§ MR.COURTNEYI have given Notice of a Motion relative to the salary of the High Commissioner of South East Africa (Sir George Colley); but I believe it will be more convenient to the House if this discussion is raised so as to cover the affairs of South Africa generally. My own remarks will be directed entirely to the policy of the retention of the Transvaal. I regret exceedingly that I could not bring the question forward earlier.
It seemed, when Parliament met in February last, that the question of the retention of the Transvaal might be regarded as an open question. It was approached by the Leaders of the Opposition with open minds, and there seemed every prospect of discussing it with perfect freedom from any disposition to prejudge the decision. My noble Friend the then Leader of the Opposition made these remarks in the course of the debate upon the Address in Answer to the Speech from the Throne in relation to the condition of the Transvaal—
Undoubtedly"—he said—"the chief difficulty in South Africa is the condition of the Transvaal, to which no reference has been made in Her Majesty's Speech …I am not going to state at this time my opinion as to the policy which ought to be pursued there. I will only say that it is perfectly clear now that the annexation of the Transvaal was a measure adopted by the Government and sanctioned by the House under wrong impressions and under incorrect information. We were informed that a large majority of the European settlers and inhabitants of the Transvaal were in favour of that annexation. It is now proved conclusively that a large majority, at all events, of the Boers are bitterly against it. We are now told that the annexation was rendered necessary because we could not permit the foreign policy of the Government of the Transvaal in their dealings with the Natives; but we have been ourselves compelled to adopt almost precisely the same line of policy which was adopted by the Boers; and, under these two circumstances, I say it ought not to be considered a settled question simply from the fact that the annexation had taken place. If it had been necessary for the peace of the community of South Africa that the Transvaal should devolve upon us, by all means let that be proved; but if, on the other hand, we find it would be more honourable to restore 840 the Government, I say that no false sense of our dignity being involved in the question ought to stand in the way. Our true dignity would be best consulted by acknowledging that we have made a mistake, if, indeed, it is found that a mistake has been made."—[3 Hansard, ccl. 92.]It is clear, then, from this that the noble Lord considered the retention of the Transvaal as an open question, to be discussed as if for the first time; and it is a great disadvantage that I cannot bring it forward now under those conditions which appeared to be so favourable then.As soon as Her Majesty's present Government entered into Office, acting upon the possession of what information I do not know, they came to a decision which they telegraphed to Pretoria and other parts of South Africa, and this, which was an open question, became a matter almost beyond the possibility of revocation. I feel my difficulty in view of this decision. I am not bringing any charge of inconsistency against the Government. I am simply placing this before the House, as, in the consideration of my case, I cannot but remember that the policy instituted by the late Government has been approved of, and continued by, the present Government; and hon. Members must feel how strong is my conviction of the impolicy of the retention of the Transvaal, when, in spite of these difficulties, I urge that it would be more wise, more dignified, more honourable, to renounce the authority we have assumed. I will not now go into the details of the annexation of the Transvaal. We all admit it was a mistake, this annexation. ["No, no!"] Then, if it was not a mistake, it must be branded by a stronger name. The hon. and learned Member for Bridport (Mr. Warton) has expressed his dissent; but I will wait for his reasons before I reply to his peculiar opinion.
Not only here has it been acknowledged as a mistake, but also at the Cape and Natal there is the same conviction. This is the opinion even of those who were foremost in applauding the act when it was done, and, indeed, of the men who were vehement in urging that step before it was taken. There has been a revulsion of feeling in South Africa itself. I shall not, I say, trouble the House at length with the circumstances under which the occupation occurred; but there are two points in connection with 841 it which have been recently brought to light to which I should like to refer. I remember, when this matter first came on for discussion, that a Member of great experience—he had sat in this House, I think, for 40 years—came to me more than once, and, in a grim spirit of humour, asked what had been given to President Burgers that he should become an advocate of annexation? I was then obliged to reply that I knew of no special motive influencing his conduct; but since that time it has been explained. It has come out, in the accounts, that President Burgers is to be the recipent of £500 a-year for the rest of his life, dating from the time of the annexation. This is known now, and was not known a few months since. Another important fact is this. It has been stated that at the time of the annexation the Boers of Pretoria were under the influence of great excitement, induced by the threat given by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, that if they did not consent to be annexed the Zulus would be turned upon them. Sir Theophilus Shepstone has denied that he used such a threat, and he has shown how he could not have done so; and I am led to suppose that, so far as the intention goes, he did not threaten the Boers with a Zulu invasion. But he has confessed that what he did say was, that the Zulus were massed on their borders, and that he had great difficulty in restraining them. Now, the difference between a threat and a warning is often extremely slight—often the same words may serve for one or the other, if expressed in a different tone. I have heard recently in this House an announcement that, if Business is delayed, there must be a Saturday Sitting, and it was interpreted by many as a threat when it was meant as a warning. Sir Theophilus Shepstone then gave this warning, and he expressed it in the Dutch language to a certain number of Boers, possibly not best qualified to appreciate nice distinctions. In their minds it was received as a threat, not as a warning. This explains the apparent concurrence of the Boers at the time which has always been difficult to understand, as it has been shown that a vast majority of the Boers immediately afterwards refused to accept the assumption of authority on the part of England.
There is another view of the case which I desire to draw attention to. I 842 have always thought that if at the time I could make those who heard me realize the character and extent of the Transvaal they would have been able to see the imprudence of annexing it. I feel now that if I could give anything like a notion of what the Transvaal is, even in its normal state, and not as it now is, disturbed by English occupation, the House would see the wisdom of renouncing the sovereignty of the territory. The Transvaal, as everyone knows, covers a very large extent of territory. A Dutch family occupying a farm will be miles away from their next neighbour. Scattered all over this wide extent of territory are some 30,000 or 40,000 people altogether; and if one could imagine these Islands forming the United Kingdom, inhabited by a population of that number, he would perceive how far off from each other the inhabitants would be, and would be able to gain some idea of the present condition of the Transvaal. He would see how feeble and weak the administration must be; and he would, perhaps, come to understand something of what the Transvaal is, and the difficulties we must have to contend with in taking upon ourselves the sovereignty of the country, and the government of a population so small and widely scattered, and with a political life so rudimentary in character. In such circumstances, what must the political and social condition of a people be who, in regard to political associations, have been accustomed to act but feebly together, and, for the most part, have assumed the character of separate and distinct families, relying upon themselves alone for the supply of their own wants, the regulation of their own industrial pursuits, and the carrying on of their own peaceful farming operations? Thus you have to deal with a large area, thinly populated, and very far off from the condition, social or political, which renders them fit to receive your administrative control. In effecting annexation, and in undertaking to apply our system of government to the Transvaal, we took upon ourselves an enormous and difficult undertaking, and loaded ourselves with responsibilities. It is clear that the country was not in a ripe condition for English administration, even if the people themselves were willing to accept the English rule. The political, social, and judicial ideas of the 843 people of the country were not sufficiently advanced for our administration; and, therefore, on the mere ground of the insufficient settlement of the country, the policy we were adopting was most impolitic. I have enumerated some of the difficulties in the way of governing the territory, even if there did not exist that greatest of all difficulties, that the country is inhabited by a people who will not have your rule, and who utterly repel the suggestion that they should consent to give up their freedom and independence for British sovereignty. The civilization of the territory is in too rudimentary a state; there has not yet been established an organized life in it; and although moral ideas of great value may, and do, exist, each family constitutes a distinct centre from the rest; and the country, therefore, cannot be in a condition to live under such a highly developed government as that of England. Those facts constitute a strong a priori objection against Great Britain assuming the control of such a country. There remains the invincible repugnance of the Boers to foreign control. Of course, I shall be told by the responsible Representative of the Colonial Office that the Boers are toning down; that they are beginning to accept as inevitable that which they resisted as long as they believed they had any chance of independence; that they have no longer any hope of independence; and that, therefore, they will resign themselves to the necessities of their position, and will fall in with the views of the Government. We have heard statements of this character over and over again; but such statements have been falsified by indisputable evidence as often as they have been made. When we first annexed the Transvaal, and our sovereignty was proclaimed at Pretoria, we were told by Mr. Lowther that the Proclamation was received with submission, and even gladness, and that the whole transaction was one upon which the inhabitants of the Transvaal congratulated themselves. This notion, however, was very soon shown to be a delusion, for a deputation from the Transvaal came over to England to enlighten the people of this country and the Ministry of the day as to the true feelings of the people of the Transvaal in regard to the independence of the country. They came here without sufficient authority, and 844 they went back in order to obtain credentials as respresenting the people of the Transvaal. Finally, they reappeared here with a Petition adverse to our rule, signed by some 6,600 burghers out of a total population of 8,000 burghers. At all events, it is clear that, as far as the feeling of the White inhabitants is concerned, you have 6,600 of them refusing to consent to annexation. That deputation was followed up by an assemblage in Pretoria in the spring of last year. A largo number of men attended the camp, and great anxiety was felt as to the result. Sir Bartle Frere, who was at that time High Commissioner, went up from the Cape. He saw the people, argued with them, and came away flattering himself that their objections would break down, and that they would recognize our rule. But no sooner was such an opinion expressed, than it was dispelled by a further remonstrance, even stronger than before; and, finally, in the winter of last year, there was another camp, in which no less than 6,300 armed Boers assembled together, and declared, in the most solemn way, once more that they would not consent to live peacefully under the sovereignty of England. That was a demonstration on their part so recently as December last. It is said that, inasmuch as the present Government have accepted the necessity of the retention of the Transvaal themselves, the Boers, in the course of time, would be induced to accept it. I answer that there is not much hope of that in South Africa. At the time of the General Election it was considered in the Transvaal that some of the speeches of the present Prime Minister, and of the leading Members of the Liberal Party, showed a disposition on their part to recognize the independence of the Transvaal. Up to the time of the new Ministry coming into Office there was reason to believe that they would be favourable to the views of the Boers. But there is no evidence that the Boers rested their hopes on the return of the Liberals to power, or kept up their spirit of resistance in the expectation of this event. In South Africa, as in India, and as on the European Continent, the weakness of the late Government in the support of the people of the United Kingdom was not understood, and the result of the Election was a surprise. As the Boers were not encouraged by hopes 845 of Liberal action, so is there no evidence that they have been, discouraged by what has since happened. Early in the spring they sent their leaders to the Cape as a deputation to remonstrate against our proceedings, to stir up the affections of their Dutch friends, and to watch the progress of Confederation in the Cape Colony. With the singular trust they have always reposed in their leaders, who are men of their own order, they have waited to confer with those leaders before taking action. We have heard that these men have gone back from the Cape; but I have not heard of their arrival at Pretoria. There has been no assemblage of burghers yet to meet them on their return, and we are still in the dark as to the consequences when they come back. We have, therefore, no evidence either one way or the other, unless we take this as evidence—that Sir William Lan-yon has recently sent home a protest on the part of some loyal Boers against being overtaxed, as they are likely to be, because their neighbours have proved troublesome and unruly. But how many Boers signed this protest of loyalty to the English Crown? We have seen that 6,600 out of 8,000 signed the first protest, and that 6,300 assembled in the camp in December last. But this protest sent home by Sir William Lanyon, with the declaration I have mentioned, was only signed by 33 Boers—33 being thus the grand total of those who are contented to remain under the sovereignty of the Queen, with a fear, however, that they are likely to be overtaxed owing to the unruly conduct of their neighbours. It is quite true that another body in the Transvaal are willing to accept our government, and to remain under the Crown of England—namely, the English people who have gone there. But they are not very many in number. A Memorial received from them is said to have been signed by 900 burghers of Pretoria; but it is difficult to understand how that could be so, as there are only 600 burghers altogether in Pretoria, and they must have got the signatures of some of what may be called the vagrant class—men from the diggings, land jobbers, and others, who are ever haunting the border lands of civilization and to rush, like unclean birds, after their prey. These are the men who repose their trust and loyalty in the Bri- 846 tish rule. But the mass of the people are extremely hostile to our rule. This is so well known that the Government has not dared to convene the Volksraad, which is the real original democratic Assembly of the people. A Legislative Council has, indeed, been established; but it is a curiosity in legislation. Every Member of it is nominated by the Executive Government, and holds office at the pleasure of that Executive. Every Member of it can be removed at a moment's notice, and every Member receives a salary for his services; and so the Council is, of course, an extremely loyal body. There is also a Legislative Assembly, every Member of which is nominated by the Government, and receives, I believe, an allowance, if not pay. Sir William Lanyon, writing on the subject of this Legislative Assembly, in which it appears that these nominated Members are in favour of Confederation, congratulates Her Majesty's Government on the existence of proof that in the Transvaal there is a feeling in favour of our rule. But the mass of the people are decidedly and unmistakably opposed to that rule. Let me place before the House one or two facts with respect to the nature of our occupation. In the first place, we keep an Army in South Africa at a cost, borne by this country, of something like £400,000 a-year. That is divided between Cape Colony, Natal, and the Transvaal. The total cost in 1879–80 was £660,000; in 1880–81 it is £440,000. But the cost of the Army in the Transvaal has been double as much as that to the Army in the other two Colonies put together; so that more than two-thirds, at least, of the sum total is spent in consequence of our annexation of the Transvaal. As to the number of the Forces maintained there, I am not in possession of a Return which gives the latest number of all the Forces of all arms in the Transvaal. A few months ago the number of soldiers in that Colony amounted to 4,000–4,000 to keep in order a male population of 8,000. During the last few days we have had a discussion as to the police force that is considered necessary in order to keep in order the population of a neighbouring Island. If it were necessary to maintain in Ireland a military or a semi-military force in anything approaching the force we find it necessary to keep up in the Transvaal, 847 the number we should require would be, at least, 1,000,000. That would inadequately represent the military power we should require in order to restrain the people of Ireland, and to insure the allegiance of the people of that country to our rule. That fact alone will show the kind of hold we have upon the affections and loyalty of the people of the Transvaal, two years after annexation; and in the Transvaal you have only a very small section of the population, those who are British by birth, who are really loyal. Those who are engaged in the cultivation of the land and in the development of the resources, and who are the backbone of the population, are entirely opposed to our rule. Take another fact. When we first took possession of the Transvaal, we lent it £100,000 to meet pressing necessities. At any rate, it was stated to be a loan; but it does not appear to have been in any way the intention of the Government of the Transvaal to repay that money; and, indeed, they are, I believe, utterly unable to do so. In addition to this loan of £100,000, they have gone into debt since to the extent of £ 148,000, and every year there is a considerable deficit in the Exchequer compared with the ordinary Revenue of the Colony. What is the prospect, then, that is before us in regard to payment of the loan? I have here the Report upon the expenditure in South Africa, which refers specially to the Transvaal expenditure. It says—
The expenditure is estimated at £114,500; but it must be remarked that the scale on which these charges are calculated is totally insufficient to secure the proper Administration of the Colony. In the first place, as the salaries paid by Merchants and Bankers are higher than those of the Civil Service, and as no prestige attaches, as in this country, to Government appointments, it is already difficult to secure the services of competent Officers, and no economy can therefore be expected in connection with the Civil establishments; indeed, as pointed out by Colonel Lanyon in his letter addressed to the High Commissioner on the 7th August last, an increase of the expenditure under this head would probably result in an increased revenue. There is hardly any Police Force; the Gaols, except at Pretoria, are in a bad condition; there is no hospital, and no lunatic asylum.Then the Report goes on to state—It has been already stated that the whole territory is unsurveyed, and that the work of survey should be undertaken at an early date; but the most urgent need of the Colony is an improved system of communication. It hardly lies within the compass of this Report to discuss 848 the question of the construction of a railway, whether to the Capo Colony through the Diamond Fields, to Natal, or, as projected by President Burgers, to Delagoa Bay. But it is almost imperative that some expenditure should take place upon the internal means of communication. The roads, although mere tracks formed by transport riders, are, it is true, from the nature of the soil and country, for the most part fairly passable; but there is not a single bridge in the Province, and, as the rivers are liable to sadden and violent floods, the danger and inconvenience suffered by travellers is very great, and the addition to the expenses of transport is considerable. It will probably also be thought that the Transvaal should undertake some adequate measures in future for the defence of her territory against the neighbouring tribes, and it seems, therefore, imperative that any improvements in the revenue should be devoted to the revision of the Civil and Judicial Establishments, the organization of an efficient Police Force for the preservation of order, and the establishment of a local Corps for the defence of the frontier. It is further of importance that considerable public works should be undertaken to provide for hospital accommodation, for the erection of a lunatic asylum, for the construction of bridges, and for the survey of the country. Should it be considered that such services might fairly be provided for by a loan, the necessary amount might be included in any sum to be raised to pay off the debt to the Standard Bank and other liabilities. No allusion has been made in this Report to the possibility of the Colony being enabled to pay to the Imperial Exchequer any contribution towards the very heavy cost of its military protection by British troops, because it cannot be anticipated that the financial condition of the Colony will at present admit of such an additional burden. Indeed, having regard to the excess of expenditure over revenue in past and current years, to the necessity for increased expenditure in the future, and to the difficulties and cost of collecting taxes in the native locations in the northern parts of the Province, there are, perhaps, hardly sufficient grounds for hoping that, with an improved system of taxation, including the contribution of a reasonable sum by the native residents, the income of the Transvaal will for some years to come be sufficient to meet the current expenses of good government, and to pay the interest, together with a moderate sinking fund, on the debt of the Colony, increased by the amount required for the execution of public works.So that we have before us the fact that the Transvaal is not only in an actual state of debt, but that the prospect before us is one of a continually recurring deficiency. You have been compelled to introduce a more scientific and highly developed administration than would be sufficient to meet the wants and requirements of the inhabitants of the Transvaal if they were governing themselves. You have this fact—that not only is the great mass of the inhabitants opposed to your rule, but that the 849 Revenue of the country will not meet the Expenditure, and that year by year you must meet a growing deficiency, besides keeping an army of occupation there, the whole expenditure of which is thrown upon this country. You have the moral difficulty of forcing your rule upon a people who are unwilling to submit to it. And you have the pecuniary difficulty of having to pay large sums, year by year, for the control you exercise. As to the effect of our occupation of the Transvaal upon the rest of South Africa, the Free State, which is partly conterminous with the Transvaal, is inhabited by a people of the same race and with the same habits. They have most strenuously remonstrated against our occupation. The Volksraad of the Free State have met to consider the matter; and, despite the efforts of their prudent President, they passed a Resolution condemning the occupation of the Transvaal, and calling for its restitution by a majority of two to one. At the Cape itself, our occupation of the Transvaal has given rise to feelings of dissatisfaction and dislike, and even of disloyalty. It has seriously interfered with the happy results brought about by the administration of successive Governors; and a spirit absolutely unknown for many years past has been provoked, and is now active, in consequence of our hostile occupation of that territory. I have here a most formidable piece of evidence which shows the existence of that feeling. I hold in my hand a Memorial drawn and signed by 6,000 Dutch Boers, subjects of the Queen within the Cape Colony, addressed to the present Prime Minister, and begging him to complete the noble work he has accomplished in other directions by bringing about the restitution and freedom of the Transvaal. It is addressed to the Prime Minister, and it may be asked why it has not been handed to him, or forwarded to him. I may, perhaps, be permitted to explain how that came to pass. It was sent to me by a Member of the Legislative Assembly of the Cape, who wrote to me to the effect that when the report of Mr. Gladstone's speeches, delivered in Mid Lothian, and on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of his birthday, in which he condemned the annexation of the Transvaal in unmeasured terms, reached South Africa, many Dutch Cape Colonists requested him to 850 write to the right hon. Gentleman thanking him for his noble utterances in the cause of justice. Circumstances prevented him from doing so for some time; and, when he was ready to do so, it was stated that a change of Ministry had taken place in England, and the information came to hand that Mr. Gladstone, now that he had succeeded to Office, had completely changed his mind with regard to the Transvaal, and had ceased to advocate in Office the undoing of high acts of injustice which he had before condemned when in Opposition. The signing of the address came, in consequence, to a dead stop, and many of those who had already signed expressed themselves so thoroughly and utterly disgusted that the gentleman who wrote to me did not feel himself at liberty to present the Memorial to the right hon. Gentleman. The Memorial itself was signed by 6,000 Dutch Boers, and its language is most applicable to what has been done in the Transvaal. It refers to what has been done in Ireland, and what has been done in England; it refers to the speeches of Mr. Gladstone in Mid Lothian and elsewhere. It reminds him of what he had said, and the Memorialists look forward to the confident hope that the time would arrive when, in Office, he would be able to do something for them. Now, that is a specimen of what has happened in the Cape Colony in consequence of the retention of the Transvaal. We have not only acquired a sovereignty over an unwilling people in the Transvaal; but we have stirred up heartburnings elsewhere. A large number of the people in the Cape Colony itself are discontented with our rule who were never discontented before; so that without the Transvaal, as well as within its limits, this retention, or forced occupation of the territory, is working mischief to the chances of Confederation in South Africa. It is confessed that the scheme of Confederation never had much of a chance; but, such as it was, it has been utterly ruined by the occupation of the Transvaal. These opinions have been expressed, over and over again, in the discussions which have taken place in Cape Colony. Mr. Sprigg, the Colonial Secretary; Mr. Merriman, one of the Leaders of the Opposition; Mr. Solomon, another Leader of the Opposition; Mr. Smith, Mr. Hofmeyr, and others, all 851 agree that the annexation of the Transvaal makes it impossible for the Cape to come under any scheme of Confederation of which the Transvaal is to form a part. They refuse to have anything to do with the burden laid upon them of maintaining British rule in the Transvaal. Now, it may be said that I have left out the most material part of the question—that I have been speaking only of the Whites. True, I have been speaking, so far, only of the Whites. But a Black population is there; and what is to happen to them? It has been, said that our occupation is to be defended in consequence of the wrongs inflicted upon the Black population. Slavery, or something like it, has been inflicted upon the Black population. Even if this were true, I would submit the necessity of considering the price that has been paid for whatever benefits may have been conferred upon the Native population of the Transvaal. One of the consequences of our occupation of the Transvaal was the Zulu War. If you have secured better treatment, and a better life for the Natives of the Transvaal, what have you done for the Natives of Zululand? You have had, at least, some little penalty to pay in the Zulu War. Another part of the price you have had to pay has been in the alliance with the Swazis—the employment of the Swazis as your auxiliaries in war. If any of you know what the Swazis are you must feel that we have paid a very considerable price in having to use them as auxiliaries in our wars. If the Natives of any part of South Africa were entitled to our kindly feeling, it is hard upon them that we should have employed, in waging war upon them, these most savage and ferocious tribes. This fact alone throws a considerable doubt upon the reality of our sympathies. But, indeed, our object was not to free the Natives from wrong and oppression. We were told by Mr. Lowther, then Under Secretary, that we annexed the Transvaal simply for our own protection; and he was most eager to disclaim the imputation of philanthropy. It was an afterthought that we should occupy it for the protection of the Natives. What kind of freedom are we leaving to them? There is an important Paper in existence, to which I think sufficient attention has not been paid, on the condition of the Natives of 852 the Transvaal. It is from Mr. H. C. Shepstone, the Secretary for Native Affairs. He says—15. The Basutos are naturally inclined to be peaceful and quiet, but in this district, owing to their having turned out the Boers, and there being no civilizing influence among them, and also to the fact of the jealousies existing between the tribes, they have lived in a constant state of turmoil and warfare up to the present time, and are, therefore, from education and habit, more quarrelsome and warlike and less amenable to control than their brethren living in the more settled districts.16. These remarks apply equally to the natives of the Waterberg district, and I fear that in these two districts where no taxes have hitherto been paid, though the different chiefs have expressed their willingness to pay taxes when the time comes, unless there is some show of force there will be difficulty in collecting if not positive refusal to pay the hut tax on the part of some of the more powerful chiefs.17. The Lydenburg District has a large native population, and in this district also no taxes have been collected, but there are no powerful chiefs in it with the exception of Sekukuni, whose submission may now shortly be expected; when this is accomplished, I do not anticipate there will be much difficulty in collecting the tax.18. At present it would be impossible to collect taxes in any of the above-mentioned districts, all the chiefs are anxiously watching the course of events as regards our proceedings against Sekukuni, and though they do not really think that he will be successful, yet there is a lingering sort of fear that he may be; and they consequently are in many instances afraid of the results of paying their taxes, and others would refuse, considering that if we were unable to subdue Sekukuni we would be unable to coerce them.19. In those portions of the Lydenburg and Wakkcrstroom districts which abut on the Swazi country there are large numbers of Swazis living, some as refugees, and others, the majority, as Swazi subjects, and disputing our right to the land.This land question is being constantly brought to my notice by the natives, who represent the hardships they are under by being obliged to live on farms under the control of the owner. In the Zoutpansberg district one of the largest Basuto chiefs, Makotu, in talking about land, claimed all he occupied as his own; and on my asking how that could be, as the Boers had taken the country and given it out in farms, he replied very true, but I drove them out and now occupy by right of conquest, as they did in the first instance. This question is one which I would urgently commend to your Excellency's immediate and earnest consideration, as it is one which will be very strongly represented when the taxes are called for, and intimately connected herewith is the settlement of the northern boundary line of the Transvaal. As your Excellency is aware, the boundary between this territory and the Bechuana Chief Sityele 853 (Sechele) is also in an unsettled state, and it is important that this question, which has been so long in abeyance, should be settled at as early a date as possible.Anybody who has studied that Paper with attention will see that we are threatened with the possibility, if not the probability, of a war against the Natives, in order to assert the authority which we say we have derived from the Boers, but which they declare the Boers never had over them. It was precisely the same difficulty out of which grew the Zulu War. The Zulus disputed the claim of the Boers to certain lands. "When we annexed the Transvaal, we insisted that we had taken over the rights of the Boers, and we made war really in the assertion of those rights. Just so here. The Natives you are so anxious to annex resist your authority, because they say they are not subject to the Boers. We are going to claim taxes from them, and to compel them to submit to our authority; and to effect this we may possibly, if not probably, have to go to war. I find, in the same book from which I have already quoted, that Sir Theophilus Shepstone and Administrator Lanyon contemplate the same contingency. The difficulties, therefore, in taking over the Transvaal, even from the point of view of the Natives, are enormous. We have been charged with the affairs of the Natives since they came within what we nominally call the Transvaal territory. They resent your authority, and they dispute your dominion. They have not paid taxes, and they refuse to pay taxes. All these troubles are prepared for us. In the Northern part of the Transvaal, where it appears that out of something like 800,000 Natives in the whole of the territory 600,000 at least live, they object to our sovereignty. I should have thought that the arguments which I adduced, first of all, as to the difficulty of ruling the Boers of the Transvaal from their unwillingness to submit to that rule, would have been sufficient to show the impolicy of the annexation. I have pointed out the difficulty of ruling a country where the inhabitants are so widely spread in small numbers over the territory. I have shown the difficulty of assuming a control over Natives who reject your authority. I think I have adduced enough to substantiate my proposition—that it would be wise 854 and politic to withdraw from the Transvaal. I should like to add one word more, and it is simply in regard to the value which the independence of the Transvaal would have on the future development of South Africa. The real mischief of our occupation of the Transvaal has been the intrusion of what I believe to be an unwise factor in a difficult problem; the spirit of foolish interference with institutions which are not ours, because they do not come up to that standard of excellence we have laid down for ourselves, without having regard to the question whether within the district concerned the movement of life which is taking placeisone of growth and of improvement, or one of decay and of death. I believe it is the highest wisdom of a politician to wait with great tolerance of evil for a better state of things, where imperfection is only an incident of growth towards a better condition; and the imperfections existing in the Transvaal are imperfections of that nature. The Transvaal started—it had not advanced very far—in its political life. Its organization was imperfect, but it was moving in the right way. It was getting into a better condition; and nothing but this spirit of foolishness in high places which will not be content to let things grow from worse to better, but must interfere to introduce institutions unfitted for the time, the place, and the people—nothing but this spirit of foolishness in high places has retarded the development of the Transvaal. Our policy in the annexation of that country has been characterized throughout by the spirit I have been endeavouring to condemn; and it shows the unwisdom of not letting things alone when things are going on fairly well. In respect to the future condition of South Africa, the independence of the Transvaal was one of your most valuable auxiliaries. What is the prospect now? The Orange River Free State existed as one of the elements of future union; the Transvaal was another, and we had there two factors of the highest importance. About these two nuclei, political life would have gradually thickened and developed, and the time would have come when they would have united together in some federal union, and would have been ready to join our Colonies in a free partnership. How stands the matter now? If you occupy the Transvaal as a subject ter- 855 ritory of your own, the prospect is, in the highest degree, dark and uncertain. Our occupation of the Transvaal has shown us that it is not a step towards the Confederation of South Africa. Confederation with a Province held in forced subjection is impossible. If, on the other hand, you had left the Transvaal alone it would have been occupying, as it were, the position of an advanced guard between you and barbarism, developing its life and its power from year to year. You had there a nucleus of political life which would have extended its influence right and left throughout the whole of South Africa, by means of which a valuable and real alliance between friendly States might have been effected. You have destroyed the whole of that prospect; and, instead of the promise of a future which was hopeful, you have now a promise that is full of doubt and uncertainty. And if I now appeal to the Government with little hope of success, it is not from any want of assurance on my part that the appeal I make is founded on reason and the highest principles and wisdom of statesmanship. Even now it would be wise to turn back from a false path to restore to the Transvaal its independence. It would not be difficult. Indeed, it might be done in a form that would secure advantages that were not in our possession at the time we annexed the Transvaal. It may be said that if we retire we would leave the Transvaal in a state of confusion and anarchy. Did that consideration prevent your retirement from Afghanistan? In Afghanistan you will certainly leave confusion and anarchy; because there the organization of the State depends on the predominance of some one individual; and until the competitors for that predominance have fought out their quarrel there must be confusion and anarchy. But in the Transvaal the case is very different. You have there the forms of Republican institutions. You may convoke the Volksraad and reconstitute the Government, with a Government so constituted that you can even come to terms as to its functions and its dealings with the Natives. I am satisfied of this—that it would be the highest wisdom, and the most profound statesmanship, to decide upon restoring the independence of the Transvaal. You could then re- 856 found on sure basis, and even a surer basis, the political life of South Africa. You have broken up the relations of political life there, and it is now all in confusion. There is no one Province or Colony which is not at odds with its neighbour. If you restore the independence of the Transvaal you will at least have some prospect of being able to remove from yourselves difficulties in South Africa which will otherwise perplex you for many years, if not for many generations, yet to come.
§ SIR MICHAEL HICKS - BEACHrecognized, in the able speech to which they had just listened, the consistency with which the hon. Member for Lis-keard (Mr. Courtney) adhered to the opinions which he had years ago expressed in the House. He (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) did not propose, and the hon. Gentleman himself had not attempted to go at any length into the question of the original annexation of the Transvaal; but he (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) confessed that he was astonished to hear him refer to that annexation as a specimen of the unwisdom of not letting things alone when they were going on well. Was the Transvaal really going on well when the annexation took place? The hon. Member told them they ought not to interfere with a state of growth and improvement, but rather with one of decay and death. Was the state of the Transvaal, at the time it was annexed to Her Majesty's dominions, a state of growth and improvement, or a state of decay and death? Its Government was absolutely bankrupt; it could not obtain enough money to pay its officials; it could collect no taxes; it was without credit; it was incapable of defending its own territory against the incursions of the Native Tribes. That was what the hon. Gentleman called a state of growth and improvement. But the practical question was this—The annexation had taken place, whether rightly or wrongly, and what were they to do now? The hon. Member, while he painted in far too dark colours the difficulties arising from that step, had almost ignored the evils that would result from its reversal. It would be impossible, if they withdrew from the Transvaal to-morrow, to establish again in that Province the old form of Government. Even the Boer Committee had 857 never suggested that that could be done. They simply asked for independence of British rule. With regard to the Native population, in a country where there were 800,000 Blacks and perhaps 40,000 Whites, surely the interests of the Natives deserved very careful consideration on the part of the Government. In that country, since the assumption of authority by the Queen, the Native population had been perfectly quiet and contented under British rule, with the exception of Secocoeni and those associated with him; and since he had been subdued, the Native population had willingly paid taxes that had never previously been enforced against them. It was at least fair, then, to say that the Native population was contented under the existing state of things. The hon. Member said there were some few Boers who objected to the restoration of the independence of the Province. Surely the interests of those persons, however few they were in number, must be considered by those who had undertaken the obligation of protecting them. Neither could the interests of those who had settled in the Transvaal on the faith of its remaining British territory be disregarded. The class who, in the towns, conducted the whole commercial business of the Transvaal earnestly desired to remain subject to the British Crown. All these points had impressed themselves on his mind with great force when he was at the Colonial Office; and they appeared to him amply to justify the decision of the late Government, and of the present Government to retain authority over the Transvaal. If that were not done, he believed the result would be civil war between the Whites and the Native population, and that disasters would arise which would gradually extend over the whole of South Africa. He was convinced that the present Prime Minister never came to a wiser decision than that which he communicated to Mr. Joubert, when he wrote that he could not advise the Queen to relinquish her Sovereignty over the Transvaal; but that, consistently with its maintenance, he desired that the White population should enjoy the fullest liberty to manage their local affairs, and that that liberty might be best and most promptly conceded to the Transvaal as a member of a South African Confederation. That was the view which he (Sir 858 Michael Hicks-Beach) himself had taken in repeated despatches, and he had also endeavoured to impress it on the delegates of the Committee of Boers when they visited this country. He believed that view would eventually be accepted by the people of the Transvaal, and that they would settle down quietly under the present form of government, and in due time become loyal and attached subjects of the Queen. The hon. Member for Liskeard said there was no evidence of a growing feeling of content with the present state of things in that Province; but he entirely overlooked about the best evidence of it which could be given— namely, the difference between the Revenue Returns of the present year and those of the previous year. The Revenue of the first six months of this year was more than the whole of the ordinary receipts for 1879. It amounted to £76,583, including a considerable sum from the Native population. That Native taxation would, he believed, prove to be the key, so to speak, of the financial future of the country. The sum which he had named not only included the taxes of the current year, but also £18,000 of arrears which were mainly due to the political agitation of the previous year. Some £23,000 of Debt had been paid off since the beginning of the year; a large sum had been spent in the construction and maintenance of telegraphs; and no less than £5,000 had been paid over to a Sinking Fund. In fact, he could not easily conceive of a more hopeful financial future for the Transvaal than was foreshadowed by the Report for the last six months. And for this advance towards prosperity the hon. Member for Liskeard sought to substitute absolute chaos, by the withdrawal of Her Majesty's authority from the country. He would venture to express a hope that, in considering the future of the Transvaal, the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Kimberley) would not fail to recognize the extreme importance of pressing forward the railway to Delagoa Bay, which was felt to be of more importance to the future of the Province by the Boers and the settlers of English extraction than almost any other work which could be suggested. He had followed the hon. Member for Liskeard in discussing the circumstances of the Transvaal, because, although he was not him- 859 self immediately responsible for its annexation, yet, for two years, he had to consider, under great difficulties, what should be the course of the Government with regard to it; and he felt now, whatever were the difficulties which existed at that time, the Government was amply justified in the decision they had taken to retain it. But his main object in addressing the House was a desire to ascertain the nature of the policy, so far as they were able to state it, which the Government intended to pursue, after the rebuff which the scheme of Confederation had no doubt received by the rejection of the proposal for a Conference by the Cape Parliament. He had read the debates on that proposal, and the views expressed by Sir Bartle Frere; and from them it would seem that the unfortunate result was mainly due to distrust of the future of Zululand and the Transvaal. Mr. Sprigg, the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, said, with reference to Zululand, that the question of its settlement raised considerable difficulty as to the union between Natal and that Colony; and that, in his opinion, advantage should be taken of the prostrate condition of the Zulus at the con-elusion of the war to establish a powerful and civilized Government amongst the people, which, no doubt, meant that Zululand should be annexed. He (Sir Michael Hicks - Beach) was convinced that it would have been impossible for either the late or the present Government to consent to any such annexation. The public opinion of the country was opposed to it, and would have refused to support any Government in the adoption of such a course. He felt bound to say that the action taken by the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in conveying to Sir Bartle Frere the intention of Her Majesty's present Government to maintain the Sovereignty over the Transvaal, was as prompt and decided as it possibly could have been; but he feared that the announcement of that intention came somewhat too late to counteract the mischief which had been already done by some of his Colleagues. The hon. Member for Liskeard had alluded to the effect of the speeches delivered by the present Prime Minister in Mid Lothian with respect to South Africa, and there could be no doubt that the Members of that Parliament had not forgotten them. When this subject 860 was last before the House of Commons, the Prime Minister said he was not aware that he had signified any opinion inconsistent with the policy pursued by the Government in retaining that territory. The right hon. Gentleman did not, perhaps, say that if called to power he would not retain that territory; but it was unfortunate that what he did say was not accompanied by some reference to the danger and impossibility of withdrawing from it. What the right hon. Gentleman did say was this—speaking at Dalkeith, on November 26, last year—
The Transvaal, a country where we have chosen most unwisely—I am tempted to say insanely—to place ourselves in the strange predicament of the free subjects of a Monarchy going to coerce the free subjects of a Republic, and to compel them to accept a citizenship which they decline and refuse. But if that is to be done, it must be done by force. There is no strength to be added to your country by governing the Transvaal.What was the interpretation put on that statement in South Africa? Mr. Hofmeyer, a Member of the Cape Parliament, said—It was most inopportune now to ask the Transvaal to send delegates to the Conference, when they had sent a deputation to Cape Town who, it was no secret, had been holding caucus meetings with Members of Parliament, influencing them to vote against the Conference, as its results might possibly be war and bloodshed in the Transvaal. It was an insult to the people of the Transvaal to ask them to join in a Conference, while they were telling us they would do nothing of the kind.And more to the same effect. What happened was this—These words of the Prime Minister were generally interpreted throughout South Africa to mean that if the Liberal Party came into power he would advise the withdrawal of Her Majesty's Sovereignty from the Transvaal. He (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) believed that kept up the agitation which, but for encouragement of this kind, would have expired long ago. But the Prime Minister's were not the only speeches delivered by prominent Members of the Government. At the commencement of the first Session of 1880, in the debate on the Address in Answer to Her Majesty's Speech, the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for India said—The annexation of the Transvaal was a measure adopted by the Government and sanctioned by the House under wrong impressions and under inaccurate information,861 That might be true; he (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) was not going into that question. The noble Marquess proceeded—If we find it would be more honourable to restore that Government, I say that no false sense of our dignity being involved in the question ought to stand in our way.AndOur true dignity would be best consulted by acknowledging that we made a mistake …and restoring the Government of the Transvaal."—[3 Hansard, ccl. 92.]Again, not a word of the difficulty and impossibility of withdrawing. He (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) happened to know —he spoke from his own personal knowledge—that this speech of the noble Marquess was telegraphed to the Transvaal, and that it had the worst possible effect in promoting and sustaining the agitation which had been going on. This view was amply confirmed by the statements made in one of the latest dispatches from the Administrator, Sir Owen Lanyon, obviously an impartial witness on such a point. He would only express one hope as to the future. He regretted that the hon. Member for Liskeard had not brought his views forward in the form of a substantive Motion, so that the decision of the House might have been taken upon it; but he trusted that after the debate and the reply, which he had no doubt would be made to the hon. Member, confirming the declaration of the intention of the present Government to maintain the Queen's Sovereignty over the Transvaal, the hon. Member would feel that his best, his only, course in the future would be to use the influence he possessed in advising these poor, simple people to desist from vain attempts to obtain what they called their independence, and accept the inevitable. If the hon. Member did not adopt that course, he would incur a grave responsibility, and he would certainly postpone the day when that self-government could be granted, which both the late and present Government wished to give on the earliest possible occasion. Now that the proposal of a Conference had been rejected by the Cape Parliament, he wished to know what policy the Government intended to pursue with regard to South Africa in the future; and there was one point on which he hoped they would speak with no uncertain sound.862 On the 12th of June, 1879, he stated in a despatch to Sir Bartle Frere—
It would be contrary to the true and permanent interest of South Africa itself that Her Majesty's subjects in that country should continue to rely upon Imperial troops for defence against Native attacks and insurrections; and hereafter Her Majesty's Forces will only be permanently stationed there as a garrison at or near Cape Town, for the defence of a naval station of great importance to the interests of the whole Empire.He trusted that that view, which was universally accepted in this country, would be again impressed by Her Majesty's Government on the Cape Government and the Governments of South Africa generally, not only by words, but by action also. He had no reason to believe that it would be distasteful to the Government of the Cape Colony. The position of things now in South Africa was very different from anything which had existed in former years. The Cape Colony had all the privileges of self-government, and he believed the great majority of the people were quite ready to undertake the duty of self-defence. They had recently assumed fresh responsibilities in undertaking the government and control of additional Native territories. He had no doubt they would faithfully carry the burden of those liabilities. But he was sorry to see that, among the arguments used in the debate on Confederation by the opponents of the measure, the old view was put forward by more than one speaker, that Great Britain must defend a South African Confederation against Native attacks. It seemed to him that no policy could be more fatal than to give the power in these matters to a Colonial Government, and not to make them bear the responsibility of the exercise of that power. He felt convinced that his views in that respect were shared by Her Majesty's Government; and he only alluded to it now because he was anxious that so important a matter should not be unnoticed by the right hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Grant Duff)."With respect to the Transvaal, no doubt the case was somewhat different. There, if Confederation was found impossible for some time to come it would be necessary to retain Imperial troops. But the statement of the hon. Member for Liskeard, that the maintenance of those troops cost this country £400,000 a-year, he believed to 863 be much exaggerated. He hoped, however, that in providing for the defence of that Province care would be taken to encourage a police force of Natives, and the enrolment of volunteers and border troops for the defence of the country— such a force, in fact, as existed in the Cape Colony—so that they might take the place of the Regular troops when they were recalled. With regard to Natal, he had read with satisfaction the statement of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that the power of self-government would not be given to that Colony until it was clear that the power of self-defence existed without reliance upon the aid of Imperial troops. He hoped that would be adhered to both in the Transvaal and Natal, and in any future case that might arise. The second point upon which he desired to insist was to express a hope that, in spite of the rebuff which had been received, Her Majesty's Government would not depart from the lines of the policy of union, or Confederation. The object of that policy might be achieved in more than one way. The rejection of the proposal for a Conference by no means gave such a check to it as was supposed by the hon. Member for Liskeard. It might be effectually promoted by the formation of a sort of South African Zollverein for Customs' duties by the establishment of a common postal and telegraphic system, or by identical arrangements for regulating the possession of arms; and he believed that if such objects as these were steadily pursued the result must be a complete union of Governments, which, however important it might be to this country as relieving it of responsibility in South Africa, would be infinitely more important to the prosperity and good government of South Africa itself. If the right hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies agreed with the views which he had expressed as regarded the questions of self-defence, and union or Confederation; he confessed he hoped he would explain the reasons which had induced the Government to recall a Governor who was so exceptionally capable of carrying out those views as Sir Bartle Frere. There was no Colonial Governor who had done so much to promote the policy of self-defence in the Colonies as Sir Bartle Frere; and in the pursuit of Confederation the Government had admitted that his assistance 864 would be of the greatest value. It was not Sir Bartle Frere's fault that the proposal for a Conference had fallen through. He (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) could understand the action of the Government if they had immediately recalled Sir Bartle Frere from South Africa, although, in his judgment, that would have been a most unwise course to have pursued. But he did not think, in the course which they had adopted, they were likely to obtain any of the credit which they might have expected from his recall, or any of the advantages which he should himself have anticipated if Sir Bartle Frere had been allowed to remain. The recall could not have been in consequence of any differences which had arisen between him and the Government in regard to his past action—as, surely, that was condoned by his retention in office when the present Administration acceded to power. Nor was it due to any want of ability or energy for the work he had in hand, because those qualities, on his part, were fully recognized. Nor did he understand that any difference had arisen between Sir Bartle Frere and the Government on any question of future policy except with regard to the small question of the confiscation of Moirosi's land; and he was quite sure that Sir Bartle Frere would readily have acceded to any wish of the Government on that matter. The Government had recognized his high merits and his distinguished services, and the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies admitted that there was no fear of a repetition of the policy which led to the Zulu War. He had stated that—Sir Bartle Frere was now in a position in which he could not, even if he wished it ever so much, commit similar errors to the Zulu War…ֵHe was practically the constitutional Ruler of South Africa, unable to take any important step except through the advice of his responsible Ministers.He was, therefore, really at a loss to discover for what reason the Government had now decided to recall Sir Bartle Frere, and he trusted that they might be favoured with full explanations on this subject. He must, however, say that he did not think the Government had treated Sir Bartle Frere fairly, even while they retained him. For he certainly could not have been much aided in the promotion of Confederation by being, as it were, with a rope round his 865 neck—a kind of intimation that he would be recalled when he had brought Confederation about, and, at the same time, deprived of that special allowance granted to him on his first appointment, which it was quite necessary for him to receive, and the withdrawal of which, as he himself said, must have been felt in the Colony as a distinct loss of valuable and legitimate influence to him in South Africa. Such conduct was not fair to Sir Bartle Frere, nor wise for the attainment of the object which the Government had in view. What, too, would be the position of the next Governor? Sir Hercules Robinson was an experienced and successful Governor; he was, doubtless, the best man to send. But he thought the new Governor would go to his post in circumstances not very favourable to him, as he could scarcely be welcome to the many warm friends of Sir Bartle Frere in the Colony, and, on the other hand, could expect but little, if any, support from the Cape opposition. He trusted, therefore, that his path might be made as smooth as possible by some explicit declaration, on the part of the Government, that, although they had obeyed the demands of hon. Members below the Gangway in recalling Sir Bartle Frere, they did not intend in the future to follow in South Africa the policy which those hon. Members had always recommended. In conclusion, he would add that he was perfectly satisfied with the general policy which was being pursued by the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Kim-berley). If he might be allowed to say so, it proceeded on the exact lines which were followed when he (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) was at the Colonial Office, as might be proved by reference to the Despatches and Papers in that Office. There was but one other question to which he hoped he might allude—that was the payment of a certain sum of £3,800, expenses incurred by Sir Bartle Frere in his journey from Natal through the Transvaal. He hoped that when the noble Earl had fully examined into the circumstances of that expenditure, and obtained the necessary Treasury sanction, he would not be reluctant to authorize the proposal of a Vote for it in the House of Commons. The journey of Sir Bartle Frere was undertaken at the direct request of the Government of the day; and hon. Members, whatever they might think of 866 his action in Natal, would admit that by his conduct in the Transvaal he prevented the outbreak of a civil war. He was confident that, however much Sir Bartle Frere's opponents might rejoice at his recall, they would be entirely superior to fining, in that illiberal manner, an old public servant, who had not spared his abilities or his private means in the service of his country, and who, if he had erred, had done so through over-readiness to take upon himself such responsibilities as most men in these days would be anxious to avoid.
MR. GRANT DUFFThe right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) has made so many direct appeals to Her Majesty's Government that I am prepared to take part now, rather than as I intended, somewhat later. In this discussion various subjects have been raised. I think all the subjects connected with South Africa have been, more or less, raised in the course of the debate. I will begin with the subject the right hon. Gentleman was treating just before he sat down—namely, the case of Sir Bartle Frere. Now, the action of Her Majesty's Government with reference to Sir Bartle Frere has been so simple, and so obvious, that I have nothing to add to what has already been said from these Benches during the course of the Session. I can only re-state it. It would be trifling with the House if I were to attempt to show in detail that the action of Sir Bartle Frere, with reference to the Zulu War, had been very severely condemned by a great many Members of Her Majesty's present Administration. When, however, the present Government came into power, they found that, although the late Government had defended Sir Bartle Frere in debate, and, as far as voting went, they had defended him successfully, they had themselves, to a great extent, adopted the policy of the Opposition. They had not recalled Sir Bartle Frere from the Cape; but they had recalled him from the preeminent position he occupied at the commencement of the Zulu War, and put him in quite a different position. When the right hon. Baronet was in Downing Street, at the time of the debate in March, 1879, he said of Sir Bartle Frere with perfect accuracy —"Great as is his authority, greater than that of any other Governor in 867 the Colonial Service." But when the present Administration came into power that would have been altogether an inaccurate statement of the position of Sir Bartle Frere. When we came into Office we found not one king in South Africa, but two kings in South Africa— Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Garnet Wolseley—two kings who by no means always agreed, either in their views, or in the manner of expressing those views. Further, we found that Sir Bartle Frere, so far from being able, as he was at the commencement of the Zulu War, to move great masses of Imperial troops, had only at his command a very small number of troops—about 800—doing the necessary garrsion duty at the Cape, and a trifling detachment—only a company, I believe—at the mouth of the St. John's River. We found, further, that the telegraph was in active operation, and, as the right hon. Gentleman has reminded me, I did say that it was impossible for Sir Bartle Frere to take any proceeding beyond the mere routine of his duties without the fullest opportunity being given to Her Majesty's Government to make known its will, and to insist upon that will being carried into effect. We further found that Sir Bartle Frere, far from being engaged in warlike operations, was chiefly occupied in one of the most peaceful courses in which it was possible for any man to be engaged. He was mainly engaged in attempting, by the usual influence in the hands of a Colonial Governor, to bring to maturity a plan of Confederation, to be initiated by a conference, the idea of which had sprung up at the Cape itself, and to effect which he had originally been sent out in 1877 before all this trouble began. Now, we had no very great confidence that this Confederation would be early effected. We always desired Confederation, but we thought the action of Lord Carnarvon was premature. We fully believed that Confederation would come one day; but, if we had been in power, we certainly should not have taken the precise way of arriving at it at the precise time Lord Carnarvon did. Still, we remembered the saying, that it is not right to quench the smoking flax, and we determined to run the painful risk of appearing inconsistent to some of our own best friends, rather than allow it to be said that by any hasty action on our 868 part in recalling Sir Bartle Frere we had made Confederation, which would certainly be advantageous both to the Mother Country and to South Africa, impossible. Accordingly, my noble Friend the Secretary of State gave Sir Bartle Frere the very fullest assurances that could possibly be given, that he should have, while he remained at the Cape, the fullest support. I utterly deny that there is the smallest occasion for the phrase used by the right hon. Baronet, that Sir Bartle Frere acted with a rope round his neck. There is not a trace of any feeling of the kind to be found in the despatches. We gave him the fullest possible support until it was announced to him he was no longer desired to remain in South Africa. Well, what occurred? In the course of the summer a telegram was received saying that the proposal for Confederation which had sprung up at the Cape, and which contemplated that Confederation being inaugurated by a conference at the Cape, had come to an end. It had failed. Then we said to ourselves—"Most certainly if the despatches which will arrive some three weeks hence do not put a totally different complexion on the case, the time has come for Sir Bartle Frere to withdraw from the Cape Colony. The Prime Minister being several times questioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), utterly declined to make any definite statement until we should have these despatches in our hands. It was always possible there might be something in the despatches which might show, although the Confederation conference was not to take place, that still there might be some hope of effecting a Confederation of the South African Colonies. In the course of time the despatches came; but there was not the slightest trace or hint in these despatches of anything of the kind. It was prefectly clear from the despatches that although it was hoped and believed that some day the Confederation project would be revived, yet for a time Confederation was perfectly dead. We join in the hope that it may be revived again; but it is perfectly clear that the object for which Sir Bartle Frere was retained at the Cape was at an end. As soon as this information was received Her Majesty's Government acted upon it. They sent a telegram to Sir Bartle 869 Frere, which was immediately placed in the hands of hon. Members. But I maintain that up to the very hour when that telegram was sent there was not the slightest foundation for the statement that Sir Bartle Frere did not receive from my noble Friend at the head of the Colonial Office, and from everyone connected with Her Majesty's Government the very fullest possible support he could have received. The right hon. Gentleman alluded to the withdrawal of Sir Bartle Frere's special allowance of £2,000 a-year. Well, with respect to that, I can only say that if the opinions of the right hon. Gentleman were the same when he was at the Colonial Office that they are now it is ten thousand pities that he did not take some means of putting those opinions upon paper. Of course, we were not cognizant of what private communications might have passed.
§ SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHNo private communications whatever passed.
MR. GRANT DUFFThen I maintain that by no possible interpretation can the public documents in the possession of the Government at the Colonial Office be strained into an agreement that this £2,000 a-year was received by Sir Bartle Frere for any other purpose than for the purpose of recompensing him for the expenses of travelling and other expenses he was put to when outside the limits of the Cape Colony. In the letter written by Lord Carnarvon's orders from the Colonial Office to the Treasury, and in the reply from the Treasury, there is not a hint of any other purpose or object than that purpose and object I have stated to the House. I am perfectly aware that some of Sir Bartle Frere's friends have maintained that that £2,000 a-year was given to Sir Bartle Frere for the purpose of adding to his state and dignity as Governor of the Cape; and it appears from one of his despatches sent to the Government, that that was his opinion. But what the foundation for it is I cannot imagine. There is no foundation for it in the public documents in charge of the Department. The right hon. Gentleman alluded to another matter—to a claim sent in by Sir Bartle Frere for a sum of from £3,000 to £4,000—£3,800, I believe, for the extra travelling expenses he was put to during his very long absence from 870 the Government in connection with the affairs of Natal and Zululand. It has not been in our power to make any proposition to the House about that sum of £3,800 this year, because we have not yet received from Sir Bartle Frere accounts which make it possible to do so; but Sir Bartle Frere will soon be in this country, and when he is here he will be able to give us full information. When we have the information in our possession we have no doubt that the House will do whatever, under the circumstances, after a full and generous consideration of the whole matter, it may deem it right and proper to do.
I should like now to answer a Question, which I shall not have another opportunity of answering, which was put to me last night, and in regard to which I said I would answer it to-day. It was a Question, and a very important one, put by my hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell). My hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy asked me if I was able to state the cost to the Imperial Exchequer of the various wars which have been waged in South Africa during the latter part of the administration of Lord Beaconsfield. Now, I would warn the hon. Member and the House that I cannot give a perfectly complete and correct answer with regard to this, but I will give the very best answer I can. But the hon. Member and the House generally will pardon me if there be found some errors in my statement. The Zulu War, according to the figures presented by the late Administration, cost the Imperial Government, up to September 30th, 1879, £5,137,878. The Transkei War cost the Imperial Government, according to the same authority, £543,465. The war in Griqualand West cost the Imperial Government, according to the same authority, £220,000. I am not in a position to say exactly what the Secocoeni War cost.
§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLAre these sums exclusive of the pay of the troops?
MR. GRANT DUFFI apprehend not; but I am unable to say. Another part of hon. Friend's Question was this —he asked what amount of repayment we had got, and what amount of repayment we expected? I think it would be unwise at present to state anything as to the amount of repayment we expect; 871 but as to the amount of repayment we have got, I may say that there was received by our Predecessors £40,000 from the Cape Government. I can assure my hon. Friend that all we can wisely, justly, and properly do towards recovering any sums to which we may assume we have a thoroughly just and equitable title, we shall do; but, as he well knows, in all cases of this kind it is the strongest partner who generally pays.
Another question raised by the right hon. Gentleman opposite has reference to the subject of Confederation. The right hon. Gentleman asks me what is the policy of the present Government in regard to Confederation, now that the immediate prospect of Confederation has broken down? To that, I reply that the present Government is as anxious for Confederation as any Government can be; but that it does not see its way to it at present. The desire for Confederation before Confederation itself can be effected must grow up and grow strong in the Colonies themselves. It is easy to take a horse to the water, but you cannot make him drink. I have no doubt—and I do not think that anyone who has given attention to the subject can have a doubt —that it would be of great benefit to this country if we could have Confederation in South Africa; but I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman opposite that, important as it would be to the interests of this country, it would be far more important to South Africa itself. But you cannot force that conviction upon South Africa yet; and the very fact of our attempting to force it would have precisely a contrary effect to that which we desire to produce, and would retard, rather than accelerate, ultimate Confederation. I agree entirely in all the right hon. Gentleman said with. regard to the importance of every one of these communities learning that they must defend themselves against Native outbreaks. All the Mother Country can do is to warn against illusions. The belief in the Mother Country coming to their aid in real difficulty seems ineradicable in certain minds in the Cape Colony; but none the less is it the duty of men on both sides of politics in this country to give those in the Cape Colony who have not yet realized the position distinctly to understand, what a considerable party there does seem to understand, that henceforward they must 872 provide entirely for their own defence against all Native adversaries whatever. It is only just and fair to say that the most advanced and powerful of these communities—Cape Colony—has really been setting its shoulder to the wheel in earnest. There have been passed during the last few years some most excellent Acts by the Cape Parliament with a view to the defence of the Colony. It would be extremely unjust—and I would be the last person—to pass over the efforts they have been making in this direction. Unquestionably, Sir Bartle Frere has done very good service to the country in reference to the passing of these Acts. And that is not all. In addition to passing these Acts, the Cape Government has behaved extremely well in all that relates to the taking over of Griqualand West. It is a very important thing for the Mother Country that it should be left free from all responsibility connected with Griqualand West. The Cape Government is now responsible for the administration of that territory. In addition, I may say that ever since the present Secretary of State announced, and I think the late Secretary of State did also—or if he did not, he would have done so if he had had the opportunity— that if the Cape Colony, by pressing disarmament, prematurely brought on a Basuto War, it would have to fight it out with its own strength, the Cape Colony has shown itself perfectly prepared to do so. Since I came to the House a telegram has been put into my hand, giving us the latest accounts from Zululand, where, hon. Members may know, Mr. Sprigg, the Cape Prime Minister, is at the present moment. The accounts, on the whole, are very much better than those we have received during the last few weeks.
A good deal has been said by the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) as to the number of troops we have in South Africa. It is, certainly, only right that I should make a statement on the subject. When I replied, a short time ago, to my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), I said there were between 5,000 and 6,000 men in South Africa. Of that number, about 800 were stationed at Cape Town, to protect the great Imperial Naval station. A small detachment at the mouth of the St. John's River was placed there for the purpose of protecting the Custom House, and 873 preventing the importation of arms. The rest, when I spoke, were scattered about in Natal, and the Transvaal. Since I spoke, the state of things remains the same, with the exception that one regiment, hitherto quartered in the Transvaal, it is thought, under the advice of Sir George Colley, may be dispensed with. That regiment is, therefore, under orders to leave the Transvaal in October. These are the latest facts in regard to military matters in South Africa. Considering how lately these countries were the scene of wars and rumours of wars, the force will probably not be deemed excessive. And the plea which was found good at the other end of Africa will be accepted as sufficient:—
Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt Moliri, et latè fines custode tueri.We have been asked, What are the views of the Government with regard to Natal? In Natal, as will be seen from my noble Friend's despatch, which is on the Table of the House, the Government propose to allow the old form of government which existed before 1875 to come once more into vigour. Until Confederation takes place, it is difficult to imagine how responsible Government can possibly be accorded to that Colony. The reasons are put so well in a despatch from Sir Garnet Wolseley, that I will read it to the House. He says—I cannot see that the demand for responsible government in Natal is supported by any good reasons, and I trust that Her Majesty will not he advised to grant the request of the Legislative Council. The qualification required by law to entitle a man to vote at elections to the Legislative Council is so small that practically every man of European descent can hold a vote if he wishes. The total number of men entitled to vote now is 4,103, of whom 1,656 belong to the two boroughs of Durban and Maritzburg. The existing Council by whom this ponderous machinery of a Parliament with an Upper and Lower House has been elaborated, was elected by a total number of 997 voters, of whom 503 voted in the two boroughs above mentioned for the election of four Members, while the remaining 11 elective Members were returned by a total number of 494 voters. In a colony where the voters, or, in other words, the grown-up males of European descent, are only about 4,100, any attempt to create a Constitution on such a very narrow basis, in imitation of that which we possess in England, would be as futile as it would be dangerous. The whole White population of Natal does not amount to 22,300 souls, while the Kaffir population is said to be nearly 400,000; and I think that even were not the paucity of the White inhabitants and their 874 inexperience in matters of government a sufficient reason of itself for mistrusting the establishment of responsible government here, the relation of those inhabitants to the immensely preponderant Black population places an insuperable obstacle in the way of the successful government of the Colony by the absolute voice of the minority of its people.These observations seem to me to admit of no denial. We shall be extremely anxious to see the day when it will be possible to give Natal a responsible Government, but how that is to be effected until the process of Confederation in South Africa has become an established fact, no one has yet been astute enough to point out.Now, Sir, I come to the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney), and to the question he has so often raised in this House— namely, the question of the Transvaal. I think, before going further, it is only fair to say that the hon. Member has manifested a great deal of perseverance in the service of those persons whose cause he has taken up. But, when all is said, what does it come to? We are not here to-night to discuss the question whether the original annexation of the Transvaal under Lord Carnarvon was a politic or a righteous act. That question has gone before another and its proper tribunal—the tribunal of history—and that tribunal is one that does not usually give its final opinion during the lifetime of the actors in any transaction. But the question which we have to decide here this evening is whether the House of Commons, on the 31st of August, 1880, is willing that the Transvaal should cease to form part of the dominions of the Queen. Now, I do not think that the House of Commons is at all prepared to come to that conclusion. I am, myself, quite willing to go as far with the hon. Member as to say that, after giving the matter the best study in my power, my impression is that Sir The ophilus Shepstone acted prematurely, and that the annexation of the Transvaal, at the particular time, and in the particular way in which it took place, was an unfortunate act. But, having said that, I will go on to say that I firmly believe that if Sir The ophilus Shepstone had held his hand, and had not annexed the Transvaal, before very long the South African Republic would have fallen like a ripe fruit, and, however much any of us— and, certainly, I have been one of them— 875 disliked the idea of having to take charge of the South African. Republic, I do believe that within a few months the cry for protection from the people of the Transvaal would have become so strong that it could not have been resisted by a civilized Government. Since the day when, according to the old story, our ancestors in this Kingdom exclaimed —"The barbarians drive us into the sea, and the sea drives us back to the barbarians," I do not believe any civilized community ever found itself in a more deplorable state than that South African Republic which, according to the hon. Member for Liskeard, was going from better to better. [Mr. COURTNEY: I said from worse to better.] I believe that it was going from indifferent to detestable. My hon. Friend has taken good care to blacken the character of President Burgers, although he was unable to say anything worse than that he accepted a pension at the hands of Her Majesty's Government. My hon. Friend felt confident that before this debate was over I should call President Burgers into the witness-box and see what he had to say; but I see that the time is going on rapidly, and that it will not be in my power to use all the extracts I had prepared. But I will use two of them. The first is part of a speech delivered by President Burgers just before the annexation—
We should delude ourselves by entertaining the hope that matters would mend by-and-bye. It would be only self-deceit. I tell you openly that matters are as bad as they ever can be; they cannot be worse. These are bitter truths, and people may, perhaps, turn their backs on me. But then I shall have the consolation of having done my duty.I pass over a number of other extracts; but there is one which I should like to read, and which gives a most pitiable and ludicrous idea of the miserable position to which this Transvaal Republic had come. President Burgers says—To-day a Bill for £1,100 was laid before me for signature, but I would have sooner cut off my right hand than sign that paper, for I have not the slightest ground to expect that when that Bill becomes due there will be a penny to pay it with.Can anyone say that a State in such a deplorable condition that it could not calculate on meeting such a bill with the Zulu power threatening it on one side 876 and Secocoeni unsubdued within what it claimed as its own borders, was likely to be long lived? Of course, I am perfectly aware of the facts which the hon. Member has laid before us. I know that a considerable portion of the Transvaal has been at all times opposed to Confederation, and that that party has been sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker. I believe it was somewhat weak about the time of the annexation; but it became strong immediately afterwards, and certainly increased for some time. But, of late, the strength of that party has been diminishing with every month that has passed over it. Although there is an anti-British party in the Transvaal, it must not be forgotten that there is also a pro-British party. The pro-British party is the party of the towns, and the anti-British party is the party of the farmers, who do not so much dislike the British Government as they dislike any Government at all. The hon. Member has said, and I go so far with him as to say, of the annexation — Fieri non debuit at the particular time and in the particular way in which it was done; though, as I have said, I believe it was in the fates that the South African Republic should, before long, become merged in the possessions of the British Crown. But, if ever there was an occasion on which it was right to complete the legal maxim, and say —Fieri non debuit, factum valet, this is the occasion. Not only has the annexation of the Transvaal been accepted by three different Secretaries of State, of very different characters and political tendencies, but it has been accepted and ratified by two Cabinets, which are so diverse that they may be said to represent almost every element which exists in British political life. You could not show, now, that things are getting worse in the Transvaal, or, doubtless, the contention of the Member would receive more consideration from the House. Already the right hon. Gentleman opposite has quoted facts and figures to show that, far from getting worse, they are getting better month by month. I will not go back upon the statements which he has quoted; but I will just read one or two statements which I have here, which show that this improvement is progressing; that it had begun already before Sir Garnet Wolseley left the country, and before the pre- 877 sent Government came into Office, and that it is being constantly continued. In April of this year Sir Garnet Wolseley wrote to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach—Reports from all quarters of the Transvaal sustain the opinion that the people, being thoroughly tired of the uncertainty and the trouble attendant upon opposition to the Government, and seeing no hope of any successful issue from the dangerous measures in which they had been induced to place confidence, have determined to renounce all further disturbing action, and to return to the peaceful cares of their rural life, which was already beginning to suffer from the continuance of political irritation. The resolution of a part of the people to deny the trade of their produce to Englishmen failed utterly, and expired with conspicuous lack of vitality before the natural forces that were fated to overpower it. Taxes are being paid, and the Revenue of the country, so long disturbed and in part suspended, is flowing in steadily in its regular course. I believe that, with the check which has thus been imposed upon the organization of discontent, a foundation has been laid for the administration of affairs in the Transvaal, upon which there may be built with the aid of time a fabric of government in furtherance of the prosperity of the people, and in unison with their sympathies and their wishes.Statements of the same character I could quote as having been made in the Legislative Assembly on the 7th of June, but time will not allow. That leads me to the statements quoted by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. In a despatch received from Sir Owen Lanyon at the beginning of this month, and dated the 26th of June, he reports as follows: —A considerable change for the better in the feelings of the population generally has taken place since the receipt of your Lordship's telegram announcing that Her Majesty's sovereignty over the Transvaal could not be abandoned. I have everywhere seen evidence of this during my journey to this place, and the landdrosts generally report to the same effect.Now, against that the hon. Member has really nothing to set, except what he thinks ought to be, and is likely to be. I have quoted facts, while my hon. Friend has entirely depended on theory. My hon. Friend has quoted nothing that has come from the Transvaal itself. He has quoted what was said by delegates from the Transvaal who were sent to Cape Town.
§ MR. COURTNEYI beg the right hon. Gentleman's pardon. I quoted facts; the right hon. Gentleman has only quoted the impressions of interested witnesses.
MR. GRANT DUFFA great many facts were likewise quoted by the right hon. Gentleman opposite which I will not re-quote, simply in order to save the time of the House. Will any responsible person, not thoroughly committed by his previous action, attempt to go back from the state of things which has been described by the right hon. Gentleman and by myself, to the former state of things just before the annexation? Compare the present position of the country with the language of President Burgers. I do not believe that any reasonable man would wish to go back, and he could not go back if he would. It would be utterly and hopelessly impossible to return from the present state of things to the old state of things without crossing a stream of blood over which I, for one, would be extremely sorry to pass. The right hon. Gentleman justly pointed to a feature in the Transvaal case which is not sufficiently remembered—namely, the enormous number of the Native population. It would be contrary to the fact to say that that Native population were well, or even tolerably, treated by the South African Republic. There is another point to which I wish to call attention in connection with the Transvaal, and it is the extremely important point raised by the right hon. Gentleman with regard to arrangements with Portugal, which might enable us to connect the Transvaal with the port of Lorenzo Marques and Delagoa Bay. I am perfectly convinced, with the right hon. Gentleman, that it would be a very important matter indeed for the Transvaal if we could succeed in getting that railway made under favourable conditions. The Treaty, which would have been the necessary preliminary to any serious consideration of such a project, was on the point of being ratified when a hitch occurred, and the matter is now hung up, I am afraid, till the Cortes meet next January. I hope it may then be arranged, and I hope so not only in the interests of the Transvaal, but in those of Portugal, to the prosperity of whose dominion in South Africa I think the proposed Treaty would largely contribute, and I am sure that every right-minded Englishman must desire the prosperity of our ancient ally who gained, at the dawn of modern history, such imperishable renown as well in connection with South Africa as with. 879 India. One other matter in connection with the Transvaal. I should be extremely sorry that the idea should for a moment get abroad that we are not most anxious to give to the Transvaal, as soon as we can, as much local self-government as possible. That is the condition in which we are anxious to see every community placed which can govern itself. There are, of course, precisely the same difficulties that there are as regards Natal, although in a more aggravated form. As soon as these difficulties can be got over by Confederation, or in any other way, I sincerely trust that we shall be able to give local self-government to the Transvaal; but, in the existing state of affairs, no one who wishes well to that country, as a portion of Her Majesty's Dominions, will desire any Constitutional changes to be made.
The hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. E. N. Fowler), before he went off to more agreeable occupations and to some well-earned rest, asked me to say a word about Moirosi's territory when I came to speak of South Africa. I comply with his wish by mentioning that a long debate with reference to the disposal of Moirosi's territory occurred in the Capo Parliament on the last day of June, and ended with the withdrawal of a Resolution which had been brought forward, upon a promise being given by Mr. Sprigg that a thorough inquiry should be made into the whole subject during the Recess by an officer who was unconnected with all former proceedings in that part of the country.
§ Motion made, and Question, "That the Debate be now adjourned,—[Sir George Campbell,]—put, and agreed to.
§ Debate adjourned till this day.
§ And it being five minutes to Seven of the clock, the House suspended its Sitting.
§ The House resumed its Sitting at Nine of the clock.