COMMITTEE. [Progress 10th July.]

HC Deb 14 July 1879 vol 248 cc344-409

Bill considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Clase 3 (Division of Act).

MR. J. BROWN

thought that if the definitions of the Bill were brought to the front of it, its provisions would be rendered thereby much plainer and more easily understood by those persons to whom it was applicable. There could be no stronger argument in favour of the Amendment which he had to propose than that drawn from their experience of the course of this Bill through Committee; for it would, he thought, be admitted that if hon. Members had had the definitions presented to them in the first part of the Bill, instead of at the end of it, they would have better understood its application, and much time would in consequence have been saved. For instance, it was not until a comparatively late clause was reached that the Committee knew whether the term "soldier "included non-commissioned officers or not, and from that circumstance great confusion had resulted. He was quite sure, inasmuch as the Bill was to tie interpreted by soldiers and not by lawyers, who would, of course, turn to the Definition Clauses at once, that it would be much better understood if the definitions were placed in the front of the Bill. The necessity for a clear view of the application of the Bill was especially apparent in the case of soldiers being called out for the suppression of riot, when, perhaps, without their being aware of it, they immediately entered upon active service, which fact, if it were not made perfectly clear and put plainly before the soldier, might be the cause of his getting into difficulty when so called upon. In these circumstances, and seeing that the Definition Clause had been postponed, he trusted that the Secretary of State for War would agree to the Amendment standing in his name. He moved to insert in page 1, line 14, after "Part I.," the words "Definitions and," for the purpose of securing the object which he had indicated.

COLONEL STANLEY

saw in the arguments of the hon. Member for Horsham (Mr. J. Brown) no sufficient reason for the insertion of definitions in a place which, in his opinion, did not belong to them. He thought that, perhaps, some time had been lost to the Committee by the Bill not having, in some cases, been thoroughly read before hand, which might otherwise have been saved; but he hoped the Amendment would not be pressed.

Amendment negatived.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 69 (Power of Her Majesty to make rules of procedure.)

MAJOR NOLAN

said, he had rather expected some statement from the Secretary of State for War with regard to this clause. When the Bill was intro- duced, a good deal of capital, so to speak, had been made out of the circumstance that the Articles of War were to be abolished; but he wished to point out to the Committee that the new clause referred to by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would, practically, give powers to make Articles of War. The present clause also gave power to alter matter in the Bill of a very serious character, which had been discussed by the Committee. It was true that nothing was to be done contrary to this Act; but it appeared to him extraordinary that the Secretary of State for War should claim for himself power to change the constitution of courts martial. He could not imagine any case in which the Secretary of State for War could exercise the power of changing the constitution of a court martial, without doing a thing contrary to this Act. The power seemed to him to be unnecessary; but if the Secretary of State for War would show him in what cases it would be useful, he would, of course, withdraw his Amendment. He moved, in page 38, line 22, to leave out the words "and constituting," thinking that the constitution of courts martial should remain sacred.

COLONEL STANLEY

said, he could not help thinking that the hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Major Nolan) had been under a misapprehension with regard to this clause. As far as he (Colonel Stanley) had been able to ascertain, by inquiry from competent advisers, nothing could be more clear than the fact that the section in no way authorized any Secretary of State to depart, in the slightest degree, from the course prescribed in the clauses of the Bill. The powers of the present section referred to small matters of procedure which could not be allowed to encumber the Bill, and which from time to time might have to be altered. For instance, the Volunteers had a right, under certain circumstances, to have courts martial composed of their own officers. That was a rule which from time to time might have to be modified, and, amongst others, afforded an instance in which the power of the clause would be useful. He repeated, that he had been advised, on the best authority, that nothing in the section gave power to the Secretary of State to go one atom beyond this Act.

MR. HOPWOOD

wished to point out that the statement of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, that the object of the section was the regulation of small matters of detail, was surpassed by the language used in the clause itself.

SIR HENRY JAMES

suggested that the following words should be added at the end of the clause:— Provided always, That no such rules shall contain anything contrary to the provisions of this Act.

MAJOR NOLAN

said, he would withdraw his Amendment, and would not move the next Amendment standing in his name.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

COLONEL STANLEY

moved, to add after the word "say," in line 21, the words "the assembly and procedure of courts of inquiry."

Amendment agreed to.

MAJOR NOLAN

said, that the clause was entirely new, and that reference was made to its provisions neither in the old Mutiny Act nor in the Articles of War. It was a very sweeping thing to say:— Subject to the provisions of this Act, Her Majesty may, by rules to be signified under the hand of a Secretary of State, from time to time, make, and when made, repeal, alter, or add to, provisions in respect of the following matters, or any of them; that is to say … (7.) Any matter in this Act directed to be prescribed.

The words appeared to him to embody the general sense of the Bill as it existed before it went through the Committee, and to give enormous power to a Secretary of State which had never been conferred by the old Mutiny Act. He moved that sub-section 7 be left out, in order that an opportunity might be given to the Secretary of State for War to afford some explanation.

COLONEL STANLEY

thought that the hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Major Nolan) bad overlooked the fact that the rules of procedure were, for the first time, being made Parliamentary. These rules were, in future, to be laid before Parliament. The clause was, undoubtedly, a new one, and alluded to a great many matters which could not possibly be recited in this Act; but he wish to make it clear to the hon. and gallant Member that by it nothing could possibly be done contrary to the Act.

The sub-section in question was intended to apply to such things as the forms prescribed in cases where regimental returns were required to be made up by officers, and which, from time to time, might have to be modified.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

SIR HENRY JAMES

moved to add after the word "law," in line 35, the words:— Provided always, That such rules shall contain nothing contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

Amendment agreed to.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

moved, in page 38, after line 42, to insert:— Whenever a court of inquiry is assembled to investigate any matter affecting the conduct or character of an officer or soldier, such officer or soldier shall be entitled to receive a copy of any opinion which may be delivered by such court; and, if the officer who convenes the court of inquiry shall prefer to instruct the court to receive evidence only and not to deliver an opinion, the officer or soldier whose conduct or character has been called in question shall be entitled to demand that the officer who convenes the court of inquiry shall himself deliver an opinion upon the matter which has been the matter of investigation, and a copy of such opinion shall be delivered in writing to the officer or soldier concerned.

COLONEL STANLEY

remarked, that he had already proposed rules with regard to Courts of Inquiry which had been laid upon the Table of the House.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

said, that they had proceeded so rapidly through the Bill that he was not aware that it was proposed to put these rules in the Bill. He had intended to have put a Notice on the Paper with regard to this matter; but, owing to certain circumstances, was prevented from doing so. With respect to the observations of the noble Marquess, referring to him in the discussion which had preceded this matter, he thought that the Committee would agree with him that they were fully entitled to consider the bearing of these provisions with respect to what had recently occurred in South Africa.

THE CHAIRMAN

remarked, that the right hon. Baronet would not be in Order in referring directly to what had passed in the House.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

said, that he wished to point out that he considered it would be very desirable that the proceedings of these Courts of Inquiry should be as clear as possible, and in support of this it was only necessary to mention a recent case which occurred at the relief of Ekowe, where a Court of Inquiry was held upon a sergeant, who was sentenced to five years' penal servitude. The sentence of the Court was sent for revision to the Judge Advocate, and the non-commissioned officer returned to this country. It was found, on inquiry at home, that the evidence was so much in favour of the sergeant that he was allowed to join the 3rd battalion of the 60th Rifles. He thought this matter was really in point to show how necessary it was to bring these Courts of Inquiry before the attention of the House. He would point out that it was highly desirable that the Government should lay upon the Table of the House the proceedings of the different Courts of Inquiry that had been held during the course of the present year. A Court of Inquiry was held with reference to the accident that happened to the 10th Hussars in crossing the Cabul River, when a troop was washed away. An hon. Member opposite asked the Government whether the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry which investigated the cause of the disaster had been forwarded to this country to the proper authorities. In reply to an inquiry addressed to them by the hon. and learned Member for King's County (Mr. Serjeant Sherlock), the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War stated that the decisions of those courts had hitherto been kept secret, and that there was no reason, in the particular case referred to, to depart from the ordinary rule. It was very important to notice the reply which the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War gave to that question, for it showed how the Government had changed its opinions on this point since the 26th of June. It now appeared by the regulations which had been put into the hands of hon. Members that morning that the Government were prepared to allow the officer or soldier, tried by a Court of Inquiry, to have a copy of the opinion arrived at. This was an important concession, and he wished to point out that as the Government had made that concession now, it would be highly desirable that they should favour the House of Commons, and the country, with the results of the Court of Inquiry into the Isandlana disaster. He did not know whether the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War was prepared to consent to lay upon the Table of the House the result of that inquiry. There was another point to which he wished also particularly to bring to his notice. A Court of Inquiry was held in reference to the disaster at the Zlobani Mountain. That was a most serious disaster, as a whole corps was cut to pieces; and from letters which he had received he had no doubt that there was very good cause for holding a Court of Inquiry. He believed the Government were in possession of the results of these inquiries, and he thought it would be far better if they were to adopt his suggestion, and since they had put this Memorandum into the hands of hon. Members that they would also lay upon the Table of the House the results of these inquiries, and it would then be unnecessary to move for the Reports. He wished further to point to a question which arose in connection with the proceedings of another Court of Inquiry recently held at the Cape. A great act of injustice had been done to one officer by the publication of the finding of that Court of Inquiry. He held in his hands a copy of that Report, dated Landsman's Drift, June 10th. It should be remembered that that Court of Inquiry was ordered by Lord Chelmsford. Lord Chelmsford also ordered the Court of Inquiry into the Isandlana disaster; but the Report of the inquiry into the most recent disaster had been published contrary to all previous practice.

THE CHAIRMAN

was bound to point out to the right hon. Baronet that he understood him to be about to move an Amendment of which he had submitted the words. He had then understood that he was about to depart from that intention, and said he would conclude by another Amendment. He wished to say that it would be convenient to the Committee that he should furnish him with the terms of that Amendment; for so far as the right hon. Baronet had gone at present he did not see precisely the connection between the observations he was now making and the subject-matter before the Committee.

SIR PATRICK O'BRIEN

asked, whether observations with reference to Courts of Inquiry that had recently taken place at the Cape were not in Order upon the subject-matter before the Committee?

THE CHAIRMAN

said, he would be able to answer that question when he had heard the right hon. Baronet propose his Amendment.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

said, he would read his Amendment. It was as follows:— Whenever a court of inquiry is assembled to investigate any matter affecting the conduct or character of an officer or soldier such officer or soldier shall be entitled to receive a copy of any opinion which may he delivered by such court; and if the officer who convenes the court of inquiry shall prefer to instruct the court to receive evidence only, and not to deliver an opinion, the officer or soldier whose conduct or character has been called in question shall he entitled to demand that the officer "who convenes the court of inquiry shall himself deliver an opinion upon the matter which has been the subject of investigation, and a copy of such opinion shall be delivered in writing to the officer or soldier concerned. He thought he was perfectly in Order in moving that Amendment upon the proposed clause of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. He had understood the Chairman of "Ways and Means to rule that he was not in Order in moving that Amendment.

THE CHAIRMAN

had understood that the right hon. Baronet had at first intended to move that Amendment, but had changed his intention.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

said, that he had not wished to move the Amendment if the Government had acceded to his suggestion. He thought his remarks were relevant to the subject before the Committee. His contention was, that when the conduct of an officer or soldier was investigated by a Court of Inquiry, then it was just and right that that officer or soldier should receive a copy of the opinion of the Court.

COLONEL STANLEY

wished to interrupt the right hon. Baronet for the purpose of pointing out, if he were in Order in doing so, that there was some misapprehension on this matter. He had promised to put into the Bill the rules of procedure for Courts of Inquiry in addition to the rules of procedure for courts martial. Inasmuch as there had been a good deal of controversy about these matters, he wanted to make his intentions perfectly clear; and he had placed, for the convenience of the Committee, a draft of the regulations which he proposed to lay before Parliament in the hands of hon. Members. He had done that in an informal shape, no doubt; but it was for the convenience of circulation. From the Memorandum it would be seen that he proposed that:— Whenever any inquiry affects the character of an officer or soldier, full opportunity must be afforded such officer or soldier of being present throughout the inquiry, and of making any statement he may wish to make, and of cross-examining any witness whose evidence, in his opinion, affects his character, and of producing any witnesses in defence of his character. Then, by Section 10 of the Memorandum it was provided:— When, in consequence of the assembling of a court of inquiry, an opinion adverse to the character of any officer or soldier is formed by the officer who determines the case so inquired into, whether such officer be the officer who assembled the court or a superior officer to whom the case has been referred by such last-named officer, such adverse opinion shall be communicated to the officer or soldier against whom it has been given. He wished particularly to draw attention to these matters, because a great deal of misapprehension had arisen as to Courts of Inquiry. He wished distinctly to state that a Court of Inquiry was not in strictness a judicial tribunal; but was simply an assembly of persons to collect evidence in any case in which a commanding officer could not himself make the inquiry. He wished to emphasize that fact, because the right hon. Baronet had seemed to suppose that a Court of Inquiry was a tribunal appointed to try an officer or soldier. It was perfectly erroneous to suppose that any person was tried before a Court of Inquiry. A Court of Inquiry was not empowered to exercise any of the functions of a tribunal, and if any such Court assumed those functions, he was of opinion that they would be entirely in the wrong, and the object of the rules proposed was to prevent that being done.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

said, that no doubt the use of the word "trial "with respects to these Courts was a mistake; but he still maintained that the Amendment which he had proposed gave a larger scope to the persons arraigned than that suggested by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, who simply said that:— Whenever any inquiry affects the character of an officer or soldier, full opportunity must be afforded such officer or soldier of being present throughout the inquiry, and of making any statement he may wish to make, and of cross-examining any witness whose evidence, in his opinion, affects his character, and of producing any witness in defence of his character. He felt very deeply upon these matters, and thought the subject was one which required the serious attention of the military authorities. It would be much better to provide, as was done by his Amendment, that a copy of any opinion which might be delivered by the Court of Inquiry affecting the conduct or character of an officer or soldier should be delivered to him. He could not conceive it desirable that in some cases the results of Courts of Inquiry should be kept secret, and that in other cases, in view of extraordinary circumstances, the results should be known. He thought that in all cases the results should be published at the place where the Court of Inquiry was held. It appeared to him that this was a matter of great importance; and he trusted that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would agree to his very reasonable suggestion that whenever a Court of Inquiry was assembled to investigate any matter affecting the conduct or character of any officer or soldier, such officer or soldier should be entitled to receive a copy of any opinion that might be delivered by such Court.

COLONEL STANLEY

wished again to impress on the Committee the regulations proposed in the Memorandum. By Section 8 he provided that:— A court of inquiry will give no opinion on the conduct of any officer or soldier, and the proceedings of a court of inquiry cannot be given in evidence against an officer or soldier. Nevertheless, in the event of an officer or soldier being tried by court martial in respect of any matter or thing which, has been reported on by a court of inquiry, such officer or soldier shall be entitled to a copy of the proceedings of the court of inquiry. He thought that that provision entirely met the justice of the case.

SIR PATRICK O'BRIEN

observed that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had stated that a Court of Inquiry was only instituted for the purpose of giving a commanding officer information which he could not otherwise conveniently obtain. If that were the case, no reasonable objection could be offered; but, unfortunately, there had been cases in which Courts of Inquiry had been used against officers for a very different purpose. It was necessary for him, in illustrating this remark, to mention to the House a case which he knew was not at all popular. He alluded to the case of Colonel Dawkins, an officer of the Guards, whose case had before been brought to the attention of the House. He had performed his duty with credit as an officer of the brigade of Guards; but he had the misfortune to disagree with Lord Rokeby, who commanded the brigade of Guards, and, in consequence of that difference, he was made the subject of a Court of Inquiry. He would say that Colonel Dawkins was tried, were it not certain that he would be told that no trial had taken place. But what happened was, that Colonel Dawkins was sent before a Court of Inquiry, and a man whose commission was worth £ 8,000 or £ 9,000 was taken out of the Army on its recommendation. Not a single statement could be made contrary to the honour of Colonel Dawkins as an officer and a gentleman, and instead of trying him by a court martial a Court of Inquiry was held. His Royal Highness would not go to a court martial, and a secret investigation was held by a Court of Inquiry. He was using this merely as an instance of the way in which these Courts of Inquiry were used. Colonel Dawkins was found guilty by the Court of Inquiry, not of any military offence, not of any want of knowledge of his Profession; and he was removed from the Guards. The fact was, he was unpopular with certain noble Lords and persons in high position at the Horse Guards. They did not want to ask for a court martial; they preferred to use the Prerogative of Her Majesty to turn anybody out of the Army without a court martial. When this man was taken out of the Profession it possibly overturned his mind, for he was found guilty of conduct which no gentleman, in his opinion, would ever attempt to justify. He considered that Courts of Inquiry were the screw which the Horse Guards could put upon any man they did not want in order to turn him out of the Army. He believed it was the opinion of numbers of independent officers of the Army that Courts of Inquiry were not used for the purpose which they were intended for, but as means for getting rid of unpopular men. He thought that the matter to which the right hon. Baronet had directed attention deserved the attention of the House, and if he went to a Division on his Amendment he should certainly support him.

MR. ASSHETON CROSS

said, that if the hon. Baronet would be good enough to read the 8th of the proposed regulations he would see that:— A court of inquiry will give no opinion on the conduct of any officer or soldier, and the proceedings of a court of inquiry cannot be given in evidence against an officer or soldier. Nevertheless, in the event of an officer or soldier being tried by court martial in respect of any matter or thing which has been reported on by a court of inquiry, such officer or soldier shall be entitled to a copy of the proceedings of the court of inquiry. He would also wish again to draw attention to the 10th rule, which carried out everything that was required by the Amendment. It stated that:— When, in consequence of the assembling of a court of inquiry, an opinion adverse to the character of any officer or soldier was formed by the officer who determines the case so inquired into," then "such adverse opinion shall be communicated to the officer or soldier against whom it has been given. He thought, therefore, that the proposals of his right hon. and gallant Friend carried out everything that could be desired; and he did not think that it was necessary to go into a long wrangle about a matter which had been already carried out.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

wished to call attention to the manner in which this matter now stood. In the 69th clause there was nothing about Courts of Inquiry.

COLONEL STANLEY

remarked, that an Amendment was put in the clause relating to Courts of Inquiry.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

had forgotten that; but he was sure that it was understood at the time they were discussing that Amendment that the regulations for Courts of Inquiry should not be put into the Bill, but should be left entirely outside the Bill. There was a general understanding with regard to that matter. There was a great objection to putting regulations with regard to Courts of Inquiry into the Bill; but it was agreed that the regulations should be communicated to the House in order that it might understand what was to be done with respect to these courts. That was the proper time, in his opinion, for making any suggestion, or proposing any alteration, in these regulations; but he did not think that it was convenient at that time to introduce into the Bill an Amendment with respect to Courts of Inquiry. They had agreed hitherto that Courts of Inquiry should be regulated by the Queen's Regulations outside the Bill. The regulations it was proposed to issue had been submitted to the House by the Government, and it would be highly inconvenient that any Amendment in these regulations should be put in the Bill.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

had understood, from the Memorandum of the proposed regulations being headed "Army Discipline and Regulation Bill," that the regulations were to be inserted in the Bill.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

thought that it was not the intention to put these regulations into the Bill. These were the regulations which the Government wished the House to know that they intended to issue in the form of Queen's Regulations in accordance with their undertaking to make rules for Courts of Inquiry. The Government had merely let the House know what regulations they intended to make in accordance with the pledge which they gave in that Amendment to the clause, which stated that rules and regulations should be made for Courts of Inquiry. It was a mistake to suppose that the regulations were intended to be introduced into the Bill.

MAJOR O'BEIRNE

thought that these regulations were incomplete so long as there was no provision for any officer or soldier whose conduct was under investigation having the same right of challenge as if he had been brought before a court martial: otherwise there would be an opportunity of placing upon Courts of Inquiry officers who would give such opinions as might lead to a miscarriage of justice. He might mention that at Naval Courts of Inquiry there was the same right of challenge as upon courts martial, and he could see no reason why the challenge should not be given in the case of Military Courts of Inquiry. As a case in point he might mention that of Colonel Carter, commanding the 62nd Regiment, who had a difference with his major, and a Court of Inquiry was directed by the authorities. The President of the Court of Inquiry was the brother-in-law of Major Jerome; and if Colonel Carter had had a right of inquiry he would naturally have objected to a brother-in-law of one of the officers, whose conduct was under investigation, being President of the Court. As a natural consequence, that court came to a conclusion adverse to Colonel Carter. He should, therefore, propose, as an Amendment to the 69th clause, that:— Any officer or soldier whose conduct is being inquired into should have the same right of challenge as upon a court martial.

SIR ARTHUR HAYTER

wished to join in the appeal which had been made to the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth (Sir Robert Peel) to withdraw his Amendment. The proposed regulations provided that:— A court of inquiry will give no opinion upon the conduct of any officer or soldier… Nevertheless, in the event of an officer or soldier being tried by a court martial in respect of any matter or thing which has been reported on by a court of inquiry, such officer or soldier shall be entitled to a copy of the proceedings of the court of inquiry. Moreover, that any adverse opinion that a Court of Inquiry might come to was to be communicated to the officer or soldier against whom it had been given. The result of the adoption of the right hon. Baronet's Amendment would be that he would put an end to the proposed regulations altogether. Everything that was required by his Amendment was really contained in the regulations, and he did not think that there was any reason for proposing the Amendment.

COLONEL STANLEY

said, that it must be borne in mind that he had placed these regulations in the hands of hon. Members merely for their information, and for the purpose of showing what he intended to do. He was sorry that any misapprehension had arisen in consequence of the form in which he had put these regulations before the Committee. It was not intended to put them in the Bill; but they were simply a Memorandum of what it was intended to do. As regarded the various points which had been urged upon him, he would carefully consider them; but he would again tell the Committee that a Court of Inquiry was simply a body of persons to collect evidence for a commanding officer, and to assist him in ascertaining what the facts were upon which he should form his opinion. He thought that particular care was required in these regulations to prevent a commanding officer, who had given an opinion on the case, sheltering himself behind a Court of Inquiry.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

was unable to find a word about Courts of Inquiry in Clause 69. He understood that the Government were about to make rules for Courts of Inquiry; but why was nothing said in the Bill with regard to Courts of Inquiry? They were not told in the Bill what a Court of Inquiry was; and he thought that Courts of Inquiry should be either excluded from the Bill, or that proper explanations should be given of what Courts of Inquiry were. It was not right suddenly to insert in the Bill power to make rules for Courts of this character. Perhaps the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would be good enough to state, as this was an important matter, whether this was the first or last mention, of Courts of Inquiry in the Bill?

SIR JOHN HAY

remarked, that in consequence of the Amendment which had been inserted in the 69th clause, the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had placed upon the Table a Memorandum of the proposed regulations for Courts of Inquiry. With regard to the suggestion of the hon. and gallant Member for Leitrim (Major O'Beirne), that there should be a right of challenge in cases of Courts of Inquiry, he did not think that there was any reason for giving such right of challenge. The Court of Inquiry was merely constituted to hold an inquiry into certain matters for the benefit of all concerned.

THE CHAIRMAN

observed, that the question raised by the hon. and gallant Member for Leitrim would be raised by a subsequent Amendment; and, therefore, it was not in Order to discuss the right of challenge upon that Amendment.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

thought there was a good deal of force in the observations of the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell), and that Courts of Inquiry should either be dealt with entirely by the Bill or wholly outside it. It was not known to him that any mention of Courts of Inquiry was made in the Bill, and why an Amendment was to be put in referring to Courts of Inquiry he did not know. As the hon. Member had said, if a Court of Inquiry were allowed to be put in the Bill, a proper definition of it must be given. He should recommend the Government to strike out the mention of Courts of Inquiry upon Report, for he thought it ought never to have been put in at all. What the right hon. and gallant Gentleman agreed to was, that Courts of Inquiry—which were no courts at all should be treated as matters of administration, and should be deal with outside the Bill by the Queen's Regulations to prevent their abuse. It was contrary to the whole character of the Bill that Courts of Inquiry should be introduced into it. He would suggest that they should be exclusively treated as matter for regulation, and that no attempt should be made in the Bill to legislate for Courts of Inquiry. At a later stage of the Bill he trusted that his suggestion would be adopted, for they might waste weeks in discussion upon the subject of Courts of Inquiry upon the postponed clauses.

COLONEL ALEXANDER

said, that Courts of Inquiry were not sanctioned, either by the Mutiny Act or by the Articles of War. From the beginning to the end not a word was said about Courts of Inquiry. The first time that Courts of Inquiry were sanctioned was in the Queen's Regulations for 1868. Before that period, Courts of Inquiry existed only according to what was called the recognized custom of the Service; but no specific rule was laid down with regard to them.

MAJOR O'BEIRNE

thought that that was the proper time to discuss the subject of Courts of Inquiry. As the authorities had power to dismiss officers by a Court of Inquiry, it was as necessary for the Committee to discuss what Courts of Inquiry were as it was for them to discuss the constitution of courts martial. In his opinion, the regulations proposed were very incomplete.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

said, that it seemed to him to be perfectly clear that Courts of Inquiry were not now recognized by law. He thought that the Government should either adopt the suggestion of the hon. and learned Member for Oxford, and strike out any reference to Courts of Inquiry from the Bill, or they should give some explanation of what Courts of Inquiry were.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

was prepared to accept the suggestion of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt). In moving his Amendment, it was under the impression that it was intended by the Government to introduce these regulations into the Bill. It was in consequence only of seeing the Memorandum of the proposed regulations that he placed his Amendment upon the Paper. If the Government would give the Committee an assurance that Courts of Inquiry should be omitted from the Bill, and that in any regulations respecting them should be contained a provision such as he had submitted, he should be content. It should be recollected that great change had been made in that matter; because he would assert, without fear of contradiction, that it was upon the finding of a Court of Inquiry at the Cape that a court martial was ordered upon Captain Carey. He did hope that the Government would give an assurance, not that they would put it in the Bill, but that they would take care that where any officer or soldier was submitted to a Court of Inquiry the proceedings of that Court should be placed in his hands, so that he might know what was charged against him.

MAJOR NOLAN

said, that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had introduced the subject of Courts of Inquiry by mentioning them in the Bill. Clauses 42 and 43 naturally suggested Courts of Inquiry. It was provided by Clause 42 that:— If an officer thinks himself wronged by his commanding officer, and, on due application made to him, does not receive the redress to which he may consider himself entitled, he may complain to the Commander-in-chief, who shall cause his complaint to be inquired into, and, through a Secretary of State, make his report to Her Majesty, in order to receive the directions of Her Majesty thereon. Then, in Clause 43, the case of a soldier was dealt with, and the mode of complaint by a soldier was specified. The clause provided that:— And every officer to whom a complaint is made, in pursuance of this section, shall cause such complaint to be inquired into, and shall, if on inquiry he is satisfied of the justice of the complaint so made, take such steps as may be necessary for giving full redress to the complainant in respect of the matter complained of. Therefore, if Courts of Inquiry were not expressly ordered by the Act, they were strongly suggested by this clause, and were, in fact, rendered almost imperative. It was impossible to leave that entirely out of the Bill. The hon. and gallant Member for Bath (Sir Arthur Hayter) said that, as no opinion on the conduct of an officer or soldier was given by a Court of Inquiry, it was no use to have a right to challenge. When that observation was made, he wished to point out that paragraph 30 of the regulations provided that a Court of Inquiry should make a Report upon what happened. There did not seem to him to be much, difference between the Court of Inquiry offering an opinion, or in making a Report. If they took the case of Captain Carey, of what consequence was it whether the Court had offered an opinion, or had made a full Report? The subject of Courts of Inquiry had been introduced by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, and it could not be said that it was of no consequence what opinion was given by a Court of Inquiry. It was just as important to exclude a brother-in-law of one of the parties being placed upon a Court of Inquiry as upon a court martial. It was very much the same thing as a court martial, only under another name. He could not see that there was any objection to allowing challenges against the officers composing a Court of Inquiry. When a challenge was made it was left to the majority of the Court, leaving out the person challenged, to determine whether he should continue to be a member of the Court. He did not think that such a right should be refused in the case of a Court of Inquiry. It might be very rarely exercised; but it ought to be allowed.

MR. E. JENKINS

thought that the Committee had been placed in considerable difficulty by the point alluded to by the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt). Courts of Inquiry were not judicial courts, either in the Army or in the Navy, and had their origin entirely in the Prerogative of the Crown. The introduction into the Bill of Courts of Inquiry appeared to him to be an irregularity, for, by so doing, they were assuming to legislate for what was unquestionably a direct Prerogative of the Crown. No doubt, Courts of Inquiry had led to abuse, for they had been used as judicial courts, and their opinions had been acted upon by the Commander-in-chief in advising Her Majesty, and officers had suffered grave injustice by reason of them. Although not judicial courts, many officers had been dismissed from the Army in consequence of representations made by them. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman had pointed out the difficulties of the situation, and had endeavoured to reconcile them, and the question was whether they were reconcilable. He noticed in the regulations which had been presented to the House, and for which he felt himself bound to thank the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, that they did not go so far as was done in the case of the Navy. In the Navy, it was not competent for any officer who had sat upon a Court of Inquiry to sit also upon a court martial in the same matter, and he thought that that regulation might well be adopted in dealing with the Army.

COLONEL STANLEY

said, that it had been done.

MR. E. JENKINS

said, that as the Courts of Inquiry were recognized in the Act, it seemed to him that it would be better to place these rules in the Schedule. He thought there was no option in the matter, and that it would be more satisfactory if that were done. He saw the difficulty that arose from the circumstances that had been referred to; but he could not help thinking that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman might introduce this Proviso into the Bill for the purpose of safeguarding these Courts of Inquiry. He knew how these Courts had been used in an irregular manner as the basis for the dismissal of officers from the Service without court martial; and there ought to be a Proviso that any officer who felt himself aggrieved by the result of a Court of Inquiry, before he should be dismissed from the Service, should have a right to have his case sent to a court martial. He did not mean that those exact words should be introduced; but the question was simply whether what he had suggested could be done by additional regulations, or whether the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would introduce a Proviso into the Bill to that effect.

MR. PARNELL

said, as this Amendment had been introduced into the Act, he thought the Committee should go a little further, and should also introduce a Schedule containing the regulations and the rules which the Secretary of State for War desired to adopt. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman had explained very fairly that the regulations issued that day were merely an example of what was in his mind, and it was only fair that he should have a little time to go over them; but, under all the circumstances, he did not think they would be doing their duty in allowing this clause to pass unless they, at the same time, inserted in the Schedules of the Act some provisions to govern the action of these Courts of Inquiry. These Courts were now, for the first time, to be legalized; and it would be unprecedented for them to lay down certain rules and regulations as regarded courts martial, and yet not follow the same precedent in regard to Courts of Inquiry. He would suggest that the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth (Sir Robert Peel) should withdraw his Amendment, and that his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leitrim (Major O'Beirne) should refrain from moving his Amendment, and that the Secretary of State for War should undertake to annex a Schedule to the Bill which would contain the ideas which he thought desirable. It was manifest they ought not to give these powers without in some way limiting them, as, otherwise, they would have a Court sanctioned by the Act, and the Secretary of State for War left free to make any rules and regulations he chose, which was much more in accordance with, or, at any rate, not contrary to, the provisions of this Act. Otherwise, the Crown would have unlimited power with regard to these Courts. No doubt, the promises of the Secretary of State for War were very satisfactory with regard to the provisions he proposed to introduce; but they did not know what might happen hereafter, unless Parliament had some control over the matter.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

observed, that the Committee were on very dangerous ground; he had paid great attention to the Bill, and if they were going into this matter of regulating Courts of Inquiry, the work would take them half as long again as it had already done to make a statutory Court of Inquiry with statutory regulations, and even that would not suffice. He deplored the alteration which had been unfortu- nately made during his absence at dinner. If he had been there, he would have protested against it with all his might, for he knew what it would lead to. It seemed to him no part for the Committee to undertake to make regulations for the administration of Courts of Inquiry. He never understood the Secretary of State for War to give an engagement to put Courts of Inquiry into the Bill, and why this Amendment had been stuck: into this clause he really did not know. He thought the best course they could now take was to get nothing more—to wait for the Report, and then cut it out. If they did not, they would get into an inextricable mess. What they should do was to adhere to the original understanding that Courts of Inquiry were not to be recognized as statutory Courts; but that regulations were to be made governing them, and that those regulations should be published and laid before Parliament. He hoped, because they had made an error in sticking these Courts into the clause by an Amendment—the consequences of which were not considered at the time—that they would not get further into the mud by endeavouring to legislate for them, but would implore hon. Gentlemen who desired the progress of the Bill not to encourage Amendments in this way, with regard to Courts of Inquiry, and he would ask them to be satisfied with the regulations to be made by the Secretary of State for War. If those regulations were not all they desired, suggestions could easily be made to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman; and he, no doubt, would give full consideration to the suggestions of the hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. E. Jenkins) and that of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Leitrim (Major O'Beirne).

SIR ROBERT PEEL

was very willing to withdraw his Amendment. He had put it down because of what he saw on the Paper; but he was quite prepared to withdraw it, on the understanding that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would consider the Amendment which he had suggested.

COLONEL STANLEY

explained, that he inserted this Amendment distinctly in deference to the opinions of hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House that something more than the publication of all regulations was necessary, and that there should be some clause in the Bill putting Courts on a more statutory footing than they had occupied heretofore. He doubted whether they were not making too much of them altogether; but if they were to recognize them to that extent, he thought there was a great deal to be said for the proposal to put them in the Bill. As far as he was concerned, it was the same thing to him whether they were statutory, or whether they were governed by regulations laid on the Table. If, however, it was thought there was any mistake about putting them into the Bill, when they came to the Report it would be very easy to strike out the Amendment. As far as he was concerned, he was not pledged one way or the other.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

hoped that the Amendment just made would not be struck out of the Report, but that it would remain a portion of the Bill. On the other hand, if any changes were to be made hereafter, he hoped they would have the fullest opportunity of considering them.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

MAJOR O'BEIRNE

wished to know whether the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would accept his Amendment? He thought it was of vital importance that it should be accepted. He proposed to give any officer or soldier whose conduct was inquired into by a Court of Inquiry the same right of challenge as on a court martial. He might mention as an instance the case of Colonel Carter, who was brought before a Court of Inquiry, and the President was the brother-in-law of the person making the charge, and a personal enemy of Colonel Carter; while the two chief witnesses were two officers of his regiment whom he had had to report for intemperate habits, one of whom died afterwards from delirium tremens. Of course, such an inquiry must be a perfect mockery. There was no provision, either, as to whether or not the officers should be taken from the regiment; and they could well understand what a state things would get into, if no one but men of the same regiment could be obtained to sit on a Court of Inquiry. He would move to add at the end of the clause:— Provided always, That any officer or soldier shall have the same right of challenge on a Court of Inquiry as on a court martial.

Amendment proposed, In page 38, at the end of the Clause, to add the words "Provided always, That any officer or soldier shall hare the same right of challenge on a court of inquiry as on a court martial."—(Major O'Beirne.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there added."

MR. CAVENDISH BENTINCK

remarked, that, unfortunately, the Amendment was not on the Paper, and the observations of the hon. and gallant Gentleman had not reached him very distinctly. He understood his proposition was, that there should be a disqualification attached to persons who might serve on courts martial. [An hon. MEMBER: No, no! a right of challenge in courts martial.] Well, he would call the hon. and gallant Member's attention to the clause which gave Her Majesty power to make rules of procedure. It seemed to him nothing could be more proper or pertinent to the rule of procedure than to make such regulations as that to which he had alluded. It had always been the policy and practice in regard to courts martial that no one who had any interest whatever in the proceedings should sit upon them. It seemed to him that the spirit in which the hon. and gallant Gentleman moved his Amendment was perfectly correct, and quite according to precedent; and he had not the slightest doubt that any rules of procedure which were made would be in such a form as would entirely meet the objection he had raised.

MAJOR O'BEIRNE

apologized for not having his Amendment on the Paper; but as these Rules regarding Courts of Inquiry were only put into the hands of hon. Members that morning, he could not, of course, formulate his Amendment earlier. The more he read these rules the more incomplete they appeared. For instance, he should like to make an Amendment that the charges to be inquired into should be placed in the hands of any officer at least a fortnight before the Court assembled. He understood the right hon. and learned Gentleman to say that his Amendment would be one of the rules of the Court.

MR. CAVENDISH BENTINCK

said, when the whole subject was thrown open, no doubt, this would be considered among other things.

MR. MONK

understood the right hon. and learned Gentleman, on the whole, to accept this proposal; but he thought it would be very much better, if that were the case, that the Amendment should be added to the Bill. As an officer had a right of challenge on a court martial, it was only reasonable that he should have the same on a Court of Inquiry.

MAJOR NOLAN

hoped the Government would either put this into the Bill or agree to put it into the regulations they were about to issue. It was not sufficient to say that the Amendment should be considered. The instance given was a proof of the necessity for the rule, for if the brother-in-law of an accuser was presiding at a court martial the person accused should certainly have a right of challenge. That right was not absolute. It only allowed the accused to object to a particular man, and then the majority would decide whether he was to sit or not.

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON

asked in what shape these rules would come before them for approval, and whether he could propose Amendments in them, and when?

COLONEL STANLEY

replied, that he could only answer the question inferentially. This power of laying rules before Parliament was taken in many Acts; and these rules would, of course, be open to challenge in the same way as any others. He had given an undertaking that these rules should be laid before Parliament, and, as a consequence, the Memorandum circulated that morning was issued; but the others were not yet finished, for he had not, in fact, had time to complete them, and until they were complete they would, of course, adhere to the existing mode of procedure. He had, however, sent them out in this form with the Votes. It was a mere Memorandum of what he hoped to do and what form he thought they should take. With regard to this point of challenge, he was afraid that would be doing what he was always afraid of—namely, making too much of these Courts of Inquiry. They were merely Courts to come to conclusions about facts'; and they ought not to have, and he did not want them to have, any control, directly or indirectly, over opinions. To give a right of challenge would be making them too much like courts martial; and, therefore, he could give no pledge that he could introduce them into the rules. At the same time, he thought it perfectly right and fair that any officer mixed up with the question should not be one of those to decide what the facts were. Whether he would put that in the form of a rule he could not exactly say.

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON

considered this a most unsatisfactory state of things. A large number of Members were of opinion that Courts of Inquiry, as conducted for the last 25 years, ought no longer to exist, or, if left at all, that they ought to be put under proper regulations; but by the statement now made Parliament was to have no control over the regulations whatever. He certainly should support the Amendment that officers should be liable to challenge. If these Courts were to be recognized as Courts, as they were by this Amendment, this Memorandum was of no earthly value to them as Members of Parliament, for they could not alter it; if it was merely laid on the Table they would have no opportunities of altering it. In two points it was very objectionable. It did not provide that the officer or soldier should have a copy, or see the instructions under which the Court was held; and, therefore, he had no means of knowing what the investigation was about, or what steps he should take to meet the implied accusation against him; and, next, it was not provided that the officer or soldier concerned should know the result of the inquiry. That was one thing which officers felt most keenly—that they should be brought into a public Court, subjected to an investigation, and yet should not know the result, and that it should be locked in the cupboards of the officials and never be known. He wished to move Amendments to that clause; but by the course now proposed he would have no opportunity of doing so. He should, therefore, certainly support the Amendment.

MR. BRISTOWE

understood that these words were inserted in fulfilment of a pledge given on a previous occasion; but he by no means understood the right hon. and gallant Gentleman to promise anything more. These Courts were to be governed by rules and regulations made by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, and they were to be laid on the Table, and so be subject to Parliament. They would surely be making a great mistake by introducing into this clause anything in the nature of procedure; and, therefore, he did hope that the hon. and gallant Gentleman would not go to a Division, because the Amendment was clearly directed to a point of procedure, and nothing else.

MAJOR NOLAN

was surprised the hon. and learned Member did not see the extraordinary inconsequence of his remarks. They were told that they were to treat Courts of Inquiry exactly as courts martial had been treated, and that after they had carefully provided for the rules of courts martial; and, therefore, according to his own argument, they ought carefully to provide a right of challenge in Courts of Inquiry. Not only was this the proper place to move this, but it was the only place. His hon. and gallant Friend (Major O'Beirne) had very handsomely offered not to press his Amendment if what he desired was inserted in the regulations; and if the right hon. and gallant Gentleman could not accept that, he certainly should advise his hon. Friend to go to a Division.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

said, he desired to pass the Bill; but the point now raised was a very grave one indeed, going, not only to the principle of the question, but also to the very root of the Amendment which he himself proposed on Clause 43. He had heard with very great astonishment that the pledge given him several weeks ago that the principle of challenge as regarded Courts of Inquiry was not to be allowed. This was a principle which must be admitted; and, therefore, he hoped it would be inserted either in the Regulations or in the body of the Bill. It was a principle for which he always had contended, and certainly always would contend.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

observed, that it would be extremely difficult to give a right of challenge when there might be nobody to challenge, for, if everybody exercised it, it would be impossible. It was also totally impossible that any rules could be introduced into this particular section; and he would, therefore, suggest that the section should be allowed to pass, and that hon. Members who wished to introduce rules should introduce them in the Schedule of the Bill.

MAJOR O'BEIRNE

did not intend to withdraw his Amendment, as the Judge Advocate General (Mr. Cavendish Bentinck) had himself admitted that what he asked was only reasonable. As the Government would give no promise that this right would be included in the Rules, there was nothing for it but to take a Division.

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON

begged to call attention to paragraph 6 of the proposed regulations, which was as follows:— Whenever any inquiry affects the character of an officer or soldier, full opportunity must be afforded such officer or soldier of being present throughout the inquiry, and of making any statement he may wish to make, and of cross-examining any witness whose evidence, in his opinion, affects his character, and of producing any witnesses in defence of his character. It constantly happened that an officer was ordered to appear before a court martial, and these were the cases in which a right to challenge was contemplated. Surely, when a man was ordered to appear, that his conduct or character might be inquired into, it was most necessary that his case should come before officers who had no previous knowledge of the matter. The concession asked ought to be conceded, for if it were not, Courts of Inquiry would be ten times worse than they were before.

MAJOR NOLAN

understood that this clause had been introduced in order to deal with complaints of officers and soldiers. [Colonel STANLEY: Not entirely.] At any rate, the Government had made this alteration in consequence of the discussions and complaints which Courts of Inquiry gave rise to. As to what the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) had said, the right of challenge was not absolute, and only such challenges were allowed as the Courts considered fair.

COLONEL ALEXANDER

observed, that the great defect of these rules was that there was no guarantee, in the event of a Court of Inquiry finding an adverse verdict to an officer, that, before his removal from the Army, he should have a court martial. Such an Amendment as that was very necessary, in order to prevent a person being practically removed from the Army, as the result of a Court of Inquiry; but nothing was said about his right to demand a court martial; in fact, there was nothing in the rules to prevent an officer being summarily removed. Courts of Inquiry should be something similar to a Grand Jury, for the purpose of informing a commanding officer whether a primâ facie case had or had not been made out.

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON

regretted that he was not in the House at the proper time, or he would have moved the Amendment of which he had given Notice.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

thought the point raised was not really a question of procedure; it was a question of the practical rights of an officer, and of his being prevented from being dismissed from Her Majesty's Service.

COLONEL ALEXANDER

understood the procedure was defective.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

replied that he was quite in favour of what an hon. Member proposed, and he did not know whether the manner in which his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leitrim (Major O'Beirne) proposed to carry it out was the best. He could not see, either, what it had to do with this clause, which was merely a clause giving power to make rules of procedure. If this Amendment were to be made, it certainly should be made in a separate clause, declaring that no man, as the result of a Court of Inquiry, should be dismissed from the Service without having the right to demand a court martial. It was not for that House to pitchfork things which did not belong to a clause into it; and he, therefore, thought the Amendment out of place, though he did not all dispute the importance of the point raised.

SIR ARTHUR HAYTER

said, they were now really discussing the clause proposed by the hon. and gallant Member for Sunderland (Sir Henry Havelock), on page 27, "Redress of wrongs." It would be more in Order if they waited till they got to that clause.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

explained, that he proposed to insert that between 10 and 11. He perfectly agreed that in these Rules regulating Courts of Inquiry there should be some recognition of the principle of the right of challenge; and also that Courts of Inquiry should never be used in substitution for courts martial, nor that the accused should be debarred from the right to a court martial for his own justification. He might point out that this did not in the least debar the Prerogative of the Crown, even after a court martial, to dismiss an accused person, if it should think fit, without assigning any reason there for. By his proposal, he granted both the rights of the Crown and of the individual. The point for which he contended was that the principle of the right of challenge should be introduced into the body of these rules as well as into the body of the Bill. It was quite possible that the course suggested, of inserting it in the new clause, might be the best. He would leave it to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman to decide that. He maintained that every officer should have the right of a court martial, for even that would not debar the right of the Crown subsequently to dismiss him if it chose.

COLONEL STANLEY

did not think, in the discussion of the 1st of May, that he ever bound himself absolutely to carry out the suggestion of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Sunderland. He explained his views at the time, and promised, as far as possible, to carry them out. With regard to this question of the right of challenge being inserted in these rules, his answer was that these rules and regulations would be laid on the Table of the House, and Parliament would then have an opportunity of making a Motion upon them, or of making any Amendments it chose. With regard to the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Sunderland (Sir Henry Havelock), of which he had spoken, that seemed to divide itself naturally into two parts. The first part was already practically included in the regulations, while the second part raised a question of vast importance. With regard to that, when they came to the clause, he would ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman to strike out the first part of it; and, with regard to the second, to put it before the Committee, and leave it to their judgment. The Committee had already agreed to a provision which gave the Secretary of State power to frame, from time to time, rules of procedure for Courts of Inquiry, and he had laid upon the Table a Memorandum showing what his views were upon the matter. He had, therefore, given the Committee all the information which he could with respect to it; and he could not help thinking that the progress of the Bill was being delayed by the discussion of the regulations at the present moment. Those regulations could not be introduced into the Bill; but when it became law they would, be laid on the Table of both Houses of Parliament, and ample opportunity would thus be afforded for criticizing them. On the Report it would, of course, be open to any hon. Member to support the words of the clause as they stood, or to move that they be omitted.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

contended that there ought, in the interests of the Service, to be a statutory recognition of Courts of Inquiry.

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON

said, lie did not think the answer which had been given by the Secretary of State for War to the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Sunderland (Sir Henry Havelock) was at all satisfactory. It was all very well to say that it would be open to any hon. Member to criticize the rules when they were laid on the Table of the House; but a private Member would find it impossible to obtain a day for the discussion of any Amendment which he might move proposing their rejection. The present was, he contended, the proper occasion to discuss the rules. The Bill, as he had repeatedly said, contained some very severe provisions, and would take away from the soldier various little privileges which he had hitherto enjoyed. It would not be right, therefore, he thought, to deprive them of a protection which they now had under the Articles of War which dealt with Courts of Inquiry.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, the Government ought to give the Committee some more distinct information than they had as yet done as to whether they meant to deal with Courts of Inquiry in the Bill or not. If they intended to do so, they ought to say so at once; if they did not, then they had allowed three hours to be wasted, simply because they had not thought proper to let the Committee know what was their policy in the matter. A fatal mistake had, in his opinion, been made by the Government in introducing into the clause the words "Courts of Inquiry." If those Courts were to be made the subject of legislation in the Bill, then it would be necessary to provide as complete a machinery for them as for courts martial. He, for one, must protest against the way in which the question was being dealt with by the Government; and he would point out to them that if now, at the eleventh hour, they were determined to legislate for Courts of Inquiry, it would be impossible to go on with the Bill. He thought the Government had accepted the principle that those Courts should be dealt with by regulation; but now there was an Amendment, in which the words "Courts of Inquiry" appeared for the first time, and everybody was asking what they were; but to that question no answer had been given. It was to introduce absolute confusion into the Bill, he maintained, to make those Courts the subject of statutory enactment. He hoped, at all events, that in the interest of the progress of the Bill the Government would, without further delay, frankly tell the Committee what they really proposed to do in the matter.

MR. ASSHETON CROSS

said, there could be no doubt that there was no intention on the part of those who framed the Bill to legislate by Statute for Courts of Inquiry. The hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Sir Henry Havelock), however, wanted to have the rules relating to them placed in the Schedule of the Bill; but that was a proposition which he did not think the Committee would act wisely in adopting, and his right hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for War had never given it his sanction. When the rules were laid on the Table of the House there would be ample opportunity for discussing them, and making a Motion, if that should be deemed expedient, for their modification or rejection; but if they were embodied in the Bill, the result would be something like a deadlock, from time to time, in dealing with matters which ought to be the subject of a more elastic mode of treatment. He quite concurred with the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) that it would be very undesirable to constitute Courts of Inquiry by the Bill.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

said, that the observations of the right hon. Gentleman who just sat down, and of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Oxford, had come somewhat too late, for, as a matter of fact, the Secretary of State for War had introduced into the Bill words which gave a statutory recognition to Courts of Inquiry; and he should like to ask the hon. and learned Member for Oxford, in the interests of the Army, on what principle it was that he was so anxious that Courts of Inquiry should be ignored in the Bill?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS

said, the Committee were now, he thought, in a position to decide the question whether Courts of Inquiry should be dealt with in the Bill or not. That question was raised by the Amendment which proposed that soldiers should have the same right of challenge in regard to those courts as was given them in the case of a court martial.

COLONEL ALEXANDER

said, there was no recognition either in the Mutiny Act or the Articles of War of Courts of Inquiry, except for the redress of wrongs. They were mentioned for the first time in the Queen's Regulations in 1868.

MAJOR NOLAN

pointed out that it was provided by the Articles of War that if any non-commissioned officer or soldier felt that he had been wronged in any matter affecting his pay or clothing, he might ask to have the grievance of which he complained submitted to the consideration of a regimental Court of Inquiry.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, the Articles of War had not the force of a Statute. They were something done by the Queen, as it were, outside the law. The real point was whether Courts of Inquiry had been recognized by the Mutiny Act, and his contention was that they had never yet been recognized by any Statute. He would advise the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War not to allow himself to be led into the supposition that he was under a pledge to anyone to introduce Courts of Inquiry into the Bill. Although the Committee could not alter what had been done already, they ought not, in his opinion, to go further in the same direction by adopting the Amendment now under discussion, containing, as it did, the words "Courts of Inquiry."

Question put.

The Committee divided:—Ayes 50; Noes 165: Majority 115.—(Div. List, No. 162.)

MR. PARNELL

said, some words ought, in his opinion, to be added at the end of the clause, similar to those which, as the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department was aware, were to be found in the Factory Act, providing that the rules which, under the operation of the clause, would have to be laid before Parliament, should be on the Table for 40 days, so that they might be subject to Parliamentary revision. There was, of course, no necessity for inserting those words on that occasion; but their insertion might be moved on the Report.

MR. ASSHETON CROSS

said, it was expected that the present Bill would come into operation in the very next week, and that it might be impossible to allow the rules framed in connection with it to lie on the Table for 40 days, inasmuch as Parliament might not sit for so long a period. The point to which the hon. Member had called the attention of the Committee was one which could be discussed on the Report.

MR. PARNELL

said, he did not mean to contend that the rules should not come into operation until they had been on the Table of the House for 40 days. Those rules, as the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department must be aware, would come into operation from the time they were made by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. In the same way, the rules connected with the Factory Act and the Prisons Act came into operation as soon as they were issued. But what ho desired was that Parliament should have the right to annul the rules made by the Secretary of State for War under the present Bill if it should think fit to do so, and in the event of their being annulled by Parliament they should cease to be valid.

COLONEL ARBUTHNOT

said, that all the rules and regulations in connection with the Army were embodied in a Royal Warrant, and circulated throughout the Army. An answer which the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had given to a Question which he (Colonel Arbuthnot) had put to him would, perhaps, be the most convincing proof which the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell) could have that it was quite open to the House to bring about a change of the rules in question immediately after they appeared. The answer to which he alluded referred to a regulation, with regard to which he had thought it his duty to make a Motion in that House, on which occasion the Se- cretary of State for War gave way; so that it was quite clear it was in the power of hon. Members to bring about an alteration in any rules which might be made.

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON

asked for an explanation of the words in the clause—"All rules made in pursuance of this section shall be judicially noticed." By the present Mutiny Act it was provided that the Rules and Regulations made by the Sovereign should be taken notice of judicially in all Courts whatever, and that copies of them, printed by the Queen's printer, should, as soon as might be, be sent by the Secretary of State to the Judges of Her Majesty's Superior Courts in London, Dublin, and Edinburgh. No provision was, however, made in the clause under discussion for sending the rules framed under it to the Judges; and he should like, therefore, to know how those learned persons were to have judicial cognizance of them, and with what object the words of the Mutiny Act were omitted from the clause?

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER)

said, that all Courts of Justice were supposed cognizants of an Act of Parliament, and that rules framed under the operation of the Act would have the force of an Act of Parliament.

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON

said, that the Committee upstairs were of opinion that they ought not to have the same authority as an Act of Parliament.

Clause, as amended, agreed, to.

Clause 72 (Appointment and power of provost marshal) struck out.

Clause 87 (Delivery of soldier on discharge with his wife or child at workhouse, or of dangerous lunatic at asylum).

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

moved the omission, in page 47, line 36, of the words "or otherwise." The clause, he said, gave power to a Secretary of State to cause a soldier on his discharge, on account of lunacy, or otherwise, to be sent to the parish in which his attestation paper showed that he had been born, and the words "or otherwise" seemed to him to be so vague that it was not desirable they should be retained in the clause.

Amendment agreed to.

MR. PARNELL

said, he wished, in the absence of his hon. Friend the Member for Mayo (Mr. O'Connor Power), to move an Amendment which stood on the Paper in his name. He himself had given Notice of an Amendment on the clause which stood lower down on the Paper, and which related to a different point. The Amendment of his hon. Friend the Member for Mayo had for its object to provide that a lunatic soldier, when discharged from the Army, should be sent to a lunatic asylum, instead of being made a burden upon the rates. The Committee were, perhaps, aware a very considerable change had been proposed by the Select Committee which sat upstairs to consider the whole question of poor removal with respect to the Law of Settlement. He was informed by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Limerick (Mr. O'Shaughnessy) that that Committee had, practically, agreed to a Report in which they recommended that the Law of Settlement should be abolished, and that any person who happened to become a pauper in any locality, no matter what length of time he might have resided there, should be entitled to relief in the Union of that locality. If their recommendation were not acted upon, so much the worse would it be, in his opinion. But the Government, under the present clause, took power to send a lunatic soldier on his discharge to the parish in which it was stated in his attestation paper that he had been born, and to send his wife or child with him. Now, a very great innovation was sought to be introduced by that provision, because, in accordance with it, a soldier would be sent, not to the place in which he might have acquired a settlement, or might have spent the greater part of his life, but to the place of his birth; and assuming that the attestation paper would correctly state what that place was, still the clause would enable the Government not to carry out the existing law with regard to paupers, but to do something entirely different. He would also observe that the Committee were in ignorance of what the law of he future might be with respect to the removal of paupers; and he thought that, totally irrespective of the general law on the subject, the Government ought to establish lunatic asylums where lunatic soldiers might be taken care of at the expense of the State. Otherwise, a very heavy charge might be imposed on the local rates of a parish which had in no way been benefited by the soldier during the best years of his life. He begged to move, in page 47, line 37, after "discharge," to leave out to "discharged," inclusive, in page 48, line 7, and insert:— To be sent to a military asylum provided for the reception of military lunatics, and the wife or child of any such soldier may be sent to the parish in the United Kingdom in which he appears from his attestation paper to have been attested, and such wife or child, if delivered after reasonable notice in England or Ireland at the workhouse in which persons settled in such parish are received, and in Scotland to the inspector of poor of such parish, shall be received by the master or other proper officer of such workhouse, or such inspector of poor, as the case may be.

THE CHAIRMAN

pointed out that the Amendment, as moved by the hon. Member, was informal, as there was no such word as "discharged" which he proposed to omit in line 7.

MR. PARNELL

said, that in that case he would at the proper time move the Amendment which stood on the Paper in his own name.

COLONEL STANLEY

said, he had an Amendment on the Paper which would, he thought, meet the case, for he had no wish to stereotype under the Bill anything which might be inconsistent with existing statutes on the subject of the settlement of paupers; and he, therefore, proposed that a Secretary of State might, if he thought proper, send a lunatic soldier to the parish or union to which he was removable. With that view he begged to move, in page 47, line 38, after "parish," to leave out to "and," in line 3, page 48, and insert:— Or union to which under the statutes for the time being in force he appears, from the statements made in his attestation paper and other available information, to be removable. He wished to point out, in reference to the proposal which stood on the Paper in the name of the hon. Member for Mayo, that it was open to the objection that it would make a lunatic soldier, even though he happened to have been in the Service only for a single day, chargeable on the military for the whole of his life.

MR. O'SULLIVAN

contended that it was not fair to send a lunatic soldier to a workhouse, where he was sure to be badly treated. There were in workhouses no proper staff to take care of a person so situated, and if he were allowed to mix among the ordinary paupers the probability was that his malady would grow worse. He would suggest, therefore, that a lunatic soldier should on his discharge be sent to the lunatic asylum of the county to which he belonged. His wife or child might be sent to the workhouse.

MR. SCLATER-BOOTH

said, that as the law stood a pauper was liable to be removed to a certain parish or union; but that power was now proposed to be taken to remove a lunatic pauper directly to the asylum attached to the workhouse of that particular parish or union.

MR. O'CONNOR POWER

regretted that, owing to some mistake, the Amendment which stood on the Paper in his name could not be put from the Chair; but if he rightly understood what had fallen from the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, he was prepared to concede the principle for which he (Mr. O'Connor Power) was contending, which was that a lunatic soldier on his discharge from the Army should not be sent to a workhouse, either of the parish in which he was born or in which he had been attested, but that, as a married man, he should be regarded as the ward of the State. It had been suggested by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War that it was, technically, scarcely open to a private Member to move an Amendment which would involve an increase of the Military Estimates; but that was a very good reason why the right hon. and gallant Gentleman should take the matter into his own hands. The proposal of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman was certainly an improvement on the clause as it stood; but the point raised by his (Mr. O'Connor Power's) Amendment was whether it was not the proper course to pursue to send a lunatic soldier to a military asylum after he had become broken down in the service of his country, instead of sending him to the parish workhouse for relief, or to the local lunatic asylum connected with it.

MR. SULLIVAN

shared with the hon. Member for Mayo the strongest objection to put upon soldiers of the Army the degradation of pauperism because they might be visited with lunacy. He should certainly impress upon the Committee that it was most desirable that this additional stigma should not be placed on men serving in the ranks of the Army. He could see no reason why mental suffering in the Army should be treated in a degrading manner any more than other suffering on the part of soldiers. He hoped his hon. Friend would press his Amendment.

MR. RAMSAY

thought that the proposal of the hon. Member for Mayo was so reasonable as to deserve the attention of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War.

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY

said, there was no degradation to a soldier in sending him to a workhouse, where everyone acquainted with these establishments would know he would be well taken care of. He did not think it would be merciful to send a lunatic soldier to an asylum, perhaps in the middle of England; it would be much better to send him to an asylum in the place lie came from, where he would be near his friends. Cateris parihus, he objected strongly to the creation of new institutions involving vast expense to the country, which would make its appearance in the Estimates. He should be sorry to see the Military Estimates charged with the maintenance of lunatic soldiers who had only served a short time; but in the case where they had served for a long time, and then lost their reason, he certainly thought that the Military Estimates should bear the expense?

MR. BIGGAR

thought that the wife and child should be sent to the place where the wife would be chargeable, supposing she was a widow. If the wife was to be sent to the workhouse at all, the best plan would be to send her to the place where she was married, and where she would probably be amongst friends. If she was sent to the place where her husband was attested, she would probably close her days in the workhouse. He certainly thought that the place where the marriage took place should be chargeable.

MR. P. MARTIN

said, under the provisions of the existing code even Poor Law authorities had no power to remove a native of Ireland, who might become insane in England, back to Ireland. The clause, without some alteration of the kind which was proposed by an Amendment on the Paper in the name of the hon. Member for Meath, would give the Secretary of State a power which at present he did not possess by Statute—namely, to send to Ireland a lunatic soldier whose attestation paper showed him to have been born in Ireland. He submitted that this would be unfair and unjust. If unfitted for service by mental affliction the Military Estimates ought to bear the cost. Reason and analogy were in favour of the adoption by the Committee of that principle. He suggested that the Proviso standing in the name of the hon. Member for Meath should be added to the Amendment of the Secretary of State for War, which, he thought, should then be accepted without further comment.

MR. RYLANDS

thought the words as they stood would cause injustice towards towns where there were depot centres. Without being able to suggest what would exactly meet his view of the matter, he thought it would be only reasonable that some means should be adopted to prevent injustice upon parishes.

MR. PARNELL

said, the Amendment of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman appeared to him to upset the whole of the existing law. If the proviso as to the cost being defrayed by the War Office were added, the soldier would not become a pauper, but would simply remain a lunatic in his regiment; and if even the law with regard to removability were altered, and it was declared that he should be entitled to relief, the soldier would not be a pauper.

MR. SCLATER-BOOTH

said, there were no powers now in existence for the removal of soldiers. The removal would be to the place to which by law for the time being the person might be removed. The attestation paper would give no power of removal.

MR. HIBBERT

thought the word "removable" objectionable, and moved that the word "chargeable" be substituted.

Amendment agreed to.

MR. HIBBERT

pointed out that a soldier in Her Majesty's Service was not a pauper, and could not, therefore, become chargeable unless he was destitute. He moved the addition of the words "if he were destitute" at the end of the Amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

COLONEL STANLEY

moved, in page 47, line 40, after the word "parish," to insert the words "or union." Also, in page 48, line 5, after "parish," to insert "or union."

Amendment agreed to.

MR. PARNELL

said, there was considerable force in the remark of the hon. and learned Member for Limerick (Mr. O'Shaughnessy), that a lunatic soldier should betaken back to his native county, where his friends were, when he would probably be amongst friends; but there was no reason why the revenues of that county should be charged with the expense of his maintenance. It had, in the case of an officer, always been the rule of the Service that if he became insane some allowance should be made to him. Why, then, should not this rule apply in the case of a soldier who became insane in the Service, perhaps from the effect of climate? It would only be fair to take the cost of his maintenance off the rates; and, therefore, he begged to move that words be added at the end of the clause to the effect that the guardians of the poor of the union or parish upon which the cost of maintaining such lunatic, or his wife, or child, devolved should be entitled to receive from the War Office the cost so incurred from time to time for the support of such person or persons.

Amendment proposed, In page 48, at the end of the Clause, to add the words "Provided always, That the guardians of the poor of the union or parish upon which the cost of maintaining such lunatic or his wife or child devolves, shall be entitled to receive from the War Office the cost so incurred from time to time for the support of such person or persons."—(Mr. Parnell)

Question proposed, "That those words be there added."

COLONEL STANLEY

said, the Amendment proposed by the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell) was at first sight entitled to a good deal of consideration; but he was bound to point out that the circumstances of the case were hardly such as some hon. Members appeared to have in their minds. The Government would have no difficulty in agreeing that the Estimates should be charged with the cost of a man who had incurred illness, or suffered from the effects of climate whilst in the service of the State; but he did not think it would be reasonable that this should be the case where insanity had developed itself in a man who had served but a short time in the ranks. With regard to the mass of these cases, however, a very considerable portion of the cost was already paid by Government under their arrangements in connection with local authorities. For these reasons, and inasmuch as the proposition required a good deal of consideration and working out, and would, moreover, create a large charge upon the Military Estimates, although, of course, the latter was not a chief point of objection, he did not feel able to assent to the Amendment proposed by the hon. Member.

MAJOR NOLAN

wished to amend the proposed Amendment of the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell) in a manner that he believed would meet the objection which had been raised by the Secretary of State for War to charging the Estimates with the cost of persons who became insane within the first three years of their service. He, therefore, moved to add to the proposed Amendment the words "provided that the soldier shall have been more than three years in the Service."

MR. BRISTOWE

could not help thinking that the hon. Member for Meath should re-consider his Amendment, which proposed that the wife and children of a lunatic, however short might be the period of his service, should be chargeable on the State. He could understand that when an insane person had been not less than three years in the Service the State should be chargeable; but he could not see upon what principle the wife and children should be so charged.

MR. O'SULLIVAN

said, the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Major Nolan) ought, in his opinion, to be accepted.

SIR PATRICK O'BRIEN

maintained that soldiers who had broken down in the Service, and become lunatics, ought not to be spoken of in the sense of paupers, and thought that the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Galway had removed every objection to the proposal of the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell). The right hon. and gallant Gentleman had objected to the latter Amendment—that we had only three years' service; but how long did he suppose that the system of short service in the Army was likely to last? He (Sir Patrick O'Brien) believed that everyone connected with the Army had discovered that, from a military point of view, short service was a failure. They ought not at least to regard the soldier as a pauper, and if his lunacy were induced by service in hot climates, the House, he thought, should not place his cost upon the rates of a particular district, but upon the Consolidated Fund.

MR. RAMSAY

said, the authorities had ample opportunities of examining a person before enlistment in order to ascertain the exact state of his health; and he understood that if there was any indication to the medical man who made the examination that the recruit was likely to become shortly insane he would not be accepted by the authorities. Now, if that were correct, he could not see upon what ground they were called upon to have a lunatic soldier chargeable upon the rates. No one could say in what way the insanity of an individual was produced; and, therefore, if it were equitable, as he felt it to be, that the State should maintain a soldier who became insane during his period of service it should be quite irrespective of the time during which he had served. If, as the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had stated, a portion of the cost of pauper lunatics was now borne by the State, it was an additional reason why the Amendment of the hon. Member for Meath should be accepted, because it would not make the burden so heavy as was at first supposed. He could not, however, agree to that part of the Amendment relating to the wife and child of a lunatic soldier. It would be inequitable to charge their maintenance upon the State; and, therefore, he thought the words relating to them should be struck out if the Amendment were accepted.

MR. PARNELL

pointed out to the hon. Member for the Falkirk Burghs (Mr. Ramsay) that there was very much more reason why the wife and child should be supported at the expense of the State than there was for the soldier himself being so supported. The wife of a soldier who had been permitted to marry would be on the strength of the regiment. It was well known that soldiers were only permitted to marry when on long service, or for some particular and special reason, and that the wives of such soldiers accompanying the regiment were on the strength of the regiment. Take the case of the wife of a soldier born in a different place from that in which her husband had a settlement; if the words of his Amendment relating to the wife and child were struck out it.would come to this—that where a soldier who became lunatic had married with the leave of the colonel, because the wife's services would be useful about the regiment, his wife and child would be sent back to the place where the soldier was chargeable, and become chargeable on the rates there although she had had nothing to do with the place. It was true that the cost would not add much to the rates; but he wondered that the Government did not agree to its being borne by the State.

MR. CALLAN

hoped that the Amendment would be agreed to. It was intended to meet such a case as had occurred within his own knowledge, and in the borough which he represented. He referred to the ease of a man stationed in one of the towns of Lancashire, who became insane, and was sent in custody of three soldiers to Dundalk; he was left at the workhouse there without any order from the parochial authorities. He (Mr. Callan), happening to be at the workhouse on the day following the man's arrival, recommended that the War Office should be communicated with, and, after the lapse of months, information was received that the man was entitled to the sum of £ 5 as deferred pay. It was also found that the man, although the son of an Irish soldier, had been born in England, and had never been in Ireland. According to law, the people of Dundalk had no remedy, and the ratepayers had been obliged to support the man ever since he was sent there. He trusted that the proposal of the hon. Member for Meath, which would provide a remedy in such cases, would be agreed to by the Committee.

Amendment proposed to proposed Amendment, by adding the words, "Provided that the soldier shall have been more than three years in the service."

Amendment agreed to

Question put.

The Committee divided:—Ayes 64; Noes 193: Majority 129.—(Div. List, No. 163.)

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 128 (Provision in case of insane persons).

COLONEL STANLEY

moved, in page 68, line 28, to leave out "insane," and insert:— By reason of insanity unfit to to take his trial, the Court shall find specially that fact, and such person shall he kept in custody in the prescribed manner until the directions of Her Majesty thereon are known, or until any earlier time at which such person is fit to take his trial. Where on the trial by court martial of a person charged with an offence it appears that such person committed the offence but that he was insane at the time of commission thereof.

Amendment agreed to.

COLONEL STANLEY

moved, in page 68,line 31, after "and," to insert the words "in either of the above cases."

Amendment agreed to.

MR. PARNELL

moved, in page 68, line 41, to leave out the word "may," and insert the word "shall."

Amendment negatived.

MR. PARNELL

said, that when prisoners became insane in prison it was evident that their imprisonment had been too much for their minds. It was a horrible thing that a man, who was certified to be again of sound mind, should be sent back to prison to become again insane. A man's mind must be more or less permanently affected by the fact of his having been insane. He, therefore, moved to leave out in page 69, line 5, all the words after "imprisonment" to the end of the clause. He would like to know whether the provisions of this section would apply to convict establishments, or only to prisons? It was his impression that it referred only to prisons.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

MR. ASSHETON CROSS

said, that he could not give an answer then, but would look into the matter.

COLONEL STANLEY

moved, in page 69, line 7, to leave out all the words after the word "prison."

Amendment agreed to.

COLONEL STANLEY

moved, in page 40, to leave out the postponed Clause 72, in order to insert the following clause:—

(Provost marshal.)

For the prompt repression of all irregularities and crimes which may he committed abroad, provost marshals, with assistants, may from time to time be appointed by the general order of the general officer commanding a body of forces. A provost marshal or his assistants may at any time arrest and detain for trial persons subject to military law committing offences, and may also carry into execution any punishments to be inflicted in pursuance of a court martial, but shall not inflict any punishment of his or their own authority. A provost marshal, attached to any forces on active service, or any of his assistants, may make a complaint to any officer in immediate command of any detachment or portion of such body of forces, against any person subject to military law who has committed any offence; and if in the opinion of such officer, it is not practicable, having due regard to the public service, that such offence should be tried by an ordinary court martial, it shall be lawful for him (although not authorised to convene a general court martial) to convene a field general court martial, and such court may try summarily the person so charged, and award punishment for his offence, and the sentence of the court shall be valid, and may be carried into effect if a sentence of capital punishment, when confirmed by the general or field officer commanding the force of which such detachment or portion forms part, and if not capital when confirmed by any general or field officer in such force.

He wished to explain, with regard to this clause, that, attention having been called to the very large powers given to the provost marshal, the Government had considered the whole subject very carefully. They proposed, therefore, to substitute for the original Clause 72 the new clause, which he now moved. It would be observed that the clause gave full power, first of all, to a general commanding a body of forces to appoint provost marshals, and the provost marshals were then given power to arrest and detain persons subject to military law. The clause did not give the provost marshal power of his own discretion to exercise punishment; he was only made an executive officer acting under authority. With regard to the punishments provided by the Act, the provost marshal, while upon active service, had the power to appeal to a court to be called, summarily, and to that court was given the power to inflict the punishments which now could be inflicted by the sole power of the provost marshal. The remainder of the clause would ex- plain itself, and lie hoped that the Committee would allow it to be passed in the form in which it now stood.

SRI CHARLES W. DILKE

said, that in the absence of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Stockport (Mr. Hopwood) he would propose the Amendments which stood in his name. He, therefore, moved, in line 1 of the proposed new clause, to leave out "all irregularities," in order to insert "offences."

Amendment agreed to.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

said, that he had now to propose, in line 2, after the word "abroad," to insert "on active service."

COLONEL STANLEY

said, that this alteration went further than he thought was right. The provost marshal was, practically, a sort of police officer, whose duty it was to superintend the police of the camp. It would be very undesirable that the powers of the provost marshal should be limited to active service; although, as would be seen, it was only while on active service that they could bring persons before a summary court martial.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

remarked, that he was of the same opinion as the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. Without the aid of the provost marshal, there would be no proper means of bringing a prisoner to justice.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

thought that, while not on active service, the military police would have been quite sufficient.

Amendment negatived.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

said, he did not intend to move the next Amendment which stood in the name of his hon. and learned Friend. He would, however, move the following Amendment, which was in line 7:—After the word "punishments," to insert "authorized by this Act." He did not know that the words were absolutely necessary; but he thought they made the matter somewhat clearer.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

thought that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War ought to tell the Committee why he would not agree to this Amendment.

COLONEL STANLEY

observed, that punishment not authorized by the Act could not be inflicted.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

said, that the next Amendment he proposed to move was in line 7, to leave out "in pursuance," in order to insert "by sentence." It was not good English to say that a provost marshal was to carry into execution "any punishments to be inflicted in pursuance of a court martial."

COLONEL STANLEY

said, that the reason the words were used was to clear up any ambiguity which would arise from saying that punishments were to be inflicted by sentence of court martial. Those words would have left it doubtful as to the confirmation of the sentence; but no doubt remained by using the expression "in pursuance of."

Amendment negatived.

COLONEL ARBUTHNOT

moved, in line 8 of the proposed new clause, after the word "authority," to insert "on, any soldier." The object of this Amendment was to make not the soldiers, but the camp followers, subject to the jurisdiction of the provost marshal. He was quite sure that anyone who had served either in India, or in any campaign in which soldiers from India had been engaged, would bear him out in the statement that it would be absolutely impossible to try every camp follower by field general court martial who happened to commit any offence. He did not know how military operations could be conducted if this were to go on. He had no wish to press hardly upon camp followers; and he would be perfectly satisfied if an undertaking were given that some order should be introduced into the regulations by which two officers should be appointed to attend the provost marshal in camp at a certain hour, and share with him the responsibility of inflicting punishment upon the camp followers. If either a regimental court martial or a field general court martial had to be summoned to try camp followers, the whole time of officers would be occupied in trying persons who were not in the Army. He felt very strongly against permitting any abuse of power by a provost marshal; but he thought there could be no objection to the proposal he had made. By camp followers he did not mean soldiers; but those who were employed as servants to the troops.

SIR HENRY JAMES

said, that by the 167th clause of the Bill camp followers had been for the first time made subject to military law. What the hon. and gallant Member now proposed to do was not only to subject those persons to military law, but, at the same time, to allow the provost marshal and his assistants to inflict upon them any punishments they chose. If the hon. and gallant Member had thought there was any difficulty in trying such persons, he should have objected to their being made subject to military law.

COLONEL MURE

wished to point out that the Bill contained no definition of a camp follower. Many men who followed a camp could not be placed under the provisions of this Act.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

said, that his hon. and gallant Friend seemed to think that there would be some difficulty in determining what camp followers were, and that persons might be placed under military law improperly. He hoped that that would not be so. He thought that they had already determined what civilians should be subject to military law. It was proposed by the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Colonel Arbuthnot) that soldiers should be tried in one way and civilians in another. He did not think that civilians ought to be left entirely at the mercy of the provost marshal.

GENERAL SHUTE

hoped that his hon. and gallant Friend would withdraw his Amendment. He recognized the difficulty which he proposed to meet, which was one that any officer who had served in India could well understand. But he did not think that it was advisable to put such large powers in the hands of the provost marshal.

MAJOR NOLAN

did not think that there would be any difficulty in carrying out the Amendment. He had seen some batteries where the camp followers were beaten by order of the commanding officer, and others where the commanding officer called together three officers to give an opinion on the subject. It would have a much better effect if these punishments were inflicted by order of three officers than if they were directed by one.

COLONEL ARBUTHNOT

would not press his Amendment to a Division, if the opinion of the Committee was against him. He was quite sure that there could be but one opinion outside the House amongst those who had served in India, that it would be impossible to summon a court martial to try every camp follower.

COLONEL MURE

said, that this clause gave a right to place persons following a camp under military law. It did not specify how near the camp persons must get to bring themselves under the Act, or if there was any radius within which they were liable. He might point out that, by the 11th section of the 167th clause, camp followers were defined to be persons who were allowed to be so. It might be provided that persons should be forbidden to come into the camp.

Amendment negatived.

MAJOR NOLAN

said, that he should not move the Amendment of which he had given Notice—namely, to leave out "having due regard to the public service," if the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would explain what the words meant.

COLONEL STANLEY

said, that he was advised to leave the words in the clause, in order to make it clear what circumstances should justify an officer in considering that it was not practicable to summon an ordinary court martial. "Having due regard to the public service "meant that an officer was to consider whether the Public Service would suffer by delay caused by summoning an ordinary court martial. He was not to run the risk which would be caused by delay to the Public Service.

MAJOR NOLAN

said, that if these words were left in the clause there would be eight or ten times as many courts martial than if they were struck out. These summary courts martial would always be held whenever there was the least inconvenience in holding an ordinary court martial; the whole matter depended very much upon what a field general court martial was. He did not suppose that any officer there knew exactly what such a court martial was; that was not surprising, for they had not been in use for 50 years. A field general court martial was utterly opposed to any custom or to any rule which governed an ordinary court martial; it was totally irregular, and conducted in quite a different manner from an ordinary general court martial. It was for that reason that he did not wish the Committee to sanction a field general court martial, if any other court martial could be held. A field general court martial possessed the power of capital punishment, as well as the power of flogging. In his opinion, its sentences ought never to be put in execution until approved of by the Commander-in-chief of the whole Army, because it was so totally irregular and informal. Formerly, a field general court martial was restricted to trying offences committed against the inhabitants of the country; it was held on the spot by any three officers, and was presided over by the officer who convened it. Such a court could be convened by any officer, if he could get the attendance of two other officers of any rank—perhaps subalterns—and it had power to sentence any man to death. The old rule was that no sentence should be carried into effect until the General commanding-in-chief had sanctioned it, so extra-judicial and summary was the court. He believed that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would propose two Amendments, which would considerably mitigate it. But the court was so irregular that it ought not to be held when it was possible to hold an ordinary general court martial. He was strongly of opinion that a field general court martial should only be held in very extraordinary cases. By leaving out the words "having due regard to the public service," they would prevent the court being used when it was possible to hold an ordinary general court martial.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

asked the Government to consider favourably the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Major Nolan). In Clause 49, a field general court martial was empowered to try offences against the property and person of any inhabitant or resident in any country beyond the seas. An entirely new jurisdiction was now given to this court, and the court of the provost marshal was practically drawn upon the lines of a field general court martial defined in Clause 49. A field general court martial was to be held, under Clause 49, whenever, in the opinion of the officer commanding a detachment, it was not practicable that an offence should be tried by an ordinary general court martial. There were no words in that clause as to having due regard to the public service. He thought that it should be expressly provided that a field general court martial was not to be resorted to, except it was not practicable to convene a general court martial. If these words, "having due regard to the public service," were not necessary in Clause 49, they were not necessary in that clause.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

said, that they might have many cases of petty offences committed by camp followers which it was necessary to deal with summarily. They had taken away the power of the provost marshal to deal with these cases himself, and had substituted a field general court martial. It seemed to him that if these words were struck out it would be necessary, if not absolutely impracticable, to bring together a general court martial of seven officers, in order to try these petty offences. The acceptance of the Amendment would make it necessary that a regular court martial should be summoned whenever practicable, although at the greatest inconvenience to the Public Service.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Sir HARDINGE GIFFARD)

said, that the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Galway would bring this clause into harmony with Clause 49. As had been pointed out by the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt), it would be extremely inconvenient to have the words" having due regard regard to the public service" in the one clause, and not in the other. For those reasons, he was disposed to agree with the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member.

Amendment agreed to.

MAJOR NOLAN

said, that he had to move, in line 18 of the clause, to insert, after "confirmed by," "the general or field officer commanding the force, and if not capital, when confirmed by." His suggestion was that sentences should be confirmed by a general officer; but if a general officer were not near, then by a field officer, in all cases of punishments not capital—such as flogging. He preferred to put the responsibility upon the general officer when he was near, and upon the field officer when a general officer could not be reached. He did not object to a field officer having the power to confirm a sentence when a general was absent; but he thought that when both were present then the general should have the responsibility.

COLONEL STANLEY

pointed out that there was a great difficulty in defining the exact circumstances under which this was to apply.

MAJOR NOLAN

said, he would not press his Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

MAJOR NOLAN

said, he had put down two separate Amendments to follow on here, but the first was no longer applicable; and as to the second, if he was informed that there was any means by which the records of courts martial should be kept, that would be sufficient. He did not think, however, it was provided in any other part of the Bill; and, therefore, he wished to move this Amendment. His great objection to the provost marshal was mainly based on the fact that no record was kept of his proceedings. Therefore, in order to see what the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would say, he would move to add, at the end of the clause:— And records of such field general courts martial shall be kept as provided in this Act for garrison courts martial.

COLONEL STANLEY

said, he would agree to the Amendment if the hon. and gallant Gentleman would leave out the word "garrison," and insert instead the word "district." There were now no garrison courts martial.

MAJOR NOLAN

accepted the Amendment, and moved to add the following words:— And records of field general courts martial shall be kept for the said time provided in this Act for district courts martial.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

thought the Amendment might be very inconvenient, as for mere petty offences they would be obliged to keep the same exact record of everything connected with the trial as though they were district courts martial.

COLONEL STANLEY

explained, that it was only the records which would be kept.

Amendment agreed to.

On Question, "That the Clause, as amended, be added to the Bill?"

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

heartily supported the new clause which had been substituted for Clause 72, and which was entirely in accordance with his own views. He entirely approved of the substitution of very summary courts martial for the provost marshal; but he was a little apprehensive lest in taking away the powers of the courts martial they should never provide for the case of a summary detachment acting apart from the Regular Army. Offences against the inhabitants of the country were most likely to arise; in such cases where three officers would not be available for the court martial, or a field officer be ready to confirm it. It was with that view that he ventured to submit this addition to the clause:— If three officers cannot be assembled for such trial the field court martial convened for a summary trial under this section may consist of two officers, or, if there be only one officer with a detachment of troops, that officer may alone exercise the powers of a field court martial as above. If there be no provost marshal with a detachment of troops on active service the officer in command may order any person to be tried in the same way as if complaint had been made by a provost marshal. If there be no field officer present with the detachment the officer in immediate command may confirm the sentence, subject to revision at any time by the general officer in command. The practical effect would be to give one or two officers in the field the powers summarily exercised by a police magistrate in regard to petty offences. He had expressly exempted the punishments of death and long terms of imprisonment, which were to be subject to the revision of the officer in command.

MAJOR NOLAN

thought the Amendment scarcely applicable to the case of civilized warfare, for there they could not imagine a case where they would not be able to get one officer; while, in the case of need, the proper remedy would be to give Native officers the power to sit on a court martial. Besides, what was the use of the provision? It did not contain sentence of death, and in cases of sentence of imprisonment, what was the good if a man must remain a prisoner until his sentence was confirmed? If it had been a case of flogging he could have understood it.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

pointed out that another objection was that the proposal was inconsistent with Clause 49, which was intended to deal with the cases of offences against the persons of inhabitants of the country. This clause proposed to deal in a totally different manner with an offence which was already dealt with under that clause.

MR. ELLIOT

objected to the powers given in the last three lines by which the officer in immediate command of a detachment might confirm a sentence. Such a power as that seemed to him to be absurd.

COLONEL STANLEY

said, the same objection had occurred to him; but, apart from that, he did not believe that they would be able to carry this clause practically into effect. He hoped the Committee would accept the clause as it stood.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

would not press his Amendment if the right hon. and gallant Gentleman could not accept it; but still it seemed to him impossible that this clause and Clause 49 could stand together. Clause 72 was a general clause applying to all offences; and, consequently, any offence being a military offence would be tried by court martial, confirmed by any field officer, and carried into immediate execution, whereas the special provisions made in Clause 49 gave a far less summary process.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

MR. SULLIVAN

wished cordially and most heartily to congratulate the Secretary of State for War, and the Committee, on the reformation accomplished by this clause. In the years to come the serious change of getting rid of the provost marshal would be one of the reasons which would justify the conduct of Members of that House who had made such efforts to amend the Bill.

Question put, and agreed to.

COLONEL STANLEY

moved, in page 103, after Clause 177, to insert the following Clause:—

Power of Her Majesty to make Articles of War.)

It shall be lawful for Her Majesty to make articles of war for the better government of officers and soldiers, and such articles shall be judicially taken notice of by all judges and in all courts whatsoever: Provided, That no person shall, by such articles of war, be subject to suffer any punishment extending to life or limb, or to be kept in penal servitude, except for crimes which are by this Act expressly made liable to such punishment as aforesaid, or be subject, with reference to any crimes made punishable by this Act, to be punished in any manner which does not accord with the provisions of this Act.

Clause brought up, and read the first time.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

asked whether it was necessary to insert this clause? It certainly was put in a very moderate form, and greatly modified as compared with the clause originally introduced; but, for his part, he could not see any necessity for it at all. The hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) said it was a great point gained, when the Articles of War were put into the Bill; and, therefore, he could not understand why those powers should be preserved.

SIR. WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, one of the earliest points considered by the Committee, and one on which they certainly came very early to a conclusion, was, that this matter could not be corrected unless the Articles of War were consolidated with the Act. His Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief assented to that general proposition. He pointed out that there might be some difficulty in cases, if there were no power whatever of issuing an Article of War to meet some unforeseen case or sudden emergency. No harm could come of this proposal, because, if any Article of War were ever issued which did not meet the approval of Parliament, it could be dealt with every year when the Mutiny Act was under consideration. The old law gave the Crown unlimited powers to make Articles of War of any kind, dealing with any offence, and giving any punishments. Then that power was limited, so as not to be inconsistent with the Mutiny Bill, but it only applied throughout the British Islands; while, in this Bill, that rule was to apply everywhere. He could not conceive a greater concession than that. As the clause stood, they had dealt with almost every question which could be dealt with in an Article of War, and no Article could be issued inconsistent with this Bill, nor any Act nor Article of War be issued dealing with a matter with which the present Articles of War dealt, because they were incorporated with the Bill. Therefore, these could only be issued for some unforeseen contingency or some necessity in the Army which required immediate remedy. Even then, if Parliament did not approve of the Article, there would be an opportunity, every year, of taking its opinion upon it.

MR. E. JENKINS

was of opinion that the hon. and learned Gentleman had fallen into a slight error, for the clause did not say that no Article of War should be made which was inconsistent with the Act. It simply said that no punishment should be given in a manner which did not accord with the provisions of the Act, which was not, of course, quite so wide. Of course, the question simply was, in consideration of the fact that the Articles of War had not been altered for 50 years, that these Articles were now embodied, with many changes, in this Bill, and that they constituted a Military Code, whether the Crown should be left with any power in any way to change the general provisions of this Act? Although this clause had evidently been drawn with some care for the purpose of, as far as possible, avoiding interfering with that Parliamentary supervision which had been assumed during the course of the discussion on this Bill, it was a question whether it would not be better that alterations should be made in the latter part of the clause, so as really to confirm the action of the Crown under such administrative regulations as might be found necessary for the better discipline of the Army. If some such idea as that were worked into the clause he thought it would be desirable.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

said, if the Government were willing to carry out the statement of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Oxford, they might do it in a much simpler manner than that suggested, by adding, after the word "soldiers," "not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." It would then still be within the power of Her Majesty to make such new clauses as might be found necessary, provided they did not conflict with the present Act. He thought that was a change of some considerable importance; because, without that limitation, it would be possible to entirely alter the constitution of courts martial, which had been settled, after considerable discussion, by that House.

MAJOR NOLAN

observed, that the remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) made him think that some great concession was to be contained in the new Act; whereas the old Act comprehended all this, with the only difference that it extended to Great Britain and Ireland only. Practically, however, they had exactly the same thing in Gibraltar and Malta. This was evidently the same as Clause 1 of the old Act, and was, indeed, word for word the same. He always understood the great advantage of this Bill was that there would be no Articles of War for the future, and that was always pointed to as a great concession; yet now they found that the Articles of War were to be enacted exactly as before, with the exception, which he did not consider of any practical value, that the Bill was to run everywhere, instead of being confined to Great Britain and Ireland.

MR. PARNELL

moved, in line 2 of the new clause, after the word "soldiers," to insert the words "not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." He hoped the Government would accede to the alteration.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Sir HARDINGE GIFFARD)

replied, that it would be impossible to make such a change consistently with the Act. He would, therefore, prefer to keep the clause in the same shape as that in which it had been read a second time.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

inquired why it would be impossible for the Crown to make Articles of War if some of the provisions were inserted in the Bill?

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Sir HARDINGE GIFFARD)

said, that the Crown made Articles of War by the exercise of its Prerogative. The Prerogative could not be used if the subject-matter were dealt with by Statute.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

asked why the Government had then inserted the Proviso that no person should be subject to suffer any punishment under the Articles of War except for crimes made punishable by the Act?

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, that that arose from the form of the old Mutiny Act. A power unlimited, in the first instance, was given by the old Mutiny Bill; it was afterwards limited to the United Kingdom. The exercise of the power of the provost marshal depended upon that limitation. That clause would be illegal in England, because it created crimes and punishments not consistent with the Mutiny Bill. The Proviso with reference to the United Kingdom had always been understood by lawyers as preventing the Crown from, making the Articles of War inconsistent with the Mutiny Bill so far as the United Kingdom was concerned. If they struck out the words "United Kingdom" it would prevent Articles of War inconsistent with the Mutiny Bill being framed for use outside the United Kingdom. All legal opinions had been founded upon the doctrine that if legislation were made clearly with reference to a certain matter, then a Proviso, by the fact of that legislation, was extinct. The Mutiny Bill only applied to England originally, and required special legislation to apply it to Ireland. So long as the Act did. not apply, the Prerogative of the Crown was unlimited; but where a Statute was passed it remained as limited by the Statute. Wherever a Statute applied to a subject-matter and limited the Prerogative, then the Prerogative was to that extent extinguished. What he had stated was, he believed, the true state of the law; and, therefore, if a Statute said that a court martial should consist of seven men it could not legally consist of any other number. He thought that they had better stick, so far as they could, to the language of the old Articles of War, and strike out the limitation of the United Kingdom.

Amendment agreed to; Clause inserted accordingly.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

proposed, in line 5 of the proposed new clause, to leave out the words "extending to life or limb, or to be kept in penal servitude." He did not see any reason to limit the Proviso preventing persons from suffering punishment except for crimes expressly made liable by the Act to such punishments to those punishments only which extended to life, or limb, or penal servitude. He did not see why other punishments, such as imprisonment, should be permitted to be inflicted under the Articles of War for crimes which were not expressly made liable to such punishments by the Act.

Amendment proposed, In line 5 of the proposed new Clause, to leave out the words "extending to life or limb, or to be kept in penal servitude."—(Mr. Chamberlain.)

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the proposed new Clause."

COLONEL STANLEY

could not consent to the omission of these words. The expression was placed in the original Bill from the old Act; but, of course, that was no particular argument one way or the other. But the words had been carefully considered, and those who had had large experience were in favour of their retention. Nothing should be done to make the Articles of War inconsistent with the Bill; but he did not think it would be wise to omit these words.

MR. RYLANDS

hoped that the Government would re-consider their decision upon this point. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman had fallen back upon the words being in the old Act; but he did think that at the time these words were used in the Mutiny Act there was an intention to reserve to the Crown a power of deciding upon the punishment of the crimes other than those affecting life or limb, or extending to penal servitude. It was the clear intention of the present Bill to do away with the power of the Crown to impose any punishment except according to the provisions of that Act. The statements of the hon. and learned Member for Oxford, and of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General, clearly proved that there was no intention under the Articles of War to impose any punishment not laid down in the Act. It would be most unfortunate that if, after they had gone through the Bill and formulated the whole Military Law, there should be a clause leaving the Crown the liberty of determining what punishments should be inflicted for crimes not specified in the Act, supposing they did not extend to life or limb. He thought that the Government should accept the Amendment.

MR. SULLIVAN

remarked, that he was not a military man; but he knew sufficient to see how serious a thing it would be if the Crown were to be at liberty to create these new crimes and punishments. He trusted that the better judgment of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, when he had had a few moments to reflect, would induce him to agree to the Amendment. Let them imagine how the clause would read:— Provided, That no person shall, by such articles of war, be subject to suffer any punishment extending to life or limb, or to be kept in penal servitude; but that as to all other punishments the Crown could decide. Either this clause went too far, or it stopped short too soon. He would respectfully urge upon the right hon. and gallant Gentleman that this clause either went too far, or else it did not go far enough.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

trusted that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would agree to strike these words from the clause. By so doing they would bring the power to make Articles of War more entirely in accord with the Act than at present. It was obviously the intention of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman himself to do that.

COLONEL MURE

observed, that if there was a meaning in English, the clause must signify that, except as to punishments extending to life or limb or penal servitude, the Articles of War had power to legislate. The Articles of War were to provide for certain cases not provided for in the Act; but, practically speaking, they had no power to inflict punishments except under the Act.

COLONEL ALEXANDER

did not think it possible that any new crime could be created by the new Articles of War. It seemed to him that every offence that could possibly be committed by man, either on active service or at home, had been put in the Bill. He did not think that in any Articles of War that might be framed within the next 50 years it would be necessary to provide for any new offences.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

asked for what, then, were the Articles of War required? The hon. and learned Member for Oxford had told them that in 1813 the Duke of Wellington proposed that Articles of War should be issued for certain purposes. Many things had been provided for by those Articles which did not exist at the present time, and the present Bill had been made so complete that there was no reason to have any Articles of War.

MR. E. JENKINS

said, that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General had told them that it was necessary to have a power for the Crown to make new Articles of War creating new crimes which did not extend to life, or limb, or penal servitude. They therefore knew what the Government was endeavouring to do.

MR. A. H. BROWN

said, that the Amendment, to be consistent, should be to leave out all the words after "articles of war" in line 4, to "or" in line 7. The clause would then run:— Provided, That no person shall, by such articles of war, be subject with reference to any crimes made punishable by this Act to be punished in any manner which does not accord with the provisions of this Act.

Question put.

The Committee divided:—Ayes 95; Noes 52: Majority 43.—(Div. List, No. 164.)

MR. E. JENKINS

stated, that he did not intend to move the four clauses standing in his name, because, in the first place, a Committee had been appointed to examine into the condition and organization of the Army; and, secondly, because he did not think they could have such a discussion on it as would do justice to the subject at that moment.

Clauses, by leave, withdrawn.

MR. PARNELL

moved, in page 11, after Clause 28, to insert the following clause:—

(Rules of Evidence.)

The rules of evidence to be adopted in proceedings before courts martial shall be the same as those which are followed in civil courts; and no person shall be required to answer any question or to produce any document which he could not be required to answer or produce in similar proceedings before a civil court.

Clause agreed to, and added to the Bill.

MR. E. JENKINS

moved to report Progress. The clauses which he wished to move would come on almost immediately; and the Committee, he thought, had already done sufficient work for the night.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

did not imagine, on the other hand, that it was necessary to move these clauses exactly in their place in the Bill. It would be convenient for them to go on with the other Amendments, and to leave this to come later.

THE CHAIRMAN

I beg to point out to the Committee that the practice of the Committee has always been to take the clauses as they stand on the Paper. The hon. Member just now stated that he had certain clauses which he wished to withdraw; and though they were not immediately in Order, with the consent of the Committee they were allowed to be withdrawn. Still, he will have no right to insist on overriding those clauses which stand before him.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

MR. PARNELL

moved, in page 16, after Clause 40, to insert the following clause:—

(Trial for offence to take place within three months of commission.)

No person subject to military law shall be tried for an offence against the preceding clause after an interval of three months has elapsed from the commission of such, offence.

COLONEL STANLEY

hardly thought the clause would do as it stood. [Mr. PARNELL referred to Clause 40.] He (Colonel Stanley) was afraid the same objection would obtain there. It would be exceptional, of course; but it would not do to lay down a hard-and-fast line.

COLONEL MURE

thought it would be a premium for committing offences under Clause 40.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

said, the hon. and gallant Gentleman could not have read that clause. That clause was to apply to the following offences:— Guilty of any act, conduct, disorder, or neglect, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, though not in the Act otherwise specified. It would puzzle any soldier to be guilty of an offence not otherwise specified in the Act.

MR. PARNELL

said, surely an offence not dealt with somewhere in that Act would not be likely to be found out. In the first place, the offence must be of so indefinite a character that the soldier would have great difficulty in knowing about it. If it was so extraordinary, it could not be so difficult to discover and punish any long time after it was discovered. He thought the Secretary of State for War might give way under the circumstances. It was really too late to argue the matter.

Amendment negatived.

MR. PARNELL

rose to move, after Clause 41, to insert the following clause:—Z

(Trial for certain offences to be before civil court.)

Where practicable every person subject to military law who commits any of the offences mentioned in Schedule of this Bill shall be proceeded against before a civil court of competent jurisdiction, and, on conviction, shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the statute or statutes dealing with such offence.

THE CHAIRMAN

This new clause, I think, cannot be introduced; for Clause 41 having been adopted as it stands, I think it is inadmissible to move this new clause, because it conflicts with Clause 41.

MR. PARNELL

asked a question of the Chairman, sitting with his hat on. ["Order, order!"]

MR. PARNELL

, rising: I was perfectly in Order. The Chairman was standing, and therefore I was quite in Order in addressing him from my seat with my hat on.

COLONEL MURE

May I ask you, Sir, for your direction on that point?

THE CHAIRMAN

The hon. Gentleman is not in Order to address the Chair sitting, with his hat on, except during a Division, or when he speaks on a matter relating simply to the calling of a Division.

MR. PARNELL

said, he would move the Amendment on the Report.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

moved, in page 18, after Clause 43, to insert the following clause:—

(Redress of wrongs.)

Every officer who shall be accused of any military offence under this Act, and whose conduct in that respect shall have been investigated by a court of inquiry, shall be entitled, if he demands it, to receive a copy in writing of the opinion of such court of inquiry, or of the opinion formed by the officer who assembled that court, upon the evidence adduced before it. And if the accused officer challenge such opinion he shall not be liable to be removed from his appointment, or to be placed upon half-pay, without being first afforded the opportunity of refuting the charges made against him, in open trial, before a general court martial: Provided always, That nothing hereinbefore contained shall affect the undoubted prerogative of Her Majesty to remove any officer from the Army, or to place him upon half-pay, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of State for War made upon his official responsibility.

This clause was one of considerable importance; but he did not desire to delay the progress of the Bill, nor to debate the point at any length. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman, in the Paper issued that day, had in substance conceded the first part of his clause; and as to the second part, he should be glad to know whether the right hon. Gentleman could not accept it? It proposed to give an officer the right of appeal against the opinion of any court martial, and that was no greater concession than the concession already made by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman. Indeed, the Secretary of State for the Home Department went so far as to say that no court martial should inquire into offences which could properly be tried by a court martial. His clause embodied that, and nothing more. If the Government would but admit that an accused person should have the right, if he challenged the accusation, of having his case dealt with by court martial, there was nothing more than that in his Amendment.

COLONEL STANLEY

was sorry that he could not assent to the second part. The first was already disposed of by the regulations he had issued that day. The hon. and gallant Gentleman must recollect that in the previous debate he expressly guarded himself against going as far as this, although he agreed that a Court of Inquiry should not take upon itself the functions of a court martial. He did not at all admit the premiss from which the second part of the clause was deduced, that a court martial could in any way affect proceedings against an officer's character; it could only assist a commanding officer to come to a conclusion. He particularly did not want to constitute a Court of Inquiry, and the principle he wished to uphold was, when a commanding officer was the responsible person, he wanted to make the person who acted upon this report distinctly responsible, and that his rules went to that point. Practically, this inquiry would put the officer in the same position he would have occupied if he had been brought before his commanding officer. They knew that confidential reports always followed the inspection of a regiment, giving an account—a very fair account, he believed—of the conduct and character of the officers, for the guidance of their superiors. A very good rule had now been made that, whenever an officer had anything reported against him, he should be made acquainted with it at the time, so that he might have an opportunity to look to it, and see that he behaved better in future. The same thing had been provided with regard to a Court of Inquiry. If they reported facts which, in the opinion of the officer, did not justify a trial by court martial, but yet told against the officer, he was made acquainted with the report, which was to put him in as good a position as he could desire. He could not quite understand how his hon. and gallant Friend was to reckon out the latter part of his Amendment. He gave an officer the statutory right to a court martial; but the officer might have committed no offence, and yet might have been employed in some office or work for which he was manifestly unfit. Surely they were not going to give this officer the right to remain in that office, subject only to dismissal by court martial. He really did not see how the two parts of the last part of the clause could work together, because, undoubtedly, the Prerogative of the Crown was still to be left. He hoped, therefore, the Amendment would not be pressed.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

replied, that the Secretary of State for War had taken up a position which forced him to repeat over and over again arguments which he thought had long since been done with. The discrepancy pointed out, and which appeared, to exist, did not exist in fact; and he had provided for both points exactly as in the Amendment which he moved on the 1st of May. He did not desire in the slightest degree to restrict the Prerogative of the Crown; but, on the other hand, he wished that the officer should have the right which had been given to the private soldier to such an extent that he could not even be mulcted of a day's pay without a court martial, if he chose. What he desired to claim for the individual officer was that when it was alleged that he was guilty of any offence under this Act, he should be allowed the privilege that attached of right to every civilian—and which, he maintained, a man did not lose by joining the Army—of being tried openly by his peers. At present, an allegation might be made against an officer that he had been deficient in some respect, or had committed some military offence, and that was submitted to the investigation of a court martial. He thought they had already come to a conclusion that courts martial should never be substituted for Courts of Inquiry; that they should never be the final inquiry, and that an officer should not be liable to be dismissed, or placed on half-pay, without being able first to prove his innocence before a court martial. His clause really did not interfere with the Prerogative, for it still would be open for Her Majesty, on the advice of Her responsible officers, if she thought fit, even where an officer had been tried and acquitted, to quietly say she dismissed him from the Service. The difference was that, in one case, a man was sent into civil life with a stigma on his name; while, in the other case, he could, at least, point to the decision of a court martial as a proof that, so far as that was concerned, he had been able to rebut the charge against him. The two divisions of this clause did not clash or conflict in the slightest degree. The charge made was that, while the Prerogative of the Crown still remained to dismiss an officer at any time without reason alleged, it did not extend to the dismissal of an officer after, and in consequence of, the decision of a court martial, until he had been first given the opportunity of rebutting the charge against him before a court martial.

Amendment negatived.

House resumed.

Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.