§ (In the Committee.)
§ (1.) £1,014,481, Victuals and Clothing for Seamen and Marines.
§ MR. W. H. SMITHI do not know whether my hon. Friend will make any statement upon this Vote; but I wish to draw attention to the Flag List, not expecting that he will be able to give me any positive answer, but to point out the very serious condition of that list, so far as the interests of the Navy and the country are concerned. At the present moment there is an understanding that there should be, under the Order in Council of August 5, 1875, a promotion of 7 captains to flag rank every year; 12 commanders to captains, or 15 if so many vacancies occur; and 20 lieutenants to commanders, or 25 if so many vacancies occur. In 1875 it was found necessary, for the healthy and vigorous supply of officers—healthy in regard to the flow of promotion—competent for their duties in the different ranks, and with a sufficient amount of expectation and hope before them, that the Flag List should not be increased beyond 68, the captains not beyond 175, and the commanders not beyond 225. Up to the present time that has been steadily going on; but the time has come when we are approaching the limits 50 then set down, and unless some steps are taken now promotion in the Navy will become stagnant for some years. The Navy List to June, 1881, showed the lists to be as follows:—Flag List, 64; captains, 175; commanders, 214. During 1881—that is, during the course of the present year—7 captains have been or will be promoted, bringing the Flag List up to 67; 11 commanders will be promoted, bringing the captains' list up to 175; 20 lieutenants will be promoted, making the commanders' list 222. In 1882 there will be two retirements from the Flag List, and none from the captains' list; 3 captains will be promoted, thus making the Flag List 68; 3 commanders will be promoted, making the captains' list 175, and so filling that list up; 6 lieutenants will be promoted, making the commanders' list 225; so that each of these lists will be filled up to its limits, and promotion will afterwards only be made by actual vacancies. In 1883 there will only be one retirement from the Flag List, and but two from the captains' list, so that I captain will be promoted to the Flag List, 3 commanders to the captains' list, and 3 lieutenants to commanders. In 1884, there will be 4 retirements from the Flag List and 6 from the captains' list, so that 4 captains will be promoted to the Flag List, 10 commanders to the captains' list, and 10 lieutenants to the commanders' list. In 1885 there will be 5 retirements from the Flag List, and 5 from the captains' list, so that 5 captains will be promoted to the Flag List, 10 commanders to the captains' list, and 10 lieutenants to the commanders' list. In 1886 there will be 4 retirements from the Flag List, and 7 from the the captains' list, so that 4 captains will be promoted to the Flag List, 11 commanders to the captains' list, and 11 lieutenants to the commanders' list. In 1887 there will be 5 retirements from the Flag List, and 8 from the captains' list, so that 5 captains will be promoted to the Flag List, 13 commanders to the captains' list, and 13 lieutenants to the commanders' list. All considerations of deaths and other than compulsory retirements from the Flag List and captains' list are not taken into account. These figures show that for some years to come there will be absolute stagnation of promotion in the Navy, and this appears to me to be a matter so seriously affecting the 51 efficiency of the Service that I venture to invite the attention of the Board of Admiralty to the question. I do not anticipate that my hon. Friend will be in a position to give any answer to these observations; but the subject is a very grave and serious one. If it is necessary that we should have young admirals, then it is also necessary that we should have young and efficient captains, and that lieutenants should have some hope of being promoted; but with the present limited system of enforcing retirement we shall not obtain those results. I do not ask the hon. Gentleman to indicate the course which will be taken by the Government; that is a matter which rests entirely with them, but I think the Committee, and I am sure the country, will be of opinion that it would not be desirable that so small a number of officers should be promoted in the next few years as the number I have given indicate, nor that the block which exists should be allowed to continue.
§ SIR JOHN HAYsaid, that having expressed the feeling of the Navy in reference to promotion his right hon. Friend (Mr. Smith) had so well stated the actual numbers at present on the lists and the results which were likely of follow at the present rate of promotion that he would not go into any figures, but merely confirm what the right hon. Gentleman had stated. But, having given some considerable attention during the last 20 years to this subject, and having sat on Committees to consider the matter, he wished to make one suggestion which he hoped would be taken into consideration by the Admiralty during the Recess. The question as to the number of officers in the Navy was, of course, ruled by the number of lieutenants. There must be a certain number of lieutenants to officer the ships in commission, and their admission into the Navy was regulated by the waste in the lieutenants' list—that was to say, by promotions from that list, deaths, and the ordinary number of resignations. The list of lieutenants seemed to number at present about 800; that was the number given, but the number was rather higher at this moment. If a man was made a lieutenant at 21 or 22 years of age, it was evident that if he had served 14 years in the lieutenants' list, he ought to be promoted or 52 retire. If he was not made a commander at 31 or 32, he could not go through the grades of commander and captain and arrive at Flag rank at the necessary time. He would suggest to the Admiralty to see what number of lieutenants must be removed from the list in each year, in order that they might arrive at the rank of commander at a time when they were fitted for that office, and at a time which might still give them some hope of rising higher. The list of commanders ought to be increased, and must be increased, to give that necessary and just promotion which officers who had served their country well on the lieutenants' list ought to expect when they reached the age of 30. He wished to make a suggestion that his hon. Friend (Mr. Trevelyan) should consider whether certain duties now performed by the senior lieutenants could not equally be performed by the same men with the rank of commander. If lieutenants received the rank of commander instead of being retained as senior lieutenants of post ships and as lieutenants in command of small vessels, that arrangement would absorb a certain number of lieutenants and reduce the lieutenants' list by that proportion, which he thought, looking at The Navy Lid, would amount to about 80, and would swell the commanders' list by an equal number. He threw out that suggestion for consideration, and he was sure it would work well and give great satisfaction to the officers. With regard to the list of captains, that would have to be increased upon its own merits, and for the sake of affording promotion to commanders, and looking to the number of officers who could be employed and who might obtain the rank of Flag officers at the time required. He supported earnestly the proposition made by his right hon. Friend (Mr. W. H. Smith), feeling most anxious, as he did, in reference to the stagnation of promotion which, after all the exertions made and the expenditure incurred, was in as deplorable a condition as he ever remembered.
§ MR. TREVELYANI can only say one or two words in answer to the remarks of my right hon. and right hon. and gallant Friends, because on this delicate question of the promotion of officers anyone who speaks from the Treasury Bench must not speak hastily. 53 I will not go so far as to say I distrust these calculations made in advance, but I think too gloomy a view has been taken of the matter, because I know what are the anticipations of the Naval Lord who superintends the list of lieutenants, and who arranges the promotions to the commanders' list, in regard to the rapidity with which the 225 commanders will be filled up, and those expectations are very different. This is a subject of importance. The efficiency of the Navy is not a question which should be taken up at intervals of 10 years; it is a question which those who are trusted with the care of the Navy ought always to have in their minds, and which those Members of this House who take an interest in the Navy should diligently press upon the Government. The suggestion of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Sir John Hay) as to the partial re-distribution of officers between commanders and lieutenants is an extremely admirable one. In a rapidly changing service such as the Navy, and in these days of science, it is impossible to lay down any strict rule as to the officers; but the observations made will be duly weighed by the Admiralty; and I can only say I approach that subject, as I approach all subjects, with a strong desire to find some means of solving any difficulty other than that of increasing the number of officers in any rank very considerably beyond the requirements of the country.
§ MR. W. H. SMITHI concur thoroughly in the last observation of my hon. Friend. There is no more important condition than that the number of officers in each rank should not exceed the probable requirements of the Service, because, otherwise, great disappointment will overtake men. Still, there are other ways by which these difficulties may be met; but I do not attempt to indicate them. There is one question upon which I have considerable anxiety. It will be very satisfactory if some progress could be reported with regard to the question of pensions. My hon. Friend mentioned that he had appointed a Committee to deal with that question, and with the re-engagement of seamen, with a view to diminish the charge for pensions without affecting the interests of any man in the Service prejudicially, but with a view to ultimately diminishing 54 that very heavy charge for pensions. I know the extreme difficulty and intricacy of the question; but it would be very interesting if the hon. Gentleman can give some information as to the progress made by the Committee. I cannot help expressing my opinion of the necessity, in considering this question, of securing not only a sufficient supply of blue jackets and of gunners, but also of experienced artificers and stokers. If we were called upon suddenly, there would be some difficulty in putting qualified men on board the Meet to discharge those duties; and my hon. Friend knows that a stoker or artificer is not to be found ready-made, any more than a gunner. It is the impression of the public that a stoker can be picked up all ready for his duties. But that is not so; and I hope attention will be given, in the consideration of the whole question, to the necessity of providing that there shall be as good and fair a number of stokers and artificers as with meet any emergency in time of war.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (2.) £1,446,346, Dockyards and Nava; Yards at Home and Abroad.
§ MR. TREVELYANI hope on this Vote to have the great advantage of the remarks of the late First Lord of the Admiralty. I was waiting to see whether he would prefer to say what he wished to say before I got up. But, fortunately, I have something already to reply to. I should be unwilling to allow the remarks of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir John Hay) on going into Committee on Saturday to pass without some observation. Whether I am in Order in replying to those remarks now I do not know; but if I am in Order I will make a statement with regard to them. I certainly cannot in any way deprecate the bringing before the House of Commons by distinguished officers, at periodical intervals, of a question which concerns our fighting Navy. The figures which the right hon. and gallant Member managed with such skill on Saturday may present themselves in different lights. We always have the lists of our own iron-clad Navy and of the Navies of our neighbours arranged and re-arranged under every possible head; and, as the result of many days' hard work and long consideration, I have got together some 55 figures which show that although there is reason for energy and activity there is no reason for shame or despair. Of non-obsolete English iron-clads—that is to say, iron-clads that may be said to represent, on the whole, the more recent ideas of construction, and not to have within themselves the elements of decay and deterioration within any reasonable time—not including the Lord Warden and the Repulse, the English Government has in commission and in reserve, counting the coast defence vessels, 27. As the French Fleet was mentioned, and as that is the only other Fleet in the world which deserves to be mentioned for a moment in the same day as our own for size, I will give the same figures. Of non-obsolete ironclads the French Government—giving them, I think, every advantage that could possibly be put in the comparison—have a commission and in reserve, and counting coasting defence vessels, 13. I have included in this list certain vessels that are awaiting repair or are under the pair in the Dockyards, such as the Audacious and the Rupert. We know our own defects, but do not know those of our neighbours; and I have included in the French list, not only ships under repair, but the Richelieu, which has lately been raised from the bottom of Toulon Harbour. Of obsolete vessels we have in commission and reserve 20 against 23 in the French list. We have every reason to believe our vessels are quite as good as the French; and if it pleases the right hon. and gallant Member to take off from our obsolete vessels the Scorpion, the Viper, and the Vixen, that will still leave our list of obsolete ironclads in this position—the 17 obsolete vessels have a tonnage of 120,000 and 270 guns, as against 106,000 tons burden and 170 guns in the 23 French vessels. The result is that the French have afloat 36 iron-clads of all classes, and the English have 47; and the French have of these 36, 10 in commission, while we have 27 of our 47 in commission. I would ask the Committee which nation is most likely to know the weak points of its Navy, and which nation is likely to keep its ships in sufficient repair—the nation which keeps 3 out of every 12 manned and equipped, or the nation which keeps equipped and manned 7 out of every 12? But when I pass to what we expect to have in the future, I 56 find that the French are building and completing 17 iron-clads, while we are building and completing 10. I do not hesitate to say that in recent years the construction in our Navy has been below the mark.
§ SIR JOHN HAYDoes my hon. Friend include the Inflexible among the ships that are building?
§ MR. TREVELYANYes, I do include the Inflexible among the ships building. I am not, however, inclined to lay down any sort of hard-and-fast line, nor am I in the least inclined to take any estimate as to the amount of tons that ought to be laid down from any private or irresponsible pamphleteer. I am not even disposed to take it from First Lords of the Admiralty in past years, however well they may have known the circumstances of their own time, and however just their calculations may be. I would ask the Committee to consider how improbable it is to take any number of thousands of tons as the proper number to lay down now. In 1870, when 12,000 tons was laid down as the amount of iron-clad shipping to be built yearly, a ton of armour plate cost from £50 to £60 sterling; whereas in a composite steam vessel, such as the Conqueror and the Colossus, the steel-faced plates on the turret have run up this year to over £100 a ton. It is improbable that we or any other country can build at the same rate as when the work could be performed so much cheaper; but still I cannot think that our exertions have always been up to what the country has a right to demand of the Admiralty. I do not think that the same charge can be brought against the present Board of Admiralty. I do not think that, allowing for his natural and long-established, and I would even say praiseworthy, determination not to spoil Boards of Admiralty by too ready commendation, the right hon. and gallant Member opposite (Sir John Hay) will say that we stand badly as compared with the Boards of the past; and, if I did say so, the Return which is numbered 338 of this year would show something very different. In 1880–1, for the first time for four years, the performance of the Admiralty exceeds its promises—7,948 tons of iron-clad shipping were promised in the Estimate; 9,325 tons were actually completed in the building sheds. This year we hope 57 we are doing better still; but, looking at the experience we have had in past years, we must not boast beforehand. This year we have undertaken to build 10,816 tons of iron-clad shipping—a much larger amount than has been promised, and a very much larger amount than has been performed since the year 1876–7. In saying that I make every allowance for the difficulties of all preceding Governments, and for their praiseworthy exertions in other lines than shipbuilding, which, by the amount of money spent on such departments, have enabled us to devote our attention and expenditure principally to shipbuilding. If the same allowances were made for the present Board, I am not without hope that even the right hon. and gallant Member will admit that we have done something considerable to guarantee the continuance of the supremacy of Great Britain by sea. This large amount of iron-clad shipping is made up by finishing off and fitting for sea the ships that are already in hand. The Polyphemus, the Ajax, and the Agamemnon will be completed this year, the Conqueror will be all but completed, and the Colossus, Majestic, and Collingwood largely advanced. As regards new vessels, I have already had the honour, last March, of describing the new ironclad cruiser, of which two specimens are to be laid down this year; and on that occasion I promised, before the end of the Session, to describe what we intend to adopt as the new first-class iron-clad. On this we have received a great deal of advice from many quarters. The prevailing opinion runs in favour of small ships, and I am bound to say that some hon. Gentlemen, who have not given very close study to the science, are rather unreasonable in their demands. I have come away from one or two private conversations with the idea that we should give great satisfaction if we could produce a ship running 16 knots an hour, carrying a coal supply sufficient to enable the vessel to run 5,000 knots, with guns powerful enough to pierce any armour, with armour thick enough to resist any guns, and which, at the same time, should be a handy small ship, which should cost half what we have been paying for our recent productions. Unfortunately, all these things—heavy guns, thick armour, large coal capacity, and, above all, speed—all 58 these things demand great cost and involve great size. It has been calculated that such a paragon as I have described, and as has been recommended to us for adoption—a ship surpassing anything yet produced—would weigh over 14,000 tons, and would cost for her hull and machinery very much more than £1,000,000. And it is not only the cost in money which has to be regarded. Though I think the right hon. and gallant Member exaggerates the importance of mere number, still number is a very important thing, and England must have a numerous Fleet; and no nation can afford a numerous fleet of Duilios and Lepantos. Nor is it a slight consideration that, in these days of torpedoes and steam rams, it is as dangerous militarily as pecuniarily to have all our eggs in one basket. A torpedo, making a hole a yard square under the water-line, would send a ship worth £1,000,000 to the bottom just as readily as if it had cost half the money; and success in the naval battles of the future, as of the past, would fall to the adversary which by the end of the day had most men-of-war afloat. And then it is worth serious consideration whether men could be got fit to fight these gigantic machines; whether a sense of the enormous amount of money and the vast responsibility involved would not deduct something from the dash and go which win battles; and whether a captain, who had so large a portion of our entire Navy beneath his feet, would risk his ship so fearlessly and confidently as if she were one of many instead of being one of few. In short, the Admiralty has determined, instead of going forward in size and in cost, to content themselves with the modest, but, I think, wiser course, of laying down vessels of a type already familiar to the House of Commons. Instead of laying down one vessel of 14,000 tons, they intend to lay down two of 9,000. Instead of one vessel costing £1,000,000, they will have two costing something over £500,000 each. In short, instead of laying down something to cut out the Italian Duilio, they propose to lay down two more English Collingwoods. The mere fact of building a ship the type of which is already familiar to the Dockyards will conduce both to economy and to efficiency and rapidity of work. It is extraordinary how much more economical the second 59 ship is than the first, and how much more complete. One such vessel will be laid down at Chatham, and another at Pembroke. The armament will be left to be determined hereafter. The Collingwood, as the Committee perhaps knows, is a ship with two turrets, and the armour of the turrets will be left over for consideration. I do not know whether it is necessary that I should enter into the question of what we are doing in the matter of guns; but it is almost certain that one of the turrets will be armed with two 43-ton guns and the other with one gun of the largest type which she can carry, whether that be 80 tons, 70 tons, or—a size to which the experiments in France now point—60 tons. The lighter broadside of six 6-inch guns will continue to be a feature in the vessels. That is the policy of the Admiralty—a policy which, I hope, will recommend itself to economists, who would prefer a ship whose hull and machinery cost £530,000 to a ship like the Inflexible, which cost £690,000; and to sailors, who would not be sorry to know that the Admiralty has at last consented to be unsensational enough to build three vessels, each of which would be the counterpart of the other—so that being appointed to a new ship would not, in this case, be equivalent to learning a new profession; but an officer, when he leaves one ship for a new one, would feel that he had a chance of finding himself at home. That is our policy in regard to ironclad vessels. It is an unsensational policy; but I cannot help thinking that it is a policy which will commend itself to the Committee and to the country.
§ SIR JOHN HAYbegged to thank his hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty for the statement which he had just made. He (Sir John Hay) was much obliged to the hon. Gentleman for admitting that, so far as he was able to ascertain, he (Sir John Hay) had stated what he believed to be the facts without the official knowledge which the hon. Gentleman had communicated to the Committee. First of all, with regard to the building programme, he congratulated the Admiralty upon that programme. He did not, however, quite follow the names of the vessels given by the hon. Member. He had only caught the names of the Majestic, the Collingwood, the Ajax, the Conqueror, the Co- 60 lossus, and the Agamemnon; and he understood that his hon. Friend had included the Inflexible, and a new one, the name of which had not been mentioned. That, however, only made eight. Was he, therefore, to suppose that the 10 would include the two new Colling-woods which his hon. Friend had alluded to? Perhaps his hon. Friend would answer that question.
§ MR. TREVELYANsaid, the 10 vessels in question were the Inflexible, the old Collingwood, the Majestic, the Colossus, the Ajax, the Agamemnon, the Waspite, and her sister ship, the Conqueror, and the Polyphemus; making 10 in all.
§ SIR JOHN HAYsaid, he was not aware that the Polyphemus was included. He presumed that the Warspite and her sister ship were the two new ships which the hon. Gentleman had alluded to.
§ SIR JOHN HAYsaid, he gathered from the statement of his hon. Friend that there would be two more ships built than were provided in the Estimates, and he congratulated the Committee upon that fact.
§ MR. W. H. SMITHremarked that one more ship was provided, but that no details were given.
§ SIR JOHN HAYwould take it, then, that one more ship would be built. He congratulated the Admiralty on the efforts they had made. He thought they deserved the thanks of the country for those efforts. With reference to what had fallen from his hon. Friend with regard to the building of small ships instead of large ones, he entirely approved of the decision to which the Admiralty had come. They could not expect the Admiralty to continue to build ships of 14,000 tons; and he was sure his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for East Derbyshire (Admiral Egerton) would agree with him in that view. He was quite sure that these enormous ships were disadvantageous to the country. The description of them given by his hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty that it was unadvisable to have all their eggs in one basket was not, perhaps, the real reason; but the fact was that it was much better to have a sufficient number of ships to attack the large ships of the enemy, if there was 61 an enemy, than to go on competing with the enemy in size. Very large ships were of very little use whatever; and instead of building four ships of the Italian type he thought it would be better to build eight ships of a smaller size that would go twice as fast. He entirely approved of the policy of the Admiralty in this respect; but, at the same time, he thought that where another nation possessed very large ships we must always take care that we outnumbered them if we did not come up to them in size. He was somewhat astonished at the statement made by the hon. Gentleman, and he accepted it with some reserve, as to the small number of ships the French Navy possessed. The Re-turns given on this subject by the United States Bureau, and by the German Admiralty, he presumed had been investigated by the Admiralty, and they were hardly consistent with the statement made by his hon. Friend. The statement that there were 31 wooden iron-clads out of condition and repair certainly astonished him. He was aware also that of the 10 French ships sent to Sfax six were wooden ships. He presumed that the French Admiralty would hardly employ wooden ships on such a service unless they considered them to be efficient for the purpose; and, of course, those six vessels were included in the number mentioned by his hon. Friend. A large number of wooden vessels iron-plated were reported to be in Brest Harbour, but unfit for seagoing purposes.
§ MR. TREVELYANsaid, he was not able to say that they were unfit for seagoing purposes, because they included a certain number of Coastguard ships.
§ SIR JOHN HAYsaid, that an official statement of this kind was much better than all the investigation a private Member could possibly make; and he had no reason for challenging, in any way, the entire accuracy of the statement made by the Board of Admiralty on so serious a matter. But, be that as it might, looking at the number of ships which they had to maintain on distant stations, he should be glad to hear from his hon. Friend that something was going to be done with regard to increasing the building in the Dockyards, and also in the employment of contract building yards for the purpose of increasing the number of iron-clad vessels as well as 62 the building of unarmoured ships. The amount of building effected in this way had not been stated by the Government; and he thought that the amount of shipbuilding now going on by no means compared with the amount in previous years of our history, when the cost of ships was by no means so great as at present. In the year 1858, which was the last year of the wooden shipbuilding of the country, the Estimates of the year were £9,878,000. In the first year of iron-clads they rose to £12,779,000; in 1860 they were £12,836,000; and in 1861 they were £12,640,000. He would not trouble the Committee with further details; but it was not until the year 1870 that the Navy Estimates were reduced to below £10,000,000; and in the year 1870, when that reduction was made, there was a Vote of Credit of £550,000 required for the services of the Navy, in consequence of the Franco-German War. In 1874 the Navy Estimates were raised to very nearly £11,000,000; and in 1878 his right hon. Friend (Mr. W. H. Smith) proposed a Vote of £10,762,000; but his right hon. Friend very properly went into the market and bought four iron-clads at a cost of nearly £2,000,000 more—namely, £1,730.000, bringing the total Estimates up to more than £12,400,000. Since then the sums voted for the Navy Estimates had been £10,195,000, £10,322,000, and £10,102,000, showing a slight decrease on the year. The Estimates being so small and low obliged us, whenever there was a scare, to go into the market and buy ships which were not so good as we should have built if we had gone on steadily increasing our building each year. No doubt his right hon. Friend was perfectly right in going into the market in 1878 for the purpose of buying iron-clads. It was impossible at that time for the Navy to go on with the number of ships we had, in the event of our being called upon to take part in any disturbance. His right hon. Friend was, therefore, justified in buying additional ironclads, and he did, in point of fact, buy as many as he could find; but it was now impossible to get ships on the same terms, and it was better that we should go on building the best character of ships we were able to build, rather than come again two or three years hence for a Vote of Credit, because the country 63 happened to be in a state of alarm. It was very much better, in his opinion, that we should employ the contract yards on the Clyde, on the Mersey, on the Tyne, and on the Humber, and also on the Thames, to build ships for us rather than be obliged to go to a foreign Power to buy up their less perfect iron-clads. Those Mercantile Dockyards were created in 1860 under a sort of promise given by the right hon. Gentleman the then Secretary of State for War that 4,000 tons of shipping should be built in the contract yards in each year. That was the understanding on which those contract yards were started, and now there was not an iron-clad built in them except the iron-clads of foreign Powers. He believed it would be more for the advantage of the country that they should continue building steadily for Her Majesty's Government each year than that we should be compelled to go into the market and buy iron-clads whenever an emergency arose. He thanked his hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty for having made the lucid statement he had made to the Committee, and which went so far in the direction they were all anxious to travel. He trusted that hon. Members would carry away with them the impression that after all it was better to build steadily in this country each year than to allow things to get behind and then suddenly go into the market, as his right hon. Friend the late First Lord of the Admiralty had been compelled to do, for the purpose of purchasing ships that were very much inferior to those we might have built for ourselves. With these few remarks, he would stand no longer between the Committee and the Vote.
§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURsaid, the statement made by the Secretary to the Admiralty was one which they had a right to expect from a man of his very great ability. Year after year they heard a great deal about the magnificent ships they were building, and this year was no exception; but, he was sorry to say, they heard very little indeed about the equally important subject of the guns with which those ships were armed. They must bear in mind that it was impossible for the ships and crews to do all the work required from our Navy. They would not be of much value without they were ade- 64 quately provided and armed with guns of an efficient character. He thought it most objectionable that they should have an eloquent description of the ships year after year, and not be told whether they were to be armed with 80-ton guns, or 70-ton guns, or 60-ton guns. He believed that the only reference to the guns of the Navy was a chance mention in the course of this Session that in the last two years about 120 guns had been provided by the War Office for the Navy, of an entirely new type; but not one word was mentioned in regard to cost of those guns—a result which he presumed was due to the fact that they were entirely paid for by the War Office. He protested, as he had many times before protested, against allowing the Admiralty to put its hand into the purse of the War Office. The result was to destroy all responsibility either for the proper appropriation of funds so used, or for the efficiency of the guns and stores obtained. There could be no question whatever that in the course of the last 20 years the Admiralty had been provided with new guns and stores, with all their costly equipments, to such an extent as to be sufficient to arm the ships five times over, simply because they chose to build the ships they deemed necessary, without having regard to the efficiency of the guns which ought to be put on board of them; and when they went to the War Office and said they must have a gun of a certain calibre, to suit the build of a ship only adapted for guns of certain lengths, calibre, and weight, the War Office had not the option of supplying them at their pleasure, but to provide the kind of gun, irrespective of its efficiency, to fit into the vessel as built. He contended that it was an evil without measure for the action both of the War Office and the Admiralty to be hampered in this way. A more satisfactory state of things ought to be introduced. It would seem that the Admiralty were now coming forward, and asking for guns of a proper size and weight. When, 10 years ago, they were demanding new guns, he had objected to the calibre of them as being totally useless, having regard to the calibre of the gun which the Admiralty dictated. At that time, the War Office could have supplied the Navy with 12-inch guns of 28 tons and 35 tons, whereas the requirement was for 12-inch 65 guns only of 20 tons, merely because the ships were built for ordnance of that weight. The system of requisitioning the War Office for guns to suit the ships ought to have been reformed in 1868, and placed upon a totally different footing. In that year the late Lord Hampton had finally decided to abolish this irresponsible system, and had urged the change on the Admiralty; but, unfortunately, there was a change of Government, and an end was put to the improvement that was being effected in the system. It was true that the War Office had to go to the Admiralty for transports and that the Naval Estimates bore the charge, and it might be that the charge for guns and that for the transports nearly balanced each other; but the system, in both respects, was a thoroughly unsound one, and led to great extravagance. For his own part, he did not see why the War Office should be able to go to the Admiralty, and put its hand into the pocket of the Admiralty and take out whatever it wanted for the transport of men and stores. The question of irresponsibility on the part of the Admiralty for the expenditure on guns and stores needed for the ships, and the like irresponsibility of the War Office for the charges for moving the men and stores of the Army, was one which ought to be fully considered by the House of Commons. He believed that it was the occasion, at present, of much inefficiency, that it rendered both Departments irresponsible, and that it tended to deceive the public as to the actual cost of the respective Services. He hoped the Secretary to the Admiralty would be able to give the Committee some information as to the guns with which the vessels were to be armed.
§ MR. W. H. SMITHI can very well understand the feeling with which my hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Sir George Balfour) enters upon the question of guns. I confess that I have, to a certain extent, shared the feeling that he has expressed on the subject. The system which exists is, undoubtedly, a peculiar one; but then very much that exists in connection with the Government of the country is peculiar and anomalous; and I do not say that everything that is anomalous is indefensible, or that everything peculiar works altogether unsatisfactorily ultimately in re- 66 gard to the public interests. There is another thing which I must say most positively—and that is, that the system does not tend to extravagance in the supply of guns to the Navy. I have had some experience in the matter, as probably the hon. and gallant Gentleman is aware. The system pursued is this—The Board of Admiralty come to a conclusion as to the amount, and character, and description of the guns, or ammunition, or of the war material to be supplied for the service of the Navy during the coming year, and it then becomes a matter of consideration between the two Departments. I venture to say that at no time, either under the present Government or under any preceding Government, has the Board of Admiralty obtained from the War Department precisely the quantity, or the kind, or the nature of the supply demanded from them. There has always been, I will not say an unreasonable difficulty, but there has always been a large amount of consideration given by the War Department to every application, and the question of expense enters into that consideration very largely indeed. It has been the duty of successive Boards to consider how far they could reduce their demands in order to meet the wishes of the War Department in keeping down the Estimates; and the result has been, in my judgment, that instead of being supplied with the newest, and most efficient, and most complete guns, there has been a certain amount of delay. My hon. and gallant Friend says that 12 years ago the War Department could have supplied the Navy with 43-ton guns. [General Sir GEORGE BALFOUR: A 35-ton gun.] With 35-ton guns then. Now, my impression is that the War Department is behind in the manufacture of guns. I make no reflection at all upon the Service, which is conducted by gentlemen of great ability, gentlemen having the very highest sense of their duty to the Public Service, and gentlemen who feel bound to render that Service economical as well as efficient; but the result is, without doubt, that there are foreign guns exceeding in strength, in penetration, in range, and in accuracy, the guns which, up to this time, have been supplied by the War Department to English vessels. The foreign guns I speak of are particularly the Krupp gun and the French gun. Both of them 67 are superior at the present time to any gun now mounted on board Her Majesty's ships. I have no doubt that Woolwich will supply shortly guns equal to those; but the experiments made in 1878, and which were attended by our officers, showed conclusively that the Krupp gun was superior in penetration, range, and accuracy, to the Service-guns furnished by the War Department to Her Majesty's ships. I do not believe that this would be a convenient or a proper opportunity for entering into a discussion as to the system which exists for the supply of guns to the Navy; nor would it be expedient on the 16th of August to enter into the consideration of the question whether the arrangements under which transports are found for the Army is on the whole the best. We left those arrangements as we found them; and while I was in Office I did all I could to make the best of them. I would, however, urge upon the Admiralty and the War Department the necessity of furnishing the most complete gun, both for size and weight, that can be found, and that the mechanical science of England can produce. I am exceedingly glad to hear my hon. Friend state that the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Board of Admiralty are continually urging the War Department to produce better guns. I believe that to be a most important duty. There can be no question whatever that the gun is the thing for which the ship exists. Unless the gun is efficient, any amount of power that we can put in the ships, and any amount of speed that we can put in them, are altogether useless. The gun is the weapon for which the ship is prepared; and, therefore, it appears to me that the gun ought to be the most perfect gun that the mechanical science of England can furnish. From that point of view, I confess I have felt a little regret that a real gun competition is not introduced in connection with the production of guns for service in England. I believe that such a competition would be healthy and advantageous in all respects, not only to Woolwich, but to the country at large; and I should be glad to hear that there is a disposition on the part of the Department to welcome the production of weapons in competition with the Woolwich weapons. I do not say that we could produce superior weapons; but it would, at any rate, 68 develop the mechanical resources we possess in this country for turning out machinery of the best possible form. We must always remember that a gun is, after all, a machine put together to accomplish certain work—namely, to burn a certain amount of powder in a given time, and cast a projectile with the greatest force in a given direction. I cannot doubt that our manufacturers are as capable of producing the best articles in the shape of guns as they are of producing any other machinery superior to the machinery to be found in any other part of the world. At the present time, there cannot be a doubt that we have been beaten in regard to providing the best gun up to the production of our last gun. I will say nothing in regard to that. I have no doubt that it is a very good gun; but we have hitherto been content to allow Germany and France to beat us, and that is not a condition of things which I can regard with anything like satisfaction, bearing in mind the mechanical ability and capacity of this country. We have the assurance of the Admiralty that they are giving their attention to this matter. I am quite satisfied to accept that assurance. I know that the First Lord of the Admiralty is as alive to the importance of producing good guns as I confess I was when I was at the Board. It was the one thing which gave me concern, and it was the one to which I directed serious and constant attention. There is now one other point in regard to the guns which I think I must ask my hon. Friend's attention to, and that is the supply of machine guns. I am aware that there have been experiments going on for a long time, in order to ascertain the best machine gun; but there can be no doubt that Foreign Navies have been better supplied with this description of arms than we have been. I am speaking from personal observation, and I know that Foreign Navies were supplied with machine guns long before we were. I make no complaint of it, because I believe that the delay is due, in a great measure, to the desire to secure the best machine gun; but there is a point beyond which even the desire to secure the best article ought not to go. I venture to say there is a time within which you must be supplied with the material you want, and it must be the best you can get. It does not do to wait for the best that can be manu- 69 factured 10 years hence, when we may be called upon to use the weapon either to-day or to-morrow. The possession of machine guns in these days is most necessary, not only to the iron-clad in order to keep off the torpedo boats, but also to our corvettes and our smaller ships. Without at all venturing to lay down the proportion to be supplied to each ship—for that must be a matter which the experienced officers of the Admiralty themselves must determine—I would say that there ought to be an ample supply—I do not say an excessive supply, but an ample supply of machine guns. With regard to my hon. Friend's (Mr. Trevelyan's) statement, and the speech of my right hon. and gallant Friend behind me (Sir John Hay) with reference to the supply of iron-clads to the British Service, I am glad that he has been able to give such a re-assuring account of the proportion of British ships above Foreign Navies. I confess that I am always desirous to avoid comparisons. My desire is always to go on in our own way—sometimes called our even way—but it is occasionally a rough way. My desire is that we should go on in our own way, and provide for the country such a Fleet as may be necessary for the discharge of the duties of the Navy in time of peace, and to meet any possible emergency in time of war. At the same time, it is impossible not to have regard to the exertions of our neighbours, and to the kind of ship and the number of ships they may be building at this moment. There can be no doubt that their rate of progress at the present moment is very largely in excess of anything that has been going on here within the last two years. There can also be no doubt that the wants of this country are very much in the proportion which my hon. Friend has stated. Where a Foreign Navy requires to have five or six ships in commission, we require to have 15 or 20 large ships in commission. The interests of this country are so vast and so widely distributed that they need protection in all parts of the world; whereas the interests of any other country are localized within a space of at least 3,000 or 4,000 miles. It is therefore inevitable that we should retain in commission, and require in a time of war, a much larger Fleet than that of any other country. I am glad that my ton. Friend is able to say that we have 70 a larger Fleet than any other country possesses, and an adequate Fleet. That is, on the whole, a satisfactory condition of affairs. I am glad, also, to find that he was willing to admit that we were now below a fair average of building. He referred to the amount of building which had been done during the last few years, and the tonnage added by the purchase of iron-clads. It will be found that the tonnage built in our own yards during the last two years has not exceeded the proportion of iron-clad tonnage added to the Navy during the preceding three years. I entirely agree with him that a past First Lord of the Admiralty, even although he may have been only 18 months in retirement, is not in a position to state to the House or the country the proportion of building which the country may require. There must be information in the possession of the Government and of the Board of Admiralty which enables the Government and the Admiralty to form a much more accurate judgment than any person outside the Admiralty or the Government can do as to the amount of building which should be undertaken.
§ MR. TREVELYANI did not refer to the right hon. Gentleman personally.
§ MR. W. H. SMITHI am quite willing to accept the disclaimer of my hon. Friend; but I quite agree with him that my own information is not sufficient to enable me to lay down grounds for positively stating what the extent of our shipbuilding should be. But I think I am able to say the amount below which it ought not to go, and I am quite willing to say this—that if the Board of Admiralty feel it their duty to recommend a larger amount of shipbuilding, I should be glad to give that recommendation my most cordial support. There may have been reasons which prevented past Boards of Admiralty from rushing recklessly into shipbuilding, or incurring a large expenditure on shipbuilding. Those reasons have been practically explained by my hon. Friend when he referred to the increased cost of armour plates, and to the development of the system of armour under which I think I may say we are now suffering. He referred to the fact that the cost of an iron plate is now nearly double—that is to say, that it has gone up from something like £50 or £60 a-ton to something like £100 a-ton, and the 71 result is that the cost of a ship has been enormously increased. There can be no doubt that a modern iron-clad, with its composite armour, is capable of resisting shot at close quarters, and is a much more efficient weapon of war than the ironclad of 10 years ago, which cost so much less. Still, we must face the fact that for the same number of tons we shall have to pay a great deal more money than we paid five years ago, and that if we have to face an increase in the shipbuilding we shall have to face also an increase in the Votes, and I am not myself unprepared to meet that contingency. I believe that my successors at the Board of Admiralty have found that every economy is practised in the several Departments of the Service; and I also believe that any addition that may be made to the shipbuilding programme must be followed by a corresponding addition to the charges for the whole Service. If the Admiralty will build good and useful ships, such as those described by my hon. Friend, I believe the country will gladly incur the expense of providing for them. My hon. Friend has described the ships which it is now proposed to build. I will not go so far as to say that at no time should we have a vessel large enough and powerful enough to cope with the greatest and most powerful vessel a foreign country might possess; but I think that my hon. Friend and the Board of Admiralty have shown a wise discretion in not committing themselves to the building of vessels of that kind, which would cost, at the present moment, such an enormous sum of money. I believe that it is wiser, in the first instance, to see the way in which the guns can be handled on board such vessels, and various other circumstances and conditions of warfare, before we venture upon spending £1,250,000 in building one large ship. The ships which it is proposed to lay down will be most powerful additions to the British Navy. I confess I feel that the present Board have paid me a compliment in adopting the Collingwood type of ship. That was a ship to which I gave very serious consideration; indeed, as my hon. Friend will be aware, from the records now existing in the Admiralty, it was the type of ship arrived at after very great discussion, and after balancing the advantages and disadvantages, but without attempting to combine every possible advantage. 72 The Collingwood is a barbetted ship, and, in designing her, all the difficulties that were likely to be encountered in shipbuilding were fully considered. If we were to attempt to construct a ship that would be able to resist any other ship, and the most powerful guns that could be manufactured, and should possess the greatest possible speed, the expense would be so enormously large that it would be almost wicked to build such a ship and to incur the risks which might be encountered by sending such a ship to cope with the dangers of war. I entirely concur, therefore, in the course which has been taken by the Board of Admiralty. But I confess that I am anxious about one little matter. My hon. Friend has laid great stress upon shipbuilding, and I believe it to be of the greatest importance; but there is another side of the question, and another duty which the Admiralty have to discharge, and that is to retain any existing ships which they believe to be efficient war ships, and which they intend to use again as war ships, and to maintain them in a proper condition of repair. I find in the Returns which were laid on the Table by my hon. Friend's Predecessor the present First Commissioner of Works (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) on the 2nd of August, 1880—the Return numbered 323—that certain ships are there mentioned, the repairs of which were to be completed within a given time. The Bellerophon was to be completed by July, 1881; the Sultan is, I believe, actually completed—it was to have been completed by December, 1880; the Repulse was to have been completed in September, 1880. The Return then gives a list of unarmoured ships, among which is the Shah, which was to be completed in 1881; the Active, which was to be advanced 71/100 in 1880–1; the Rover, which was to be completed on the 31st of March, 1881; and the Volage, which was to have been completed before the 31st of March, 1881; and so on. I want to ask what progress has actually been made with the repairs of those ships, and what provision has been made with regard to the Resistance, the Rupert, the Thunderer, the Shannon, the Audacious, and the Black Prince? I am aware there was a question as to what should be done with the Black Prince and other vessels; but it is one which must be decided and considered by the Board of Admiralty. There are two 73 sister ships of hers, which will come in for repairs shortly, and the course which is adopted with regard to the Black Prince—which is sound in all respects as regard hull—will he the course which will be adopted with regard to these two other ships. Then, as to the Resistance and the Rupert, I am not aware whether any provision has been made for the repair of those ships this year. The Thunderer is to complete her term of commission, and, according to general report, she will be replaced by the Inflexible. I should like to know, in her case, if any repairs are provided by the Board of Admiralty in the Estimates for the present year. Then there are the vessels which are not mentioned in this Paper at all, such as the Raleigh at Devonport. I think I heard a rumour that she was to be taken in hand, and that something was to be done with her; but I cannot help pressing very strongly on my hon. Friend this fact—that if vessels coming to hand for repair are allowed to remain unrepaired for even one year, there will come next year another batch of vessels which will also require repair, and the consequence of not dealing with those vessels which are coming in for repair as they come in will be that at last there will be a large accumulation of unrepaired vessels. Of course, my remarks apply principally to the boilers, because the boilers are the life of the ship, and there is a difficulty in supplying reliefs for ships on foreign stations. The consequence would be that all shipbuilding would be practically stopped, and you would be obliged to take up and spend all your money in repairs. I venture to think that no policy could be more unwise than that. I do not ask the Board of Admiralty to repair a single ship about which a doubt exists as to whether it should be employed again; but if a ship is to be employed again, then, as soon as she conies into the hands of the Dockyard authorities, she ought to be taken and repaired at once. A vessel deteriorates very much indeed after being sent up the Hamoaze and left exposed to the weather, instead of being taken in hand and repaired. That has been the case with one or two ships. There is also this to be borne in mind, that an average of at least a year must elapse from the date at which a ship is taken in hand before she can be made efficient for sea again, and to all intents and pur- 74 poses she might, for the time being, be struck off the list of the British Navy. If a war were to spring up suddenly, it would be over before such a ship could be rendered fit for sea. I would, therefore, insist strongly on the necessity for carrying out the repairs of vessels systematically, just in the same way as you undertake your shipbuilding. By no means neglect your shipbuilding; but on no account whatever omit to carry on the repairs which are required; and the greater the cost of the ship, and the greater the speed of the ship, the greater is the necessity for taking these repairs in hand at once and making them complete. There is also a little information I think the hon. Gentleman can give us as to the progress which has been made in cruisers of the Leander class, which were ordered some time ago. Is the programme likely to be carried out so far as those ships are concerned? I should also like to know whether the present Board of Admiralty contemplate the provision of a second torpedo depot ship. The Hecla has, I believe, been found to be exceedingly useful; but, after all, there is only one Hecla, and if we were to find ourselves involved in war, one Hecla would not be sufficient for the wants of the Service. Possibly the subject may not have attracted the attention of my hon. Friend; but I hope he will draw the attention of the Board to it in the course of the next three or four months, before the next Estimates are framed, and that the House may hear something upon the subject. I should also be glad to learn something with regard to the supply of torpedo boats for the Service. I have been looking about for them in the different Dockyards; but I have failed to find quite so many of them as I thought were provided for the Service. I do not know whether all of them have been delivered, or whether the speed provided for them in the contract under which they were built has been attained. I am afraid that I have occupied a great deal of the time of the Committee; but I can assure the Committee that my observations have been directed, as far as possible, to the good of the Service, and have not been dictated by any desire to criticize disagreeably or offensively the work of those who have succeeded me at the Admiralty. As long as I have the honour of a seat in this House, I shall endeavour to do 75 my best for the Service, without, in the slightest degree, desiring to make it a political weapon or instrument. When I was First Lord of the Admiralty, I always deprecated the introduction of political questions into the discussion of naval affairs; and as long as I sit here I shall continue to deprecate the introduction of such questions, and to do my best to assist my successors in providing an efficient Navy at the smallest possible cost, but at a cost which I am sure the country will willingly pay.
§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURsaid, that the failure of the War Office to supply the number of guns of the exact description, according to the expressed views of the Admiralty, required for the Navy was the result of two independent Departments working in the same direction, but on contrary conditions, the Admiralty demanding guns to suit the vessel as built, and the War Office trying to supply guns of an efficient description as to weight and length to suit the calibre. In his opinion, the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary to the Admiralty, working in this way, would never be able to secure that efficiency which the sole head of one Department would bring about. It was not to be wondered at that the War Office had failed to supply the guns required, having regard to the enormous quantity demanded of them, for in one year the number of new guns requisitioned was equal to the whole number needed for all the vessels of war. It was quite impossible that the number so required could have been supplied by the Department in the time, nor, indeed, could any nation have met the reiterated demands made by the Admiralty for guns of new types, but of unsuitable lengths and weights in reference to the calibres. Before the change from wooden to iron ships in 1859, at least 17,000 guns were maintained in a state of high efficiency, so far as that type of gun allowed of; but from that time they had never been able to keep up with the wants of the Admiralty as respects either the calibre or the number of the guns, nor had the joint action of the War Office and the Admiralty been equal to the production of a thoroughly effective weapon. He trusted that the system would be changed under which the Navy was dependent upon the War Office for its guns, and that the Admiralty would 76 assume the whole responsibility not only for the expenditure on guns and stores, but for providing the type of gun best suited for the Navy, as well as for the custody of these guns and stores.
MR. DUFFremarked, that there were three small vessels building at the different Dockyards, as well as three others which were being built by contract in. private, yards. He thought these vessels were much wanted, and should be very glad to hear what progress was being made with them. He should also be obliged to his hon. Friend if he would let the Committee know what progress was being made with the ship now in course of construction at Pembroke. He had failed to gather from the remarks of his hon. Friend what was the speed and draft of water of the vessel, which had been described as of the Collingwood class, and perhaps his hon. Friend would supplement the statement he had made with regard to her. He entirely approved the programme of the Admiralty with respect to the building of two ironclads of moderate size instead of one large vessel of that class; but he thought it very desirable that the Committee should be made acquainted with the progress that was being made in carrying that programme into effect.
§ MR. JENKINSpointed out that a large sum of money was being spent upon repairs. He trusted that these repairs would be completed within a reasonable time, and that when the ships were repaired they would not be found unserviceable. It was evident that numbers were no test as applied to the efficiency of the Navy; and he only hoped these 20 vessels that were undergoing repair would not prove a source of weakness rather than of strength. He wished also to remark upon the importance of a large coal supply, which, in the case of cruising ships, was, he thought, a matter entitled to more consideration than the question of giving them an inch or two more or less of armour. In time of war it must be remembered that the coaling stations might be closed against our ships, and then the want of large coal space would be felt. He agreed that it was desirable to utilize private yards for the purpose of shipbuilding more than they had been lately. He had no doubt that cruising ships could be built in private yards much more quickly and cheaply than in the Dock- 77 yards. With regard to the two new ships, the Secretary to the Admiralty had not stated what power they were to have, and what speed they would attain. He would like to know what their coal space would be, and over what distance they would be able to travel at full speed, and how many days' coal they would carry at full speed and half speed? It was also desirable that the Committee should be informed whether any improvement had taken place in the working of the boilers of our ships, which, in a former discussion which took place upon this important subject, was shown to be unsatisfactory.
§ SIR JOHN HAYagreed with the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (General Sir George Balfour) that the process by which the Admiralty obtained guns from the War Department was not satisfactory. He had frequently urged this point in the House, and in Committee; but he had always said the Admiralty would also be an unsuitable Department for the production of guns, inasmuch as this would cast upon that Department an amount of labour and responsibility which it would be unable to bear. That, in his opinion, showed that the office of Master General of the Ordnance ought to be re-established; and, moreover, he was sure that the Secretary of State for War found himself with quite sufficient to do for the Army itself, without having to attend to the manufacturing departments of the Navy. It was true that, during the Crimean War, it was thought better to create the Office of Secretary of State for War in place of the Ordnance Department; but since 1860 the work of the Ordnance Department, as controlled by the Secretary of State for War, had been increased by an enormous amount, and he believed that the old system under which orders were sent for guns for the Army and Navy to an independent Department was a better arrangement, inasmuch as it relieved the War Office of a plethora of business, and, at the same time, gave an efficient armament to both Services. With regard to another subject, he would point out to the Committee that the building of that large ship which had been contemplated involved an additional draught of water, and that meant the deprivation of her services on each side of the Suez Canal; and, therefore, he regarded it as necessary that the draught of our ships should be 78 limited so that they might be capable of making use of the quickest route to India, China, or the Colonies. That was an additional reason why the draught of water, which the hon. Members for Penryn and Banff (Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Duff) had inquired about, became an essential element in the construction of iron-clads; and it strengthened him in the belief of the desirability of building a smaller class of vessels, instead of vessels of a large size that would be of no use for the purposes he had referred to. With regard to the repairing of our ships, different processes had prevailed at different times. At one time great energy had been thrown into building, and at another into repairing. But, as his right hon. Friend (Mr. W. H. Smith) had pointed out, the repairing process must be carried out. In the five years, 1870–4, a large amount of repairs was necessary; but, doubts existing as to whether some of the vessels were worth repairing, the arrears of vessels requiring repair was very large. It resulted in only six iron-clads being repaired in those years. In the five years, 1875–9, 21 iron-clads had to be repaired at a tremendous outlay, the result of the repairs not having been attended to in the previous five years. On looking at the Navy Estimates he found that the numbers of the men employed in building and repairing were nearly balanced. If that were so, he should like to hear from the Secretary to the Admiralty, either that those ships which the late First Lord had alluded to by name were in a forward state of preparation, or that arrangements were in progress for making them efficient and ready for sea.
§ MR. PULESTONreminded the Committee that there were two sorts of economy—the false and the true—and that whenever the Navy Estimates, and particularly the Shipbuilding Vote, were cut down below a certain amount, the country had to spend three or four times the amount of the reduction in cases of emergency. But he rose for the purpose of deprecating the idea which might arise from this discussion that they ought to cultivate shipbuilding in private yards to the exclusion of their Dockyards. That practice had at one time been carried to excess with results disastrous to the interests of the country. If it were a fact that in private yards the work was done cheaper and faster than in the Royal 79 Dockyards, it arose from the fact that the latter were not kept up to their full complement of work. There was no reason in the world why the work should not be done as rapidly and efficiently, and with as great advantage to the Service, in the Royal Dockyards, as it was in the yards of private persons; and although he did not dispute the desirability of availing ourselves in case of need of all the shipbuilding resources of the country, he contended that they should at all times see that the Royal Dockyards were fully occupied in all their departments.
§ MR. TREVELYANIt is impossible to exaggerate the interest of this discussion both to myself and to everyone who has listened to it, and it will be a great satisfaction to me to reply to the questions proposed by hon. Gentlemen who have addressed the Committee. The hon. Member for Banffshire (Mr. Duff) observed that I did not particularly describe the new ship. That is perfectly true; I did not do so because a description of the vessel was given by my right hon. Friend opposite two years ago. The mean draught of the vessel is 25 feet 9 inches, and the extreme draught aft is 26 feet 3 inches, which will enable her to be used on both sides of the Suez Canal. The speed is 15 knots. The vessel on its trial trip would carry 950 tons of coal, and it might be fairly said that when her bunkers were full she would have on board 1,200 tons of coal, or sufficient at 15 knots for a run of 2,020 knots, at 14 knots 2,800, and at 10 knots an hour the almost ideal number of 5,000 knots. The three cruisers laid down by the late First Lord of the Admiralty are approaching completion, although not quite so rapidly as we could have wished; and in addition to them the present Board has laid down another cruiser, which will be proceeded with side by side with the ironclads. In addition to that there are two other swift iron-clad cruisers, the Antagonist and the Warspite, and these six vessels will provide good work for two years. With regard to repairs, I consider that in this respect we stand in a satisfactory position. The Shah and one other iron-clad which are under repairs will be completed this year. The rest are nearly completed, and it is the wish of the Admiralty that when next year they go to sea they should carry guns of the new 80 type mentioned at the commencement of the debate. These vessels are in the programme to be completed, and the intention is to complete them this year. But we have done a little more than that, because, finding that there was money to spare, owing to the slow progress made with the cruisers in private yards, we have thought it right to apply that money to the repairs of the Raleigh, which are not included in the Estimates of this year, and an order has been given for supplying her with new engines and boilers. The number of men employed are—in shipbuilding, 4,230; on repairs, 5,469; and in ordinary service, about 5,000. With respect to the Repulse, referred to by my right hon. Friend opposite, that vessel was completed some time ago. The Bellerophon will be finished in 1882, and we intend that her armament shall consist of the new new 8-inch guns. The Black Prince and her consort are engaging the attention of the Admiralty, who are considering the best use that can be made of these vessels, and whether it is not desirable to convert them into very powerful and swift cruisers, by fitting them with new engines. The Thunderer, so far as I know, is not at present under repair; it appears in the list as being in an. efficient state. With regard to the Shannon and the Minotaur, these vessels will soon require repair, and will be dealt with in the programme of next year. Of first-class torpedo boats, 19 have been built; of the smaller class, 18 are complete and 30 are in course of construction. One or two hon. Members have complained that the Admiralty did not obtain all the guns they wanted from the War Office; but I am bound to say that that Department has not shown a disposition to refuse anything which the Admiralty, keeping in view efficiency and economy, had thought it right to ask. I am anxious that it should not go forth to the country that our ships are deficient in gun-power as compared with the ships of other nations. It is undoubtedly important that uneasiness should exist when there is any real deficiency; but it is extremely undesirable that a panic should be created with reference to matters in which we are sufficiently strong; and if we look to what is actually our position with regard to guns, we shall find that we are better off than any other nation. I do 81 not say that the Germans have not on board their heavy ships some Krupp guns of new type, or that the Chilians and the Japanese have not got some Armstrong guns; but the 27-ton gun of the French Navy is inferior in power to the guns of the Thunderer and Dreadnought. I read a few days ago a list of the guns carried by our ships; and I am bound to say that at the present time we may be said to be superior to all other Navies in respect of the character of our guns. But in speaking of the guns that are actually mounted in the Navy we do not touch the real point of the present situation. It is not enough that in 1881, as in 1874, we should be ahead of other nations in the guns that are actually mounted in our sea-going ships. Within the last few years a revolution has taken place in the construction of guns which is in itself as great and as important as the change from the musket to the rifle. Without going into scientific detail, it has been discovered that long guns, with large charges of slow-burning powder, impelling the shot with ever-increasing velocity along the great length of the tube, produce results of the most extraordinary character, as compared with those of former times. But it is of no use, in matters of this kind, to throw the blame for any deficiency that might be supposed to exist upon any one Department of the State. There is only one body responsible for putting good guns on board the ships of our Navy, and that body is the Government for the time being; and I am bound to say that, as far as my experience has gone, the Admiralty and the War Office have worked together in the best way to secure the object they have at heart. When the present Government acceded to power we found a 43-ton gun in course of manufacture at Woolwich; but we did not find any of that competition to which my right hon. Friend opposite refers, but which, had he remained at the Admiralty, would, no doubt, have been set on foot in a short time. The very first act of the present Government was to set this all-essential enterprize on foot, and on the 24th of May the War Office wrote to Sir William Armstrong, inviting him to send a 43-ton gun to Woolwich for experiment. He accepted this proposal, but asked for 10 months to complete the task, so heavy 82 and complicated is even the preliminary business in connection with the adoption of a great gun. This gun was tried at Elswick on Tuesday last, the time actually occupied in its construction having extended from June last year to August this year. When the preliminary trials are finished, it will be brought to Woolwich, where its work in comparison with that of the 43-ton gun made there will be watched by the Admiralty with close interest and without a vestige of prejudice or partiality. The Woolwich gun has been ready for about three months, and has been tried recently at Shoeburyness. It will be enlarged so as to carry a charge of about 400 lbs. of powder; and the charge of the Elswick gun having been run up to 385 lbs., there would be an admirable opportunity of judging the respective merits of these important weapons. But in this matter of heavy guns the Admiralty is impressed with the fact that it is important to unite caution with activity. Hurry in a matter of this kind means an enormous expense to the country and the risk of great danger on board ship. There is no occasion to be in a desperate hurry for the arming of our ships. The right hon. Gentleman opposite came to the conclusion, after long and careful consideration, that the Ajax and the Agamemnon should be armed with the old 38-ton gun; and on inquiry the Government were told by the Controller that it would be impossible now to reverse that decision. The ships which will get to sea this year will, therefore, be armed with the 38-ton gun, but with that gun so improved as to carry 50 to 64 lbs. more powder and to pierce a couple more inches of armour. We shall, however, take care that the new gun shall be selected, tested, and completed in time to arm the Majestic, the Colossus, and the Conqueror. The next in size is the 8-inch 12-ton gun which was introduced to the Admiralty by Sir William Armstrong in 1879. This is the gun which performed the feat, in the Chilian War, of sinking an iron-clad at a distance of five miles, and the trials of which—set on foot originally at the desire of the right Eon. Gentleman opposite—have fully confirmed its high reputation. The last of the armour-piercing guns is the 6-inch gun, of which 14 were ordered from Elswick by the late Government. 83 The moral of the story is that, with regard to the larger guns, on the success of which our supremacy at sea depends, and from the possible failure of which great disasters might ensue, the Government are proceeding with diligent caution; but as regards the guns of more moderate size, the type is already resolved upon, and they will, without delay, be put in hand. Provision has been made for placing 103 6-inch guns on board a number of our corvettes and gunboats, and the Shah and the Raleigh, frigates, will be furnished with a full broadside of these beautiful weapons. I will now beg the Committee to remark that I have avoided, in speaking of any description of gun, any attempt to apportion the credit which may be due either to public or private establishments. The Admiralty appreciates the readiness which Sir William Armstrong and his partners have always displayed in placing their talents and energies at the service of the country. And we rejoice that Woolwich and Elswick are working cordially together; and I can assure the Committee that the Admiralty places in the first rank the object at which it aims of maintaining the efficiency of the British Navy.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (3.) £1,172,700, Naval Stores for Building and Repairing Fleet, &c.
§ SIR JOHN HAYasked whether attention was being paid to the supply of smokeless coal for the Navy?
§ MR. TREVELYANsaid, this question had received the careful attention of the Admiralty, and smokeless coal had been supplied to a portion of the Fleet.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (4.) £683,239, Machinery and Ships built by Contract, &c.
MR. WILSONsaid, the Committee had heard statements that evening upon the ships and guns of the Navy, but nothing upon the important subject of machinery. He was confirmed in his opinion that the attention of the Admiralty ought to be carefully directed to this matter, because the Committee had been told that the newest ships of the Collingwood type, with a speed of 15 knots, would be able to carry coal sufficient for a run of 2,000 miles only. It was well known that ships of large size were constructed in private yards 84 which were capable of steaming from 16 to 18 knots, while, instead of their only carrying a coal supply sufficient for 2,000 miles, they were able to carry sufficient for a distance of 3,000 or 4,000 miles. Now, if vessels built in this way could attain the speed he had mentioned, and keep the sea for so long a time, it certainly appeared to him that the point required to be narrowly watched by those responsible for the efficiency of the Navy with the view of providing engines of the newest type. It was probable that the engines which they were now getting were not of the most modern and economical description. He regarded this subject, which had not been mentioned at all by the Secretary to the Admiralty, as of more importance even than that of the guns themselves. Then with regard to the boilers. Although he was not aware whether the Government were using iron or steel boilers, he wished to point out that steel was coming into general use in the manufacture of boilers for the Merchant Service. Boilers of this kind were expected to last from 9 to 12 years—a very much longer period than that in which iron boilers were worn out. He felt that these two points were of such vital importance that they deserved more attention than they now appeared to be receiving from Her Majesty's Government.
§ SIR JOHN HAYagreed with the hon. Member who had just sat down that the subject of machinery was one of the greatest importance, as relating to the efficiency of the Navy. There was one point, with reference to the application of electricity as a motive power for torpedo boats, upon which he would observe that motive power had been obtained by means of electricity in France; and that, if it were possible to apply this power to the purpose he had indicated, two serious difficulties would be got rid of—namely, the consumption of fuel and liability to boiler explosions.
§ MR. TREVELYANsaid, with reference to the observations of his hon. Friend (Mr. Wilson), that it was absolutely impossible to make any useful comparison between ships that carried armour and those that did not in the matter of speed. Indeed, there was no comparison between them. The fair thing would be to compare the unar- 85 moured ships referred to by his hon. Friend with vessels of the Mercury class. With regard to the shape of the engines, it must be borne in mind that in a man-of-war the whole of the engines was practically below the water line. The Admiralty had instituted an independent inspection of boilers, officers being appointed for the sole purpose of keeping a register of the boilers in use, and orders had been issued on the subject, which he would not describe, but which he would have no objection to show to his hon. Friend. It must be remembered that the boilers of vessels engaged in commerce had this advantage over ships of war—that while the boilers of the latter were frequently unused, those of merchant ships, as a rule, were in use continually.
MR. WILSONadmitted that there was a difference between the engines of a man-of-war and those of a merchant ship; but there was not the slightest loss of power as between engines horizontally and vertically constructed. As far as boilers were concerned, he believed that men-of-war had obtained a longer life for their boilers on account of their not being so often used as those in the Merchant Service. This subject was one which deserved the most careful attention, because in connection with it there had been a great waste of public money. Speaking as a practical man, and with the advice of other practical men, he hoped this matter would receive a little more attention from those who were responsible, and that the Department would make itself thoroughly acquainted with the whole subject, so that the boilers supplied might be properly taken care of. With regard to merchant ships built in private yards, not only did these run two or three times the distance run by ships of the Navy, but they also carried large cargoes in addition to their coal supply. We were certainly far behind the age when we talked of building ships that could only steam 15 knots an hour. Her Majesty's ships ought certainly to be able to steam as fast as the ships of the Merchant Service; and, in the present state of naval architecture, he did not see why that should not be the case.
§ MR. TREVELYANstated that experiments had also been made with a view of testing the motive power employed for the propulsion of vessels.
§ MR. PULESTONremarked, that experiments had also been made in France in connection with the propulsion of vessels.
§ MR. TREVELYANsaid, that was so. Merchant ships, he believed, were able to secure speed in accordance with the length of the vessel; but in the Royal Navy it was impossible to obtain more than a certain length in heavily armed vessels. The Admiralty were building unarmoured vessels which would run 16 knots an hour. Very great care was being paid to the condition of the boilers by officers who thoroughly understood the question, and great improvements were being effected. As he had already said, an officer had been appointed by the Admiralty for the sole purpose of keeping a register of the boilers in the different ships. The new system which had been adopted was always to keep the boilers full of water.
§ MR. BIGGARwished to put a question in regard to the ironclads. So far, they had heard very little about ironclads, and he wished to know to what extent the Admiralty had obtained any experience as to the value of ironclads; whether they could be used in the event of war, and to what extent they would be effective against artillery casting very powerful projectiles from unarmoured vessels at sea? It seemed to him that it was very likely a vessel wholly unarmoured, with very good guns, and a quick sailer, would be quite a match for a comparatively slow ironclad.
§ MR. TREVELYANsaid, he would refer the hon. Member to a Paper prepared by the German Government, which put the case better than he had ever seen it put before. It gave a curious analysis of all the sea fights which had ever taken place since the invention of iron-clads. It appeared that it was impossible for unarmoured ships to compete in action with ironclads. The superiority of the ironclad was manifest from the Huascar affair alone. Two of the finest unarmoured vessels in the English Navy were entirely repulsed by the miserable little Peruvian iron-clad; but that iron-clad in its turn fell an easy victim to another iron-clad belonging to the Chilians.
§ Vote agreed to.
87§ (5.) £550,141, New Works, Buildings, Yard Machinery, and Repairs.
§ MR. W. H. SMITHI should like to ask my hon. Friend if he can give the Committee any information as to the progress of the works at Chatham. I believe they are now approaching completion, and it appears to me that they have been conducted in a manner creditable to all persons concerned, and that when finished they will be of great value to the country. Time will, of course, be required to enable the Admiralty to ascertain whether workshops or sheds are required; but it will be necessary that all the mechanical appliances requisite for moving the ships in and out of the basin should be provided in ample time. I would also wish to direct the attention of the Admiralty to the advisability of constructing a new dock at Malta. I asked a question about Malta last year, and I cannot help thinking that with an important Fleet in the Mediterranean it may be worth consideration whether an additional dock is not required at Malta. There is at present only one dock there capable of taking an iron-clad; and if by any unfortunate circumstance we should find ourselves engaged in naval warfare it would certainly be necessary to have more than one naval dock for the purpose of dealing with iron-clads coming in for repair. There is a site in Malta exceedingly well suited for the construction of a dock, and I think that one might be constructed that would be of great service to the country in a case of emergency. I cannot expect my hon. Friend to answer the question now; but I hope it will receive the consideration of the Board during the winter. There is no more important question than the provision of further dockyard accommodation at Malta, not even excepting the Dockyards at home. In the event of a war breaking out, Malta would be the place where the repairs of iron-clads should be carried out. The dock already existing has been proved to be most serviceable to ships even on the East India Station, which are brought through the Suez Canal to Malta.
§ SIR JOHN HAYsaid, he was glad to be able to confirm what had fallen from his right hon. Friend as to the necessity of providing additional dock accommodation in the Mediterranean. If it was to be at Malta, let it by all means at once be commenced at Malta; 88 but, in his opinion, the right place was Famagousta. He should very much like to see a Dockyard constructed there, seeing that it was by far the best place for protecting the Suez Canal and our Indian Possessions. In regard to Chatham Dockyard, he thought the works recently constructed there of the greatest possible value to the country, and they had been completed in the most creditable manner. He thought it was unfair to press the Admiralty to build more workshops than were necessary in the neighbourhood of the new docks, until the arrangements were more fully developed; but when the docks were in use he thought there should be sheds to protect the men who were working on board the ships in the docks, and he hoped that an assurance would be given that there would be an appropriation for that purpose, notwithstanding the fact that no such appropriation at present appeared in the Vote. It would not require a large sum of money; but he thought that some accommodation of the kind was imperatively required for the use of those employed in the docks. He congratulated the Committee and the country on the fact that the great expenditure in Chatham and Portsmouth Dockyards was now at an end, and would no longer continue to swell the Navy Estimates. He, therefore, hoped that the Government would see their way to the expenditure of a larger sum for the building of new ships, which, on all sides, was held to be necessary for completing the strength of the Navy.
§ MR. W. H. SMITHI must apologize for not having completed what I intended to say. I want to obtain some information from my hon. Friend as to the barracks at Portsmouth and Keyham. I understand that the barracks at Portsmouth have been stopped altogether, and I want to know if those at Keyham are being proceeded with. I believe that the provision of barracks will prove to be most necessary for seamen at home, and that there is no more extravagant, and no more inefficient system than that of berthing the seamen, in waiting for employment, on board a receiving ship. The cost is undoubtedly much larger than it would be in barracks, and the interest of the money expended in barracks would be infinitely less than the ordinary repairs would come to on board ship. There is this 89 further difficulty which the Admiralty will have to face, that in the course of a year or two we shall have no ships which can take the place of the old line-of-battle ships, which now act as guard-ships or depot ships. The Duke of Wellington was reported to be in a very bad state a few years ago, and quite unfitted for employment as a flag ship. It will turn out some of these days that the Duke of Wellington will again be reported unfit, and then the Admiralty may experience some difficulty in replacing her. If they take an old wooden ship out of ordinary and fit her up as a flag ship, it will be necessary to expend £40,000 or £50,000 in order to do so.
§ MR. PULESTONsaid, that, before the Vote was taken, he would like to ask what time was given for the completion of the barracks at Keyham; and whether, in view of the fact that the work had been-discontinued at Portsmouth in the erection of seamen's barracks at Keyham, it would not be wise so to erect them as to make them at least capable by extension to accommodate a much larger number of men. It would be much easier to take that matter into consideration when they were about to put up this sort of building than to find it necessary to pull the barracks down and rebuild them afterwards. He understood that the barracks now being erected were only capable of containing 1,000 men; and having regard to the possible contingency that it might be necessary to provide accommodation for three times that number, the necessary provision might be made now at a much less expense, and with a better regard to the comfort and convenience of the seamen than hereafter. He found that £30,000 was the amount appropriated this year; and he should like to know if it was to be understood that that was a maximum sum per annum upon which the work of constructing barrack accommodation was to be carried out? He understood, from the engineer's clerk, that no further expenditure or outlay was contemplated in this direction during the present year.
§ MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORsaid, he wished, before the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty answered the question, to draw attention to the fact that the amount voted this year for Haulbowline was even less than it was last year. He by no means objected to any reasonable 90 amount of expenditure upon naval works in Great Britain or abroad; but, in conjunction with a considerable number of Irish Members, he shared a certain amount of jealousy and impatience at seeing the enormous sums of money expended on military and naval works in Great Britain and abroad, and the small amount of money permitted to be expended in Ireland for the same purpose. The present First Commissioner of Works (Mr. Shaw Lefevre), when Secretary to the Admiralty last year, admitted the reasonableness of this complaint, and gave the Irish Members to understand that the disparity between the amounts expended in England and Ireland would be very much diminished this year. But, as he had pointed out, the amount voted for Haulbowline last year had been diminished this year to £30,000. When, however, he turned to the Estimates, he found that in such places as Bermuda, Halifax, Jamaica, Hong Kong, Sydney, and Malta, thousands and tens of thousands of pounds were spent, it did appear somewhat unreasonable that the Government should fail to push on, as they might do, the works at Haulbowline, especially as they undertook last year to proceed with them as quickly as possible. In connection with Haulbowline he would remind the Government that it was stated the Convict Prison there was to be done away with. He did not know whether any steps were being taken to carry out that determination; but he was reminded that the Prison Commissioners had represented that in consequence of the works at Chatham, and in other places in England, being near completion there would be a large number of convicts for whom it would be necessary to obtain labour. He hoped, therefore, that the hon. Member the Secretary to the Admiralty would say what the Government proposed to do in the way of naval works, and whether they intended to continue the employment of convicts not only in England but in Ireland. He wished further to know if it was intended to remove the convict labour from Haulbowline to Gal-way to be employed on naval works there, and if it was intended to commence immediately or approximately any new naval works?
§ SIR THOMAS BRASSEYsaid, that in regard to the question which had been asked by his right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. W, H. Smith) with reference to 91 Chatham, he had to say that the works which were expected to be completed with in the present financial year would not be finished until next summer, in consequence of the reduced number of convicts now employed at Chatham. A Vote of £8,000 would be required next year for the completion of the works. He was glad to find that hon. Members who had spoken had taken occasion to pay a just tribute of praise to those who were responsible for the design and execution of these splendid works. The docks at Chatham reflected the greatest credit upon Colonel Clarke, who designed them, and Mr. Bernays, who had for many years been engaged in the execution of the works. With regard to the necessary fittings for working the docks, a provision for the necessary hydraulic machinery would be made in the Estimates to be submitted to Parliament next year. His right hon. Friend (Mr. W. H. Smith) had put a question with reference to the progress which was being made with the barracks at Keyham; and his hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Puleston) had put other questions upon the same subject. In reply he might say that the site which had been selected for the barracks at Keyham commended itself entirely to the Board of Admiralty. They were less satisfied with the choice of sites at present submitted to them at Portsmouth; but no doubt a local investigation might suggest some ideas which had not yet been put before the Admiralty. In his own researches at Portsmouth he seemed to be surrounded by objects which were not in any way the most desirable for contemplation. These were the Gas Works and the Convict Establishment; and if they went to the Island, now used as the practice ground for the Excellent, they found that it was made ground, and not at all satisfactory in a sanitary point of view. They were taking a distinct step in the direction recommended by his right hon. Friend in commencing the construction of a barracks at Keyham; and although, as his right hon. Friend said, the supply of ships for the reception of seamen would in course of time cease, owing to the disappearance of such vessels from The Navy List, yet for some time to come there would be no difficulty in providing receiving ships of a suitable character for seamen at Portsmouth. The general question of barracks, as compared with ships for the 92 reception of seamen in the home ports, was one upon which he thought the right hon. Gentleman would admit there was a great diversity of opinion. He (Sir Thomas Brassey) lost no opportunity of consulting naval officers on the subject, and he certainly encountered a considerable divergence of opinion. When he looked to the practice of a neighbouring Power he found that in France there was a dual system, and the authorities there had not yet made up their minds as to the relative value of barracks versus ships. At present there were barracks at Brest and Cherbourg and ships at Toulon; and, therefore, he thought it would be difficult for the right hon. Gentleman to establish, with absolute certainty, that barracks were superior to receiving ships. The progress at Keyham in the present year had not been quite as satisfactory as the Board of Admiralty could have desired; but the director of the works informed him that the delay had arisen from the necessity of settling numerous points. The lodging of seamen on shore was altogether a new thing in the British Navy, and the naval officers, before making up their minds on the point, had taken time to consider. Hence there had been a certain amount of delay in the progress of the works; but diligent progress would be made, and a much larger figure must necessarily appear in the Estimates next year for the execution of the works. In answer to the question of his hon. Friend (Mr. Puleston), he might add that it would take about two years to complete the present proposals in regard to barracks. His hon. Friend had suggested that it would be necessary to keep in view the growing demands for barrack accommodation. That was already done in the plan which had been adopted. The barracks consisted of blocks. Each block was capable of providing accommodation for 500 men. The present proposal was to erect two of these blocks, and when the whole scheme was carried out there would be room for eight blocks upon the entire site.
§ MR. PULESTONsaid, he believed the scheme only made provision for four blocks.
§ SIR THOMAS BRASSEYsaid, the barracks would consist either of four or of eight blocks. At any rate, ample accommodation would be provided for 4,000 men on this site, and that was 93 recognized to be fully adequate to meet any demand that might hereafter be made. In reference to the interesting and not unanticipated question which came from his hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Arthur O'Connor), he would wish to make a very short explanation. No doubt, there had been a delay in carrying out the works at Haulbowline. It had arisen, in part, from the increasing difficulties which had been encountered. Another and an important cause of the delay had been the circumstance that there had been a combination of convict and free labour in the execution of the works. In the year 1868–9, when 460 convicts were available, the free labourers numbered only 150. In 1880–1, the number of convicts fell to 180, while the paid men rose to over 400. That, of course, had been an important change, and a change which he thought had been beneficial locally. The work was now being carried out in very much larger proportions than was first contemplated by local labour which had been obtained from the district. In reference to the total cost of the work, he had also some information to give his hon. Friend. The total actual cost of the works, up to the 31st of March, 1880, amounted to £309,000, and the expenditure this year would probably be £33,000, making the total, up to the 31st of March, 1881, £343,000. The total sum included in the Votes up to that date was £314,000. His hon. Friend asked why the Admiralty did not expedite the completion of the works? As he had already said, the question was complicated by the fact that it had been found necessary to combine free labour with convict labour. They would expedite the work very much by doing away with the present system and by employing a contractor; but the question was whether the change would be of advantage locally. The execution of the works by a contractor would be a quicker mode of carrying them out; but the probability was that if they put up the work to open tender the contractor selected to undertake the execution of the work might not be a local contractor, but a person coming from this side of the Channel; and, if that were so, it would be almost certain that the labour would be introduced from a distance, to the exclusion of the local workpeople. He questioned whether such, a change would 94 be altogether advantageous to those who were personally interested in the matter. His hon. Friend would be aware that last year great distress was experienced in the locality, and efforts were made to relieve that distress by giving a certain amount of employment at Haulbowline. No less than 120 workmen were taken on, making the total employed at that time about 500; and arrangements were made to increase the appropriation of money for the work. It was intended that the number should be reduced to the normal number of 400 on the 31st of March; but the distress in the locality continuing, the reduction was postponed, by the desire of the First Lord of the Admiralty, and, at the present time, the number of labourers employed was 450. It was intended, however, to bring down the number ultimately to 400. He hoped that this explanation would be satisfactory to his hon. Friend. In conclusion, he might add that sensible progress was being made with the works. With regard to the question of his hon. Friend as to the employment of convict labour at Galway, he really was not able to answer that question. It rested more particularly with the Home Office, and he believed that an inquiry was about to be made with reference to the more advantageous employment of convict labour. A Committee would be appointed, and the experience of the Admiralty would be represented on it in the person of the Superintendent of Works. He hoped that a solution of the question would be arrived at in a short time, and that such solution might be advantageous to the interests of the Irish people.
§ DR. LYONSsaid, he thought that the explanation given by the hon. Gentleman was, as far as it went, very satisfactory; but still these important works at Haulbowline had been so long before the public, and such great interest was felt in them in Ireland, that he should like to ask the hon. Gentleman if he could give any idea as to when the works might be expected to approach something like completion. When was it at all reasonable or probable to expect that the docks might be in operation for the use of the ships? If any reasonable statement could be given on this subject, the Irish people would be content to wait. He was glad to see 95 that there was so much proper feeling on the subject, and the remarks of the hon. Gentleman on the part of the Admiralty would be received with great satisfaction in Ireland and in the locality, especially if there were any reasonable notion conveyed as to when the docks would be completed.
§ SIR THOMAS BRASSEYsaid, he had already stated that it would take about two years to complete the works.
§ MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked if the Board of Admiralty had received any information as to the date beyond which convict labour was not likely to be available at Haulbowline? He was glad to hear, from the observations of his hon. Friend (Sir Thomas Brassey), that the subject had received so much attention at his hands.
MR. PASSMORE EDWARDSsaid, the right hon. Gentleman the late First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. W. H. Smith) had asked the Government if there was any probability of there being a new dock constructed at Malta; and the right hon. and gallant Officer behind him (Sir John Hay) suggested that it would be more desirable to erect one at Cyprus. Considering that the imagination of the public was aroused to a high pitch a few years ago upon this very question, and upon the superiority of Cyprus as a place of arms to stand between Europe and Asia, he thought the question of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman might receive one word by way of answer.
§ SIR THOMAS BRASSEYremarked, that, with reference to the convict question, it did not rest with the Admiralty, but with the Home Office. The Admiralty were in no way responsible for it; and, no doubt, a solution would be arrived at by the Committee which was about to be appointed. With reference to the question of constructing a dock at Cyprus nothing of the kind was before the Admiralty. As to the dock accommodation at Malta, he was sensible of the great importance of Malta as a Dockyard station; and he was glad to know that they had, at least, one very fine dock at Malta. The Government were, he thought, showing that they took an interest in Malta by the expenditure which was taking place there, and he might properly refer to the very large item of £8,000 for torpedo boats in connection with that Establishment.
§ MAJOR NOLANsaid, that before the Vote was put from the Chair he wished to express his regret at the answer made by the hon. Gentleman (Sir Thomas Brassey) to the question of the hon. Member for Queen's County (Mr. Arthur O'Connor) in reference to the works at Galway, and the employment of convict labour there. It was a subject on which they had had a very definite promise from the late Government; and he thought that in a question of this kind, when one Party succeeded another in Office, they ought to keep up these Administrative promises. He would not say that on some great question of policy the two Parties might not have a difference of opinion; but upon a question of mere Administrative policy, such as the policy of opening a harbour or building a pier, such as were contemplated at Galway, one Government ought to be bound by the promises of its Predecessor. He thought the First Lord of the Admiralty would allow that if the late Government had added a sum of £10,000,000 to the National Debt he would not consider it his duty to object, although he might not like it, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer would pay the interest on it. He really did think that on a question of this kind of providing increased harbour accommodation, by transferring convict labour from one place to an-other, there should be no difficulty placed in the way by Her Majesty's Government. The work at Galway could only be well done by convict labour. It would hardly pay to do it under other circumstances, but it was admirably suited for the employment of convict labour; and he therefore thought that, under the circumstances, the Government were bound to pay some attention to the promises of their Predecessors.
§ MR. BIGGARsaid, he thought the question adverted to by his hon. and gallant Friend (Major Nolan) was entitled to some reply from the Government. The policy of the Government, so far as he could see, was to continue any undertaking commenced by the late Government provided that it suited their own purposes. In that case they argued that all the undertakings entered into by a former Government ought to be respected. But if it did not suit their purpose then they said that the undertakings of former Governments were not binding upon them. He thought the re- 97 quest which had been made by his hon. and gallant Friend was entitled to consideration. As an illustration of the truth of the statement he (Mr. Biggar) had just made, he would remind the Committee that when an application was made last year on the part of the landlords for loans, on the ground of the distress which prevailed, the late Government brought in a Bill for acceding to such application, and the present Government had followed up the policy of the late Administration by continuing to grant loans. The present Government had carried out in that respect the policy of the former Government. In regard to the case of Galway Harbour, he understood from his hon. and gallant Friend that the late Government actually undertook to supply convict labour by transferring it from a place where it was not wanted to a place where it could be beneficially employed. He thought that the present Government should be bound by the undertakings of former Governments, and if they did not consider themselves bound by the promise made in this instance they might at least take the trouble to reply to the request which had been made to them by an hon. and gallant Member of the House. The hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Thomas Brassey) had not given a very definite reply to the question put to him in reference to the construction of a dock at Famagousta. He therefore felt disposed to ask that some pledge should be given on the part of the Government that they would not throw away any more of the public money upon Cyprus. The idea of making it a place of arms was quite absurd.
THE CHAIRMANI must remind the hon. Member that the question of Famagousta and Cyprus has nothing to do with the Vote now before the Committee, and the discussion upon that question cannot be allowed to continue.
§ MR. BIGGARsaid, he would only express his opinion that some Member of the Government ought to reply to the questions which had been put to them; and if they continued to refrain from doing so, he would certainly move to report Progress.
§ MR. TREVELYANwished to point out that the Committee were now discussing Vote 11, and that it contained no allusion to Famagousta. In regard 98 to the construction of a harbour at Galway, he must remind his hon. and gallant Friend that it was proposed to construct a harbour for commercial purposes, and certainly not for the use of the National Navy.
§ MAJOR NOLANtrusted that he might be excused; but the question was one which very naturally affected the national interests.
§ MR. TREVELYANsaid, he did not think it was necessary to spend the Admiralty Votes on the construction of a harbour at Galway. He had no wish to treat lightly any question that affected the interests of the Irish Members, but he certainly did deprecate the discussion of extraneous questions on the present occasion. He thought hon. Members would agree that very full attention had been paid by the Admiralty to the wishes and interests of Ireland in these matters. It was very seldom indeed that the Admiralty exceeded any Vote included in the Estimates; but in the case of Haulbowline, for reasons not connected with the immediate pressing needs of the Navy, that had exceeded the total sum voted by several thousand pounds.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (6.) £398,450, Extra Estimate for Services not Naval.—Freight, &c. on Account of the Army Department, including Supplementary sum, £170,000, Transport Services (Transvaal).
§ SIR JOHN HAYsaid, he did not want to detain the Committee, but he wished to ask a question concerning Her Majesty's Indian troopships. There were five special Indian troopships, all of which he believed had done good service.
§ Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; Committee counted, and 40 Members being found present,
§ SIR JOHN HAYsaid, he should like some information as to the condition of repair of these troopships, and also as to whether Her Majesty's Government intended to supplement the Indian troopship service, especially in regard to the transport work to be done in connection with South Africa?
§ MR. TREVELYANThe Euphrates troopship has been paid off, and is to undergo a thorough overhauling; there- 99 fore she will not be sent out until next year. The other four ships are now at Portsmouth undergoing repairs. Two of them are undergoing considerable repairs, and the other two—the Serapis and the Crocodile—are having some slight alterations done to them. In all, I think, £120,000 will be spent on the vessels. As far as we know, the only Imperial service which is likely soon to be performed by any of them is that which will be performed by the Serapis. She will go back to Bombay.
§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURsaid, he wished to call attention to this charge for transports in the Accounts of the Navy on account of the movement of the men and stores of the Army, and to point out that it was impossible for economy to be practised so long as the Army could go to the Admiralty chest and take money therefrom. He had already pointed out that the like practice of the Admiralty in demanding guns and stores from the War Office and making the charge fall on the Army Estimates, was calculated to lead to extravagance and inefficiency. To his own knowledge, that did occur; and he therefore thought it would be much wiser to allow the War Office to look entirely after its own expenditure for the movement of the men and stores of the Army. There was not a single item here of the work to be performed by the Admiralty for which that Department was not obliged to go outside their own Department to hire transports, and this duty could as easily and as efficiently be done by the War Department, aided as necessary by fit officers either of the Navy or Mercantile Marine—especially the latter—and many of whom might be found with matured experience fitted for the work of taking up transports. He knew very well he should not be able to effect the object he had in view, which was to make each Department bear its own expenditure—the one for its guns and stores, and the other for its transports; yet it was his hope that when he had passed away this duty would be taken up by someone else, and that the principle he wished to see adopted would be eventually established.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (7.) £152,523, Greenwich Hospital and School.