§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT, in rising to move—
That the policy pursued by Her Majesty's present Government with regard to the Foreign 769 and Imperial relations of Great Britain has tended to the dishonour and disintegration of the Empire, and has isolated England in Europe,said: I regret that such important questions as those I am about to raise should have to be brought forward at so late a period of the Session. The hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will regret having taken the course he adopted at an earlier hour to-day, in order, by a side-wind, to defeat the Amendment I am about to submit to the House. The hon. Baronet, I hope, will recognize—the country, at all events, will feel—that it would have been a more manly and straightforward course for him to have met the Amendment directly, and to have replied to the arguments that might be advanced. The Military and Diplomatic Estimates for the service of the Grown have been in a great measure wasteful and unnecessary. A larger sum than the House of Commons has ever before been asked to vote is to be given by this Bill. The policy of the Government has been a policy of disturbance and surrender abroad, and anarchy and revolution at home. Nothing can be more germane to the consideration of this Bill than the attempt to show that a large sum of money voted for the service of the Crown has been practically thrown away. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who attempted, by a side-wind, to shirk the discussion of these questions, might have remembered that eminent Members of the present Government had, in previous years, taken a course precisely similar to that which I am taking now. In 1875 the present Secretary of State for India raised a discussion upon the whole policy of the Session on the second reading of the Appropriation Bill; in 1868 the whole Central Asian Question was raised on the same Bill by the present Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as in 1876 the question of the Bulgarian outrages was introduced by the Secretary to the Board of Trade. In one respect, indeed, the question of Foreign and Imperial policy is more important than the grave Home questions which have engrossed the attention of Parliament since the beginning of the Session, to the exclusion of all other subjects, English and Foreign. It is perfectly true that, under the present Government, Ireland has become the scene of triumphant lawlessness and terrorism. It is perfectly true that the 770 state of that unhappy country, which the Ministry found in May, 1880, orderly and progressive, if not prosperous, has, under their incapable charge, in spite of bountiful harvests and increased trade, become, in the language of the Prime Minister, "a shame and a disgrace to England in the eyes of the civilized world." The moment England and the English Government are really in earnest, the moment that they say to the Irish agitators and the Irish law-breakers, "These things shall end and the law shall be maintained, your foul deeds shall be curbed and shall be punished," the moment they take efficient measures to make the violent and the criminal feel that they will meet their deserved punishment, then, Sir, that moment will Ireland once again be prosperous, honest, and quiet. Until this is done, agitation, which pays the agitators so well, will, of course, continue. But, Mr. Speaker, it is far different with those interests of Great Britain which are affected by the aggrandizement and aggression of your rivals and your enemies abroad. If you neglect the advance of those who covet, and who are plotting to obtain, your possessions; if you allow them to acquire, one by one, those valuable positions which nature and history have alike marked out as the bulwarks of your Empire, the time may come, and come far sooner than you dream, when you will find yourselves in presence of superior strength, of that force majeure before which even the bravest men have to yield. You cannot deal with the legions of Russia or the bayonets of France as you would with the wild peasantry of Connemara. Our foreign relations are, as the late Lord Beacons-field tersely summed them up, "the interests of Englishmen in other countries." The Empire of England, "upon the roll of whose drum the sun never sets," as a great orator once said, extends over nearly two-fifths of the surface of the earth, the subjects of the Queen number over 300,000,000 of human beings, the trade of these Islands amounts to over £1,000,000,000 every year. So the strength, the security, the integrity of our Empire in every quarter of the globe is of vital moment to every family in these Realms. It will hardly be credited that the House of Commons has, during a Session of nearly eight months, only given three days to debate upon Foreign and Imperial questions, and 771 then only upon a portion of those questions. The wonder will be increased when it is noted that these eight months covered a period when questions of the greatest moment were at issue, when events were happening in every quarter of the Empire which, from whatever view they may be regarded, must be deemed of the first importance for the interests of the British Power. This must be my excuse for venturing to lay before the notice of the House a subject which I would gladly have introduced before, but which the waste of Parliamentary time by the Ministry has rendered impossible. I contend that the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been throughout unfortunate and disastrous. They have alienated invaluable Allies, and gained nothing in their stead. They have destroyed the wise and permanent settlement of European questions which their Predecessors had aimed at, and in its place raised up a perfect crop of disturbance and turmoil. They have neglected and scoffed at the interests and rights of the Queen's subjects of British blood in distant Colonies, and have driven them wild with injustice; they have stirred up strife and war by their reckless language both in and out of Office; they have incurred defeat, they have carried on wars with discredit, and concluded peace with dishonour. Their policy, or rather their want of policy—for they have had no intelligible or consistent policy—has been equally injurious to the material interests and to the honour of their country. Their mode of conducting the Foreign and Imperial relations of this great country has been the same old masterly inactivity, laisser aller—letting-everything-drift policy—whose fruits are written on the pages of history from 1852 to 1874. There has been a shutting of the eyes to threatening dangers until they burst upon them with overwhelming violence, and then a series of ludicrous makeshifts. The Ministry care only to do that which is cheapest for the moment, but in reality the most expensive, fruitful with trouble and pregnant with disasters. It is true that right hon. Gentlemen opposite are getting a little alarmed at the growing feeling of indignation in the country aroused by their open contempt for great Imperial interests. Some of their supporters, especially those who live at Birmingham, and who have been used to 772 shriek, "Perish India!" must have been greatly astonished to read the speeches of the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster at the Mansion House. Why, Sir, if such speeches had been made by Members of the late Lord Beaconsfield's Administration two years ago, they would have been denounced as "Jingoism" and "bastard Imperialism," and I know not what other offensive epithets, which were the stock-in-trade, in default of sensible arguments, of hon. Members opposite during and before the late Elections. The Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster actually spoke in terms of some warmth of our Imperial interests, and of the value of our Colonies and Dependencies; and the latter right hon. Gentleman used the word "Empire" not less than six times in his address. I am glad that the hon. Baronet who sits for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), and the hon. Member for Warrington (Mr. Rylands), and the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn) were not present. They would have been in need of ample restoratives had they heard their great prototype and prophet speak even kindly of anything so aggressive and national and British as "Empire." The Ministry will be judged by deeds, and not by words. It is too late, after the disintegration and disgrace which have marked their career abroad and at homo, to try at the eleventh hour to cajole the people of England with a few specious phrases which read like the mockery they are in the mouths of those who use them. Even by their words might they be condemned. It would be easy enough to collect passages from the speeches and writings of both right hon. Gentleman during the past to prove their inconsistency now. But it is by their deeds that the British people will judge them. Do you think that a Cabinet who "scuttled out of Afghanistan," who abandoned Candahar, the gate of India, who have allowed Russia to overleap all obstacles, and at one step to advance her armies 400 miles nearer India and close to Herat, will be deemed by the intelligent people of England and of India to have the interests of the Empire at heart? Do you think that Ministers who, by their reckless harangues, stirred up rebellion in the Transvaal, who have abandoned the loyal subjects of the Queen, after enduring severe privations, loss of life and 773 property, to their foes, who have aroused the bitterest indignation among all English-speaking people in South Africa, who have accepted three defeats with meekness, and made an ignominious surrender of all they had been fighting for, will be accepted by the inhabitants of South Africa or of any other Colony as mindful of the interests of the Colonists of England? Do you think that a Government who have allowed France to seize the fertile regions of Tunis, and to make a great advance towards Egypt, will be considered as vigilant for the Imperial and commercial interests of Great Britain? No, Sir. If the retreat, shirking, surrender, and humiliation which have marked the policy of the present Government mean cultivation of Imperial interests, Heaven preserve the Empire from such attentions, for if they go on much longer there will be little left to strive for. I said just now Her Majesty's Government had no consistent policy. They have been consistent in one course, and one course only, and that is a steady attempt to reverse everything done by Lord Beaconsfield. One by one the great achievements of that illustrious man have been reversed, and his measures for the security and greatness of the Empire have been done away with and nullified. It is by illustrating the contrast between the two policies that I can best prove my case. The aim of the late Government was to preserve the honour and interests of the country at home and abroad; it was to defend British interests in every portion of the noble Empire under their charge. [General Sir GEORGE BALFOUR: But they did not do it.] The sneers which used to be directed at these aims by hon. Members opposite are not yet forgotten. In Europe and in Asia the late Ministry found those interests threatened by the same disturbing Power. A bloody war, which had ended in the complete prostration of one of the antagonists—an ancient Ally of England—had raged in Europe. The balance of power was seriously threatened, the most valuable territories and the choicest positions, commercial and military, were about to fall under a gigantic military autocracy, a Power hostile to English interests, and, in my humble judgment, hostile to those of civilization also. I shall not recall the factious and anti-national efforts made by distinguished personages in these Realms to aid the enemies of their 774 country, and to counteract, day by day, week by week, and month by month the patriotic policy of Lord Beaconsfield. Let us consider the ultimate results of Lord Beaconsfield's policy. In July, 1878, a secure basis for the pacification of Europe and for the defence of British interests was established at Berlin. No man who examines the gravity of the position, who realizes what were the difficulties in the way of the Statesman who took the leading part in those memorable transactions, the factiousness and folly at home, the ambition and evil power abroad, can hesitate to say that the Treaty of Berlin must remain for all time a monument of the wisdom, the far-sighted statesmanship, the unwavering patriotism of the Earl of Beaconsfield. Constantinople was saved, Russia was compelled without the sacrifice of a single British life to forego most of her conquests, the peace of Europe was preserved. By the purchase of the Suez Canal Shares the British Government inaugurated a policy which would have gained for this country a predominant interest and influence in Egypt, the great sea route of the present to the East. The Prime Minister has sneered at that brilliant financial achievement, whose value has increased 300 per cent, as "a stock broking transaction." Envy never more demeaned itself than in those words. The English people would have no objection to a few more such "stock broking transactions." By the occupation of Cyprus the command of the great land route of the future is equally secured. When the railroad across Asia Minor, and down the Euphrates Valley is completed, Cyprus will dominate its terminus, whether that be fixed at Tripoli or at Alexandretta. More than this, Famagousta might, by a slight expenditure, be turned into a splendid harbour and coaling station for your ships of war and of commerce. It is only 150 miles from Port Said, the entrance of the Suez Canal, and one-fourth the distance of either Malta or Biserta, which you have just allowed France to seize. These are great results, and as time goes on the country will more and more appreciate the character of the man by whom they were achieved. Another feature in his policy was the Anglo-Turkish Convention—that "insane" Convention, as the Prime Minister called it.
§ MR. SPEAKERThe hon. Member is discussing the policy of the late Mi- 775 nistry, which certainly has no reference to the present Appropriation Bill.
§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTI am only doing so incidentally, in order to contrast the expenditure of the two Ministries and the results achieved by them. But I will not pursue that subject beyond remarking that by the Anglo-Turkish Convention the paramount influence of England in splendid territories, capable of becoming the garden of the East, and over a noble race of men, brave, honest, and friendly, was secured. These fertile regions and this matchless warlike material were thus guaranteed from falling under the cruel sway of Russia, and from becoming the instruments of her unsatiable aggression. In the further East, the frontiers of our wonderful Dominion in India were made impregnable, and vast districts were thrown open to our stagnating manufactures. The railway to Candahar would have given us the trade of Central Asia. At no remote date it might have been prolonged to Herat, and thence through Persia and Asia Minor. All the commerce of these countries would then have debouched on the Mediterranean, close to our Arsenal at Cyprus. Sir, when I consider this noble fabric of statesmanship, this marvellous foresight, these splendid conceptions of creative and patriotic genius, I am tempted to ask what crime this country has committed that it should have been permitted blindly to neglect its vital interests. A lesson, bitter, but necessary, is being taught the people of England for their ingratitude to the great man who laboured so vigilantly, and so successfully, for its greatness and welfare. It is not enough to have policies and to make Treaties. Any dreamer or any skirker can do either. Anybody could devise a fictitious "Concert of Europe," wherewith to tickle the uninformed and the rhapsodical, and any body could make such a peace as you have made in the Transvaal without guarantees, or the possibility of enforcing it. It is for the statesman to devise such combinations as will insure the practical success of his policy, and will insure the permanent observance of his Treaties. It was in his practical arrangements that Lord Beaconsfield displayed such brilliant ability. Alliances—sound, practical, based on common interest—are the mainstay of great peoples and the props of international 776 arrangements. Such an alliance Lord Beaconsfield formed with the two great stable Powers of Central Europe—with powerful Germany, and well-ordered, peace-loving Austria. It was, indeed, an impregnable combination, for what could withstand the Armies of Austria and Germany on the land, or the Fleet of England on the seas? All three Powers were non-aggressive. Germany—contented with her successes and her unity—only asks for peace. Austria dreads war more than any other European Power; and no one would accuse England of a wish for wanton aggression. All three Powers were concerned in restraining, on the one side, the devastating aggression of despotic Russia, on the other, the restless vanity and ambition of Revolutionary France. The alliance with England was most popular among the German and Hungarian people—and why? Because they, wishing for peace, recognized in Lord Beaconsfield and in his arrangements the skill of a Statesman, which could alone preserve the balance of power, and, therefore, alone secure the peace of Europe. The unanimous testimony of the Austrian and the German Press to this fact, both before and since the General Election, proves the feeling both of the Government and the people. I will give only one extract from The Cologne Gazette of March 12th, 1880, the leading and most independent journal of Germany—
The success of the Beaconsfield Government at the approaching Elections would be a guarantee of the maintenance of European peace.Nor were the French papers behind their neighbours in admiration of the late Premier. There is no more striking feature of his policy than this—that, although his understanding with the German Powers was well known, France was on perfectly good and cordial terms with this country. His Successors have thrown the alliance with Austria and Germany to the wind, and have succeeded in disgusting Republican France as well. It was evident from the first that the new Ministry would not stand by the settlement of their Predecessors. In the beginning there had been the Prime Minister's famous insult to Austria, an affront offered without provocation and retracted without dignity. A mere verbal apology cannot atone for such a blunder. There never was a more unprovoked, 777 more untrue, and more self-damaging attack made by a public man than this upon Austria. It was unprovoked, except in the promptings of those Russian and Panslavic emissaries who exercised so pernicious an influence over the impressionable mind of the right hon. Gentleman. It was untrue, because at the present time there is no Government in Europe so free, so tolerant, and so truly liberal as that of Austria. The Austrian people enjoy a Constitution and a representative Parliament; they have a free and intelligent Press; they have a beneficent and popular Monarch; they are prosperous and contended to a degree that it would be difficult to match among their neighbours. And there is this in addition to the credit of the Government of Austria, which has accomplished these most admirable results, that they have been achieved in the face of the very greatest natural difficulties—the peculiar geography, the diverse nationality, religion, and history of the various portions of that heterogeneous Empire, rendering the task of preserving unity and good administration most difficult. I have dwelt upon this question of the affront to Austria and the change of policy which it and subsequent events involved, because therein lies the whole key to the policy of the present Government—to their isolation in Europe, and indirectly, though still by a clear connection, to their greatly-weakened position in Asia. There were minor events which happened shortly after the present Government came into Office. There was the famous menace addressed to the German Chancellor by no less a personage than the Vice President of the Council—"Hands off, Bismark!" History will doubtless record the alarm, terror, and utter prostration of the great German Statesman when those petrifying words were conveyed by the telegraph to the seclusion of Varzin. [Mr. MUNDELLA: I never used any such words.] I accept, of course, the disclaimer of the right hon. Gentleman; but the remark has been attributed to him in the public Press for 18 months without contradiction. Then there was the scheme sketched out by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, just budding into hopeful statesmanship, and ready to deal off-hand in his own way with all the problems of Europe. "In concert with Republican Trance and Free Italy 778 we shall endeavour to cut the Gordian knot of the Eastern Question," &c. "We shall compel Turkey to carry out the reforms of the Treaty of Berlin in spite of Prince Bismarck." The well known intimacy between the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the veiled Dictator of France was to bear startling fruits. We may be sure all these hopeful intrigues were carefully watched at Berlin. This was the new programme. The understanding with the German Power was cast to the winds. Our diplomatic tyros had some plans in its stead, however. "Free Italy and Republican France" were, with Autocratic Russia, to be the new combination that was to enable the right hon. Gentleman and his Colleagues to carry out their ideas of European policy. What these were it has never yet appeared beyond one feature only—namely, that poor, bleeding Turkey was to be bullied without stint or mercy. The results of the new policy and the new combination are now apparent enough. Russia has shown her friendship and her devotion to the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, by breaking her promises and advancing at one stride 400 miles nearer to our Indian Frontier—a gigantic progress which alarms even our faineant Ministry. France, your new friend—whom you abandoned in 1870, without an effort, to her bitter enemy—France has taken advantage of your incapacity, and your proved want of back-bone, to seize a great territory in North Africa. During the process she cajoled you with professions that were each week by week falsified. Your timid remonstrances have irritated French feeling while they stimulated French aggression. What sort of harmony is there now, after a year of your skilful diplomacy, between the two chief members of your combination? How does "Free Italy" feel towards "Republican France?" There is the keenest jealousy and animosity between your boasted Allies. Where are your friends? Where are your Allies in Europe? What have you got in the place of that splendid alliance which Lord Beaconsfield left his country as its bulwark, and his Successors as a precious charge? You have not a single Power, great or small, upon whom you can depend. There is not a State that is attached to you now by the ties of common interest, of gratitude, or of hope for future favours. You have 779 even driven from you, by your gross injustice, the Mahomedans of Turkey, so long your brave and faithful allies; you have, at the same time, irritated the whole Mussulman feeling of the East. How, on the other hand, stands the great Statesman whose friendship you gratuitously despised, and whoso power you recklessly alienated? Prince Bismarck can rely upon the splendid Armies of Germany and Austria. He can rely on the hearty aid of Italy in a European struggle. He can readily obtain the support of the matchless soldiers of Turkey, whose Government he has been as assiduously cultivating as you have been needlessly and unjustly aggravating. He is arbiter of Europe, while you are left out in the cold. It is German interests, and German interests only, and very naturally too, that the German Chancellor now aims at securing. Under Lord Beaconsfield, England had a share in the direction of his policy, and an invaluable guarantee in his alliance. Your reckless affronts and your puny defiances would have been ridiculous enough had they been less injurious to the Empire. Perhaps some attempt may be made to dispute my propositions. The hon. Baronet may, with his usual happy audacity, try to make the House believe that Austria and Germany are still on the same terms towards England that they were 18 months ago. Well, Sir, such a line of defence will be received with some incredulity abroad. The facts are tolerably well known in political circles on the Continent. The Ambassador at Berlin, who so suddenly visited England just after the fiasco of the Demonstration, gave some valuable hints to eminent personages on the Ministry. The late Ambassador (Lord Dufferin) at St. Petersburg, who resigned his post because he was unwilling any longer to share in the responsibility of allowing Russia to hoodwink this country, and steadily press on towards India, gave his views to the Ministry at the same time. The leading statesmen of Austria and Germany have not been very guarded in their private utterances upon the attitude of the British Government. Some very sarcastic comments have fallen from the great Chancellor with regard to the Prime Minister and his Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
§ MR. SPEAKERI must again point out to the hon. Member that in his re- 780 marks he is travelling very wide of the Question before the House.
§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTI should like to ask the Government if they can dispute my propositions? If anyone really wishes to satisfy himself as to the change of policy on the part of the English Ministry, and the complete alienation of the German Powers, let him read the newspapers of these countries since and before March, 1880. A more marvellous contrast was never before presented by any public literature. Nor do these journals represent merely passing shades of popular feeling. Many of them are well known to be the mouthpieces of the statesmen who direct the policies of these countries. Inspired articles are even more common on the Continent than they are in England. There are many of these criticisms in such papers as The Cologne Gazette, The Nord Deutsche Zeitung, The Neue Friee Presse, and other Austrian papers, so scathing and so hostile to the policy of the Prime Minister that I would not like to quote them. Let hon. Members turn to the Blue Books issued by the Government, especially those relating to the Berlin Conference, the sham "Concert," and the affairs of Greece. They will there fail to find a single expression of warmth or cordiality towards the British Government on the part of Austria or Germany. The tone is cold, reserved, and critical; and even sarcastic throughout. Contrast the despatches and the conversations of Austrian and German statesmen with those of Russia and France. The former are bursting over with effusive sympathy and hopeful ambition. For some time, also, there is a considerable cordiality exhibited in French despatches; but that gradually cools down, until about the time of the rejection of the piratical proposals of the Ministry with regard to Smyrna and of the separation of the Fleets at Gravosa, they get as cold as the tone of the German Powers. It is a peculiar attribute of the interesting foreign policy of right hon. Gentlemen opposite that it not only alienates the allies of their Predecessors and of their country, but that it soon disgusts even their own special friends. I am told that quite recently there have been some attempts on the part of Her Majesty's Government to wards a rapprochement with the Powers that they slighted. The right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) 781 is credited with some statesmanlike influence in that direction. No doubt, experience has taught even the Prime Minister the extreme danger of his course and the extreme desirability of having some allies in Europe. If this Government will frankly reverse their steps and restore the beneficial alliance with Austria and Germany, no one will rejoice more than I shall. Much may be done even yet to revert to the stable guarantees secured for British interests by the Earl of Beaconsfield. Only I will ask one thing—let common gratitude be shown to the illustrious Statesman who showed you the path in which to tread, and whose wisdom, experience—bitter, but salutary—is now demonstrating to you. The year 1880 will be recalled in history as the year of the "Demonstration" that never dared to demonstrate, and the "Concert" that was never united except in its disagreements. The Eastern policy of the Ministry will be for ever connected with the fiasco of Dulcigno, and the ridiculous efforts to put a good face on the failure of the Concert. This preposterous theory of "the Concert of Europe" was first broached about the time when the late Ministry distinctly showed that they had a policy of their own about the Eastern Question, that they meant to pursue it regardless of jealous faction at home, and of hostile ambitions abroad. "The Concert of Europe" was intended to take the place, in the popular imagination, of the old manly and British policy in the East—the policy of Pitt and Wellington, of Palmerston and Beaconsfield; nor, Sir, will anyone deny its authors a considerable amount of ingenuity and a keen eye for popular credulity. It has, I admit, a very enticing sound. It is eminently calculated to tickle the fancy of the uninformed and the sentimental. It would be, indeed, a noble and desirable end if an International Tribunal, impartial and philanthropic, could be found, before which the Powers could, with confidence, lay their grievances, and before whose verdict they would bow. That the time will ever come when such a Tribunal can be constituted, many doubt; but no one can believe that it exists or can exist at present. Who that regards the facts of recent or present European history can believe in any real concert between the Powers? The state of Europe at this moment—its peoples 782 turned into vast camps, millions of men armed to the teeth, and trained for self-defence or mutual aggression, the keen intellects and watchful Governments that are, on all sides, straining eagerly for every chance of increased power and aggrandizement; all show the most hopeful that Europe is still far from any such Utopia as "a Concert." These are à priori considerations which must occur to every practical man. It needed no special knowledge to foresee the absolute impracticability of your schemes. What, then, is to be substituted for them, may be asked? Stable alliances between States, and a defence of the balance of power, I reply. The balance of power has been ridiculed by our philosophical Radicals, those dreamers of dreams, and universal overturners of well-tried and practical policy. It is a bulwark of the weak, and a curb upon the over-weening. By the balance of power, we mean that theory and practice of statesmanship which seeks to prevent any one State from gaining such advantages and such aggrandizement as would make it dangerous to the possessions or to the independence of its neighbours. You tried a novel principle, that of "the Concert," and, at the first touch of practical trial, it burst and vanished, like the soap bubble it was. You claim to have accomplished the surrender of Dulcigno by your Concert, and by its only achievement—the Naval Demonstration. It is doubtful enough whether even that notable performance was the result of the Demonstration which never dared to demonstrate, but which lay trembling off Ragusa for 10 weeks doing nothing, while you diplomatically protested, and struggled, and implored in vain. The Porte had never refused to surrender Dulcigno. It only asked for time to soothe down the natural indignation of its Albanian subjects. All and more than the time it ever asked for it obtained, and no repetition of the policy of coercion is likely to be seen. You tried coaxing and bribery of revolution in Ireland, and signally failed. You tried bullying and coercion in Turkey, and equally failed. It is, indeed, only through the prudence and caution of France that this country was not involved in desperate enterprizes, and Europe plunged into a universal conflagration. Had Prance been ready to join with England and Russia in their policy of exasperation and of brigandage against Turkey, 783 the flame would have spread over that vast powder magazine which the East now presents. Russia was anxious enough to see war break out, with England on the wrong side. Bulgaria and Roumelia were crowded with Russian officers, ready, on the signal being given, to rise in insurrection against the Turkish Power. Servia was also on the alert; Greece was arming under the same incentive. Amid the general ruin the arch-plotter would have found it easy to seize Constantinople, and perhaps the whole of Asia Minor. Had Dulcigno been bombarded, had your piratical proposals as to seizing Smyrna not met with a firm veto from France, as well as from the German Powers, had you been allowed to use your Fleet as you wished in aid of Greece, the fatal spark would have been applied. Europe and England owe a deep debt of gratitude to the statesmen abroad, who checked you in your wild, crusading zeal against our old Ally of the Crimea. Prince Bismarck, Baron Haymerle, and M. St. Hilaire did more for the interests of England than her own Ministry. Well, Sir, a great flourish of trumpets has been made over the Greek negotiations. The Ministry claim the cession of territory to Greece some 18 months after they took Office as a great triumph of their diplomacy. I have no wish to depreciate the service of the right hon. Member for Ripon to his Party and to the State. I believe those services to have been, in some respects, more deserving of the public gratitude than is generally known, for they were principally directed to counteract the mischief caused and threatened by his own Chiefs at home. But, Sir, when I listened to the overwhelming congratulations which were addressed in this House to the right hon. Gentleman some weeks back by the Prime Minister, and the pæan of rejoicing that was raised over the Greeko-Turkish Convention, I could not help wondering what more could have been said had the right hon. Gentleman returned covered with the laurels of a Congress of Vienna or of Berlin. The Greek people and the Greek Committee in this country would, if they spoke their minds, tell a very different tale. They would speak of exaggerated promises which were never kept, of great hopes rashly excited which were betrayed, of an unnecessary and crushing military expenditure and national debt, which were all caused by the mislead- 784 ing attitude of the British Cabinet. They would tell you of boastful undertakings and of ignominous retreat, of two States brought to the brink of war and overwhelmed with a ruinous expenditure, because the British Ministry could not see in July, and August, and October, 1880, what they were forced to see in April and May, 1881. The net result of your Greek policy is this, that, in May, 1881, you compel Greece to take that which she might have had in October, 1880. That delay cost Greece 60,000 men taken from useful industry, and £ 6,000,000. In this she has gained absolutely nothing which she might not have had without that loss and expense. After protesting that she should have nothing less than what was sketched out for her by your Conference at Berlin, you compelled her to take three-fifths of that amount. Talk about the Concert of Europe. Why, all through these Greek negotiations, from the Berlin Conference down to the final Note of Lord Granville—a plaintiff and pathetic confession of disappointment and surrender—there is absolutely no Concert visible; at least, I defy you to find it in the Ministerial Blue Books. The Powers are constantly giving advice different from that of England. Action and diplomatic pressure is taken of which England is quite in the dark. Good advice is given to Greece by the other Powers as to curbing her impetuous war fever, in which England does not join. Our Representative at Athens is actually told to do nothing that will lead the Greeks to suppose they are not to be supported by England in their extortionate demands. The Hellenic Government is advised by the right hon. Gentleman to mobilize—a fatal and costly piece of advice. [Sir CHARLES W. DILKE: We were the last to withdraw our advice against mobilization.] Yes, Sir, I have heard the hon. Gentleman say that before; but I have never been able to find any proof that the other Powers either gave or withdrew such advice. But, whether you were the first or the last, you were greatly to blame for encouraging Greece to plunge into those ruinous preparations for war which cost her so much, and which all but provoked a fatal and a general struggle. In fact, there might have been a real Concert in August and October, 1880, and one for peace and settlement, had the British Cabinet not stood in the way 785 and refused to join in the good advice which every other Power was tendering to Greece. Sentiment and the Greek Committee were too strong for the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister. He held out all through the winter, and destroyed what there was of his own "Concert." It was not until April this year that he capitulated. The right hon. Gentleman had thought as the late Government held a Congress he would hold a Conference. It took place in the first flush of the new Ministry's power, before the world had tested their capacity and resolution and found them wanting. Russia, of course, inspired the programme. France fell in with it, because she was anxious to secure the Hellenic factor for her ally, and to have England on her side in a European war, and Italy made no secret of her readiness to go with the highest bidder. Germany and Austria were thus outvoted at the Berlin Conference, and the British proposals, which every sensible man in Europe knew were excessive and impracticable, were carried with a rapidity which might have caused some little anxiety among less sanguine politicians than those on the Treasury Bench. But the German Ministers had no doubt as to what would happen, and they set themselves quietly, but steadily, to counterwork the reckless projects of the British Government. How they succeeded the present position of Europe and of England sufficiently shows. As the Concert developed, and the Naval Demonstration became more trouble some, the more pronounced were the organs of the German and Austrian Governments in their sarcastic criticism. I could give the Treasury Bench enough quotations from the Press of Europe ridiculing their "Concert" to drive even them from their belief in its efficacy. Never was there such a burst of humour and indignant criticism from all quarters at any international performance. As Baron Hay-merle sensibly said—
An arbitrating Europe which attributed to herself the wisdom for solving every difficult problem, and could be made responsible for every vexed question, together with its settlements, such an Europe did not exist.And, again, it appears, from the evidence of the same Minister, that the Demonstration was not an act of the Concert showing its efficacy, but only a means to an end; that is to say, that the other Powers assented to it in order to gratify 786 the vanity of the British Cabinet. It was just possible to keep a show of concerted action over the affair of Dulcigno, for nobody cared particularly about the fate of its 5,000 inhabitants; but the moment you tried to apply the Concert to more serious questions, the moment you proposed to seize Smyrna or to visit the Piraeus in order to settle the Greek Question in your own way, that moment the Concert dissolved like a rope of sand. The abandonment of the Austro-German alliance has been evil fruit for England in the Mediterranean. Without Allies, and with your hands full at the Cape and in Ireland, the Government have been obliged to look on quietly, while France committed an act of high-handed injustice and international immorality in her absorption of Tunis. They have been half-dupes, half-accomplices in that wretched business; not daring to openly tell France her aggression would be resisted, and not daring to tell the Parliament and people of England that they acquiesced in the French designs. So they have fallen, and fallen as they deserved, between two stools. They have aggravated France, and they have not prevented her from doing as she aimed. They have disappointed and disgusted the people of England, and they have not gained any gratitude or friendship from the Power to whom they have given way. It is said, and with much show of probability, that Germany has been very willing to see her Gallic neighbours engaged in this enter prize. French enter prize may thereby be diverted from the Rhine. French revenge may be cooled by the sweet morsels of North Africa. Certainly the danger of an alliance between France and Italy is completely at an end; and several French Corps d' Armée find ample employment in dealing with the troubles which the invasion of Tunis have aroused. While we are giving up territory and influence in South Africa, France is spreading rapidly over North Africa. She is acquiring regions which were once the granary of the Roman Empire, and even the rival of Rome for the supremacy of the world. A step further and the French legions adjoin on Egypt; and of what avail then would be your Fleet to secure your main road to India and the East? You have driven Prince Bismarck to other alliances. Take care lest he does not avenge himself at your expense. For Holland and 787 the command of the North Sea, the German Chancellor might not grudge even Egypt to France. I pass now, Sir, to a brief review of those questions of Imperial interest to which public attention has already been to a considerable extent directed, and which I shall only refer to in the most concise and general way. The reckless, the unprovoked abandonment of Candahar in the face of, and in despite to, the urgent and all but unanimous opinion of all the experts of England and of India, military and political alike, was manfully protested against by the Conservative Party both inside and outside the House. In that protest the great mass of public opinion outside the House cordially concurred. In deference to faction us Electioneering pledges, and from a petty desire to reverse all that you could of Lord Beaconsfield's policy, that matchless position, the impregnable bulwark of Hindostan, the key and gate of India, the great mart of Afghanistan and of all Central Asia was given up. It was given up in the face of the Russian advance, and in violation of your solemn undertakings to the Native population. Your former conqueror is now again master of the city you abandoned, and is oppressing the people who flourished and grew rich under your rule. The Russians, so far from retiring after Geok Tepe, as the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told the House, have advanced another 150 miles; their head-quarters are now at Askabad, not 300 miles from Herat, and their outposts are close to Meshed, the capital of Persian Khorassan. They are still annexing fresh territory, and their latest acquisition is the fertile valley of Keshef, which will give them complete mastery over Khorassan and Herat. While you have left to ruin the invaluable railway which Lord Beaconsfield all but completed to Candahar, and which could have poured your manufactures, and, if necessary, your soldiers, within four weeks from leaving these Islands, into the heart of Afghanistan, Russia is hurrying on her railway from the Caspian towards Herat, and sweeping into her net the whole commerce of these regions, from which you will now he rigidly excluded.
§ MR. SPEAKERI do not see the relevancy of these remarks to the Question of the second reading of the Appropriation Bill?
§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTThe tendency of all my remarks is to prove that the Government wasted the resources placed at their disposal by the Bill before the House. Then there is the terrible danger to your Indian Empire from this proximity of the Armies of your great Rival. Will nothing rouse this Ministry from their fatal stupor? Russia has crossed the desert which was the natural boundary; she has acquired a fresh basis, fertile territories, and splendid and warlike auxiliaries within striking distance of your beneficent Dominion in India. The railway brings her in close communication with her central resources. Believe me, the danger is imminent, it is at your doors. If you neglect it now, if you do not instantly make such statements and take such steps as will prevent Russia from occupying Herat, and from adding to her enormous armies the brave Turcomans of Merv, in a few years, perhaps before 10 years are passed a Way, you will be engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Russia for the possession of India, not among the mountains and passes of Afghanistan, where every advantage of position, time, and preparation would be on your side, but on the plains of Hindostan itself, with every disaffected Prince and Nationality blazing into revolt in your rear. England may be successful in such a struggle. Heaven grant she may be, for her own greatness, wealth, and security, and not less for the sake of the people of India, upon whom her civilizing dominion has conferred priceless blessings. They would find the Tartar and the Cossack very different masters. But what will be the cost in men and in treasure of such a struggle? Sir, the time will come when the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington), who many have thought to be superior to the ignorance and crotchets of Birmingham, and the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Afiairs, who, while he retained his independence, showed some statesmanlike appreciation of the real objects of Russia, will bitterly regret that their names are connected more than any others with the precipitate and disastrous abandonment of Candahar last April. I very much fear that the retreat from Candahar and the capture of Geok Tepe will prove to have been the turning-point in the history of Asia. They may too probably have sealed the doom of thousands of brave Englishmen and the waste of 789 millions of British treasure. In India you have alienated Native feeling by your retreat and want of courage; but at least you could say this—that your retirement took place after your Commander had signally vindicated the honour of the British arms, and had chased the conqueror of Maiwand from Candahar. It remained for South Africa to show a British Ministry, for the first time in British history, shrinking away after a triple defeat, and concluding a humiliating peace with an insolent enemy. You sacrificed the safety, the property, the rights of Colonists of British blood and of tried loyalty, and the liberties of nearly 1,000,000 of the Natives to a few thousand semi-savage Dutchmen, whose good shooting baffled you for the moment, and whose religious and political cant imposed upon you. The rebellion in the Transvaal was stirred up by your inflammatory if not your seditious harangues. The war which you began, and undertook to prosecute until the honour of the Sovereign and the rights of her subjects were vindicated, you conducted with discredit and defeat; the peace you refused to make at first, you concluded with dishonour, after being thrice vanquished in the field. Those very speeches in Mid Lothian, to which I have referred, prove the hollowness of the protest, that it was not until after the rising and after the Boer victories that you realized the Dutch opposition to the British supremacy. The Prime Minister was thoroughly aware of it, and it was his duty when the annexation was first made by Sir Theophilus Shepstone and his 25 policemen, and during the discussion which then took place in this House, to have protested against it with all the force of his transcendent eloquence and with his unequalled energy. After it was a fait accompli, and the British flag flew over the Transvaal, he should have held his peace. Then, Sir, there is another pretence, which formed a large portion of the defensive arguments of the advocates of the Ministry—that they intended all along to grant these terms to the Boers, that negotiations were begun and being actively prosecuted before the defeats in the field, and that it was a noble and magnanimous course not to break them off simply because of military disasters. Sir, upon this I make two statements. The first, that this plea conveys a far more damaging condemnation of the action of 790 the Ministry than any I have heard advanced by their opponents. If Her Majesty's Government were willing to offer the Dutch rebels this complete capitulation in December and early in January, I ask why they refused to offer the same terms when the news of the rising first reached this country? I ask why they prated about "vindicating the authority of the Queen?" Why did they put the troops of England in motion? Why did they send out large and frequent reinforcements? Why did they send out the hero of Candahar on a fruitless promenade to Natal? Why was Sir George Colley allowed to set out on his ill-starred march? Why was he permitted to risk the life of a single British soldier in an expedition which you now declare to have been perfectly objectless? You knew that your General was about to attack the enemy encamped on the soil of your Colony, ten days before Laing's Nek. Why did you not flash your countermanding orders to him by the same telegraph by which you dictated step by step all the details of your ignominious surrender? You knew of the proposed attack on Majuba Hill seven days before it was made; why was not that prevented? Sir, I say, fearlessly, that if the statements of the Government made in the last debate were true, that they were willing from the first to grant these terms to the Boers, then the lives of those 750 brave soldiers who perished under the deadly fire of the Boers were wantonly and cruelly thrown away. The blood-guiltiness for the loss of those precious lives rests upon the Ministry that could conduct a war so unnecessarily and so discreditably, and end it with so much dishonour. The fact is, that there were no real negotiations until after your defeats. There was merely an attempt on President Brand's part to get you to make some definite proposal, an attempt you deliberately baulked by evasive answers. You were, as usual, drifting along, trusting to the chapter of accidents, as I can prove from your own Blue Books. The reverses in South Africa and a feeble splutter of Radical agitation here, wrought the usual conversion in a brave Liberal Ministry. Suddenly, after Majuba Hill, you discovered the blood-guiltiness you had failed to see before. That there was a complete change, the sudden recall of General Roberts proves. As you 791 have sacrificed the honour of the whole Army under your direction in South Africa, so you have treated the special cases which claimed the attention and the vindication of any Government worthy of the name. The atrocious massacre of the detachment of the 94th at Brunker's Spruit was contrary to the laws of war. What have you done to punish the men who ambuscaded your brave soldiers, entrapped them by a flag of truce, and then shot them down? Then there are the cold-blooded murders of Captain Elliott, Mr. Malcolm, and Mr. Barber. What steps have you taken to bring the well-known criminals to justice? None whatever. The Boers are too good, too brave, too wild and free, too sternly religious, to be called to account for their misdeeds ! It is rather what the President of the Board of Trade was pleased to call "so-called loyalists," who deserve punishment. "So-called loyalists!" Sir, when I heard these words from the mouth of a British Minister, who was advocating a cowardly surrender, applied to men, subjects of the Queen, who had endured suffering, privations, loss of property, in many cases the death of their dearest, for the honour of their country and the integrity of the Empire; when I heard that shameful stigma applied by a Minister of the Crown to brave and honest Englishmen, whom he was bound by his position, by his oaths of Office, by the noble traditions of the past, to protect and defend, I wondered what word of scorn and of indignation those betrayed and affronted Colonists would apply to a "so-called Minister" who had added insult to the injury they had already suffered. You have done all this in the name of justice and humanity, the same sort of justice and humanity which your prototype and darling, the Russian Crusader, used to put in the forefront of his "civilizing mission" against Turkey. I have endeavoured to prove the correctness of the terms in which my Motion described the injurious effect of the policy of Her Majesty's Government. I believe that as time goes on the truth of my criticism will be more and more evident. The narrow, parochial, and stunted policy connected with the Birmingham school is not regarded with favour by the working classes of this country. The idea of an England indifferent to her great interests abroad, reckless of the splendid influence 792 and dominion which has been handed down by the great men of the past, careless of the splended future which the statesman and the patriot would aspire to secure, is repellent to the great mass of Englishmen. There is a growing feeling of indignation in this country, and very widely existing among the working classes, at the neglect with which the present Ministry have treated the interests of the country abroad. The mass of Englishmen realize the fact that if the policy of retreat and dishonour pursued by the present Government is continued, its authors will find themselves unable to defend even those sordid objects for which they have sacrificed honour, greatness, and Empire.
MR. GLADSTONESir, I have some doubt whether I ought or ought not to allow the speech of the hon. Member who has just sat down to be buried in the midst of that solemn silence that appears in all quarters to have been prepared for its due interment. But, on the whole, I think it would not be right that a precedent should be set according to which a Government should allow to pass, without observation of any kind, an accusation which was perfectly unbroken from the beginning to the end of a long speech, of which I should not go too far if I were to call it outrageous. The hon. Member says it will hardly be believed that there have been only three nights' debates during the Session upon foreign politics. Well, perhaps that will hardly be believed; and it will hardly be believed that a fourth night has occurred in the Session which is to vindicate that foreign policy, under circumstances so extraordinary as those under which the hon. Gentleman has come forward to discharge his duty to his country. For, while the hon. Gentleman compares himself to the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) and other Leaders of Parties who have availed themselves, on former occasions, of the Appropriation Bill to review the proceedings of the Session, he performed that operation with a feeling which was duo either to courage or to insensibility—I know not which—to an audience of two Gentlemen on his own side of the House, both of whom, I believe, were detained on those Benches, not by the desire to follow the course of thought of the hon. Gentleman, but to be upon their look-out for other measures which were coming forward, and in which they 793 took an interest. Such, Sir, are the circumstances under which the hon. Gentleman delivers this remarkable address. Now, with respect to the address itself, it is within my power to deal with it very shortly. Everything that the hon. Gentleman asserts I deny, and everything that he denies I shall assert. I think the application of that succinct formula will dispose of the whole oration we have heard. It will leave him and me in a position of mortal combat. It is painful, Sir, for me certainly to be put in that position in relation to the hon. Gentleman. The hon. Member has a great deal of human feeling. At various periods of his speech, he referred to the deep pain—I do not know if he used the word "anguish"—the deep and excruciating pain he knew he was inflicting on me. And he did this with a kindliness which approached almost to commiseration, for which, I can assure him, I am truly thankful. And as to the nature of that pain, however much I suffer from it, I will endeavour to bear up against it as well as I can until the hon. Gentleman, on some other occasion, gives me my quietus by another oration as pungent and as convincing as that which he has delivered to-night. The hon. Gentleman says that the purchase of the Shares in the Suez Canal has given us the command of that channel of communication with India. I say it has given us three votes—I think that is the number—in a Board of 25, and has given us no other command whatever. And if that is what the hon. Member understands by the command over the communications with India, I rejoice to find that we are condemned by him at every point, because his condemnation gives me additional reason to hope and believe that we are in the right. He says that Cyprus gives us another command over the route to India. [Mr. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: I said over the land routes of the future.] Over the land routes of the future! The hon. Gentleman can see into the future a great deal further than any of those who usually sit round him. And what a pity it was that he could not muster a single Member of his Party to come and be illuminated by his discourse! I thought there was consolation in store for him when the hon. and learned Member for Bridport (Mr. Warton) arrived in the House with a handful of volumes. Those hopes were dissipated 794 when I was told that the hon. and learned Member for Bridport had, indeed, arrived in the House, but with intentions perfectly distinct; that his investigations had been directed to another quarter, and that he was reserving the stores which he intends to bestow on the House for one of the later Orders of the Day. Well, the hon. Member for Eye perceives in the Island of Cyprus a power of controlling the routes of the future across Asia. The hon. Gentleman has, no doubt, in his mind plans for, in the first place, making up the deficiency in the Revenue of Cyprus; then he has a few millions in his pocket for constructing a harbour and an arsenal, building them out of the sea; and he is then prepared to deal with the very easy and simple question of civilizing and reducing to perfect peace all the countries, beginning with the source of the Orontes and ending with the Tigris and the Euphrates, which are to constitute the land route of the future, Well, I hope he will reserve some portion of his eloquence until that future comes more nearly in view; for at present, undoubtedly, it is somewhat in the case of the Spanish Fleet, of which it was said—
The Spanish Fleet thou canst not see, becauseIt is not yet in sight.I confess I am rather at a loss to account for the speech of the hon. Gentleman; but, on the whole, I think I am not wrong in ascribing it to the ever-increasing and at length intolerable pains of prolonged retention. All these stories, I believe, he has been amassing since the accession to power of the present Government. When I consider, Sir, the nature of the materials he has been taking in, consisting, not of genial food for the mind, but of ideas and notions which are of the most painful and poisonous character, all intended, no doubt, to be vented on his antagonists, and which might have been vented without inconvenience to himself if he had had an earlier opportunity, I am not surprised that he found himself unable any longer to retain them without destruction to the mind itself in which they were stored. Consquently, it was not choice, but necessity, that led him to make the speech which he has given us to-night. Really, Sir, it is not necessary to go over the ground taken by the hon. Gentleman. I have already ex- 795 ceeded the modest period that I had marked out for myself; but I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be more careful as to the description of compliments he bestows on his friends. The most pointed of his attacks was an attack on the present Government, and myself in particular, for the disparagement of Austria. And how does he deal with his friends in Austria? He says that the Army of Austria is under the command of Prince Bismarck. These were the very words of the hon. Member. Whether he knew the meaning of the words he uttered it is not for me to determine or inquire; but the words which fell from his lips I carefully treasured, as I would treasure everything that falls from him. I hope, however that when next he alludes to Austria he will, at least, be prepared to accord to her the credit that is due to a great and independent Power, and that he will not tell the House of Commons that the Army of Austria is under the command of the Minister of a foreign State. I do not think that he was nearer the mark when he said of Turkey that her Army was under the command of Prince Bismarck. Prince Bismarck has one magnificent Army under his command, and, no doubt, with that is perfectly content; and I greatly doubt whether, if Prince Bismarck reads in some corrected report the discourse of the hon. Gentleman, he will feel greatly indebted to him for the eulogies he has bestowed. But as to Turkey, I tell the hon. Gentleman plainly that he is entirely mistaken; that there can be no terms better than those on which the Government of Her Majesty stands with the Government of the Sultan. And if the hon. Gentleman chooses to refer to the manner in which we commenced our career in respect to our relations with the Sultan's Government, let him read the conversations of the Turkish Minister at this Court with Lord Granville and myself, which were published to the world 12 months ago, and have never been contradicted. The hon. Gentleman says that I have, at some period or another, affected to feel an interest in the British Empire, and that this affectation to feel an interest in the British Empire has excited great surprise among nay friends. Well, Sir, I wish to leave that observation, and, indeed, my wish would have been to leave all the observations of the hon. Gentleman free course over the whole 796 world, to circulate and distil themselves, if they could or would, into the minds of civilized mankind, in order that the digestion of the various cultivated races might dispose of them in the proper manner. For my part, I have no pretentions to offer an argumentative answer to speeches such as that which the hon. Member has delivered to-night. Let me, however, tell him this. He is young; he takes great pains; he has plenty of time to gain instruction; he has plenty of time to unlearn and to cast off error. Let him apply that time to good purposes; but let him learn this—that if he wishes really to make an impression on the world, if he wants really to give aid to his friends or to inflict disaster on his adversaries, the very first lesson he must learn is to restrain his universal and sweeping propositions within the bounds of fact and actual experience, to submit himself to be taught by the lessons of the world and the lessons of the day, and to learn and know that moderation, reserve, consideration for those with whom you have to deal, and the endeavour to bring your propositions into exact conformity with the circumstances of the ease, is, for him and for everybody else, the very first condition of any useful and durable success.