HC Deb 13 August 1879 vol 249 cc910-1
MR. BLAKE

asked Mr. Attorney General, If his attention has been called to a case which occurred last week in the Brompton County Court, in which a defaulting debtor, who is also a Peer of the Realm, refused to obey a Judgment Summons of the Court; and in this, as in a former summons before the Court, pleaded his privilege as a Peer as immunity from arrest, and declined in any way to take cognizance of the proceedings. Whereupon his Honour the Judge is reported to have said that— The fact of this privilege being claimed was so surprising to him that he had a difficulty in considering it possible that it should be advanced in answer to a just claim. He had, however, referred to a case which showed that the objection was well founded, and although he did not believe it was a correct view of the Law, he considered himself bound by the decision of Lord Denman. He hoped that the decision to which he had referred would some day or other be altered by the law of common sense, and regretted that he had no power to help plaintiffs; and, if in the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown, defaulting debtors who are Peers are entitled by Law to such exemption; and, if so, if he has considered the desirability of repealing the exemption?

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER)

Sir, my attention has been called to the case mentioned in the Question, and the facts appear to be correctly represented. I may state that the judgment summons was issued against the noble Defendant to compel payment of an amount of £2 8s. for coal sold to him by the plaintiffs. I do not think it would be becoming in me to pronounce an opinion upon a point of law which has been decided by a competent Court. The learned Judge of the Brompton County Court is a man of great ability and experience, and I think we may presume his decision was right. With reference to the last portion of the hon. Gentleman's Question, I should not myself be disposed to advocate an extension of the power of commitment for the non-payment of debt, or to interfere with the long-established privileges of the Peerage. It is to be regretted that the privilege should have been relied upon in the case in question. The plaintiffs, however, may be consoled by the reflection that as the noble Defendant thought proper, for the purpose of evading the payment of a debt, to envelope himself in the mantle of the privileges of his order, he may be left to resort to the same mantle for the purpose of keeping himself warm. The plaintiffs can refuse again to supply the noble Lord with coals.