunity, to enable Her Majesty's Government to offer such explanations of their conduct as it might be in their power to give to the House, and ourselves to challenge the judgment of the House upon the course they had pursued. Therefore, if—as I hope will not be the case—any harm should result from this discussion at this moment, I do not think that that harm can fairly be charged to the account of those who sit upon this side of the House. I am quite sensible of the difficulty and of the delicacy of the questions with which we have to deal. Whatever may be the future relations between the Boers of the Transvaal and this country, all would wish that those relations should be friendly; and, therefore, I hope that in the course of this debate nothing may be said which will interfere with our friendship in the future. For my own part, I can only say this—that whatever there may be in the history of the present or of the past as to which we may have a right to complain of the conduct of the Boers of the Transvaal, I shall keep those matters entirely, as far as I can, apart from my argument; and all the more on this account—that I feel that any wrong-doing on their part has been due not so much to the fault of those who at the moment have been nominally in the position of authority in the Transvaal as to that spirit of insubordination natural to every comparatively uncivilized community—a spirit of liberty degenerated into personal licence—to which the fall of the first Transvaal Government was due, to which most of our difficulties in connection with that country may be traced, and from which may spring even greater trouble in the future. Now, I do not wish at all to underrate the difficulties of the charge with which Her Majesty's Government have to deal. It is very easy to denounce any South African policy; but since some hon. and right hon. Gentlemen took up their positions on the Treasury Bench, they may have realized that it is extremely difficult to frame a South African policy which shall take fair and proper account of all the numerous and conflicting interests involved. And, in spite of much that has occurred, I should not personally have been ready to challenge the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in this matter if it did not appear to me clear that, in dealing with the Transvaal they had solely present to their minds the claims of the Boer inhabitants of that country, and had forgotten, for the moment at any rate, those of that far larger portion of the population—the Native population and the loyal inhabitants who are attached to Her Majesty's dominion. It is not the first time that, in my humble opinion, there has been some failure on the part of some Members who sit on that side of the House, to look at both sides of a South African question. I can remember the debate on the Zulu War. At that time the wrongs of the Native population were the great topic on which those hon. Members delighted to dilate. Everything that was good was ascribed to the Natives; but when they came to talk of the Colonists, whether of English or of Boer origin, their remarks were by no means complimentary, and often, I am sorry to remember, were calculated to diminish the friendly relations between this country and the inhabitants of South Africa. But now, on the other hand, to all appearance, they think of nothing but the Boers. I should like to hear some voices on that side of the House take up the case of the Native population of the Transvaal as they took up the case of the Native population of Zululand. I should like to hear some proof from that Bench that the Native population of the Transvaal has occupied any place in the thoughts of Her Majesty's Government. I think that Her Majesty's Government have been unfortunate in this, that if their proceedings be viewed, as a whole, from the time they took Office up to the present time, I question whether there will be any Member of this House by whom they will be entirely approved. Why, Her Majesty's Government do not even approve of their whole South African policy themselves, for we have heard from the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, a Member of the Government by no means very anxious to admit himself wrong, that in the earlier part of their South African policy they made a mistake. At the commencement of this Session hon. Members sitting in that part of the House were decidedly opposed to the war into which Her Majesty's Government felt themselves compelled to enter. We, on our side of the House, are even more opposed to the manner in which they have concluded it. Many hon. Members objected to the policy which Her Majesty's Government adopted at their accession to Office, because they said that that policy was inconsistent with their previous declarations. We, on the other hand, now object to a reversal of the policy of which we approved; and yet, though Her Majesty's Government have so plainly proved themselves to be fallible in this matter, that very independent Member the Member for Carnarvonshire (Mr. Rathbone) has given Notice of an Amendment to my Resolution, which, though it does not dwell very much on the past, expresses a blind confidence in the future policy of the Government, as if they were the most consistent and successful Government that ever administered public affairs. I am not going to occupy the time of the House at any length by referring to the past history of this question; but I do not think that I can entirely neglect it, because I am perfectly ready to admit that the course of Her Majesty's Government cannot fairly be considered unless this past history is also in the minds of the House. The late Government were responsible for the annexation of the Transvaal. I have no reason to complain of the mode in which that annexation has been referred to either by Lord Kimberley or Mr. Grant Duff as representing the Colonial Office in Parliament. If I remember right, both those Gentlemen have frankly admitted that the annexation was not due to any mere spirit of territorial greed. It was undertaken by the late Government with the view of protecting our own Colonies, and delivering from an apparently impending destruction a ruined and helpless State, including many British subjects within its borders. I think it must also be admitted by those who fairly consider the circumstances of that time, that the annexation was not carried out by force, but was undertaken with the consent of the people—["Oh!"]—with the express consent of the inhabitants of the towns and the Native population, and with the tacit assent of the Boer farmers. No doubt, a Memorial was sent home by Members of the former Government protesting against that annexation; but I think it is sufficient in mentioning that Memorial to add that all those, I believe, occupying official positions in the Transvaal, with the solitary exception of Mr. Kruger, testified their practical acquiescence in the change by retaining their offices under the new Government. Well, the annexation was effected. Unquestionably, after that time a spirit of disaffection and of dislike to our rule manifested itself in the Transvaal. In consequence two Embassies were sent to this country, who represented the independent Boer population. The first of them having been received, and having stated the whole case to my Predecessor, returned to the Transvaal, expressing themselves satisfied that the annexation could not be reversed. The second Embassy came to this country when I had the honour of occupying the Colonial Office. I placed before them, as was my duty, the facts of the case as they appeared to Her Majesty's Government. I put before them the obligations we had undertaken—the impossibility, as it appeared to us, of receding from those obligations. But I also expressed the strong desire of Her Majesty's Government to give them as extreme an amount of local self-government as might be compatible with that control over Native questions, both within and beyond their borders, and over the foreign relations of the Transvaal, which it was our duty in the interest of our South African Dominions to retain. Well, their answer was this—We will not discuss these matters with you until you first give us back our independence. I endeavoured, both publicly and privately, to overcome this resolution. I remember perfectly well speaking in this House upon the question, and going so far in my statement of the desire of Her Majesty's Government to meet all reasonable wishes of the Transvaal people on this head, that I was actually taken to task by Irish newspapers because, as Colonial Secretary, I was willing to concede Home Rule to the Transvaal, whereas, while Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, I refused it to Ireland. In the autumn of 1879 grave difficulties threatened the Transvaal. I feel bound to say that, in my opinion, no small addition was made to those difficulties by the sympathy and support which the Transvaal Boers had received, and knew they could reckon upon, from the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) and other persons in this country. However, time went on, and matters to all appearance settled down. When Her Majesty's present Government came into Office the financial prospects of the Transvaal—no small test of the reign of law and order in that country—were, I will venture to say, as hopeful as could be found in the history of any of our recently-annexed Colonies. The state of political affairs which had existed in the previous autumn had greatly improved; the mass meeting of the Boers, which was summoned for April, had been postponed indefinitely; and Sir Garnet Wolseley was able to report in April, 1880, to Her Majesty's Government that the reports from all quarters of the Transvaal sustained the opinion that the people had determined to renounce all further disturbing action and return to the peaceful scenes of their rural life; and he held out to the Government of the day as favourable a picture of the future prosperity of the Transvaal under the Colonial Government as was ever held out by anyone in a similar position. I have seen blame attached to the late Government because they did not confer representative institutions on the Transvaal; but anybody who fairly considers the circumstances, who remembers that the Representatives of this very considerable portion of the Transvaal population would not even discuss those institutions with us, must surely see that it was impossible to do anything more in this direction than was done by the late Government—namely, to confer the Provisional Constitution of a Crown Colony, in the hope that matters might soon so change as to enable them completely to fulfil the promises which were made by Sir Theophilus Shepstone at the annexation. And when the particular form of this Provisional Constitution is objected to I must say that, after all, when you come to consider the circumstances of the Transvaal, many persons, whose opinions are of far greater weight than mine on Colonial questions, would consider that, in a territory comprising 40,000 Whites to 800,000 Coloured persons, the government of a Crown Colony is by no means ill-adapted to secure real liberty to the whole of the population. Well, the present Government acceded to Office. They found matters in the state which I have described; and, after a full consideration of the whole circumstances of the case, they resolved—I remember the words of the President of the Board of Trade last summer—they resolved without doubt that Her Majesty could not be advised to relinquish her Sovereignty over the Transvaal. Now, I do not at all find fault with that determination. It was approved by the country; it was approved by the House. ["No, no!"] It was brought to the test of a debate and a division in this House by the hon. Member for Liskeard; and the policy which Her Majesty's Government had adopted met with the definite approval of the majority of this House. But there was then an element in this question which had not existed in our time. The impression—I will not now question whether it was well founded or not—had prevailed, not only in the Transvaal, but throughout the whole of South Africa, that the present Prime Minister, in certain speeches which he made when in Opposition, had expressed his intention to restore the Transvaal to the Boers. I am not inquiring whether what the right hon. Gentleman actually said justified that impression. All I would say is that that impression undoubtedly prevailed. It is clear from statements made by our Colonial officials in the Papers which are in the possession of the House, from frequent references in Petitions which have come from the Cape, from the Transvaal, from Holland, in favour of the restoration of independence to the Boer—it is clear that that was the sense in which the words of the Prime Minister were received. But the letter of the Prime Minister in June and the previous announcement of the policy of the Government in the Queen's Speech from the Throne dissipated this impression in the minds of those who had entertained it. And, as the impression had led to great hopes, so its dissipation led to great disappointment. It would, I think, be difficult to exaggerate the effect of this disappointment on the position of affairs in the Transvaal. I remember reading a letter by Mr. Joubert on this question, written in the early part of this year. Mr. Joubert asked at considerable length, and in very strong language, why the Prime Minister had not carried out his promises, and done that for which they relied on him? Well, in December an outbreak—so far as we can see, unexpected alike by the Government of the Transvaal, by the Government at home, and by the people generally in South Africa—occurred in that country. Her Majesty's Government had then to deal with an entirely new phase of the question. Almost at the same time as the outbreak occurred there came from South Africa a Memorial to the Colonial Office—sent at the instance of some of the most influential Representatives in the Cape Parliament—praying Her Majesty's Government to appoint a Commission to inquire into and deal with this question. Sir, I have never been able to understand why Her Majesty's Government considered that request for a Commission inopportune, when, some weeks later, after the series of defeats which they had sustained, they agreed to the identical proposition which was then submitted to them. But they declined it. They knew at the time they declined it—they must have known long before that time, just as well as they knew in February and March last—the grave dangers that existed in this matter from the undoubted sympathy between a large part of the population of the Cape Colony and the Free State and those who, in blood at any rate, are related to them in the Transvaal. Yet, when this proposal was made to them at the time of the outbreak, this danger does not seem to have exercised the same influence on their minds as it made after the series of defeats to which I have referred. Her Majesty's Government persisted in the policy which they stated to Parliament in Her Majesty's Speech from the Throne. I do not blame them for persisting in that policy; but what I do blame them for is this—that they carried it on for a certain time, and then they abandoned it. I believe that by their half-hearted action in this matter, not only has it happened that blood has been shed to no purpose—the blood of brave British soldiers—not only has it happened that our Army has had to deplore defeats unavenged; but, even worse than this, that Her Majesty's Government have effectually precluded themselves from securing the interests of those whom they were most bound to protect against the men whom they fear; that by making peace at the time and in the manner in which they made it they have secured, not only that peace shall not be lasting, but that it shall be the precursor of infinitely worse trouble than any from which their weak yielding has for the moment delivered them. Now, I understand that Her Majesty's Government argue that they have carried out the promises which they made to the country in Her Majesty's Speech from the Throne; that they have re-established the authority of the Queen in the Transvaal; that the arrangements which are now in progress are identical with those to which they would have consented last summer; and that, in point of fact, the Boers have surrendered to them, and not they to the Boers. Well, let us take these points and see how far that argument can be sustained. Has Her Majesty's authority been re-established in the Transvaal? What is the present position of affairs in that territory? Why, I will venture to say that Her Majesty's authority does not extend beyond the boundaries of those fortified posts which we occupied during the war, except by the kind permission of the leaders of the Boers. When, at the suggestion of the Boer leaders—and it is a suggestion which did them very great honour—you sent a detachment of troops to re-occupy Potchefstroom, you were obliged to send it under the escort of one of those leaders through a territory which you say is subject to your authority. The Papers show that even now, so far as we can tell, at Middelburg and other places which have not been garrisoned by the English, the Landroosts of the English Colonial Government have not been permitted to resume their offices or to rehoist the English flag. And in the mere matter of the collection of taxes, when the ad interim Government of the Transvaal—your Government—thought it right that certain licence duties should be raised, they were obliged, in the very newspaper that gave notice of their intention, and at the side of that advertisement, to add to it a letter signed by the Boer leaders in testimony of their gracious permission that this taxation should be levied. This is what you call re-establishing the Queen's authority in the Transvaal. How will it be in the future? Are the arrangements to which you have agreed in any sense identical with those to which you were prepared to agree last summer, or before this war broke out? What view do the Boer leaders take of this matter? I will venture to say, without fear of contradiction, that anyone who looks through the whole literature on the subject—and that literature is very large—will find there is one thing on which the Boer leaders have been alike consistent and persistent, and it is this—that their independence, as far as regards everything within what they call the Transvaal, must be restored entirely, and that, without the restoration of such independence, they were not even prepared last March to negotiate with us. What interpretation are the Boer leaders, after the victories they have secured, likely to put on the terms of the agreement to which you have come? Why, this—that all they have ever contended for has been obtained; and I will venture to say that that is fully carried out by the terms of the agreement itself. If by your making peace even at the time, and in the manner in which you made it, you had obtained the terms which you were prepared last summer to concede, I admit that there would be something to be said in defence of Her Majesty's Government. I think I have shown that this—at any rate, in the minds of these victorious Boers—cannot possibly be the case. But if it is not the case, what have you done? You have given to men with arms in their hands what you denied to their peaceful prayers. And, of all policies, that must be the most fated to a country like this, having domination over so many alien and ignorant races. But you did not do this without warning. I suppose I shall be told that Tories are careless of the shedding of blood. But you had warnings as to the danger of your course from men who you dare not say are careless of the shedding of the blood of either their own soldiers or of the race with whom hon. Members opposite now so warmly sympathize. You had opinions from Sir Evelyn Wood and from Mr. Hoffmeyer, at Cape Town. Sir Evelyn Wood, on the 5th of March, said— Considering the disasters we have sustained, I think the happiest result would be that after accelerating a successful action, which I hope to fight in about 14 days, the Boers should disperse without any guarantee, and then many who are now undoubtedly coerced will readily settle down. Again, on the 7th of March, he said— After eight hours' talk I am confirmed in the opinion I expressed in my telegram of the 5th instant. What did Mr. Hoffmeyer, the advocate of the rights of the Boers of Cape Town, say? Telegraphing to Mr. Joubert me the 11th of March he said— In any case, before the Commission can be appointed, either the British arms must have conquered or the Boers must have given a tangible proof of submission in the eyes of the world. What would have been the risk of persisting in the policy which, me far, you had carried out? No doubt it is possible that some lives might have been lost. Yet we know now that Laing's Nek was a position which might easily have been turned, that the defences were contemptible, and that many of the Boers were getting tired of the conflict. Success might not improbably have been obtained even without loss of life; but oven if loss of life lead followed, what a position would leave been gained by it as compared with that which you now hold. Having defeated the Boers, and having secured their submission, you would have been in the position which was somewhat prematurely described by Mr. Grant Duff when he said that the policy of this country was parcere subjectis; you might then, with true magnanimity, have given to a defeated enemy terms which you ought never to have given to a victorious foe, because you would have had a security for the performance of any conditions that you might have required. They would have felt and appreciated the power of Great Britain, and all, whether Boers or Natives, in South Africa would have known that whatever conditions were made in the Treaty to which they might have agreed would be enforced by a Power capable and willing to enforce them. Lord Kimberley talked the other day of the salutary influence which Her Majesty's Government might still exercise in the Transvaal. But your influence must be based on something. What is the basis for it now? Is it the terror of your arms? Even while you maintain an army there, to all appearance, rather to protect the Boer leaders against the Natives and the loyalists than for any other purpose, you have not re-established your authority; and you know very well that you will not permanently maintain a large army in the neighbourhood of the Transvaal. Is it to be moral influence? What can be the moral influence of a country which has behaved as you have behaved, which has added another chapter of reversal to the many previous chapters of reversals in our South African history, which has betrayed its friends and yielded to its victorious enemies? I have thus far spoken rather of the power which the action of Her Majesty's Government may have left to them of insisting upon the performance of the stipulations of the Convention which is about to be concluded than of the merits of the Convention itself. It appears to me that, whatever the merits of that Convention may be, the manner in which it has been concluded is an insuperable bar to its successful working. But what are likely to be the merits of the Convention itself? I did not want to discuss this part of the question in the dark; and therefore, the other day, I was rather anxious that this debate should be postponed till we had the Convention itself before us. As, however, the right hon. Gentleman has insisted upon it, I am obliged to gather what I can from the Papers as to the terms of that Convention. [Mr. GLADSTONE: I did not insist. Exactly the reverse.] The right hon. Gentleman has insisted that either by me or by someone else this question should be brought before the House to-day. [Mr. GLADSTONE: No!] I am therefore obliged to discuss this question without knowing what the Convention is. I have said that throughout the whole course of the history of this matter the Boer leaders have been consistent and persistent in claiming independence for the Transvaal, so far as it affected the interior government of that country. They announced, some time ago, their readiness to accept a kind of protectorate on the part of Great Britain. I take it that that protectorate is identical with the suzerainty proposed by Her Majesty's Government. I do not wish at all to dispute the value of such a control, looking to the possible future of South Africa, upon the relations between the Transvaal and other foreign civilized States beyond the borders of South Africa. That, I take it, the Boer leaders have agreed to, and that, I understand, they were always willing to agree to. But I very much question whether the Boer leaders really understand that the terms of peace concluded between them and Sir Evelyn Wood authorized this country to maintain any effective control over the relations between them and the Native tribes upon their borders. I suspect that this has been a matter which has been relegated by them to the decision of the Commission, with complete confidence that the Commission will not insist upon any definite action of that kind. Why do I say this? Because I cannot understand how any such control can be practically exercised, unless the real government of the Transvaal be in the hands of Her Majesty's Government. You are to have a Resident at the capital of the Transvaal, who is supposed to control the Frontier policy of that country. But how is he to do so? Has he any force at his command? And what is the Frontier policy of that country? Why, as everyone who has given the slightest attention to the South African Question knows, the Frontier policy of every African State is made up of cattle raids on one side and of claims to land on the other; and from most trivial causes of this kind the most bloody wars have arisen. What is your Resident to do when he hears of cattle raids by the Swazis and other powerful tribes? Is he to tell the Boers that they must not retaliate, and that they must look to the control of Her Majesty's Government? If so, will not the Boers very naturally say—"Well, if this be so, Her Majesty's Government must protect us against these inroads?" But how is the Government going to do it? Or suppose—and this is very likely—that the Boers laugh at the advice of the Resident, that they retaliate upon their neighbours, and that their neighbours in turn retaliate upon them. Why, then you will have the old story over again; you will have the precise circumstances recurring which led to the annexation of the Transvaal. This brings me to another part of this question of even greater importance. What, I wish to know, are to be the borders of the Transvaal? Hon. Members have, no doubt, studied the map of the Transvaal which has been recently circulated. Those who have done so will see that the nominal borders of the Transvaal extend far beyond the real limits of the Boer occupation. If Her Majesty's Government had made peace in such a manner as to render it probable that the terms arranged would be really observed, I grant that it might have been a possible, though I think it would have been a difficult, solution of this question to have founded a second Orange Free State in South Africa, limiting the Boers of the Transvaal to the territory which they really occupy, and giving them, within those limits, complete independence, having the security, which you have in the case of the Orange Free State, that their boundaries would be distinctly defined, so that beyond those boundaries you might, had it so pleased you, have established a British protectorate or government over the Natives. In that way you might have confined the Boers within their proper limits, and taken reasonable and necessary securities for their noninterference with their Native neighbours. That would have been a possible policy under certain conditions, which Her Majesty's Government have not fulfilled, and I cannot help thinking that it was a policy which recommended itself to the Colonial Secretary when the terms settled by Sir Evelyn Wood were agreed to. But now what is to happen? We have had from several sources of information statements—so frequently repeated that there must be some truth in them—that this country, to the East of the 30th degree of longitude, is to be retained in the Transvaal. I think it is very possible that this may be the result, and why? Because it is a result which is very keenly desired by those whose interests alone appear to be consulted in this matter—namely, the Boers themselves. I notice among the Papers that are laid before the House statements as to the feeling of the Boers upon this subject. Mr. Joubert, in a speech at Potchefstroom, on being asked about the 30th degree of longitude said—"Never mind, that will be all right; we shall get back our country." I notice also a strong Petition signed by Boers in the neighbourhood of Pretoria, and presented to the Boer leaders, telling them, in so many words, that if they consent to give up any part of their country the people will again resort to arms. I notice also a statement from the Utrecht district by Mr. Rudolph, showing that the Boers there were likewise averse to any separation of the Native territories. Suppose Her Majesty's Government make concession in this matter to the Boers, what will they have done? Have Her Majosty's Government any right to give over those Native territories to the Boers? Let me state what is the actual population of these districts. In Lydonburg there are 123,320 Natives, 1,286 Boers, and 292 persons of English or other nationality, and some of the Boers there are reported to desire a continuance of the English rule. In Waterberg there are 174,045 Natives, 714 Boers, and 50 persons of English or other nationality; in Zoutpansberg there are 364,200 Natives, 654 Boers, and 160 persons of English or other nationality. Now, I would very much like to know what right some 2,654 Boers have to the future government of this great territory, inhabited by 660,000 Natives, all of whom, so far as we have any expression of opinion on the subject, have a desire for the continuance of English rule; or, at any rate, of the condition in which they are at present placed. I will venture to say that nothing can be stronger than the statements that appear in the Papers on this subject. It is stated by the Native Commissioner that he found the Waterberg district and also that of Zoutpansberg in a most unsettled state, and that the majority of the Chiefs were prepared for war. He says— I was distinctly informed, by the Chief Ligidi, that if the rumours to the effect that the British Government intended abandoning the country were true, the Natives would take the law into their own hands and settle their grievances by arms. I was further informed by the same Chief that the Natives ignored the authority of the Boers, and that, having driven them once before out of the district, they might do so again. During the war, and my absence from Blueberg, Ligidi took charge of the Government offices and also the cattle; and when it was known that the Boers intended seizing all the Government property his commando, I believe 700 to 1,000 strong, was ordered into the field, and instructions given to the effect that if the Boers attempted to enter the Poort they were to fire upon them. The Government property taken charge of by the Natives was duly returned to me, and upon inspection I found everything correct. Another Chief of the Waterberg district, who can turn out from 6,000 to 8,000 fighting men, and who rules over about 40,000 souls, said that he never was a Boer subject, and that he and his people would never consent to Boer rule. Well, what right have you, when dealing with masses of Natives of this character, to hand them over to a few Boers? It is one thing to give the Boers self-government; but it is quite another matter to give them the right of governing these hundreds of thousands of men who have joyfully accepted the position of British subjects, and whom you are bound to care for in the future as in the past. Why, you have not ventured to do such a thing even in your own Colonial Possessions. Only a few months ago Her Majesty's Government refused to the Colony of Natal the gift of responsible government, and what was the main reason for that refusal? Why, that the White population of Natal is about 23,000, while the Native population is about 400,000. I know that responsible government has been given to the Cape, with authority over large Native districts; but remember this—that the Cape Colony is a community far advanced in civilization when compared with the Boers of the Trans- vaal; and that it is a community where there is every material for a capable and enlightened Government, and where day by day and year by year there is springing up a greater desire for a humane and fair policy towards the Native races. But it was not very long ago that, even with regard to the Cape Colony, some right hon. Gentlemen, now Members of the Government, used harsh language about the policy of the Cape Government towards the Kaffirs or Basutos. Those Gentlemen, I think, if I am not wrong, expressed a desire that the control of this country over those Native territories should be resumed, and that they should no longer be left in the hands of the Cape Colony. Then, with what face can a Government composed of Gentlemen who have made statements of that kind make over all the Natives north and east of the Transvaal to a few uncivilized Boers who have not a shadow of right, or the slightest power to rule over them? I say they have not a shadow of right. Why, the inclusion of these districts in the old maps of the Transvaal is a geographical farce. The Boers never exercised authority over the greater part of them; and from some parts where they did exercise authority they had actually been driven out before the annexation, and the Boer farmers have paid black mail to the Native Chiefs. What can result from this policy on the part of the Government? You cannot hand over to the Government of the Boers Natives who have expressed the opinions I have quoted. They will resist it. But suppose the Boer Government—you having handed them over, as far as your power goes—attempts to enforce your decision. Why, you will have the commencement of a bloody Native war. I will venture to say that every drop of blood shed in that war will be upon the heads of those who, in dealing with this subject, have ignored the rights which belonged and the duties which they owed to seven-eighths of the population of the Transvaal. But more than this, I have spoken of the strong; I will now speak of the weak. There are Natives within the limits of the Boer portions of the Transvaal, within reach of Pretoria and the principal centres of population. What is their view of the question? Why, Sir, their view of the question is this—that they are too weak to fight—that they must either leave their homes or submit with dread and pain to those whom, rightly or wrongly, they look upon as their ancient oppressors. Will the House bear with me while I read just one extract from these Reports with which the Blue Books teem, as to the feelings of these unfortunate persons? I find that in the Pretoria district there is one Chief whose name is Jan Kekana. Jan Kekana and another Chief had an interview with Sir Evelyn Wood. His Excellency said that he was very glad to see them. Jan Kekana said that they had come in specially to ascertain what was the truth regarding the statements made to them by the Boers that they had beaten the English and taken the country back. Jan states that they, the Natives, did not wish to live under the Boer Government again. That they had acknowledged the English Government's taking the country with gratitude, and that they could not and would not now disavow their act. Sir Evelyn Wood stated that the Boers had not beaten the English, but had repulsed on three different occasions a small English force, on no occasion more than 500 strong; the Boers had, in each instance, three or four times that number; that there were now very large reinforcements in Natal; but that the Queen did not wish more blood to be shed, and had graciously granted peace to the Boers. That is an answer which does great credit to Sir Evelyn Wood's ingenuity, as well as to his patriotism But, strangely enough, the Native Chiefs were not satisfied, nor were they satisfied with the attempt which Sir Evelyn Wood made to explain the securities which would be provided for their protection under the Boer Government. Having heard all these explanations, Jan Kekana then said that they did not wish to return to the Boer Government, that he had grown up under the Boers, and knew what they were, that they were even now threatening them with what they intended to do when they were in power again, and that he felt sure many days would not pass before complaints were received from the Natives of ill-treatment by the Boers. The Chiefs then went on to say that they could not speak with two mouths and serve two masters, that they had thankfully become British subjects, and would not again consent to be ruled by the Boers; that if the country was given back to the Boers they would move their people and property to the mountains and fight rather than submit to Boer rule again. Jan Kekana then concluded by asking that he might be allowed to purchase powder should the country be given back. They then took leave, and were rewarded by Sir Evelyn Wood for their good conduct. Jan Kekana thanked His Excellency, and said what they had done was nothing, and had not been with the view of receiving any reward; they were British subjects, and what they had done was a matter of duty. What they wanted was that the country should still be ruled by the English; that was the reward they craved for, and that they would not consent to be ruled by the Boers again, and they requested that, should the country be given back, sufficient notice should be given to enable them to move their families and property at the same time as the Government left the country. I have here another touching document, which was addressed by another Native Chief to Mr. Shepstone— Please have the great kindness to answer me the following question—Are you English really defeated? I am very sad, because I thought your honour would always be my father, and foster me; but now you leave the country and us to our fate. Oh, may your honour, before leaving the country, not forget to do something for the Black population of the Transvaal, so that they may bless you. Oh, might the Commission make a paragraph to protect us from unjust treatment or the like. May your honour, who has to now been our father, do acts of a father for his children whom he leaves. May your honour think of your child Magate, so that nobody dare take revenge. Oh, make a peace which will also be a real peace to us Black people. All this which I write are the prayers of the hearts of me and my people. For God's sake, don't forget us in the peace you make! In reply, he also was told that the English had not been defeated, and that every care would be taken to protect the rights and interests of the Natives. Mr. Rudolph reported to Sir Evelyn Wood on April 26— A great many of the Natives of Luneberg and the surrounding country met me there, to express their thankfulness that British rule was again established in their district..… Also the Natives of the country cut into the Transvaal by the boundary line made after the Zulu War. And now, are you going to give up all these people to the Boers, merely taking paper securities for their future protection? For, after what has occurred, your securities, I fear, will be nothing else. Remember what these people have done. In 1877, they loyally accepted British rule. They remained at peace even when the Zulu War and the difficulties of the Transvaal Government would have tempted them, had they desired it, to revolt. They paid taxes willingly when called upon to do so, believing that thereby they secured for themselves your protection. During the war they helped you by every means in their power, in spite of the fact that they were often ill-treated and plundered by the Boers. They would have fought against the Boers if every exertion had not, very properly, been made to prevent them from interfering, though they naturally thought it strange that they, being British subjects, should not be permitted to fight in defence of the Queen's authority. But they must surely think it stranger still that after all this they should be deserted by the British race, in whom they had trusted, and of whom they had possibly heard as the protectors of the Coloured population, not merely when they were British subjects, but in all the countries of the world. Is this a step in that path of liberty, justice, and humanity in which the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister a short time ago told us that his Government was proceeding? Is this the regard paid to the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" which I observe in a sort of official statement which has recently appeared in the newspapers is the sole aim of the Liberal Party? Is this the way in which pledges given to the Coloured races are to be redeemed by those who hitherto have been their especial defenders? Or are they now to learn for the first time that when a race arises strong enough for the moment to defeat our troops our sympathies for the Coloured population are to be thrown to the wind? We are giving to those who defeat us the right to govern themselves; can a Liberal Government refuse that very right to hundreds of thousands of those who have stood by us, because their skins happen to be of a different colour from our own? There is yet a further point. I rather gathered from the right hon. Gentleman's gestures, when I was alluding to the subject, that he will contend that care will be taken to protect the interests of all the Natives to whom I have alluded. But how are the Government to do it? I am referring to the Natives within the territory which is still the Transvaal. I will venture to assert that there is no proof whatever in these Papers that the Boer Representatives have ever agreed that their conduct towards the Natives within their country shall be subject to our control. But even if that be agreed, how will you carry it out? You can only carry it out by having, as you might have in territory that belongs to you, control over the local Courts of Justice. You cannot carry it out merely by means of a Resident at Pretoria. Why, it may be that the Volksraad may pass laws, not only against slavery, but permitting Natives to hold land, and giving them full permission to move from one part of the country to another and some degree of independence. But how are you to secure that these laws shall be carried out in a country as large as France, thinly inhabited by a White population, and where there is no strong public opinion in favour of such laws? Is it not clear, from all that has hitherto occurred there, that they will be frequently violated; and if the Resident shall chance to become acquainted with cases of the kind—no very easy matter—what can he do? Why, he can only appeal to the Government for redress—a Government which depends upon the support of the people who may have committed the outrage. You never will obtain redress. But there are other persons in the Transvaal besides the Boers and the Natives. There are those who are known as loyalists. What is their position? They are not so few in number as has been hitherto supposed. We know that there have been 3,700 of them in Pretoria, that there have been others in different garrisons which have been besieged by the Boers. We know that Mr. Kruger recognized their numbers, when he admitted that he had some fear of their action, and of the claims which might be made by them for property of theirs taken by him and his friends to fight against their Sovereign. What is to be their future? Their numbers, it is true, though considerable, will be smaller than those of the Boers. You say you will take securities for the protection of life and property, and that they will be entitled to all the rights of settled govern- ment. What do they think about it? Why, they think this—They feel the danger of their position so much that they are flying by hundreds from the Transvaal, sacrificing a large portion of their property for the moment in the fear of losing it all, and possibly their lives, by remaining. What have these people done? Why, in the first place, they have made large investments in the Transvaal on the faith of the promises of the British Government. That fact alone induced the right hon. Gentleman last June to attach great importance to the obligations which we had incurred. But since then, what more have they done? Why, they have adhered, in spite of threats and dangers, to the Government in which they trusted. They have fought and bled by the side of our soldiers in defence of the authority of the Queen. History will record in the future deeds of courage and skill on the part of the Boers; but history will also record equal deeds of uncomplaining heroism and self-sacrificing gallantry on the part of those who have remained loyal to the British Crown. What reward do you give them? You tell them you secure that which they know well it is not in our power to secure. I have always thought that it was the duty, the interest, and the pleasure of the Government of this country, whatever its political opinions, to encourage loyalty in the Colonial subjects of the Queen. A pretty encouragement you have given to these unfortunate men and others who may be tempted to imitate their example. The retrospect is painful, but the outlook is even more gloomy, not only for the Transvaal, but for the whole of our South African Possessions. It has hitherto been recognized as a matter of vital interest to all those communities that the supremacy and control of the British Government should be maintained in South Africa, in order to secure peace and good order between race and race and community and community. You have practically abandoned that supremacy and lost that control in the very part of South Africa where its exercise was most required. I fear that, by the manner in which the Government have brought this war to what they think a conclusion, they have insured a bitter harvest of evil for the future. They have encouraged a spirit which is not merely confined to a small body of farmers in the Transvaal who desire local self-government, but which is expressed in the words Africa for the Africanders, from the Zambesi to Simon's Bay—Africa for the Africanders, no longer a part of the British Empire, or subject to the authority of the Queen. I do not know whether this conduct can be rightly considered magnanimous and just; but what I venture to think is this—it would be more magnanimous if you had given what you meant to give before it was forced from you. It would be more just if you had paid more attention to the sufferings and the claims of those who, at great cost to themselves, have shown their attachment and loyalty to the Crown. The influence of this policy will go beyond South Africa. It will go all over the globe; and although it may be lauded with half-concealed contempt by those to whom it has given what they desire in the present, or by others to whom it promises what they hope in the future, yet I think by the varied races who compose our Empire it will be received in a spirit which no loyal subject of England would desire. If we have a friend, that friend will find in our conduct occasion for surprise. If we have an enemy, he will find in it occasion for delight. He will see in it a revelation of infirmity of purpose, a weak acceptance of a momentary defeat in an unpopular war, alien to the past history of England, and full of dangerous, and, it may be, fatal promise for our future. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving— That, in the opinion of this House, the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government with respect to the rising in the Transvaal, so far as it has yet been explained to Parliament, has resulted in the loss of valuable lives without vindicating the authority of the Crown, is fraught with danger to the future tranquillity and safety of Her Majesty's dominions in South Africa, and fails to provide for the fulfilment of the obligations contracted by this Country towards the European settlers and native population of the Transvaal.

BARON HENRY DE WORMS

Sir, I rise to second the Motion of my right hon. Friend. It may appear somewhat paradoxical, but I feel that this debate is at once too late and too early. It is too late, inasmuch as the House is now called upon to decide, not what the policy of the Government should be, but rather with regard to what it was. It is too late, because the House is called upon to ratify, by its decision, as autocratic and arbitrary an act as ever has taken place either in this or any other country, because, also, by the will of a large and obedient majority—a majority too ready to accept the policy of the Government as a whole rather than to inquire into it and analyze it, to which we are obliged to submit, but whose verdict will not be that of the nation—Parliament has been committed to an act which, in the honest conviction of many even on the other side of the House, is most detrimental to the best interests of the country. Sir, this arbitrary proceeding may possibly be compared with the policy followed by the late Government; but the result of the comparison will be to the advantage of the latter. The Conservative Administration has been taunted with Imperialism. If by Imperialism it is meant that they have done all they could to augment and maintain the prestige of this great Empire, I am willing to accept the word. Sir, the Conservatives may have annexed territory, but they annexed it with the consent of Parliament; it has been left to the present Advisers of Her Majesty to effect the retrocession of territory without the consent of Parliament. This debate has come too soon, because the House is not in possession of the facts connected with the Royal Commission which would enable hon. Members to come to a clear and proper decision upon the policy that has been adopted by the Government. But, while considering what they have done, it is necessary, in order to arrive at a fair and just conclusion, that the House should also consider briefly and clearly why this annexation, which has been so abused by the Government, and which is now going to be cancelled by them—why this annexation took place. It is alleged by certain so-called philosophical Radicals that all conquest and annexation is wrong, as being a violation of the freedom of nations; but I maintain that the annexation of the Transvaal was as much in the interests of the White population as it certainly was in the interests of the Black population. It was in the interest of the Whites, because they proved totally unable to protect themselves—to collect taxes, or, indeed, to perform any of the functions of government. The Prime Minister said at Dalkeith, in November, 1879, that the annexation of the Transvaal had been voted against by 6,500 adults out of a population of 8,000. These figures, I venture to say, do not represent the fact accurately. The White population of the Transvaal is somewhere about 40,000, and although it might be said that only 8,000 of this number are capable of bearing arms, I think the right hon. Gentleman will agree with me that capability to bear arms does not, of necessity, form the only quality which is required in the exercise of citizenship, and is not the only qualification demanded from those who are to have a voice as to the future government of a country. Moreover, Sir, if we had acted on those principles of liberty and humanity which are always paraded as the peculiar attribute of the Liberal Party, we ought to have taken a sort of plébiscite in order to ascertain the opinion of the Natives who had suffered so terribly from the oppression and cruelty of the Boers. As a matter of fact, there were only 6,500 against the annexation, and the rest of the adult population, together with the Natives, were in favour of it. The Boers themselves who had voted for the annexation had so acted because they considered the White population unable to govern itself and unfit to be trusted with the government of others. The attributes of this model Republic, to use the words of the right hon. Gentleman himself, this Christian community, are so well known as scarcely to need recapitulation. This model Republic was so enlightened and religious that it tolerated and practised slavery in its worst forms; so capable of self-administration, that with a population of 840,000 and an area of land as large as France, the Treasury had 12s. 6d. in its coffers at the time of the annexation; and so deep was the national and patriotic spirit, that Sir Theophilus Shepstone effected the annexation, without the slightest resistance, with a force of 25 policemen. The attributes of this Republic, which the President of the Board of Trade characterized as "animated with a deep and stern religious sense," are the enslavement and cruel treatment of its Native population. That has never been denied. ["Oh, oh!"] To those hon. Gentlemen who question that statement I would commend the evidence of Mr. Ludorf, a German missionary, who witnessed a good many of these cruelties, and who asserted that on a particular occasion—[Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: What date?]—I have not the exact date, but the statement was made this year—a number of Native children who were too young to be removed were collected in a heap, covered with long grass, and burned alive. Other atrocities, too horrible to relate, have been committed. Mr. Merinsky, another German missionary, spoke of the Transvaal as a vast reserve for those who were animated by the lust of land, of cattle, and of the bodies of men. In a document issued so late as the 7th of February, 1881, and signed on behalf of the Triumvirate by Mr. Kruger, Vice President, it was stated that the ultimate aim of the rebel Boers was to banish English influence altogether from South Africa; that the root of their troubles lay in the cession of the Cape of Good Hope to England, and that their exodus was the result of the forced liberation of slaves breaking up their old patriarchal forms of life. Here is the evidence that slavery had existed among them. And in further proof of this, one gentleman, a loyal Boer, has had the courage to come forward and say that within the last few years he has purchased slaves. How can it then be said, in the face of such evidence, that slavery does not still exist in the Transvaal? These facts alone amply warranted the annexation, and should have been known to the Prime Minister when, in his speech at Dalkeith, on the 26th November, 1879, he said— In the Transvaal we have chosen most unwisely—I am tempted to say, insanely—to put ourselves in the strange predicament of the free subjects of a Monarchy going to coerce the free subjects of a Republic, and compel them to accept a citizenship which they decline and refuse. Sir, the right hon. Gentleman thus compared the free subjects of this country with the free subjects of this model Republic—with men who tolerate and practise slavery with all its horrors, for it is only an evasion to say that it has taken the form of apprenticeship. Does he endorse that opinion, and defend this "European, Christian, and Republican community" (as he called it in hip speech at Edinburgh on the 25th of November, 1879), on that ground? Is he again advocating the maintenance of a system of "apprenticeship," as he did so eloquently and with such effect in this House in 1838, when he urged that apprentice- ship in the West Indies should continue for two years longer on Sir George Strickland's Motion in the House of Commons, following Lord Brougham's in the House of Lords, in favour of its immediate abolition? The right hon. Gentleman's words on that occasion may well be quoted in description of his policy at the present time— I think myself entitled and bound to show how capricious are hon. Gentlemen in the distribution of their sympathies among those different objects which call for their application."—[3 Hansard, xlii. 256.] A few years ago the right hon. Gentleman claimed for himself and his Party almost a monopoly of sympathy with oppressed nationalities; but now he exhibits equal sympathy with the oppressor. It may be a curious coincidence, but it is nevertheless a fact, that the speeches of the Prime Minister and other Members of the present Government in 1879 were followed by the Boer rising in 1880. Having obtained protection at the cost of English lives and treasure from the Zulus, whom they could not fight themselves, the Boers want now to pose before the world as an oppressed people and as a model Republic still suffering from the tyranny of a Tory Government. The Queen's Speech of the 6th of January announced that the authority of the Crown would be vindicated. I should like to ask hon. Gentlemen opposite if it has been vindicated, and what we have been fighting for? If insurrection was by its mere act to have terminated annexation, the Government need not have incurred blood-guiltiness; but at the first rising we ought to have retired from the Transvaal. On the same principle we need not have put down the Indian Mutiny, but should have ceded India; and we need not have resisted Fenians and Land Leaguers, but should have given up Ireland. If that policy had held good we should not have continued to hold Natal, which we annexed in 1839, under very similar circumstances, for in 1840 our troops were defeated by the Boers; but we did not, as now, surrender the country to them. When we annexed Griqualand, 10 years since, under the Liberal Government, we took, incorporated, and have since kept a large tract of land between the Hartz and the Vaal Rivers which was part of the Transvaal. Is Her Majesty's Government going to give this up? On what principle is this policy to be carried out? Is the maintenance of our conquests and annexations to be decided by the lapse of time? Are those of 50 years ago to be permanent, and those of last year abandoned? On the 8th of June, 1880, the Prime Minister wrote— Our judgment is that the Queen cannot be advised to relinquish her sovereignty over the Transvaal. It seems incredible that, 13 months afterwards, this House should be called upon by the right hon. Gentleman to endorse a Resolution approving of the surrender of the Transvaal. There can be no doubt that the object of the Boers is ultimately to obtain all our African Possessions for the Africanders; this is clearly proved by the interference of the President of the Orange Free State on their behalf. The right hon. Gentleman in his speech on the Irish Land Law Bill laid great stress on the pretium affectionis. Might that not be applied to those who had lost their lands in the Transvaal by the conduct of the Government? It is to be applied to disloyal agitators in Ireland; could it not also be applied, with greater justice, to the loyal subjects of the Queen in South Africa? Sir, I regret to say that the Government have not taken that view, and I am still more astonished when I read the Amendment of the hon. Member for Carnarvonshire (Mr. Rathbone), who expresses delight at the policy of the Government. The Government and the hon. Member seem to be guided by the spirit which actuated Ralph when he said— How great, I do not know, We may, by being beaten, grow. They seem to think that it is to the honour of this country that England should be beaten, and that the flag of England should be dragged in the dust. When the Government had the power and the opportunity of saying that they disagreed with the annexation of the Transvaal they never opened their lips, and it was left for the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) to act and speak on the subject as an independent Member. The present Government, when in Opposition, allowed the annexation to take place, and sanctioned it by their silence, and they only altered their opinion when our soldiers were butchered at Brunker's Spruit and defeated at Majuba Hill and Laing's Nek, and they then took the opportunity of treating with the rebels when they were actually in possession of portions of Her Majesty's Dominions. Sir, I am within the recollection of the House when I say that this Session Her Majesty's Government was asked whether the Boers were rebels or belligerents, and that they hesitated to give an answer. Why did they do so? Because they knew that if the Boers had been unsuccessful they would have been liable to be hanged as rebels; whereas, having beaten the troops of the Queen, they were raised to the position of belligerents, and their Leaders to the rank of Plenipotentiaries appointed to treat with the Generals and Administrators of Her Majesty's Government. The words of Lord Cairns in "another place" are indeed true when he said that this country had "never blushed before;" but she must blush now; and I defy hon. Gentlemen to produce another instance in which the Government deliberately handed over the possession of a country to a number of rebels without the consent of Parliament, without even consulting Parliament, and after the Queen's troops had been defeated by rebels who were in possession of portions of the territory of Her Majesty. After various defeats, culminating in the disasters of Laing's Nek and Majuba Hill, the Government determined to send troops to Natalunder General Roberts. The troops sailed, and were recalled by telegraph. Why was this done? Was there anything to modify or palliate our humiliating defeats? Sir, we heard of meetings and deputations to the Prime Minister, and we began almost to believe that we had been victorious, and that, with the generosity of conquerors, we were treating with a vanquished foe; whereas, in fact, Great Britain was treating with rebels, in actual occupation of part of her own territory, which they had invaded, and on which they had beaten her troops. The only conclusion that can be arrived at is, that the recall of General Roberts and the humiliating peace negotiations were concessions to Party, and to the overweening desire to maintain the large and obedient majority of the Government. This is a policy of humiliation and degradation which will not only prejudicially affect our position in our Colonies, but throughout the world. Sir, the solidarity of this Empire, with all its vast possessions, can only be maintained by the loyalty of its Colonists; and how is that loyalty to be kept up unless by confidence in the Mother Country? In the present instance, the Government has violated all principles on which alone loyalty and confidence can be based. The English settlers who bought land on the strength and in faith of English rule and English promises are ruined. The action of Her Majesty's Government has, in my opinion, tarnished the honour of the Empire, and is now imperilling that which is of vital importance—its credit. Our obligation to the Boers is to teach them civilization and humanity, and not to allow them to carry on an infamous traffic which the House of Commons half a century ago declared could not exist under or in contiguity with the British flag. We are the proud champions of liberty all over the world, and how strange it must seem in the eyes of the world when the Government of England is seen as the advocate of slaveowners. The policy of the Government is a surprise and a regret to every man—certainly to every loyal subject—and I ask the Government to think of the feelings of those brave men who, after escaping a soldier's grave, have lived to hear it said of their fallen comrades that they fought and fell in an unworthy cause. Sir, as a protest against the course which has been adopted I beg to second the Motion which the right hon. Baronet has so ably proposed.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That, in the opinion of this House, the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government with respect to the rising in the Transvaal, so far as it has yet been explained to Parliament, has resulted in the loss of valuable lives without vindicating the authority of the Crown, is fraught with danger to the future tranquillity and safety of Her Majesty's dominions in South Africa, and fails to provide for the fulfilment of the obligations contracted by this Country towards the European settlers and native population of the Transvaal."—(Sir Michael Hicks-Beach.)

MR. RATHBONE

Sir, I rise to move as an Amendment to the Resolution which has been proposed— That this House, believing that the continuance of the war with the Transvaal Boers would not leave advanced the honour or the interest of this country, approves the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government to bring about a peaceful settlement, and feels confident that every care will be taken to guard the interests of the na- tives, to provide for the full liberty and equal treatment of the entire white population, and to promote harmony and goodwill among the various races in South Africa. I should not have ventured, on attempting to answer the able speech of the right hon. Baronet, in any reliance on eloquence that the House knows I do not possess, and never pretended to, had I not felt firmly convinced of the right and justice of the case which I have to defend, and that it required merely a plain, straightforward, and business-like statement of the facts as they exist, and an appeal to principles which we all recognize to uphold it. The right hon. Baronet alluded to me as believing in the absolute faultlessness of the present Government. It is not because I believe the present Government are faultless—I do believe that it is one of the strongest and most just Governments that has ever existed in this country—but because I believe when they find that they have made a mistake they have the courage to correct it. I entirely disagree with the principle which has gone through the speech of the right hon. Baronet. The right hon. Baronet has assumed throughout the whole of his speech that this country was bound to act as policemen throughout the whole of the districts of South Africa. He described most graphically the impossibility of our fulfilling that position. From the speech of the right hon. Baronet, I gather that he has only recently read the history of affairs in South Africa; because, from former speeches of the right hon. Baronet, I had felt inclined to doubt whether he had noticed how we had tried, and tried in vain, under Government after Government, the very task which the late Government also attempted, and in which it likewise failed. I altogether differ from the right hon. Gentleman in his view that the Government were not justified in staying hostilities as they have done, for I feel strongly and deeply that national vengeance is national criminality. No Government would for a moment be justified in going on when once they were convinced that they were in the wrong. It will be my duty, in the course of the observations I have to submit to the House, to question the accuracy of the accusations which had been brought against the Government in the attack made upon them during the last Recess on the subject of their South African policy. It appeared to have been agreed that the Transvaal Question should be the staple means of discrediting Her Majesty's Government. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire (Sir R. Assheton Cross), being a lawyer, and who thought he had better read his Papers first, was the only Gentleman who did not make the Transvaal Question the ground for intemperate speeches against the Government during that Recess. I submit this Amendment with confidence to the House because I am satisfied that the action of the Government, in putting an end to the war in the Transvaal as soon as they were convinced that the annexation of the Transvaal was a mistake and before further blood was shed, was one of the most courageous and righteous acts which has been witnessed in our time. I believe that the continuation of the war would, to use the words of the right hon. Baronet, have been fraught with danger to the future tranquillity and safety of Her Majesty's Dominions in South Africa, and have failed to provide for the fulfilment of the obligations contracted by this country towards the European settlers and Native population of the Transvaal. I contend that we are now in a better position to help the White population than we should have been by adhering to a mistaken policy. Let me endeavour to state clearly and concisely the issue before the House. The late Government annexed the Transvaal under what has been now admitted by their own Agents to have been a mistaken notion—that the majority of the inhabitants of the Transvaal were favourably disposed to annexation or acquiescent. The present Government did not reverse that decision when they came into power, because they were informed by the Agents who were appointed by the late Government—Sir Owen Lanyon and Sir Bartle Frere—that if they reversed the policy of their Predecessors such reversal would lead to civil war, and put an end to the prospect of Confederation. But the Government are accused of continuing that policy when they were convinced that it was wrong until the reverses of Sir George Colley, and that then they yielded to fear that which they had refused to justice. I think I can show conclusively, from Papers which were in the hands of the right hon. Baronet when he made this unfounded accusation, that as soon as the present Government were convinced that the annexation was wrong, and before the reverses to Sir George Colley occurred, they had offered to negotiate on the very terms on which the peace has been finally concluded. I hope still further to convince the House—or, at least, those who I hope are a small minority who are not already convinced—that the Government have promoted the honour and the interests alike of England and South Africa by the course they had taken. I shall first deal with the attacks on Her Majesty's Government, which have taken the ground that, even assuming that the original annexation of the Transvaal was a mistake, and that justice and expediency required a return to the principle of the Sand River Treaty, the Government ought to have taken that course before and not after Sir George Colley's repulses. Of course, it is notorious that a large portion of the Liberal Party did think that when Her Majesty's Government came into Office they should at once, both in India and Africa, have given effect to the decision pronounced by the nation at the General Election on the policy of the late Government by reversing that policy, and at once recalling all those of its Agents who had shown a disposition to strain their instructions in the way of aggression. The right hon. Baronet is not, of course, primarily to blame in this matter. He was suddenly called from duties which he was discharging with credit to himself and usefulness to Ireland to preside over the Colonial Office, with the complications in South Africa, and a number of dangerous Agents as an inheritance from his Predecessor; and, in these circumstances, the House would naturally have been disposed to sympathize with him, and would not have dealt harshly with any mistakes he might make. As, however, the original blunder arose with the right hon. Baronet's Party, and the mistake into which the present Government for a time fell was the consequence of the incorrect, misleading information sent them by men who were appointed by the late Government, I think the House will consider that it is not reasonable for one who has borne so conspicuous; though, perhaps, unwilling, a part in these blunders to attempt to damage the Government by reckless statements out-of-doors, or by a Resolution such as that which is now before the House. Her Majesty's Government have now seen that the policy of their Predecessors was a mistake, and have courageously done their best to retrieve it. The Liberal Party—and I venture to say the country also—will support them, They certainly will not join the right hon. Baronet in a Motion which, though it professes to deplore the loss of valuable lives, Parliament would have heard little of had the Government gone on to sacrifice more of such valuable lives, in the maintenance of a policy at once unwise, unjust, and admitted to have been undertaken upon erroneous information. The annexation took place under a Commission, the terms of which, I say with regret, discredit the prudence and foresight of Lord Carnarvon, a Nobleman who hitherto has borne a high character for prudence and moderation. Under that Commission the Proclamation of Annexation was only to be issued if Sir Theophilus Shepstone was satisfied that the inhabitants of the Transvaal, "or a sufficient number of them, or the Legislature thereof," desired to become the subjects of Her Majesty. And surely the use of such an expression as "a sufficient number of them" is altogether too loose and indefinite to find a place in such a document. If Sir Theophilus Shepstone could not have satisfied himself that the inhabitants of the Transvaal generally or the Legislature thereof were consenting parties, it ought surely to have been made clear by the Commission that a majority of the inhabitants were favourable thereto before we overrode a solemn Treaty, very recently made, by which we bound ourselves for the future not to interfere with the Government of the Boers, not to encroach on territory North of the Vaal, and not to ally ourselves with the coloured nation to the North of that river. Had Lord Carnarvon's character not stood so high as it did, it would have been impossible to escape the suspicion that the terms of the Commission were purposely vague in order to induce the Commissioner, as in another notorious case, "to find, or, if need be, to create, an opportunity" for a display of spirited foreign policy, leading up to the annexation of territory, in violation of the distinct terms of a Treaty. I think the author of that Commission might have shown a little more moderation and reserve than was exhibited in the noble Lord's bitter speech at Burton-on-Trent on the 7th of June. In the Spring of last year the present Government came into power, and amid the other serious complications they had inherited, they received a despatch from Sir Bartle Frere, dated the 27th of April, asking whether any alteration was contemplated in the retention of the Transvaal, to which they naturally replied that the matter required careful consideration. They were, however, not to be allowed time for consideration, for, on the 3rd of May, Sir Bartle Frere telegraphed again—that the report of the intention to give up the Transvaal had created great excitement, and that the result of abandonment would be fatal to Confederation, and would possibly entail civil war in the Transvaal. Sir Garnet Wolseley, on the 2nd of March, had reported a growing desire among the Boers in the Transvaal for a conclusion of the agitation against the British Government; and, in short, the Government received, and continued to receive, from all the various Agents whom they had inherited from the late Government, representations making it appear that it would be far more difficult and dangerous to retrace their steps than to maintain annexation. I venture to think that everyone reading the despatches, not only from the Transvaal, but also from India, must see that the curse of political blindness seems to have affected all the Agents of the aggressive policy of the late Government. Sir Owen Lanyon, writing even as late as the 19th of last November, thought that at least three-fourths of the White, population of the Transvaal were secretly in favour of annexation. Though the Government were all agreed that the original annexation was a mistake and ought never to have been made, yet, acting on these representations, they decided not to recommend the relinquishment of the sovereignty of the Queen, but assure the Boers that they would take the earliest opportunity of granting them the freest and most complete legal institutions. But within a few days of the last of these assurances the general and determined rising of the Boers of the Transvaal in arms showed the utter fallacy of the representations by which two successive Goverments had been misled, But the most serious accusation brought against the Government I understand to be that, having been thus misled, they neglected to negotiate until they were frightened into arrangements with the Boers by the reverses of Sir George Colley. I am glad the accusation is so clear, because I shall show conclusively that the Government were very anxious to negotiate as soon as they were convinced that the majority of the Boers were opposed to annexation, and before any of the serious military reverses to which I have referred took place; and I venture to think this House will agree with me that if the Government were right in entering into these negotiations before any reverses took place, it would be the height of folly and injustice to abandon those negotiations when we knew the Boers were prepared to accept the terms which we, before the reverses, were prepared to give, simply because small detachments had been defeated in operations in which they were the aggressors. I am sure that all who have read the despatches will have seen that the Government were, before those reverses, prepared to negotiate on the very basis on which the actual settlement was made, while they sent out an overwhelming force with a view to making such negotiations easier. It was obvious that reverses made it much more difficult for the Government to continue these negotiations. To assert, then, that the negotiations which led to peace are the result of the repeated repulses sustained by our arms under the gallant but unfortunate Sir George Colley is the reverse of the truth; and I think the House will feel that those who have brought forward such a serious but groundless charge against the Government of the Queen are entitled to little credit either for their love of fair play or that patriotism a monopoly of which they so persistently claim. What, I would ask, are the dates upon which the proof of what I assert rests? I beg to call the attention of the House particularly to these dates. The earliest of these reverses, that at Laing's Nek, took place on the 28th of January; but as early as the 10th and the 11th of January Her Majesty's Government informed both President Brand and Sir George Strahan that "if the Boers would desist from armed opposition to the Queen's Government, Her Majesty's Government did, not despair of being able to make a satisfactory arrangement." The right hon. Baronet distinctly stated just now that the Government had refused to send out a Commissioner, or to agree to the appointment of a Commissioner, until the reverses of Sir George Colley—[Sir MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: No, no!] I certainly understood him to say that. I think the House so understood him, too.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

Let me explain. I referred to a reply of Lord Kimberley to the proposal of Mr. Merriman that a Commission should be sent to the Transvaal, and I said that Lord Kimberley said the proposal was inopportune; and I asked why, if it was inopportune before, it was not inopportune after our troops had been defeated?

MR. RATHBONE

I listened carefully to that point, because the right hon. Baronet had dealt with it previously, and I certainly understood him to say that we refused to send out a Commissioner until after the reverses. But 10 days before the first of these reverses the Colonial Secretary suggested to President Brand whether a settlement might not be brought about by the appointment of a Commissioner. On the 29th of January Sir Hercules Robinson wrote that President Brand Is much pleased with the answer, and that he suggests that the Transvaal people should be informed of it forthwith before the satisfactory arrangements you contemplate are made more difficult by further collision. Sir Hercules Robinson had suggested that President Brand should give immediate and widespread publicity to his messages and to the replies of Her Majesty's Government. Sir George Colley was informed of these negotiations, and on the 11th of February he advised the Government that he had received overtures from Kruger wishing to stop bloodshed, but offering terms which were not acceptable; and the Secretary of State replied on the 16th of February— I have received your telegram of the 14th inst. Inform Kruger that if the Boers will desist from armed opposition we shall be quite ready to appoint Commissioners, with extensive powers, who may develop the scheme referred to in my telegram to you of the 8th inst. Add that if this proposal is accepted you are authorized to agree to a suspension of hostilities. In other words, 13 days before Sir George Colley's defeat and death, and in answer to an overture from the Boers, he repeated the proposal made originally by Her Majesty's Government, which was substantially the foundation on which peace was finally concluded. Has not the Government, therefore, a right to be indignant when, both in the other House and in extra-Parliamentary utterances during the Recess, right hon. Members opposite had endeavoured to show that in making peace the Government has been actuated, not by the idea that England is so great that she can afford to confess her mistake, but by the fear engendered by these reverses? It is a remarkable thing that, although foreign countries are generally so ready to criticize the action of this country, not a single newspaper in Europe has found fault with the conduct of England in reference to our conduct in making peace with the Boers; while, on the contrary, all have recognized the justice of our action. The right hon. Baronet opposite made a speech at Cheltenham on the 8th of June, in which he said, referring to the present Government— When these men came into Office, and having, as Mr. Chamberlain said, considered the subject in all its bearings, they decided, as their Predecessors decided—and for reasons that might have been copied from my own despatches—that it was necessary that the Queen's sovereignty should be maintained, and they adhered to that view for some months—until something happened—until they discovered that the Boers could fight and shoot, then doubts began to afflict their tender consciences. They thought of blood-guiltiness, which had never occurred to them before. They thought of injustice, which they did not dream of last summer; and they sent out orders that terms should be made with the Boers after we had suffered three defeats. No more disgraceful surrender had ever been made. That speech was made by the right hon. Baronet on the 9th of June, while the Papers I have quoted from had been issued in March. The last of them was in the hands of hon. Members on the 24th of March—that is, two and a-half months before that speech was made. I must ask the question, therefore—Had the right hon. Baronet ever read those Papers before he delivered that speech? The speech was delivered by one who has been a responsible Minister of the Crown, and by one who has given Notice of his intention to bring the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in relation to the Transvaal under the notice of Parliament. I ask, will the right hon. Baronet now stand by the words he had then uttered?

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

I will stand by every word of them.

MR. RATHBONE

All I can say is this—that in that case inaccuracy of statement has, to use the words in its French sense, so demoralized the right hon. Baronet that he is incapable of realizing the logic of facts and of dates. These words assert, as clear as any words in the English language can assert, that the English Government had not intended to negotiate until they were three times defeated; and I have shown that previous to those defeats those negotiations were begun, and that they were so far advanced that actually the very basis of them was settled, and that the Boers had practically agreed to them. There is one kind of courage that might have led us to urge on our troops to crush a mere handful of Boers by an overwhelming force; but the courage that is necessary to meet slander and unpopularity at home, by retrieving an error, is, to my mind, another and a higher and much nobler quality. Does not the right hon. Baronet know that these repulses increased enormously the difficulty of concluding the negotiations for peace, and that nothing but the highest sense of duty, courage, and that aversion to blood-guiltiness, at which he unworthily sneered, could have strengthened the Government to continue the negotiations which, as I have proved to the House, were already substantially advanced? The House will feel with me that it is to such unfounded aspersions of the motives of the Government of his country, and not to the conduct of the Government, that the word "disgraceful" will be more appropriately applied. The absurdity of the attempt to attribute the continuance of these negotiations to any question in the mind of the Government as to the result of the conflict is disposed of by the mere statement of the forces at Sir Evelyn Wood's disposal when he concluded the Treaty with the Boers. Sir Evelyn Wood knew, and the Government knew, that he would soon be at the head of about 10,000 trained soldiers, including four regiments of Cavalry and considerable Artillery—an arm of which the Boers were entirely destitute, and which they held in considerable alarm, while further regiments were under orders for the Transvaal. No kind of doubt can exist in the mind of any reasonable person that, with this overwhelming force, Sir Evelyn Wood could have completely crushed the Boers. But, in doing so, we should, with our eyes open, have been inflicting an additional injustice on those whom we had already, under a misapprehension, wronged by the original annexation; and this injustice we should have inflicted for no nobler end than to assert our military prowess by crushing a people whose whole population capable of bearing arms did not equal in number the trained forces with which we should have defeated them. Did hon. Gentlemen opposite really believe that Her Majesty's Government, wielding the enormous forces of this great and populous country, retreated in fear before a country whose whole White population—men, women, and children—did not equal that of Cheltenham, the watering-place which the right hon. Baronet chose for his Whitsuntide address? What, Sir, is the proud position of England worth if, in order to maintain her military prestige, it is necessary, as these patriots assert, to consummate an act of injustice by vanquishing in such unequal contest a people thus inferior to ourselves in military resources? I, for one, heartily rejoice that we have now a Government which has shown a true sense of the greatness of England and of the conditions on which that greatness rests. I heartily rejoice that this country is great enough to be able to retrieve a wrong. Sir, we heard some months ago predictions, on high Conservative authority, of the unwillingness and incapacity of the leaders of the Boers to carry out the terms of the Treaty. I trust, Sir, that those prophets of evil are now patriotic enough to rejoice at the signal manner in which their predictions have been belied. Potchefstroom has been replaced in the hands of our troops. What is it that they were supposed to be able to give up that they have not given up? The murderers of Elliott have been given up to justice and placed in our hands for justice; and, let me ask, is it only in the Transvaal that sometimes a jury cannot be found to convict? I do not know. I am not prepared to judge whether the jury were right in the conclusion they came to, or were wrong; but I do say this. It was stated that they would never be able to give up those very men, the murderers of Elliott, to justice. Those whom we designated as the murderers of Elliott have been given up to justice. Well, Sir, I think we have a right to ask these prophetic statesmen what would have been their alternative policy and its probable consequences. I suppose that we may, without hesitation, assume that their policy would have been to continue the war until the rebellion was stamped out in blood and the Boers had sued for peace. ["Hear, hear!"] Hon. Gentlemen say "Hear, hear!" And what would have been the result of such a victory? Is it one that statesmen would willingly face? We should have had in the Transvaal a population more alienated than Ireland even was two centuries ago; we should have had that population in a wilderness thousands of miles further off; we should have had to maintain an enormous army at the cost of the blood and treasure of this country, in order to meet all the complications which would have accompanied it on its widely extended Frontier; and last, and worst of all, we should have had a blood feud with the race who constituted the vast majority of the settlers in our own Dominions in South Africa, who were two to one of those of British extraction. Would not that be an operation fraught with danger to South Africa? And, Sir, I think it would have been a great disgrace to this country to burden herself with such liabilities, with such impossible taxes, and with such a drain upon her resources as this merely to give the temporary appearance of success—for it would have been no more—to one of the blunders of the Conservative Government. But, Sir, I venture to think that a question far more important to this House and to this country to consider than what shall be the precise blame attaching to the Government is, what ought to be our policy in South Africa, and whether the act we have decided upon is in conformity with justice. Now, I venture to think that no more important question has ever been offered to the deliberations of this House—for it is no less a question than this: whether we shall best consult the honour and the interest of this country, and of the vast millions over whom we hold sway, by constantly seeking to increase our limits and increase our responsibilities, or by concentrating our energies in worthily fulfilling the vast responsibilities already undertaken. That is the question which is involved in this issue. Now, Sir, we have in this case not merely the dictates of wisdom and statesmanship, but the simple results of experience to guide us, for it is one of the strange and unfortunate features of the policy of the late Government that every aggression and blunder they made was the almost slavish repetition of some blunder committed by Liberal and Conservative Administrations in the past. The mistakes of Lord Auckland in Afghanistan were repeated almost on the same lines by Lord Lytton; and the blunder of Sir Harry Smith in South Africa was repeated by Lord Carnarvon when he annexed the Transvaal. The repetition of this mistake is all the more remarkable if the late Government were aware—and they certainly ought to have known it—that this policy of interference with the Boers had been initiated by the late Lord Derby in 1833; it had been given 18 years' trial, and then Lord Derby had been wise and prudent enough to put an end to it by the Sand River Convention—the very Treaty which the late Government violated when they annexed the Transvaal. Lord Derby, in 1852, thought that it was best to limit our undertakings in South Africa, and engaged not to interfere with the Boers and the Natives in their own territory, or beyond their own territory. Anyone who really wishes to know what has been our policy would do well to read a most remarkable pamphlet which was written by Sir William Molesworth in 1854, and reprinted last year by permission of Lady Molesworth. It is called, "Materials for a speech in defence of the policy of abandoning the Orange River Territory." In that pamphlet he describes most graphically the nature of the country of South Africa, its various races of inhabitants, and the determination of the Boers to escape from our rule. He describes also how, after repeated promises that we would let them alone in the new territory, we followed them from the Cape to Natal, from Natal to the Orange River Territory, and, last of all, to the district beyond the Vaal. The writer says— We had hunted the Boer for 18 years, for it was in 1833 that Lord Derby first unkennelled the Boer on the Eastern Frontier of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. Since then we had followed him at a break-neck pace—Lord Derby and Lord Grey leading for many a hundred mile up the steep mountains and over the rugged karroo; across the deep kloofs, the broad rivers, and the wide plains of South Africa. Still, in 1851, the Boer was many hundred miles ahead of us; and, if we were to continue the chase as Lord Derby proposed, we should have to follow him to the Equator, and probably earth him in the Mountains of the Moon; for the events which I have narrated prove the Boer to be staunch and determined not to be caught. The remainder of this most remarkable pamphlet is devoted to show the wisdom of our withdrawing from the Orange River Territory; and how remarkably has the wisdom of that advice been justified. The Orange River Territory is now the most prosperous inland State in South Africa; and it was from the President of the Orange Free State that we received the first intimation of approaching danger, and the most friendly assistancein bringing the war to a termination. Under these circumstances, I would ask, may we not, guided by that experience, accept the promises of the Boers, when they say—"Your Majesty cannot desire no rule over unwilling subjects; unwilling subjects, but faithful neighbours will we be." The character of these Boers cannot but be considered as a factor by any statesman in deciding the question as to what ought to be our duty. We have heard the description of the right hon. Gentleman who recorded this Motion; but I think a reliable witness is to be found in Sir Bartle Frere, who, when himself opposing these very Boers, gave a good account of their social qualities. Sir Harry Smith also gives a most touching account of them, though he does not seem to have been guided by his own experience of the sufferings which he saw these men endure rather than remain under our rule. I would ask any sensible man whether these men are not much more likely to be guided by us by our showing to them respect for Treaties, by good example, by doing right yourselves, not by doing wrong and then expecting to force them to do right? That is my idea. I believe there is something besides force. Well, now, there is the question of slavery. We have had certain evidence on that subject; but I will also call evidence which I think the House will receive with undoubted faith, because it comes from a man who has spent all his life, and has all his life suffered because of his constant and unwearying advocacy of the rights of the slave; and who may, I think, be regarded as a better authority than the accusation brought forward by interested contractors and land-jobbers. Bishop Colenso, in a letter quoted in The Times of the 27th of June, says— I have been in constant correspondence with Mr. Chesson, Secretary of the Aborigines' Protection Society, and others, and done what I could to dissipate the charge of slave-holding, or, rather, slave-making, which, whatever ground there may have been for it in the past, ought not to be brought against the present generation. Rather I have urged that the 'simple fact"— I regret that there is no Member on the Front Opposition Bench to hear this; but they rather object to facts— the simple fact that 800,000 Natives were living under the Boer Government without taking to flight and running over to Natal for protection is enough to show that the accusation against the Boers of ill-treating the Natives under their rule must be grossly exaggerated, and that, to all appearance, they even prefer the Boer rule to our own. And The Times Correspondent pointed out most justly how little opportunity the Boers have had of telling their own story against the misrepresentations to which they have been exposed. Now, we have some evidence about this slave trading. A man who confessed himself to be a German slaveholder has been paraded before the British public as an authority on the subject; and by whom? By Lord Salisbury. We remember Lord Salisbury as Lord Robert Cecil, a man who was a perfect genius for getting his own country or somebody else's into some inconceivable scrape or other. We remember that if his dangerous counsels had not been controlled by the greater wisdom and statesmanship of Lord Beaconsfield he would have plunged this country into a war with America in support of slavery. And, Sir, I venture to say that the House and this country will prefer to trust to that Government which contains in its Members men who have, during a life-long struggle, been ever the protectors of the Native and of the slave, than they will leave it to that man who, if his wild counsels had prevailed, would have plunged this country into war with America on the side of slavery. I have no wish to overstate the case in this matter. I am afraid we must admit that not only the Boers, but our own Colonists, have not been free from compulsory labour which comes far too near slavery for Englishmen to like it. But would it not be better to take the beam out of our own eye before we attempt to take the mote out of our neighbour's eye? In 1879 we had an official list made out of 99 Native men, women, and children indentured to forced servitude, under the English flag. It has never been shown that the indenture system in the Cape Colony is not analogous to the system which existed among the Boers. In the following year Mr. Chesson complained that several thousands of Kaffirs had been indentured under circumstances painfully reminding us of the practices to which we object. And I do not think we could be much surprised at that, when we found Mr. Sprigg, the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, on the 21st of May, 1879, advocating that "every year a number of youths should be brought down from the Frontier and placed in compulsory service in the Western districts." Well, I am perfectly well aware that Mr. Sprigg has attempted to explain this away, and has said that it was his intention that these young people should not be taken unless they were willing to go, and had the consent of their parents. I do not think that his words exactly bear that interpretation; and, moreover, I do not think that was the interpretation Mr. Sprigg meant them to bear at the time they were uttered, as he said he expected that they would be attacked in England on the ground that they purposed slavery. Now, I would merely ask the House to consider this—does not our experience with the Transvaal confirm the warnings of our wisest statesmen of the immense danger of increasing the liabilities and engagements which this country already has? We have already undertaken a greater task, a wider empire, and a more difficult responsibility than have ever been successfully performed by any Empire that has preceded us; and I venture to think that there is no one who has followed with interest the course of our rule, whether in India or South Africa—whether as regards the internal development of our rule in those countries or our Border policy—but must have been struck by the constant and increasing difficulty of worthily performing the responsibility which has fallen upon us. Why, the Prime Minister, only the other day, pointed out how that difficulty had been increased by what one might have supposed would have lessened it. He pointed out how the telegraph had thrown overwork upon the House and overwork upon the Executive; how ques- tions which formerly were decided in the most distant possessions on the spot are now thrown upon us to be decided by the Government, who have only the very imperfect and insufficient information which the telegraph can give them upon which to form their opinions. Well, Sir, I have only one point more to which I would allude very shortly; but I think it is one which our states, men ought to consider—our statesmen have now to lead and to represent a Democracy. Now, a Democracy will fight and will endure to almost any extent for any cause which they clearly see involves a great principle of liberty and of justice. We had ample proof of that in the taxation and sacrifices endured by the American Democracy in the Civil War. We had still more impressive proof of it in the sufferings and endurance for three weary years by our own artizans, when they positively refused all inducements to accept relief for their own misery by any act which should in any way forward or support the cause of slavery. But what is it Democracy will not do? It will not burden its labour and stain its hands with blood to defend the consistency of a Ministry, or in order, at a heavy and prolonged cost, to give the sanction of success to a mistaken and unrighteous policy; it will not support a war for prestige, disassociated from justice; and it will not support a war of aggression. Lord Cairns, speaking in "another place," seemed to have a glimpse of this. Depend upon it, the educated part of the working classes will not bear you out in wars like those in Afghanistan and the Transvaal. I am sure that anyone who has watched with interest the declarations of the more intelligent of the working classes throughout Europe of late must have seen the growing disinclination, or, I would rather say, detestation, of wars of aggression. Well, Sir, I am afraid I have detained the House rather long. It seems to me that this is a most important question that we have to decide to-night. I hope I have shown the incorrectness, to use no stronger term, of the accusations that have been brought against the Government. I have shown the justice and the nobility of the actions they have undertaken; and, Sir, I rejoice that the action of the Government this night, and the vote which I believe the House will give on that action to-night, will prove to the world that we are determined that the foundations of this great Empire shall not rest on force alone, but on the rock of the eternal principles of justice and of right, and shall, therefore, stand whatever storms from without or trouble from within may beat against them; that we are determined to control the actions of our pro-consuls on the border parts of our Empire; and that we are determined not to follow the examples of the great Empires that have preceded us—not to imitate their false pride and their aggressiveness, and not to share their fate. We will seek rather the glory and the happiness of fulfilling worthily and nobly the duties already our own, than yield to the poor, wretched, reckless ambition of trying further to extend them; and then, Sir, we may rest with perfect reliance on those noble words, "In quietness and in confidence shall be your strength." I have great pleasure in moving the Amendment that stands in my name.

MR. H. H. FOWLER

I rise, Sir, to second the Amendment which has just been moved by my hon. Friend (Mr. Rathbone). It is impossible to sever this question from the policy of the annexation of the Transvaal. If that was an annexation which ought to have been made, then it was the duty of the Government to have continued the Transvaal as a portion of the British Empire. But I think that, before we can pronounce an opinion in that way, we must ask ourselves whether this annexation was just and right; and if we think that the annexation was wrong, we are bound, in justice to the Opposition, and in defence also of our own views, to state the reason why the Government adhered to the policy of annexation for the first eight or nine months after they came into Office, and then we have to ask ourselves whether they are now justified in abandoning it altogether. It appears to me that one important element in considering this question which deserves serious attention is—What is the position of South Africa? It is not an English Colony in the sense that Australia and New Zealand are English Colonies, arising out of the Imperial protection and authority by virtue of which those Colonies were founded. There does not exist that mutual tie to this country with respect to South Africa that exists with English Colo- nies, either Australian or New Zealand. South Africa has been a conquered Colony, but it was not a Colony founded by us; and we must, in dealing with the South African Question, recognize that. We have heard to night a line of argument adduced on the basis that South Africa as legitimately belongs to us as does Ireland or Scotland. South Africa was colonized by the Dutch upwards of 200 years ago. We never conquered South Africa until 1766, and then we had to give it up again to the Dutch, and re-conquered it in the year 1806. You have a great number of White people in South Africa who do not belong to the ruling race, and you have a small minority, who, themselves, form the ruling power. Now, the Dutch have invariably resisted our rule in South Africa, and my hon. Friend who has just sat down (Mr. Rathbone) has told us how the English have driven the Dutch from point to point as they founded their independent States in order to be free from us. On the last occasion, they went beyond the River Vaal, they colonized the country beyond the River Vaal, and they hold it by as complete a right as we hold New Zealand or Australia. In 1848 they formulated their Government, they formed their State; and in 1852, by the Sand River Convention, the English Government recognized their independence, and from 1852 to 1877 they retained their independence. Representations were made to Lord Carnarvon to induce him, in 1877, to authorize Sir Theophilus Shepstone to carry out the annexation; but that annexation was sanctioned only on one condition by the late Government—namely, that the majority of the people desired it. The late Government conscientiously believed that the majority of the people in the Transvaal desired to be placed under British rule; and I think that the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India (the Marquess of Hartington) very accurately described matters to this House when he said, in February, 1880— The annexation of the Transvaal was a measure adopted by the Government and sanctioned by the House, under wrong impressions and under incorrect information."—[3 Hansard, ccl. 92.] Now, the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) to-night said that the people of the Trans- vaal accepted it. According to the Papers which have been presented to Parliament on the subject, I think it is shown that the people did everything they could do in order to express their dissent from it. They protested against it, and they stated that it had been done by force of arms alone. They sent in 1878 a deputation to England to represent the state of matters to the Government; and Lord Carnarvon informed them that he was under the impression that a majority of the inhabitants were in favour of the annexation. Immediately on their return they called a meeting of the population, and that resulted in a Memorial being signed against the annexation by 6,591 out of 8,000 people capable of voting on the question. Another deputation was sent over to the right hon. Gentleman opposite, in 1879, and they tried to convince him, and they failed. Sir Bartle Frere then went out, and he, along with Sir Garnet Wolseley, attempted to convince the Boers of the wisdom of the annexation, but failed. The Boers then bound themselves by a solemn agreement that they would never desist from action until they had achieved the independence of their country, and it is impossible to find a more determined resistance to the annexation—a determination at the first possible moment to regain the independence of which they were deprived than was shown on that occasion. The Leaders of the Liberal Party have been blamed for expressing sympathy with the Boers; but those Leaders would have been false to their whole public life if they had not declared that the Boers who claimed the independence which had been taken from them under false pretences were not entitled to have it back again on fair and proper terms. I am not going to defend the course pursued by the Government when they came into power. They were misled down to October or November, when Sir George Colley reported that the taxes were paid everywhere, and that everything was going on satisfactorily. Although I give all credit to the Government for having done what they thought right, it would have been better if they had recalled Sir Bartle Frere when they first came into Office, and adopted the policy which the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Chamberlain) indicated at Birmingham—namely, re- versed the annexation of the Transvaal. But the fact remains the same, that both Governments were misled. One was misled with regard to annexation, and the other with respect to public opinion in the Transvaal. In the same way that the war was precipitated in America 100 years ago, the forcible collection of taxes raised the spirit of the Boers. I am not going into all the various facts with regard to the policy of the Government since the war broke out. The right hon. Baronet in his speech did not repeat what had been said in "another place" by a certain noble Lord who had great influence with his Party, that peace was dictated to the Government by the victorious Boers, and that the terms assented to by the Government were not accepted until after the defeat of the English Forces. I will trouble the House with reference to a point on which so much stress has been laid in this country—that after the battle of Majuba the terms of the settlement were proposed by the British Government in consequence of that defeat. My hon. Friend (Mr. Rathbone) showed very clearly that, in January, the Government had intimated their readiness to come to terms. As a matter of fact, the Earl of Kimberley, on the 14th of January, stated the Government would consider the appointment of a Commission. On the 13th February Mr. Kruger wrote to General Colley, offering terms of suspension of hostilities. General Colley telegraphed those terms to London; he received back from London an answer to accept those terms, and negotiate on that basis. He applied again for further information, and he received further suggestions. The telegrams occupied, backwards and forwards, from the 13th to the 21st of February, and on the 21st General Colley wrote to Mr. Kruger, stating the terms which the British Government would accept in case they desisted from hostilities. That letter specified 48 hours for a reply, and if the reply was not received, the English Forces would march. Owing to the state of the roads that letter did not reach Heidelberg until the 25th. It was opened by one of the Boer leaders, who wrote back stating that Mr. Kruger was away, and that he would not be back for four days; but, on the 26th, unfortunately, the assault on Majuba commenced, and on the 27th the defeat of the British Forces took place. At that moment—on the day of the defeat—the very terms which the British Government afterwards accepted, had been laid down by them in black and white, and were in the possession of the Boer leaders. I, therefore, say that for any man, no matter what his position may be, to assert that the terms which resulted in the present Treaty of Peace, and which the Government dictated, were wrung from them on the morrow of the defeat, is to make an assertion totally devoid of the slightest foundation. Will any man say that, under these circumstances, the Government could have retreated; or on any principle of civilized or uncivilized warfare that, having offered terms of peace, and while under consideration, you yourselves being the aggressor, because you sustained a defeat, you would have been justified in withdrawing and refusing the terms, and continuing the war for the purpose of avenging the defeat and shedding more blood? The Government must have done one of two things—either have gone on with the war and obtained a victory, and concluded a peace, on the terms now accepted, or—and these terms are the only alternative—retained the whole of the annexed territory. Which would have been right? Would it have been right to go on with the war simply for the sake of winning a victory, or would it have been wise to attempt to conquer and hold a country as large as France, with a hostile population, and in the midst of all those difficulties which the right hon. Baronet described, all of which were strong arguments against the annexation. What would have been the result? The Government would have encountered the permanent hostility of the people, and there would be a constant drain on the English Exchequer to maintain an Army in the conquered territory. Does anybody believe that a policy of that kind would have survived a single election in this country? After having shed seas of blood, and squandered millions of treasure, I doubt if the Government could make a more satisfactory peace than the one they have made, or done more than secure the suzerainty of the Queen, the control of the foreign relations of the Boer Republic, and the protection of the Natives. I think the Government were justified on the grounds of policy alone. But there are higher grounds. I know it is the fashion now-a-days to sneer at higher grounds being imported into affairs of State. We have got a new standard of morality, which applies a different scale to the individual acting by himself and in the mass. I demur to the correctness of that principle. I do not believe that the guilt of any wrong-doing is minimized by the number responsible for it. I believe that the Sixth or Eighth Commandment can be as flagrantly violated by a Government, by a Parliament, or a nation, as by a single individual. I know that the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury), who has been alluded to tonight, has thrown on this proposition all the scorn of his cynical eloquence, and has characterized this international morality as one of the delicacies of modern civilization. I do not think anybody will charge him with having yielded to any of that delicacy. I prefer the ethics and the statesmanship of Edmund Burke to the ethics and the statesmanship of Lord Salisbury. Burke has said that "the principles of true politics are those of morality enlarged." That sentence is as true to-day in the plains of South Africa as in this House—for whatever is morally wrong can never be politically right. I will go further, and say that whatever is morally right can never be politically wrong; and I believe that the conduct of Her Majesty's Government is not only right in principle and right in policy, but emphatically morally right. I know they could have purchased a cheap and fluctuating popularity by yielding to the impulse of resentment which an unexpected defeat always arouses, they could have axenged that sad slaughter by a terrible retribution, and added another sanguinary chapter to the history of our South African conquests. I think they have achieved a wiser, a braver, and a nobler result. They have had the courage to subordinate pride, and power, and prestige to the difficult, and sometimes unpleasant, duty of undoing a great wrong; and in accomplishing that they have surrounded the Imperial rule in South Africa with a strength, a dignity, and a Christian character far surpassing anything they could have attained by the most glorious victory or the most brilliant campaign.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House, believing that the continuance of the War with the Transvaal Boers would not have advanced the honour or the interests of this Country, approves the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government to bring about a peaceful settlement, and feels confident that every care will be taken to guard the interests of the natives, to provide for the full liberty and equal treatment of the entire white population, and to promote harmony and good will among the various races in South Africa,"—(Mr. Rathbone,) —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

SIR HENRY HOLLAND

said, that he did not like to give a silent vote on this occasion, as he had paid the closest attention to the difficult question now before the House, and as he had had much to do with the affairs of South Africa when he was at the Colonial Office. It appeared to him that there were three important stages in our dealings with the Transvaal. The first stage was the annexation of that territory by the late Government; the second was the continuance of the policy of the late Government by Her Majesty's present Government upon their accession to Office; and the third stage was the restoration of the Transvaal to the Boers. Now, as regarded the first stage, he held that Lord Carnarvon could not have acted otherwise than he did upon the information he received. It had been said, both in that House and out of it, that the annexation of the Transvaal was only a part of the Imperial policy of the late Government. Nothing could be more contrary to the facts of the case, and he (Sir Henry Holland) would cite in support of this denial the very frank and fair speech of Lord Kimberley in a recent debate in the House of Lords. That noble Lord said that he admitted that The late Government, in annexing the Transvaal, were not for one moment actuated simply by a desire to extend the Queen's Dominions. The motives for that step were not motives of which the country need be ashamed. He (Sir Henry Holland) begged the House to remember that these words were spoken by a Secretary of State for the Colonies, than whom no one was more competent to form an opinion upon the point; and he trusted, therefore, that they would hear no more of this charge against the late Government. He might add that no one was more reluctant to increase our responsibilities in South Africa than Lord Carnarvon. Having been twice Colonial Minister, he knew well the gravity of those responsibilities, and his reluctance to act was shown both in his despatches to the Cape, in his speeches in the House of Lords, and, he (Sir Henry Holland) might add, in his private conversations. Nor must it be forgotten that the necessity of annexation under the circumstances was fully recognized by eminent Liberal statesmen, who had paid special attention to Colonial matters. He (Sir Henry Holland) desired to say here a few words in defence of one who had been made the scapegoat in this business. They were all too anxious when in difficulties to look about for a scapegoat upon whose shoulders they could lay the blame, and in the present case Sir Theophilus Shepstone had been made the scapegoat. Now, it was not clear that the feeling of the inhabitants generally, when he reported, was against annexation. The country was in a state of distraction and complete ruin. There was a great alarm of the Natives; there was a very feeble Government, to which the principal Boers were, as President Burgers sadly admitted, very disloyal. The Boers might not, perhaps, have desired or contemplated a permanent annexation and loss of independence, but they certainly desired in many quarters to have British protection. At all events, Sir Theophilus Shepstone might well have been deceived; and small blame, if any, could be attached to him for error of judgment, seeing that he was able to effect this change without any riot or disturbance, although he had only a force of 25 policemen with him; and that he had received addresses and prayers for help from the respectable and peaceful inhabitants of the principal places in the Transvaal. It certainly was most unfair to judge of the feeling then by the feeling now shown. Could they be surprised if, after peace and prosperity had been restored under British government, and all fear of invasion removed, many Boers who might have throughout regretted their loss of independence, were readily excited and roused by the violent language of a few leaders? These leaders desired the power and office which they might have had, or hoped to have, but for the annexation, and they had strained every nerve to excite the people. But he (Sir Henry Holland) ventured to doubt whether they would have succeeded had they not been able to point to the language of the Prime Minister, of the Under Secretary of State for the Home Department, and other leading Radicals, and to hold out hopes that a change in the Government at home would lead at once to a change of policy in the Transvaal. He (Sir Henry Holland) had heard with surprise a denial that the language of the Prime Minister before he came into Office had had any effect in the Transvaal. He would point, in reply, to the speech just delivered by the hon. Member for Carnarvonshire, and to the speeches in that House of the hon. Member for Lisheard (Mr. Courtney) before he took Office. That hon. Member made it clear beyond doubt that the speeches of the Prime Minister had a very exciting effect in the Transvaal and at the Cape. He would further ask why, if great hopes were not entertained of a change of policy and restoration of independence upon the accession to Office of Her Majesty's present Government, it was found necessary not only at once to decide to adhere to the annexation, but also to telegraph out at once that decision to Pretoria? He now came to the second stage of this subject—namely, the policy pursued by Her Majesty's present Government when they came into power. He believed that their decision to retain the Transvaal was approved by the great majority of Members and by the country at large. He would go further, and say that he believed there was a feeling of relief when the country learnt the decision arrived at. But he must call the attention of the House to the grounds upon which the Government based their decision, as this formed a most important element in the consideration of the questions before the House. Lord Kimberley, on the 24th May, 1880, said that assurances having been given to the Native population that they would be under the British Crown, and the communication having been made to the Dutch settlers that there was no intention to abandon the annexation, it would not be desirable now to recede. He added that "nothing could be more unfortunate than uncertainty in such a matter." The Prime Minister, on May 20, 1880, spoke of the existence of the large Native population in the Transvaal— To whom, by the establishment of the Queen's supremacy, we hold ourselves to have given a pledge."—[3 Hansard, cclii. 145.] Mr. Grant Duff, on May 21, 1881, gave in fuller detail the grounds for the decision of the Government. He pointed out that if the Transvaal was handed back to the Boors all the old difficulties would revive; that there would be danger of civil war between the Boers and English settlers; that all the merchants and persons of property would tremble if left to Boer rule; that troubles would arise between the Zulus and Boers; that the interests of the friendly Boers must not be overlooked; and that regard must be had to the feeling of the vast mass of Native inhabitants. And lastly, on the 21st January, 1881, the reasons were fully set forth again by the Prime Minister. He said— I must look at the obligations entailed by the annexation; and if, in my opinion, and in the opinion of many on this side of the House, wrong was done by the annexation itself, that would not warrant us in doing fresh, distinct, and separate wrong, by a disregard of the obligations which that annexation entailed.… First, there was the obligation entailed towards the English and other settlers in the Transvaal, perhaps including a minority, though a very small minority, of the Dutch Boers themselves; secondly, there was the obligation towards the Native races, an obligation which I may call an obligation of humanity and justice; and, thirdly, there was the political obligation we entailed upon ourselves in respect of the responsibility which was already incumbent on us, and which we, by the annexation, largely extended for the future peace and tranquillity of South Africa."—[3 Hansard, cclvil. 1142.] These were very strong reasons, amply justifying the policy of Her Majesty's Government in retaining the Transvaal; and these reasons had been intensified a hundredfold by the war. Our obligations then became still more sacred and binding, especially towards those who had lent, or offered, us loyal assistance. He would now pass to the third stage of these proceedings—namely, the surrender of the Transvaal to the Boers. Looking to the reasons given for maintaining that territory, the Government ought to be able to advance very strong and powerful reasons for the change of policy. If the change had been made at first, when the Government came into power, if the Transvaal had then been abandoned, either on the ground of the probable expense and danger which would be incurred in retaining it, or because of the strong feeling in the territory against British authority, they on that side of the House might have regretted and protested against the decision; but the reasons for it would have been clear and simple, and bloodshed would have been avoided. But the change of policy was not made. On the contrary, the continuance of the annexation was justified, although it was known that there was a party in the Transvaal opposed to it; and it was also urged that danger might be anticipated from a change of policy. What, then, were the reasons, what the motives, which subsequently induced the Government to alter their decision? There was no proof of any increase of hostile feeling on the part of the Boers, except, perhaps, just after the time when the decision of the Government was first made known in the Transvaal. Indeed, there was reason to believe that the feeling was quieter. The outbreak in December was a sudden act; a spark lighting up a smouldering disaffection which would have been stamped out, even if it had not died out of itself, if a firm front had been shown. At first, after the revolt broke out, there was no apparent substantial change in the policy of the Government. "Her Majesty's authority was to be vindicated;" and "there was a duty anterior to all duties—that of vindicating the authority of the Crown." These were the phrases used by Ministers; but he (Sir Henry Holland) suspected that a change was all this time working in the minds of those Ministers. It was no secret that the original policy of annexatiou was distasteful to many Members of the Government, and not improbable that one or two would have been willing at once to reverse that policy. It was well known that there was discontent at the decision taken by the Government on the part of many, if not all, of the Radical Members, and on the part of many who had so largely assisted in bringing the Prime Minister into power. There was, therefore, constant pressure put upon the Government to restore the Transvaal, and this pressure was increased and intensified by the revolt. Then came further checks of our soldiers, and still more pressure, and with all this the dislike that more blood should be shed in a cause which was considered of doubtful justice must have weighed with the Ministers. He (Sir Henry Holland) blamed the Government for yielding to this pressure; but he most strongly blamed them for the uncertainty and hesitation in their policy. He regretted that they had not taken to heart Lord Kimberley's statesmanlike remark that "nothing could be more unfortunate than uncertainty in such a matter." This uncertainty strengthened the pressure here; it strengthened the Boers out in the Transvaal; it gave a direct encouragement to rebellion, and it was a direct discouragement to our friends in the Transvaal and throughout South Africa. There was not time this evening—as a division was so much desired—to go in detail through the different steps downwards until Her Majesty's Government, in lieu of vindicating Her Majesty's authority—in lieu of performing that paramount duty—made peace with armed rebels actually holding a position in our Colony of Natal. Perhaps, however, he might point out that he thought the hon. Member for Carnarvonshire (Mr. Rathbone) had somewhat misapprehended the statement of the right hon. Baronet the Mover of the Resolution. The hon. Member appeared to forget that there had been three military checks before Majuba. There was the attack on the 94th Regiment at Brunker's Spruit, the fight at Laing's Nek, and the fight at Ingogo. These three checks had taken place before Her Majesty's Government placed any substantial and definite scheme before the Boers for their consideration; and two of them had taken place before President Brand urged by telegram that the nature of the scheme proposed by the Government should be explained. But, without going into detail, he (Sir Henry Holland) desired to point out to the House the gradual change in the language of the Government. They began with the term—"Necessary to vindicate Her Majesty's authority;" they went through the stage—"If the Boers will desist from armed opposition;" then came the very serious check at Majuba, and thereupon they made peace with Joubert, whose declaration that the Boers "will negotiate, but not submit or cease opposition," the Government received on the 4th of March. To make peace with such a leader, at such a time, was hardly to vindicate Her Majesty's authority. Why had not the Government the courage to follow the advice of Sir Evelyn Wood, who knew these Boers well. He wrote— The happiest result will be that after accelerating successful action, which I hope to fight in about 14 days, the Boers should disperse without any guarantee, and then many now undoubtedly coerced will readily settle down. The hon. Member for Carnarvonshire asked what alternative policy we would have advised? Well, in the first place, a firm adherence to our policy would have prevented this scrape; but still he did not hesitate to say that in the circumstances he would have re-established the Queen's authority and Government in the Transvaal. If blood was shed in doing so, which, however, might not have been the case had we maintained a firm front, much as such bloodshed was to be regretted, he believed it would be less than might ultimately have to be incurred through this change of policy. He would, as soon as it was possible, have given large local powers to the inhabitants of the Transvaal, when they had settled down and shown themselves competent to exercise such powers. In what position did we now stand? We had broken through obligations solemnly entered into by the late Government, and renewed and confirmed by the present Government. Could it be contended that the Government had substantially protected those to whom we were under obligations? Could it be contended that they were in as secure a position as that which we practically guaranteed to them? The answer must be in the negative. The Instructions given to the Royal Commissioners were, he admitted, wide in terms and well framed; but then the decision of the Commissioners and the terms they made were not final, but had to be submitted to the Volksraad. We were labouring under the disadvantage of not knowing what those terms would be; and he (Sir Henry Holland), for this reason, was one of those who desired to see the debate put off until the Commissioners had reported. But, in the first place, unless all had been conceded to the Boers which they desired, would these terms be accepted, or, if accepted, would they be observed? He would refer upon this point to a very ominous passage in a despatch of Sir Evelyn Wood of March 28, 1881—a passage, he might observe, which did not appear in the despatch as originally given in the Blue Book, but which was subsequently presented to Parliament at his request. Sir Evelyn Wood writes that Mr. Joubert— Gave me to understand that the question of peace or war was very much in the hands of those who had taken up arms under his leadership; and I am inclined to believe that these men, who, it must be remembered, have never sustained defeat, may at any future time make their voices heard in the event of the Royal Commission giving any decisions which may be unpalatable to them, or which may fall short of what they expect. And, in the second place, assuming that the Commissioners in terms protected the three classes of persons to whom we were bound, as the Prime Minister had admitted, to give protection; and assuming that the Volksraad accepted those terms, who was to guarantee, and how were we to secure the performance of them, and who was to punish for a breach of them? That question was one of the gravest importance, and must be faced. The Boers, if we looked back to their history, could not be safely trusted. They broke the Sand River Convention, and it was to be feared that they would—not, perhaps, in the first or second year, but within no great length of time—again begin to harass, perhaps enslave, the Natives. In such case, what protection would the Natives have? What would the Boer Government care for the remonstrances of the British Resident unless those remonstrances were backed up by Imperial Forces and Imperial power? He begged the House to look at the position of those settlers and Natives who had loyally assisted us, or tendered their assistance to us, during the recent troubles, and of all those who had gladly hailed our protection. In lieu of a powerful and friendly Government, they would be under a Government hostile to them and overbearing; in lieu of a Governor appointed by Her Majesty, they would have a British Resident with no power; in lieu of Imperial protection, they would have the remonstrances of the British Resident; and in lieu of Imperial obligations, they would have the promises of the Boer Government. This policy had been called "generous" and "just;" but by whom? He (Sir Henry Holland) could understand why it should be called generous by Radical Members and their constituents. Their lives were not endangered, their property was not rendered insecure, their commercial relations were not affected by a change of policy, of which they approved as coinciding with their views. He could understand why it should be called generous by the Boer leaders, and it had been so characterized by them in a despatch or Memorial. They had gained power, office, and the emoluments of power and office, which they would have failed to gain under British rule, and they had been successful in their rebellion. He could understand why President Brand—who, he must remark in passing, had taken a most kind and judicious part in these proceedings—should call this policy generous, because he naturally would prefer to see a Dutch Republic, rather than a strong British Government, on the borders of the State over which he so ably presided. But what was this policy called by those to whose opinions we were chiefly bound to look; by those to whom we had contracted solemn obligations; by those to whom, to use the Prime Minister's words, which he (Sir Henry Holland) had already cited, we have done a "fresh, distinct, and separate wrong by a disregard of the obligations which the annexation entailed." They said they had been "wilfully and deliberately abandoned, cruelly deceived and betrayed;" and, allowing for some not unnatural exaggeration, he could not but think that these words very fairly described the position of these people. He did not regret the loss of the Transvaal. The responsibilities of this country were sufficiently grave without any further extension; but he did regret that the Government had yielded to pressure, and given a premium to successful rebellion. He agreed with the very pregnant words of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen), when speaking a few days ago of the Irish Land Bill—"It is a dangerous thing in the history of a country when agitation is successful;" and he ventured to think that it was still more dangerous when armed revolt was successful. He did regret the loss this country had sustained in her character for honourable observance of obligations, for ready protection of friends and of the weak, for ready protection of those who had been brought under our power, and especially when so brought by our own action. The Prime Minister a few weeks ago, in eloquent language of which he was so great a master, denounced the late Government for the Anglo-Turkish Treaty and the occupation of Cyprus; and he said it would be the duty of himself and his Colleagues to restore the character of this country for disinterested conduct in European affairs. If he (Sir Henry Holland) had one-tenth part of the eloquence of the right hon. Gentleman, he would employ it in exhorting him and his Colleagues to endeavour to restore the character of this country for strict observance of obligations, for justice and humanity, for readiness to protect, through good report and bad report, through good days and bad days, those who had come under Her Majesty's authority, and who had a right to look for such protection. He would exhort the House to disapprove of a policy which had been wavering and uncertain, and by that very uncertainty had led to the loss of many brave officers and men; a policy which had yielded to the pressure of a successful rebellion, and failed to vindicate Her Majesty's authority; which had led us to break obligations solemnly entered into, while incurring now engagements which we might soon be called upon to perform, and which we must then either again recede from, or perform only by again pouring troops into the Transvaal, by further bloodshed, and by a repetition of those sad and terrible scenes which a firm policy would have prevented. There must be a large majority against us this night; but hon. Members on this side of the House were content to have entered a strong protest against the policy of the Government, a protest in which he believed a large number of Her Majesty's loyal subjects, not only in this country, but in the Colonies, would heartily concur.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

said, he was certainly not disposed to under-estimate the importance of the considerations which had just been brought before the House by the hon. Baronet the Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland), who was probably as well qualified as anyone in the House to speak with authority on the subject. He (Mr. Chamberlain) was ready to admit that the question was one environed by difficulties on every side, and that the course which the Government had pursued might not he followed immediately by an entirely satisfactory conclusion of the difficulties which they had encountered. He was aware, also, that it was quite conceivable that the Government might have further complications to face. But he wished to point out that it followed from what the hon. Baronet the Member for Midhurst had said, and also from what had been said by the right hon. Baronet the Member for East Gloucesshire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), that, in their opinion, the only satisfactory alternative to the policy of the Government would be the policy of persisting in the annexation of the Transvaal, and by this country continuing to maintain the entire control over the institutions of that country. But he (Mr. Chamberlain) doubted if it would have been possible to have maintained that control, and, at the same time, to have given free representative local institutions. They must, therefore, have maintained a practically despotic Government, and they must have been prepared to keep a large force constantly in South Africa. Here was the plain issue for the House. Were they willing that the annexation of the Transvaal should be permanent? He was not going to dwell upon the difficulties of such a course. He did not doubt that Sir Evelyn Wood, with the large force placed at his disposal by the Government, could have, if so minded, overrun the Transvaal and re-conquered the country. His difficulties, however, would not have ended there. He would have had to face, probably, the opposition of the Free State; and the Government would have been confronted with the agitation among the Dutch Colonists of the Cape. But the enterprize would have been absolutely Quixotic. They would have had permanently to maintain a large army on a European scale. They would have had to risk the best interests of South Africa, and face an insurrection at any moment, when any considerable portion of our troops were removed, and they would have done all this for the purpose of maintaining the supremacy of the Crown over a population of only 40,000 White inhabitants, who were apparently so poor that the utmost revenue that this country could expect from them would not exceed £100,000 per annum. But these were not the main reasons why, as he submitted, it was impossible for them to maintain the annexation of the Transvaal. He thought that course was impossible for any Government caring for the honour, as well as the interests, of this country. It was contrary to their Treaty engagements; it was contrary to the best traditions of a free country. ["No!"] He should convince the hon. Member who said "No" of the accuracy of what he said. Mention had been made, in the Motion of the right hon. Baronet (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), of the obligations which they had contracted towards the loyal inhabitants. He admitted those obligations, and that they ought to be respected. But this country was under stronger obligations of longer standing and more binding to the Boers. By the Sand River Convention they bound themselves to the Boers to guarantee to them their independence, and not to make any encroachment on the lands West of the Vaal. It was impossible for any self-respecting Government to ignore those undertakings, unless with the consent of the Boers themselves. And this was the position taken by the late Government at the time of the annexation. When placing the matter before the House of Lords, Lord Carnarvon said that the large majority of the population was in favour of the annexation, and that if it were not so he bad no desire to take over an unwilling population. This was the spirit of the Instructions given to Sir Theophilus Shepstone; it was the condition, the ground of the annexation. It was upon the assumption that the majority of the Boers were in favour of annexation that Parliament consented to it in 1877. If they found out subsequently that the wishes and sentiments of the Boers were entirely misunderstood—that they had gained the Transvaal on false pretences—they were bound in honour to withdraw from the position which they had unwittingly and wrongly taken up. He could not understand how those who talked so glibly of the honour of this country could fail to see that the greatest shame and humiliation would be in maintaining a high-handed breach of faith, and destroying the independence of a people which they had solemnly engaged to respect. The moment the Government became aware of this feeling they adopted the conclusion to which he had referred. It was said they ought to have come to this decision before. He should meet that charge, though it was not contained in the Resolution. There were two possible occasions on which they might have consented to withdraw. The first and most critical occasion, no doubt, was when the Government took Office. The question at that time was not an easy one to decide. Although they were then all of opinion that the original act of annexation was a mistake, the objections to the reversal of this policy were very serious indeed. There was, of course, in the first place, the possibility that upon their leaving the Transvaal the territory might become the scene of civil war. There were the obligations to which the Resolution referred, and which they were bound to respect. They had also the opinion of Sir Bartle Frere, that the project of Confederation, which he believed he was about to carry to a successful issue, would be entirely frustrated if they announced their intention to withdraw from the territory. These being the difficulties, it was perfectly clear that no Government could have successfully defended its policy on encountering these risks unless it had positive evidence that the occupation of the Transvaal was contrary to the wishes of the population. They had no such evidence. On the contrary, they had positive assurances that the country was rapidly settling down. They had before then, it was true, an early statement from Sir Garnet Wolseley, dated October,1879; that he had come to the conclusion that the objections of the Boers were mach more serious than was imagined; but later he was re-assured, and they received a telegram from him on April 4, 1880, in most re-assuring terms, which was confirmed and expanded in a despatch dated April 10, in which he stated his conviction that the announcement of the irrevocability of the annexation would produce a cessation of the agitation. This was also the opinion of Sir Bartle Frere at the time, and it was subsequently confirmed by fuller accounts from Sir Owen Lanyon and Sir George Colley. Sir George Colley made a tour of the Transvaal, and was so satisfied with what he saw, and by the reports from the officials in the territory, that he actually proposed a reduction of the garrison by one regiment. There was other collateral evidence which appeared to confirm these statements of our officials. The taxes were being paid, and the military commanders were, as he had said, of opinion that they could do with smaller forces; and, as had been pointed out, by, he thought, the right hon. Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), several of the most important Boer leaders had already accepted office under the British Government. Well, those were the statements, and the only statements, in their possession at the time when they had to come to a conclusion; and they came to the conclusion that those statements, at all events, did not justify them in encountering the alternative risks of withdrawing from the annexation. It was very easy indeed for anybody to be wise after the event. They knew better now; but he did say, looking back to that time, that it would have been exceedingly difficult for them to have attempted to withdraw with the information in their possession. The theory had been started that all would have been well in the Transvaal but for political agitation in this country, especially but for the speeches of his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in Mid Lothian and of his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for the Home Department, he supposed in that House, because he did not recollect that he made speeches in the country on the subject about the same period. It was a very convenient theory for right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite; but it appeared to be entirely at variance with the facts, because the favourable opinion of the officials in the Transvaal as to its conditions continued, and continued with increasing emphasis long after the speeches in Mid Lothian made by his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, and by his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Home Affairs, and down to within a week of the outbreak. They now knew these opinions were based on a misapprehension of the facts; but there was not the least reason to suppose that they were more accurate at one time than another. There was not now, he believed, the slightest doubt that there never was a time since annexation when the vast majority of the Boer population had not been entirely opposed to it. There was a second occasion when it had been suggested the Government might have withdrawn from the annexa- tion, and that was the time when, on the 29th of December, the proposal was made by Mr. Merriman and others at the Cape that Chief Justice De Villiers should be appointed to report on the state of the Transvaal. The right hon. Baronet the Member for East Gloucestershire said—Why was it inopportune to accept the suggestion on the 29th of December when it was opportune to send a Commission after you had suffered defeat? The insinuation of the right hon. Baronet was that it was the three defeats which caused a change of policy and made it opportune. On January 26 it was opportune, and on December 29 it was not. Well, it might have been expected that the right hon. Baronet would have seen that there was a considerable difference between the two proposals. He blamed the Government both for what they had not done and what they had done—for agreeing to appoint a Commission which was asked for by the Boers themselves, and which was to be appointed in order to consider and settle the terms of peace, and he blamed them also for not appointing a Commission on the 29th of December, at the instance of the Cape Colonists, who were not directly concerned in the question, and which was only to inquire and report, with no assurance that its propositions would be acceptable to, or would be welcomed by, the Boers. To justify the opinion that it was inopportune to send a Commission on the 29th of December it was only necessary to consider the condition of affairs at that time. Information had been received that the detachment of the 94th Regiment had been cut off; there were allegations of treachery which subsequent inquiry had shown to be utterly devoid of foundation; but the allegation had to be considered without the means of ascertaining how far it was accurate; British garrisons were being besieged and attacked; our troops were coping with an insurrection in which they were outnumbered; the demands of the Boers at the time, so far as the Government were acquainted with them, were unreasonable; and there was no reason to believe that, if we had offered such terms as we subsequently conceded, they would have been accepted. On the contrary, we knew that, since the acceptance of those terms, the younger and higher spirited men among the Boers had complained bit- terly of the humiliation to which they had been subjected in accepting terms which they said we had imposed upon them, and they accused Joubert of having betrayed them. He now went back to the time of the outbreak, when the Government had to consider what was to be done, and when they advised Her Majesty to state in the Speech from the Throne that she had taken military measures to insure the prompt vindication of her authority. It was said that their subsequent action had been inconsistent with this statement, and that they had not vindicated the authority of the Crown. It appeared to him that the right hon. Baronet put much too limited an interpretation on those words. He admitted that the view that the right hon. Baronet took of the vindication of authority was consistent with a legitimate interpretation of the words; it was one interpretation of the words; but he appeared to think that there could be no other vindication of authority than a bloody victory followed by the resumption of the Crown control over the territory. Although he shared the right hon. Gentleman's disinclination to confess when he was wrong, he would make a confession, and would say that, at the time when those words were inserted in the Queen's Speech, if he had been asked what he expected to be the result of our action, he should have assumed it to be probable that when Sir George Colley received the reinforcements he would have attacked the Boers and dispersed them, and immediately afterwards we should have sought the first opportunity to withdraw from the Transvaal, into which we ought never to have entered, offering the Boers the terms we subsequently conceded. The importance of the three defeats had been exaggerated. Although it was deplorable to lose valuable lives, yet to a country such as this, with its population of 35,000,000, and its enormous resources, the defeat of a few hundred troops by greatly superior forces could not be treated as a matter of national importance, demanding necessarily the further sacrifice of valuable life. He should not have expected that the Boers after their victories, which naturally raised their military spirit, would have consented to accept the terms which we were willing to concede to them. But surely the use of the words—"The vin- dication of the authority of the Crown," could not be held to preclude us from offering and accepting a satisfactory peaceable settlement? Surely it was not a condition of our accepting terms, in themselves satisfactory, that we should have previously won a victory over the Boers and destroyed their power. Assuming the terms to be just and reasonable in themselves, which he know was a matter of controversy with right hon. Gentlemen opposite, considering that they were the result of overtures which came from the Boers and were not made by us, that they were our terms and not theirs, that they were imposed in the face of an overwhelming military force, at a time when Sir Evelyn Wood said that he could, humanly speaking, promise a victory if he made an attack, and that these terms included the dispersal of the Boers, he should have thought that they constituted a vindication of the authority of the Queen which was not at all less complete because unaccompanied by a further effusion of blood. It was to be remembered that the Boers put forth originally demands very different from the terms they accepted, and that they withdrew those demands. They agreed to disperse, they accepted a Royal Commission entirely nominated by the Crown, and they permitted the resumption of the English civil administration of the Transvaal. The right hon. Gentleman thought that resumption was imaginary, and that that was shown, as he said, by the troops sent to replace the garrison at Potchefstroom accepting what he called the escort of a Boer leader. This was most amazing. Did he believe that a considerable body of British troops required to be protected by one man? It was evident on the face of the fact that what occurred was this. We were determined to replace the garrison; we told the Boer leaders that, in order to do so, we would overcome any opposition; the Boer leaders protested their good faith; they said no opposition would be offered, and, as a guarantee of this, they furnished one of their leaders as a hostage rather than an escort to accompany our troops; and in the result their good faith was vindicated. It was said that the policy of the Government had been changed by defeats, and that the tone of the negotiations was altered by them. That proposition he denied entirely; he submitted that there was not the slightest variation from first to last in the terms the Government were willing to concede. As time went on they assumed a different shape in some of the details; but they never varied in principle. The dispersal of the Boers and the desistance from armed opposition was to be found in them from first to last. On the 10th of January these negotiations commenced by a reply to a telegram from Mr. Brand, in which the Government said, provided the Boers would disperse and desist from armed opposition to the Queen's authority they would not despair of making satisfactory arrangements. On the 12th Mr. Brand suggested that Mr. De Villiers should be appointed as Commissioner to settle terms of peace with the Boers. On the 14th the Government replied that if the Boers would desist from armed opposition they would consider whether a settlement could not be brought about by the appointment of a Special Commissioner. On the 26th Mr. Brand asked whether it was not possible to offer terms and conditions taking up the words of the Government—"Provided the Boers cease from armed opposition." The Government replied that immediately opposition ceased they would endeavour to frame such a scheme as would, in their belief, satisfy all enlightened friends of the Transvaal. All these telegrams were previous to the disasters of Laing's Nek, Ingogo, and Majuba Hill. It was said that they were vague and indefinite; but they were not so considered by those to whom they were addressed. On the 29th Mr. Brand said that he was very pleased to receive such an answer, and all he desired was that it should be immediately made known to the Boers. The real question was not whether our policy was changed in consequence of the defeats, but whether it ought to have been changed in consequence of the defeats—whether, in consequence of our defeats, we should have withdrawn the offers we had made previously in order to have substituted terms more unfavourable to the Boers? The right hon. Baronet referred, but not with his usual candour, to the despatch of Sir Evelyn Wood, dated the 5th of March, in which he said he anticipated the happiest results from fighting a successful battle; he evidently approved of that suggestion, and desired it should have been adopted; but he did not go on to quote the subsequent despatch of the 8th of March in the same Blue Book, in which Sir Evelyn Wood stated that "by happiest results" all he meant was that he thought a fire had been kindled it would be difficult to extinguish, and if he gained a victory over the Boers they would be more easily dealt with. In effect, what Sir Evelyn Wood said was this:—At that time, flushed as they were with victory, he did not think the Boers would accept the terms he knew that we were prepared to concede, and he suggested a victory with this "happiest results" in order that we might by victory impose upon the Boers those terms which the Government could hardly expect they would accept without a victory. Sir Evelyn Wood himself, on the 4th of March, the day succeeding the date of his despatch, acting on his own discretion, concluded, to his own great credit, an armistice with the Boers.

SIR HENRY HOLLAND

Sir Evelyn Wood's despatch, to which I referred, is a different one from that.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

said, he was not referring to anything said by the hon. Baronet, but to a statement made by the right hon. Baronet (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach). What he had to say on behalf of the Government with respect to that matter was this—that, in their opinion, a great nation could afford to be generous. In old times, when duelling was common, it did not unfrequently happen that a man who had, as it was said, given his proofs, refused to go out on insufficient grounds because his character for bravery and skill did not require any further proof. In the same way, the right hon. Baronet had taken too low a view of the reputation of the country when he thought it needed to be sustained by pursuing the war to the bitter end. They had, as a nation, too often proved their courage and tenacity of purpose for anyone not blinded by Party prejudice to think that their reputation must be be made good in such a fashion as that. They had the power in their hands, but they had not the will to use it. The strength of the giant was there, but it would have been tyrannous to employ it. If they had not so employed it, it was because they were not satisfied with the justice of their cause—because they did not think there was any end to be served commen- surate with the sacrifices they would impose upon themselves and others; and because they had learned to recognize in their opponents qualities which were worthy of a free people; and, lastly, because they considered that all reasonable demands were satisfied, and that peace gave to this country everything that victory would have enabled them to secure. He would briefly refer to the terms which had been arrived at. The right hon. Baronet complained that he was at a considerable disadvantage in dealing with the question, inasmuch as he had not before him the details of the final settlement. Well, that was a disadvantage which they shared with the right hon. Baronet. The negotiations were still incomplete, and they had to be approved of by the Government and by the Volksraad. But he was confident that when the result of the deliberations became known it would be on the whole and in the main satisfactory to the people of the country, and that it would be found that full consideration had been given to the points which the right hon. Baronet raised in his Resolution. The House had before it the preliminary conditions of peace and all of the Instructions sent by Lord Kimberley to Sir Hercules Robinson, and these were sufficient to enable them to discuss the question. The right hon. Baronet condemned those arrangements, root and branch, and in doing so was a little inconsistent in himself, for there was nothing in them which was not covered by the promises made to the Boers by the right hon. Baronet when he was in Office. On the 20th of November, 1879, the right hon. Baronet wrote a despatch in which he said that the Transvaal might receive a Constitution which would confer upon the people, under the permanent authority of the British Crown, the fullest independence and freedom of self-government, according to their own views, in all matters except those as to which an independent Power, unless hostile, would be compelled to cooperate with its neighbours. But the right hon. Baronet stated that he had been informed by those in whom he had the fullest confidence that the best form of government for the Transvaal was that of a Crown Colony. Well, was that the opinion of the right hon. Baronet when he wrote that despatch? He did not doubt that the right hon. Baronet was perfectly sincere when he penned it; but he now said that, in his opinion, the offer he made to the Boers in it was not that of the best form of government for them; above all, that it was not one which would best maintain the interest of the Native population. Why, then, did the right hon. Baronet, as a friend of the Boers and desirous of securing the interests of the Natives, make it? Was he afraid of the Boers? When he saw reason to dislike any terms proposed by the Government he represented them as trembling in their shoes for fear at this terrible population of 40,000 Boers; but he could hardly be acquitted of having manifested some timidity himself when he was found offering the Boers terms which he now characterized as improper. Well, the offers made by Her Majesty's Government were covered by those of the previous Government; they offered the fullest legal independence, reserving the foreign relations of the Boers and their external policy. The only thing which remained was the difference between sovereignty and suzerainty. Whatever importance right hon. Gentlemen opposite attached to that difference, he ventured to say that in all practical arrangements of affairs no distinction could be established. But the Government had gone a little beyond the right hon. Baronet, because he made no reference with respect to our obligations to the loyal settlers and Natives. It would be found that the loyal settlers would be protected in their rights, in their legal position, in their lives, and in their properties; and, further, that compensation would be exacted, not only for damage which might have been wilfully inflicted, but for damage which naturally and necessarily followed from the war. There might be claims for compensation which no Government could entertain. They could not entertain a claim for compensation for depreciation of property owing to a change of policy on the part of the British Government; and some such claims might be made by the so-called loyal settlers. They could get some idea of the claims which might be made from the statements made at the meeting which had been referred to, and which was presided over by the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition in "another place." There they found one loyal settler, who must have rather astonished his patrons by admitting that he had been, and perhaps still was, an owner of slaves, who said he went to the Transvaal before the annexation and acquired property there, that that property—including, he supposed, his slaves—increased in value under British rule, and he claimed compensation because that property might be depreciated to its original value. Well, it was likely that a good deal of property had been appreciated under British rule when soldiers were sent to the district at the cost of the British taxpayer; but such claims were out of the category of reasonable claims. He was not, however, disposed to deny that there were other claims much more just, and which would be found to receive the fullest acknowledgment. But what was much more important was the question as to the arrangements which might be made for the protection of the Native population. The right hon. Baronet had thought himself justified in taunting them with professing great interest in the Natives and yet neglecting to promote their interests. He did not think the right hon. Baronet would be able to maintain that charge. But he was bound to say he was surprised and delighted at the sudden interest which the right hon. Baronet had evinced in the Native population. If they considered the interests of the Natives of the Transvaal, why was not this said at the time of the annexation, both in this House and in "another place?" Let him, in the first place, set some hon. Members right as to the actual position and claims of these Natives in the Transvaal. They appeared to be under the impression that the Boers in the Transvaal were fierce and unjust aggressors, and that they dispossessed the Natives of their territory, and brutally ill-treated them afterwards. He wished hon. Members would read the Papers before they came to this rash and inconsiderate conclusion. The absolute reverse of that was the fact. ["No, no!"] He commended a letter in the Blue Book by the Rev. George Blencowe, who was an advocate of Native interests, to their consideration, and they would find there that previous to the advent of the Boers the territory was depopulated by an inroad of Kaftirs, and the original possessors were either destroyed or driven out. When the Boers came to the territory, they found it practically a desert, and they did not dispossess any quantity of Natives so as to constitute a serious and considerable charge against them. After the Boers had settled the country and thrown back the Kaffirs, some of the original possessors returned, together with many foreign tribes, so that now there was a mixed population, who had been attracted by the settled rule of the Boers, imperfect as it was. He was perfectly aware that these people had speedily increased and multiplied, and that it was the Boers who were afraid of them, and not they of the Boers. By the latest Returns the population of the Transvaal was 38,000 Boers and 5,000 English and other settlers, more or less hostile to them, and in the face of that White population there were no less than 770,000 Blacks. Did they not think that, on the whole, such a vast population would be able to take care of themselves? The right hon. Gentleman opposite had quoted Major Bellairs, an Administrator of the Transvaal, who stated that when the Government were going to give up the Transvaal the Natives were then paying willingly their taxes; but he added that this might be owing to their desire to keep on good terms with those whom they considered would be their future rulers. His right hon. Friend opposite said that the Blacks paid their taxes willingly; but he (Mr. Chamberlain) would quote again the opinion of the Rev. George Blencowe, who strongly protested against the hut tax of 10s., which the Blacks regarded as unjust. He considered that if they had continued to govern the Transvaal they should have found it very difficult indeed to maintain their rule over the Native population. But he was prepared to say this—that it was their duty—and that they had fulfilled it—to do their best to make provision compatible with good policy for security of the Native races. The Earl of Kimberley had suggested in a recent despatch that Natives should have a legal right to the land they held, and he believed that suggestion would be acted upon by the Boers, and that it had already been admitted. Then, as to slavery, he had no doubt that it would be put down—the indentureship, it might be admitted, was almost as bad as slavery, and they had made a stipulation and an agreement that that should be done away with. But while they denounced inden- tureships among the Boers, they must remember that it had existed for years, and still existed in some of their British Colonies. He had himself called attention to the fact that hundreds of children had been separated from their parents, and especially also to cases where the widows and orphans of men killed in the wars had come under this abominable system of indentureships, and with no guarantee whatever for their treatment or future liberty. It was a bad practice whether accepted in the Transvaal or in the Colonies; they had tried to put a stop to it in the Transvaal, and they hoped that this example would have due weight elsewhere, so that the shame of this system might no longer attach to the British name in any of their Colonies. Lastly, the right hon. Baronet told them in the Resolution that the arrangements they had made were fraught with danger to the future tranquillity of the country. He (Mr. Chamberlain) had admitted that the future was certainly not free from complication. With regard to the difficulties with the Natives, they had endeavoured to provide for that by preserving control over the external relations of the Transvaal. They had provided for arbitration in all cases of dispute. The greatest danger, no doubt, existed in the possibility of bad relations between the different White races in the Transvaal. All he could say with regard to that was, the only security which they could take was in the endeavour which they were making to promote friendly feeling between these people. But no conceivable policy could be more likely to destroy hopes of such an amicable relationship than the policy advocated by the right hon. Gentleman and his Friends—which was to maintain by force the unwilling allegiance of the inhabitants of the Transvaal, besides embittering and endangering the relations between the Dutch and English settlers in the rest of our Colonies. He submitted, therefore, for the consideration of the House two propositions. The first was, that as soon as the Government became acquainted with the true feeling of the Boers, as soon as it became manifest that to conciliate them with any offer short of absolute independence was impossible, then the restoration of their independence was absolutely called for by regard to our Treaty engagements and the honour of our country. Under the circumstances which he had described, to have continued to maintain the annexation would have been an act which he could only describe in terms which had been applied by a high authority to a different subject as an act of "force, fraud, and folly." He submitted, in the second place, that the retrocession having once been decided upon, the Government were bound to take the first opportunity of effecting a peaceable settlement and preventing further bloodshed. It was said that by these proceedings they had tarnished the honour of England. There were some hon. and right hon. Gentleman who took a delight in being humiliated. He did not, at any rate, share their feelings. It seemed to him if a brave man unwittingly committed an injustice he did not lose, but he gained in public estimation by taking the first opportunity of repairing the wrong which he had done. He could see no distinction between private and public morality. He could not see how a great nation should be shamed by doing that which they should all consider admirable and right in a private individual. For his part, he was not afraid or ashamed to appeal to the House of Commons, to appeal, if necessary to the English people, to justify the course which the Government had taken, and, above all, to approve their action in preferring justice to revenge, and in restoring to a brave people the independence of which they ought never to have been deprived.

MR. GORST

said, the right hon. Gentleman seemed to be well satisfied with his own defence of the Government; but, as far as he could judge from the reception of their speeches, the Prime Minister was better pleased with the defence which was offered by the hon. Member for Carnarvonshire (Mr. Rathbone). He would not have followed the right hon. Gentleman, but for an observation he made in his speech. To the great astonishment of the House and his Colleagues, the right hon. Gentleman said that all his Colleagues disapproved of the annexation of the Transvaal. When the right hon. Gentleman made that observation his (Mr. Gorst's) eye wandered over the Treasury Bench to see whether the Chief Secretary for Ireland was present. If that observation had been made in his presence, he might, perhaps, have interrupted the right hon. Gentleman by stating that, in 1877, when this matter was under the discussion of the House, he said he approved that annexation, and that it was absolutely necessary to prevent anarchy. But he should like to read to the right hon. Gentleman some observations which Lord Brabourne, a Member of the late Liberal Government, had made in a pamphlet. The observations of Lord Brabourne were to the effect that during the Session of 1877 many discussions took place on South African affairs, and one upon the special subject of the annexation of the Transvaal; that during that debate the Prime Minister (Mr. Gladstone) never opened his mouth to say one word against it; that the Under Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Courtney), who had been very recently elected, was only supported by two or three of the Irish Home Rule Party; that the annexation was acquiesced in by the Liberals as a Party; and that it was only recently that they discovered objections to it which they never entertained before. He should like to state clearly what were the accusations against the Government, and what it was that, in the opinion of the Opposition side of the House, ought to be answered by some Member of the Government. The first accusation against the Government was an accusation of sheer blood-guiltiness. These were the words of the Prime Minister himself. The Prime Minister, in a letter to Mr. Tomkinson, with reference to an address expressing approval of the course adopted by Her Majesty's Government with regard to the Transvaal, said that when they came to the discussion of the subject in the House of Commons he would adopt no apologetic tone, and that this was a question of saving the country from sheer blood-guiltiness. Would the Prime Minister be good enough to inform the House why, if it would have been blood-guiltiness to have continued the contest in the Transvaal after March in the present year, it was not blood-guiltiness to have continued the contest up to March? The Government offered certain terms of peace; but it was admitted that those terms of peace might have been obtained without shedding a single drop of blood. It seemed to him that unless the Government could make out clearly what happened between the time when the Queen's Speech announced that they were determined to vindicate Her Majesty's authority in the Transvaal by force of arms and the time when the terms of peace were arranged to justify the Government in carrying on the war, they were open to the charge of sheer blood-guiltiness. He had no doubt the Amendment of the hon. Member for Carnarvonshire (Mr. Rathbone) was settled by the Cabinet, and he durst say the speech made by the hon. Gentleman was also settled by the Cabinet, because he (Mr. Gorst) observed that the hon. Gentleman was very ardently cheered by the Prime Minister. But he made a most extraordinary statement. He said that the Government commenced negotiations as soon as they knew that the majority of the Boers were against annexation. He would not have attached so much importance to those words if the Prime Minister had not cheered them. [Mr. GLADSTONE said, he did not cheer that expression.] He was glad to withdraw that observation. But it was a remarkable statement from the hon. Member for Carnarvonshire. Obviously it was untrue, because the Prime Minister did not cheer. The hon. Member for Carnarvonshire showed that he had read the Mid Lothian speeches very carelessly. He wished the Prime Minister to tell the House why it was that the effusion of blood was not stopped until the 5th of March. The second accusation against the Government was that they had betrayed the loyal inhabitants of the Transvaal. The British Government engaged to retain the Transvaal for ever. After the present Ministry came into Office, the declaration was made, over and over again, by the Prime Minister and by Lord Kimberley, that the Transvaal would under no circumstances be surrendered. When the war broke out, the Government announced their intention to vindicate the authority of Her Majesty, and they accepted the services of the loyal inhabitants of the Transvaal in assisting in its vindication. But the part of their policy which was most likely to be condemned hereafter was their entire disregard of Native interests. The right hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain) had spoken in the most contemptuous manner of the obligation which the Government was supposed to have contracted towards the Native races. Now, on the 9th of January in the present year, when the war had broken out, the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) wrote a letter in which he said— This much is certain—that whatever be the number of the Natives, they are now the Queen's subjects and our fellow-countrymen, and it is the duty of the Government to consider their interests and rights, if not their wishes, in dealing with the territory which they inhabit. Nor can we, in considering their interests, forget that one great reason, if not the chief reason, why the Boers first went to the Transvaal and now demand to be the independent rulers of the Transvaal is that they desire to carry out their ideas of Native policy, which, to say the least, are not in accordance with the usual English ideas. He was not surprised, after reading that letter, that the Chief Secretary for Ireland had absented himself, because, if the right hon. Gentleman had heard the observations of his right hon. Colleague, they must have given him great pain. He feared, however, that there was a great deal of hypocrisy among rival political Parties as to their zeal for the interests of Native races. He had been a long time in the House, and he had always observed that the Opposition for the time being was much more zealous for the interests of Native races than the Government of the day was. The state of affairs in the Transvaal when we annexed it was this—the Dutch Boers were undoubtedly guilty of occasional acts of cruelty and tyranny, both towards the Native races inhabiting the Transvaal and those also around its borders. That cruelty and oppression were, however, tempered by the fear of retaliation on the part of those Native races. When we annexed the Transvaal there was within the territory the Chief Secocoeni, who had resented the tyranny of the Boers and conquered them in several engagements; while outside its limits there was the powerful Chief Cetewayo, with his Zulu warriors, prepared to resist their incursions on his territory. At that time the Natives were getting rather the best of it, and it was supposed if we had not interfered that the Boers would either have been swept away altogether by the Natives, or would have had greatly to moderate their conduct towards the Natives both within and without their territory. The result of our intervention was undoubtedly advantageous to individual Natives, who paid taxes to us which they had refused to pay to the Boers, and rendered a loyal submission to us. But though the short period of our rule in the Transvaal had been a period of great prosperity and happiness to the Natives, we had destroyed their power. We had destroyed the power of Cetewayo, the reason given for doing so being that the existence of his strong military force was a standing menace to the Transvaal. We did not much object to its being menaced as long as it was Dutch; but soon after it became English we declared war against Cetewayo. No one now contended that our war against Cetewayo was otherwise than unjust; no one now believed that there was real danger of the invasion of Natal; and everybody now admitted that the Zulu War was impolitic. It might be said that the Boers were opposed from the first to the annexation, but they, no doubt, tacitly acquiesced in it because they were afraid of Cetewayo; and it was not until Cetewayo's power was destroyed that they thought they would be safe in the Transvaal without British protection, and began to clamour for their independence. If the Government were sincere in their desire to restore the state of things which existed in the Transvaal before the annexation, why did not they restore Cetewayo? The Government of the day had not approved of the policy of the Zulu War, and the right hon. Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) had written a strong despatch censuring Sir Bartle Frere for commencing it. The Loaders of the Liberal Party, too, had not approved of that policy; and though the question had been debated in that House the issue raised was merely whether Sir Bartle Frere ought to be recalled. He wished the Prime Minister, when he rose to address the House, to explain why, as he reversed the policy of his Predecessors in the Transvaal, he did not reverse the policy not of his Predecessors, but one of their pro-consuls, with reference to Cetewayo and Secocoeni. He was very much obliged to the House for the kindness with which they had listened to him. He wished to point out what the Prime Minister was expected to answer before he could expect them to vote against the Resolution of the right hon. Baronet. First, he had to explain why the effusion of hood was not stopped before the 5th of March; second, why did they encourage the loyal inhabitants of the Transvaal to fight against a cause which they were going to yield, and leave them a prey to those who had been their fellow-subjects? And, lastly, why had they abandoned a cause which the Chief Secretary for Ireland supported on the 19th of January, 1881, and leave their fellow-subjects, who wore entitled to the protection of the British Crown, to the ill-treatment, tyranny, and slavery which they might expect to undergo at the hands of the Boers?

MR. A. M. SULLIVAN

said, that, at all events, the Irish Members were free from blood-guiltiness in connection with the Transvaal. It seemed to him that the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst), in an ebullition of candour, had destroyed the Party purpose of his speech. The hon. and learned Gentleman had spoken of "blood-guiltiness" being laid at the door of the Prime Minister; but what should they say when he proclaimed to his Friends of the Opposition that everyone now admitted that the Zulu War was an unjust war? He did not know whether the minority who voted against that war had the advantage of the vote of the hon. and learned Gentleman. He wished, as an Irish Member, to say a word on the subject before the House. He would remark, in passing, that the position of an Irish Member on such questions was not an agreeable one, because the Irish people saw themselves committed in every quarter of the globe to enterprizes of which they did not approve; and their blood might be shed and their treasures spent in contests from which their consciences recoiled. He would say, however, that he had read many speeches attacking the policy of the Government in the Transvaal, and he studied them in vain to see whether there was any attempt to maintain now that the annexation of the Transvaal ought to have been persevered in. He was ready still to listen and be convinced if any Member should prove that we ought to re-possess ourselves of the Transvaal, that we had a legitimate title there, and that we should hold it to the bitter end. When he read the Instructions given to Sir Theophilus Shepstone to the effect that the inhabitants, or a sufficient number of them, were to be in favour of annexation, or the Government would not approve of it, he considered that there were two ways in which such instructions were to be taken. One way was to take them honestly. But it must be remarked that in all countries such additional commissions to pro-consuls produced the desired results. When the Emperor Napoleon III. wanted to annex Nice and Savoy it was only to be if the population of Nice and Savoy desired to be annexed. In the case of the Transvaal Sir Owen Lanyon declared that three-fourths of the White population were favourable to annexation. But what was the conduct of the Boers when they found their independence about to be taken away? They solemnly protested by the Representative of their Government and by their leaders, and they appealed to the Government at home and to the British people against it. Was he to understand that if, in the first instance, they had taken up arms the genuineness of their opposition would have been more readily acknowledged? He recognized, in the conduct of these men, a steady belief that the Government and people at home had been misinformed, and that if they appealed to the conscience of this country justice would be done. They first appealed to the justice of those who had wronged them, and then, when the appeal was made in vain, they unwillingly fell back upon the ultima ratio. It appeared to him that the Members of Her Majesty's Government, and notably the Prime Minister, entertained the conviction that the Boers had been wronged, and that somebody had blundered. But if those right hon. Gentlemen proceeded to work a State policy based upon their convictions out of Office without official information of the facts, what an outcry would have assailed them. He was not astonished, therefore, that the Government did not a month, or two months, or three months after acceding to Office proceed to put into operation the convictions which, no doubt, they had formed on the information open to them. But, from such a perusal of the Papers as he had been able to make, he challenged contradiction when he said that the Government, before those military accidents which made hon. Gentlemen say that Great Britain had been defeated, took prompt and immediate steps to effect an honourable settlement of the question. The real ground of complaint was that the Government did not withdraw their offers of peace and follow a policy of revenge, for the fact was that the statement of the terms offered was sent before the battle of Majuba Hill, and the Boers fought in ignorance of them. Ought those terms, then, to have been withdrawn in consequence of Sir George Colley's failure? It would be shameful to assert that England made peace because she was driven to do so by a handful of Boers. If he were an enemy of England he should say that those persons who propounded the doctrine that she had made peace with the Boers because she was beaten to her knees by a handful of brave men were teaching people to despise the name and power of England. But that was precisely what the Motion meant, and the story spead abroad throughout the country was that the Government became alarmed and conceded all that the Boers asked. That was the disgraceful statement made, though every child at a board school knew that the prestige of England was not dependent on the issue of a skirmish like that at Majuba Hill. He was not an Englishman, and could hardly speak without fear of misrepresentation of his sympathy with men fighting for their country; but at the time he watched the crisis narrowly, and waited to see whether England would dare to be magnanimous, and whether the Government would have the moral courage to be just. The opponents of the Government had endeavoured to stimulate a desire for revenge, alleging that the national flag had been trailed in the dust, and that nothing but complete victory could repair our military prestige; but he, for one, thanked the Government for what they had done, and, indeed, had never read of any Administration that had more signally exhibited at once its strength and its generosity. Their conduct would not recommend them to those who thought of nothing but military prestige; but they would obtain a verdict from those who desired better things, and from the more thinking part of the civilized world.

SIR WILFRID LAWSON

wished to congratulate the right hon. Baronet the Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) upon having at last obtained a day for his Motion. He would congratulate the right hon. Gentleman also upon the debate as far as it had gone, and upon the division that might be expected a few hours later. The real question was whether Her Majesty's Government deserved praise or censure for having made peace with the Boers after we had been defeated by them. His hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvonshire (Mr. Rathbone) declared in his Resolution that the continuance of the war would not have advanced the honour or the interests of this country. It was thought by some people that British interests ought to be defended at all costs. The question in dispute between the supporters of the late and of the present Government was whether British interests were to be advanced at the expense of British honour. What interest could there be in expending millions of money and sacrificing thousands of lives in order to rule over a people who were not willing to be our subjects? Therefore, the real question was whether the honour of the country was involved in what had been done. He supposed that when we were told the honour of the country was involved, it was meant that it would not have been honourable to abandon the Natives to a system of slavery. ["Hear, hear!"] An hon. Member said "Hear, hear!" It was nothing of the kind. The question of slavery was the red herring which had been trailed across the discussion all along. [Mr. R. N. FOWLER: No, no!] The worthy Alderman denied that; but he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) said that when the late Government annexed the Transvaal they had no idea in their minds of making any alteration in regard to those whom they considered slaves in that country. [Mr. R. N. FOWLER: Oh!] He protested against the interruptions of the worthy Alderman. Some time ago he wrote a letter and put it in The Times, and in that letter he said that if anyone chould bring substantial evidence that when we annexed the Transvaal a single slave was set free he would give that individual £10. The money had never been claimed, and if the worthy Alderman would bring forward his proof the £10 was his. That was what he called a practical test, and if his hon. Friend refused to accept it do not let him call out about slavery again. Mr. Chesson was the Secretary of the Aborigines' Protection Society, and what did he say when he saw his (Sir Wilfrid Lawson's) letter? Mr. Chesson wrote another letter to The Times in which he said that during the British occupation of the Transvaal the Executive had not interfered with the domestic customs of the Boers. They had had a quotation that night—he would not read it again—but it was a very good one indeed, from a statement by Bishop Colenso, who was known all over the world for the interest he took in the South African Native Tribes, and he said it was all nonsense about the Boers having slaves. It might have been the case some time ago, but there was no proof of it now. The Boers themselves had had a correspondence within the last dozen years or so with our own officials at home, and when charged with promoting slavery they always indignantly denied it, and our own officials had never been able to bring any proof that it was so. [Mr. R. N. FOWLER: Oh!] He would tell something to the worthy Alderman. Some years ago a Portuguese was prosecuted by the Boer authorities for slave-trading. He got off owing to a flaw in the indictment, but he was dismissed from the office he held. We went to the Transvaal to put down slavery, and the first thing Sir Theophilus Shepstone did was to re-appoint this old slave-dealer to his old office. So much for their desire to get rid of slavery. He did not believe all the benevolent projects that were put forward whenever we annexed a country. He did not believe in the benefit of the annexed, but in the benefit of the annexor. The Slavery Question having been worked sufficiently, another start was being made now. We had now got to the loyal Boers. Lord Salisbury had taken them in hand, and a most extraordinary set of people they were. Still, he gave Lord Salisbury great credit for taking them up. The late Lord Beaconsfield invented the Conservative working man, and Lord Salisbury had now discovered the loyal Boers. For his own part, he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) did not believe in them. He believed they were myths. If there were any he should call them disloyal Boers, for they were disloyal to their own country. They showed an absence of patriotism, and a bonâ fide loyal Boer was a sham and a delusion, like the bonâ fide traveller in England. They were nothing more than a lot of self-seeking traders, trying to make money out of the Government of this country, and he did not put much faith in their statements. It might be said that he had no right to say that; but he had. What a couple they were whom Lord Salisbury paraded at Willis's rooms! One of them was a romancer, for he made statements which he was unable to prove. He asserted that the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) wrote a letter to the Boers encouraging them to revolt. But the hon. Member for Liskeard—he did not speak upon this question now—wrote a letter and challenged the man to prove his assertion, saying that it was utterly untrue. Notwithstanding that, this loyal Boer—this pet of Lord Salisbury—had not said a single word in reply. He (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) was, therefore, entitled to say that he was a romancer. As to the other one who attended the meeting, he was a most extraordinary character, because, after Lord Salisbury and other Lords and gentlemen had talked about their antipathy to slavery and their desire to put it down, they said—"Here is another Boer; he will make you a speech." The Boer accordingly got up and said—"I hold slaves myself." There had been nothing like it since the old story of the temperance lecturer, who used to go about lecturing against the use of intoxicating liquors. His brother was accustomed to go with him; and the brother, unfortunately, was in the habit of getting a good deal more alcoholic liquors than were good for him. Somebody said to him—"Why do you go about with your brother; you are generally drunk?" His reply was—"Yes; my brother lectures, and I am the frightful example." In the same way, Lord Salisbury was the lecturer, and the Boer was the frightful example. The defeats of our troops had oppressed the minds of the majority of the House, and they were the next things which were borne in mind when the debate was brought on, and the question came to be discussed. Of course, there was something unpleasant about these defeats—very unpleasant indeed. But the peace which followed had produced an effect never known before; it had made an Irish lawyer blush. Earl Cairns, in referring to it, said he had grieved and wept, but never blushed before. He had never blushed when 10,000 Zulus were slain. ["Question!"] He had never blushed when he and his Colleagues were stealing a scientific Frontier; he had never blushed when British soldiers hung 87 Afghans, simply for defending their country! Yet, now, forsooth, he blushed because we had stopped a war which we had made in defiance of Treaty, which we had been led into by false reports, and which Mr. Trollope, himself a defender of annexation, declared, in his book, to be the most high-handed deed ever recorded in English history, and a deed which would have cost us millions of money and thousands of lives if we had carried it out to the bitter end. All this outcry that was raised against the peace was a cry for revenge. Even if the Boers were the dreadful people they were made out to be, and he was not there to whitewish them, still they could not be so very bad. When the troubles began, we charged one of them with high treason; but, after a short time, we sent for him and put him in the Government. He had, however, too much sense to go into it—unlike most Members of the House of Commons. It was quite clear that the outcry was simply an outcry for revenge. They said—"What will the world think of it?" The greatest cowards in the world were not afraid of what they did, but what the world would think of it. If they were satisfied in their own consciences as to what had been done, it was enough. Hon. Gentlemen who cried out that we should be supposed to have quailed before the superior power of the Boers were the very people who were lowering and destroying the prestige of the country. This country spent about £30,000,000 annually in armaments, and £1,250,000 in the movement in which Lord Bury and the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) took such great pride. We had a right hon. Gentleman in that House to look after the Army, and an illustrious Duke at the Horse Guards. We had the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire to look after the Volunteers; the House of Commons was full of colonels, although a good many of them had not been accustomed to scenes of slaughter, and to cry out and say that we were afraid of 10,000 Dutch farmers was so absurd that he could scarcely have thought such a fear would have entered the head even of the hon. and learned Member for Bridport (Mr. Warton). He (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) did not think our reputation would suffer from doing that which was right. Did our reputation or our honour suffer when we gave up the Ionian Islands? [Mr. WARTON: Yes.] He rejoiced to hear that voice. Did our honour or reputation suffer when we gave up the Orange Free State—a very similar case to this, and admitted to be the wisest thing we ever did in those regions? Would our honour or reputation suffer when we recalled our 40,000 troops from Ireland, and left that country free to govern herself? Did we suffer in consequence of our conduct in the Alabama case, when, regardless of ridicule, regardless of misapprehension, the Government of the day did what was wise and just? He rejoiced that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition was one of those who assisted in that great settlement, rendered at one time so difficult by the conduct of Lord Salisbury, who was now the right hon. Gentleman's suzerain. In regard to the Transvaal, if Her Majesty's Government had not acted as they had done, they would have been false to all their professions and principles, and to the people who placed them in power. In the Mid Lothian campaign, which had already been alluded to in the course of the debate, and which hon. Gentlemen opposite regarded as the source of all the evils which had afflicted this country, the right hon. Gentleman, now Prime Minister, declared that his principle was equal rights to all nations. He rejoiced to see that the right hon. Gentleman had had the courage boldly to carry out that principle, and he hoped the House that night would endorse the action which the right hon. Gentleman had taken. But whether that were so or not, he was quite sure that the wise and most statesmanlike conduct of Her Majesty's Government would be received by the great mass of the people of this country with the warmest approbation.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

said, he would only detain the House for a very few minutes. There was, however, one remark which the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade made use of which, as an old soldier, he should be very loth to allow to pass unnoticed. The right hon. Gentleman said that the defeat of a few hundred troops could not be taken as a matter of national importance; and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War sat by him in silence while such an assertion as that was being made in the British House of Commons. Whatever opinion hon. Gentlemen who sat below the Gangway might have, he ventured to say there was not a single man who sat there, or in any other part of the House, who did not believe that the devotion of the British soldier to his Queen and to his country was such as to deserve the commendation of every man. A statement such as that made by the right hon. Gentleman was one that was most damaging, not only to individuals, but to the whole of the British Army. There was nothing in this peace—this humiliating peace—which was more to be deplored than the effect it would have on the morale and the traditions of the Army. No one ought to deplore that peace more than the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War; and he (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) could not conceive how a man of such high position, representing the great interests of the Army, could, as a Cabinet Minister, stand passively by and acquiesce in the terms of peace which had been agreed to—terms, too, that were made at such a time and in such a manner. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would have something to say in the course of the debate with regard to the Army. At any rate, he ought to get up in his place and say something as to the devotedness with which the men defended the outposts, especially at Potchefstroom, where their tents were riddled down to within three feet of the ground. Surely they were men who deserved some commendation for the efforts they had made. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War knew perfectly well, as anybody who understood the theory of the art of war knew, that Sir Evelyn Wood would have been perfectly able to turn the flank of the Boers at Laing's Nek, and that the chances were that the war would have been ended without further bloodshed; but, instead of waiting until that was done, the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government having taken six or eight months to consider the question, having sent out troops to defend our territory and vindicate our honour, as the country were led to believe from the Queen's Speech he intended to do, the right hon. Gentleman allowed the war to go on, when he had it in his power to dictate the same terms without bloodshed, and allowed these actions to be fought. That was the time when the right hon. Gentleman ought to have stood up for the honour and dignity of the country, and future generations would record that it was upon him and upon his Government the blood-guiltiness which he imputed to others rested. That was the question before the House. He did not intend to waste the time of the House by going back upon times and things that were gone by. The real question for the Government to answer was why they did not, at an earlier date, before any effusion of blood had taken place, stop the proceedings which they could so well have done? He asked the Prime Minister to explain the change in the policy of the Government. Those proceedings had a great deal to do with the terms that were dictated. Anyone who read the despatches carefully must see how they were minimized from day to day, and how different the final terms were from those which were first propounded to the Boers. Never in the history of a great country, whatever the feeling for peace might have been, had rebels in arms against their country been asked to come to terms, and such terms as were in this instance accepted, and then allowed to march out of their positions. And where were those positions? Not in their own country, but in ours. He repeated, that never in the history of a great country had such a thing been known before; and he ventured to say that it would be handed down to all posterity that the present Government had humbled and humiliated the country at a time when they had full power to avert any such consequences, without the necessity of going to war at all. The course which had been taken was calculated to affect most prejudicially the interests of the Army. Not one single word had been said for the brave men who had been doing their duty under such trying and difficult circumstances; and he would ask the Prime Minister to stand up and say how it was that, under these circumstances, he had not stopped this effusion of blood?

MR. GLADSTONE

I was in hopes that the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just sat down, when he appealed to me, was going to express his anticipation that I should say something as to the sense which the Government entertain of the gallantry of the British soldiers in South Africa. There never was a more baseless charge made than the charge which has been preferred by the hon. and gallant Gentleman against the President of the Board of Trade. My right hon. Friend was deprecating, as I think, the very exaggerated sentiments and statements of those who have treated the miscarriages of the small force under Sir George Colley as if they had implied a great military misfortune to the country; and the reward my right hon. Friend has received for that temperate and prudent representation is that he has been rebuked as if he had been cruelly reviling and depreciating the character of the British soldier. There was not the smallest shade of reflection on the character of the British soldier iu the remarks of my right hon. Friend, and to the words of his speech to which the hon. and gallant Gentleman has referred I, at any rate, can heartily subscribe. Now, Sir, I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) upon having somewhat moderated the tone of his language in this House as compared with what he says elsewhere. Addressing safer audiences, the right hon. Gentleman introduces into political warfare terms which, as far as I know, were unknown there before. [Cries of "Oh!"] They may be known to those Gentlemen who cheer me derisively, but I know not whether, in the political societies they are accustomed to frequent, they have been used to hear one gentleman engaged in the public life of this country say of others that he despises them. I am heartily glad to have mentioned the matter, in order that it may be well understood whether the right hon. Gentleman has been mis-reported; but I read from a speech delivered at Stroud, or reported to have been delivered at Stroud, on the 23rd of February, 1881, in which the right hon. Gentleman said that He despised the men who, when the annexation of the Transvaal was announced, never, even by vote or voice, uttered a word against it, but who now came forward and told the country they had always disapproved of it.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

That, Sir, is a mis-report. It would be ridiculous in me to say I despised the right hon. Gentleman, to whom, among others, I was directly alluding. What I said was that I despised the conduct of men who did what I described.

MR. GLADSTONE

It requires more subtlety and acuteness than I possess to realize in my own mind the great value the right hon. Baronet appears to attach to the distinction. I will still say that if a shade is taken away from the bitterness and contemptuousness of the expression which he used, it still remains, as far as I know, a novelty in political life. I have always held that very strong language ought to be used if the occasion justifies it; but in the amenities of political life, I must own that I know of no circumstances in which such a term has been applied by one gentleman to another. I do not speak of myself personally. I have the misfortune to be the man whose conduct is despised by the right hon. Gentleman; but I am very doubtful whether, if that word had been used in this House, the right hon. Gentleman would not have been compelled to withdraw it. A more important point, and one that goes more to the heart of the matter, is a statement which has already been alluded to tonight, but which I think has been left in a condition which requires some clearing up. My hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvonshire (Mr. Rathbone), in his admirable speech—[laughter]—I see the hon. and learned Member for Bridport laughs. [Mr. WARTON: Not alone.] I venture to adhere to my opinion, notwithstanding that of the hon. and learned Member. My hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvonshire stated to-night that the right hon. Gentleman opposite had said that we waited until after three defeats of the British arms before we proposed our terms of peace to the Boors. I believe the right hon. Gentleman was perfectly correct in saying that no such statement had fallen from him to-night; but undoubtedly he is reported to have said at Cheltenham, on the 8th of June— That they (that is, we) thought of blood-guiltiness which never occurred to them before; they thought of injustice which they did not dream of last summer; and they sent out orders that terms should be made with the Boers after we had suffered three defeats. No more disgraceful surrender had ever been made by an English Government. I do not know whether I am to assume that those words are correctly or incorrectly reported.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

Speaking from recollection, I believe that they are correctly reported.

MR. GLADSTONE

Then, Sir, I do not hesitate to say that they are totally without foundation. It was on the 10th of January, as you may learn from the telegrams, that Lord Kimberley stated to Mr. Blyth that we were ready, provided only the Boers desisted from armed opposition, "that Her Majesty's Government do not despair of making a satisfactory arrangement." Was not that laying down the basis of a negotiation? On the 26th of January Lord Kimberley went somewhat further, and in a telegram to Sir Hercules Robinson he said— I have to instruct you to inform President Brand that, if armed opposition should at once cease, Her Majesty's Government would thereupon endeavour to frame such a scheme as in their belief would satisfy all intelligent friends of the Transvaal. That was on the 26th of January. The first of the three unhappy engagements of Sir George Colley was not fought until the 27th; and the right hon. Gentleman ventures to state that it was not until after his three defeats that we entered upon overtures for peace. I venture to affirm that the dates and the words I have quoted prove that the heat of the right hon. Gentleman carried him entirely beyond his recollection of the circumstances, and that our offers, instead of following the three defeats, preceded the very first of them. ["No!"] Well, Sir, let us consider for a moment what kind of an inheritance was left to us in the Transvaal. Something very like what we received from the late Government in other quarters of the globe. In 1852 we solemnly covenanted—it was done, as it happened, by a Conservative Government, but it expressed the universal sense of the country, for at that time the traditions of both Parties were as nearly alike as may be on questions of this class, and they continued the same until, in the disastrous experience of the last six or seven years, they came to be changed—in 1852 we solemnly engaged to respect the independence of the Transvaal. That was by a Treaty formed between us and the representatives of the Boer population. What right had we to infringe that Treaty? What right had we to make ourselves the judges of that Treaty, and then set up the miserable plea in the despatch of the right hon. Gentleman opposite that there was an implied reservation in that Treaty—an implied reservation which made us parties competent to deal with it as we did deal with it? Why, Sir, what a doctrine to apply to the whole formation of Treaties that are to bind nations together, and the very essence of which is that no party can under any circumstances have any title to import into a Treaty, of his own motion, that which the Treaty does not contain. Sir, most unhappily, Her Majesty's late Government—["Question!"]—I seem to hear a cry of "Question" from the quarter opposite. Are hon. Members not aware that the right hon. Gentleman himself, with perfect propriety, in the earlier portion of his speech went back upon this portion of the history of the question. Well, Sir, an unfortunate error entered into the policy of the late Government, and, I think, precipitated them in their career. It was a premature, though no doubt a well-meant, attempt to bring into South Africa that principle of Confederation which is most admirable where your Colonies are prepared for it, and where they obtain it in thorough conformity with their own desires, but which it is rash and dangerous to attempt to force upon them. That attempt at a policy of Confederation was part, unfortunately, of the measures which led us into these difficulties. We had no right to break that Sand River Convention, except on the ground of offence on the part of the Boers against ourselves; but, unfortunately, we broke it upon pleas relating to matters of remote apprehension and policy which invested us with no title at all to deal in such a way with a solemn instrument so contracted. If we are to talk of loyalty; if we are to talk of honour; if we are to talk of humiliation; if we are to talk of blushing, it is those who deal with these solemn instruments in a manner so unscrupulous who ought to be very careful how they throw these stringent and formidable terms at their opponents. Well, Sir, the annexation was then brought into contemplation; but it was only brought into contemplation if it was agreeable to the will of the people, or of a sufficient number of the people. I presume there was a real belief on the part of Lord Carnarvon and of the right hon. Gentleman that a great majority—which I presume is what they meant by a sufficient number—that a great majority of the Boers were favourable to annexation. But very soon after that annexation, out of 8,000 White adult males, 6,600 signed a declaration remonstrating against the annexation and declining to accept it. It was alleged that that Petition was obtained by intimidation, and through undue influence. I can conceive of a charge of that kind where a Petition is promoted by the ruling Power; but this was a Petition which expressed the sense of the people adversely to the ruling Power, and, in the circumstances, it was impossible for you to have a more genuine, effective, and legitimate expression of the sense of the community at the time. We have heard much to-night of the interests of the Natives. I want to show how this annexation operated upon the interests of the Natives, and I call in as a witness the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst), who has reminded us to-night that that destructive and dishonourable Zulu War, which slaughtered thousands of innocent men, and which inflicted upon British arms the most serious disaster that they have sustained for one generation of men, was the direct consequence of the annexation of the Transvaal. It was the unfortunate necessity under which we lay of conciliating, or attempting to conciliate, the Boers when we had established interests of our own in connection with them that led us into that sanguinary war. I must, of course, observe that I cannot greatly censure, but I may lament the fact that the Government established over the Boers was a Government alien in its spirit to British institutions and to our established Colonial practice. It was a despotic Government—to all intents and purposes a despotic Government—and a despotic Government established for whom? The hon. and learned Member for Meath (Mr. A. M. Sullivan) has gracefully and generously alluded to the fact that he, from his religious point of view, has not, and could not have, any special sympathy with these men. But who are these men? They are the descendants of the Calvinists of the United Provinces who defied the power of Spain, the greatest military Monarchy of Europe at that epoch, and of the French Huguenots, who maintained such a contest against the dominant party in France that they obtained from the wisdom of Henry IV. the famous Edict of Nantes. These are the men who, rather than submit to what was adverse to their convictions and their consciences, went across the seas, even as our own Pilgrim Fathers went across the seas, to save their religion and their freedom, at the sacrifice of their homes and all their home associations. Well, these were men with regard to whom we ought to have known that we were dealing with persons not to be trifled with—that we were dealing with persons of extraordinary vigour and tenacity of character—of a character, perhaps, in some respects not unlike that which we boast of for ourselves, and certainly, I am afraid, capable of being compared with ours in those weaker points which hon. Gentlemen opposite do not seem to recognize at all as belonging to us—namely, that we have not always been the tenderest and gentlest in the world towards subject races, or the most generous in our treatment of indigenous races, or in our dealings with the institution of slavery. Well, Sir, the Transvaal was handed over to us with a moderate military force; it had been reduced to 10,000 men, with prospects of difficulties, perhaps; but difficulties we were bound to measure according to the best information we could obtain. That information was to the effect that gradually the Boers were departing from their sentiments of alienation for the British Government. Was it our duty—would it have been allowable or tolerable in us to have overthrown and set aside that information? On the contrary, we endeavoured to estimate it as fairly as we could. It came from men of honour and men of intelligence—from men in the service of the Crown, who were unanimous in their representations, and the representations which they made of the constantly improving sentiments of the Boers were associated at the time the present Government came into Office with an assurance we received on the part of Sir Bartle Frere, that it was not improbable—on the contrary, that he had sanguine hopes that, at the meeting of the Cape Parliament, the question of Confederation would be seriously taken in hand. That was the main reason which determined us in advising that no change should be made in the then existing state of things. There was not the slightest reason, in those circumstances, to suppose that we were travelling towards a state of violence and war. There was given to us this authoritative statement as to the plan of Confederation, which, if it could have been brought about, undoubtedly would have solved the great civil and political problem before us—namely, of giving perfect local freedom to the Boers in the management of their own affairs. That was what influenced the first decision of the present Administration. And so things went on until Confederation failed in August, and Sir Bartle Frere was recalled. What did we do? We could not venture to proceed in South Africa, where we had no confidential Agents of our own, upon a matter so delicate and difficult as that of granting free institutions to the Boers until we knew who were the men who were to conduct this difficult task. We therefore chose a gentleman of great ability and experience, Sir Hercules Robinson, to go to South Africa for the purpose of taking this important business in hand. Unhappily, before he arrived, the war broke out; but down to the very eve of the breaking out of the war we continued to recoive the same assurances that the minds of the Boers were settling down, that those who were averse to us were passing into a minority; and, in fact, such were the professions held out that we had every reason to believe—and I do not hesitate to say that it was at that time our duty to believe—that the Boers had abated their original stiffness of intention, and that, provided we could give them full freedom of government, we should have no difficulty in establishing a satisfactory arrangement with them. Well, Sir, I come now to the outbreak of the war, and to observe upon some of the conflicting charges which appear to be made against us. The right hon. Baronet says that an overture was made in the Cape Parliament, by some of its Members, for the appointment of a Commission to inquire into the state of affairs in the Transvaal, and he says he is quite at a loss to conceive why it was we considered that overture inopportune. I will give the reason at once. First of all, it was because, at the time it was made, we were not in a condition to say that we had placed the authorities in South Africa in a position to vindicate the Queen's authority; and, secondly, because it came from persons who, however benevolent, had no locus standi in the matter, and had we been so imprudent and precipitate as to act on that overture we might have been justly repelled by the Boers with an answer which would have been eminently disagreeable. A very short time after that proposition was made the state of things materially changed, and it became necessary for us to advise the Crown to state in the Speech from the Throne that it was our duty to vindicate the Queen's authority in South Africa; and a pointed question is put by the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst), which I admit to be a perfectly fair question, as to what happened between the time when the Queen was advised to state that her authority must be vindicated in South Africa, and the time when we entered into negotiations for peace. We have got now to the point when we declined to enter on a merely unauthoritative overture. The most essential point, in our opinion, had become perfectly clear when the war broke out that we had two duties to perform. The first was to accumulate in the country what might be conceived to be an overwhelming force, and, by an overwhelming force, I mean that which was actually sent there—namely, a force of Regular troops, independent of any aid which might be received on the spot—a force of Regular troops of all arms, greatly outnumbering the force which the Boers were bringing to bear. But our second duty was to look for the very first opportunity of making peace. But that was not afforded simply because two or three Members of the Cape Parliament said we could send a Commission. We could not expose the authority of the Queen to repulsion and insult. It was impossible to send a Commission to the Transvaal until we knew how it would be received there. But we acceded to a proposal that a Commission should be appointed when Mr. Kruger, the Civil head of the Boers, himself made a proposal that a Commission should be sent, and this proposal made, as we knew it to be on behalf of the Boer Government, and with the consent of the Boer people, was an offer which made us believe that the door was open, and that that door ought not by any wanton or hasty action of ours to be closed. Well, Sir, it was our duty, as I have said, to look out for an opportunity of making peace; but it has been said that we have done nothing to vindicate the Queen's authority. Now, my answer is that we have done everything to vindicate the Queen's authority, except the shedding of more blood. To this issue we shall bring this matter. I say that the first thing we did to vindicate the Queen's authority was to accumulate an overwhelming force in South Africa. Sir, are these patriotics to laugh at the force which was accumulated in South Africa? or am I not right in saying that it was a powerful and overwhelming force; that it was a force of Regular and trained troops of all arms, fully equipped and prepared, and exceeding in numbers the whole amount of individuals in the Transvaal with whom it might be brought in contact? Sir, I call that an overwhelming force. We also required that the first overture should come, not from us, but from the Boers, and the first overture for peace came from them. We did not make it. We should not have thought it consistent with our position, or with the dignity of the Queen, to make it in the actual state of affairs; but we thought it our duty to accept it, and, in my opinion, if we had not accepted it we should have incurred a heavy responsibility, and deserved the censure which is now sought to be cast upon us. But, Sir, we used an expression in all our telegrams that we should require the Boers to desist from armed opposition. That expression was used on the threshold of these communications; but, when we were further advanced into them, then, of course, it became necessary to interpret that expression, and we did interpret it by requiring that the first act, in order to enable negotiations to be instituted, should be the dispersion of the armed force of the Boers. That is what I call an ample and sufficient interpretation of the phrase we had previously used of desisting from armed opposition. And, Sir, finally having done that, it is to be remembered that at this very moment the only collected forces in the Transvaal are the forces of Her Majesty, and that during the period through which the negotiations extend, it is the name of Her Majesty which alone is of authority in that country. Therefore, I say we have vin- dicated the Queen's authority in all ways except by the shedding of more blood; and I call upon you to show me, and not a man in the debate of this day has shown, in what other way it could have been vindicated except by the way of blood. Then I am told there was a change on our own part. There was no change on our part whatever except that we developed in detail the expressions that we at first used generally; and I affirm, and I think I shall not be contradicted, when I say that the expression "desisting from armed opposition," might, perhaps, have borne some more qualified construction than the strong construction that we put upon it when we required that, as the very first step of all, the armed forces of the Boers should be dispersed. Sir, I repeat, there was no change on our part. What is complained of on the other side is that we did not change in their direction; that we did not, in consequence of the unfortunate miscarriages to the forces put in motion by Sir George Colley, say—"Although we might have treated with you before those miscarriages, we cannot do so now until we offer up a certain number of victims in expiation of the blood that has been shed; until that has been done, the very things which we believed before to be reasonable, and which we were ready to discuss with you as reasonable, we refuse now to discuss, and we must wait until Moloch has been appeased." We contend that that would have been an unjust and cruel method of procedure. I will go so far as to admit this. Had those three unhappy movements been movements of the Boers themselves against us, then, indeed, it would have been at least plausible, perhaps reasonable, to say that we could not afford to deal with them until there had been further military operations. But considering that the Boers had nothing whatever to do with those movements—[Interruption, and "Hear, hear!"] Mr. Speaker, I am really very sorry to observe—and I do not wish to be impatient—that in a particular portion of the House there are methods in practice which are not usual in this House, which are not conformable to Parliamentary practice, and which make it somewhat more difficult than it otherwise would be to give hon. Members that satisfaction for which I have no doubt their understandings are longing. But, Sir, I have just stated that the Boers had no share whatever, except a defensive share, in those military operations; and that being so, I put it plainly to the House that it would have been most unjust and cruel, I believe it would have been cowardly and mean, if, on account of those operations, we had refused to go forward with negotiations which, before the first of those miscarriages had occurred, we had already declared we were willing to promote and undertake. When criticisms of this kind are made, it is a fair thing to ask what is the alternative policy offered by the right hon. Baronet; and, above all, what is his alternative policy, not merely in relation to the military question, but in relation to the ultimate destination of the country? Why, all his promises of free Government to the Boers vanish into thin air. He has to-night propounded the doctrine that such a Government as prevails in a Crown Colony is no unfit Government for the Transvaal under the Boers. He has propounded it in a circuitous but intelligible manner. He has quoted it as the opinion of gentlemen entitled to respect. He said it would be necessary for us to keep the Government in our own hands. He said it would be necessary for us to keep our control over all local Courts of Justice. Our control over all local Courts of Justice! Is that our idea of free Government? But for our Colonial institutions, would he, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, have dared to broach such a doctrine to the free people of Canada or to a single one of our Australian Settlements? The right hon. Baronet evidently has in his head something like the old re-actionary system of Colonial Government from Downing Street, and that it was under that Downing Street Government that he intended to place the Transvaal. In my opinion, it is not only the perfectly clear intention of the words of the right hon. Gentleman, but it is a most serious fact indeed for the consideration of the House. I will refer to it again in a moment; but I ask now, what would have been the military upshot of this policy? I have no doubt that he would have been able to crush this small and gallant people. They would have offered him a resistance which would have been famous in history, and which would have excited the sympathy of the civilized world. He would have been able to crush them, no doubt, after, as I believe, unlimited bloodshed, and leaving behind him most painful and bitter recollections—after bloodshed including, and including largely, those loyalists and those Natives of whom he has been the advocate to-night. Was this to be carried on from generation to generation? After the Sand River Convention, the breach of it, the annexation, the proof brought out at last beyond all doubt that the enormous majority, the overwhelming majority of the European population not of English origin, were bitterly averse to English rule, were we to go on in that remote region of the earth keeping down these people generation after generation by the tyrannous action of brute force? Were we to tell them that we must have control over every Court of Justice in the country, and that there were very wise men who thought that the system of justice and of government known as that of the Crown Colonies would be very suitable to the Transvaal? That is the policy the right hon. Gentleman offers to us as an alternative to the one we have pursued. What is the policy we have pursued? There was one sentence in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman with which I perfectly agree. He spoke of the difficulties of the South African Question. For 40 years I have always regarded it as the one great unsolved, perhaps unsolvable, problem of our Colonial system. I do not doubt that we have sacred and solemn duties imposed on us in this matter both towards the English Party whom we call "loyalists" and likewise towards the Native tribes of South Africa. This has never for a moment been disguised; but I do not for one moment admit that the course we have taken has involved neglect or disparagement of the interests of the populations of the Transvaal. Our duty towards the loyalists is plain. It is to obtain for them, in the first place, compensation for the losses they have sustained according to well-understood rules—losses in consequence of the war, for example, in fines levied upon them for not taking up arms against us. Besides that, it is our duty to secure for them that they shall remain in the country on terms of perfect equality with the other inhabitants. Those are our duties to the loyalists, and we have put these people in such a position that they will no longer have reason to find fault. Now, as to the Natives, I want to know whether any other course than that which we have pursued would have been more favourable to them. What are the courses that might have been pursued? There are four that might have appeared possible; but two of them I reject. I do not think that with the view we take of our obligations in this matter it would have been possible for us to recognize the Transvaal State simply as a foreign Power, even to the extent to which it was recognized by the Sand River Convention. It was our duty to make such reservations in establishing practical and virtual independence as should enable us to secure interests that we were bound to cherish. I, therefore, set that aside; but there is a second course—that of the right hon. Gentleman, which I likewise set aside. I cast aside the plan of governing the people of the Transvaal by the officialism of Downing Street as visionary and impracticable. I put aside the notion that the Boers were a set of people who would have rested content, or who would have thought of resting content, with even the largest amount of liberty under such a form of Government. There were two other plans—one, that of giving a Colonial Constitution as it is now understood and widely practised, with real and responsible government. We might have offered them that; but I do not believe it would have been acceptable. I am not going into arguments for the purpose of testing them; but I do not think they would have accepted that offer if it had been made to them. After all that had occurred it became necessary that there should be some plan fixed and agreed upon between us, so that they should know what obligations they were under to us, and that we should have no powers except such as were well understood by them. That is the plan which we have actually adopted. I apprehend that the term which has been adopted—"suzerainty of the Queen"—is intended to signify that certain portions of sovereignty are reserved, and are expressly reserved; but that all that is not reserved is given up. That is the meaning which I think we ourselves should attach to the term. What are those portions of sovereignty? The portions of sovereignty that we desire to reserve are—first, those which relate to the relations between the Transvaal community and foreign countries—the whole care of the foreign relations of the Boers. Those foreign relations are not altogether unknown to the Boers in their brief independent existence. They had communications with various countries of Europe, with various considerable countries of Europe; but the whole of these relations in the future will remain in the hands of the Queen. But what was still more important was that we should reserve sufficient power to make provision for the interests of the Natives. And this reservation of foreign relations was a most important one as regards the interests of the Natives, because a very large portion of the Native interests of the country involve the Natives beyond the Frontier of the Transvaal. Therefore, the whole of the interests of the Natives beyond the Frontier of the Transvaal will be retained in the hands of the British Government by the retention of the suzerainty. As to the interests of the Natives in the Transvaal, I can only say that we have decided on and embodied in the fixed terms of the instructions by which the veto of the Crown will be reserved over any law enacted in the Transvaal concerning the Natives. Well, there are other arrangements in progress of which I cannot now speak, because they are not completed; but they involve, not only the holding of lands by Natives, but allocations of considerable portions of territory, as a preliminary measure to the establishment of some organ or authority that shall be able to safeguard the interests of the Natives so established in the country. But what I would point out is that it is our opinion that the provisions which we have made in an engagement of this kind with the people of the Transvaal, whether they give us sufficient power or not for maintaining the interests of the Natives, give us a great deal more power than we should have had if we could have established that kind of Colonial Parliamentary government with responsible Ministers. I do not hesitate to say that our power of interference on the part of the Natives would be infinitely greater than if the Government in the Transvaal were like that of Canada. In what respect do the Canadians fall short of the absolute management of their own internal concerns? Supposing there were a great body—which, happily, there is not—of Natives in Canada, what power should we have of securing the interests of those Natives? Are hon. Gentlemen aware that more than 30 years ago the Queen had to set her hand to an Act of Parliament passed in Canada which requited persons who had suffered losses in the Canadian rebellion, and which requited and compensated the losses of rebels as well as those of loyalists? Are hon. Gentlemen aware of that? And I ask them, if they are, what sort of power of interference do they think we should have had on the part of the Natives, or for any other purpose, if we had established such a system in the Transvaal? It is true you have retained a veto in Canada; but you know that that veto never has been, and never will be, exercised in a matter of the slightest consequence. You never can go into collision with the feeling of the people of your Colonies when once you have granted them free government. Now, I contend that by separating this veto upon laws relating to the Natives from any general interference with the business of the country, with regard to which the Transvaal community know they are perfectly secure, we have put ourselves in a position to make use of that power, and provide a far more efficient safeguard than we could have had for the interests of the Natives if we had retained the Transvaal in the Colonial connection. But the truth is, as I have said, that hon. Gentlemen opposite do not really believe that they could—nay, they do not really believe that they ought—to give local liberty to the people of the Transvaal. And it is not now so much a question about the name of local liberty. There can be no greater liberty than that which is enjoyed by the people of Canada as to the whole of their internal concerns. That is practically the condition of the people of the Transvaal; and that is what I am firmly persuaded the right hon. Gentleman means we ought to have denied. ["No, no!"] But his own words, which he does not deny, and of which I have given a specimen, were to the effect that we ought to have control over every local Court. What is the plan which is offered to us as an alternative of our own—the plan our not following which is made the subject of a Vote of Censure upon us in this House? It is this—that we should have withdrawn from what we had said on the 10th of January—namely, that if the Boers desisted from armed opposition some agreement might be come to. It is said now that we withdrew, not because they desisted from armed opposition, but because they had strenuously defended themselves in a manner which was altogether inconsistent with their desisting from armed opposition. We were, then, to withdraw from the terms we had offered, and were to proceed to execute military operations. The hon. and gallant Gentleman who spoke last (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) assured us, upon his military credit, that Sir Evelyn Wood would have out-flanked the Boers, and so have put an end to the war without bloodshed. But, great as may be the authority of the hon. and gallant Member, that is not the language of Sir Evelyn Wood. He does not disguise from us that what he expected was a battle with the Boers, and a defeat. I cannot mention the name of that distinguished man without expressing the debt we owe to him for the qualities, both civil and military, he displayed; and, although on that point we frankly differed from him, we should not have been justified in casting on him our responsibility, and we declined to proceed to further bloodshed. But if we had proceeded to further bloodshed, under what circumstances should we have done so? We should have left in the minds of those men who, I believe, are now generally animated by kindly and, to use their own expression, loyal feelings towards the Queen as their Suzerain, bitter and lasting hatred. We should have squandered more millions of treasure—though I hardly mention such a thing in the company of much greater matters—in addition to the £8,000,000 mainly spent, but partly remaining liabilities, which are the result of the happy proceedings of the late Government and the late Parliament in South Africa. But we should have done much more than that. The right hon. Gentleman opposite seems to forget that the Boers of the Transvaal are not the only Boers of South Africa. He seems to forget that the Orange River Free State is close by, and conterminous with, the Transvaal, and that the strongest sympathy pervades the minds of all the men of Dutch descent with whom the Boers are inextricably mixed throughout South Africa. With your schemes of war you would have run the risk of the most deadly contagion of sympathy spreading from the Transvaal into Natal, into the Orange Free State, and over the whole length and breadth of South Africa. So that their calculations were dangerous and hazardous calculations to enter into, and it would have been as rash as culpable to act on them. They do not mend matters when they refer to taking the Natives for their allies. The right hon. Gentleman opposite gave it as one of the complaints of the Native Chiefs that they were not allowed to fight for us.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

I said they were very properly not allowed to do so.

MR. GLADSTONE

I did not catch that; but I am very glad to hear it. I am afraid the establishment of a partnership in such a war would have been found a very inconvenient and difficult thing. There is one other matter I think it worth our while to bear in mind. We should have made this war, first on the Transvaal, but too probably, in the end, upon a very large portion—nay, on the whole of the Dutch population, of South Africa, which numbers two to one of the English. We should have made the war at an enormous cost, with immense difficulty, and with the strong disapproval of the civilized world. But what should we have made it for; and when we had ended the war what should we have done? We should have done the very thing we have now done. We should not have wished to keep under the sovereignty of the British Crown these unwilling and reluctant subjects. We should have been glad to give them the very liberty we have conferred on them. We have attained that end without bloodshed—for the blood-shedding that occurred, as is well known, was due to local counsels. This is what we have done. We have chosen to attain the end we had in view and to confer liberties which we knew we ought to confer without carrying a most painful and dishonourable warfare—a warfare which would have done nothing to increase the general fame or credit of England. Sir, these are the grounds on which we have proceeded in the Transvaal. Our case is summed up in this—we have endeavoured to cast aside all considerations of false shame, and we have felt that we were strong enough to put aside these considerations of false shame without fear of entailing upon our country any sacrifice. We have endeavoured to do right and to eschew wrong, and we have done that in matters involving alike the lives of thousands and the honour and character of our country; and, whatever may be the opinion of Gentlemen opposite, we believe we are supported, not only by the general convictions of Parliament, but by those of the country. From the remotest corner of Anglo-Saxon America have come back to us echoes of the resolution we have taken—favouring and approving echoes, recognizing in the policy of the Government a higher ambition than that which looks for military triumph or territorial aggrandizement—an ambition which seeks to signalize itself by walking in the plain and simple ways of right and justice, and which desires never to build up empire except in the happiness of the governed.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

There is much, Sir, in the speech to which we have just listened, and much in what has been said in the debate, upon which, if the hour wore not so late and the opportunity were favourable, it would be tempting to offer some observations. I should be very much tempted, if we were in a position properly to do so, to offer some observations on the statements made by the Prime Minister with regard to the arrangements which are now in the course of completion, and which, I suppose, we shall soon be made better acquainted with, for the future government of the Transvaal. But we cannot, with any advantage, enter upon a matter like that at the present moment. We have not the Papers before us—we do not even know that the Convention has been concluded. I will, therefore, only say at the present moment that, whatever the arrangement may be, I believe we shall find that there has been in the policy of Her Majesty's Government matter which will weaken and embarrass any settlement at which they may arrive, because I believe it will be found impossible to arrive at any proper settlement and solution of the great difficulty of governing in this part of South Africa, or any other part, without proper regard to the authority and strength, and—if I may use a word so often used—the prestige of the British Government. I say that because, by the course which has been adopted, we have materially weakened that prestige—I do not say weakened in the eyes of the world or in our own sight, but in the sight of these South Africans with whom we are especially concerned. The course which has been pursued and the action of Her Majesty's Government cannot fail to have weakened that prestige; and if we are to maintain our just settlement in the settlement of questions which will arise, we shall find that we have greater difficulties than if greater wisdom had prevailed. But I will not attempt to enter into the discussion of arrangements which are now being made. We are called upon by the hon. Member for Carnarvonshire to express our confidence that these arrangements will be satisfactory; but, for my part, I do not feel that confidence. I do not see the grounds for it. They may or may not be satisfactory. I hope they will be; but, at the present moment, so far as I can see, we have no ground for expressing confidence in those arrangements, except in so far as we are disposed to place implicit confidence in the wisdom of the present Government, and I shall not be surprised to see all those who have that confidence vote for the Amendment of the hon. Member for Carnarvonshire (Mr. Rathbone). But, leaving that part of the question aside, I wish to direct attention, as far as possible, to the actual Motion which is before us in the shape of the Resolution of my right hon. Friend the Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), and the issues between him and the hon. Member for Carnarvonshire which are now presented to us. I wish to say, in the first place, that the House, before it goes to a division, and a decision on this matter, must endeavour, as far as possible, to concentrate its attention upon that which we particularly challenge—which is not one particular event in the course of Her Majesty's Government, but the whole course they have pursued since they had the management of these affairs. There are other matters into which I should very much like to enter and offer some observations upon. I should naturally be tempted to say something with regard to the attacks made on the conduct of the late Government. I feel very little difficulty indeed in answering many or most, if not all, of the criticisms bestowed upon us; but I feel, at the present moment, that we are not bound to go into that question as if the question at issue now was between our management and the management of the present Government. It is an ingenious way, no doubt, of evading a difficult question, and I have observed that many of the speakers on the opposite side have been very much more ready to find fault with the late Government than to defend the present Government. I will say a few words with reference to our proceedings. I deny altogether the kind of imputation which is thrown upon us of having broken up Treaties and annexed territories, as if we desired to increase the British Dominions. That is an entire misapprehension of what took place at the annexation of the Transvaal. It was not a deliberate and spontaneous choice of our own. It was a matter which was forced upon us by circumstances over which we absolutely had no control. Contrast the position we were in with the position in which the Government have been since they have had the direction of affairs. We had no telegraph to Africa as you have, and communication could not be made as rapidly. We had no warnings, such as you had from President Brand, at the earlier part of those transactions. We were, on the other hand, pressed by the imminent danger in which we saw the State of the Transvaal, which was in a condition of internal anarchy and bankruptcy, and threatened with serious consequences from Natives upon its borders. We had to bear in mind the consequences to those for whose safety we were responsible; and it is my firm belief that at the moment that annexation took place it was a step which saved the State from the ruin that must have fallen upon it. The difficulty was solved; but the spirit of those who, at the moment, I believe, were only too glad to accept our assistance, changed, and, no doubt, a different feeling began to prevail. It was, no doubt, a question how far that feeling prevailed; and the evidence, gradually accumulating, showed that there was a stronger feeling against annexation, on the part of the Boers, than we had at first any reason to believe. If we had remained in Office, we should have gone on on the lines we had already acted upon. We were desirous to arrive at a conclusion by which, if the Boers had accepted the sovereignty of the British Crown, we would apply to them any system of proper government which would give them that measure of representative institutions and that measure of local self-government which might be reasonably desired by them. But we were turned out of Office, and the present Government came into Office. They came in with every advantage for dealing with this question. At the moment at which they took Office the feeling among the Boers had begun to make itself tolerably clear. They were beginning already to have some reason—and in their own view, no doubt, they considered they had strong reason—to believe that annexation was inevitable; but did the Government—in accordance either with the views they had expressed in Opposition, or in accordance with the views we have heard to-night of the extreme sanctity of the Sand River Convention, which ought to have overridden everything—did they proceed at once to say—"Our consciences will not allow us, in face of a violated Treaty, to be here, and to retain this Republic in the form of a Monarchy. We must at once take steps to reverse that policy?" If they had taken such a step as that, it was frankly acknowledged by the President of the Board of Trade that, at the beginning of their administration, they had the power of coming to an arrangement with which we might or might not have been content. It would have been of little consequence to them whether we were or were not content; but they had the means of carrying such an arrangement into effect, and if, with the views they hold, they had proceeded in that direction, no one would have charged them with incompetency or anything like vacillation of purpose. But what did they do? They endeavoured to do that which we had been endeavouring to do. They pushed forward a scheme of Federation, and followed the advice of those who had the administration of South Africa. They tell us now—"Those were gentlemen whom you placed there, and we are not responsible for acting on their advice, because we thought we had better follow the advice of those on the spot." Right hon. Gentlemen have no right to use language of that kind. They had been in Office nearly 12 months before this serious crisis arose. During that year they had had the administration of affairs in their own hands. They had. the power, if they chose, of recalling or superseding any Administrator with whom they were dissatisfied; and if they had not confidence in any Administrator or gentleman there, they have no right to turn round and say—"We are not responsible because we did not appoint them."

MR. GLADSTONE

Who said so?

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

The President of the Board of Trade.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

I never said anything of the sort.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

If I have misrepresented the right hon. Gentleman, I beg his pardon; but that has been the tenour of the remarks on the reasons given for the attitude the Government maintained. They told us they were acting, to a considerable extent, on the advice of officers—such as Sir Owen Lanyon and others—who had been appointed in the time of their Predecessors, and they conveyed to the House the idea that they considered themselves as not responsible. I am glad to see that that is all swept away, and that they accept the responsibility for what has taken place. I hope they will do something else, and that the Prime Minister will explain that he did not mean all that he seemed to mean when he spoke of those actions which resulted in the death of so many of our brave soldiers as being due, not to the action of the Government, but to local counsels. I think there was something ungenerous in that; 733 British soldiers and officers were killed and wounded in those actions, and then we are told that we are people who are ready to shed blood in order to enforce a policy in which we believed, and that the blood was shed to support a policy in which they did not believe. We talk of blushing. I think arguments of that sort are among the arguments that make one ashamed of himself. The course of policy the Government have adopted is what we challenge. We do not single out any particular moment, and say because you made peace at that moment, or sent that telegram, or did something else, therefore we challenge your policy. We say your policy was faulty as a whole. If you had followed either of the two lines open to you we should not have made this objection; but you pursued first one line and then the other. It is in consequence of that change, it is in consequence of the vacillation which must necessarily lower the opinion of all those people in South Africa who have witnessed what has taken place, that we say your course of policy has been faulty. It has not vindicated the authority of the British Crown. We had a comparison made just now by the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson). He compared the course taken by the Government on this occasion with the course taken in the case of the Alabama Claim. There could not be a greater contrast. Some think that that arbitration was right, and some think it was wrong; but, undoubtedly, that was an arbitration entered into to prevent a quarrel—to prevent a war that might have broken out—but not in the middle of war; not after you had sent out your ships and lost the lives of a portion of your forces; not when you were apparently in a position of inferiority in the field or on the ocean. No; that was done as the Government might very well have done—as they might have come forward in the early part of last year, and said—"We are ready to face any taunts, any charges of timidity, or anything else; but we will do that which we think best. We will restore the Transvaal; we will send out a Commission, and we will do anything that is necessary." Had they taken such a step as that, there could not have been a voice raised against them. But what was done was, first of all, to hold strong language—language which the greatest fire-eater among us would find it difficult to excel—arguments as to the impossibility of allowing any negotiations to take place until the Queen's authority had been vindicated. After they had put that well forward, and made it well known both here and in Africa, all of a sudden they changed their course; and at what a moment did they appear to change They say they changed before the disaster. I will come to that in a moment. The point we have to consider is this—that, as far as appeared to the world, as far as appeared to the people of South Africa themselves, it was undoubtedly in consequence of the defeats which they had sustained that the change took place. Now we are told that we are not acting fairly towards them with regard to their proposals, and about these telegrams. We are told that they had begun the negotiations long before the defeats they have sustained. Well, but I want to know, if they had begun these negotiations—if they had made up their minds that there was to be a settlement—can there be a greater condemnation of their policy than the fact that 733 lives were lost? There may not have been a want of skill—there may not have been any question of want of courage; we cannot for a moment suppose—no Minister of the Crown will for a moment think we can suppose—that it was not in the power of the British Government, with the forces they had sent out, to overcome the resistance of the small number of Boers opposed to them. Nobody can doubt that we were perfectly aware of it. But what took place shows that, in the negotiations which they conducted, they were conducting them with divided minds. We are referred, in the first place, to the proposal that was made on the 11th of January. That was a communication from Lord Kimberley to Sir George Strahan. It is, I think, the first telegram from Lord Kimberley, and it says— Mr. Blyth, the Consul of the Free State, has received from the President the following telegram Don't believe the malicious fabrications about the Free State. We only wish to secure peace and prosperity over the whole of South Africa, and we fervently hope that efforts will be made without delay to prevent further bloodshed.' I have requested Mr. Blyth to inform the President of the Free State that if the Transvaal Boers will only desist from armed opposition to the Queen's authority, Her Majesty's Government do not despair of being able to make a satisfactory arrangement. That is certainly not going very far. If the Boers were to begin by giving up their armed opposition, Her Majesty's Government did not despair of making some favourable and friendly arrangement. That is certainly not going very far towards opening up friendly communications. Later on it comes in a more formal manner. On the 26th of January we have a telegram from Mr. Brand, to whom I wish to pay the highest tribute of respect for his whole conduct in the matter. If he uses curt language, he must have felt not a little astonished at the course pursued by the Government. He asked— Is it not possible to offer the people of the Transvaal, through Sir Hercules Robinson, certain terms and conditions, provided they cease from armed opposition, making it clear to them how this is to be understood? That is President Brand's proposal, which he made through the High Commissioner to the people of the Transvaal. What is the answer to that? I have to instruct you that if armed opposition should at once cease"—that is the condition precedent—"Her Majesty's Government would thereupon endeavour to frame such a scheme as in their belief would be satisfactory to all enlightened friends of the Transvaal community. That is the cordial way of beginning the discussion with a view to a settlement. And now let me call attention to this, which is the answer received to this communication. It is exceedingly civil. It is dated January 29, and is the reply of Sir Hercules Robinson to Lord Kimberley— President Brand writes to me with your answer suggesting that the Transvaal people should be informed of it forthwith, before the satisfactory arrangements you contemplate are made more difficult by further collision. That is very sensible on the part of President Brand. But, while it was being urged that some means should be devised to make the scheme referred to known to the Boers, the fighting was going on at Laing's Nek. President Brand expresses great sorrow at hearing of the engagement then taking place, and he hopes some understanding may be come to as to a guarantee by means of which further bloodshed may be avoided. And so, from time to time, the negotiations go on. There is communication after communication from President Brand, on whom we always throw the whole responsibility of making the proposals. We carry on the fighting; no attempt seems to be made to stop the generals as they advanced. We are told that it was they who were advancing and not we; but that seems to me to be a play upon words. The right hon. Gentleman said the Boers had nothing to do with the movements—that it was we who were attacking. Considering that the Boers were in the occupation of the soil of Natal, and that the attack on the 94th Regiment was certainly not a movement promoted by us, I cannot see the accuracy of the description given. But let us take the case as if it were so. If it were our forces that were attacking, why did we not stop our forces from doing so? And here I see very speedily afterwards comes the news of the losses sustained in the fighting going on at the time. An application was made for reinforcements; and what was the answer of the Secretary of State for War? The right hon. Gentleman, on the 29th of January, telegraphs to the following effect:— Have heard of your check with much regret. Do you want reinforcements in addition to those already advised? Could send you a light cavalry regiment from home, and a battery of horse artillery from home or from India, also probably a light cavalry regiment from India, all arriving about the same time, Reply as soon as possible. This is spirited conduct on the part of the Secretary of State for War, if he intended to fight the matter out. But was it intended to be part of the negotiations that were to be carried on in order to win the confidence of the Boer leaders, and put an end to all this trouble? It seems to me to be of so extraordinary a character that it neither vindicates the Queen's authority, nor does it seem to me to bring affairs to any satisfactory settlement." To vindicate the Queen's authority" are words used in the Queen's Speech; and those who wrote them have a right to interpret what they meant by them. But it appears that what they meant by the phrase was altogether inconsistent with the action of the Secretary of State for War, who held it to mean the sending out of a large body of troops to the Colony to look at it and come back again. Sir, I need not say that that is a dangerous mode of vindicating the authority of the Crown. What is the position of England in those regions? On what does it rest? It does not rest upon the force you show; but in the confidence which exists in South Africa, and in other parts of the world where we have possessions—in the great reserve power of England, in the determination of England; if she is engaged in a struggle, to fight it out to the last. England acts, or ought to act, at all events, on the advice given by our great national poet— Beware Of entrance to a quarrel; but, being in, Bear it that the opposer may beware of thee. The people of South Africa ought to know that if England is engaged in a struggle to maintain her authority, and to vindicate her position, she will fight it out to the end; they ought to believe that when this country gives pledges to any people, be they Black or White, those pledges will be maintained, and that the country will not shrink on account of any armed opposition that may be offered. It is all very well to say that nobody believes, that England does not believe, that Europe does not believe, that we withdrew from the Transvaal because we were not strong enough to conquer it. The question is, what do the Boers believe? What is believed by the Natives? How far is the faith they have been placing in us shaken? If it has been shaken, and seriously shaken, depend upon it the result will be disastrous. I believe that Her Majesty's Government are now doing everything in their power to bring about a reasonable and fair settlement of those affairs. I hope they are not too sanguine in saying that they expect they will arrive at a settlement which will be durable and satisfactory. We have been reminded by the right hon. Gentleman that South Africa is the almost insoluble problem of our Colonial system. We know that as well as the right hon. Gentleman does. We know well, by what we have heard and seen of the working of that great Dependency, what the difficulties are. Many and many a time, attempts have been made to solve them, and sanguine forecasts have, as now, been made only to be disappointed. I think that the Government, in the course they have taken, have weakened rather than strengthened their chances of succeeding. I should be sorry to say anything that would still further weaken the hope of a satisfactory settlement of this matter. Now that the attempt has to be made, I trust their efforts will be successful, for I desire to see a prosperous condition of affairs in a Colony in which we have so large an interest, and in regard to which we have acquired such grave duties. But there is much at stake. It is not a question of the Transvaal alone; it is not a question of Natal alone; but it is a question of the whole of our South African Dominion, and we should be well assured that Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to shrink back from the duty laid upon them, and say it is too great for the shoulders on which it is laid. We hope and trust that, whatever may be the vote of the House to-night, it may not go forth to the country that we are disposed to shrink from our obligations to South Africa, and that it may not be supposed that this is the beginning of a retreat from our Colonial responsibilities and our Colonial Empire; but that it may be clearly understood that England is dissatisfied with much that has been done. I do not believe that the right hon. Gentleman himself, or any of his Colleagues, are satisfied. If we could ask them to supply the hiatus noticed here and there in their speeches, I think we should find spots that are far from satisfactory; but we hope that the future may mend. In the meantime, we go to a division with perfect confidence, not in the result of what will be the expression of this House, but in the sincerity of our own purpose, and in the result of the appeal we are making through this House, and through the intervention of this debate, to the people of England.

MR. O'DONNELL

(who rose amid loud calls for a division) said, he wished that some of the hon. Members opposite, who were now burning with zeal for the people of the Transvaal, would be a little more indulgent. He had opposed the Tory policy in the Transvaal when it was apparently supported by the right hon. Gentleman the present Premier. He had opposed the Tory policy in the Transvaal, as it had been expressed that night, and as it had been repudiated by the Premier; but he must decline to give a whitewashing vote to Her Majesty's Government, who supported the Tory policy in the Transvaal until it broke down in their own hands The Prime Minister told them how he had devoted one small portion of the powers of his mind to the consideration of the South African problem during the last 40 years. He (Mr. O'Donnell) was justified, then, in concluding that when the project of the annexation of the Transvaal was first brought before the House, the right hon. Gentleman was fully aware of the iniquity of violating the Sand River Convention. In his mind would be present all the wickedness of that invasion of an independent people's rights. He (Mr. O'Donnell) also remembered that when a handful of Members of that House stood up to oppose, in season and out of season, within the ordinary Rules of Parlia- ment, that iniquitous transaction, that handful of Members received no aid from the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government. Where was, therefore, all the inviolable sanctity of the Sand River Convention? Where was all the burning wrong the right hon. Gentleman so keenly felt to-night? It was from the Liberal Benches that the Government were strengthened when that handful of Members protested against that scandalous transaction. They had then taken every precaution to inform themselves of the state of affairs in South Africa. A Delegation from the South African Republic, composed of Paul Kruger and Dr. Johnson, came to London to lay their case before the great Liberal Party. When it was asked that the Representatives of the Republic should have their case laid before that House, either by themselves or in due form according to the precedents of Parliament, he and his hon. Friends received no support from the Prime Minister. When Mr. Kruger's appeal was supported by none except that handful of Irish Members, no attention was paid to it; but when he addressed himself to the refined and delicate conscience of the Prime Minister with 10,000 deadly rifles behind him, then he received all that attention and all that consideration which was formerly refused him. He was utterly unable to attach very much weight to the plea of conviction and conscientious feeling put forward by the Liberal Party on the pie-sent occasion. He had listened with pleasure to the eloquence of his gifted compatriot the hon. and learned Member for Meath (Mr. A. M. Sullivan), in his admirable and ingenious defence of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government, when he proved, amidst the exulting cheers of hon. Gentlemen opposite, that it could not be supposed that any sense of fear could have induced the Government of such a mighty Empire to bow down before a few thousand Dutch farmers. But his hon. and learned Friend must have been considerably discomposed a few moments afterwards, when the Premier had to throw over the whole of that magnanimous argument; when he had to admit that it was not only a few thousand Dutch Boers that were ranged behind Mr. Kruger and the other leaders, but that behind them there were the Boers of the Orange Free State, the Boers of Natal, and the considerable Dutch population of South Africa—in the proportion of two to one of the English population—and, behind all, the indignation of the civilized world. He said it was not until the right hon. Gentleman saw that all these would be arrayed against him if he continued to carry out the Tory policy, which he did carry out as long as he could, that he listened to the whisperings of his conscience. It was with pleasure, not unmingled with surprise, that he found the right hon. Baronet the late Secretary of State for the Colonies in the ranks of the friends of the African Natives. He remembered very well that when Irish Members, occasionally supported by English Members, asked numerous Questions about the ravages perpetrated upon the Natives, and instanced cases of wholesale burning of Native towns, and the taking of Native women and children into slavery under the rule of the late Colonial Secretary, that he (Mr. O'Donnell) had been unable to perceive in the right hon. Baronet a very keen and active friend to the Natives of South Africa. The Prime Minister had laid great stress on the fact that up to the very last moment he was supported in his policy by the Reports of the local officials. The importance of that statement, which could not be denied on either side of the House, should receive the attention of hon. Members. Unquestionably, the policy of Her Majesty's present Government, which was also the policy of Her Majesty's late Government, was partially supported by the officials in South Africa—by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Sir Bartle Frere, and Sir Owen Lanyon. He confessed that to him, standing outside English Parties, it seemed to him strange that the head of the Government should admit that he was grossly misled by those officials, that to all intents and purposes the representations on the state of affairs in South Africa were nearly in contradiction of the truth, and that the Premier, in obedience to official traditions, should consider that he had done enough in throwing blame upon officials without bringing to the bar of justice the men who had brought about the troubles in South Africa. He trusted that some hon. Members would take the lesson to heart, and add this as another proof to proofs which were accumulating, that in the present constitution of Parliament, and the present constitution of the Empire, the Government of the day, whether Tory or Liberal, was practically helplessly in the hands of a bureaucracy composed of the officials of the great Departments of State. There was no opportunity of controlling the activity of those men; and it was only when the country was on the actual brink of disaster that the country learned that the Government had been misled by irresponsible officials.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 205; Noes 314: Majority 109.

AYES.
Alexander, Colonel	Corry, J. P.
Amherst, W. A. T.	Cross, rt. hon. Sir R. A.
Archdale, W. H.	Cubitt, rt. hon. G.
Ashmead-Bartlett, E.	Dalrymple, C.
Aylmer, Capt. J. E. F.	Davenport, H. T.
Bailey, Sir J. R.	Dawnay, Col. hn. L. P.
Balfour, A. J.	De Worms, Baron H.
Baring, T. C.	Dickson, Major A. G.
Barne, F. St. J. N.	Digby, Col. hon. E.
Barttelot, Sir W. B.	Dixon-Hartland, F. D.
Bateson, Sir T.	Donaldson-Hudson, C.
Beach, rt. hon. Sir M. H.	Douglas, A. Ayers-
Beach, W. W. B.	Dyke, rt. hn. Sir W. H.
Bective, Earl of	Eaton, H. W.
Bellingham, A. H.	Ecroyd, W. F.
Bentinck, rt. hon. G. C.	Egerton, hon. W.
Beresford, G. De la P.	Elcho, Lord
Biddell, W.	Emlyn, Viscount
Birkbcck, E.	Ennis, Sir J.
Birley, H.	Estcourt, G. S.
Blackburne, Col. J. I.	Ewart, W.
Boord, T. W.	Feilden, Major-General R. J.
Bourke, right hon. R.
Brise, Colonel R.	Fellowes, W. H.
Broadley, W. H. H.	Fenwick-Bisset, M.
Brodrick, hon. St. J.	Filmer, Sir E.
Brooke, Lord	Finch, G. H.
Bruce, Sir H. H.	Fletcher, Sir H.
Bruce, hon. T.	Floyer, J.
Brymer, W. E.	Folkestone, Viscount
Burghley, Lord	Forester, C. T. W.
Burnaby, General E. S.	Foster, W. H.
Burrell, Sir W. W.	Fowler, R. N.
Buxton, Sir R. J.	Fremantle, hon. T. F.
Cameron, D.	Freshfield, C. K.
Campbell, J. A.	Gardner, R. Richardson
Carden, Sir R. W.
Cecil, Lord E. H. B. G.	Garnier, J. C.
Chaplin, H.	Gibson, rt. hon. E.
Christie, W. L.	Giffard, Sir H. S.
Churchill, Lord R.	Goldney, Sir G.
Clarke, E.	Gore-Langton, W. S.
Clive, Col. hon. G. W.	Gorst, J. E.
Close, M. C.	Grantham, W.
Cobbold, T. C.	Greene, E.
Coddington, W.	Greer, T.
Cole, Viscount	Gregory, G. B.
Collins, T.	Halsey, T. F.
Compton, F.	Hamilton, Lord C. J.
Coope, O. E.	Hamilton, L. T.

Hamilton, right hon. Lord G.	Paget, R. H.
	Palliser, Sir W.
Harcourt, E. W.	Peek, Sir H.
Harvey, Sir R. B.	Pell, A.
Hay, rt. hon. Admiral Sir J. C. D.	Pemberton, E. L.
	Percy, Earl
Herbert, hon. S.	Phipps, C. N. P.
Hicks, E.	Phipps, P.
Hill, Lord A. W.	Plunket, rt. hon. D. R.
Hinchingbrook, Visc.	Powell, W.
Holker, Sir J.	Price, Captain G. E.
Holland, Sir H. T.	Puleston, J. H.
Home, Lt.-Col. D. M.	Rankin, J.
Hope, rt. hn. A. J. B. B.	Repton, G. W.
Hubbard, rt. hn. J. G.	Ritchie, C. T.
Jackson, W. L.	Rodwell, B. B. H.
Johnstone, Sir F.	Rolls, J. A.
Kennard, Col. E. H.	Ross, A. H.
Kennaway, Sir J. H.	Ross, C. C.
Knight, F. W.	Round, J.
Knightley, Sir R.	Sandon, Viscount
Lawrence, Sir T.	Schreiber, C.
Lechmere, Sir E. A. H.	Scott, Lord H.
Lee, Major V.	Scott, M. D.
Legh, W. J.	Selwin-Ibbetson, Sir H. J.
Leigh, R.
Leighton, Sir B.	Severne, J. E.
Leighton, S.	Smith, rt. hon. W. H.
Lever, J. O.	Stanhope, hon. E.
Levett, T. J.	Stanley, rt. hn. Col. F.
Lewis, C. E.	Storer, G.
Lewisham, Viscount	Sykes, C.
Lindsay, Sir R. L.	Talbot, J. G.
Loder, R.	Taylor, rt. hn. Col. T. E.
Long, W. H.	Thomson, H.
Lowther, hon. W.	Thornhill, T.
Macartney, J. W. E.	Tollemache, H. J.
Mac Iver, D.	Tollemache, hon. W. F.
Macnaghten, E.	Tottenham, A. L.
M'Garel-Hogg, Sir J.	Tyler, Sir H. W.
Makins, Colonel W. T.	Walrond, Col. W. H.
Manners, rt. hn. Lord J.	Warburton, P. E.
Master, T. W. C.	Warton, C. N.
Maxwell, Sir H. E.	Watney, J.
Miles, Sir P. J. W.	Welby-Gregory, Sir W. E.
Mills, Sir C. H.
Morgan, hon. F.	Whitley, E.
Moss, R.	Williams, Colonel O.
Mowbray, rt. hn. Sir J. R.	Wilmot, Sir H.
Newdegate, C. N.	Wilmot, Sir J. E.
Newport, Viscount	Wolff, Sir H. D.
Nicholson, W. N.	Wroughton, P.
Noel, rt. hon. G. J.	Wyndham, hon. P.
North, Colonel J. S.	Yorke, J. R.
Northcote, H. S.
Northcote, rt. hn. Sir S. H.	TELLERS.
	Crichton, Viscount
Onslow, D.	Winn, R.

NOES.
Acland, Sir T. D.	Balfour, Sir G.
Agar-Robartes, hn. T. C.	Balfour, J. B.
Agnew, W.	Balfour, J. S.
Ainsworth, D.	Barclay, J. W.
Allen, H. G.	Baring, Viscount
Allman, R. L.	Barnes, A.
Anderson, G.	Barran, J.
Armitage, B.	Bass, A
Arnold, A.	Bass, H.
Asher, A.	Beaumont, W. B.
Ashley, hon. E. M.	Blake, J. A.
Baldwin, E.	Blennerhassett, Sir R.

Blennerhassett, R. P.	Edwards, H.
Bolton, J. C.	Edwards, P.
Borlase, W. C.	Egerton, Adm. hon. F.
Brand, H. R.	Elliot, hon. A. R. D.
Brassey, H. A.	Errington, G.
Brassey, Sir T.	Evans, T. W.
Briggs, W. E.	Fairbairn, Sir A.
Bright, J. (Manchester)	Farquharson, Dr. R.
Bright, rt. hon. J.	Fay, C. J.
Broadhurst, H.	Ferguson, R.
Brooks, M.	Ffolkes, Sir W. H. B.
Brown, A. H.	Findlater, W.
Bruce, rt. hon. Lord C.	Fitzmaurice, Lord E.
Bruce, hon. R. P.	Fitzwilliam, hon. C. W. W.
Bryce, J.
Burt, T.	Fitzwilliam, hn. W. J.
Buszard, M. C.	Flower, C.
Butt, C. P.	Foljambe, C. G. S.
Buxton, F. W.	Foljambe, F. J. S.
Caine, W. S.	Forster, Sir C.
Cameron, C	Forster, rt. hon. W. E.
Campbell, Lord C.	Fort, R.
Campbell, Sir G.	Fowler, H. H.
Campbell, R. F. F.	Fowler, W.
Campbell-Bannerman, H.	Fry, L.
	Fry, T.
Carington, hn. Colonel W. H. P.	Gabbett, D. F.
	Gill, H. J.
Cartwright, W. C.	Givan, J.
Causton, R. K.	Gladstone, rt. hn. W. E.
Cavendish, Lord E.	Gladstone, H. J.
Cavendish, Lord F. C.	Gladstone, W. H.
Chamberlain, rt. hn. J.	Gordon, Sir A.
Chambers, Sir T.	Gourley, E. T.
Cheetham, J. F.	Gower, hon. E. F. L.
Childers, rt. hn. H. C. E.	Grafton, F. W.
Chitty, J. W.	Grenfell, W. H.
Clarke, J. C.	Grey, A. H. G.
Clifford, C. C.	Hamilton, J. G. C.
Cohen, A.	Harcourt, rt. hon. Sir W. G. V. V.
Colebrooke, Sir T. E.
Collings, J.	Hardcastle, J. A.
Collins, E.	Hartington, Marq. of
Colthurst, Col. D. la T.	Hastings, G. W.
Corbet, W. J.	Hayter, Sir A. D.
Corbett, J.	Henderson, F.
Cotes, C. C.	Heneage, E.
Courtauld, G.	Henry, M.
Courtney, L. H.	Hibbert, J. T.
Cowan, J.	Hill, T. R.
Cowper, hon. H. F.	Holland, S.
Craig, W. Y.	Hollond, J. R.
Creyke, R.	Holms, J.
Cropper, J.	Hopwood, C. H.
Cross, J. K.	Howard, E. S.
Crum, A.	Howard, G. J.
Cunliffe, Sir R. A.	Hughes, W. B.
Daly, J.	Hutchinson, J. D.
Davey, H.	Illingworth, A.
Davies, D.	Inderwick, F. A.
Davies, R.	James, C.
Davies, W.	James, W. H.
De Ferrieres, Baron	James, Sir H.
Dickson, J.	Jardine, R.
Dilke, A. W.	Jenkins, D. J.
Dilke, Sir C. W.	Johnson, E.
Dillwyn, L. L.	Johnson, W. M.
Dodds, J.	Kingscote, Col. R. N. F.
Dodson, rt. hn. J. G.	Kinnear, J.
Duckham, T.	Labouchere, H.
Duff, R. W.	Laing, S.
Dundas, hon. J. C.	Lalor, R.
Earp, T.	Lambton, hon. F. W.

Law, rt. hon. H.	Pugh, L. P.
Lawrence, W.	Pulley, J.
Lawson, Sir W.	Ralli, P.
Laycock, R.	Ramsay, J.
Lea, T.	Ramsden, Sir J.
Leahy, J.	Rathbone, W.
Leake, R.	Redmond, J. E.
Leatham, E. A.	Reed, Sir E. J.
Leatham, W. H.	Reid, R. T.
Lee, H.	Rendel, S.
Leeman, J. J.	Richard, H.
Lefevre, rt. hn. G. J. S.	Richardson, J. N.
Litton, E. F.	Richardson, T.
Lubbock, Sir J.	Roberts, J.
Lusk, Sir A.	Robertson, H.
Lymington, Viscount	Rogers, J. E. T.
Mackintosh, C. F.	Roundell, C. S.
Macliver, P. S.	Russell, C.
M'Arthur, A.	Russell, G. W. E.
M'Arthur, W.	Russell, Lord A.
M'Carthy, J.	Rylands, P.
M'Clure, Sir T.	St. Aubyn, Sir J.
M'Coan, J. C.	Samuelson, H.
M'Kenna, Sir J. N.	Seely, C. (Lincoln)
M'Laren, C. B. B.	Seely, C. (Nottingham)
M'Laren, J.	Shaw, W.
M'Minnies, J. G.	Sheridan, H. B.
Magniac, C.	Shield, H.
Maitland, W. F.	Simon, Serjeant J.
Mappin, F. T.	Slagg, J.
Marjoribanks, Sir D.	Smith, E.
Marjoribanks, E.	Smithwick, J. F.
Marriott, W. T.	Smyth, P. J.
Martin, R. B.	Spencer, hon. C. R.
Marum, E. M.	Stanley, hon. E. L.
Mason, H.	Stansfeld, rt. hon. J.
Massey, rt. hon. W. N.	Stanton, W. J.
Maxwell-Heron, J.	Stewart, J.
Mellor, J. W.	Storey, S.
Milbank, F. A.	Story-Maskelyne, M. H.
Molloy, B. C.	Stuart, H. V.
Monk, C. J.	Sullivan A. M.
Moore, A.	Sullivan, T. D.
Morgan, rt. hon. G. O.	Summers, W.
Morley, A.	Synan, E. J.
Morley, S.	Talbot, C. R. M.
Mundella, rt. hon. A. J.	Tavistock, Marquess of
Nicholson, W.	Taylor, P. A.
Noel, E.	Tennant, C.
Nolan, Major J. P.	Thomasson, J. P.
O'Beirne, Major F.	Thompson, T. C.
O'Brien, Sir P.	Tillett, J. H.
O'Connor, T. P.	Torrens, W. T. M'C.
O'Conor, D. M.	Trevelyan, G. O.
O'Donoghue, The	Verney, Sir H.
O'Gorman Mahon, Col. The	Villiers, rt. hon. C. P.
	Vivian, A. P.
O'Shaughnessy, R.	Walter, J.
Otway, A.	Waterlow, Sir S.
Paget, T. T.	Waugh, E.
Palmer, C. M.	Webster, J.
Palmer, G.	Wedderburn, Sir D.
Palmer, J. H.	Whitbread, S.
Parker, C. S.	Whitworth, B.
Parnell, C. S.	Wiggin, H.
Pease, A.	Williams, S. C. E.
Pender, J.	Williamson, S.
Pennington, F.	Willis, W.
Playfair, rt. hon. L.	Wills, W. H.
Potter, T. B.	Willyams, E. W. B.
Powell, W. R. H.	Wilson, C. H.
Power, J. O'C.	Wilson, I.
Price, Sir R. G.	Wilson, Sir M.

Wodehouse, E. R.	TELLERS.
Woodall, W.	Grosvenor, Lord R.
Woolff, S.	Kensington, Lord

Bill read a second time, and committed for To-morrow at Two of the clock.

Words added.

Main Question, as amended, put.

Resolved, That this House, believing that the continuance of the War with the Transvaal Boers would not have advanced the honour or the interests of this Country, approves the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government to bring about a peaceful settlement, and feels confident that every care will be taken to guard the interests of the Natives, to provide for the full liberty and equal treatment of the entire White population, and to promote harmony and good will among the various races in South Africa.