SUPPLY—ARMY ESTIMATES.

HC Deb 03 March 1879 vol 244 cc37-105

SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

COLONEL STANLEY

In moving the number of men to form the Forces for the ensuing year, I confess I have a task of some difficulty before me, and one for which I think I may fairly ask, and I am sure I shall not ask in vain, the kind indulgence of the Committee. The circumstances of the year are somewhat peculiar, and the Estimates show on the face of them that even at the last moment, when under ordinary circumstances no alteration or addition of any kind is made to the Estimates, it was necessary, to a certain extent, to re-cast them and to make provision for the misfortune, the memory of which is so fresh in the recollection of the House. I had hoped that it would have been my duty to show the Committee that the manner in which they responded to the invitation which the Government was compelled to address to them last year to vote increased Supplies for the service of the Army had been met by an endeavour on the part of the Government, in the hope of quieter times, to reduce the burdens which they are always unwilling, even for the necessities of the Service, to place on the taxpayers of the country, if it can be prudently avoided. It is true no very large reduction was hoped for from the Estimates of last year, yet it will be seen by those who care to go through the various explanations that were published when the Estimates were first circulated, that wherever it was possible there has been a diminution of expenditure, and that it is chiefly in the non-effective Votes, which are not under the control of the House or of the Secretary of State for War, that inevitable increases have arisen. But although the hopes with which these diminished Estimates were pro-pared have not been fulfilled, and we nave found ourselves at the last moment placed in a situation which forbade any reduction of the Army, yet I must confess that the mode in which the Estimates have been presented—and for which I am entirely responsible—is not wholly satisfactory even to myself. But I thought it better to place them before the Committee at once, even in a somewhat unusual manner, rather than to withhold the Estimates from them, and to take further time for re-casting the whole of the Vote. The Committee have before them, in the Estimates as they are printed, the number of men and the expenses as they were originally framed; and they will find that it became necessary at the last moment to withhold the reduction of the men which we had previously intended to make. Before I show how that increased number of officers and men was distributed, there are some other matters connected with the first Vote upon which it will be expedient that I should briefly give the Committee some information. So many of those Papers which are the foundation of these Financial Statements are now, in accordance with a very good custom, made the property of the House, that it is rather difficult to enter upon any new ground. Therefore, as so many matters are already within the knowledge of hon. Members, I do not intend to occupy time by going at length into them, but will only pass rapidly over the leading topics. Coming first of all to that which is one of the principal points in reference to the Service—the recruiting—I may state that the Recruiting Report for the year 1878 is one which I think the Committee will consider eminently satisfactory. It is true we all know, and perhaps deplore, the circumstances which may have led a large number of men, who otherwise would have been occupied in civil life, to seek the profession of arms; but, speaking for the moment from a departmental point of view alone, the results of the recruiting are, I think, satisfactory. The establishment has been more than kept up, and there has been at no time a lack of recruits. Last year the number fluctuated to an extent which has caused us largely to exceed our establishment; and to- wards the close of the financial year now passing we made efforts, not absolutely to check recruiting, but to utilize the excess by sending more men to the Reserve. Still, at no time, except in one month, have we been at all below our establishment, and then only to a trifling extent. The Medical Reports as to the recruits raised have been entirely satisfactory; the medical officers have been stringent in their examinations, and yet the small number of men they have rejected proves that the quality of those who joined in the past year is equal, if not superior, to that of the recruits enlisted in former years. It is true that upon one point matters are not quite so satisfactory. The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms) referred on a former occasion to that point, which is undoubtedly a weak one in the history of the British Army—namely, the somewhat large amount of desertion. It must, however, be borne in mind that the number of desertions, considerable as it appears, is by no means to be reckoned as representing exactly the number of men who deserted. On the contrary, it is within the knowledge of all who care about the subject, that the facility for the commission of that offence leads almost to its becoming a professional habit amongst some of the men. I trust that that habit, and still more the enlisting of a class of men who take up re-enlisting as a sort of trade, will be somewhat checked by a Bill which I hope will be in the hands of hon. Members in the course of a very few days. The net loss by desertions amounted, in the past year, to 2,747 men. That is, however, more than counterbalanced by the large number of recruits raised. I have no word of disparagement to say of recruits, except this—which has been said almost uniformly by every Secretary of State for War since I have had the honour to sit in this House—namely, that in some cases the recruits are not quite so old as could be wished. That is a fault, no doubt, which mends every day; but, at the same time, it does not place our battalions in quite the same position as the battalions of Continental States, which can take men compulsorily for this service at any age they please. With regard to the number of appointments made in the Army, I think it may be of interest to the Committee to know that between the 1st of January and the 31st of December last year, 601 officers joined the Army. Of these, the number of gentlemen cadets from the Royal Military College was 387; there were nine non-commissioned officers promoted to commissions; there were also 205 Militia candidates. I mention this because in the year 1878 the first appointments were considerably in excess of the vacancies. Owing to the establishment of cadetships in the Royal Military College in 1877, there were not a sufficient number of candidates in that year to fill the vacancies, and they were accordingly not filled until the year 1878. Moreover, owing to the Reserve having been called out in the summer it was necessary, to some extent, to increase the number of officers. The total number of officers who retired from the Service by various means during the same period was 347, and of those 16 went on half-pay. This year a very material effect has been produced by the operation of the new Pay Warrant. That provides for the Army Pay Department; and as some hon. Gentlemen opposite were largely interested in the success of that experiment, I may say that I believe that it has fulfilled the expectations with regard to it. Notwithstanding the imminence of a European war during the first portion of last year, and notwithstanding the subsequent wars which broke out in Afghanistan and at the Cape, which, of course, in some instances, prevented officers from continuing their applications to join the non-combatant branches of the Service, yet over 100 vacancies were filled by volunteers from the Army, and the new Department has, therefore, come greatly in aid of the system of compulsory retirement. Many officers who would otherwise have been retired compulsorily from other causes have had opened to them this mode of retirement. It still utilizes their services, while, at the same time, it removes them from the line of promotion with which they would otherwise have interfered. That measure was intended for the benefit of the Service; and I hope that both as regard the qualification of the officers and the manner in which they perform their duties that the institution of the scheme will be justified. There are now 28 officers of that Department at the Cape, and no difficulty has been experienced in sending them out to fill up the places as required. Under these circumstances, I think there is a justification for the increase of the Vote for that Department this year by the sum of £5,280. It must be borne in mind also that a large portion of this sum would probably have had to be placed under the non-effective Vote, had these officers not gone into the Army Pay Department. I now come to a very important point, which I think I had better touch upon at this stage of our proceedings. It will be borne in mind that some few years ago a system was introduced by Viscount Cardwell which promised—and the promise has since been fulfilled—that in time of emergency we should be able to increase the Service by a number of men called from the Reserves, and, as it were, from civil life, who would come back to swell the Forces required for the purposes of war. It is rather curious, however, that at the time when we thought so much about an increase in the number of the men we should have thought nothing whatever about an increase in the number of the officers which the outbreak of war would inevitably necessitate. This difficulty must be constantly borne in mind. If, on the one hand, we appointed all the officers who would be required for the immediate purposes of war we should run the risk, always thought formerly to exist, that after the cessation of war promotion would be blocked up and a number of officers have to be compulsorily retired on half-pay. The subject was one of such importance that when I took Office I lost no time in assembling a Committee to inquire into and report upon this subject, as it seemed to me highly desirable that steps should be taken, without delay, for the establishment of a Reserve of officers. The importance of the subject will be seen, even when a small casualty has caused a demand for officers to exist, and when it is considered how many officers are required for the lines of communication and other duties connected with an army in the field, it is clear that the demand is one which we should be prepared to meet. Then, again, the increased establishment caused by the calling out of the Army and Militia Reserves would call for a very considerable increase in the number of officers. What recommended itself to the Committee was that those officers who had left the Service from one reason or another should be allowed to join on certain conditions. It has never been more signally shown than in the course of the last few days that there are in this country a number of officers who have retired from the Service, but who would give their ears to come back. The Committee considered whether they could not add to the number of officers available on an emergency without stopping the stream of promotion. We thought that if we employed properly qualified officers, without interfering with the line of promotion, we should materially strengthen the country in time of war. The Committee was presided over, with great ability, by General Hawley, and the object of their inquiries was to ascertain and report upon the number of officers required to complete the Army when raised to its full war strength, and whether it would be possible to employ the retired officers on an emergency, it being understood that such officers were to receive an increased rate of pay while employed, but were to revert to their former condition on the emergency passing away. The result of the Committee's inquiries was that the total number of extra officers when the Army was put upon its full strength would be 679, exclusive of those required for keeping up a line of communications extending over 100 miles, for which 124 officers would be required. The Commissariat and Ordnance Store Departments would also require greatly strengthening, and it becomes very important that they should be made thoroughly satisfactory. Under these circumstances, I have ventured to recommend that we should frame an Army Warrant, which would enable us to employ a reserve of officers in time of war. The details of the proposed scheme are still in course of preparation; but the substance of it amounts to this. We shall pay the officers a somewhat larger sum for allowance for a higher rate of pay; but they will be employed simply during the time when their services are actually required. Conditions will have to be laid down for preventing the employment of these officers interfering with the stream of preferment; but when the scheme has assumed its final shape, I shall lay it on the Table of the House, and shall be then happy to give further information. I think it is the first time we have contemplated a Reserve of officers; but I hold a very strong view as to the necessity for the step, and I believe that we may rest assured that the Committee, over which General Hawley presided, has found the right means for the end intended to be met. I will now pass from the officers to another point connected with the men. This is a question upon which I must ask the permission of the Committee to speak with entire frankness, and yet with some reserve. In 1872, the system known as the localization of the Army was established by Viscount Cardwell, the special points of which were that two battalions were to be linked together where double battalions did not exist in the same regiment. They were to have a depot in common, and a Militia regiment was to be attached to them. The linked battalions, as they were called, were, from a certain date, to be absolutely interchangeable as regards officers and men. If I am not mistaken, exception was taken at the time, when the measure received ample criticism, to the want of elasticity which the system involved. I am bound to tell the Committee that if the lines of the localization scheme were strictly adhered to, I do not think that margin enough has been allowed for the possibility of our sending both battalions out at a time when we are not in a state of general war. Viscount Cardwell's localization scheme provided that one battalion out of every two might be abroad at the same time; and his alternative to having only 70 battalions was that when both battalions were abroad we were to raise the strength of a provisional battalion, and then to call out a linked battalion, and if an emergency required it to call out the second, and so on. But these were proceedings which it was understood could only occur when there was a war which threatened to be of very large dimensions. The Committee to which I have previously referred drew attention to it in words which very fairly expressed the want then felt. They said it seemed desirable to add to the existing Regulations some means by which the depôt might be expanded when both battalions were abroad at the same time. Since 1852 there have been the Burmese War, the Crimean War, the Kaffir War, the Indian Mutiny, two Chinese Wars, a Persian War, the Abyssinian Expedition, the Ashantee Expedition, and, since then, the war with Afghanistan, and, unfortunately, the war now going on at the Cape. In most of these wars the Forces abroad were increased, but in two cases only have the Militia been embodied. I think it right to speak with frankness about a fact which has been brought before the eyes of most men within the last few days—namely, that the short-service system and the localization system have not removed that difficulty of which we have always complained, and still experience, of having to transfer men from one regiment to another. Almost all commanding officers, although, comparatively speaking, they are used to see their men pass from them, feel the loss very much; and both commanding officers and regiments suffer unduly when those men are taken from them and transferred to other regiments. I do not wish to complain, or say that these matters could have been foreseen; but when we take cases such as occurred the other day with the 91st Regiment, which has been sent out to the Cape, along with the 72nd, now in Afghanistan, the difficulty will be understood. To supply the 72nd with the drafts necessary to keep it up the 91st has had to send out some of its best soldiers. When the disaster took place in Zululand, the 91st, which was the first for service, was necessarily put under orders, and it had to embark with no fewer than 374 men who volunteered and were drafted from other regiments.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

asked from how many regiments these men were drawn?

COLONEL STANLEY

Those 374 men were volunteers from 11 regiments. We recognize the courage and spirit of the men; but that cannot relieve the officers from the unpleasant necessity of receiving hurried drafts in that way. The 2nd battalion of the 21st received in that manner no less than 326 volunteers from eight regiments; the 58th 192 from four regiments; and the 94th 306 volunteers from nine regiments. I will give one more instance. Both battalions of the 24th are now serving at the Cape. The Committee is only too well aware that five companies of the one and one company of the other have been utterly destroyed. The brigade depôt at that time, out of a nominal roll of 248 men, including the men awaiting their discharge, and so forth, had to send 109 men to fill up this draft. I do not wish the Committee to imagine that things are worse than they are; and we must bear in mind that these great vacancies could be easily filled up if we were in such a state of war as would enable us to call up our men from the Army and Militia Reserves. If an emergency were to arise, we have sufficient Forces to fill up the vacancies by calling up the Army Reserve, and also the Reserve of that useful body, the Militia. But those Reserves can only be called upon if we are in a condition of general war. It is my duty to tell the Committee that these difficulties arise out of the short-service system, and to place these difficulties, as I feel them to exist, before the Committee, though I have no positive plan which at the moment I can lay before the Committee for removing them. In making this annual Statement, I have thought it right that the Committee should know how the matter stands, and I am sure that they will agree with me in the propriety of certain steps which I have taken. From what I have already indicated to the Committee, it will be seen that we shall be prepared at another time to give a little more elasticity to the present system, by allowing the Reserve men to come forward for active service. By the expansion of the depot, and by allowing Reserve men to volunteer for active service, I believe that a considerable number of our difficulties may be mot. But if I do not find from further investigation that the increase of the depots and the permission to the Reserves to volunteer for active service are sufficient to meet, the wants of the Service, I shall, in a great degree, rely upon the assistance of a Commission or Committee, which I am prepared to appoint, consisting of officers high in the Service, by whose practical experience I shall endeavour to be guided, and by which, without departing from the general lines of the scheme which the country has adopted, we may, perhaps, be able to supplement it, and to supply, in some small details, the deficiencies which now exist. I venture to pass from this point, and I do not think that it is necessary for me to touch on every Vote in succession. I will now mention a subject which is always one of interest to the Committee—namely, the general state of the health of the Army. The health of the Army during the year 1878 has been very good. The admission rate has been somewhat below the average, and the death rate has been very considerably under the average. There has been, on an average, about 4 per cent of the strength of the Army in the hospital. There has been a good deal of cholera in May, June, July, and August in India, and fever and other diseases of the digestive system in the summer months in Malta. There have also been some cases of yellow fever in Jamaica; but in no instance has the death rate been above the average, and the health of the Army abroad may be considered satisfactory. There is one exception, I must frankly admit, in the case of Cyprus, where there has been a most unusual amount of sickness. There the Army suffered from fever, for the most part of a most malarious type. But, though the admissions were certainly very high, the death rate was not so. About 19 of the deaths were due to fever, 5 to sunstroke, 5 to dejected system, 1 to debility, 1 to dyphtheria, 1 to consumption—in all, 34. The average number of men in hospital was 19 per cent, and deaths were at the annual rate of 37.57 per 1,000. The most unhealthy month was September, and there was a great improvement in the health of the men after the cold weather set in. On the 28th of January, the number of men in hospital was reduced to 25 per 1,000. On this subject, the other day, I spoke without book; but my strong impression is that it will turn out that the sanitary state of the Ionian Islands will show a state of things, as regards the health of the Army, that will be encouraging in the case of Cyprus. I have also said that although Cyprus has been a good deal before the public with respect to the health of the men, and has challenged a considerable amount of attention, yet that there are many places in the various commands where the normal state of health is, unfortunately, loss satisfactory than at Cyprus—places which we do not for one moment think of abandoning on that account; and other places where, as I shall show, sanitary arrangements made by British medical officers have contributed materially to improvement in the health of the troops. I am not able to compare entirely the health of those places; but I may say that the annual ratio of admissions per 1,000 in Malta is 1,090; in Gibraltar, 848; in Bengal, 1,979; in Madras, 1,562; in Bombay, 2,498; and in Cyprus the admissions are 4,298, from all causes. But when we come to the death rate, even in the worst month of the year, Cyprus is slightly in excess, in point of health, of other stations. The death rate is stated there at 37.57 per 1,000; while Bombay stands at 35; and Allahabad, Meerut, Delhi, and other places at 43 per 1,000. A rate of disease has often occurred far exceeding the rate during the short period we have occupied Cyprus; and, no doubt, our troops landed there at a very unhealthy period of the year. In the Mauritius, prior to 1867, the admission rate was 815 per 1,000, of which 22.23 was due to fever, and the death rate during the same period was 40.95. Sanitary arrangements at the Mauritius have very greatly improved the health of the troops, and we are in hopes still further of reducing the causes which tend to extend the fatality there. In the Ionian Islands much has been effected by sanitation. I am not able to give the statistics from an early period; but, in 1817, the earliest date I can get, the annual admission rate was 1,378 per 1,000, and the death rate 49 per 1,000. In 1836, the admission rate had dropped to 985, and the death rate to 15 per 1,000. In 1863, the admission rate was 684, while the death rate was only 8 per 1,000. That was considered literally one of the best stations in the Mediterranean. Both on medical, and on other grounds, I trust that the disease which has been so marked in Cyprus, and to which I am bound to call attention, has been due to exceptional circumstances; and I have every reason to hope, from medical reports which I have received from competent authorities at home and abroad, that the sanitary state of the Island may be brought to fully equal, if not surpass, other stations in the Mediterranean. Before leaving the Medical Vote, I must refer to a question of very considerable interest. I have endeavoured to give the House every information; but I am able to carry them very little further than that state of knowledge which they have already the means of possessing. The state of the Medical Department has, during the last few years, as hon. Members know, been by no means satisfactory. We have not been able to get the candidates required for the Service—that is to say, they have not come forward in such numbers as to give that scope for competition which ought to exist for entering the service of the Crown. But when we come to consider the causes of that state of things, they are not so easily traced. My noble Friend (Viscount Cranbrook) appointed a small Committee to inquire into the subject, and to report upon the reasons which prevented candidates from coming forward. That Committee stated many points upon which they thought there might be considerable amendment. But it must be borne in mind that there is always one point upon which there may be considerable dispute—namely, whether we ought to revert to the regimental system. That, no doubt, is a matter of money. I am free to admit that I may have some natural predilection in favour of the regimental system, and that if it were possible to retain the advantages of medical officers being attached to regiments while carrying out the general hospital system, that there may be a good deal to be said for such a proposal. There were two points contemplated when the Army Medical Department was formed. One was the diminution of the number of the officers, and the other was the adoption, in time of peace, of a system which must be followed in time of war. So far as I am concerned, I can be no party to anything which detracts from the general working of the Department so formed— that is to say, to anything which detracts from the working, in time of peace, of the system which is to be followed in time of war. The general hospital system was adopted by Viscount Cranbrook, and he said that it would be impossible to revert to the regimental system. That system was tried years ago, and it was found at Aldershot, Dublin, and other places, that regimental officers, as they then thought themselves, holding allegiance only to their regiments, considered it a matter of grace to undertake duty at hospitals for other regiments. The grouping of the sick, also, in the order of their regiments, led to undue expense in opening separate wards, or caused confusion, from the men of two or three regiments, suffering from the same class of disease in the same ward, being attended by separate sets of orderlies belonging to their different regiments. It was proved, to the satisfaction of the highest medical authorities, that such a system was impossible to work. For my own part, I must express the same adherence to the general hospital system, in time of peace as well as in time of war, that my noble Predecessor did. I have, however, thought it expedient to see whether, without undue expenditure, certain of the station hospitals may not be taken up by officers attached to regiments, and whether it will be possible to attach to them, for two or three years, officers who, while moving about with their regiments, can assist in performing general hospital duties at the stations wherever they may find themselves quartered. Although moving about with their regiments, when they came to the general hospital, they will, if necessary, take up the work of the officers they relieve. It is supposed that, under such an arrangement, without interfering with the general hospital system, it may be possible to carry out some of the conveniences and amenities of life which are agreeable to medical officers. That arrangement, however, will affect a very few; and though I have mentioned that such an inquiry has taken place, I must guard myself by saying that, unless it can be done within a reasonable margin of cost, the general hospital system, in its present form, must be adhered to. Two complaints have been made on behalf of medical officers. One, of the difficulty of effecting exchanges, and the other, of the inconvenience resulting from the frequent changes of station. I may state generally to the Committee that, from the inquiries I have made, I am satisfied that much may be done to diminish these complaints. If the Medical Department were entirely full, and if the conditions of service were a little nearer approached to what I hope to see, I think in many cases exchanges may be facilitated, while removals may in many cases be avoided. The Director General has promised to the best of his ability to keep officers in the same station longer than has hitherto been the case. In the Estimates we have not taken the full amount which will be necessary to meet the requirements of the Medical Warrants. I am bound to say that some matters connected with the Medical Department require careful investigation, such as accepting the nomination of collegiate and other bodies; and having regard to the period which must elapse before the new Warrant can be laid on the Table, I have made no substantial increase in the Vote on that account. I have, however, taken a certain amount for additional pay, and to meet certain changes provided for by the Warrant. Although the matter is one of great urgency, it is one in which we are bound to proceed carefully in ascertaining the facts and figures; but I am not without hope that I may be able to get the assent of the authorities to the issue of the Warrant before the next examination takes place in August. With regard to the attached medical officers, it must be understood that I am only proceeding to an extent which will not interfere with the general hospital system. As regards the Militia, the account I have to give to the Committee is generally satisfactory. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Sunderland (Sir Henry Havelock) will be glad to recognize the good that has resulted from the Committee of last year, on which he sat, and the benefit which has accrued from the Regulations with regard to the modes in which Militia recruits are enlisted. The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms) will also be glad to learn that the change which we have made in recruiting, so far as our short experience goes, has been justified, and that great practical benefit has resulted from placing greater responsibility on the recruiting officer. That is proved in two ways. In the first place, we have not so many recruits, but a much larger number of men have presented themselves for duty. The recruits, in 1877, were 41,000; and in 1878, 39,939 men. The loss in the former year was 9,970; whereas in the latter it was only 8,815. The net gain to the Service, therefore, was 31,071 in the former, and in the latter 31,124. Moreover, there was a diminution of £551 in the matter of bounty. Special testimony ought also to be borne to the recruiting battalion of the 6th West York, which in 1877 had 205 absentees, and in 1878 had none. The total strength of the Militia Force on the 1st of February this year was 114,603 men, against 110,979 last year. I must now remark upon the reasons which have weighed with me in recommending that the Militia should be trained this year three weeks instead of a month. Large numbers of recruits, it must be remembered, were raised last year. Those recruits, in most cases, received from eight to twelve weeks' drill, and therefore may reasonably be supposed not to have forgotten all they learned. The Militia Reserve was also called out, and served for about four months under the Colours. The circumstances under which the Estimates were prepared rendered it necessary to endeavour to save money wherever it could be justified; and I confess that, in view of the large number of recruits that were trained three months, and the large number of Reserve men that were trained four months, and looking to the fact that this year's recruits would receive three months' training, I felt myself justified in shortening the period of training by one week out of 28 days. I do not say that I did that without hesitation; but when one sees the inevitable increase to which I shall refer, and when one has to look about in various directions in the endeavour to bring the Estimates within reasonable proportions, one is bound sometimes to exercise one's judgment against one's wishes in these matters; and with that view I have thought myself justified, under the exceptional circumstances of this year, in recommending that the Militia training should be shortened by one week. The strength of the Militia Reserve on the 1st of February was 20,239; that was a slight falling off from the preceding year, when the number was 21,130. That, however, is easily accounted for by a large number of men having finished their time between the two dates, and by the fact that there has been no means of increasing the Reserve in that period. The strength of the Yeomanry has been given to the House in a recent Return. Here, again, as in the case of the Militia, I have found myself, for special and exceptional reasons, justified in recommending that the training should be shortened, and the Vote consequently diminished. During the last two months, and especially during the last fortnight, applications have been very numerous, in which it has been repre- sented that, under the exceptional circumstances of the year, farmers will be much inconvenienced if they are drawn away from their ordinary occupations. Owing to the state of the land, they have not been able to carry out the necessary agricultural operations; and there can be no doubt that many of them would be unable to attend without loss. We have no right, if we can possibly avoid it, to press persons who at other times are ready and willing to come forward and give their services, and to place them in a position of disadvantage when we can relieve them. We propose, therefore, to give the various regiments the option of attending four troop drills in which each troop will be drilled in a particular locality. We also propose to recommend that they shall be paid at the rate of 3s. 6d. for each troop drill. At present these drills are not paid for at all, and it has been represented that something should be paid the men for their time, and for the labour of their horses. This year I propose to give commanding officers the option of either calling out their men together for two days, or of allowing them to assemble for troop drills, for which they will be paid at the rate of 3s. 6d. each. That course will, I believe, meet the exceptional circumstances of the year, though it must not be taken as a precedent for future years. With regard to the Army Reserves, I have only to reiterate what is already a matter of notoriety, and to repeat my statement as to the willingness of the men to come forward, and the very small percentage of desertions. Statements have been made, at various times and in several quarters, that the Reserve men considered themselves hardly dealt with, and that they were summarily dismissed. There must be reason in all things, and we are bound not to propose that they should be paid for a longer period than would meet the case of men out of work. Especially it should be borne in mind, that many of those men are engaged in employment subject to very short notice. We paid them for a period of about three weeks, and gave them a gratuity; and, as far as I know, the men accepted the amount with a good spirit, regarding it as fair, if not too generous, payment. I now come to the Volunteers, whose enrolled strength on the 1st of November, 1878, was, including the Staff, 203,213. I must ask leave of the Committee, in consideration of the time I have already occupied, to be allowed to pass over briefly the Report of the Committee upon the Volunteer Forces, as it has been only recently presented, and some of its points are of such difficulty as to afford materials for much discussion. But there are one or two subjects on which it seems my duty to say a few words. My noble Friend in "another place" has touched upon the leading principles of that Report, and has explained the necessity of speaking with some reserve, although he considered it necessary to lay before the public, at as early a period as possible, the recommendations of the Committee. There is one recommendation of the Committee to which, however, I have no hesitation in asking this Committee at once to give effect. I shall ask the Committee to increase the money grant for the purposes of instruction in camps. The Report of the Committee will form the subject of many discussions, and I think it is hardly necessary to say more at the present time than that the subject seems to me to have been satisfactorily discussed. It appears that the Parliamentary Votes for the Volunteers are, under ordinary circumstances of management, sufficient for the conditions of the Service, the sole exception being the allowance for camps, for which we propose to take an increase in the present Vote. There has been a certain amount of misconception in certain quarters with regard to the limitation of the establishment. On the one hand, we are all anxious in theory that a Force such as the Volunteers should be encouraged to increase to its utmost dimensions; but, considering the effect of such an increase on the Estimates, there are reasons for carefully guarding against any undue expansion of the Force. Perhaps we have been somewhat negligent in assenting to the increase of the establishment without taking into consideration how far it would increase the Estimates for the ensuing year. There is, however, no wish on my part, or on that of my Colleagues, to diminish the extent of the existing Forces; and though some limit, such as 200,000 or 250,000, might be reasonably assigned, still we must take things as they are, and endeavour to respond to the spirit of the Volunteers in the manner in which they them- selves have responded to the call of the country. At any rate, I shall approach with very great caution anything in the nature of a limitation of this establishment, for I think that the time for such limitation has not yet come, though it may not be far distant. The increase in the present year is almost equivalent, in point of expense, to the cost of a battalion of Infantry; and, if the House insisted on diminished Estimates, a Minister of War would have to choose one of two alternatives—either to limit the Volunteer Forces, or to reduce the permanent establishment, which latter course would probably meet with very little favour. The increase which has taken place since 1873 in the Volunteer expenditure, exclusive of arms and ammunition, amounts to £99,500. The Estimate of last year was £485,338, and that of the present year, £512,400. This increase is satisfactory enough, but they are seriously large figures, though I may say that Volunteers have also increased both in numbers and efficiency. Still, the matter is one which requires very serious consideration at the hands of any Secretary of State for War. As to clothing, the Committee had recommended that the clothing of the Volunteers should, if possible, be assimilated to that of the Regular Forces, and very plausible reasons are adduced why such a change is desirable. The recommendations of the Committee will, however, cause a large amount of expense to the country. It will necessitate the advance of clothing, which will have to be charged in the Estimates of the year, while only one-third of the amount will be recoverable within the year, leaving two-thirds to be paid in the course of time. That, of course, is a thing which will remedy itself; but I have not thought fit to include anything of the kind in the Estimates for the present year. There is no reason, when men come handsomely forward, and give up their time, that additional cost should be thrown upon them. I am of opinion that such a matter as the change of clothing should not take place gradually. I will now touch upon another point in regard to the alterations which I propose to make with respect to transport in the field. There have been various complaints outside the Service that the existing commissariat and transport arrangements have broken down. These complaints have, in many cases, been very much overstated; and I do not believe that our deficiencies are greater than those which other countries, with far better military reputation, are likely to experience under similar circumstances. There are a great many difficulties with regard to shipment and trans-shipment; and there can be no doubt that, in certain cases, the Department was not physically equal to the work that it has been called upon to undertake. That was the case upon the West Coast of Africa; and I believe that in Cyprus and at the Cape the consequence was that the officers were, in some instances, nearly worked to death, or else that subordinate officers were pushed into duties which it did not ordinarily fall to their lot to discharge. What we require, therefore, is such a Department as will be capable of expansion in time of war, with a tolerably low establishment in time of peace. I hope, by the introduction into the Department of an intermediate rank of officers such as has been established for many years in India, and has been found to work well —namely, conductors—not only to provide satisfactorily for the carrying out of the lower duties of the Commissariat, but also to afford an opening to deserving and efficient non-commissioned officers. In India such a class of men has been found to work well, and it is also proposed, in analogy to the Reserve of officers, to give general officers, under certain conditions, a power to make use of combatant officers in the field. I am far from saying how we can carry out the process of amalgamation at the present time; but it must ultimately lead to this—that the duties involving work in the field will be conducted by the officers upon a military footing, while the Store Department depots will be attended to by some of the most able of the officers of the Commissariat Department. I may say that the manner in which Commissariat General Strickland has fulfilled his duties under Lord Chelmsford, and has permitted the substitution of military officers for civil in the administration of the Commissariat Department, has well illustrated the value of the proposal. The Clothing Estimates for this year show a decrease of £20,000, while there is an increase in the Exchequer receipts of £10,000; thus amounting in all to a net decrease of £30,000. The general reduction of the Vote is caused principally by the fall in prices of all clothing materials, and there is no doubt, but for the fall in prices, there would have been an increase. This year we have been making the clothing for the Militia in 1880. The increase in the Exchequer receipts is owing to the clothing becoming the property of the public, instead of being given to the men upon its being discarded. This has been done gradually, and the soldier, on his discharge, receives a suit of plain clothes, instead of going home in a ragged uniform, which is not a credit to the Service. Great praise must be given to the endeavour to get a good pattern for the clothing, and great attention has been bestowed on its improvement. I venture to think that much improvement has taken place, and that it is probable that further improvement will occur. A change has also been made in the clothing factory, and a manager of great practical experience has been obtained to bring to bear his civil intelligence upon military clothing. I think it right to observe, with regard to the reinforcements sent out to the Cape, that each man, on landing, will receive new clothing, together with a reserve of boots and other necessaries. Nearly 8,000 men have been supplied within 12 days of the order being given, and no less than 17,000 garments have been made at the factory within that period. With regard to the question of heavy guns, of course that subject will receive our greatest attention; but we have not, at present, any very new or startling proposal to make in connection with ordnance. We have a gun equal to, if not exceeding in power, those of other nations; and I think we have very large experience in the different sorts of arms. I think we shall, therefore, be justified in resting satisfied with our present knowledge. Apart from the size of a gun, it is clear that the question of breech-loading guns for certain purposes must come up before long. It was found in practice by Sir William Armstrong that a very great increase of power could be obtained by producing guns of a lengthened bore. Sir William Armstrong, I believe, made experiments with a muzzle-loader and a breechloader, and, within a small fraction, the two guns gave identical results. Therefore, the long-vexed question of breechloaders and muzzle-loaders is pretty much in the same position as before. But there is another question raised by lengthening the bore of a cannon, for so doing in many cases would make it impossible to use such a gun on board ship. On some of our large ships the recoil of the gun is to the utmost limit of the available space, there being in many cases only 18 inches or 2 feet to spare; and it is quite obvious that if you increase the length of the gun by 2 or 3 feet, it will not be possible to allow for the recoil. We have taken steps, therefore, to have drawings prepared for the 20 and 40-ton guns. They were ordered by us a little time back, and have been in a state of forward preparation ever since. But while the design of these guns were still in course of preparation the lamentable accident on board the Thunderer occurred, and it was thought better to await the result of the inquiries into the cause of that explosion, and to see from what defect in the firearm the cause of the accident was attributable. I may say that Sir William Armstrong put into practice that which had been known, at all events, for some time before; and I think I shall be only doing justice to my gallant friend, General Campbell, the Director of Stores, by saying that as long ago as 1873 he made a proposal for the lengthening of the bore. That is the same proposal that has been brought forward as a new one at the present day. There were reasons why that could not be put forward at the time, and it is only right that I should state what I have on behalf of the gallant officer. I have not seen the gun myself, but I understand that it is one of great power and accuracy, and it is supposed not to be open to some of the defects that are found to exist in others of the same class. We have thought it right to order two 80-ton guns, two 75-ton guns, 14 18-ton guns, and 22 of smaller dimensions. For sea service we complete one 80-ton gun, six 38-ton guns, two 25-ton guns, and other guns of smaller dimensions. Martini-Henry rifles will be issued to the Cavalry, and carbines to the Royal Artillery; and, as far as I am aware, no man, mounted or otherwise, will go out to the Cape without an efficient firearm. In the present Estimates we have provided for 30,000 Martini-Henry rifles and 15,000 carbines. Although that does not give us a large stock, yet the supply is one which, under the existing circumstances, will be fully sufficient, unless we have an unusual demand made upon us. It is also proposed this year to manufacture a certain number of pistols. We have found a difficulty in obtaining them from the trade, and have been subjected to great delay and inconvenience. The submarine mining stores were fully replenished under the Vote of Credit; and as they still continue available, it is not necessary to put down anything on that account. With regard to accoutrements, we have been trying to put two regiments into an excellent description, known as the "Oliver" pattern. Owing to a most unusual delay in the factories, we were not able to supply them nearly so soon as we intended to do. I do not wish to use any words which may be interpreted as a threat; but, still, I cannot help saying that we have experienced such difficulties in times past in getting accoutrements in at the proper day, that it will become at least a question whether we shall not have to take up a certain amount of that work ourselves—at all events, to such an extent as to insure the Service not being put to inconvenience. The accoutrements which I have mentioned are no longer of buff and tan leather; but are buff leather for the Rifles, and brown leather for the Infantry. I think that the advance in the present form of accoutrements marks a period when the consumption of pipeclay will be put an end to. I may say generally that the works under the Military Forces Localization Act have been carried out. Of brigade depots, there are now 61 established; 32 are now in hand; 23 are completed; and 9 existing barracks will be completed this year. The total expenditure contemplated by the Military Forces Localization Act of 1872 was £3,500,000, and up to the present day £2,750,000 has been expended. The Cavalry barracks at Knightsbridge will be completed in the course of the year; and we have taken some money for repairs at Aldershot, Shorncliffe, and elsewhere. £2,000 is also put down for the military works at Cyprus. The amount required at the latter station is £11,000, and that will have ultimately to be spent; but we have only taken £2,000 this year, and that will be sufficient to enable some progress to be made with the works. We have also taken money to provide for the erection of a sanatarium at Mauritius. With regard to the works generally, however, I have found myself bound to put a stop to the erection of any new barracks or works wherever it can possibly be avoided. Of course, when the works are in progress, and in many cases under contract, there would have been no real economy in stopping them. In March last a Committee was appointed to consider the various points connected with the defence of the Colonies, as regarded the establishment of coaling stations at Colonial ports. In accordance with the Report of that Committee, the Estimates of last year sanctioned an expenditure on those stations; and it also included other works, which have been proceeded with and are now in a forward state. I am bound to recognize the public spirit with which the Australian Colonies have taken up the question of their own defence. They have taken the best moans in their power for the defences required. The Dominion of Canada has displayed a similar spirit in providing for her defence; the principal object sought to be attained by her being to provide secure places for Her Majesty's ships to coal and refit, instead of small vessels having to be sent to the ships. I have now, I think, passed through at some length nearly all the items of the Estimates; and, although very great care has been taken to diminish the Estimates of this year, there are certain causes which rendered it almost impossible that we should free ourselves from a large expenditure. The expenditure on the non-effective Vote I have already referred to. The pensions have increased from £1,216,000 in 1873–4 to £1,582,000 in the present year, showing in six years an increase of £366,000. The expenditure on the Volunteer Forces I have also mentioned; but there is another increase which I must mention, and it is in connection with the Army Reserve. In the years corresponding to those I have just given there has been an increase from £51,000 to £113,000. This branch of the Service will, of course, be the source of further increase. The next few years will, perhaps, be the worst period of our military history, so far as the expenditure in connection with this branch of the Service is concerned; because we have, on the one hand, the pensions of the old long service men, while, on the other, we have a yearly increasing amount of reserve and deferred pay. With regard to the deferred pay, that increase has been one that the circumstances have fully justified. I am far from saying that that is not also the case with regard to the other increases, for I believe that they have all been necessary. I believe that the various Votes which Parliament has sanctioned must unavoidably lead to an increase of expenditure for the next few years, until the pensions cease to come in. At the present time there is a first increase due to the men who enlisted about the time of the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny, and who are now going to be pensioned; and I am informed that, in all probability, for the next few years there will still continue to be an increase upon the non-effective Vote. I beg to thank the Committee for the patience with which it has listened to my lengthened Statement, and I venture, with some confidence, to recommend the Estimates to the consideration of the Committee.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 135,625, all ranks, be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, at Home and Abroad, excluding Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1880."—(Colonel Stanley.)

MAJOR O'BEIRNE

considered that the Statement of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would be generally gratifying to the country; but upon one subject he (Major O'Beirne) could have wished him to be a little more explicit. With regard to the brigade depots, it was his opinion that there was a vast scope for the reduction of expense in connection with their present organization. By the Return of last year it appeared that the strength of the brigade depots did not exceed 80 men available for service, one colonel, one major, four captains, four subalterns, while there was an establishment of four captains and four sub-lieutenants. It appeared to him that a great reduction of expense might be effected by amalgamating these into companies, with only one captain for each depôt of the regiment, and by that plan a reduction would take place to the number of 141 companies, and a saving of £2,156 be secured. The present position of the depôts he thought to be quite indefensible with regard to the number of the commanding officers employed, for they had really nothing to command.

COLONEL MURE

had intended to address to the Committee some observations upon the general condition of the Army before going into Committee, but had been prevented from so doing. With regard to the short-service system, he thought that inasmuch as the present year was the first in which they had been at war since that system had been brought into play, it might be regarded as a test year; while it was a subject for congratulation that, on the whole, the system was found to be working well. He was present last year at a Queen's field day at Aldershot, when the Reserves were called out, accompanied by a gallant officer, and on that occasion they were both much impressed by the magnificent appearance, as to stature and physique, of the men of the Reserves who were in the ranks. On leaving the ground his friend inquired—"What is all this croaking about the recruits?" and added—"I do not think I ever saw better men in my life." He (Colonel Mure) then asked him to look at the recruits who were, on that occasion, keeping the ground. "Good gracious!" replied this gallant officer—"You do not mean to say those are recruits who have been made into the fine men we see by good feeding and treatment alone?" It was, therefore, his opinion that the system of short service was acting well; but had the Motion of the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms) gone to a Division he should have voted against it; because it must be remembered that although the Reserve system was an admirable thing, it would not do to destroy our ranks with the Colours in order to make Reserves, which were accumulating, and would in the course of time form a far larger body of men than they did at present. Unfortunately it was the fact that we were engaged in small wars in various parts of the world; and for this reason he was glad to hear from his right hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for War that he had very carefully considered the difficulty in which he had been placed in this respect. A very great strain had been placed upon the Army, and much difficulty had been experienced in sending out efficient troops to the seat of war, for which reason he was desirous of knowing what had become of the 18 regiments which Viscount Cranbrook last year had said were to be kept in a state of efficiency. It was a most remarkable fact that although the recruits numbered 28,000 yearly, and amounted to 80,000 during the last five years, we were unable to supply regiments in a state of efficiency when required in an emergency. The fact was we had the men; but they were too young, and could not be made use of. In 1877 he had asked for a Return showing the ages of the men in two regiments sent out to Malta at the time when it was believed we might get into difficulties with Russia. He referred to the second battalion of the Queen's and the second battalion of the 13th Regiment; and from the reference to the Return which he was about to make he thought the Committee would form a very decided opinion upon the point of their efficiency. Those two battalions went out at a time when there was no great strain, as at the present moment, upon the Army—for it was to be borne in mind that we had now two wars on hand at once—and were only sent to Malta, at a time of profound peace, to reinforce our Army in the Mediterranean. The second battalion of the Queen's embarked in 1877, and numbered 759 privates, of whom 458 were under 20 years of age, while 130 were men of 18 months' service and under; 470 of one years' service and under, and some of six and nine months only and under. The second regiment, which was the 13th Light Infantry, embarked about the same strength; 380 of these were under 20 years of age; 427 had only seen one year's service; 326 had only had nine months; and 139 only three months. He asked, when they knew the age at which they presumably admitted recruits—namely, 18—even if they all reached that age—whether they could call these regiments powerful Infantry? But when they knew that a great many men enlisted at 17 and 16—while in some Cavalry regiments even at 15—could it be suggested that these bodies formed efficient regiments of Infantry? He had had the good fortune to see the 60th Rifles embark the other day for the Cape; and he had no hesitation in saying that that was a very able battalion of short, strong, handsome men. He also saw the men who were to replace the 24th, and almost the same might be said of them. At the same time, it must be remarked that the great mass of Infantry which was now sent on these sudden calls was far too young for the work they had to do. The 88th Regiment (the Connaught Rangers) embarked not long ago for the Cape of Good Hope, and it was composed mainly of boys; and the Blue Book issued last year contained some reference as to their conduct at Pretoria, showing that this regiment of boys not only acted like men, but as brave men. In reference to that, he found a despatch from Colonel Bellairs, in 1868, as to the affair on the 29th of December, 1877, in which, after referring to the bravery of Major Moore, he spoke of the 88th, as follows:— The enemy were 600 strong, but with a small body of 48 Connaught Rangers we drove them off with a mere handful of young soldiers imperfectly acquainted with their weapons. Now, he asked, was it fair or just to send out mere boys to fight such men as the South African Natives unacquainted with their weapons? Furthermore, Major Moore reported that the Connaught Eangers—boys as they were— not one of whom had fired a shot at an enemy before, repelled the attack from huge bodies which advanced in every direction, and held the final position in a well-contested field. Their fire was so wild, however, that to this may be attributed the small loss the enemy sustained. That was an exact illustration of that which he had urged upon the House over and over again—namely, the fault and improvidence of employing mere boys to do this serious work. As to the late war in Afghanistan, he had not a doubt in his mind as to the admirable conduct of those engaged; but he should like to ask, whether certain reports which had appeared from the correspondents with the Army were true or not? Those reports did not refer in any way as to the excellent conduct of the men, but as to whether they were efficient soldiers in regard to their youth and physical requirements. It had been reported that the 70th Regiment was made up, for the most part, of men so young— half-grown boys, in fact—that they suffered extremely in the march, and that after the march a very large number were so incapacitated that they could not move. It was also reported that as to the second battalion of the 8th Regiment in the Peiwar Pass, though they behaved as British soldiers should, their physical condition was very far from satisfactory. He had no doubt that these reports were very much exaggerated; but, still, there were no Reports from the War Office, and, therefore, he was justified in asking the question. He regretted very much indeed the speech which had been delivered by the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms'), for he always regretted to hear a Member of Parliament say anything in that House which detracted from the character of non-commissioned officers or privates of the Army. Their physical condition was a fair subject for criticism; but their moral qualities were such as no man ought to attack in this Assembly. They had 28,000 or 29,000 recruits every year; and out of that large number there was the greatest difficulty in getting men to take the stripes. This could not arise from the deficiencies amongst the men, as many of these recruits were reported to be of superior education. It could not arise from anything painful in their position under British commissioned officers, because he was perfectly certain that the general conduct of commissioned officers showed them to be humane, generous, and careful men. Therefore, there must be some reason why they would not take the stripes. He believed the speech of the hon. Member for Hackney would have a bad influence. He regretted that a Member of Parliament should think it right to produce a letter from a private soldier, of whom nobody present knew anything, whose sympathies and object were unknown, and who wrote a letter containing general charges against young-non-commissioned officers of an almost disgraceful nature. He felt sure that, if the privates of the Army read the speech of the hon. Member, if it were reported, it would not be recognized by them as an inducement to take the stripes. What they wanted was to offer larger inducements to take the stripes — and not only this, but also to induce the men to remain in the Army long enough to become good non-commissioned officers. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman had, however, tackled the question, which was a very difficult one; and he had already introduced what he believed would be a most beneficial improvement, and that was the establishment of a class — something between the commissioned and non-commissioned officer. That would be a great advantage, no doubt; but, in conversation with a serjeant-major of one of their most distinguished regiments, the serjeant said the arrangement would be all very well as far as it went, but there would be but very few cases in the Army generally where this class would operate. Nevertheless, a little promotion would follow; and he had hoped, when he heard the intentions of the War Office, that there would be a class of these conductorships introduced into every regiment in the Service, instead of into the Commissariat and Supply corps alone. He confessed he should like to see this system more extended than had been proposed by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman. He now came to a subject which had never been brought to the attention of the House before. They now had wars in two parts of the globe; and morning after morning they with pride read of the gallantry of the British soldier. When they saw the names of relations or friends who had distinguished themselves, they congratulated each other upon the fact. They knew very well that in all Armies there were a certain number of hard fighting men who faced the enemy, who plunged into danger from which they could hardly expect to escape with life, and they knew that they were the company officers, the non-commissioned officers, and the leading privates. Nevertheless, in the despatches, rarely or ever was the name of a company officer, non-commissioned officer, or private mentioned — the latter almost never; but there was invariably a list of the names of officers—Departmental officers —who were commended to the notice of Her Gracious Majesty for their behaviour. That was the case the other day in that engagement in which the 72nd Highlanders and the Ghoorkas were so distinguished. He hoped the Committee would remember that this was a very delicate subject to allude to in Parliament; and he only mentioned the subject under a strong sense of duty to the company officers, non-commissioned officers, and men. They were all familiar with the contents of the despatch to which he alluded. The advance against the entrenchments of the Afghans was led by the 5th Ghoorkas and a company of the 72nd Highlanders. Here was an instance of the most terrible task which could be imagined—namely, the carrying of entrenchments in the face of brave defenders, well armed with rifles, and prepared for the defence. The only loss which took place that day was amongst the 72nd Highlanders and the 5th Ghoorkas. Captain Cook, who led the Ghoorkas, was mentioned in the narrative, but not in the recommendations for reward, of the despatches. He was given to understand that Captain Cook was to have the Victoria Cross — he trusted that this might prove true. But there was not a single reference in the despatches referring to the gallantry with which those Ghoorkas and 72nd Highlanders behaved—not a single company officer mentioned, not a single non-commissioned officer or private; but, strange to say, while the names of many Departmental officers were given, there was not a name of a Native officer mentioned of any rank whatever, although the greater part of the force was composed of Natives. Had fairness been awarded to the men who had done the brunt of the fighting that day? Was this encouraging to men when they enlisted to accept the stripes and remain in the Army? Per contra, how much inducement there would be if, after having fought bravely, men were mentioned in the despatches for gallantry. In what a proud position that man would be placed on returning to his native village, covered with honour, to receive the congratulations of his relations and friends. He trusted, in these remarks, he had said nothing which showed a want of respect to General Roberts. It was not his fault, but the fault of the system, which was most baneful to the interests of the Army. As a young officer, he had been glad to accept a position on the staff of Sir Harry Smith, because he knew that if he came within 1,000 yards of the enemy, and thus took part in no actual fighting, he should be mentioned in the despatches. He thought it was most of all important to notice that in this despatch not a single Native was mentioned; and, according to it, not a single person distinguished himself but those who were mentioned. He did not say that those who were mentioned had not behaved admirably, and did not deserve mention; but when a special distinction was conferred, the inference, undoubtedly, was, that the others did not distinguish themselves so much. Another question to which he wished to allude was the social condition of the British non-commissioned officer and private, and, generally speaking, those who were the uniform of Her Majesty in the Army or the Navy. At that moment anyone wearing Her Majesty's uniform—unless he was an officer—was, to a certain extent, a pariah in society. He might be a man of good education, and, when at home, living in a superior class; but if he went anywhere with civilians, relations, or friends, to a theatre, or on board a steamboat, or railway, he was told that he could not have a good seat at a theatre or place of public entertainment, or berth in the saloon of a steamer, or a first-class carriage, if he were Her Majesty's uniform. No wonder that Her Majesty's uniform was considered by some as a badge of degradation, and that these exclusions gave rise to a strong feeling of mortification. It was a matter which he meant to bring before the House in a more substantial form, with the view of drawing public attention to the improvement of the social and civil position of the private soldier. Viscount Cranbrook, when in that House, had, with his usual generosity, admitted that the way in which soldiers were treated in society was a grievance which ought to be redressed.

COLONEL COLTHURST

said, he did not think the plan decided upon by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would supply the want of non-commissioned officers to the regiments. What was wanted was non-commissioned officers; and as long as the men of the regiments were mere boys, the more necessity there was for them. A few years ago, when he had the honour of com- manding a regiment, he found it difficult to get good, experienced noncommissioned officers. The non-commissioned officer of the future would differ in no material sense from the soldier he had to command, except by a little superior education. If they wanted, however, good non-commissioned officers, they must give them inducements to re-engage. The inducement of pensions, he thought, was the only one which would find them good noncommissioned officers. There was another point with respect to the brigade depots, which had been alluded to by the hon. and gallant Member for Leitrim (Major O'Beirne). He (Colonel Colthurst) thought his hon. and gallant Friend had somewhat under-estimated the amount of work brigade officers had to do, and the number of officers there was available. He thought two or three, at the most, were generally with the four composing the brigade depôt. As regards the colonel in command, however, he thought there was a great waste of power in throwing upon him a great many minor duties, which distracted his attention from more important subjects, and which might be done by a subordinate officer. It was a great pity that the colonel was at all expected to interfere in the interior economy of the 80 or 90 men of a brigade depôt, when the duties could be attended to by the major. Very recent instructions from the Horse Guards, however, obliged the colonel to take personal charge of the brigade depôt.

MR. RITCHIE

said, that some steps should be taken to put a stop to the large number of absentees in Militia regiments. It was found, in many regiments, that the large proportion of those who enlisted never turned up for training at all; and, in his own regiment, he might mention that the proportion which did not come up for training was ridiculously large; for while last year they enlisted 633 recruits, at the training time only 203 came up—or not one-third of the number enlisted. It was a wrong principle to give men bounties on enlistment. He knew the answer would be, that if the money were not given the men would not enlist. No doubt this was true to a considerable extent; but he questioned very much indeed whether it would not prove, in the end, more advantageous to give the bounty now given on enlistment at the first or second training rather than at the time of enlistment. There would be fewer recruits in the first instance; but he thought, in the end, there would be as large a number of men at the training. There were many commanding officers of Militia regiments who were formerly unwilling to support this method who had now changed their minds; and he, for one, must say that he thought the experiment should be tried. Of course, experience only would show whether a great saving in expenditure might not be made without materially affecting the number of men present at the training. Another matter to which he wished to call attention was the very small proportion which the total number of men present at the annual trainings bore to the establishment. He considered that it would be very much more satisfactory, if the numbers on the establishment could not be maintained, that the establishment should be reduced. In 1878 the establishment was 137,556; only 86,458 came up for training—that was nearly 30 per cent short of the establishment. No doubt, the numbers present at that time were reduced by the fact of the Reserve being out simultaneously. In the previous year, however, there was a deficiency of about 25 per cent, the numbers being 99,850, showing a deficiency of about 37,000. He should like to ask whether the permanent staff was calculated on the total number of the establishment, because, in that case, it was much too large, as he had shown that the discrepancy in the numbers that came up for training varied from 25 to 30 percent. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman had informed them that the Militia were to be called out this year for 20 days' training only. This he considered highly unsatisfactory. It was penny wise and pound foolish. If the Militia was to be maintained in an efficient state, it seemed to him that it was most unwise to think of reducing the number of days by such a large percentage. The reason which the right hon. and gallant Gentleman gave for calling them out for 20 days only was because the Reserves were out last year, and because the recruits now obtained so much more drill than previously. This argument, if it was good for this year, was equally good for any year, so that the only really new feature in the matter was the fact of the Reserves having been out last year, and he did not consider this was any reason for cutting short the drill of the whole Force by seven days or one-fourth. What was the actual result of 20 days' training? They all knew that there were certain days at the beginning and end of a training in which it was impossible that any work could be done; there was certain routine work to be gone through which precluded the possibility of proceeding with the ordinary training. He had made a calculation, the result of which was that out of this 20 days, only 13 would remain actually available for the purposes for which the Militia were called out; and such a number of days, he contended, was totally inadequate for the requirements of the Service. He confessed that state of things was, to his mind, most unsatisfactory—that, in order to effect a saving in the Militia Estimates—for that seemed to him the real reason—that body was to be deprived of a considerable part of their annual training; it must, he held, lead to a decrease in the efficiency of the Force. With regard to the brigade depots, he agreed, in the main, with the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite. In the brigade depôt with which his regiment was connected there were only 68 recruits obtained during last year. The establishment of the brigade depot was— 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 4 captains, and 100 privates; both battalions of the regiments were in India. He considered that a saving might be effected in the number of these depots, and, consequently, in their expenditure. At Guildford the depôt was two miles from the town, and this materially affected the recruiting for the Militia. Recruits would enlist at the old barracks in the town; but they would not, as a rule, walk two miles to the depot and then enlist in the Militia. On that account he considered that the brigade depôt system at Guildford did not work altogether satisfactorily. With reference to the question of the Volunteers, he was glad that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had said that he was not prepared to recommend, at least for the present, the carrying out of the change of clothing which was suggested by the Committee which sat on that Force.

COLONEL STANLEY

remarked that he had said in his speech that he was not prepared to carry out the recom- mendations in toto, but that he thought they should be carried out only very carefully and tentatively.

MR. RITCHIE

said, he understood the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would not recommend the change of clothing at present at any rate; and he was glad that that was so, as otherwise a hardship would be imposed on some regiments. In April, 1874, it was arranged that if any change of uniform were to be made, the colour to be assumed was that of the brigade depot to which the regiment belonged. He understood that the future colour was to be scarlet. One regiment which he knew, one of the best in London, would, if this recommendation was carried out, suffer a great pecuniary loss and hardship. He believed that it would result in its disbandment. This regiment was attached to the 53rd and 54th brigade depots at Winchester, whose regular regiments were the battalions of the Rifle Brigade. By carrying out, therefore, the suggestions of this Committee, this regiment, which had adopted the recommendation of April, 1874, would be saddled with the double expense, and that from no fault of their own, but from having complied with the Regulations promulgated. That had been done, he knew, at an outlay of some £400 or £500; and if a new Order were issued again to change the colour of their uniform, that regiment, which had by great care extricated itself from pecuniary difficulties, would be again plunged in debt. For these reasons, he trusted that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would, when he adopted the suggestions of the Committee, show some consideration to those regiments which, by following out the requirements of the Regulation of 1874, had adopted a colour other than that now recommended.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, that there were very few points in the speech of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman to which he could take exception, although on some small matters he wished to ask questions. He would, however, first invite the attention of the Committee to a matter which affected rather the conduct of the Cabinet and Government than the War Department. He alluded to the fact that in the Estimates it appeared that the Army was to be reduced by 4,000 men; but that, at the last moment, these men were put again on the Establishment on the ground of reinforcements being sent to Natal. He admitted that it was a case which might often occur—that a Government thought that it saw its way to a reduction of the Forces, and found at the last moment their hopes frustrated by an unforeseen occurrence; but could it be said that the present occurrence was unforeseen? The right hon. and gallant Member for Stamford (Sir John Hay) had stated the other night that the Zulu War had come upon the Government as a surprise. But he asked hon. Gentlemen did the facts appear to bear out that statement? Was not the policy of the Government rather one which tended to war, and which had so tended for months past? He was convinced that it was so. He would not enter into the question whether the actual movement towards war originated at home or in the Colony; but the fact of the Government receiving the despatches, which were before the House, from Sir Bartle Frere, showed distinctly that they must have been aware that their policy was one which tended to war. He would refer, quite briefly, to certain expressions in the despatches in order to prove that the Government could not have looked upon the declaration of war as a surprise. In October— on the 17th of that month—the Government, having received an application from the Cape for reinforcements, declined to comply with that request, and in their despatch expressed a Confident hope that, by the exercise of prudence, it will be possible to avert the very serious evil of a war with Cetewayo. Sir Bartle Frere repeated his application, and in November the reinforcements were sent. The Colonial Secretary, in announcing their despatch on November 21, says, he regrets to learn that-— The prospect of peace is so very precarious; And he went on to say— Though the aspect of affairs is menacing in a high degree, I can by no means arrive at the conclusion that war with the Zulus should be unavoidable. Now, was it possible that anyone reading those despatches could say that the Government were unaware of the probability of war? And every subsequent event could only have confirmed the opi- nion that war was inevitable. And what was the nature of the Force in the Colony? Sir Bartle Frere, in asking for additional troops in September, said— The whole Force at General Thesiger's disposal in Natal would, with the reinforcements I suggest, still be much less than Sir Garnet Wolseley considered necessary to guard against a Zulu outbreak in Natal before our responsibilities were extended to the Transvaal. And the Government themselves, when complying with his request, said, in the despatch already quoted from, that the troops then sent were Not for invasion or conquest, but to afford such protection as may be necessary to the lives and property of the Colonists. So that as long ago as last autumn the Government knew that the policy of the Colonial authorities was tending certainly to war, and that the troops were only sufficient for defensive purposes; and yet in this crisis they resolve to reduce the Army by 4,000 men. Now, it was evident that if there was a war at all, it must be an offensive war, in order to break the power of Cetewayo; and accordingly, he asked, was this the time to reduce the establishment of our Army? There were some who might say that the Army was strong enough for the purpose even without those 4,000 men. Whoever might use this argument it could not be the Government, who put them on again in hot haste the moment our military operations received a check. In any case, it was clear that more men would have been required for the campaign, and this disaster at Isandula— deplorable as it was—was, after all, partial in its character; it was such an incident as might be expected in a campaign of this kind; it was not a great military catastrophe calculated to strain the power of the Empire. Yet he found the Government totally unprepared; it found them proposing to reduce the Establishment of the Army by 4,000 men, whom, by their subsequent conduct, they acknowledged they could not spare; and they were also driven to the adoption of hurry-scurry expedients in order to send out the battalions that were required. He considered that the conduct of the Government, in thus playing fast-and-loose with the Establishment of the Army, proposing a reduction of it at a time when they had one war on hand and were drifting into another, reducing the number of available men, and then, the moment a check occurred, immediately reinstating them, was a matter that required both explanation and justification. No doubt, the idea of a reduction was suggested by a desire to appear economical. He would attribute to right hon. Gentlemen opposite a sincere desire to merit such a character; but it seemed to him to be altogether beyond possibility that they could do so while this policy of annexation and aggression went on. With regard to filling up battalions for foreign service, he thought that the Government had also shown a want of care and foresight. The difficulty in filling up the six battalions which had been sent was due to two causes—First, to the fact that regiments first on the roster for foreign service were not maintained at full foreign service strength; and, secondly, that many of the men in their ranks were practically unfit for active service. The consequence was that they had to be filled up from other battalions, and thus those other battalions were in turn reduced by being deprived of some of their best men. Now, this was much to be deplored, and ought, if possible, to be avoided. With regard to this system of small linked battalions with short service, he wished to say that, although Lord Cardwell introduced it, he trusted it would not be imagined that the late Government would view with jealousy any attempt to alter its details. It was nut cast-iron in all its parts, and he would gladly support any change necessary to case its working. The difficulty of filling up regiments to war strength had always existed — it was especially observable during the Crimean War; and he did not think that the system of short service had increased that difficulty so much as it was sometimes thought to do. They had tried that system, and he believed that the decision was entirely in its favour. It was evidently successful for the purpose of great wars. He thought everyone was ready to admit that; but whether it was so applicable in small wars which occurred suddenly and without much warning might be doubted. Since they had adopted that system they had been threatened with a great European war, had experienced a war in the Transkei District, another in Afghanistan, and were now carrying on one in Zululand. No system could be expected to meet without difficulty such a strain as that. There was one mode, however, of meeting the difficulty, which was felt in these Colonial wars, and that was that men from the Reserve should be allowed to volunteer for service in the Line. Being a legal point, he would not express a confident opinion upon it; but he would just observe that he thought it unwise to refuse to allow them to serve in that way, if they were willing to do so. They might have been engaged for a longer period than six months, contingently upon the passing of an Act of Parliament—which would have been of the nature of a Bill of Indemnity—justifying their being so employed. He had no doubt, however, that what had been decided upon by his right hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Stanley) was right; and, at any rate, he considered it highly satisfactory to know that as regarded a future emergency those men would be available for service. But admitting that, in a case of sudden emergency, there was a difficulty with short-service and linked battalions, that difficulty dwindled when they could look ahead and prepare. It was a question of administration and of arranging the roster. He thought that the seven years' experience of the working of that system of linked battalions and short service was matter for much congratulation. Both Viscount Cranbrook and the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had been most loyal to that system, and he hoped that the right hon. and gallant Gentlemen would continue to be so. The principle on which it was worked was a very simple one —of allowing battalions when they first returned home to dwindle to a low strength, and then as they approached the period at which they should go out again their strength was brought up, so that, at the time of embarkation, they stood at their full strength. But the relative numbers of the strong and weak battalions was entirely a question for the authorities to determine who alone knew the probable requirements of the year. The noble Lord the late Secretary of State for War increased the number of battalions at full strength, and the measure had been considered a wise one, and had been cheerfully supported by those who sat on his (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman's) side of the House. His right hon. and gallant Friend the pre- sent Secretary of State for War had now, on the other hand, gone in the opposite direction, for, by the original Estimates, in which it was intended that 4,000 should be taken off; and it would be found that the establishment of the battalions just come from abroad was 480 rank and file, a point lower than that at which the late Government ventured to leave them—as, if he remembered rightly, it stood, on their quitting Office, at 520 men. Of this he quite approved. If the idea was once abandoned that those battalions were intended for show, and that of their being merely drilling machines accepted, then it appeared to him a wise thing to reduce them, and the lower they were reduced consistently with their efficiency for drill purposes the better. Now, all this question was entirely at the discretion of the Government; and it was absurd to blame the system of short service and linked battalions, if the first battalions were too low in strength, or if there were too few of them for the requirements of the Government. Now, he submitted, with great deference, that it would have been a reasonable course for the Government, in October or November last, when they were in the state of mind which he had described—when the best they could say was that they thought that war at the Cape was not unavoidable, and that the preservation of peace was precarious—to have quietly and carefully worked up, say, half-a-dozen battalions, so as to be ready if called upon. By this means the men would have had time to shake into their places, and need not have been sent on board ship without any acquaintance with their comrades or officers. That, he thought, would have been a reasonable plan; but the Government appeared to have been perfectly unprepared in that respect; while the disaster of Isandula came upon them as an unexpected blow. They apparently did not expect that any fresh regiments would be required; but that was quite inconsistent with the knowledge possessed by them, as disclosed by the despatches already quoted. There was, indeed, another alternative which might have palliated, in some respects, the evil complained of; and that was that more battalions might have been sent at a smaller strength. It appeared to him that in the case of em- barking in an European war, where masses of men were to be brigaded, there would, perhaps, be some advantage in large battalions; but this would not be the case in bush warfare, which was often conducted in companies, and even half-companies. And while there might be no disadvantage in having small regiments, there was a great advantage for such a war in a large proportion of officers; and if more regiments were sent full of picked and mature men, he could not but see that the Force would have been more efficient than it was. It might be said that it would increase the expense by sending out more head-quarters; but he ventured to say that the poorest economy in time of war was, on account of the cost, to fail to make use of the best means for bringing war to a speedy conclusion. He regarded the whole question as one affecting the Government rather than the Secretary of State for War, and considered that they had not acted with sufficient foresight, and in accordance to the knowledge which they possessed. Turning to the Estimates, he had a few things to say. He joined the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite in regretting the short training proposed for the Militia; but thought that, as the Militia Reserve men were out a long time last year, it was not unreasonable that they should be let off this year with a shorter period of training. With regard to the Volunteers, he was glad that the Secretary of State for War had not committed himself entirely to the Report of the Committee. He was not quite sure that the construction of the Committee gave entire satisfaction to the body of Volunteers; for it was generally observed that no acting Volunteer officer was upon it, who knew the real wants of the Force, with the exception of his hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Loyd Lindsay) and a noble Lord in "another place" (Viscount Bury), whose interest in the matter was looked upon as hybrid—half representing the War Office, and half representing the Volunteers. Again, there was the Volunteer Artillery, a very useful body of men, drawn chiefly from the artizan class, who were not so well off as the other portions of the Force, but whose expenses were much greater, and who, consequently, deserved a great deal of consideration, but who were not represented on the Committee. But the evi- dence upon which the Report was founded had not yet been laid before Parliament; and it might be found that they were well represented by witnesses, although not upon the Committee. Another point was as to the Store Votes. He was very anxious to know whether the right hon. and gallant Gentleman could inform the Committee what use had been made of the money voted last year outside the general Estimates? The sum voted last year, beyond the ordinary Estimates, was nearly £900,000. He would like to know on what sort of stores that money was spent, and whether the outlay gave any prospect of a reduction at a future time? The last observation he would make was with regard to a small but somewhat important matter in its way. The Recruiting Report of the year was a very satisfactory one, and he was sorry to see that the Inspector General proposed that there should be no more Reports. He hoped the Secretary of State for War would not agree to that proposal, for these Reports were full of information, and were deeply interesting to the House and to the public.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

said, he had listened with surprise to the hon. Member for the Stirling Burghs (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman). He had noticed that he looked to his right hand, and to his left, and saw that strong men were gathering round him, and that the Secretary of State for War had felt it necessary to call up his Reserves, and was now prepared to fight the hon. and right hon. Gentlemen arrayed on the other side. He was surprised to find how small was the attack made by the hon. Member. Did he suppose that the Government would determine to reduce the numbers of the Army when there was any necessity for keeping them up? And what would he, and those who acted with him, have said if the Government had made great preparations for this Zulu War, when all the despatches, so far as he could gather, had shown that the Government were determined that no rupture should take place if they could prevent it, at any rate, for the present? But when it was found that a rupture had taken place, he would like to ask the hon. Member, who had filled a responsible office, whether he would have neglected to keep up the Army in a State of full efficiency? He recollected perfectly well, when there was a great deal more necessity than existed at that moment, the noble Lord, then Secretary of State for War, came down to the House in hot haste, and on a hot day in July, asking for 20,000 men and £2,000,000 on account of a great war that was then raging. When he heard hon. Members on the front Opposition Bench saying that the Government ought to be prepared on every point, he would call their very special attention to the way in which they themselves were prepared when great wars, and particularly the Crimean War, came upon them. No doubt the short-service system was on its trial, and no doubt it had not come up to all they could have wished. He was surprised to hear the hon. and gallant Member for Renfrew (Colonel Mure) first say that it was exactly what was wanted in the country, and then proceed to demolish his own argument, word by word, by saying that no regiment which they had sent out had men fit to enter into action. He said, indeed, that they had acted gallantly and nobly, but that they had not the required physique.

COLONEL MURE

said, that he had said they were not acquainted with their weapons.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

thought he had heard something about the regiments in the Bholan Pass; that the men were not of that physique which would enable them to bear the strain of a campaign.

COLONEL MURE

As to the 88th Regiment, he had spoken of them as boys, and quoted an official despatch. He said they were not acquainted with the use of their weapons. With regard to the 70th and 2nd Battalion 8th Regiments, he had simply alluded to a newspaper report, and asked a question.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

said, he had no wish to misquote his hon. and gallant Friend, who had, he thought, confirmed everything he had said—that the men were not acquainted with their weapons, and were too young to be sent on service. He was glad his hon. and gallant Friend had spoken so strongly about it. It was known all over England, and elsewhere, that these men were young, and that they fought gallantly; but young they were, and older men could not be got. But the great question was, how were they to go on for the future? Were they to continue sending out men in the condition of those sent to South Africa; or were they to have older and stronger men? That could only be done in three ways— first, by calling out the Reserves; and so filling up the regiments with the Reserves. He understood that the Reserves were to be available in cases of emergency, and was not the present a case of emergency? It might be said that the men would be disheartened by being called out for a war of the kind now being waged. But the question ought to be settled whether or not they were to be made available. Anyone would see that his right hon. and gallant Friend had put the fact as plainly as any man could put it—that the depot system had failed. He said it was not what he could wish, for they had had to call on regiments to furnish volunteers, which, he admitted, was a bad system. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman had told them that the 91st Regiment had obtained volunteers from 11 different regiments. Ex uno disce omnes; they were all alike, and had to take the only fit and efficient men from the other regiments. Was it to be tolerated for a moment that they could only keep up some of their regiments by getting volunteers from others? But there was another way of getting older and stronger men; and he would like to ask the right hon. and gallant Gentleman in what state was the First Army Corps at the present moment? He fancied they were to have an Army Corps fit to go on foreign service. The 18 regiments first for foreign service ought to have their full complement of 1.000 men, from which, perhaps, 200 might be deducted as unfit to go abroad; but there would still remain 800 men fit for foreign service. One regiment had been sent out and had received the full praise and commendation of his hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Colonel Mure). That was the 60th Rifles, which had not borrowed a man except from its own brigade depôt; but that was the corps depot, and it was a question whether, instead of two, they ought not to have four battalions at the depot centres. He had one word to say with regard to the despatches and the officers and non-commissioned officers serving abroad. What could be more gallant than the conduct of those poor fellows, Melville and Coghill, whose bodies were found wrapped in the flags of their regiments. No matter who was to blame—he was not going into that at present—what could be more gallant than the action of those young men, whether they had fought in Zululand or Afghanistan? He maintained that, although they had young soldiers, they were possessed of men most anxious to do their duty. He would now refer to another matter upon which he thought his right hon. and gallant Friend might afford some explanation—namely, the rather curious transaction which had occurred in one of the Cavalry regiments that had gone out. He would at once say that he had the highest respect for the gallantry and for the position of Colonel Drury Lowe, and for the way in which he had discharged his duties, as well as for the way in which he was received, and the honour in which he was held, by every man in the regiment; but the precedent, if followed, was one that might do great mischief in the Service. Colonel Lowe, of his own free will, had retired upon half-pay, receiving the money which he had expended on his commission, and had been again appointed to the command of the regiment over the head of an officer—a major in the regiment—who had taken a first-class at the Staff College, but who, for reasons best known at the War Office, was not thought competent to go out in command of the 17th Lancers. He hoped it would be seen that this was a precedent which ought not to be repeated, and that the case was one which deserved that consideration that he felt sure his right hon. and gallant Friend would give to the subject. He was not one of those for superseding a man after five years' service in his regiment. It was thought a good rule by Viscount Cardwell that, after five years' service, a man should be obliged to resign his command. But was it a rule that worked well? His firm belief was to the contrary. If the colonel of a regiment was a good man, he could not be in command too long; but if he was a bad man, he could not remain with the regiment too short a time. How was it with regard to Staff appointments? They had a right to compare the one with the other; and it was the fact that the system was rigidly adhered to in the case of regiments, but was evaded when they came to the Staff. He hoped his right hon. and gallant Friend would consider that point also. He believed that far more credit was due to the Secretary of State for War than he had claimed with regard to the system now in operation at Sandhurst, which was inaugurated by him and General Hawley. The tone and morale were good, and things were altogether in a better position now than they had ever before been at Sandhurst. Great credit must also be given to General Napier and Colonel Middleton. With regard to desertion. Although he believed a great deal was going to be done when the House came to deal with the Army Discipline Bill—and he ventured to hope that a great deal would be done in the direction of putting a stop to that offence—he would yet remind the Committee that there was nothing that deterred men from deserting so much as the knowledge that they would be marked with the letter "D." He believed there were some hon. Gentlemen who would say that they would not object to a mark, provided all—both officers and men—were marked on first entering the Army. But they wanted to distinguish the good from the bad; and it was to get at those who deserted, and then did the same again in another regiment, that their plan must be directed. He knew that the attention of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had been called to this subject very lately; and he hoped that he would be able to frame some Rules by which the system of desertion might be curbed and put a stop to. He would not stop to make reference to the Militia or Volunteers, although they did require consideration. He congratulated the right hon. and gallant Gentleman upon his Statement; and he hoped that the discussion which had taken place on the regiments which had just been sent abroad would result in the abolition of the system which made it necessary to go from one regiment to another in order to fill vacancies in a regiment ordered for foreign service.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, that, whoever else might not be prepared to meet this war question, no one would be more ready than his hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Sir Walter B. Barttelot). He, at least, was always ready to enter upon a campaign, as he had shown when he found fault with his hon. Friend the Member for the Stirling Burghs (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) for making some very reasonable and natural remarks. His hon. Friend had stated that, after reading the South African despatches, he could not understand that Her Majesty's Government could have expected peace in that region. He thought that was an admission at which every impartial man would arrive. He did not wish then to open a discussion with which they would thereafter have to deal very seriously; but he would only say one word upon it. If Her Majesty's Government had said to Sir Bartle Frere—"You must not enter upon an offensive war," then, it was true, they would have had a right to be surprised at the outbreak of such a war. But they did not say anything of the kind. They said—"We do not wish for war, but you are the best judge, and we leave it to you." But how any man, after reading Sir Bartle Frere's despatches, could have supposed that there would be no war, when the question was thus left to Sir Bartle Frere's discretion, he could not understand. It was perfectly clear which course would be taken under the circumstances. Therefore, his hon. Friend was entirely justified in saying that the Government ought not to have been surprised, and should have completed proper arrangements in view of a probable war in the course of this year. On the subject of the short-service system his hon. and gallant Friend appeared to have repented of his repentance; but on this question he knew that His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief had come forward and said publicly that, although he had been opposed to the system, he had been entirely converted by the magnificent success which had attended the calling out of the Reserves. He thought that was a tribute to the success of Viscount Card-well's policy, coming from a high place—namely, the Head of the Army; and he also thought he remembered to have heard the hon. and gallant Gentleman state that, although he had been opposed to the system of foreign service, what had taken place had converted him. Such, however, was apparently not the case at the present. The hon. and gallant Member had, as he had said, repented of his repentance, and was now a greater opponent of the system than ever. He knew perfectly well, however, that in the quarters which knew best there was no repentance as to that system at all. It was not upon that question that he had risen to address the Committee, but upon the very much more important matter of the Estimates; and he was sorry to say that the Army Estimates were likely to occupy the attention of the Government this year much more than usual. They had undertaken—and were undertaking—new liabilities. They undertook to defend new territories every month—large countries in Europe having scientific Frontiers—to an extent which they did not know—for they had not yet been told whether they were going to take the whole of Afghanistan. Not satisfied with our own Empire—which extended in all directions to the Antipodes—they had undertaken to defend another Empire. They were not only going to defend Asia Minor, annex the Transvaal, and, probably, Zululand, but hon. Members opposite would not have forgotten that they had undertaken to defend the Frontier of Asia Minor. That was a very grand undertaking, and he had examined the Army Estimates to ascertain what was the exact provision for carrying out the Anglo-Turkish Convention for the defence of Asia Minor. They were going to defend that vast Frontier; to protect the mountains of Armenia; to line the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates; to cover Erzeroum; to protect India; to menace Russia—and for that purpose they had taken the Island of Cyprus, which in future was to be a great place of arms. This was the assurance to the Turks of the sincerity of the Government with regard to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. From this Island they were to menace Russia with their Forces; and, therefore, he looked forward, as he had said, with great interest to these Army Estimates, to see how this great place of arms was to be manned, and what was the Force which, at a moment's notice, was to be poured into Asia Minor to defend the lives of the Indian people, and to uphold the Anglo-Turkish Convention. It was not near enough to be at Malta—they must be close to the Tigris and the Euphrates. He looked with great, even absorbing, interest to see what was not the temporary garrison, but the permanent garrison, which Her Majesty's Government intended to place at Cyprus, because that was the Force which was to frighten Russia, and show their sincerity in regard to the Anglo-Turkish Convention, which was to maintain the reforms in Asia Minor—which had not begun—which was to be the last Article of the Treaty of Berlin. If the House would allow him, he would refer them to page 12 of the Estimates, and there they would find the permanent garrison of Cyprus, which was to remain until March, 1880. Before that time they did not know what might occur. There might be an Armenian War; and, from all he heard of the state of Armenia, an outbreak there was most likely. Hon. Members would find that the permanent garrison of Cyprus, which was to maintain the Anglo-Turkish Convention—for which object that Island was taken—and which had occupied it for nine months past, was exactly half a battalion, consisting of 350 men! They wanted the character of an economical Government, and they had to keep it. He had always had the highest opinion of the British soldier; but his imagination had never reached the height of believing that with 350 men they were going to line the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates; to cover the mountains of Asia Minor; to menace Russia, and to thereby uphold the Anglo-Turkish Convention. But what were these 350 men going to do? They kept 6,000 men at Malta—why did they only keep 350 men at Cyprus? If they were intending to make Cyprus a great military station, as at Malta and Gibraltar, why did not they keep an army there to protect their fleet, as well as a fleet to protect the army? He would be told that the Government would send a large body of men to Cyprus in the autumn, as had been done last year; but if that was to be so, how was the Island to become better prepared to receive the men than it was last year? Why was it that the men suffered unduly last year? The Government said it arose not from the climate, but on account of the hurried preparations and bad accommodation there. The fact remained, that they were to send 10,000 men to Cyprus next July; and what more did the Government ask for with which to make the necessary arrangements for their reception? "Why £2,000! He doubted! whether that sum would be sufficient to erect barracks for the 350 men, especially if they were built at the top of a mountain 3,500 feet high. He ventured to say that the real sincerity of the Government in these matters was not shown by making speeches, but by being ready to propose Estimates, and to ask the House to grant them. The Government dared not do this, and they were quite wise. The Government dared not do anything substantial in respect of Cyprus—that would be to put their sincerity to too severe a test. They made plans as to making a harbour at Famagosta; but when they were asked whether the work was proceeding, they replied—"Oh, no. It could be done; but we do not propose to do it." What did the Hydrographer to the Navy say in his Report? Why, that every single man in the Navy at Cyprus had the fever last year. The Government did not believe in Cyprus, any more than he did. If they did, they would have come forward with Estimates for adequately entertaining an army in this strong place. But they knew the thing was too ridiculous. A harbour was not made in a day, nor a year If the Government had intended to make a harbour there they would not have lost a valuable year in setting about it. That being so, what became of the Anglo-Turkish Convention? To use a common expression, the Government believed Cyprus to be quite as great a humbug as those on that side of the House. There was not a single item of gain in the whole place. It was all very well to go to the Mansion House and say it was a strong place of arms, when the Government did not come forward and ask for a single serious item of expense in connection with it. There was another article in the Estimates, which referred to Cyprus, which seemed a little indefinite, and that referred to the Medical Department at page 162. From that it appeared that if there were to be 350 men of the garrison of Cyprus they were to have 13 doctors in attendance on them. He had had the curiosity to compare the ratio of doctors at Cyprus with that of other regiments; and he found that whereas at Cyprus half a battalion had 13 doctors, at Halifax two battalions had six doctors. Therefore, the number was as from 6 to 10 to 1; while, as compared with the number of soldiers, 13 doctors to 350 men would permit half of this army of 350 men being always in hos- pital! There had been some reference to the death-rate in Cyprus, and the Secretary of State for War had supplied them with particulars on that subject. It had been suggested that the evil was not in the ratio of deaths, but in the number of illnesses. He found, however, that the deaths at Bombay amongst a given number of men was 2,298, while at Cyprus it was 4,208. They wanted an effective army at Cyprus; but the army could be as much injured by illness that did not cause death occurring at the time the army was wanted as by death itself; and it had always been said of this fever that it disabled the men. That was the reason, he supposed, why it was proposed to put them on the highest mountain among the gods of Olympus, 60 miles from the harbour which had not been built. That being so, all he could say was that Her Majesty's Government were extremely wise in confining the number of men stationed there to the smallest possible force. They could not abstain from putting none at all, because that would be very prejudicial to the general opinion formed as to that Island; but the smallest force they could possibly send actually would be half a battalion, and therefore that quantity had been sent to show the sincerity of the Government in carrying out the Anglo-Turkish Convention. The real proof of the utility of things was the question of money; and the Government, from the first, appeared to him, to have shrunk from paying anything for Cyprus. What had they done there? Nothing. What were they doing? Nothing; and, in his opinion, they never intended to do anything. The whole estimated revenue of Cyprus was about £180,000 a-year, and of that they had to pay £110,000 to the Turks. The military administration cost them about £50,000; and that left a bare margin of £20,000 a-year, which would not cover the military expenditure, and was utterly insufficient to do anything in the way of developing the Island for war or anything else. It was said that the place was unwholesome, but that so were the Ionian Islands till they had made them wholesome. But what was being done to render Cyprus healthy? Nothing. They had not begun to drain or to take steps to mitigate the evils of the climate, except plant a few trees. They had laid out large sums on the Ionian Islands; but the income of Cyprus was not equal to defray the cost of improvements there. Therefore, he came to the conclusion that the Government had practically abandoned the notion of doing anything for Cyprus at all. They were not going to make it a harbour or a garrison; while to think of defending Armenia from Cyprus, under the circumstances, was a complete and entire delusion. He must say that he did regret the Government should keep Sir Garnet Wolseley there with that force of 350 men. There was no man more fit and proper to command an important stronghold; but look at what they were keeping him there for—as a taxgatherer for the Turkish Government! Surely a much more inferior man could perform those duties. It seemed to him that elsewhere the Government had work for Sir Garnet Wolseley; and why in the world a man like him should be kept to fill a position somewhat akin to that of the pettiest of the German Princes, with no money to improve the Island, or to make necessary reforms, he could not understand? Although some people were alarmed at the serious liabilities undertaken by the Government under the Anglo-Turkish Convention, he, for one, never believed that they meant anything by it at all. He never believed they would reform Asia Minor; he never believed they would defend Asia Minor; and in the words of Gay's epitaph, he believed the whole tiling was A jest, and all things show it; I thought so once, and now I know it!

SIR JOHN KENNAWAY

thought he should reduce the discussion to a practical turn by not following the hon. and learned Gentleman. The Volunteers had looked forward with great interest to the remarks of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Stanley), who, in opening, had made an appeal to them not to discuss the recommendations at the present moment. Considering the heavy strain upon the War Office during the past month, he was sure that suggestion would be adopted. The remarks of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman showed that he fully appreciated the sacrifices made by the Volunteers, and recognized the delicate manner in which this subject would have to be dealt with. He was sure the Volunteer Force throughout the country would be content to give the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the time he asked for, and also that they would obtain full justice when the opportunity came. He hoped that the drills would not be unnecessarily increased, but that they would be kept within the number essential to the maintenance of efficiency. The Volunteers were willing to make any sacrifices that might be necessary for the well-being or the defence of the country. He hoped that when the right hon. and gallant Gentleman came to consider the question of change in dress, he would remember the many associations and memories which were mixed up with their peculiar uniforms. It had been shown by the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ritchie) what had been done by regiments in endeavouring to comply with the War Office Instructions. He felt sure that if the advantages were pointed out properly, whatever was necessary would be acquiesced in, and that nothing on their part would be wanting in order to effect an increased efficiency in that Force. He hoped, also, that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would consider carefully the difficulties that lay in the way of some men becoming efficient on account of the great distances they had to come to their drills, and the time which was occupied in the service of their country. Very often, he believed, that time interfered with their business or other engagements. With regard to the increased allowance for camps, he would say that in that matter the right hon. and gallant Gentleman did not expect them to make bricks without straw. He was more and more convinced that Volunteers learnt more in camp than in any other way, and he thought that the Secretary of State for War had earned the thanks of all Volunteers in that matter. He quite agreed, also, with what the hon. Member for the Stirling Burghs (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) had said about the Artillery. Guns, gun-carriages, ammunition, and articles of equipment, made it necessary that stores should be provided. He thought that hardly enough consideration had been given to that matter, and hoped that it would be attended to.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

said, that the Estimates had been apparently drawn up very carefully. From thorn, however, it appeared that a great saving had been effected; but on investigation it would be found that there really was none. The sum of £2,000,000 which had been apparently saved, in reality, exhibited no saving at all. As far as he could ascertain, it appeared that there was rather an increase on each item. He did not at all agree with the remarks which had fallen from the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), nor did they meet the objections which had been urged by the hon. Gentleman the Member for the Stirling Burghs. The attention of the country had recently been turned to the large number of men required for regiments being brought up to full strength when sent out. He did not at all admit the soundness of the criticisms advanced by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, and the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex, that the fault lay at the door of the short-service system. On the contrary, the short-service system had, in the fullest degree, justified everything expected of it; and, more than that, had exceeded, he believed, all expectations. During the last few days five battalions had been sent abroad, and he thought it was most unsatisfactory that 300 or 400 men had been taken from other regiments to make the required number. But where lay the fault in this matter? It lay, he believed, with the right hon. and gallant Gentleman himself (Colonel Stanley). In 1877 it had been arranged that the 18 regiments first on the roster for foreign service should be kept up to the war strength, and both sides of that House had concurred in that arrangement. What sufficient reason, he wished to know, could the right hon. and gallant Gentleman bring forward for altering it? It was very curious that, simultaneously with this change—and he believed the short-comings in these five regiments were due to nothing else—five pages had been withdrawn from the Estimates; the very pages which contained the establishments of the alteration in which he now complained. He would not charge the Secretary of State for War with having done this intentionally—no doubt, it was the work of some subordinate. But he trusted that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would give them an explanation of the circumstances which led to the removal of those most important pages, and he hoped that ere long they would see them restored to their place in the Estimates. If the system agreed to had been carried on, places in regiments would not have to be filled up by young men—soldiers not properly trained—and he trusted that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would soon return to the policy of his Predecessor. He was very glad that the Secretary of State for War had said that he intended to proceed tentatively in the matter of the Army Medical Department. If he could, by those modifications, give some of the luxuries of regimental life to this large establishment, without departing from the principle of General Hospitals, he (Sir Henry Havelock) thought that he would have conferred a great boon on that branch of the Service. Another point touched upon before they went into Committee was a comparison between different means by which the Army might be augmented. He was glad that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had not given any support to the proposal of the hon. Member for Hackney. If, on the other hand, a suggestion as to increasing the Militia Reserve had been carried out three years ago, there would have been now 10,000 more Reserve men to carry the system into effect. That would have been the effect of increasing the Militia Reserve from 30,000 to 40,000 men. That could be done at an expense to the country of only £10,000, which, compared with the number of men made available on any sudden emergency, was so trifling, that it was perfectly certain no other plan could carry it out at less than five or six times the expense. As to the point touched upon by his hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Mure), he did think that too much prominence was sometimes given to Staff officers in the despatches, when subordinates were omitted. His hon. and gallant Friend was not, however, very happy in his illustration, for whatever the other defects of General Roberts, he certainly had adhered to the good old custom of India, and had brought into prominent notice the names of the Native officers and Native soldiers. He would instance the mention made by General Roberts in his report of the attack on the Peiwar Kotal of a Native officer, Azeez Khan, of the 5th Punjaub Infantry, and to the special compliment paid to him in the order of the day. He was very glad to know that every mounted man sent to the Cape was to be armed with a long range rifle.

COLONEL STANLEY

said, he did not wish his hon. and gallant Friend to fall into any mistake, even though that mistake might be in his own favour. What he said was that no mounted man would go out to the Cape without an arm of some sort, either rifle or revolver.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

said, he was sorry that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had been obliged to modify this statement, especially in view of the recommendations on this head made in the very last despatch from the Cape. He was sorry, again, to hear that it had been decided finally that only one of the batteries sent to the Cape should be 9-pounders, and that the rest of the batteries would be 7-pounders only. Both from the reports received from the Cape and the opinion of all military officers who had discussed the question, it was now clear that the 7-pounder was not the one best suited to Cape warfare, though admirably suited for different circumstances, in a different country. As they had already something like 21 of these guns at the Cape, in his opinion they ought to have had 9-pounders instead of 7-pounders sent out. He feared that, from some oversight, the peculiar fitness of the Gatling gun had been overlooked, although in the only report which had yet reached this country on that subject—that from Colonel Pearson, who was intrenched at Ekhowa—it was shown that one Gatling gun had been of the greatest possible service. Meeting at short range large masses of men, the execution done by that gun had been exceptionally tremendous, due to the manner in which the Zulus fought; and therefore he regretted very much that the right hon and gallant Gentleman had not sent more of the Arm-strong-Gatling, although they had plenty of them in store at Woolwich. The guns they had sent out weighed 400 lbs., while Armstrong's pattern weighed but 150 lbs., and, mounted on a light Kaffir carriage, would not only have been infinitely lighter, but would have had greater range, and have been of more service to this sort of warfare. The only other point to which he wished to refer had a melancholy interest at the present time. In these days of breech-loading arms, and rapid fire, the greatest results must be obtained from any sort of shelter, however trifling and slight. Forces in the open, without cover, must certainly be exposed to a punishment which it was almost impossible for them to bear. The despatches from the Cape bore out, in a remarkable and melancholy manner, the lesson they were taught two years ago at Plevna; and he trusted that, at all events, that lesson would be utilized in the future. Changes in our Army were, however, so slow, and they were so difficult to bring about, that if the War Department were left to routine, and the public opinion of the country and the strong opinion of this House were not brought to bear, he did not see any reasonable hope of any change being made to provide for an emergency until that emergency had passed away. The experience of all armies in the field since the American War showed that troops who occupy a position for a few hours, or even a portion of a day, could and should immediately entrench themselves sufficiently to make the position most difficult to attack. Both the Russians and the Roumanians came very soon to see that it was no use having intrenching tools carried by waggons three or four or five miles in the rear. If they were to be of any use whatever, it was now certain that the tool must be carried by the soldier on his person, so as to be immediately available. On the most sudden and unexpected emergency those armies were able, with a light spade, weighing about 2½ lbs., in a very short time, to throw up the intrenchments that were required for their immediate protection. Already the Oliver equipment had been designed to add the intrenching tool to the ordinary equipment of the English soldier; and, therefore, he regretted all the more that this equipment was not supplied- to the regiments that had just gone out to the Cape. If the men at Isandula had had these light spades, they would have been able, even in a few hours, to have intrenched the camp, or, at any rate, to have thrown up a few rifle pits flanking each other. Then, with the powerful weapons with which our men were armed, he undertook to say that we should not now have been mourning a great disaster; the greater Force would not have failed to do that which had now gained for a few men at Rorke's Drift an imperishable name in the annals of our country, and the war would have had a totally different beginning. He did hope that, under these circumstances, the lesson of the Turkish War would not be thrown away on the military authorities.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, he had listened very attentively to the debate, and the remarks of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Stanley) made an impression on him which nothing subsequently said had tended to weaken—that they had had an exceedingly unsatisfactory Statement. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman had very clearly and fairly done his part; but it was quite easy to see from his Statement that the Military Department was in a very unsatisfactory condition. In fact, there were only three or four points on which he had been able to congratulate himself. In the course of his Statement he laid stress on the improved condition of recruiting. If, however, that was a source of satisfaction to the military authorities, it was so to nobody else; because its explanation was found in the deplorable condition of trade, the depression of trade, and the prevailing misery. Again, the right hon. and gallant Gentleman congratulated the House on savings in the cost of clothing, although it was to the depression of trade, and the general over-stocking of the markets, that this was to be attributed. No doubt, the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, if the Government followed its perturbing and braggadocial policy, would always be able to indulge in such sorry congratulations. It was by diminishing the demand for useful labour that the Government were able to get starving recruits to seek their ranks; and, no doubt, if they continued their disturbing policy, the damage to trade would continue to cheapen the material for uniforms. The hon. Baronet opposite (Sir John Kennaway) was very well advised in not attempting to answer the criticisms of the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt). The right hon. and gallant Gentleman assured them that the acquisition of Cyprus should in no way dishearten them, because they might, by a sufficient expenditure, make it as healthy as the Ionian Islands. That was a curiously tame defence of a spirited foreign policy. He learnt, from a paper distributed that morning, that in order to make the harbour of Famagusta they would have to remove 15 feet of the abominations of centuries. He could not but think that if a Select Committee of the admirers of the Government were exported to that invigorating atmosphere, they would very soon come to a different conclusion on the glories of the Government policy. To one part of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman's speech, however, he could give an unqualified approval, and that was the part in which he gently throw cold water on the Volunteer system The Volunteers were a very nice British toy, and they were little more than a toy. Undoubtedly, under certain circumstances, the volunteering movement might be of use in the defence of the country. In the time of Napoleon it would have been of a very considerable utility; but, at the present time, according to all the possibilities of the situation, the battles of England would not be fought on the shores of England, but at a very great distance from the centre of the Empire. For carrying out the magnificent schemes of our foreign politicians, and for the maintenance of the Empire, the Volunteers were not likely to be of the least possible utility. They could not be sent either to the defiles of Afghanistan, or to the forests of Zululand. He believed there was a rumour in the air that they might be made available for service in Ireland. He did not know what service was in contemplation; but, whatever it was, they would not be fit for it in any real soldierly sense. They were simply men who gratified a taste for soldiering, and gratified it at the expense of the real efficiency of the Military Force. It was on the Army and Navy, the troops ready for service in any part of the world, that the permanent security of the State could alone depend. He saw a very considerable objection, and an objection of the political order of the first class, to the indulgence of the volunteering foible. This introduction of a spirit of soldiering—this indulgence of a fancy for uniforms and arms, and all the fal-lals of an ornamental warfare—was decidedly calculated to spread among the masses of the civil population, who ought to be thinking of more serious things, and more noble things, that spirit which was not warlike—which was mere braggadoeia—that spirit which Party opprobrium had marked with the name of Jingoism. He did not speak merely from his own limited observation, but from the observation of a large number of men indifferent parts of the country—old politicians, accustomed for 20 years to mark the progress of public opinion in this country—and their opinion was that the volunteering movement, while practically useless for the purposes of real military defence, was only useful to that Party which sought to draw off the attention of the country from real and domestic grievances, and to occupy it with the flashy visions of foreign aggrandisement. A Government which would confine itself to the business at home, and to the legitimate defence of the country abroad, would, he thought, very quickly and inevitably come to the conclusion that there should be limits to the Volunteer Force. Even the present Government saw that this mania had spread quite far enough for all the purposes of Jingoism; and he thought the Secretary of State for War quite right, now that all necessary political capital had been got out of the Volunteer movement, to throw cold water upon it—so far, at any rate, as it was likely to make more and more demands upon the public purse. It was mere sham soldiership, very similar to that National Guardism, and similar stuff, which had been discouraged by all foreign nations, as calculated to spread among the civil population an unhealthy craving for military exhibitions, which was most detrimental to the real progress and domestic happiness of the country.

MR. PARNELL

said, he quite agreed with the remarks of his hon. Friend, although, on the other hand, he should always vote against the grant for the expenses of English Volunteers as long as Volunteers were denied to Ireland, though that country had to pay its share of their cost. He did not propose to enter into the general question; but he did wish to ask some questions as to the Vote (A) for the men on page 6. The general Staff had increased from 78 last year to 237; while, on the other hand, he found, by reference to page 14, that the pay of the general Staff had been reduced from £86, 416 to £83, 170. The matter had puzzled him a good deal; and he thought it as well that the seeming inconsistency should be explained. Again, on page 10, the colonels of regiments were stated as 112, while last year the number was only 75 —51 at home, and 24 in the Colonies. He should like to have this explained, for he could find no reason for it in the Estimates. Again, on page 7, he found that the number of horses in the Royal Horse Artillery and the Horse Artillery had been reduced. In the first—the Royal Horse Artillery—the horses had been reduced by 90, and in the Horse Artillery by 648—in all making a reduction of 748. He should like also to ask whether this reduction had been already carried into effect, or whether it was only in contemplation? Again, page 13 showed 3, 991 horses at home and 122 abroad belonging to the Royal Artillery, and 1, 853 at home belonging to the Royal Horse Artillery on the 1st January, or 759 above the present Establishment. He was at a loss to understand how, in the short time since that time, there could have been this change. Then, again, for years, the aides-decamp had stood at 38. He found, by reference to page 15, that these numbers had now been increased from 38 to 40, and he should like to know the reason for that change.

COLONEL PARKER

said, with the exception of the hon. and gallant Member for Renfrew (Colonel Mure), no other hon. Member had referred to the gallantry displayed by the officers and men on service in Afghanistan; but he (Colonel Mure) had gone into the facts, and brought to the notice of the Committee the services of the 5th Ghoorkas and a company of the 77th Highlanders at the Peiwar Kotal, while he looked in vain to the despatches for the name of a single non-commissioned officer or private recommended for distinction. Having served many years in India, he (Colonel Parker) had been a witness to the devotion of these men to the service of their country. Hon. Members themselves had also seen the promptness with which they tendered their services in Europe, and had been made acquainted with their meritorious deeds. As this was no Party question, he joined in the expression of regret that the services of some of the officers and men in India had not been more fully recognized, and was equally anxious with the hon. and gallant Member for Renfrew, who had spoken on the other side of the House, to tender to those men the distinction which was their due.

COLONEL STANLEY

confessed that he could not clearly follow the second reference of the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell) in regard to the general Staff; but he would endeavour to give full details on this point on Report. Again, with regard to colonels, if the question of the hon. Member related to the increase of two colonels which had taken place, that arose from the fact that the regiment was upon the India Establishment. It was also quite true that there had been a considerable reduction in some of the batteries of the Royal Artillery, which led to a corresponding reduction in the number of horses. The Government had, indeed, intended to reduce the number of horses by about 1,000; but the reinforcements sent to the Cape had prevented their carrying the reduction to that extent. In regard to the question as to the increase in the number of aides-de-camp, attached to the Staff of the General Officer at Cyprus, this was a new command, and they appeared now on the Estimates for the first time. He felt bound to make some remarks generally upon the criticisms with which the Estimates had been received. He had occasionally heard of a small boy tying a cracker to the coat-tails of a respectable person and then running away. He did not, however, think it was respectful to the House, or conducive to the dignity of its proceedings, that a prominent Member on the Opposition Bench should tell them that he came from a Committee of Supply elsewhere, where, consequently, he could not have heard what was said in the first instance, and, after making a speech—no doubt, brilliant and effective, as all his speeches were—leave the House without waiting for a reply. He (Colonel Stanley) spoke without any feeling of annoyance, but could not think the course pursued by the hon. and learned Member (Sir William Harcourt) was one conducive to Public Business. He was bound not to allow some of his remarks to pass without contradiction. He spoke in a grand way with regard to Cyprus, and asked when they were going to see all those wonderful effects of the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and whether they were going to defend the banks of the Euphrates with half a battalion of men? As an after-dinner speech it was, doubtless, very effective, but had no relation to the Business before the House. The hon. and learned Gentleman had, moreover, no reasonable ground for making those statements; because it was only a short time ago that he had put a number of categorical questions, which he (Colonel Stanley) had answered to the best of his ability, and yet he again put those questions that evening. He had always told him that Cyprus was not a station which came under the same conditions as Malta and Gibraltar, and that it was one which they would endeavour to occupy with a very small garrison. It was quite true that only £2,000 was taken in the Estimates for the present year; and in the Statement made to the Committee earlier in the evening he had explained why only that sum was taken, the explanation being that they did not receive the Estimates in such detail as would have enabled them to insert a larger amount. It was also to be borne in mind that there was a considerable quantity of building materials, for which the money had been voted last year. This had, no doubt, been utilized to a considerable extent; but the whole of it might not have been spent. He would only warn his right hon. Friends upon the Bench opposite not to allow the hon. and learned Member to occupy his position until he had received some little financial education; and he thought that of all the expensive and expansive ideas he had ever heard, those of the hon. and learned Gentleman were the most so. With regard to the 13 medical officers at Cyprus, he thought it right to state, in the first place, that rather an excess of medical men were required there, because the garrison was split up into small detachments; and he had, therefore, yielded to the wishes of Sir Garnet Wolseley, who attached great importance to the presence of medical men in the districts to be administered by him, who should be available for the civil population. This advice could not be overrated among the population of Cyprus, and he was happy to say that the sanitary precautions recommended had been largely attended with success. He had been afraid that the hon. Member for the Stirling Burghs (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) was about to bring a very grave charge against him; but if he would look at the facts, he would see that they conclusively disproved the charge which he brought. There was nothing in the despatches of the Government inconsistent with the proposals which had been made for lowering the Estimates made in the first place, and that which he had been obliged to make in increasing the original Estimates. His hon. Friend asked what ground could they allege for the change made at the last moment? The answer was, that the change explained itself. The Estimates were not financially closed until after the 11th of February. The Government had every reason to believe that the force furnished was sufficient for the purposes for which it was intended—namely, of defence. It was quite beyond the question to say that it was less than Sir Garnet Wolseley thought would be necessary for the suppression of the Zulu rising. The Government had, under the circumstances of the year and in view of the increased Reserves, been desirous of bringing the Estimates within the narrowest financial compass, and they had at one time thought it desirable to contemplate the reduction of 3,900 men; but, between then and the presentation of the Estimates, a demand for reinforcements had arrived from the Cape. That, of course, placed them in a different position; for, when they were sending thousands of men out of the country, it was not the time for reducing the Army by 4,000 men. The hon. Member then went on to say—"Why did we not use foresight, and why did we not get Reserve men to come forward, and then come to the House for a Bill of Indemnity?" But, considering the gauntlet to be run, what sort of opposition would he have met with? Again he asked—"Why had we departed from the Establishment?" All he could say was, that he was unwilling to depart from the principle of having the first 18 battalions kept for service. But it was illustrative of the curious complications of the Service that the proposal of Viscount Cranbrook to increase 18 battalions to their highest strength had allowed the influx of a very large number of young troops. So it was thought better, if possible, to adjust the scale so as to have a certain number of battalions with less interval between them, and to group them into sixes. Then the hon. Member said they would have done better by sending out small battalions. They had already something like 88 battalions in the place of 70; and to increase the number would be to raise difficulties against themselves, and force them to take a step which, he ventured to inform the Committee, would oblige them to expand some of the depôts. That was certainly not the course which it was thought fit to pursue. The hon. and gallant Baronet (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) had asked how they then stood with regard to the Army Corps? To this he would reply, that the system of short service and linking of battalions had been somewhat strained by the calls made upon it, which calls had arisen from the undertaking of extra duties thrown upon the Army. This was, practically, a complete Establishment; and if, unhappily, cause should arise for the first or second Army Corps to go abroad, it could only be under circumstances in which those Army Corps would be very efficiently completed. With regard to the other question of his hon. and gallant Friend, he would frankly own that he was personally responsible for the change of appointment, made at the last moment, in the 17th Lancers. He had not the honour of acquaintance with the distinguished officers who had been referred to; but the facts were that Colonel Gomm, who recently succeeded to the command of that regiment, had met with a most unfortunate accident, which placed his life in no slight danger for some days, and which for a time would wholly incapacitate him for proceeding upon active service. The gallant officer himself hoped to recover sufficiently to enable him to proceed on the passage with his regiment; but whether that gallant fooling was indulged or not, it was felt that there should be in charge of the regiment an officer fully acquainted with it, from the highest to the lowest ranks. It so happened that Colonel Lowe had been looked up to—he would almost say adored—by both officers and men of the regiment. As to any in justice having been done by passing over an officer second in command, who had only recently returned to the regiment, he (Colonel Stanley) felt, under the circumstances, that it was one of those peculiar cases in which no time was to be lost. Colonel Lowe had undertaken, in the handsomest manner, to comply with the condition of serving under Colonel Gomm, and otherwise to place his services at the disposal of the regiment, in the event of his recovery. The arrangement was one to which, he believed, that no officer had demurred. And he repeated that he took upon himself the whole responsibility of having decided the matter in the way it then stood. In reply to the observations made by his hon. and gallant Friend with regard to the alleged evasion in every way of the five years' rule, he would be glad if some specific statement were made, in order that the cases referred to might be brought to light. He was not conscious that the rule had been departed from, except upon one occasion when the continuance of the command was sanctioned by himself, and when the application of the rule would have rendered the officer liable to recall at a time when his regiment was actually in face of the enemy.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

thought it due to himself to state that it was not with regard to regimental officers, but to Staff appointments, where officers had been transferred from one appointment to another, which, was virtually keeping them employed for more than five years.

COLONEL STANLEY

said, if the officer had proved himself efficient and qualified, it was best, upon public grounds, that the appointment should take place. The hon. and gallant Member for Sunderland (Sir Henry Havelock) had commented upon the delusive idea, encouraged by the form in which the Estimates had been drawn up, that a very great reduction had been effected. With regard to the first item, he admitted that this did appear to be the case, and would take care that the form should be altered, if the comparison of the Supplementary Estimates with the original Estimates did not render the item clear. He feared his hon. and gallant Friend had not heard his reply to the question of the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon), which would have explained to him the reason for the omission from the Army Estimates of this year of the details of the Regimental Establishments at Home and Abroad. In that reply he had stated that some difficulty had arisen in re-adjusting the Estab- lishment at the last moment, and that, therefore, it had been thought better to omit the details of the Establishment from the body of the Estimates; but that he intended to lay on the Table of the House what was called an "Establishment Circular," giving fuller details, and to have a certain number of copies printed and left at the War Office for such Members as chose to call for them.

An hon. MEMBER

thought it preferable that the details should be given in their ordinary place in the Estimates; although, of course, the same information might be conveyed in another form.

COLONEL STANLEY

wished to pay his humble tribute to the manner in which the hon. and gallant Member for Cork County (Colonel Colthurst) had for the first time addressed the House, while he ventured to express a hope that he would, in future, take part in the debates. With regard to his remarks upon the position of the non-commissioned officer, he quite agreed that it was desirable to endeavour to supply his wants. Viscount Cranbrook had already done something in that direction, and the question would not be lost sight of by him. The noble Lord was most anxious to open up a prospect, if possible, for this very deserving body of men. With regard to the social position of non-commissioned officers and privates, he quite agreed with the hon. and gallant Member for Renfrewshire (Colonel Mure); but, although the point raised was very worthy of consideration, and although some natural indignation might be felt that a red coat should exclude the wearer from a position which he might fairly claim, he thought the matter was one in which neither the House nor the Government could, at the present time, interfere, and which must be left to the good feeling of the public. The hon. and gallant Member had also asked several questions with regard to the recruits of the 70th Regiment in Afghanistan, to which he replied that the Government were in possession of no more information—possibly not so much—as was the hon. and gallant Member himself. Indeed, no report had been brought to him in any manner; and he could, therefore, only hope that the circumstances of which complaint had been made were not so bad as the hon. and gallant Member supposed. The hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ritchie) had commented upon the changes made in the payment of recruiting money, which had been attended with better results as to the class of recruits. He urged that they should not pay any bounty, and he (Colonel Stanley) quite agreed that if the custom could be broken down by giving up recruiting for two or three years, the suggestion might be adopted with advantage. The question had been discussed in Committee, and many Members of it were in favour of the system of the hon. Member. He had already spoken on the subject of the depôts and agreed that there was not really the number of officers available which appeared on the Establishment. With regard to the clothing of the Volunteers, he asked leave, at a future time, when the Vote was reached, to press upon the Committee rather more clearly certain facts and figures. What h e had said earlier in the evening he repeated—namely, that he was very anxious that the recommendation of the Committee should be carried into effect if it was likely to be for the public good. He believed he had now included all the points raised by hon. Members, and had, therefore, only to ask the House to allow them to take the Vote.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

wished to say one word with reference to his absence. He had fully intended to be present to hear the reply of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, but was not informed that it had been begun. He hoped the Secretary of State for War would not think that any intentional disrespect was meant.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolution to be reported.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £4, 598,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge of the Pay, Allowances, and other Charges of Her Majesty's Land Forces at Home and Abroad (exclusive of India), which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1880.

MR. PARNELL

, in view of the lateness of the hour, moved to report Progress, as he wished to make some reference to the Stock Purse.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. Parnell.)

COLONEL STANLEY

would be very glad to afford the hon. Member any information he desired on the subject of the Stock Purse; but, at the same time, must appeal to the Committee, after the very long and fair discussion which had been taken upon the Estimates, to allow the Vote to pass.

MR. DILLWYN

thought that if there was the prospect of a discussion, and a speech of half-an-hour's duration from his hon. Friend (Mr. Parnell), it had better be adjourned for another night. The sum of £4,000,000 was a large one, and required some consideration.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, there were many subjects upon which further information was, he hoped, to be given before the Vote was allowed to pass, many of which had, again and again, occupied public attention. It was on occasions when money was asked for that the nation expected to have authoritative declarations upon questions which were raised by the Estimates. He could not but think that the Committee had the right to remind the Government that it was only lately that their craving for taking away the rights of private Members on Monday nights had been satisfied. The House would be more ready at an appropriate hour another day to vote the money. He supported the Motion of the hon. Member for Meath.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolution to be reported To-morrow;

Committee also report Progress; to sit again upon Wednesday.