§ MR. LABOUCHEREasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether his attention has been called to a report in the "Birmingham Gazette" of the 6th instant, of the conduct of Mr. W. M. Ellis and Mr. John Lowe, in refusing, when sitting as magistrates at the Birmingham Police Office, to allow a witness to give evidence because he asked to be allowed to affirm; and, whether he contemplates taking any notice of this conduct on the part of the aforesaid magistrates?
§ SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT, in reply, said, he observed that an almost similar Question was asked him by the Colleague of his hon. Friend (Mr. Bradlaugh) on the 17th of August last year. He must repeat the answer he then gave. This Question and many others put to him were founded upon an entirely erroneous view of the office and functions of the Secretary of State for the Home Department. Some people, and he was surprised to find among them some hon. Members, had a notion that he had got a general power to direct magistrates and Judges as to how they ought to conduct judicial investigations. The Home Secretary had no such power. The 1715 fundamental principle of the Constitution of this country was the independence of judicial officers, and the absence of any control of the Executive Government over the actions of the Judicature; and yet he was constantly asked if he had seen what such and such a justice had done, and if he would undertake to set the decision aside. If he undertook any such function he would do that which he was forbidden to do by the Constitution. The only office of the Secretary of State was to advise the Crown as to the exercise of the prerogative of mercy. He had made these observations generally, because he was constantly being plied with Questions of this kind. In reference to this particular Question, he had to say that if any magistrate or Inferior Court admitted evidence which ought not to be admitted, or refused to receive evidence which ought to be admitted, that was a matter that could be corrected, and only corrected, by a Superior Court of Law, upon the interpretation of the statute.
§ MR. LABOUCHEREasked the right hon. and learned Gentleman whether it was not the case that the Lord Chancellor could dismiss any magistrate, and who was responsible in that House for the action of the Lord Chancellor?
§ SIR WILLIAM HARCOURTsaid, the Lord Chancellor could dismiss a magistrate for proved misconduct, for conduct of a corrupt or dishonest character; but he could not do so for an error in the interpretation of the law. As to who was responsible for the action of the Lord Chancellor, that was a Question which he was not prepared to answer off-hand.
§ MR. LABOUCHEREasked whether ignorance, when it amounted to the extent shown in his Question, was not a reason of itself for removing a magistrate from the commission of the peace?
§ [No answer was returned.]