MR. J. COWENsaid, after the frank and candid statement of the Secretary of State for India, he hoped the discussion that had been raised by the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) would be allowed to terminate. On a future occasion, with more ample details, the case could be discussed. He was desirous of drawing the attention of the House for a short time to another but cognate theme. He had the misfortune, along with some other hon. Gentlemen who sat on that side of the House, not to be in entire accord with the Government on their foreign policy. During the Session they had—he was speaking for others as well as for himself—abstained from provoking discussions that might be inconvenient. They were unwilling, even apparently, to embarrass the diplomatic and administrative action of the Ministry. Although they did not approve of some things that had been done, and others that had been spoken, they had been silent. They had been assured, however, on more than one occasion from the Treasury Bench that before the Session terminated a statement of the course the Government intended to pursue in the East would be submitted to Parliament. And that statement, they were led to understand, would clear up many difficulties and remove many doubts. The speech of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India, on Thursday night, did not fulfil this expectation. The information then imparted was meagre and incom- 1299 plete. He wished to afford the Government an opportunity at that, the last Business Sitting of the House, to extend their statement; and, as they said they could not enter into general details, he would address to them special questions, to which, possibly, they could give explicit replies. He knew that the task he was undertaking would be distasteful to many present. The thoughts of hon. Members were running on other things. It was unreasonable to suppose that they could deeply interest themselves in an abstract dissertation on foreign policy, initiated by an irresponsible outsider like himself, at the close of a prolonged and exhausting Session, at an Afternoon Sitting, on a sunny Saturday in September. Still, the question was so important that he must use the only opportunity now afforded him to press it on the consideration of the House. Let them look at the facts. Parliament was about to rise. For six months the Cabinet would have uncontrolled authority. They would be enabled to use the vast military and naval power of the State, free from the criticism and comments of the Legislature. And on the eve of their separation Members were told that the Government had committed themselves to a perilous enterprize, which might end in a way they did not intend, and on which they did not calculate. It might produce, indeed, another Navarino. Political memories were never long. People usually forgot one week what had transpired the previous one. But there must be some Gentlemen in the House who had not entirely overlooked the proclamations, the professions, and the promises of the last six months. The charge made against the foreign policy of the late Government was that it was a policy of evasion and equivocation, of mystification and concealment. The Cabinet were accused of forging their designs in secret, and then launching them upon a startled world with theatrical suddenness. Their policy at home was summed up in the word "brag," and abroad in the word "swagger." These were, in substance, the accusations on foreign matters that were pressed with wearying iteration against the last Administration. The present Government came into Office to reverse that course of procedure. They were to usher in a reign of righteousness, of peace, and of non-intervention. As 1300 that man was healthiest who did not know he had a stomach, so they were assured that that nation was happiest which did not know it had a foreign policy. They wore to concern themselves mainly, if not exclusively, with domestic affairs, and leave entangling engagements abroad to more meddlesome States. How had these professions been fulfilled? The Government had been in Office over three months; and he would undertake to say that a less amount of information respecting the action of the Cabinet in foreign matters had been imparted to Parliament during that period than during any similar period in the last six years. A few Questions had been addressed to the Ministry from time to time, and the information in reply to them had been doled out in driblets. Now, when within a few hours of the Prorogation, they were informed that, at the instance of England, the representatives of the fleets of the Great Powers were to rendezvous at Ragusa. They did not gather such a quantity of gunpowder and such a number of guns in an obscure Adriatic port without a purpose. And what was that purpose? The Government were either unwilling or unable to state. The de-sign they had in view might end in a fiasco, and bring in its train humiliation. It might end in fighting. He would like to know what would have been said by peace-loving Members to such an enterprize, initiated at such a time, and under such circumstances, by the last Administration. He could easily conceive—if the Liberals had been sitting on the opposite seats, and the Conservatives had held the Treasury Benches—the indignant speeches that would have been delivered. They talked of opposition. That word would convey no description of the tactics that would have been adopted. The Appropriation Bill, and the other routine measures of terminating the Session, would have been obstructed violently and determinedly. The Privileges of Parliament and the rights of the people would have been appealed to, and it would have been declared, again and again, that hon. Members would not disperse in such a state of uncertainty. Attempts would have been made to drive the Ministry to break through their reticence, and no one would have been more active and energetic in this course of procedure than half-a-dozen hon. Members whom he 1301 could easily name. But now that the position of Parties was reversed those hon. Gentlemen were still and silent. What would have been not only wrong but dangerous, if not unconstitutional, when done by one Party, was condoned and approved of when done by the other. He owned that he did not see the fairness of such reasoning. It was to him a matter of no consequence what Party was in power. If they adopted a line of action calculated to endanger the best interests of the State, he would, to the best of his ability, oppose it. It was matterless whether it was done by political friends or foes. They were constantly being assured that Party government had conferred great benefits on the country. Within limits, that contention was correct. But the benefits conferred had been grossly and outrageously exaggerated. To him, one of the most painful aspects of strict Party action was the incentive to insincerity and immorality that it engendered. His hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle, at least, was consistent. He took the same line when his Party was in Opposition as when it was in power. Whatever side of the House he sat on, he was opposed to drinking and opposed to fighting. He supposed the object of the threatened gathering of destructive mechanism at Ragusa was to terrify the Turks. But suppose the Turks would not be terrified? What then? Was the naval power of free and Constitutional England to be used for the purpose of burning or beating down the huts of the Albanian huntsmen, fishermen, or herdsmen on the harbourless coasts of the Adriatic? Was that the ignoble purpose to which the might of Britain was to be applied? But if even this proposed pressure was not found sufficient, was Constantinople to be blockaded and bombarded? [Sir GEORGE CAMPBELL: Hear, hear!] He was surprised at the approving cheer from his hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy. Had he fully realized what the bombardment of a peaceful and unoffending city meant? He did not know, he had no means of knowing, more than any ordinary person knew; but it had been said abroad, on what appeared to be fair authority, that such a project had at least been discussed. The forcing of the Dardanelles and the carrying of coercion to the Turkish capital was said to be at least a possibility. But the idea, he hoped, had got 1302 no further than a suggestion. And what was all this for? It was to secure additional territory to the little State of Montenegro. It was far from his intention to speak in terms of disparagement of any country, however small, or of any people, however powerless. But it was right for them to have before their minds the extent of the country and the character of the race on whose behalf they were asked by the Government to run such large risks. Montenegro was a State on the east coast of the Adriatic, about the size of a moderate English county. It had a few more inhabitants than the borough he had the honour to represent in that House. The gross annual Revenue was under£30,000 a-year, and half of this was supplied from abroad; £15,000 was given as subsidies by foreign Governments—£12,000 by Russia, and£3,000by Austria. The Prince received from the Montenegrin inhabitants £350 a-year; but that amount was made up by the Czar to £3,500. This Montenegrin Prince, therefore, was really in the pay of Russia, and the State was little more than an outpost of that Empire. Its surface was sterile and mountainous. There was a story common on the Dalmatian coast, that when the gods were busy sowing stones upon earth a bag of boulders burst over Montenegro, and that accounted for the unusual prevalence of rocks. The people had been described by one Prime Minister in that House—Lord Palmerston—as the worst savages in Europe. They had been described more recently by the present Prime Minister as a highland and heroic race. Highland truly they were; but their heroism was, he feared, somewhat damaged by their brutality. They were unquestionably courageous, and fought with commendable bravery for their independence. But their warfare had been in the past of a rather repulsive character. The Montenegrins were accustomed to cut off the heads of the men they slew in battle and sometimes of their prisoners, and the skulls of their slain enemies were hung about the walls of the Montenegrin houses alongside the implements of war and the chase. As the North American Indians preserved the scalps of their enemies, the Montenegrins preserved the skulls of theirs as trophies of their victories. They were regarded as proofs of their old men's valour, and used as incentives to their 1303 young warriors to follow the example of their fathers. No doubt, the country would be benefited if it could be brought into closer contact with the outer world by having free access to the sea. This would be a distinct gain, and one which every liberal and generous man would desire to see realized. It would have a softening influence upon the Montenegrin character. It would also be well if, in addition to their mountains, they had some lowlands where their cattle could be fed with greater ease and with less labour. A portion of the people were engaged either as brigands or as soldiers. Unable to raise sufficient food on their sterile soil, they were driven to levy black-mail, and to commit acts of pillage on their neighbours. It would be to the advantage equally of themselves as of their neighbours if their cultivateable land was increased. But while he admitted the force of this reasoning, and the wisdom of its being complied with, he altogether denied the right or the wisdom of this country giving to Montenegro territory that belonged to others. The Montenegrins were surrounded by another people who were equally as brave, and whose history stretched back into the very mists of time. The Albanians were the oldest people in the Levant. They were there before the ancient Greeks. They had legends, language, and characteristics of their own. They had some of the adverse features, unquestionably, of the Montenegrins; but they were quite as courageous, and their love of independence was as unquestioned and as unquestionable. What the Powers proposed to do was to take the land of the Albanians, and hand it over to the Montenegrins without the approval or consent of the Albanians. [An hon. MEMBER: They are not a nationality.] Not a nationality, his hon. Friend said. That was Prince Bismarck's remark at Berlin. He said he did not know of the existence of the Albanian nation. Such a statement was not at all surprising. Prince Bismarck did not know of the nationality of Denmark or of Holland either. And another Prince, quite as potent then as Prince Bismarck is now, contended at the Congress of Vienna that he did not know of the nationality of Italy. In that statesman's opinion, Italy was merely a geographical expression. And yet they all knew that 1304 Italy to-day was a great and united nation. What had come true of the people on one side of the Adriatic, in little more than 50 years, might also be-come true, in a modified sense, of those on the other side in a like period. There were bitter race feuds between the Montenegrins and the Albanians. They were members not only of a distinct nationality, but they were of a different religion. It was, in his judgment, as unjust to subject the Albanians to the domination of the Montenegrins as it would be to subject the Montenegrins to the domination of the Albanians. The proposition was to take the more fertile valleys, and the few harbours that were to be got on the Adriatic from the Albanians, and give them to their enemies. So that the Albanians, if the arrangement was carried out, would be in exactly the same position as that now complained of by the Montenegrins. They would be injuring one people to benefit another. The district of Dulcigno, which was at present in controversy, contained between 8,000 and 9,000 Mahommedans, 3,000 or 4,000 Roman Catholics, from 1,200 to 1,500 gipsies, and about 1,500 Slavs of the Greek Church. It was proposed to hand over the government of these 13,000 or 14,000 people of different religions and races to the 1,400 or 1,500 Slavs. And this was to be done in the name of the principle of nationalities. He owned he was unable to see the justice of such a course of procedure. No one in that House more warmly upheld the cause of nationality than he did. But he repudiated their right, or the right of Europe, to trample on a people merely because its faith was unorthodox, and its civilization Asiatic. They had recently had roused in this country quite a fervour in favour of nationalities. Its growth had been sudden and its extent suspiciously limited. These people had no end of sympathy for Slav nationality—for the Bulgar, or the Montenegrin, or the Serb; but they had very little care for the nationality of rival peoples. The Turk or the Mahomedan might die in the ditch there—polygamous and deistical heretic that he was—he might die without a groan, die without a sigh, so that his emancipators, his Christian emancipators and liberators, might live in peace and aggrandise their dominions at his expense. The advocates of this 1305 partial application of the principle of nationalities should remember that—
Tawny skins and dark complexionsCould not forfeit Nature's claim.Creeds might differ, but affection and right of nationality dwelt with Turk and Slav the same. Our Government had specially espoused the cause of nationalities, and he rejoiced in it. But their course was inconsistent, if not erratic. It was rather a surprising circumstance to find a Government that ruled India talking of nationalities. They were fond enough of nationalities for the Bulgars; but they had small concern for the nationality across the Irish Channel. There they had a distinct nation with boundaries clearly enough marked certainly, and they not only refused it autonomy, but even any form of local self-government. Yet the Administration that did this set itself up as the special champion of nationalities abroad! He was told that the cession of the territory to Montenegro was in accordance with the decision of the Congress at Berlin. He quite admitted it. The Sultan had bound himself to give additional territory to the Montenegrins, and he ought to fulfil his engagements, however unpleasant or however difficult. But, as showing the ignorance that existed even in the highest quarters as to that part of Europe, the history of this Montenegrin extension might be recited. Gibbon said, at his time, that the interior of Albania was as little known as the interior of Africa, and it would almost appear that what was true in Gibbon's day was true now. By the Treaty of San Stefano a certain territory was awarded to Montenegro. It was found, at Berlin, that this territory was occupied exclusively by Mahommedans; and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to hand them over to the little State without much bloodshed. A new strip of land was then marked out for surrender to them. But the statesmen and military men merely took the Austrian military map, ran a line across certain hills and certain valleys, and said—"This much goes to Montenegro, and the other is to be retained by Turkey." But they took no account of the people who lived in these valleys. They found, upon examination, that as the people conceded by the Treaty of San Stefano were Mahommedans, so those conceded by the 1306 Treaty of Berlin were mainly Roman Catholics, So that arrangement also had to be set aside. Count Corti hit upon a compromise, and a not altogether unsatisfactory one; but there were difficulties even in the way of its fulfilment. And now our Government were insisting upon the surrender of the district of Dulcigno, which he had just referred to. The changes that had been made in surrendering the different strips of territory showed the difficulty of dealing with the question with a due regard to interests and rights of all parties concerned. The Turks were blamed for their dilatoriness in fulfilling the engagements. He had no wish whatever to stand there, in any sense, as an apologist of the Turkish Government. Their doings had put them beyond defence. Their corruption, their slothfulness, and their extravagance had rendered apologies for them impossible. There was little that the Prime Minister had said in condemnation of the orthodox government of the Pashas and the Palace that he was not prepared to indorse. What he contended for was that injustice should not be done to the people of Turkey because of the sins and crimes of the governing classes in the country. His contention was that, heretics though they were, they were as much entitled to consideration as their Christian, or professedly Christian, neighbours. He could not emphasize too strongly his declaration that it was sympathy with the common people of Turkey—who had suffered more than the outlying Christian populations—and not sympathy with the governing caste that he had. But while saying this, he was equally bound to say that the Sultan, on this Montenegrin question, had not acted unfairly. He strove to surrender the territory awarded by the Treaty of Berlin, and sent, for the purpose of the cession, one of his ablest statesmen and greatest generals—Mehemet Ali. But the distinguished soldier and his suite were murdered by the Albanians. Rather than comply with the orders from Constantinople they killed their own countrymen. It was not want of will so much as want of power on the part of Turkey to do what was asked of her. He had no doubt the Porte would be very glad to be quit of the difficulty; but, in getting quit of it, they did not wish to drive their own subjects into insurrection. 1307 On another occasion, when the Turks surrendered the forts along the Montenegrin border, the Montenegrins were unable to take possession of them. If there had been any serious desire on the part of the people in these districts to join this Montenegrin State the withdrawal of the Turkish soldiers would have enabled them to do this. The contention was that these people were kept in subjection by Turkey. The Turks, however, withdrew; and yet, notwithstanding, the people clung to their rule, and refused to be annexed to Montenegro. What Europe wished to do was to compel Turkey to fight against her own people, and hand them over against their will to a race and Government they disliked, if not detested. With respect to the Treaty of Berlin, he denied, too, that there was anything in that Treaty that required the Powers to take conjoint action to enforce its provisions. That Treaty was a compromise. It prescribed certain territory to be surrendered by Turkey, and certain advantages to be conceded to her. But when Prince Gortschakoff sought to induce the Congress to enter into an engagement for giving military effect to these provisions, all the Representatives of the Congress refused to agree to his proposal. None did this more emphatically than the Representatives of this country. Prince Bismarck said that all the Congress was called upon to do was to mark out certain arrangements which it deemed to be desirable for the East of Europe, and then leave the fulfilment to the steady operation of time and the influence of circumstances. He protested, and so did Count Andrassy, against any forcible application being made to apply these provisions, lest by that very application of force the whole arrangements of the Treaty might be endangered. But when the Government did seek to apply military and naval pressure for this purpose it was right that its application should be equal—that, while it obtained the fulfilment of the conditions that were against Turkey, it should be equally used to secure the conditions that were made in her favour. And that led him to ask the Government to state whether the conditions prescribed with respect to Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, as well as those respecting Montenegro, were also to be enforced by the 1308 concerted action of the Powers. He would like to know from the Representative of the Foreign Office if the Government could give any information as to the unusual and extraordinary migration of Russian soldiers to the Balkan States. It was said that 80,000 stand of arms and 30,000 Russian soldiers had recently gone to Bulgaria. These soldiers, and these munitions of war, could only be sent there for one purpose, and that purpose would be aggressive and offensive. Were the Government in a position to state that the use to be made of this warlike material and these warlike men was not a like use to that made of a like migration into Servia a few years ago? Did they not point to further assaults upon the Mahomedan population? The Under Secretary had said some time ago, in answer to a question from the hon. Member for Rochester (Mr. Otway), that a proposal had been made to the Government by another Power to this effect. Supposing the Turkish Government fulfilled all the conditions of the Treaty of Berlin, was England prepared to join the other Powers in declaring that no further concessions should be asked for from her? He knew it was not an absolute guarantee that was suggested by Germany; but it was a general undertaking that, if the Treaty engagements were fulfilled, for a time, at least, the Ottoman Empire should not be further harassed. These were the three points on which he desired information from the Ministry. First, whether the naval power of England, if used for the service of Montenegrin nationality, might not be used to the disservice and detriment of the Albanian nationality? Second, whether any further arrangement had been made as to the proposed engagement with respect to protecting the remnants of the Turkish Empire? Third, whether the suspicious action of Russia in Bulgaria and Roumelia had received the attention of the Ministry? He thought it would be possible for the Government to give the country information on these points, without embarrassing them in any action with the other Powers. So far as the Treaty of Berlin was concerned, he joined with the Ministry in believing in the necessity for effect being given to it. There were two ways, however, of carrying out a bargain. Its fulfilment might be made to press with 1309 undue severity on one of the parties, and with great leniency on the other. They had ridiculed it, and declared, not once, but frequently, that the retention of any form of Mahomedan rule, even for the Mussulman population west of the Bosphorus, was not only impossible, but undesirable. They sought not only the overturning of the Porte—which was a point on which he, to a large extent, agreed with them—but also for the subjugation of the Turkish to the Slav race. In estimating the value of the Treaty of Berlin, they should calculate not only what was accomplished by it, but the obstacles there were in calling it into existence. The settlement of the oldest, the greatest, and the most complex international problem in Europe, one involving the destinies—material, political, and religious—of millions of people, was not an undertaking that could be adjusted off-hand, as they could do a Railway Bill in that House. In the classic lands dealt with in the Treaty of Berlin, there met the conflicting civilizations of the East and West—the one iconoclastic and progressive, the other traditional and conservative. There came there into collision all variety of races and religions—the Hebrew, the heathen, the Greek, the gipsy, and the Slav—men of all faiths, as well as men of no faith. At the junction of opposing streams, you had formed debateable deltas, erratic eddies, and cross-currents. So, in Turkey, there was run together territory that had been the battle-ground of the world for ages, the representative of an all but exhausted past and of an aggressive present. War and diplomacy, sentiment and interest, the principle of nationality, and the prejudices of sectarianism, had all been tried; but it had baffled the ingenuity of generations of statesmen to find a solution for the many complex problems that were bound up in the Eastern Question. The long existence of the loosely-organized Turkish Empire was itself a monument and symbol of that failure. The Porte, though not a system of government that could be defended, had been heretofore found a fairly working substitute for the object of that fruitless search. It was unreasonable to expect that any Congress, or Government, or series of Governments, could clear off all at once the legacy of sectarian hate, and of race jealousy, that centuries of injustice and 1310 misrule had bequeathed to the present generation. All that could be done by such an arrangement was to help forward the settlement; and this, he contended, the Treaty of Berlin had done. In sitting in judgment upon the finding of that document, they should recollect not only the intrinsic difficulties of the question dealt with, but the rival interests of the parties concerned. When they remembered these difficulties—the intricacies in the East, the jealousies of other nations, the divisions always active and sometimes exacting we had at home—he thought they might fairly regard the solution arrived at two years ago at Berlin as not unsatisfactory. It was not what many of them wanted; it was not what some of them expected. But, given the circumstances, and admitting the conditions, the award was, taking it all round, not unfair. He rejoiced, therefore, that the Government had resolved to give effect to that agreement. In their efforts to do this they would receive, if impartial, the encouraging support of all shades of politicians in this country. He recognized clearly the difficulties of their position, and was willing to make all allowance for them. It was the interest of all parties to lend the Government help in seeking the fulfilment of this Treaty. But, again, he wished to declare that to seek the fulfilment of one side of the Treaty, and not the fulfilment of the other, would be to prevent the realization of the advantages that it would otherwise confer. At the same time, it would be an injustice to unoffending and helpless people; and it might, if pushed too far, be a danger to Europe.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEthought that the speech which they had just heard would have been more appropriate to the debate of last Thursday night than to the present occasion. The policy of the late Government was an isolated policy. That of the present Government, on the contrary, was one upon which the Powers were in agreement. It was not, however, a new policy; it was the policy traced out by the Treaty of Berlin. On the general question, his hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen) had used language which he could not but describe as of a very exaggerated kind. His hon. Friend spoke of forcing the Dardanelles and bombarding Constantinople.
MR. J. COWENremarked, that he referred merely to rumours -which were in circulation to that effect.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, he was, of course, in the recollection of the House; but it appeared to him that the hon. Member did not merely refer to rumours, because he went on in a passage of impassioned oratory to protest against the bombardment of a peaceful town. But the truth was that no project of the kind was entertained. His hon. Friend did the Montenegrin people scant justice. They were, no doubt, miserably poor; but their love of independence was very great, and they might be said to be almost the only unconquered race in the East of Europe. There was nothing to show that they were animated by a spirit of brigandage and lawlessness. On the contrary, he believed they were, to a great extent, free from the vice of brigandage so prevalent in the East, and their respect for law and order was proved by the scrupulous care they showed in carrying out the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin—a matter in which they had put themselves in harmony with the most modern ideas of civilized Europe. Again, there was no information in the possession of the Government to confirm the statement of the hon. Member that there was a wish to hand over the Albanians to a Power whose rule they would detest. The Corti Compromise would, if carried out, have embraced a large Catholic population; but Her Majesty's Government were assured that the Dulcigno Arrangement was not subject to any objection of that sort. He did not sympathize entirely with the Slav populations, and he had taken pains to ascertain what were the feelings of the people in regard to the matter in question. He could not agree with the estimate of his hon. Friend to the effect that there were 9,000 Mohammedans in Dulcigno. The highest number at which he had heard them put was 5,000, and he had every reason to believe that there were not more than 3,000, and he thought that his hon. Friend would give him credit for a desire not to favour unduly any population in the East at the expense of another. That Turkey was willing to carry out the Treaty of Berlin in respect to the Montenegrin Frontier was not a view which the Government, acting upon the Reports of their responsible 1312 agents, could take. There might have been a moment when Turkey was willing to rectify the Montenegrin Fronter in the sense prescribed; but, certainly, since the present Government came into Office there had been no sign on her part of a disposition to do so. The information which the Government possessed led them to impute to Turkish officials all the delay which had taken place in the execution of the Treaty of Berlin in respect to the Montenegrin Frontier, and all the consequent danger to the peace of Europe which existed. There could be no doubt, in fact, that the present state of things in respect to the Montenegrin Frontier did constitute a menace and a danger to the peace of Europe. Their information was that early in June the North Albanian Chiefs had expressed themselves as not unfavourable to the proposed arrangement. The inhabitants of the Dulcigno district could hardly be said to belong to the Albanian race; they were an extremely mixed people, and it was doubtful how far they were Slav and how far Albanian; but, at any rate, they did not have frequent? communication with the Chiefs of North Albania, from whom they and their district were cut off by a river and a lake. During the late War the whole district had been occupied by a Montenegrin force, which remained for a year, and left in fulfilment of one of the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin. There was reason to believe that that Montenegrin occupation was not resisted by the people of the district. According to the latest information sent by Mr. Kirby Green, the local feeling in the extreme north of Albania was favourable to the Dulcigno Arrangement, and the Chiefs who were in favour of resisting it were not inhabitants of the district. In a despatch that would shortly be published it was stated that—
The arrangement would be received by the Albanians with a sensation of relief from a state of things that is fast becoming intolerable.And they had heard over and over again that any resistance that might be made would not be bond fide, but would be instigated by officials from the Porte. He might also inform the House that the several Governments had agreed to make the fullest possible arrangements for the equitable treatment of the inhabitants of any districts that might be ceded to Montenegro. It might be urged, pos- 1313 sibly, that no such stipulation had any practical value; but they were bound to believe that any such arrangements would be carefully carried into effect. There was another matter to which his hon. Friend had alluded very briefly, and that was the statement that 80,000 stand of arms had been imported into Bulgaria. There was no doubt whatever that the Bulgarian Militia were being armed, and, as far as he knew, there was no reason why they should not be armed; but they had no information that would lead them to suppose that there had been so considerable an importation of arms. He would only add that no one concurred more sincerely than he did with his hon. Friend in desiring that all creeds should be treated on an equality. He firmly believed that their policy was designed to treat them all equally, and not to favour one nationality at the expense of another.
§ SIR WILFRID LAWSON,as an irresponsible outsider, thought that it would be well to know what was going on with respect to foreign affairs. He did not wish for any further declaration, but only to know that the Government would not take any active steps in the direction of a policy of coercion without giving the House an opportunity of expressing an opinion on the subject. He confessed that he was puzzled to know what the Government meant by their projected Naval Demonstration in concert with the five Great European Powers. They had been told that the object of the Naval Demonstration was to strengthen and not to embarrass the Turkish Empire, and to secure European peace, and preserve the power of the Porte itself. That was only the old cry again, the balance of power in Europe, that ancient fetish which had cost millions of lives. What was known as the independence of the Turkish Empire was the most foolish policy which this country had ever maintained. It was impossible exactly to know from the statement of the Under Secretary what the real object of the Naval Demonstration was, for he was at a lost to understand how a country could be strengthened by pressure being exercised upon them by the combined Powers of Europe. His own firm conviction was that the course now being pursued was full of danger, because it was impossible, without great danger, to keep a fire in a powder magazine. As to 1314 acting in conjunction and by agreement with other Powers, if the Government once began such a policy they would cease to be their own masters, and would be in the greatest danger of becoming, before long, entangled in the toils of the military Empires. And what was it all for? The Prime Minister had preached the doctrine of nationalities. There was a conflict between the speeches of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen) and the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as to the number of Mahomedans and Catholics in certain places. That showed that we were not in a position to undertake the settlement of these disputes in different parts of the world. We ought to consult the wishes of the people as to the Government they wished to live under. We could not arrive at a satisfactory settlement by the Powers of Europe carving out territory as they thought fit. He supposed that what was aimed at in this case was not a scientific Frontier, but a philanthropic Frontier; but he was not prepared to send a single soldier or a single ship to fight for it. He had never read a speech with greater pleasure than he did the reply of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India to the deputation of Jingoes who urged the occupation of Candahar. They urged all the usual arguments; the noble Lord heard them through, and with that straightforward, honest directness which would some day make him the most popular man in England, said—"It is all very well; but the question is, what right have we to go to Candahar?" That was a plain question, and it was such a question he wished the Government to consider thoroughly before undertaking to settle Frontiers in distant parts of the world. Let us find out what right we had to make those settlements. He protested against the doctrine that we were the police of the world. We had no commission, human or divine, to set right every wrong. We lived in an island far away from all these complications; and it would be a great deal better, in his opinion, not to throw themselves into these quarrels and troubles, but to remember the old maxim that we should do our duty in the station of life to which it had pleased God to call us. We had had a six years' cry of British interests. That was the most humiliating cry that any nation could have put forth 1315 —interests at the expense of honour; but he did not know that the cry of British interference all over the world was a great deal better; it was only Jingoism in a respectable dress. It seemed a ridiculous idea that we, of all people, were to set ourselves up as the great reformers of abuses, that we should go to war for nationalities, whether bullets or buckshot should be used to keep one down, that we should talk of peace while our hands were reeking with the blood of Afghans and Zulus, who simply defended their own country, and that we should insist on local government elsewhere, while we could not shoot a rabbit without the permission of an absolute oligarchy. We really seemed to exhibit ourselves as the Pharisees of Europe. He asked for no statement that might endanger our relations. He fully believed the Home Secretary, when he said that no projects were being hatched that would take the country by surprise. All be asked was that the Government would undertake, before committing the country to warlike measures, that Parliament should have the opportunity of considering whether the object was one for which the blood and treasure of this country ought to be expended.
§ MR. A. J. BALFOURsaid, he failed to see the distinction in point of selfishness between the policy of British interests, which the hon. Baronet described as degrading, and the policy of ignoring foreign affairs altogether, and devoting ourselves entirely to our own interests. In fact, they only differed as to the manner in which British interests could best be promoted, and the hon. Baronet thought it was to be done by selfish isolation, and not by united action among the Powers of Europe. The Government said their object was to carry out the Treaty of Berlin; but the means by which they intended to carry it out seemed to be full of danger, and might have consequences more far-reaching than they contemplated, and might, in no distant future, produce evils throughout Europe. No doubt, it was strange that the Gentlemen who, two or three years ago, were complaining of the concealment practised in foreign affairs, should, within the first three months of their taking Office, practice concealment as dark as any practised by the late Government. He did not mean to complain 1316 of them on that account. If they said it was for the interests of this country that the conduct of foreign affairs should not at that moment be made public, he claimed for them, as he claimed for the last Government, that they must be the only judges of that public necessity. The late Government said, at a certain time, it was impossible for them to take the public into their confidence without injury to public interests; and he would be the last to say that such a plea should not be considered now. The real check upon the foreign policy of a Government was the discussion which must come at the close of particular stages. ["Hear, hear!"] The Prime Minister cheered that statement; but, in his Mid Lothian speeches, did he not express disapproval of that theory of government, and say that the public ought to be taken into confidence at every stage of foreign negotiation? The check on Government was the responsibility to Parliament for the consequences of a policy. But he must warn the Government against doing what they seemed inclined to do, which was to urge the fact that they were acting in concert with Europe as an excuse for the consequences of their policy. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said there was a great distinction between the present and the late Government in this respect—that whereas the late Government pursued a course of isolation the present were acting in concert with the Powers of Europe. He did not think this would exonerate the present Government from blame if they got into any difficulty. It must be remembered that for every end the Powers had in common they had half-a-dozen not in common; and though we were acting in concert with other Powers, they might be acting in the best possible way to obtain their own ends. Acting with them we might not be acting in the best possible way to obtain our own ends.
§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTadmitted the anxiety of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to prove that great impartiality and fairness were shown to the Mussulman population; but when they came to action it was always found that action was most favourable to the intolerant majority. In no action they had taken had the condition of the Mussulman population been fairly considered. Had they taken 1317 any serious steps to improve that condition of the Mussulman population? On the contrary, it was becoming more and more atrocious till it had now reached a state of oppression unequalled in ancient or modern times. The provisions of the Berlin Treaty had not been duly respected in this matter. At the present moment intrigues were going on all over the Balkan Peninsula, and Russian agents were traversing it with impunity from end to end. Turkey knew very well that we were pressing ruthlessly every point that told against her, as in the matter of Greece; but why should the Government claim credit for doing so with a view to strengthen Turkey? Let the Government be fair and equitable in this matter, and when depriving Turkey of their territory and population let them not pretend that they were doing so to strengthen Turkey. He agreed with much that had been so eloquently stated by the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen); the facts were as he had represented. The Treaty of Berlin had been assented to by the Turks, and was signed by the Sultan, however unfavourable it was in some of its provisions. In that Treaty the Powers were authorized to offer their mediation; but what had been done? The Government, instead of acting as mediators, had acted as arbitrators. England with the Russian Government or the Powers of Europe were going to compel an unwilling people to cede their territory to Montenegro and Greece. There was another point, and that was the contrast between the condition of affairs now and the condition of affairs when the late Government were in Office. All these questions were being quietly settled under the late Government. As soon as the present Government came into Office every one of these questions burst out afresh. Every one of these nationalities was encouraged by Russia to disturb every part of the Turkish Empire. Moreover, suddenly, since the accession of the present Government to Office, a new naval demonstration on the part of the European Powers had been arranged, which threatened general disturbance and war. He thought the Government of this country would show greater courage by giving up the policy of sanctioning, directly or indirectly, the plans of Russia. If they had any real desire to promote the welfare of Turkey 1318 its action towards it would be of a very different character; and instead of a British squadron being sent to make a demonstration in Turkish waters they would hear of one being despatched to the coast of Poland, and another to the Eastern shores of the Black Sea. The policy which the Government were pursuing in Grecee was evidently designed to promote the interests of that country at the expense of Turkey, and could not be expected to be received with favour by the latter country.
MR. GLADSTONESir, I believe it is right, out of consideration for one or two hon. Members who have spoken, that I should not allow this debate to close without saying a few words. But I think also that the prolongation of it would be attended with great inconvenience, not only to persons present, but to persons elsewhere. There are many matters to which I should have been otherwise glad to refer. After hearing the speech of the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, I can only say that the strain of that speech is such that I do not think on the whole it requires an answer. Every idle rumour, every extravagant assertion, every doctrine favourable to domination of Turkey, even beyond what the Turks themselves advance, we are sure to hear from him when he rises. Even on a matter of geography the hon. Member is extravagant, for he recommends us to send a fleet to the coast of Poland or to a corner of the Baltic. Under these circumstances, I will only refer to one point which he has mentioned. He told the House, and I have not a doubt he himself believes it, I am sure he speaks with perfect sincerity, that we are acting under the dictation, or under the secret influence of Russia in endeavouring to extend the Greek Frontier at the expense of Turkey. So little has the hon. Gentleman watched the relative attitude of Russia to the Hellenic race in the Turkish Empire that he, actually running counter to the most palpable, notorious, and elementary facts of the Eastern Question, lands us in the supposition that Russia herself, watched by us mainly on account of her inclination to sacrifice Greek interests to those of the Slav, is the active, ardent champion of the Greek race, at whose instigation Europe has been acting in recommending the extension of the Greek Frontier. [Mr. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT dis- 1319 sented.] The House, I believe, put upon the speech of the hon. Gentleman the construction I have put upon it; and if it is not the true one, the hon. Gentleman will have an opportunity of explaining his speech when I sit down. As respects the Greek Question itself, I will only observe that for the assembled Powers of Europe to give a construction to the Treaty of Berlin has been characterized by the hon. Gentleman as an act of international brigandage; and he said there was no precedent for anything of the kind. He entirely forgets the manner in which the Greek Kingdom was setup. He forgets how it was and why it was the Free State of Belgium came into existence; and, in fact, he claims for himself a licence which I think he must find very greatly to increase any facilities he might otherwise enjoy for sustaining the case he wishes to recommend to Parliament, but which likewise, I think, dispenses us from the necessity of minute and detailed reply to his observations. Now, Sir, the case of Greece is not one which is most prominently before us; but the case of Greece cannot be justly or fairly considered except by bearing in mind that of which there is not a glimpse in the hon. Gentleman's speech, nor, apparently, in his mind—namely, the course taken with regard to Greece during the War between Russia and Turkey. At that time the alliance of the Greeks would have been invaluable to Russia. Russia sought the alliance of the Greeks. A union with Greece, acting upon the Christian population of Thessaly, which my hon. Friend never seemed to take at all into account, but treats Thessaly as if it were a country inhabited by Turks—a union of Greece with Russia at that time would have been of vital consequence to Russia; but Greece was prevented from giving that co-operation by the action of the Powers of Europe; and after Greece was prevented from giving that co-operation, the hon. Gentleman, and possibly others, say the Powers of Europe have no right to interfere between Greece and Turkey, or to take any steps whatever for the extension of the Greek Frontier. I see my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford (Mr. A. J. Balfour) has returned to his place. I think he is perfectly correct in stating that we cannot escape from any part of our responsibility by pleading the con- 1320 cert of Europe. If the measures which we recommend to the House, or if the measures which we ourselves adopt, are bad, it is no sufficient apology to offer to Parliament, or the people of England, that we adopted them in concert with others; and, therefore, I am most glad we should be taken to task if, at anytime, we are heard urging the doctrine of the concert of Europe, and the expediency of maintaining it as a means of escaping from, or reducing in any respect, our own responsibility. But, on the other hand, when we come to consider the question whether the concert of Europe, so far as it can be had, is a most valuable and important instrument for the settlement on broad principles of justice of international questions, then we are ready to maintain the doctrine of cherishing and promoting to the utmost this concert of Europe. It is difficult, no doubt, to maintain; but when you cannot maintain it what have you to substitute for it? As long as it can be maintained you have that inestimable advantage and security that it. is almost a moral impossibility that all the united Powers of Europe over can consciously act together for the pursuit of an object that is unjust. Mistakes may be committed, into errors they may fall, but injustice is hardly conceivable; while selfishness it is totally impossible that the Powers of Europe should pursue in common. Therefore, I am very sorry when I hear any speech in this House, whether it is the speech of the hon. Gentleman opposite, or the speech of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen), which, so far as I am able to judge, goes to depreciate or to put out of repute that which the present Government have declared to be emphatically their policy—namely, to maintain to the utmost of their power the concert of Europe for the settlement of international questions. Now, I do not think the hon. Member for Newcastle will be in the slightest degree put out of conceit with the speech which he has delivered when I state with what regret, and even, as to some parts, with what surprise I have heard it. My hon. Friend is a great promoter of the doctrine of nationalities. No person can doubt the sincerity of his professions on this subject. He has, I believe, given practical demonstration of the sincerity of those professions in a manner to place 1321 them beyond all question; but I must say it is most unfortunate, so far as regards the East, that I never heard my hon. Friend, in these latest years, preach and enforce the doctrine of nationalities, except in conjunction with an argument and declaration which go directly to the promotion of the Turkish policy and the maintenance of the Turkish Power, irrespective of all the great interests we ought to consider in connection with the maintenance of nationalities. But he has yet to learn one lesson, the most vital of all, and it is this—that if you permit and cause it to be understood in Turkey that you believe the first necessity of the hour is the maintenance of the Turkish Empire, irrespective of the manner in which government is exercised—when that is once known, all your love of nationalities, all your desire for reforms, all your humanity and philanthropy—and far be it from me for a moment to question them—will become doctrines idle and utterly futile in the view of the Government of Turkey. That, Sir, was the basis on which the Powers proceeded at the period of the Treaty of Paris, when the language adopted was this—
We shall recommend and take every security in our power for the introduction of reforms into Turkey; but their introduction must be subservient to the maintenance of the integrity of the Turkish Empire.That was the doctrine adopted at the time in good faith, and I will not say it was not justified by the state of experience of that day. But what was the effect of that doctrine? The effect of it was that though 20 years of perfect rest after the severe chastisement Russia had received were granted to Turkey; though she had every facility which, in the nature of things, it was possible she could have for introducing reforms during the whole of that period, and though—as we are now told that want of money, forsooth, is the reason why reforms cannot be introduced—though she then had £200,000,000 put into her pocket for the purpose, not the slightest progress in any one portion of her Empire was made towards the attainment of those objects. And, Sir, it became perfectly clear that a change of tone must be adopted; that it was a sham and a farce to continue to recommend reforms, and, at the same time, to hold this language to the Turkish Govern- 1322 ment—"Mind, whatever we say about reforms, that is a secondary object in our view; to keep you where you are is our first object. "And the change, Sir, that I hope has been made has been this—that the Ottoman Government begins to understand that although we are bona fide desirous to avoid the difficulties and complications that might arise upon the breaking up of the Turkish Empire, yet the tolerable discharge of the duties of government towards the subjects of Turkey is no longer a secondary, but a primary object; and that unless Turkey is prepared to discharge them in that tolerable manner of which, I am sorry to say, we have not yet sufficient evidence, the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire must learn to shift for themselves. Notwithstanding it may appear strange to the hon. Member opposite, this is what we believe to be true friendship to Turkey. We believe the true interests of Turkey lie in the adoption of those reforms which good government demands. Other friends of Turkey have had her destinies in their hands at other times, and we see what has been the result. The present condition of the Turkish Empire and its present dangers are the proof of the fruits of another policy. Let Europe make it understood by Turkey that the discharge of the duties of a Government is the first condition of support and countenance to the maintenance of Ottoman rule, and then, no doubt, if ever, we shall have some hope of effecting real improvement in that condition. I listened with the greatest regret to the account given by the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen) of the people of Montenegro—the most heroic race in Europe. I am sorry he should have ridiculed their sterile country. Why is their country sterile? Because they alone of the European races preferred to surrender property, ease, and comfort, and, retiring into these mountains, hold their rocky fastnesses, while the desolalation of the Ottoman conquest spread all around them. And that is made a subject of reproach and ridicule by my hon. Friend, the friend of nationalities. It is quite a mistake, as far as my information goes—and if a mistake, a most injurious one—to describe the Montenegrins as in great part brigands, and given systematically to inhuman acts in war, such, for instance, as the destruc- 1323 tion of the lives of prisoners. I wish my hon. Friend would give some study to the interesting history of Montenegro. It is evident he has never done it, and that he has given us one or two little scraps of what he may possibly have picked up from some Turkish newspaper. They actually cut off the heads of their prisoners, it is said. Sir, that is totally untrue. Not only so, but it was untrue even in times when the people of Montenegro were, to a considerable extent, barbarized by the circumstances of their position. I remember an anecdote, which is a true anecdote. It was certainly many generations ago; I will not define the exact date, but it is not less than 200, perhaps 300, years ago. In a particular action the Montenegrins took 147 prisoners from the Turks, and they exchanged these 147 Turkish prisoners for 147 pigs, these being of great value to the Montenegrins, whose country produced hardly any animal food, while 147 Turkish prisoners were evidently of no value at all. I mention that incident, strange as it may seem, to show that in far more barbarous times than the present they had not the practice which the hon. Gentleman describes. I will admit that, having taken some pains to acquaint myself with Montenegrin territory, I find that 100 years ago the Montenegrins were largely given to brigandage, and no wonder, because they had been perpetually maintaining a military struggle for the possession of the lands of which they had been formerly proprietors, Dulcigno included. That being so, it was no very great wonder that these people, driven by such hard conditions of life and the extreme want of their inhospitable fastnesses, should make raids on their neighbours, whom they deemed to be in unjust possession of their lands. Still, what the hon. Member ought to know is this—that not only have great efforts, in the ordinary sense of the word, been made, but the most extreme severity has been exercised by the last rulers of Montenegro to put an end to that system of brigandage; and, unless I am mistaken, I am within the mark in saying that 500 Montenegrins were put to death by the last Prince or the present one, and that the effect of the severity has been that brigandage is at an end. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to characterize 1324 the Montenegrins as simply a savage and lawless people, let him take this fact and lay it to heart, about which there is not the smallest doubt, that any traveller who goes to Montenegro, and obtains a Montenegrin woman for his guide, although he may be a stranger and without any defence—and in worse times than at present and before brigandage was extinguished this was the case—he may walk in perfect safety from one end of the country to the other. I will not dwell upon that subject any further, but will come very briefly to what I think are the main allegations of the hon. Member. The hon. Member lays down a very just principle—that we ought not to hand over to any other State the unwilling populations. But he begs the question when he assumes that Dulcigno is unwilling. We do not admit that Dulcigno is unwilling. We know very well that Turkish organs tell us that Dulcigno is unwilling. If, Sir, we are to trust Turkish organs, we had better abandon altogether intervention in this matter, and we had better never have contracted any engagement in relation to these Eastern countries. From the information we have received we have every reason to believe that the people of Dulcigno are agreeable to the transfer. When it is said that Mr. Kirby Green is our solitary informant the statement is totally inaccurate. The Representatives of other Powers, and particularly a most competent gentleman, the Representative of Austria, are on this point in complete accordance with him. Therefore, the first condition set up by my hon. Friend, the assent of the people as a transfer from one Government to another, is satisfied in the case of Dulcigno. The Government has no wish to go all over the world rectifying the wrongs of mankind, and any action in which the present Government has been engaged has been absolutely limited to the settlement of the Treaty of Berlin. The hon. Gentleman says that the Turkish Government has been eager to give effect to the Treaty of Berlin. I will not now enter into that matter. Our means of judging have been tolerably large during the time that we have been in Office; and, instead of saying that during that time there has been eagerness on the part of the Turkish Government to give effect to the Treaty of Berlin, I am bound to say there has been precisely the oppo- 1325 site. The hon. Member did not in the course of his speech make many other statements which have not been ably answered by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I must, however, before sitting down say a few words in reference to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson). In the first place, I do not believe there is any body of gentlemen who more entirely concur in the general declaration of my hon. Friend than the present Government. We have no mission or commission to go all over the world rectifying the wrongs of mankind wherever they are to be found. That is, I believe, as far as possible from the view of Members of the present Government—at any rate, it is as far as possible from any action with which the present Government has been engaged. My hon. Friend spoke of British interference all over the world. Our interference has been absolutely limited to the fulfilment of Treaty obligations. My hon. Friend must admit, and I do not think he would be reluctant to admit, that the fulfilment of Treaty obligations is a matter entirely distinct from either chivalrous or Quixotic tendencies to wander all over the world in search of occasions for interference; or, what is still worse than chivalrous and Quixotic interference, a disposition to set up a plea and pretext of British interests for the purpose of disregarding the rights of other people. To neither of these things is there, in my opinion, any reason for me to refer on the present occasion. I will, therefore, confine myself to meeting the inquiry put by my hon. Friend, who says that he does not know what we are going to do. The hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen) says that we are keeping back information from Parliament, and that there never has been an occasion when it has been so long withheld. It was not until well on in the Session of 1876 that the first information was given to us with respect to the events in the East, which had commenced in the summer of 1875; and it was not until the end of the Session of 1876—on the 31st of July, I believe—that the first adverse criticism was pronounced upon the policy of the then existing Government, which policy they had been prosecuting for more than 12 months. Therefore the charge of a hasty, intolerant, and precipitate attack upon the policy 1326 of the late Government falls to the ground. But my hon. Friend asks from us a positive declaration that if any measure is adopted by us which can, under any circumstances, lead to the use of coercion, concerted or isolated, great or small, for the most immediate purposes of humanity, or for general purposes of policy, no such measure shall on any account be taken without first summoning Parliament. [Sir WILFRID LAWSON: What I said was actual measure.] If it is to be done before any actual measure, it must be done before any step is taken that can lead to those actual measures. Otherwise, what is the value of the intervention of Parliament? It is a very heavy responsibility I admit. It is a responsibility that cannot be overstated. Parliament puts into the hands of the Executive Government the use of the military and naval power within certain limits; and though we should be the first to assert that such military and naval power ought never to be used except under the gravest necessity, and with the clearest proof of right, yet we are not prepared to say, and, indeed, we might sacrifice the honour of the country if we were prepared to say, that on no condition should it be exercised and no measure should be taken that could even so remotely result in its exercise until Parliament had been called together and consulted at the very outset as to the origin of the measure. The conditions which my hon. Friend seeks to impose are not compatible with the functions of an Executive and Legislative Assembly. My hon. Friend is quite satisfied, I hope, that there is no wild, impolitic, or selfish schemes entertained or fostered on the part of the Government. If it is so, I hope that he will rest satisfied with the limitation that we have placed upon ourselves. Of course, it is a great limitation to say that we are averse to any isolated action, for obviously concerted action is a very limitation on the liberty which might be assumed by any single Power. We have placed upon ourselves another and a different limitation, and it is this—that we are not now proposing to Parliament to give effect to objects of policy, however tenable they may be, or however good they may be, which are new or undefined; but we have placed before ourselves nothing else than this—the fulfilment to the letter, and in the spirit, of 1327 what has been brought about by our absolute and positive obligations. That, again, I need scarcely say, is a narrowing somewhat of the province of action, such as I hope will tend to re-assure my hon. Friend. If further assurance is necessary, and should be required, I have only to say that I trust my hon. Friend may find it in looking back on the career of those who in general form the present Government. I am not aware that any of them have been characterized by a precipitate desire to multiply our foreign engagements and relations all over the world, and which tend to increase the already heavy burdens imposed on the shoulders of the people of this country. In that spirit of reserve, and caution, and discretion, with that desire to maintain the united action of the civilized Powers, as well as with the strictest regard to what we conceive to be due justice, all our steps have been, and will be taken. Let me now give an assurance to the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen) that, not upon what we may think it to be vain and idle rumours, but upon proved facts, the moment just consideration of the rights of a nationality is established we have no title to inquire by what name that nationality is called. There is one point more in the remarks of my hon. Friend to which I must now allude. After the speech of my hon. Friend the Under Secretary, referring to the question he has put as to the existing state of things in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, I can assure him most unequivocally, as can be borne out by information that can be laid before the House, that all the influence we could fairly use has been exercised to preserve the peace of the Balkan Peninsula by the maintenance of the existing state of things. That is the path in which we still continue to go. I feel sure, from the generous character of the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), that he will not believe we have any latent intention when we say that it is not possible for us to enter into any absolute engagement, and that every case that may arise in a complicated state of affairs abroad must be considered on its own particular merits, and will never be considered by us without a due sense of our responsibility to Parliament and to the people of this country.
MR. J. COWENsaid, after the satisfactory assurances that the Prime Minister had made, he had no desire to trouble the House further. He trusted that his adverse anticipations as to the threatened demonstration would not be realized. He wished to make only this other remark. He had never dreamt of speaking adversely of a State because it was little, or of people because they were poor. Whatever fault he might find with Montenegro, certainly the sterility of its soil, or the fewness of its people, were not objections with him. Why he cited the facts was to show that the risks likely to be run by a naval demonstration were out of proportion to the proposed advantages that the demonstration could effect, even if successful. In a sentence, the risks were greater than the results could be beneficial.
§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTwished to explain that he had in several particulars been misunderstood by the Prime Minister. He did not say that Russia was instigating the cession of territory to Greece, but that she was instigating the Naval Demonstration, with a view to precipitating disturbance and war throughout the Ottoman Empire; nor did he say there were no Greeks in Thessaly; but he objected to the enforced cession of the Albanian fortresses and territory of Janina and Metzovo to Greece. He did not object to pressure being put by the Powers upon Turkey to induce her to reform; but he objected to the use of the Fleets of Europe to plunder Turkey.