ADJOURNED DEBATE. [THIRD NIGHT.]

HC Deb 23 May 1878 vol 240 cc499-614

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [20th May], That, by the Constitution of this Realm, no Forces may be raised or kept by the Crown in time of peace, without the consent of Parliament, within any part of the Dominions of the Crown, excepting only such Forces as may be actually serving within Her Majesty's Indian Possessions."—(The Marquess of Hurtington.) And which Amendment was, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House, being of opinion that the constitutional control of Parliament over the raising and employing of the Military Forces of the Crown is fully secured by the provisions of the Law, and by the undoubted power of this House to grant or refuse Supplies, considers it to be unnecessary and inexpedient to affirm any Resolution tending to weaken the hands of Her Majesty's Government in the present state of Foreign affairs,"—(Sir Michael Hicks-Beach,) —instead thereof.

Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

Debate resumed,

MR. ASSHETON CROSS

Sir, I am not going to be led by the observations of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), who addressed the House at the close of the debate on Tuesday night, into any discussion as to the policy of Her Majesty's Government in the management of these Eastern Forces. That, as I understand, is a question which hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite have not thought it right at the present moment to bring before the House. I am quite content that the Government should rest, as it does, on the approval of the vast majority of the House of Commons and of a still larger majority of the country; and when the time comes for the discussion of the policy of the Government, I, in common with my Colleagues, shall be ready to defend it whenever it may be attacked. But the right hon. Gentleman made a considerable number of observations on that policy. He alluded to the 35,000 troops added to the Forces of the Crown by calling out the Reserves, and remarked that at that time we had followed the proper and Constitutional practice of sending a Message to each House of Parliament; and he went into an elaborate calculation as to how much English and Indian troops were respectively worth, coming to the conclusion that the 7,000 Indian troops were worth only 3,500 of English, and asking if we could act Constitutionally with regard to the 35,000, why did we not act in the same Constitutional manner in reference to the 3,500? I should have thought that he might have thought of this argument—namely, that from the manner in which the Government acted with regard to the larger Force, in which respect their conduct was wholly in accordance with the Act of Parliament, it might be presumed that they would not willingly act contrary to what they believed to be the law with regard to a smaller Force. The right hon. Gentleman then went on to say that there was very much dispute in regard to the employing of these Indian Forces at all in concert with European Forces. That really was discussing a question which I have not the slightest intention to discuss. He went into the matter with considerable detail, and quoted to us the evidence of a great number of persons who were examined before a Committee; and all that, to my mind, shows this—the great inconvenience, to say the least of it, of having a Resolution put before us of such a character as the noble Lord has placed before the House; because that being, as he himself stated, a matter connected with the Constitutional and legal bearings of the question, it has formed a peg upon which hon. Gentlemen have hung a series of accusations against the Government, and if we answered them at length, the debate would be interminable. One of the accusations of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract, which he enforced as strongly as he could, had reference to the secrecy which the Government observed in regard to these Indian troops. I am quite ready to meet that accusation. It was a question on which we might have been challenged, and were not challenged. It forms no part of the subject-matter which was offered to the consideration of the House. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies gave an answer which undoubtedly had great weight with the Government—namely, that this was a step the Government did not want to take unless they thought they were absolutely driven to do so; and when we came to our decision we found that there were local difficulties with the winds and waves that made it absolutely essential that it should be carried out by a certain time; and, as there was still a doubt whether some practical difficulties could be got over or not, it would, as my right hon. Friend said, have been the height of folly if we had told the world what we were going to do, and then found out that there were local reasons why it could not be done. There are reasons why, even at the present moment, we cannot be entirely explicit, for the right hon. Gentleman must know that this must be a time the most inopportune to go at any great length into what has taken place in the deliberations, not of England alone, but of Europe, at the time in question. I may say, on behalf of the Government, that the most absolute secrecy was essential, for negotiations of the highest importance were going on, and at that time of good promise; and, on the other hand, we had received certain information from a high authority which has since, happily, turned out untrue. No one was more glad of that than myself; but there were rumours, which came from such an authority that we were bound to pay respect to them; and it would have been the height of rashness and folly if we had induced Parliament, at that moment, to enter into excited debates on the subject. To my mind, the secrecy which the Government observed at that time was absolutely necessary for carrying on the affairs of the Empire. I am aware that we are responsible for that; but I believe that we would have betrayed our trust, and been unfaithful to our high duties, if we had not kept that secrecy. All this leads me to one further observation as to the Motion of the noble Lord. He says—and I am bound to admit that in his speech he kept as far as possible to what he said at the outset—that he was going to treat this matter simply in its Constitutional and legal bearing. That may be so; but the noble Lord must remember that the House is not a mere debating society, and it is not a question whether we ought to discuss a dry and abstract point of law, which might be discussed in the Courts of Law; but it is absolutely certain, in discussing a Motion of this kind, though you do not want to attack the general policy of the Government, this House, being filled with men of practical business-like habits, and men of common sense, must see that the Resolution of the noble Lord has no object whatever unless it is to be considered in regard to the acts of the Government; and that it is the acts of the Government that must be considered by the House if it is necessary to take up the time of the House at all with the discussion. And when we came later on in the debate we found that that certainly was so, for the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), though he praised the noble Lord for not discussing our policy, made a speech of which the whole tenour was not the discussion of a Constitutional abstract question, but an indictment of the gravest possible character against the acts of the Government. [Cheers.] I am glad to hear that cheer; this is exactly what I say—if you mean to discuss the acts of the Government, and to pass a Vote of Censure upon them, why do you not do it, instead of introducing this Resolution as a means of discussing them in a byway, without calling upon the House to form an opinion practically as to the Government's acts. When I come to consider the terms of the Resolution, I must remind hon. Members, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich in particular, not simply that there is a Resolution, but that there is an Amendment also; and I recommend the House to take into consideration, not only the terms of the Resolution, but the terms of the Amendment. I quite admit that, supposing the Government had chosen, in spite of all statutes and all practice, in a time of profound peace, to take the whole Indian Army to garrison all the places in Europe with Indian troops, in order to set free English soldiers for service elsewhere, and had deliberately concealed that from Parliament till it was necessary to come to Parliament for Supplies, and had then made a request for those Supplies without rhyme or reason, then the Government would have been guilty of a gross breach of the Constitution. That is the imaginary state of facts on which hon. Gentlemen argue. They magnify the acts of the Government, and then think it high time to pass their Resolution. But that is not the real state of the case. In the first place, what we did was not done in a time of profound peace; on the contrary, what we did was done in a time of profound danger; and the Government never raised one single man or Native troop whom they were not authorized to raise by the consent of Parliament. There is no question of raising troops without the consent of Parliament; not a single man has been used who has not been enlisted with the absolute free will and consent of Parliament and the country. But what, then, has the Government done? They have advised Her Majesty, in the exercise of Her undoubted Prerogative, to move a portion of Her troops from one portion of Her Dominions to another. Have they done this with the deliberate intention of concealing it from Parliament? Why, the very first day Parliament re-assembled the Chancellor of the Exchequer came down and said that he was going to present to Parliament the Estimates which would practically provide funds for these troops; and the day on which the Estimates were to be considered was actually fixed before Notice was given of the Motion of the noble Lord. What we did was done not in a time of profound peace, but in a time of imminent danger; indeed, so serious did even Parliament itself consider the situation, that it had some time before sanctioned a Vote of Credit, and by that Vote practically sanctioned the calling out of the Reserves. At all events, it was the opinion of Parliament that a great emergency had arisen; and when hon. Gentlemen proceeded to a discussion of the actions of the Government, they should not leave those facts out of consideration. With reference to the movement of these Indian troops, we had no intention or design of concealment. The moment they were moved—the moment when the secrecy which, in our opinion, was then essential was no longer necessary—and I am bound to say that, from military considerations, it was not intended that the movement of the troops should be known so soon—that moment, if Parliament had been sitting, the House would have been informed that the Government would come down and ask the necessary Supplies. Now, these are the acts of the Government, and I do not believe they have been guilty of any dereliction of duty, or that they can be justly charged with having broken any Act of Parliament. Having done what they have done with, I think, the full approval of the country, I contend that, looking at the exigencies of the case, they were only performing their duty, and that, in the words of the Amendment, there is no necessity for passing any such Resolution as that of the noble Lord, which he knows must, if carried, tend to embarrass the Government. I do not wish to detain the House long; but I am anxious to place before the country the acts with which we are charged, and to call the attention of the House to the state of things which existed not only in England, but throughout Europe, at the time the Government took the course which they felt bound to adopt. In considering the Resolution and the Amendment I say that, unless the acts of the Government are such as to call upon this House for censure, there is no occasion to pass such a Resolution. I go further, and contend that the noble Lord must make out that there have been acts done by the Government which imperatively call upon, the House to pass a Resolution of this kind, to prevent such action in the future, before he can fairly ask the House to assent to it. In that case, it is not only this House which ought to interfere, but Parliament; and I maintain, therefore, that it is idle and ridiculous to bring forward in the House of Commons a Motion, abstract in its terms, but disputing by a side-wind the action of the Government, and at the same time, in the other branch of the Legislature, to bring forward something totally and distinctly different, as if the matter were one of no importance, and one with which Parliament ought not to deal. With all deference to the noble Lord, I cannot understand why he assented, in common with his advisers, to pursue such a course of conduct. I have alluded to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), and I need hardly say with what great pain, as a Member of the Government, I listened to another speech—I mean that of an hon. Friend of mine, for whom I entertain the highest regard—the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate.) I cannot think my hon. Friend has viewed this matter in its true light, or that he has taken into consideration the state of England and Europe at the time at which the measure to which he objects was adopted. He bases his opposition to the act of the Government, so far as I can make out, on the effect of the clause which was introduced into the Government of India Bill in 1858. Now, my observations on that point I will, with the permission of the House, defer for the present; but I feel assured that if my hon. Friend had before him the true facts of the case, he would not have been so ready to listen to the indignant observations of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone). That right hon. Gentleman has made some serious charges against the Government. He has charged us with illegality in two matters, and when that charge broke down—as I believe it did utterly—he said that we had acted unconstitutionally in two ways. Here, again, comes in the difficulty of dealing with this Resolution. If we have done anything illegal, why not put it down and say distinctly what it is? If we have done anything unconstitutional, why, again, not say clearly what it is, and take the opinion of Parliament on the subject? Instead of doing that, however, the right hon. Gentleman says—"You have done something illegal; you have done something unconstitutional; or, at all events, you have done something uncivil;" but in making charges in such terms as these, he is really putting us in a difficulty under which no Ministers of the Crown ought to be placed. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, however, is of opinion that we infringed the Bill of Rights; but I should gladly leave that part of the subject to those hon. Gentlemen who are learned in expounding the law. I must, at the same time, protest against the charge that we have broken the Bill of Rights in any form or shape. I cannot help thinking, I may add, that the right hon. Gentleman was rather hard on the Attorney General the other night when he denounced, in the strongest terms, not only the law as laid down by my hon. and learned Friend, but the danger from such an exposition of the law to the liberties of the subjects of this realm. The right hon. Gentleman accused my hon. and learned Friend of having stated that the Bill of Rights was not a declaratory Act, and that it made the law. Now, it is no part of my business to contend that the Bill of Rights did not expressly declare the law. The right hon. Gentleman laid great stress on the word "declare," because it was to be found in the statute. There is, however, no magic in that word, and it does not, it seems to me, bear out the right hon. Gentleman's contention. But if there was one part of the Bill of Rights with respect to which more than another he blamed the Attorney General for saying it was not the common law, it was that relating to the raising of Forces by the Crown. The right hon. Gentleman, in the course of his speech, quoted a sentence from Mr. Hallam. Now, no one values more than I do the authority of Mr. Hallam. Any statement of his is entitled to the greatest weight. It is, at the same time, I think, to be regretted that, when such a violent onslaught was made on the Attorney General, we were not favoured with the benefit of Mr. Hallam's opinion on the particular point to which that onslaught was directed, especially as it is to be found not only in the same book, but in the same page—almost the same sentence—from which the right hon. Gentleman quoted. Let us first see what the right hon. Gentleman, with all the eloquence at his command, puts in the mouth of my hon. and learned Friend. This, it must be borne in mind, is not only an attack upon the Attorney General, but an attack upon the Government, and I must protest against the actions of the Government being dealt with through the action of the Attorney General. [Ironical cheers.] Pardon me for a moment. I say that the acts of the Government are one thing, and a sentence which may fall from a Member of the Government quite another thing; but when that sentence, after a long series of manipulations, comes out in a totally different shape from that which it first presented, no one, I think, has more reason to complain than my hon. and learned Friend himself. The Attorney General, seeing his own innocent words through what I may call the magic lantern of the right hon. Gentleman's eloquence, reminds me of a country person coming up to London for the first time who is shown what seems to him to be a glass of pure water, which he afterwards perceives to be filled with all sorts of hideous forms, and in which he can no longer recognize the pure drop of water he first saw. "The Government," said the right hon. Gentleman, "according to the Attorney General, has the power to maintain what Forces it pleases, and to use them as it pleases, and when it pleases and where it pleases, and as long as it pleases, until it is under the necessity of finding money for the services; but as to the time of that necessity it can exercise its own discretion, and there is no limit as to the time at which it is under an obligation to come and take us into its counsel." Well, I hope the action of the Government is not to be read by the light of that version. It only shows how apt people are to be led away by eloquence, when really and truly there is not so very much in it. Well, Sir, what is the opinion on this subject of Mr. Hallam, whom the right hon. Gentleman quoted? Mr. Hallam says— Except in this article of the dispensing Prerogative, we cannot say, on comparing the Bill of Rights with what is proved to be the law by statutes, or generally esteemed to be such on the authority of our best writers, that it took away any legal power of the Crown or enlarged the limits of popular and Parliamentary privilege. The most questionable proposition, though at the same time one of the most important, was that which asserts the illegality of a standing Army in time of peace, unless with consent of Parliament. It seems difficult to perceive in what respect this infringed on any private man's right, or by what clear reason, for no statute could be pretended, the King was debarred from enlisting soldiers by voluntary contract for the defence of his dominions, especially after an express law had declared the sole power over the Militia, without giving any definition of that word, to reside in the Crown. This had never been expressly maintained by Charles II.'s Parliaments, though the general repugnance of the nation to what was certainly an innovation might have provoked a body of men who did not always measure their words to declare its illegality. It was, however, at least unconstitutional, by which, as distinguished from illegal, I mean a novelty of much importance, tending to endanger the established laws. And it is manifest that the King could never inflict penalties by martial law, or generally by any other course, on his troops, nor quarter them on the inhabitants, nor cause them to interfere with the civil authorities; so that even if the proposition so absolutely expressed may be somewhat too wide, it still should be considered as virtually correct. But its distinct assertion in the Bill of Rights put a most essential restraint on the Monarchy, and rendered it in effect for ever impossible to employ any direct force or intimidation against the established laws and liberties of the people."—[Constitutional History, chap. 15.] It will be seen from this, that the one point which the right hon. Gentleman pressed upon my poor Friend the Attorney General, with the greatest possible force and violence of his eloquence, was this which Mr. Hallam says is the only point which was doubtful. I should be curious to hear from the legal Gentlemen who may speak in the course of the evening how far, in their opinion, the ancient common law of England extends. The right hon. Gentleman says the Bill of Rights extend over not only the United Kingdom, but all the Dependencies of the Crown, like the common law. Well, I have every respect for the common law; but I must confess my surprise to hear it asserted that it extends to all the Dependencies of the Crown. I thought it had been decided over and over again that it did not. Blackstone says— There is a difference between these two species of Colonies with respect to the laws by which they are bound, For in conquered or ceded countries that have already laws of their own, those laws remain in force until changed by competent authority, and the common law of England as such has no allowance or authority there."—[Sec. iv.] In Jamaica a statute was passed in which the common law of England was made to be the law of that country, but that statute did not receive the Royal Assent. Where would slavery have existed if the common law of England had been in force in all the Dependencies of the Crown? As to Lord Bathurst's views, I have only to say that the report of them is of the most meagre description, and that hon. Members who discuss this question in future years will have the advantage of studying the law as laid down by another Lord Chancellor—namely, Lord Cairns—whose views I am debarred at the present time from quoting. So much for the Bill of Rights. As I have endeavoured to show the House, we have not infringed it, and until the doctrine which has been laid down on the other side is carried further, we are not liable to any charge of illegality. Now we come to the second charge of illegality, in making which the right hon. Gentleman says he feels more at home in history than in law. I hope to be able to show that, if he was wrong in law, he was still further wrong in history. The account which he gave of the clause in the Act of 1858 would not, I am sure, lead hon. Members to form a just and proper conclusion as to what occurred at the time of its passing; for, curiously enough, on that occasion the doctrine now laid down by the right hon. Gentleman and his Friends was not advanced by any speaker. Now, what was the history of the clause? The Bill, as brought in—not by the Government which passed it, but by a previous Government—contained a provision that Indian troops should not be moved out of Asia. Subsequently, however, that provision disappeared, and the right hon. Gentleman introduced a new clause—this, namely— ''That except for repelling actual invasion, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, Her Majesty's Forces in the East Indies shall not be employed in any Military operation beyond the external frontier of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, without the consent of Parliament to the purposes thereof."—[3 Hansard, cli. 1008.] Then he appealed to the Members of the late Government to say— Whether it was not a most dangerous precedent that it should lie in the discretion of the Executive to make use of what might be called extraneous finance and an extraneous Army for the purposes of making war, the expense of which was hereafter to be borne by the British people?"—[Ibid. 1011.] Well, as the right hon. Gentleman says very fairly, the clause was objected to by Lord Palmerston and Earl Russell. Earl Russell thought the clause unconstitutional, because it interfered with the movement of troops by Her Majesty. The noble Earl said— Supposing we had a war with some European Power, and that, this war being supported by the House of Commons, it was considered desirable for the Indian Army to attack the possessions of this enemy of the Crown, it appeared to him the clause would prevent the employment of those Forces without the consent of Parliament."—[Ibid.] That is the very point we are now discussing. The clause, however, passed the House of Commons; but the objection taken to it was so serious that, on the second reading in the House of Lords, the Earl of Derby made use of the following words:— It has been objected to this clause that it appears to interfere with the Prerogative of the Crown, inasmuch as it provides that none of Her Majesty's Forces maintained out of the revenues of India shall be taken, except in cases of urgent emergency, beyond the frontiers of that country without the previous consent of Parliament. ….Your Lordships will recollect that, although there is no prerogative of the Crown more indisputable than that of making war or peace, the Constitution has provided an equally indisputable check on the practical exercise of that Prerogative by rendering it necessary for the Crown to come to Parliament for the Supplies necessary to raise and maintain the troops, without which it would be impossible to carry on a war."—[Ibid. 1458–9.] The clause having been withdrawn, he brought it forward in a new form—namely— Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the Revenues of India shall not, without the consent of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of such Possessions by Her Majesty's Forces charged upon such Revenues."—[Ibid. 1696.] There is the exact point of difference, and no one puts it more strongly than Earl Granville himself, for, on the second reading, he says— The clause as it originally stood was as follows:—That, except in cases of great urgency, the Army in India shall not be employed beyond the frontier of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions without the consent of Parliament. Now, that appears to me to be altogether unconstitutional."—[Ibid. 1470.] The whole point at issue under the clause was, whether the Prerogative of the Crown in moving troops was to be interfered with or not, or whether there should simply be a check upon the Prerogative of the Crown in the shape of power to refuse Supplies if it moved the troops improperly? I understood the right hon. Gentleman to say he approved the alteration; but there must be some mistake in the matter, judging from what occurred when the question was previously discussed in Committee in the House of Commons. The Solicitor General suggested an alteration in the clause, so as to make it read—Her Majesty's Forces "maintained out of the Revenues of India" shall not be employed, &c.; but Mr. Wilson urged that, instead of "Her Majesty's Forces in the East Indies shall not be employed," &c., the clause should provide that "the revenues of India shall not be employed for such purpose, except with the consent of Parliament"—an alteration which, he said, would leave the Prerogative of the Crown in respect to the employment of Forces unimpaired. Well, that was the view the House of Lords adopted; but the right hon. Gentleman, who had brought forward the clause, said that, while he had no objection to the alteration proposed by the Solicitor General, he did not think Mr. Wilson's proposal a desirable one.

MR. GLADSTONE

I changed my mind on further consideration.

MR. ASSHETON CROSS

I am very glad to hear the right hon. Gentleman did change his mind.

MR. GLADSTONE

The right hon. Gentleman misunderstands me. My objection to Mr. Wilson's clause was that it would not answer the purpose it had in view. When we came to consider Lord Derby's proposal, on the contrary, I saw that the consent of Parliament—by which I always understood, and now understand, the previous consent of Parliament—would be an efficient check, and that the clause would not be open to the objection, which I admitted, of interfering with the Prerogative of the Crown.

MR. ASSHETON CROSS

Having changed his mind once, the right hon. Gentleman I hope, on looking over these debates, will change it again. As I have said, the point discussed in both Houses in 1858 was, whether or not the power of the Crown to move troops should remain unimpaired, and the argument used against the proposed change was, that in the case of military operations in Java, Egypt, or other places, the consent of Parliament might not be obtained in time. No Minister under the sun would think of using these troops without coming to Parliament as soon as he could; but before he could get the money he was to have the undoubted Prerogative of the Crown at his command for the movement of the troops. Well, I say that that is exactly what we have done. I see that the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Warwickshire shakes his head. I grant you may say that the circumstances which led us to move the troops before coming to Parliament did not constitute an emergency, but that is not the point at issue now. In our opinion it was an emergency. What I want to put to the hon. Member for North Warwickshire is this. We are dealing with the question of legality or illegality. Can the hon. Member say that in no case under that clause could the Crown move the troops without the previous sanction of Parliament?

MR. NEWDEGATE

remarked that he had never said that. Those who were in the House when he spoke would remember that he read the speech delivered by the late Lord Derby in moving the 55th clause. The noble Lord said that an emergency dangerous to Her Majesty's Possessions was distinctly excepted from the operation of the Act.

MR. ASSHETON CROSS

The one point on which we are at issue now is, whether the action of Her Majesty's Government was legal or not. It was for the Government to determine whether an emergency had arisen; but as to the question of legality or illegality, I say that the hon. Member has given up his point at once.

MR. NEWDEGATE

again rose, but

MR. SPEAKER

said: The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department is in possession of the House, and must be allowed to proceed to the end of his address. If at the end of that address the hon. Member wishes to explain, the House, no doubt, will give him an opportunity of doing so.

MR. ASSHETON CROSS

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich went on to refer to two Constitutional questions, one of which is so closely connected with the Office of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that I would rather leave it to be answered by my right hon. Friend. It was said that we incurred a charge in respect of the Indian troops at the very time that we were carrying our financial measures for the year without proposing Ways and Means for meeting that charge. I will leave the Chancellor of the Exchequer to deal with that. But I understood the right hon. Gentleman also to say, that if at that time we could not lay Estimates upon the Table, at all events we need not have preserved secrecy as to our proceedings. He seemed to think that we might have come down to the House of Commons and said—"We want a million of money for something we cannot tell you about." Would not the right hon. Gentleman have declaimed against us in the strongest possible manner, and would he not have been the very first man to take the matter up? The right hon. Gentleman also says we have acted in an unconstitutional manner, because we have, practically, compelled Parliament to meet the expenditure which has been incurred without its sanction and knowledge. He said, in effect—"Parliament must give the Queen the money She has asked for, because, otherwise, the Government of India will come before us in formâ pauperis, and say the expenditure will fall upon this poor country of India." Then the right hon. Gentleman said—"When we were in Office, and had the Crimean War on our hands, we were content with Constitutional action, and we came and asked for a Bill, although it was in time of war." Well, of course they did; if they had not, they could not have had a single soldier in their service without it. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary, and I do not think they can take much credit for that. But when it comes, as it now does, not to a question of law, but a question as to how soon we are to ask Parliament for money to repay the Indian Service, it becomes much more like the cases of 1859 and the Abyssinian Expedition. I really do not want to detain the House at any greater length; but I hope I have shown that the accusations which have been made against the Government are, practically, untrue, and have been raised in the most inconvenient form that they could have been. I have shown, I think, good reasons why the Amendment should be preferred to the form of the Resolution of the noble Lord; and I cannot help thinking that the declamation about the liberties of the country being in danger, about dashing the Constitution against the rocks, and about the people standing up for their rights and liberties, will, when it has been considered, wear a very different complexion to what it was supposed to do on Tuesday night. I say there is no action of the Government that has called for any Resolution of this kind. I say that there has not been one single man raised who was not raised under the distinct authority of the Imperial Parliament. I say that the Queen has moved Her troops, as She has an undoubted right to do, and that, therefore, there has been no infringement of the Bill of Rights. I say, with reference to the second point, that there has been no infringement of the Indian Government Act, and that the Government have come down at once to ask Parliament to vote the money, as we were bound in duty to do. That is the check placed by the Indian Government Act against an ambitious Government or an unconstitutional Sovereign, and we have never violated the spirit of that Act. If it comes to a question as to the day when we should bring forward this matter, we may be asked, although we are not asked by the form of this Resolution, to give an answer on that point. But I am bound to say, as regards this whole matter, you know at the present moment, as well as anyone does, that it is absolutely impossible for the Government to enter fully into discussion of all the negotiations that are going on. If there is one moment in the negotiations when it is desirable to maintain silence on this part of the matter, the present is the moment. You know that no word must fall from my lips that would in the slightest degree provoke anger or jealousy, or tend to disturb the friendly relations which exist between us and other Powers, or that would in any way tend to prejudice that agreement of Europe, which, we hope, will be eventually come to, and by which not only peace, but lasting peace, will be preserved, and the interest and good government of the European peoples secured. I say it is unfair to press us on the point as to what we have done under an emergency. There is quite sufficient to show that there is an emergency, and, I think, the country will say we have done nothing but what that emergency absolutely warrants. I believe the people of this country will throw the accusations made against us by the right hon. Gentleman on those rocks on which he wishes our action against the liberties of the people to be thrown, and I am quite sure the verdict of the country will, in the long run, be in favour of the Government.

MR. NEWDEGATE

said, he had quoted on the last occasion Lord Derby's own speech; but as it seemed that he was liable to some misinterpretation, he would read the 55th clause of the Government of India Act, which was as follows:— Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the revenues of India shall not, without the consent of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of such Possessions. The words which the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary had challenged were not his words, but those of the late Earl of Derby. The object of the clause was to impose certain restrictions on the Prerogative of the Crown.

MR. SPEAKER

said, the hon. Member was passing beyond the limits of an explanation.

MR. HERSCHELL

thought there must still remain on the minds of hon. Members who had attended to this debate considerable doubt as to what was the position which the Government really intended to maintain. Some Members of the Government insisted that all that had been done, or was being done, was strictly in accordance with the laws and Constitution of the Realm; while, with regard to others, it was very difficult to say whether they agreed with that proposition or not. If it was contended that all that had been done had been in accordance with the law and with the Constitution of the Realm, this raised a question of very serious import, and involved principles which to some at least on the Opposition side seemed novel and dangerous. On the other hand, there were Members of the Government who seemed to rely not so much on the contention that what had been done had been strictly within Constitutional limits, as upon the contention that the Government were justified in overstepping those limits by the emergency in which they found themselves. That was a different question, but even as to that, considerations of no mean moment arose; because, suppose the Government were driven from strict Constitutional limits, it was important to consider what was the course they should take, and what was the course the House ought to take, to secure from danger the Constitutional principles violated. One thing was clear, that in discussing this matter these two things must be kept separate. That he intended to do. The House had been distinctly challenged by the Chancellor of the Exchequer upon this question of Constitutional right. The right hon. Gentleman said the fact that troops were being sent to Malta had become public sooner than he anticipated; but that even had the Government known that the intelligence would have been communicated to the public so soon, they would not have considered it necessary, under the circumstances, to communicate it to Parliament. That he (Mr. Herschell) considered was an ostentatious assertion on the part of the right hon. Gentleman of the right of Her Majesty's Government to act in this matter behind the back of Parliament. The Opposition would have abandoned their functions if they did not protest against a proposition which was, in their opinion, opposed to the Constitutional rights and privileges of the people. The acts of to-day became the precedents of to-morrow, and might be used hereafter under different circumstances, and by other persons, for very different purposes. Therefore, it was their duty to see that unconstitutional rights were not claimed by the Government, or, if they were claimed, that they were not acquiesced in in silence. He (Mr. Hersehell) maintained that the proposition in the Resolution of the noble Marquess had not been displaced by the arguments which the House had heard. What was the claim set up? That the Crown had the Prerogative in a time of peace of increasing indefinitely, beyond the number voted by Parliament, the Forces kept in its Dominions, and of keeping up a standing Army in time of peace, without the consent of Parliament, anywhere outside the United Kingdom. The Attorney General laid down that claim with startling clearness. The Home Secretary had said the Government were not to be judged by the words of their Attorney General; but he wished the Home Secretary had told the House how far he agreed with the Attorney General, and how far he disagreed. He listened with the greatest attention possible for the purpose of discovering that, but was wholly unable to do so, though there fell from the right hon. Gentleman at the end of his speech expressions which seemed to state the propositions in terms not very different from those used by the Attorney General. What he (Mr. Herschell) and the other Members of the Opposition maintained was that the principle of the Resolution proposed by the noble Lord the Member for the Radnor Boroughs was established not merely by the Bill of Rights and by the Mutiny Acts, but also by two centuries of Constitutional precedents and practices. The Attorney General had told them that the Bill of Rights did not declare the law, but made it; but surely the framers of that famous Statute must be supposed to have known what they meant by enacting it; and when they asserted that it was a declaration of the Common Law as it existed up to that time, he would prefer their interpretation of it to that of his hon. and learned Friend. As to the argument that it was limited to the Kingdom of England properly so called, he would rather rely on the opinion expressed by Lord Camden and Lord Bathurst than upon the dictum of the present occupant of the Woolsack, however eminent he might be; for there was this difference between them—that Lord Cairns was delivering judgment in his own case, whereas Lord Bathurst was admitting a doctrine which assailed the Government of which he was himself a Member. With respect to the argument of his hon. and learned Friend, that owing to the urgent character of the emergency in which the country was placed the present time could not be regarded as a time of peace, he could only say that his hon. and learned Friend was living behind his time, as he would have been an excellent adviser of the Stuart Kings, since there was never a time in the history of the country when the Monarch might not have similarly justified the maintenance of a standing Army without the consent of Parliament. It was an error to think that this question could be decided by the strict language of the Bill of Rights. The operation of many remedial Statutes had been often extended beyond their strict terms by the manner in which they were acted upon. It was important to see how the Bill of Rights was understood by those who framed it, and how that compact between the Crown and the people was carried into effect immediately upon its becoming law. Immediately after it became law two steps were taken for the purpose of carrying it out—one was the passing of the Mutiny Act, and the other the voting of the men to whom that Mutiny Act would apply. The effect of the first was to enable the Sovereign to have a standing Army, for without the Mutiny Act the men, of course, would have been an undisciplined rabble. The effect of the other was to fix the number of men to whom the Mutiny Act was to apply. The Mutiny Act applied not only to troops within the United Kingdom, but to the troops of the Crown, wherever they were, in the Sovereign's Dominions outside the Kingdom. Parliament voted the number of men to be employed outside the Kingdom and the money for their maintenance in the same way that it voted the number of men to be employed in the Kingdom and the money for their maintenance. And since the time when the numbers were inserted in the Mutiny Acts, the number of the Forces which the Crown was enabled to keep as a standing Army was determined in terms not with reference to the wants of the United Kingdom, but of the Empire at large. In fixing the number, Parliament took into consideration the fact that the Crown must keep a large part of its Forces outside the United Kingdom. But what was contended for now? Why, that the Crown might from other sources replace every man outside the United Kingdom and bring the total number judged by Parliament necessary for the protection of the entire Dominions of the Sovereign within the United Kingdom with perfect legality and in accordance with Constitutional law. Did that carry out the compact between the Crown and the people? Was that consistent with the course which had been followed by Parliament for nearly two centuries in voting the men, fixing the numbers, and passing the Mutiny Act? Was it consistent with the course which had been pursued ever since Parliament had established its control over the limits and numbers of the standing Army? Precedents had been relied on upon the other side; but it was easy to have precedents, if one was not particular about the facts. No doubt, in many respects, India was in an exceptional position. Since the Forces of India had become entirely the Forces of the Crown, the Queen had in India a large standing Army under no control of Parliament and under no annual Mutiny Act. But the question was, what could the Crown do with that Army? It was one thing to say that the Crown, by virtue of its Prerogative, had the power to move the Indian troops out of India; it was another thing to say that the Crown could bring them within its other Dominions. No doubt, it was within the Prerogative to move them to Abyssinia, for example; but was it within Constitutional right and principle to bring them into Her Majesty's Dominions outside India, thus extending indefinitely the number of men entitled to serve in those Dominions? The precedents of the Indian troops serving at Singapore and Hong Kong were against hon. Gentlemen opposite, because those troops were voted by Parliament as well as the Supplies for them. From 1865 to 1871, the number of these men was every year voted by Parliament, and the voting of the men by Parliament was the authority—and the only authority—given for some years after the Bill of Rights for keeping them within, as well as without, the Kingdom. The Attorney General had put cases in which he said it would be idle to wait for the consent of Parliament. He quite agreed with his hon. and learned Friend. But, because there might be cases when it was desirable to overstep the limits of the law, it did not follow the law was not as stated; and yet that was the argument of his hon. and learned Friend. It was said that this was a case of emergency; and that, in cases of emergency, it was absolutely necessary sometimes to step outside the law. If the Government put it on that ground, many on that (the Opposition) side of the House would feel the greatest satisfaction. If the Government would abandon the unconstitutional doctrines which some of them, at least, had put forward; if they would not seek to convert this step into a precedent which might have dangerous consequences; he and many who agreed with him would be extremely glad. But, instead of taking that course, they put forward a doctrine the logical consequence of which was that if Parliament refused to pass the Mutiny Act, and thereby destroyed the standing Army in the United Kingdom, the Queen might keep a standing Army of any number anywhere else in Her Dominions—say, for example, in Guernsey. If the Government would put their case on the ground of emergency alone, it would be a very different thing, because it might often be the duty of a Government, in circumstances of emergency, to step outside the strict path of the Constitution. He did not dispute that for a moment, and he believed that nobody on his side disputed it; and if hon. Gentlemen opposite would only abandon their unconstitutional doctrines, there was, he was sure, no desire on the part of those sitting near him to make the difference between the two sides of the House more extensive than it need be. They had been informed that evening that the troops had to be secretly brought because of matters which could not be communicated to the House. But what said the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the eve of their adjournment at Easter, and on the very day before the announcement was made that these troops were to be moved from India? Why, they were assured that there was nothing new, no fresh cause of apprehension; that they might depart to their homes calmly, without delaying their holidays for a day or an hour. There was surely a great discrepancy between those two distinct representations. Assuming that this was a case of emergency, what ought the Government to have done? They ought not to have stepped further beyond the strict limits of Constitutional right than was absolutely necessary; and if they did step beyond those limits, they ought to have returned within them as soon as possible. When the House met again after the Recess, what was there to prevent the Chancellor of the Exchequer from laying at once on the Table a Vote for the men, and saying that, although it was impossible before to communicate to them the fact of the ordering of those troops to Malta, now it was known, he would urge the plea of necessity, that he proposed to ask them to vote 7,000 additional men within the Dominions of Her Majesty, and also to vote the money to pay for them? But was that the course taken, or the tone assumed? Nothing of the kind. They were told, on the contrary, that it was not necessary that any such communication should be made to Parliament at all. That was the way in which Parliament was treated. Surely, it was at least incumbent on the Government to have shown as much deference as was possible in the circumstances to Parliament? It was, therefore, the duty of those on his side—whatever course hon. Gentlemen opposite might think fit to take—to stand up for the rights and privileges of Parliament, and see that they were properly asserted. The right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary had found fault with the particular terms of the Resolution; but he shrewdly suspected that any other terms would have been unsatisfactory to the right hon. Gentleman, except those of unequivocal support and admiration of the Government. He must protest against the doctrine that, whenever they criticized a departure from Constitutional right, they were to be called upon to formulate a Vote of Censure. What was that but virtually telling Gentlemen on his side—"It may be that we cannot refute your argument, but we may, at least, be able to out-vote you?" When a greater emergency than the present existed, and the country was actually at war, the present Prime Minister himself made speeches of a severe and trenchant character against the acts of the Government of the day, without following his criticisms up by a Vote of Censure. The Resolution now before the House had not been put down with the intention of embarrassing the Government. [Laughter.] He knew the belief of Roman Catholics in the infallibility of the Pope was as nothing to the belief of hon. Members opposite in the infallibity of Her Majesty's Government. He should be the last to desire at a time like this to embarrass the Government. ["Oh, oh!"] Well, he did not care whether he was believed or not by those who apparently were unable to conceive that anyone could honestly differ from them. There were many on his side of the House who were fully conscious of the deep responsibility which rested upon Her Majesty's Government, and would not wish to embarrass it in the least. But they were not on that account to abdicate their right to vindicate the principles of the Constitution and the Privileges of Parliament. Even now many of them would be very glad to be saved the necessity of affirming that Constitutional principle by finding it admitted by the other side. They seemed to be charged with faction. A similar charge had been made in the debates of 1775 against Edmund Burke, a man whose name would live in the memories of his countrymen, while few cared or knew anything about the Minister who uttered the charge. Again, they were charged with a want of patriotism. It might be as factious and as mischievous to the country to exaggerate and misrepresent the difference between them, as it was to give utterance to the differences. In supporting the Motion they had no desire to diminish the real Prerogatives of the Crown; but they desired to preserve those checks and limitations which the wisdom of their ancestors had imposed on them as being essential to the just balance of the Constitution and the well-being of the nation. And it was by cherishing those safeguards, not by disregarding them, that they would best maintain not only the liberties of the people, but the security of the Throne.

MR. ROEBUCK

It is, Sir, with great reluctance that I rise to take part in this debate. It appears to me that the debate itself is most inopportune, and that the mode in which it has been conducted, as well as the origin of it, is exceedingly mischievous. Why is the debate inopportune? Let us look at the exact state of the country when this matter was brought before Parliament. I do not wish, Sir, to enter into a sort of discussion which is more fit for a Court in Banco than the House of Commons. I wish to look merely at a political action on the part of the Executive Government; and I ask myself whether that political action is for the benefit of the country, or not. What is the state of things? It is said that we are in a state of profound peace. Does anybody believe that? It may be that to-morrow—aye! to-morrow—it may be made manifest to the people of this country that we are on the brink of war; and in this state of things, when the whole interests of the country are concerned, and when she is standing up for a great principle of European conduct, when she is the Representative of the great light of Europe, our country is to be assailed—how? Not by the Great Powers on the Continent who may be opposed to us, but by her own people. Is it not of the utmost possible importance at this moment that our opponents abroad should know and believe that the people of this country are a united people? But can it be supposed that the Monarch with whose Government we are now negotiating, does not listen to everything that is said in this House, and does not ask himself how the great men on the front Opposition Bench can speak as they do, if they believe that the people of this country are prepared to defend the interests of Europe in the way in which I think they ought to be defended? Does not everybody know that every sentence, every word which is uttered here, goes by telegraph to St. Petersburg; that it is there weighed, not merely by the Monarch of that country, but by his Executive Government, and that the one great thing which animates them throughout, in their opposition to England, is the notion that we are a divided, and therefore a weak people. I would ask the House, and I would ask my country, to weigh in the balance the conduct of the two sides of this House. On the one side we have the Executive Government, and will anybody say that they are not desirous to maintain the true interests of England? Will anybody say that they are not conversant with all the difficulties of the position in which they are placed, and that they have to meet not merely the difficulties abroad, but the difficulties at home? And yet, notwithstanding that, they stand firm in their determination to maintain the interests of Europe against an overruling and a despotic Power. That is the conduct on that side of the House. But what is the conduct on this side? Why, that when the Government are in this difficult position, when the interests of England are at stake, and when every word said here will either strengthen or weaken their power, hon. Members on this side come forward—with what? With a vague, general proposition on some point of technical law, which the House of Lords do not dare to call in question. And for what purpose is that done? The hon. and learned Gentleman who preceded me has said that it has been supposed, and said that it has been done for the purposes of faction. If it is not done for the purpose of faction, for what purpose has it been done? It is said that it has been done for the purpose of maintaining the great principles of the Constitution. What is the real point in debate?—because that is the question. Where is the danger to this country, to the liberties thereof, or to the power of this House? Why, it is reduced to this—On that side of the House, Ministers, looking at the resources in hand, have asked themselves what they could gain in the way of assistance from the great outlying Possession of India, and they have found, as they believe, that in the Army of India they have the means, not merely of strengthening themselves, but rather of terrifying their enemies. The Government, on that side, say that it is the undoubted Prerogative of the Crown to move any portion of the Army of the Sovereign of this country to whatever place the Sovereign may determine, the Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland only excepted. Now comes the point upon which the great question turns. Gentlemen on this side say—"No, the Crown has not that power, without the consent of Parliament." But where is the danger? If the troops are moved, and they are now being moved, what will be the result? They must be paid; they cannot exist a month without pay. Can they be paid without the assistance of Parliament? [Mr. GLADSTONE: Hear, hear!] Aye! hear, hear. I want to know whether this is not the real question at issue? Is not the power of the House what it was before? And if it should turn out that Parliament decides not to pay the troops, I want to know what would be the consequence? Why, the Government opposite would be driven out of power as chaff before the wind—they could not exist there for a moment. They would not only be reduced to the level of us private people, but they would run great risk of being impeached. But is there any danger on either one side or the other? Do Ministers fear impeachment, or that what they have done will be condemned and punished by the people or by the Parliament of this country; or do they think that hon. Members on this side believe that the Government ought to be impeached? It appears to me, Sir, that when a man has risen to power and exercises sway over the minds of a great portion of his countrymen, he ought gravely and strictly to weigh every step of his conduct; and when in a grave crisis like this such a man comes forward and talks the wild talk he does, and renders people almost terrified by his vaticination, does he not believe that he is injuriously affecting the mind of a great portion of the people and strengthening the enemies of his country? You talk about patriotism, and you stand up for the rights of the people and the Privileges of Parliament, and you talk of the danger of being trampled upon by the Crown. I ask for a moment, is there a man of sane mind in this country who believes in any one of these cries? Does he believe that because 7,000 men have been removed from India to Malta without Her Majesty's Government previously telling Parliament what was about to be done—does he believe that the interests or the liberties of the people of this country are in the least danger of being infringed? Does he believe that the power of this House is less to-day than it was the day before the troops were moved? No, Sir, he does not believe it! I will describe what I think ought to have been the conduct of the Opposition at this time. It is the duty of the Opposition to watch the conduct of the Government. When this thing was discovered, they ought, in my opinion, to have come down to the Government and said—"We learn that such and such has occurred, and we believe that you have acted in a way that is contrary to the Constitution of this country, and we want you to explain what you have done." The Government would then have said—"We have acted in a great emergency; we think that secrecy is a matter of great importance. There are great difficulties, and everybody must know those difficulties, in moving those troops; and we do not at the present moment wish to discuss this question, because we believe that it is for the interest of this country that it should not be discussed." What ought, then, to have been done? The Leaders of the Opposition ought to have said—"We give you credit for what you have said; but, mind, we shall call you to account. The time will come when Parliament will step in, and will ask gravely why you have done this; and if you are not able to give us a satisfactory answer, then we shall move a Vote of Censure." That would have been straightforward and honest conduct. But what have you done? Not wishing to call in question the policy of the Government—no, not openly—you bring forward an abstract Resolution, which, if passed, would be a censure upon the Government, and you throw difficulties in their way on all points which prevent them from bringing forward a complete defence of their policy—that complete defence which I hope they will make, but which, if they do not make, they will find me as much opposed to them as any right hon. Gentleman on the front Opposition Bench. When they come to make that defence, they will make it with respect to their policy. They will say—"We thought, and we now think, such-and-such to be the law; but if we have overstepped the law, these are the grounds which induced us to do so." If those grounds are weak and insufficient, punish the Government; but do not interfere with them at the very moment when the interests and vitality of the country are concerned, and at the very monent when there is a crisis in the negotiations which are going on. While we are debating in this House, the Envoy of Russia is possibly laying before the Government the things he has to say on the part of his Sovereign, and negotiations are going on of the most delicate description. Yet in this state of things you come down and embarrass and trouble the Government with a Resolution of this sort. That is not what honest and patriotic men would do. But, Sir, this is not a departure from the rules of conduct adopted by the Opposition in this House. During the whole of the Napoleonic wars there was an Opposition in the House of Commons which did precisely the same thing—they hampered the Government, they abused the General, and until the battle of Salamanca, it was the one grand purpose of the Opposition to decry the Duke of Wellington. That is exactly what they are doing now. It is the same narrow Party spirit which guides their conduct. They feel themselves in the position that they cannot assail the Government directly; they cannot rush into their camp and say—"We will burn your camp over your heads by a Vote of Censure. Nay, we cannot do that, but we can trouble you; we can weaken the influence of your country, we can make England less powerful than she is, and we will do it." Yes, they are doing it to the utmost of their power; What other good—if that can be called a good—could result from, the course of conduct which has been pursued? Does anyone believe that England will suffer from the debate which is now proceeding? I, for one, certainly do not think so; but I can easily imagine what has been passing through the minds of those who support the line of action which has been pursued by the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition in this House. They will have argued with themselves in this wise—"Oh, the Government is weak, and therefore we are delighted; the people of England may suffer, but our Party will gain." These were the only reasons I have heard during the three nights of the debate. There has been no generous conduct or generous feeling on the part of those who have opposed the Government. No one has come forward and said—"Though we think you have done wrong, the country is under your charge and the interests of it are in your guardianship. Therefore, we will not weaken your hands; we will do everything we can to aid and assist to maintain the power and dignity of England, but, mind you, we shall call you to account when the proper day arrives." If this had been done, the Opposition would have deserved the approbation and applause of the country. They might have said—"We have performed the duties of an Opposition; we have not weakened the country, but strengthened the forces of the Constitution. We have made Ministers aware that they have been under great difficulties as regards the Constitution of the Realm, and that there are men here who will never suffer that Constitution to be injured or weakened." If they had done this, they would have deserved and received the approbation of their countrymen; but, not having done it, I say, without hesitation, that they deserve, and will receive, their most severe reprobation.

MR. HALL

said, that there would be no one who had heard the patriotic words of the hon. and learned and venerated Member who had just spoken, but would applaud them from the bottom of his heart, and desire that they should reach the environs of the Empire and be re-echoed by the patriotism of the English people. He trusted that hon. Gentlemen opposite would be satisfied with the exposé by the hon. and learned Member of their conduct. The more moderate opponents of Her Majesty's Government did not, he thought, so much object to what had been done, as to the manner of its doing; and this was the same complaint that hon. Members on the Ministerial side of the House had to make in reference to the Motion of the noble Marquess which was now under consideration. He recognized the great advantage of having a Party in opposition which should, in the exercise of a responsibility second only to that of the Ministers of the Crown, criticize the course which the Government might take on on any particular occasion; but he counted it a great disadvantage that the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons should come down at a critical moment like the present and submit a Resolution calculated to embarrass the action of the Government and thereby to imperil the peace of Europe. It had not been proved that Her Majesty's Government had committed any breach of Constitutional law, and it could not be so proved; because, on grounds of policy, the Government had not explained their reasons for the course which they had taken, and therefore the grounds on which a judgment could be based were not in possession of the House. He remembered an occasion on which a Vote of Censure was passed upon the present Prime Minister when the House was not in possession of the facts on which the Motion was based, and he also remembered that when the facts became known, the House ate its words and revoked the Vote of Censure which had been passed by it. It might be said that the Resolution was meant to lay down a principle of Constitutional law which was to rule the action of the country for all time; but he warned the House against the tremendous responsibility which it would undertake if it consented to accept a vague Resolution drawn and placed upon the Paper, after very brief consideration, under the circumstances to which he had alluded. It was admitted that the Government might act as they had done in a great emergency; but if this Resolution was to become law, it would be quite impossible for the Government to act without the previous concurrence of the House and the country. If, in time of war, it was the duty of the Government to act without the consent of Parliament, how much more was it their duty to act on their own responsibility in time of peace—or rather in time when war was not actually declared—to avert war? How inconsistent was the Opposition. They said, why did not the Government come to the House and ask for a Vote of Credit, as it would have been granted? But they knew what would have happened. The Opposition would have debated that proposal for a long time, and the Government knew it was their bounden duty not to waste more time than was possible in the course which they felt they must pursue. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) had drawn a lurid picture of England's liberties crashing in red ruin around us in consequence of the action of the Government; but the Leader of the Opposition Party, to which the right hon. Gentleman belonged, had not seen it necessary to ask the opinion of Parliament upon the subject. He had simply spoken in the House of Lords upon a Motion referring to a point of Constitutional law, and had not asked his Peers to accept a Motion such as certainly would not be accepted by the House of Commons. His hon. and learned Colleague said the other night that he approved the policy of Her Majesty's Government. He (Mr. Hall) was delighted to read that announcement in the papers, and he could not help asking himself how ancient was that conversion, and what had it to do with the public opinion out-of-doors? [Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: I never said anything of the kind.] His hon. and learned Colleague must, then, settle his account with the reporters of The Times. He certainly was so reported. But if his hon. and learned Colleague did support the policy of Her Majesty's Government, it was a thousand pities that, during some of the crucial divisions which had been taken, he did not go into the Lobby with them, instead of leaving the House, thus setting a bad example to smaller men. Well, the country quite agreed with that opinion as to the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and the real practical question which would be asked by every common-sense Englishman was this—Is the end in view not sufficient to justify the movement of the Indian troops, which is one of the means of attaining that end? It was clear that that movement was on all fours with the grant of £6,000,000 and the calling out of the Reserves, each of which the House approved. It was one of the means by which Great Britain showed her resolve to stand upon Treaty obligations at all costs. The noble Lord opposite might, of course, question the propriety of employing Indian soldiers to settle European difficulties; but he ought not to forget that one of the principal aims of Her Majesty's Government was to safeguard other than merely British interests; that they had interests, perhaps primary interests, in Asia; and that, therefore, it would have been the height of folly to ignore Asiatic soldiers. Our interests were Imperial, and they must be Imperially defended. Did the noble Lord and his Friends mean to say that England was to tie one of her arms behind her back, on the principle divide et impera, in the interests of Russia? Were they to tell Indian soldiers that they were never to be employed except against their own fellow-countrymen? Was it not wiser to tell them they were free to help us to safeguard our interests in India or in Europe? History would so regard the matter. Lord Beaconsfield, notwithstanding all that his enemies could say, had proved himself to be a great statesman, and the loyalty of India was never so firmly riveted as it was on the day when the order went forth that the Native Indian troops of the Queen were not unworthy to stand side by side and shoulder to shoulder with Her European soldiers in defence of Her Empire. If the Government was right in maintaining that the Treaty of San Stefano ought to be subjected to a revision by the European Powers, let that determination be sustained with the resources of the Empire. Firmness at a great national crisis was often the harbinger of peace; discord—and more especially House of Commons' discord—might be the sure forerunner of war. Signs were not wanting that Europe approved the firm attitude of England. The French Press was almost unanimous on the subject, and the public opinion of that enlightened country approved the unflinching attitude of Her Majesty's Government. Owing to that firmness the Russian mission to Austria had signally failed; and now, the eyes of Russia, having searched in vain through Europe for sympathy, were fixed with feverish earnestness on Her Majesty's Opposition. Well, was the old game to be played a little longer, or would the noble Lord and his Friends adopt the advice of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck)? He feared they would not. They would press this wretched Resolution—an act which he regarded as a deliberate attempt to em barras the legitimate action of Her Majesty's Government. He wanted to know what was the compact that existed on the Opposition Benches, under which the noble Lord was to hunt not only with those above, but with those below the Gangway? They talked of a dual Government; but was there one Opposition above the Gangway going to vote for this Resolution, because it did not condemn the foreign policy of Ministers; because it would not pledge the noble Lord and his friends to any opposite course, and another Opposition below the Gangway going to vote for it; because it did condemn that policy, and because it would pledge this House, if adopted, to the tactics of the Birmingham League, he feared it was useless to appeal to the noble Lord or to his Friends. It would, however, be an extraordinary thing if they were able to persuade the English people that it was of no advantage to this country that she should find a latent power which no one had thought of, and which in time of war or under the apprehension of war would be to her of inestimable value, and which in time of peace cost the British taxpayer absolutely nothing. Surely, in the history of Parliamentary Government no Party had ever made so serious and extraordinary a blunder as had the noble Lord and his supporters? What fatal counsellor had the noble Lord taken to his bosom? What clever fellow had devised this expedient, and persuaded the noble Lord that the English people would not see through it. The English people would see through it. They would not be misled by all those legal technicalities. The Resolution of the noble Lord opposite he boldly arraigned at the bar of English common sense—public opinion; first, because it was unpatriotic; and, secondly, because it was ill-timed; and it was unpatriotic, simply, because it was ill-timed. If there were the smallest hope that the Resolution would be withdrawn, they might offer the olive-branch to hon. Gentlemen opposite, and forget the past; but, alas! there was no such hope, and therefore they must condemn it in no measured terms. If the noble Lord had waited until the existing strain was lessened, until the present tension was passed, and then come down to the House of Commons and asked them to carefully consider anything he thought he had discovered in the conduct of Her Majesty's Government which was fatal to that Constitutional discipline which they all desired to see maintained, the House would have given a careful and candid consideration to his Resolution; but to move it now was needlessly, at a most critical moment, to embarrass the action of Her Majesty's Government.

MR. WADDY

As time is of great importance, and we have a serious matter to discuss, I shall not follow the hon. Member for Oxford, who has just sat down, through the somewhat excited irrelevancies in which he indulged; nor will I refer at any length to the observations of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, who, from his years, is possibly entitled to more respectful consideration than he would otherwise have received at our hands. We cannot help rejoicing that the old spirit still exists, even though there be some diminution of the old strength. At the same time, we can only bewail that the charming impartiality with which he formerly dealt with both sides of the House has disappeared, and that the hon. and learned Member reserves his favours entirely for those among whom it is his pleasure to sit. Times change, and, of course, people change also; but it is on record that the hon. and learned Member, in 1857, spoke strongly in reference to the employment of Indian troops in a war in which we were then engaged, describing it as an unconstitutional proceeding. On that occasion he strongly denounced the conduct of the noble Lord then at the head of the Government, and declared that it had been reserved for a Liberal Prime Minister to cast a slur and stigma upon the House of Commons, and he even went to the length of bringing forward a definitive Resolution condemning the conduct of the Ministers. If the hon. and learned Member had been in his place, I should have read extracts from his speech, but in his absence I refrain. The question actually before us is one of the deepest importance—it is one of principle—and does not, as has been suggested, depend on the existence of a supposed emergency, or on mere financial considerations. The question of emergency might afford ground for an attack on the policy of the Government; but this is comparatively unimportant. The matter is far too serious for Party struggles, or a Party division. I care little what may be the result of the debate with regard to numbers. I care not whether a Vote of Censure is passed on the Government or not; but it is an important matter whether a breach has been made in the Constitution. We have pursued precisely the course which the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield says we should have adopted. When we were informed of the novel action of the Government, the question was fairly and frankly asked, whether the number of men allowed by the Mutiny Act has or has not been exceeded? What answer have we obtained? It is admitted that such is the case; but, instead of pleading emergency—a plea which, if made, should, in my opinion, be received with great consideration—the Government replies that the Resolution to call Indian troops to Malta was taken some time ago, and that it was not necessary that such a decision should be communicated to Parliament. Now, that answer lays down a most serious, and as we think, a most unconstitutional and dangerous principle. It propounds an issue which the Opposition were therefore in duty bound to accept. But it should be accepted and fought in no factious spirit. The view taken of the matter by myself, and—as I have reason to know—by many of my Friends near me, is not factious. It is simply this—By some means or other the Government has been misled, and they have stepped over the lines of the Constitution, but no actual and serious mischief has been done, and the breach has not been committed wilfully; if, therefore, the Chancellor of the Exchequer now comes forward and admits that there has been a transgression of the law, relying for his justification on the emergency which some of his Supporters seem doubtfully to plead, we should be ready to do anything to save the Government from annoyance and trouble. But, if this ground be not taken, then we must earnestly contend that the act of the Government is utterly illegal and unconstitutional. They have practically increased the standing Army of the country by 7,000 men without consulting Parliament, and, when called upon to account for it, they answer—not, "There is an exigency," but "the movement of the troops is quite within the Prerogative of the Crown; you have nothing to do with it, except that if you bide your time, you will have the pleasure of paying the bill." No doubt, an Army when raised is under the care and management of the Crown; but the raising of an Army belongs to Parliament, which has always restricted its strength by mentioning either the number of men or the money to be expended—which is practically the same thing—or both. It is said for the Government, that the Crown has two Armies, the Forces of which can be interchanged in any way, although the result might be that you might fill every Colonial garrison with Indian troops, and so liberate the whole domestic Army for any purpose the Crown pleased. As the Indian Army is practically unlimited, there would be no restriction on the augmentation of the domestic Army for purely political purposes. In the view of the Opposition this is not a question of finance, but one of the liberties of the country. It was no question of finance at the time of the Bill of Rights. James II. kept 30,000 men out of his Civil List; he did not ask for a farthing on their account from Parliament; but he had no right to have them at all without the consent of Parliament; that was the complaint made against him; the country would not submit to it; and, practically, the Government is doing the same thing now. It is true that in the list of charges against James, contained in the Preamble of the Bill of Rights, there was a double complaint with respect to these Forces. It was declared that James had done wrong by raising and keeping a standing Army within this Kingdom without the consent of Parliament, and by quartering soldiers against the law. Afterwards, when the Declaration was embodied in the Act, nothing was said about finance or about quartering; but the thing forbidden was the having the men. We do not anticipate any danger now, but we are bound to provide against their future occurrence. The argument against the legality of the movement of these troops is based on several grounds. It has already been stated, repeatedly, that we hold it to be a clear infringement of the Bill of Rights; that it contravenes both in letter and spirit the provisions of the annual Mutiny Acts; and I shall also contend that it is a direct breach of the very Act passed for the regulation of our Indian relations. I do not propose to add anything to the observations which have been made by hon. Members on this side of the House on the subject of the Bill of Rights, for those arguments have not been met by the Supporters of the Government, and they are, practically, unanswered. The only attempt at a defence was that which was made by my hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General, and it is a remarkable proof of the propriety of our contention that, finding it impossible to support his arguments by history, he has ingeniously provided a new history to fit his arguments. The reply of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich has exhausted that part of the subject, and I turn to the consideration of the Mutiny Acts, because I think there are certain views of them which have not been adequately developed, and certain quotations which it will be useful to make. The Supporters of the Government have two modes of avoiding the restriction on the Prerogative which we say is contained in the Mutiny Acts. They rely on the form of words. They are— Whereas the raising or keeping a standing Army within the Kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of Parliament, is against law. The Government points to the words "within the Kingdom," and to the words "in time of peace," and they found an argument on each of those expressions. They say—first, that those Acts refer only to the Kingdom of Great Britain, and not to the Colonies or to troops employed in foreign operations; and, secondly, that the Acts provide only for times when we are at peace with other nations. I contend that both these suggestions are totally unfounded. I shall show, I believe, that the Acts cover all Her Majesty's Dominions at home and abroad, and that they provide not only for "time of peace," in the sense in which those words have hitherto been used in this debate, but for all periods and exigencies of external war. Of course, if any part of our territories should be assailed, the principle would apply—that inter arma legis. But a careful analysis of the Preambles of the Acts, and especially of the earlier ones—to which no reference has hitherto been made in the course of the debate—will show that the "peace'' there mentioned is only peace as opposed to civil or internal war, and, with this exception, they provide for all the contingencies not only of threatened, but of actual conflict. It would occupy the time of the House unduly, if I were to deal with these questions separately, and to read the Acts twice, to support first one contention and then the other; and I will endeavour, as briefly as possible, to show now their bearing on both points. The language of the Mutiny Acts was borrowed, in the first instance, from the Bill of Rights. It was obviously desirable, then, to cleave closely to the precise expressions used in that great Charter, and it was equally important to preserve the same formula in succeeding years. But, to appreciate the meaning of the word "now," we must ask, what did they mean "then?" and it has been admitted by the Lord Chancellor in "another place," and by the Attorney General in this debate, that the word "Kingdom" originally included all the Dominions of the Crown. And, as those Dominions extended geographically, the political meaning of the word extended with them, until 1858. There never have been two Armies—one for our home, and one for our foreign possessions. The one Mutiny Act has been the only authority under which any Army has existed, and it has contemplated the defence of all our territories and the maintaining of our wars in all parts of the world. The Attorney General has argued with great energy, and amongst the cheers of his Friends, that danger of war should be considered tantamount to war, and justifies a breach of the Act. He would not have committed himself to such an argument, if he had referred to the very first Mutiny Act, passed in April, 1689, which, after reciting that it was against law to raise or keep a standing Army in time of peace without the consent of Parliament, says that it was adjudged necessary to maintain Forces "during this time of danger." But the case is far stronger. Not only is "danger" no ground for extending the Prerogative, but even actual war is provided for specifically, showing that both peace and war are supposed to exist together, and that the peace so mentioned is, as I have said, only peace from internal war. For, in the same year—1689—there was a second Mutiny Act passed six months after the first. At that time the danger had become a reality. The war had actually broken out with France, and the words of the Act wore "during this time of war"—and we shall find that this, or a similar form, has been constantly adopted since that time. Another amazing statement was made by the Attorney General—that though, after the Revolution, troops were maintained in Ireland for many years, these were outside the Mutiny Acts, and were never provided for by them. Why, the very first Act sets forth that the Forces it allows are "for the safety of the Kingdom, for the common defence of the Protestant religion, and for the reducing of Ireland." The same form is repeated in the second Act. In 1690, the words are "for the reducing of Ireland, and for the carrying on of the war against France." Similar language is found in the successive Acts, and the same principles have governed Parliament from that time to this. I shall not detain the House by multiplying examples, but will come at once to later times, pausing only for a moment on the year 1814, when, in the very height of our struggle with France—when, if ever, an excuse might have been found for neglecting the law—the Act will be found to prescribe every man that was to be enrolled for the defence of the Kingdom, our Colonies and Dependencies. The next year to which our attention should be specially directed is 1857, the year before India was transferred from the control of the Company to the sole Dominion of the Crown. Up to that time we claimed no jurisdiction over the Native Army, and much of the confusion that has marked the arguments of hon. Members on the other side, arises from their not having distinguished between the Indian Native and the Indian European Armies. The Mutiny Act of that year provided for our entire domestic Army, carefully excluding any of the European regiments that should be in the territorial possessions of the East India Company, but as carefully including all those which were recruiting at home. The state of things, therefore, at that time was this—The European Army in India might be transferred to this country, or elsewhere, for the Service of the Crown; but, if so, it must appear in the enumeration in the Mutiny Act; but the Native Army was not at our disposal for any purposes whatever outside the possessions of the Company. I will show, immediately, that this is still the law; but I will first challenge the other side to accept a simple and conclusive test. We are told that we may move these 7,000 Native soldiers to Malta, because the Imperial Army and the Indian Army are now one, and the Crown has the power to transfer its troops at pleasure, to or from any part of Her Majesty's Dominions. Then, can you bring back to England or Malta, or place on the Imperial Service and Revenue 7,000 European troops, not included in the Mutiny Act, because they come within the excepted troops in India? Most, if not all, of the instances which have been given on behalf of the Government do not touch this question at all, for the simple reason that they are cases in which the troops have been employed within the territorial possessions of the East India Company, and are, therefore, clearly outside the Imperial jurisdiction. The geographical limits of those territories were defined by Charters, and have been repeated and ratified by Acts of Parliament down to the present reign, and include all the territory between the Straits of Magellan and the Cape of Good Hope; so that the Expeditions to China, Abyssinia, and so forth, are quite beside the question. The test to which I invite the Government is simple enough. You are authorized to have within the Dominions of the Crown a certain number of European troops. That authority expressly excludes the European Army of India. Do you maintain that you are entitled to bring over 20,000 Europeans in addition to those allowed by the Mutiny Act? I do not think anyone will be found bold enough to assert that right. Then, if you cannot bring Europeans, by what right can you bring Sepoys? If they are one Army, one argument applies. But the fact is that they are not one. The Native Army is entirely governed by Articles of War made by the Governor General, while the European troops are governed by an annual Mutiny Act and distinct Articles of War; and yet we are bravely told that Indian Native troops and European troops are convertible terms. It remains for us to ascertain what new powers have really been conferred upon Her Majesty in consequence of Her taking the place of the old East India Company. What are the powers which the Governor General and the Company possessed, and to which the Crown has succeeded? The military power of the Company was founded, or, at all events, consolidated, by its most important Charter in 1698, and was recognized and ratified by the East India Mutiny Act, 26 & 27 Geo. II. c. 9. Both the Charter and the Act restricted the use of the Indian Army to the defence of the Settlements, Plantations, and Factories within the limits of the Company, and evidently never contemplated the possibility of the men being called upon to serve elsewhere. An attempt has been made to extract from some words in the Act of 1833 an implied, but not an expressed, justification of the action of the Government. That Statute gives the Governor General certain powers with respect to the troops, "wheresoever they may be serving." But those words must, of course, be interpreted by their meaning at the time they were used. In 1833, they could only be employed by the Governor General within his own jurisdiction. He could not send them to take part in any operations outside that limit. The "wheresoever," therefore, cannot extend the authority of the Governor General, or the duties of his troops, beyond the territories confided to him by Charter and Statute. This, then, was the state of things until 1858, and in that year the Company expired, and the Crown took its place. India became a Colony or Dependency of this country on one of two principles—either its relations with us became the same as those of our other Colonies and Dependencies, or they were modified by its preceding history, Charters, and Statutes. No other terms have ever been sanctioned by Parliament, and without such sanction no others can exist. And on neither of these hypotheses can the present claim of Prerogative be based. There is, however, a very important fact still to be observed. The conditions of our rule were authoritatively settled by the Act of 1858, to which reference has already been made. But the most important section of that Act has not hitherto been cited. We have had a long discussion about Section 55, and the implied arguments to be based upon it; but, after all, it is merely a financial section, and does not directly affect the question of the troops. But the next section is precisely in point. It is as follows:— The military and naval Forces of the East India Company shall be deemed to be the military and naval Forces of Her Majesty, and shall be under the same obligation to serve Her Majesty as they would have been under to serve the said Company, and shall be liable to serve within the same territorial limits only, &c.; and such Forces were to be and continue subject to all Acts of Parliament and laws of the Governor General, and all Articles of War relating to the East India Company. It is true that the 57th section gives certain powers to the Governor General of India in Council; but that does not affect our present argument, for two reasons. In the first place, those powers can only be exercised within his jurisdiction; and, in the second place, no such powers have, in fact, been exercised with regard to the Native Army, though they have with respect to the European troops. So that, apart from all financial considerations, there is a distinct provision that the only condition on which Parliament has sanctioned the authority of the Crown over this large Army is that it should not be used for purposes other than those for which it was designed, and should not become a factor in domestic politics, or a possible danger to our national liberties. Will any man in his senses, in the face of that clause, say that the Government was entitled to take these troops to Malta, Canada, or to any other part of the world? It cannot be said that the Act only applied to the then existing Army, for the clause goes on to say that it should apply to Forces hereafter to be enlisted. Thus, it is clearly shown, that it was never contemplated that these Forces should pass from the jurisdiction of the Governor General. There is, in fact, a definite warning against the step taken by the Government, who have decidedly acted in an illegal and unconstitutional manner. I entreat the Government to admit that they have overstepped the law, and I, for one, if they fall back on the plea of emergency, will not inquire too closely into that plea. It would be wrong on the part of the Opposition to needlessly criticize the action of the Government in a time of emergency and peril; but what I insist on is that, if the occasion appears to them to demand exceptional measures, they should not attempt to defend them on statutory authority, and to set up a dangerous precedent. The Attorney General has said that in the financial check which it can exercise, Parliament has almost complete control over the action of the Crown in these matters; but Parliament will not be satisfied with anything short of complete control. It has been stated that these Indian troops have been moved to Malta for the sake of making an impression, as to the great power which this country possesses, on Russia, or that they may be in readiness in the event of war breaking out. But if we are to commence operations by making a great breach in the Constitution—for such I maintain the act of the Government is—even though we should by that breach bring Russia to her knees and make her our vassal for centuries, such a result would be dearly bought. Whatever may be the consequences of the war, it is the safer course far to be true to our selves and to the great principles of the Constitution.

• "This England never did, nor never shall
• Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror;
• But when it first did help to wound itself.
• Come the three corners of the world in arms,
• And we shall shock them: naught shall make us rue,
• If England to itself do rest but true.'

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON

said, he hoped that, before the debate was brought to a close, some explanation would be given in regard to Clause 56 of the Act, which appeared to limit the services of Her Majesty's troops in India to Indian territory. That was the only point on which he had a doubt in connection with this part of the subject. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck), when he declaimed against anyone venturing to find fault with the Government at a critical time in the history of the country, seemed entirely to forget what occurred in 1854–5, when he himself moved for a Committee to inquire into the conduct of the Ministry of that day in regard to the Crimean War. Bearing in mind that fact, the hon. and learned Gentleman ought, he thought, to have some consideration for those who deemed it to be their duty not to vote blindly for the Government on the present occasion. For his own part, though he had been told that, as holding a position in the Army, he ought not to vote against the Government, yet he felt that it was because he had had the Mutiny Act before him for 40 years that he was somewhat qualified to form an opinion on the question under discussion. He had, he might add, the same doubts as to the legality of the step which had been taken by the Government which had been so well explained by the hon. and learned Member for Barnstaple (Mr. Waddy). He had listened to the debate with great attention, but he was still at a loss to know whether the Government rested their justification of the step they had taken upon its legality, or upon its necessity. He based his view of the matter upon the ground of its illegality and its violation of the provisions of the 55th section of the Act of 1858, where by these troops were to serve only within the territorial limits of India, to which reference had just been made. He had carefully examined the whole of this question, and he believed that when these troops arrived at Malta very considerable difficulty would be found to arise in connection with trials by court martial. It was admitted that those troops were only kept in discipline by the Indian Articles of War, and the Articles in question, framed by the Governor General for Indian territories, did not apply to Malta. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies thought it was necessary to keep the knowledge of the intended movement of these Indian troops secret on military grounds. He (Sir Alexander Gordon) had supposed there might be a diplomatic difficulty, but he could not see how there could be any military difficulty; and it was, he could not help thinking, somewhat alarming to be told, when we might be on the eve of embarking on one of the greatest wars of the century, that the practical difficulties, in a military sense, in the way of transferring 7,000 men from India to Malta were so great that the Government might have had to abandon the whole scheme of employing Indian troops at all.

MR. ASSHETON CROSS

The question was one of time. The occurrence of the monsoon had to be considered.

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON

said, he could not conceive how that difficulty could arise, because the monsoon did not begin in Bombay till the first week in June, and on the South coast of Madras it was a little earlier—about the end of May—and the decision of the Government was come to in April. He was glad, however, to find that it was not the military difficulty which had operated on the minds of the Government. It ought to have been stated, he thought, as a naval difficulty. He came to the House to give an opinion on points upon which he believed he possessed some slight information. He did not come there to walk or crawl in a narrow groove cut out for him by any Party Leader, but to state his views freely and honestly; and he trusted such further explanations would be given on behalf of the Government as would enable him to have the pleasure of going into the same Lobby with the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

MR. J. HOLMS

said, the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield had rebuked that side of the House for embarrassing Her Majesty's Government by the course they had taken on that occasion; but the hon. and learned Gentleman himself, in 1855, brought forward a Motion which in no small degree embarrassed the Government of that day, although he knew perfectly well that our Army was in the face of the enemy, and that the difficulties of the Executive were very great. No doubt, the hon. and learned Member brought forward the Motion from a sense of duty, and when he charged the Opposition with embarrassing the Government, he ought to remember that they, too, were acting from a sense of duty. He admitted that any Government in time of difficulty had a right to expect from the House of Commons not only great consideration, but complete indulgence; but when a Government asked for such indulgence, the House might fairly expect to have been treated with courtesy, frankness, and consideration. There were two points which they had now to consider—first, did Her Majesty's Government, in moving the Native Indian troops, contravene the spirit of the Constitution? and, secondly, how far did they, by with holding information, treat the House with disrespect? If the contention of the Attorney General was correct, that the power which had been exercised by the Government was a proper one under the Mutiny Act and India Act, the inevitable result would be that next year, in discussing the number of men, the House certainly need not be troubled with any Motion for reducing the numbers, for the Government would be able at any time to increase the number to an indefinite extent. Moreover, in that case, it would be necessary to discuss the question of the whole military services of the two countries—not only as to the number, but as to the quality of the men. The movement of the Indian troops was an infringement not only of the Mutiny Act, but of the Indian Government Act of 1858. With regard to the First Class Army Reserve, the Government had also done that which required some explanation. According to the Act of Parliament, no one was to be engaged in the First Class Army Reserve who was over 34 years of age. He had reason to know that men who, when they asked for re-engagement, were told that they could not be re-engaged in the Reserve, because it would be illegal, as they were over 34 years of age, were afterwards sent for and re-engaged.

GENERAL SHUTE rose to Order. The hon. Gentleman was discussing a Question which had nothing to do with the subject before the House.

MR. SPEAKER

said, that as the Question before the House was, that no Forces might be raised or kept by the Crown without the consent of Parliament, he did not think the hon. Gentleman was out of Order.

MR. J. HOLMS

said, the Government had treated the House rather as a voting machine than a Representative Assembly; they sought to rule without Parliamentary control, and did not give the House information of which they were in possession, and which it was absolutely necessary that the House should have. The only explanation which the House had got from the Government was, that it was their humour to do as they had done. Acts of that kind came upon the country with a surprise which was quite unnecessary. No doubt the intention was to alarm Europe; but it was absurd to suppose that five great Powers, who together could bring 4,000,000 men into the field, would be alarmed by our bringing some 7,000 troops from India. The result, however, was greatly to alarm the commercial community. When the Government declared they had nothing to tell the House, telegrams were the same day in the hands of merchants in the City stating that troops were to leave Bombay. The consequence of this want of candour was, that the trade of the country became paralyzed. He, for one, rejoiced at the resolute stand made by the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition, and he believed that the House would give the Motion now before it very considerable support.

GENERAL SHUTE

said, his hon. Friend who had just sat down suggested that an Army of 10,000 English and 20,000 Natives would be sufficient for India. Did the hon. Gentleman know the vast area of our territorial possessions in India, our great extent of frontier, the warlike tribes on our frontiers? Did he know that the aggregate forces maintained by the semi-independent States within our own Empire amounted to upwards of 300,000 men; and, if so, how could he advance such an argument? He was puzzled to think what could be the object of all the laborious special pleading which the House had heard that evening, unless it was to reduce the power of England and to weaken our foreign policy. He had hoped, after the common-sense and most admirable speech of the veteran of the House (Mr. Roebuck), of whom they ought to be proud, followed by the most eloquent and able speech of the hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Hall), they would be able to get away from the quibbles of the law and that most questionable logic. Confining himself to the common-sense point of view, and avoiding legal quibbles, he would speak of the diplomatic and military exigencies of the case. Russia had always less power than desire for aggression. Her great territorial space, and the thinness of her population, rendered her military power less formidable in proportion to her extent than that of other countries; but the Crimean War showed her what was necessary, and her railways had now been constructed with a view to strategical and original, rather than to other purposes. England was in a state somewhat similar to that of Russia, until the great political mind of the Prime Minister had solved the problem. He had shown us that we could concentrate speedily, though not so secretly as was desirable, for military purposes all the power of England—from her Colonies, Dependencies, and great Indian Empire—upon an important strategical point. Mere common sense forbade us to believe that this newly developed power could ever threaten England's Constitution or England's liberty. Hon. Members opposite were animated by a sort of feminine vexation and spite that they were not let into a particular secret before the Recess, and a few had adopted a tone highly disapproved of by the majority of their own Party. One leading Liberal, in his constituency said to him the other day—"General, I am fast becoming a Tory;" and another, who owed a Baronetcy to a Liberal Government, had told him that the conduct of a certain section had made him ashamed of his Party. He should have liked to see the advanced guard of our Indian Army established at Malta before the intention to move them had become known to the House, and, consequently, to Europe; because he believed that that would have greatly increased the power and the influence of this country in favour of peace. Campaigns were so quickly decided now that it was dangerous to draw too marked a line between great danger of war and actual war. In military affairs it was always dangerous to show your hand, and how often had the Opposition endeavoured to force the Government to show their hand? To gain their political ends, some Members opposite would positively rejoice in the diplomatic failure of the Government, and even in a military disaster. ["Order!"]

MR. SPEAKER

said, that the hon. and gallant Member had exceeded the limits of Parliamentary debate in imputing such motives to Members of this House.

GENERAL SHUTE

begged to apologize for having used the language in the heat of debate, and to withdraw it. Still, however, he must say that he believed that there existed a very small section of the Opposition who cared little what happened, provided it might facilitate the passage of those straits [pointing to the floor of the House], and their occupation of this Constantinople [pointing to the Ministerial Bench]. It had been urged, on the one hand, that Indian soldiers would conduce to our defeat if they engaged the Russian troops; and, on the other, that it would be a very dangerous thing if we were to gain a victory by their aid. In the first place, the Indian troops, when well officered by British officers, would be able to hold their own against the Russians; and, in the second place, without those British officers, they would be powerless against ourselves. A full complement of officers, however, they must have—instead of seven there should be 27 a regiment. Why should we not use thees Native soldiers, rather than more of our Reserve men, the loss of whose skilled labour in civil life would inflict damage on the trade of the country? It had been urged that no extra Supplies were needed; but he had strong reason, drawn from personal experience, of the Crimean War, for believing that it was as disgraceful to the country as to humanity to send out troops, either for possible or actual warfare, unless they were well found in the necessaries of life and comfort. He was at the Russian manœuvres at Warsaw a few months before the Crimean War. At Count Orloff's table it was remarked—"Great friends as we are here, we may be even now at war in the East." A General Tanshaw remarked—"No; the House of Commons won't allow the means." Another Russian General said—"No; there can be no war; you are making no preparations." Our supposed for bearance was imposed on, and we drifted into war. Had we then showed a determined front, there would have been no war. Although he hoped and believed in the present crisis war would be avoided, yet he maintained that it was our duty to be prepared for it. The nation whose foreign policy was influenced more by fear of war than love of peace was as much to be despised as the man who, in regard to his moral and religious obligations, acted more from the fear of the Devil than the love of God. Loving peace, permanent peace, as she did, England, by her present preparations, had virtually put herself to forbid war.

MR. SYNAN

condemned the Government for having pursued two distinct policies in regard to this question—one of peace on the floor of Parliament, and one of war outside. It reminded him of the character of Trinculo in the play, with his two voices—the one a backward voice, uttering denunciations and threatening war, in the person of the Prime Minister; and the other the forward voice, promising peace, in the person of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He would not have taken any part in the debate but for the Constitutional question which had been raised, and for its bearing upon the law of Ireland, and he thought that question had been discussed in ignorance of the law and Constitution of Ireland. The noble Lord had told the House that he intended to confine himself to a discussion of the Constitutional question, and to obtain, if possible, such an opinion from the House as would prevent any Government in future from pursuing the course which Her Majesty's Government had followed, and he (Mr. Synan) would follow the same course. And the Home Secretary had that evening repeated the same statement, that he would confine himself to the Constitutional question. Now, in discussing this question of Constitutional law, he did not think that any hon. Member could doubt what was the real position of the case. As early as the time of King Charles I., it was declared that the government of the Army was under the control of the Sovereign, and he thought it was impossible to deny that, subject to the power of the House, Her Majesty's Prerogative was a substantial part of the Constitution, and that She had the supreme command of the Army. That Prerogative had been approved of by Mr. Fox, and by the celebrated Lord Chatham, and it still existed. That Prerogative was subject to two checks—first, the Mutiny Bill under the Bill of Rights, and secondly, the power of the purse in voting the Supplies. Then, had the Government infringed the Bill of Rights? In regard to the Bill of Rights, he would ask what was the meaning of the word "Kingdom?" It was contended that it meant England, but he thought that could not be a sound construction. It must mean something wider. The word "Kingdom" meant the Dominions of Her Majesty where the Common Law existed, for the Bill of Rights was a declaratory Act, and the Mutiny Act was founded on the Bill of Rights, and was co-extensive with it. It had been argued that Ireland was a Dependency of the Crown, like India, to which the Mutiny Act did not extend. That argument was founded upon a complete misapprehension. Ireland was within the Bill of Rights, and included in the Mutiny Act. Until 1780 the English Mutiny Act extended to Ireland, and in 1780 an Irish Mutiny Bill was passed in the Irish Parliament, and the Army there was regulated by the Irish Mutiny Act until 1800. He should submit that the Bill of Rights applied to all part of these Dominions. The question was whether the course which the Government had taken was a violation of the Bill of Rights? and that would depend upon this—whether the standing Army in India had been made subject to the same checks by the Act of 1858 as the Army in this country. If the Indian Army was not under the absolute control of the Crown, the Government had no right to send the men to Malta. He contended that if the Bill of Rights extended to Malta, the removal of the Native Indian troops to that island was illegal, unless it was warranted by the Act of 1858. Was it so warranted? It had been pointed out that evening, that the 56th clause of the Act prohibited the employment of Native Indian troops beyond the boundaries of India. It was true that the Act, in another section, gave the Crown power to remove the troops from India; but it limited the exercise of the power to the case of invasion, or to great and sudden emergency, and such a state of things had not been proved to have arisen. So far as the opinion of Ireland was concerned its sympathies were entirely anti-Russian. The Irish people trusted that the time had now arrived when the aggression of Russia would be controlled by this country, acting in conjunction with the other Powers of Europe. He held that, on the grounds of secrecy and urgency, the Government had made no defence for its conduct, and he must give the Resolution his support.

LORD ROBERT MONTAGU

Sir, I crave the indulgence of the House for five minutes, while I endeavour to indicate the course which I intend to take, and the grounds for taking it—a course which I determined on before coming down to the House this evening, and which has become firmly fixed in my mind by the first part of the Home Secretary's speech—a course which some of my Friends in this House, to whom I have spoken on the subject, also purpose to follow. It is not my intention to dabble in the Constitutional lore, which has already flooded the House to a baneful degree. There are two grounds for that intention. The first is that, although I have studied the legal aspects of the question, the House will not care to hear a layman's conclusions on the subject, after so many able lawyers, on both sides, have spoken their opinions; and the second ground is, that the real question before the House is not to be found buried under the musty lumber and dusty lore of law. The point at issue lies in the question whether there is an emergency or not—whether the step taken was necessary or not. The Chancellor of the Exchequer knows the answer, and will doubtless inform the House, if he can do so consistently with the requirements of the public service and the interests of the country; or, if he feels that it will not be safe to do so now, then, when the present state of affairs has passed away, and the prevailing tension has become relaxed, he can be called upon to make the required disclosure, and be brought to account for the step which the Ministers have advised Her Majesty to take. I desire, Sir, to recall the House to an examination of the two propositions which are before us. I must premise that, by the word Constitution, I mean the laws, the constituted laws of the Kingdom. I know no abstract thing called "a Constitution" apart from the laws, written or unwritten, under which we live. What, then, is the Resolution of the noble Marquess?— By the laws of this Realm, no Forces may be raised or kept by the Crown, in time of peace, without the consent of Parliament, within any part of the Dominions of the Crown; and so forth. My study of the legal question has not led me to such a conclusion. Moreover, it seems from actual facts that the assertion cannot be true. For there are Forces in Canada, which have been raised in the Colony; and at the Cape, in Australia, and in New Zealand. These have not been raised, and are not maintained, with the consent of the Imperial Parliament. Or, if you say that, as they have been raised under the Acts of Parliament which govern those Colonies and permit the maintenance of Colonial troops, then I reply that in India the troops are raised and maintained under the Act of 1858. What, then, can be the meaning in the qualifying words of the Resolution, "excepting only such Forces as may be actually serving within Her Majesty's Indian Possessions?" Sir, I do not think that the Resolution is a true statement of the law, and, therefore, I cannot support it. Look at it, moreover, in this light. It certainly is the law, or it is not. If not, then why endeavour to place it upon our Journals to eke out its ineffective and dishonoured existence? The law is stronger than a Resolution of the House, and a Resolution which is not in accordance with the law must be unavailing out-of-doors. If, on the other hand, it is a true statement of the law, then why place it on the Journals of the House? The law is there, in the Statute Books on the Table, and may be appealed to and enforced without difficulty. The only aim of the noble Marquess must, therefore, be to censure the Government. But, if so, why not censure them openly and boldly, instead of covertly and under a cloud? I shall return to this point again. In the meanwhile, let us turn to the Amendment. Again I shall use the word "legal" for "Constitutional." How does the Amendment run?— ''This House is of opinion that the legal control of Parliament consists in [the exact words are 'is fully secured by'] the provisions of the law. Of course! It needs no angel from Heaven to tell us that. No apostle need preach on earth to make us believe such a doctrine as that. It is a truism which no one can contradict. How does the Amendment continue?—"And by the undoubted power of this House to grant or refuse Supplies." This little phrase contains the whole point of the Amendment, and I shall ask the House to consider it presently. But, let me first ask, why does the Amendment not stop there? Is that not enough? I will tell you why. Because such an Amendment is not the contradictory of the Resolution. Contradictory propositions are such that every person must affirm one of them and deny the other. But, in this case, every person may, with perfect consistency, vote for both Resolution and Amendment; or he may vote against both, and hold some third opinion. In order to withdraw attention from this defect, certain words have been added, which plead with the House not to weaken the hands of the Government. Having devised this acute scheme, what did the Government do? They did not take some Member below the Gangway on the Liberal side to plead with the House in favour of the Government, and say—"Have patience, and they will pay you all." They did not select an independent Member below the Gangway on their own side, but they sent down the youngest Member of the Cabinet, the Secretary of State for the Colonies—at least, I suppose he is the youngest Member; the Secretary of State for War opposite to me will pardon me if I err—they send him down to the House in a white sheet, and with the candle of penance in his hand, to drop on his knees, and clasp his hands in entreaty, and utter this humble and even grovelling plea, ad misericordiam—"This Eastern Question is difficult, very difficult; it taxes our powers to the utmost; it exceeds the grasp of our intellects, and the reach of our abilities. For Heaven's sake be quiet! do not talk and make a noise, or you will bother us and put us out, and we shall make some grievous blunder." That is the unworthy ending, the un-English ending, of the Amendment proposed by the Government. I will not support it. But, it may be said, there is the short phrase about the control of Parliament in granting or refusing Supplies. The Bill of 1858 has been alluded to, and the new clause of the right hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone). That clause was opposed by Lord Palmerston, by Lord John Russell, by Sir George Cornewall Lewis, and by the Liberal Party. But it was supported by Mr. Disraeli, who said— If the power of declaring war and peace were left entirely in the hands of the Sovereign in India, there were not the means of controlling its exercise that existed in this country, and a policy might be pursued extremely injurious to the national interests. Then, stating that he would support the clause, he added— Some provision of this kind would, therefore, he thought, he salutary as regarded India."— [3 Hansard, cli. 1014–15.] We have here to observe two things—first, the object of the new clause was to restrict the Prerogative, to impose on the Crown a control which, in the opinion of Mr. Disraeli, and of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, did not then exist. In spite of your declaration of rights, it did not then exist. Secondly, we may learn from it some of the mind of the present Premier. It was he who originated that liberty which the Liberal Party are now, as they think, defending, but which the Prime Minister would be the last to infringe. He, and not the Liberal Party, saw the danger to our liberties, and the remedy which could be secured by a slight modification of the new clause. He, then, is not the man to employ the Army contrary to the law, except an urgent necessity compels him. This is still more shown by the words of Lord Derby, in the House of Lords, when an improvement of this clause was under discussion— The object of the clause was to impose a certain restriction upon the Prerogative of the Crown, through the intervention of Parliament. … The Constitutional check upon the exercise of the Prerogative was the sanction of Parliament, by the granting of the pecuniary resources. The Crown could not send out Forces unless Parliament provided the funds to pay them."—[3 Hansard, cli. 1697.] Sub intelligitur, of course, the words—"unless there should be any urgent necessity." I allow the force of that which was urged by the last speaker, that consent must be previous to action, and that consent cannot properly be asked or given after an act has been done. Yet the act may be done, without consent, in a case of necessity; for necessity knows no law. The safety of the people may demand a violation of a law, and such violation would not be wrong; for, salus populi suprema lex. The real point at issue is, then, whether there is now such a necessity? The Government can only know that; and, if the safety of the nation requires it, the Government will be justified in withholding that information for the present. I have already said that there can be no grounds for the Resolution of the noble Marquess, except it be as a censure upon the Government. But, if it be so, it is very improper. He says that the Government have violated the Constitution, that they have broken the law. If so, they have committed a grave crime. When the law has been broken, what is always done? That which should always be done—namely, a judicial investigation takes place. A judicial inquiry—not a debate between two parties, which is determined, not according to truth and right, but by the relative number of noses in this Party or that. After the judicial inquiry, and after judgment has been arrived at, punishment is awarded, if guilt has been found. No one is content with censure; punishment is demanded. In the case of a guilty Government, the same rational course should be pursued. We should not debate their conduct, and propose a Vote of Censure, and decide it by votes; but they should be impeached. [Laughter.] That is the law; that is the Constitution. Those who pretend to stand up in defence of the Constitution are now laughing at the Constitution. Why was there no laughter when the Home Secretary was speaking? He said—"If the Government are guilty of breaking the law, not the House of Commons, but Parliament should have interfered." That was a dark saying, of the meaning of which I had only a faint suspicion, but that suspicion was confirmed when he warmed on his subject, and grew bolder, and added,—"You should have impeached us." But, if that be the mind of the Home Secretary, if he can dare the Opposition to arraign him before the House of Lords, how can he vote for the miserable and craven plea ad misericordiam of the Secretary of State for the Colonies? I, for one, will not do so. Nor yet can I support a Resolution which I do not regard as true. I hold that you should wait until you can prepare Articles of Impeachment against the Members of the Cabinet, to try them judicially in the Constitutional manner.

MR. W. E. FORSTER rose to continue the debate, leaning for support on crutches.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

instantly suggested that the right hon. Gentleman should be permitted to sit while addressing the House.

MR. W. E. FORSTER

When I find I cannot stand any longer, I will take advantage of the kind suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman; but at present I think the House has a material guarantee that I shall not detain it very long. If I had not cared very much for this question, which vitally concerns the Privileges of the House, I should not have asked permission to make a few remarks upon it. With regard to the Amendment, to which I will refer at the outset, it appears to me very ingenious, for it enables the Government to claim the Votes of their Supporters without asking them to assent to any attack upon their Privileges or upon the Constitution, and it also evades entirely the question at issue. The House has been asked to express an opinion, and then to come to a conclusion. Well, I suppose it is our opinion on this as it is on that side of the House that, in the words of the Amendment— The Constitutional control of Parliament over the raising and employment of the Military Forces of the Crown is fully secured by the provisions of the Law, and by the undoubted power of this House to grant or refuse Supplies. Our contention is not that the Law, as embodied in the Statutes, or that the Privileges of Parliament, as established by the common law of Parliament, or acknowledged by precedent, are at fault; but our contention is that the Government have disregarded both one and the other. While asking us to vote the Budget, they kept us in ignorance of the demands they were going to make upon the purses of our constituents, and they have thus set at nought the power of the House to grant or refuse Supplies. It is because my noble Friend thought that, by bringing these troops to Malta, the Constitutional control of Parliament has been infringed, that he brought forward this Resolution. In its wording it is as moderate as it is possible to make it. We have no wish to embarrass the Government at this particular moment. There is no censure in this Motion, and our object in bringing it forward is to put upon the Records of the House such a Resolution as would prevent the infringement of the Privileges of this House, which we think the Government have committed, from being established as a precedent. How should the Government have met it? They should have either declared that there had been no infringement on the Privileges of the House or of the Constitution, or they should have set out that there had been an infringement which had been justified by necessity, and that being so justified, care should be taken that it should not be treated as a precedent. They have taken neither of these courses. By pleading no justification, they have admitted the charges against them; and yet they have not taken the course of Lord North, in 1775, and asked condonation of their action on account of the necessity of the case. Of course it is inexpedient to pass a Resolution weakening the hands of the Government at the present moment; but how can a Resolution, merely asserting the Privileges of this House, be open to such an interpretation? My noble Friend would have been recreant to the principles, which he may be said to have inherited, if he had not stood out on behalf of our Privileges. Nor do I think that he and those who have acted with him can be charged by Her Majesty's Ministers with having, in the whole course of these Eastern negotiations, done anything to increase the difficulties of the Government. At no slight sacrifice to our opinions—at the cost of much misconstruction of our actions—at the cost of complaints, not unreasonable, of many of our friends, we have avoided expressing disapproval when we felt it, because we have been determined to do nothing that would embarrass the Government in the conduct of these negotiations. But, when we come to this Resolution referring to our ancient rights and liberties, it would be humiliating, if it were not absurd, to say that our relations with Russia or Turkey, or any or all the Powers of Europe, were to prevent us from giving that question our full consideration. I hope the Government are going into a Congress on the Eastern Question; but that Congress will not discuss the English Constitution, and we have a right to express our opinion, and are not to be told that England is so weak or so powerless, that we must not assert our Privileges for fear of weakening the hands of the Government. It is my belief that the Government will be strengthened by Russia knowing that it acts with the knowledge and consent of Parliament. If it be possible to weaken the hands of the Government, it would be by allowing Russia to suppose that the Government found it necessary to act without the knowledge of Parliament, to hoodwink us by concealment, and to cheat us into consent to their action by presenting to us a fait accompli. It has been said thsat this secrecy was necessary. I cannot see that that assertion has been proved; and if it should be proved, I shall be even still less able than I am to understand the answer which was given me by the right hon. Gentleman the day before the Easter Recess. If there was a great emergency, I should wonder why there was such an extraordinary power of reticence on the part of the Government, that no sort of hint was given to us. I believe that publicity would have enhanced the effect of the introduction of these troops into Europe. We have been told that there would have been a difficulty in regard to transports. My strong impression is that publicity would have increased the supply of transports. But what are a few pounds owed in freight, compared with the preservation of the Privileges of the House? If there were no emergency, and no hint of one had been given on the part of the Government, there are only two other explanations for their concealment. The one is, that in the great pressure of this Eastern Question, the Government lost sight of the Constitutional question, and that this is, in fact, a casus omissus. The other is, that the Government have really come to the conclusion that it is desirable to strengthen the Prerogative of the Crown at the expense of the Privileges of this House. I think and trust that the first explanation is the correct one, but I do fear and believe that the tendency and effect of this step will be found in the other explanation. What, after all, is the chief Privilege of Parliament, and especially of this House? It is that we thought we had, and still think we have, a share in the Government of the country, and that we have a right to prevent the carrying out of any policy, either at home or abroad, of which we disapprove. But what becomes of that right, if policy, as important as it is new, is to be carried out without consulting Parliament? I should not have thought that any Government, much less a Conservative Government, would have taken upon itself, in the name of the Crown and of the Crown only, to bring about what seems to me the greatest possible innovation—either as regards the relation of the United Kingdom to India, or of this country to Foreign Powers, or of the Crown to the other Estates of the Realm. I cannot understand how it is, that in the name of the Crown, they have brought in what seems to me the greatest possible innovation. Why do I conceive this to be a grave innovation? I do not know that I can describe the magnitude of the step which has been taken better than by referring to the language of many of its supporters. I am not now speaking so much of its supporters in the House, where there appears to have been rather an attempt to minimize the step, as of its supporters outside. What have we been told? We have been told that Russia—that Europe—has been startled by the sudden discovery that we are not only the greatest Naval Power in the world, but one of the greatest Military Powers. When I say a great Military Power, I mean—and all Europe so understands it—a great Military Power, not merely for defence, but for offence, not merely for potential, but for immediate action. We are told that we can now match the greatest Armies of the Continent without conscription, and that, by a stroke of his pen, the Prime Minister has increased our Reserves by all the Indian Army, and has made it possible to call to our aid every fighting man amongst the millions of India. That is a very flattering prospect, but it has its dark as well as its bright side. With an increased power of offence, there will be more temptation to offend. We must not suppose that fresh powers will not bring fresh responsibilities. At all events, the taxpayers of England will have to pay for the Sepoys they hire; and it is quite possible our action may have the effect of leading to an increase of the Armies of the Continent, already so very numerous. There are those who think that the action of the Government can have no result, except in increased Estimates and in undue meddling with affairs that do not really concern us; but I am well aware that this is not the occasion to debate the policy of this measure. All I say is that this policy involves a great change; and if we are the great Council of the Nation, we ought to have been consulted before it was made. Hitherto, we have supposed that we fixed how many troops should be raised and maintained at the cost of our constituents—for that was the question—for these Islands and the Possessions of the Crown; but it appears we were mistaken. We are to have a Supplementary Estimate, and I am glad to find we are to discuss it next Monday; but that Supplementary Estimate might have been postponed. But, whether postponed or not, it was quite certain we could not refuse to pay for services that had been rendered. Gentlemen might say a Supplementary Estimate was sufficient. Our ancestors would not have used that argument. They knew it was right to have many checks and safeguards for Constitutional Government, and that it was necessary that the House of Commons should have not merely the power of the purse, but the deciding of the number of men. Well, it might be thought that safeguard had better not be maintained; but my argument is, that it is, at any rate, a most important change of policy, and that the House ought to have been consulted upon the subject. Turn again to our relations with India, and we find that the change of policy is as momentous as it is novel. Hitherto, it has been our boast that India has been governed not for English, or even for Imperial purposes, but solely for Indian interests. Why, it may be asked, should we maintain that self-denying policy? But that is a question to be argued in this House; and have we not a right to complain that the Government, by the steps they have taken, have done the utmost they could to prejudge the question? Let it not be supposed that, because the Queen is Empress of India, She can wield the resources of India and call upon the millions of Her subjects in India to fight just as She pleases, or even as Her Parliament pleases. We shall find that we shall have to consult Indian feelings and Indian interests. True, we, the people of England, are the despotic rulers of India; but even despots must consider the feelings of their subjects; and our Indian despotism is no exception to that rule. Depend upon it, in gaining this help from India, we shall be called upon one day to give something in return. If India is to help us in carrying out our foreign policy, we shall have to consult Indian feeling in framing that policy; and, in my opinion, we shall have to treat India rather as an Ally, than as a Dependency. That would be a great change; but, supposing I am wrong, is it no change to rely not upon the patriotism and spirit of our own people, but upon the power of our money bags, to get Ghoorkas and Sikhs and Mussulmen to fight for us? Then, look at the effect upon the actual Administration of India. I hope these Indian troops that have been moved to Malta will be sent back to India without being called upon to fight, and I am one of those who believe that, if they do fight, they will fight well. But are we sure that when they return to India they will make India easier to govern? Surely, the House ought to have been consulted before a step was taken which affects India so deeply and closely. I may be told it is the Prerogative of the Crown to declare war, and that no one of these results would be of equal importance; but I would gladly rest the whole of my argument upon the analogy of a Declaration of War. Without doubt, it is the duty of Ministers to advise Her Majesty to declare war when they think fit; but would the present or any Government for a moment think of declaring war without giving this House an opportunity of expressing its opinion as to whether war should be declared? Before the House adjourned for the Easter Recess, the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave me, and gave the House, the impression that nothing unusual would occur in the Recess. The right hon. Gentleman will not contend that during the Recess a Declaration of War might have been issued without consulting Parliament; but this moving of the Indian troops, which has been adopted without consulting Parliament, is almost, if not quite, as important, as a Declaration of War. Neither during this Session, nor during the whole of this Parliament, as far as I know, has there been the slightest allusion by any Member of the Government or of the House to the possibility of employing Indian troops. There has, indeed, been much talk about it outside, but there has been complete silence inside the House. We know what happened in the Crimean War, when, although there was a great pressure for men, the Sepoy troops were not used. In this debate there has been much search made for precedents, but none have been brought forward of the use of Sepoys or of Indian troops, except in what might be called Oriental Wars and in Asiatic Enterprizes. In 1863 there was some intention of sending Sikh regiments to New Zealand, and it became my duty to question Lord Palmerston's Government on the subject. Lord Palmerston, it is true, justified that intention; but, within a month, counter-orders were sent, and his Cabinet gave it up. This novel and momentous step is one, therefore, which has been suddenly taken, and for which not the slightest warning has been given to Parliament. I have not attempted—it would ill become me to do so—to dwell on the legal bearings of the question, which have been dealt with by those competent to do so. But, even if the provisions of the law have been kept—and I do not think they have—and even if the letter of the Constitution has not been infringed—and I think it has—I maintain that the spirit of the Constitution has been disregarded, and that our Privileges have been attacked. If we are to hand down to our successors those Privileges as ample and secure as we have received them, the least we can do is to vote for the temperately-worded Resolution of my noble Friend, which affirms that this step ought not to have been taken without first obtaining the consent of Parliament.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Sir HARDINGE GIFFARD)

said, he thought that the inconvenience, otherwise than in a Party sense, of the Resolution, of the noble Lord opposite had been abundantly illustrated in the course of that debate. It was hardly possible to revert to any matter connected with the Eastern Question which had not been touched upon in the course of that discussion. And yet, when he looked to the language of the Resolution itself, it appeared designedly to have been framed with a view to avoid anything but the consideration of an abstract question. The Resolution stated—he thought inaccurately—a proposition of Constitutional law. But it was manifestly aimed at certain conduct of the Government; and he supposed that the tactical excellence of the Resolution as it stood was, that the noble Lord could obtain a certain number of votes from hon. Gentlemen who were not ready to pledge themselves that the Government had done anything wrong, but who would accept the proposition of law that involved a matter of fact which they did not venture to express in words, but which they were all thinking of. He ventured to think that that was an extremely inconvenient course. He admitted that there were two questions to be solved—first, whether there had been an infringement of the letter of the law? and, next, and above all, whether there had been an infringement of the spirit of our Institutions, such as might be justly described as unconstitutional? He said, in the first place, that the letter of the law had not been infringed. It was argued that the Bill of Rights prohibited the raising of Her Majesty's Forces in the circumstances stated in the Resolution in every part of the Queen's Dominions, and that they were to read the word "Kingdom" in the Bill of Rights as if it meant every part of the Dominion of the Crown. He agreed, in a measure, in what had been said by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone); and he might take this opportunity of saying that he had not the least conception which utterance of his the right hon. Gentleman referred to when he said that he had uttered some gibe with reference to the question of Army Purchase. [Mr. GLADSTONE: It was a mistake.] If so, he would say no more. Those who had refreshed their memories by looking at the Bill of Rights would remember that it contained a recital of the various unconstitutional and illegal acts that had been perpetrated by the Sovereign who had left the Kingdom. And then followed the declaration of what the state of the law was with reference to those things. It was there declared that the raising or keeping of a standing Army within the Kingdom in time of peace, unless with the consent of Parliament, was against the law. As to the letter of the law, the question they had to solve was, whether the word "Kingdom" comprehended all the Dominions of the Crown? Let them see whether the Statute drew the distinction, and spoke of the Kingdom in the wider sense that was contended for. Now, he found in other parts of that Statute, where they were settling the Crown and dealing with the jurisdiction of the Crown, the able and learned men who framed the Statute, and who knew how to choose language that would express their meaning, when it was intended to comprehend in it all the Dominions of the Crown, used no longer the words "the Kingdom," but "the Kingdom and the Dominions belonging thereto." And if he were to suppose—what lay at the bottom of the argument of the right hon. Member for Greenwich—that that declaration in the Statute was to apply all their Constitutional liberties, such as they had been and as they had grown to, to every part of the Dominions of the Crown, that supposition would not only be contrary to every authority, but ludicrously inconsistent with the history of the English Colonies. It was said, forsooth, that they had the authority of Lord Chancellor Bathurst, and other learned lawyers, for construing that word ''Kingdom" in the sense which comprehended all the Dominions of the Crown. That was a great error. The point in the debate, in which Lord Camden and Lord Chancellor Bathurst took part, was the sending of the Electoral troops of the person who happened to be King of England as well as Elector of Hanover into places of trust under the Crown. The question there raised was as to the paragraph of the Act of Settlement. The prohibition in the Act of Settlement was that no person should be capable of enjoying any place of trust, civil or military, who was born out of "the Kingdom of England, Scotland, or Ireland, or the Dominions there unto belonging." Let them see whether Lord Camden and Lord Bathurst, in the passages which had been quoted, were construing the words "the Kingdom" in the Bill of Rights, or the words in the Act of Settlement. Lord Camden, who one might have thought would have escaped the imputation of being supposed not to know what the words of the Bill of Rights were, said that a distinction had been made between the time of peace and the time of war; but he was certain that neither law nor usage justified any such interpretation; that it was true the word "foreigners" was not mentioned in the law; but would anyone suppose that, although it was not right to keep an Army of Natives, an Army of foreigners might be kept? The words used implied a distinction between times of peace and times of war; but, if they referred to the Act of Settlement, they would find that no such distinction was there made. The argument was obviously this—they were dealing with those garrisons of the Crown, as though they had a right to send into them Electoral troops who were not under the jurisdiction of the Crown of England. Lord Camden's observations came to that; and if his hon. and learned Friend opposite did not assent to that view, perhaps he would be good enough to explain what Lord Camden had meant by saying that neither law nor usage drew any distinction between times of peace and times of war? What had Lord Bathurst said? He had said that the sending Hanoverian troops to Gibraltar and Port Mahon was fairly within the meaning and spirit of the paragraph of the Act of Settlement. That was Lord Bathurst's observation, and he had concluded, singularly enough, by declaring that he, for the rest of the Ministers, had assisted in advising the measure. He was unable to understand what hon. Members opposite meant by saying that if the authority of Lords Camden and Bathurst were fairly construed in the language of the Bill of Rights, the word "Kingdom" would include all the Dominions of the Crown. He quite admitted that Lord Bathurst, in the course of his observations, had not said what would be applicable to the present circumstances, if such an argument were to be used for any serious purpose. He said that if the word "Kingdom" were to be taken to include the Dominions of the Crown, it would have to be so taken in conjunction with the phrase "while at peace," whereas they were at war with America, and, therefore, the Act of Settlement did not apply. If anyone supposed that Lord Bathurst intended that for serious argument, he might himself use it also. Suppose he were to say that the Bill of Rights applied only in time of peace, and that they were not in a time of peace while the war at the Cape went on, how would such an argument be received in the House? The result of Lord Bathurst's argument was to expose the absurdity of that fallacy. It had been said, more than once, that the Ministers ought to have followed the precedent of Lord North; but that had been said in ignorance of the facts. The Bill of Indemnity had been forced upon Lord North. He said, in a quiescent way, that he had no objection if additional protection were wanted, but that it was unnecessary; and when the Bill reached the other House, three Ministers of the Crown spoke and voted for the rejection of the Bill, declaring it to be perfectly unnecessary, as what had been done was lawful. The measure was rejected by the votes of those Members of the Government. Yet Lord North had been represented as having admitted that his Government had acted illegally in the step they had taken, and had to come to Parliament for an Indemnity. He at once conceded that, when all had been said that could be said on the language of the Bill of Settlement, that did not decide the question. They were told, next, there had been an evasion of the law, and that charge he unhesitatingly denied. Without troubling the House with what was unconstitutional and what was not, he would suppose a case. Suppose, under the Mutiny Act as it stood, the whole of the 135,000 men were brought into the Kingdom, and every outlying garrison consisted of Indian troops, the words of the Bill of Rights would not be infringed. Speaking, not as the adviser of an unconstitutional King of the 17th century, but as a lawyer, he boldly contended that there would not be the smallest infringement of the Bill of Rights; yet it was clear that any Constitutional lawyer who looked at the recital of the Mutiny Act, would see that the letter of the law was observed though the spirit violated. But he should have thought that no lawyer would have contended that it was unconstitutional to bring the Indian troops from one Dominion to another. The Amendment of the noble Lord would have been very relevant if, instead of binding himself down to the abstract Resolution, and instead of allowing everybody to supply the suppressed premiss, he had moved that the Ministers had been guilty of unconstitutional conduct; for then they would have had an opportunity of discussing and settling the question whether the movement of the troops to Malta was unconstitutional. But all that was irrelevant to the Resolution, as it stood, which put before the House no obvious issue to challenge. That was avoided, and the Resolution omitted, and the noble Lord had taken credit for omitting the very question that might have made the Resolution a fit subject of debate, and might have given point to the discussion. He had observed that hon. Gentlemen opposite had taken up a sort of oscillating position between what they said was illegal and what they contended was unconstitutional; but if they would only make up their minds as to which of the charges they intended to rely upon, he should be prepared to meet them upon either issue. What, he would ask, was the unconstitutional character of the act to which exception was taken? Had the Government evaded, in what they had done, the control of Parliament; and, if so, in what way? Was it maintained that the Indian troops could not be moved out of India at all? His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Barnstaple (Mr. Waddy) had given the House some information as to the operation of the Government of India Act, and appeared to have caught in his toils an unwary Supporter of the Government, who had not made himself thoroughly acquainted with the real state of the case. Perhaps, when he knew the hon. and learned Gentleman as well as he had, he would have reason to see that he ought to beware of his ingenuity. Now, the discovery which had been made by the hon. and learned Member for Barn staple was, that by the 56th section of the Government of India Act, the Military and the Naval Forces of the East India Company should be deemed to be the Military and Naval Forces of Her Majesty, under the same obligations to serve Her Majesty as those under which they were to serve the Company, and should be liable to serve within the same territorial limits only. His hon. and learned Friend, having quoted that section, seemed to say—"Now I have caught you. You clearly had on right to send those Indian troops beyond the territorial limits prescribed, and you have, therefore, been guilty of an infringement of the law." His hon. and learned Friend seemed not to have observed that the whole question turned upon the terms and conditions under which those troops were enlisted. He would, therefore, keep him in suspense no longer, but tell him that the terms of enlistment had been altered, and that soldiers enlisted in the Indian Army—those soldiers, at least, who were now on their way to Malta—were not enlisted under any obligation which would simply confine them within the territorial limits of the East India Company, but under the conditions that they were bound to go wherever they might be ordered. He would only add upon that point, that before his hon. and learned Friend had made use of the argument with respect to it which he had urged against the Government, it might have been as well if he had ascertained what the real facts of the case were. But what he was about to ask when it occurred to him to give an answer to his hon. and learned Friend was, in what consisted the unconstitutional conduct of the Government? His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Durham (Mr. Herschell), in the remarks which he made with reference to the Government of India Bill, seemed to him to have entirely omitted to consider the language of the Statute itself. He said that if the Government would only say that the exigencies of the case had led them to act in opposition to the law, he and a great many hon. Members on his side of the House would be very glad to accept that position, and would not insist on passing a Resolution which might appear to be a Vote of Censure upon their conduct. All such remarks would, no doubt, be fair and just in a case where a Government, under great pressure, had undoubtedly infringed the law. His hon. and learned Friend, however, seemed to forget that what had been done in the present instance was no infringement of the law, but was an act in pursuance of the law; and that his suggestion to the Government that they should make a confession that they had done wrong and ask the pardon of Parliament, was only applicable to cases where a Government had not the authority of Parliament for the course which they had adopted, which could not be truly said in the present case. As for Parliament, when it came to pay the bill, it had the undoubted power of either condemning or approving the action of the Government. He could not help feeling that the discussion of this question had already been very protracted, though, in truth, it was confined in very narrow limits, and he was not desirous of protracting these proceedings; but it was obvious to ask—if only for the purpose of pronouncing an opinion upon a dry abstract proposition of Constitutional law applicable to nothing, and the conclusion from which there was nothing to be drawn—with what object was this Resolution, at this particular juncture, put before the House? What would other nations—those who were watching their debates—think of this debate? Would they stop to inquire whether any dispute as to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights or the Act of Settlement decided questions of this sort? He almost apologized to himself for having discussed these matters; but these were questions which were thrust upon them. These miserable technicalities—he heard hon. and right hon. Members opposite commenting upon his words, and suggesting that the Bill of Rights, according to his view, was a miserable technicality—he knew what use might be made of his words hereafter—he said that these miserable technicalities would be misunderstood abroad. He was as deeply impressed with fervent admiration of the liberties of his country as were hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite. He knew that it was the custom of hon. Members opposite to assume and arrogate to themselves the character of champions of the liberties of Parliament, and to assert that those who did not agree with them must of necessity be bigoted; but he had a right to his own opinion, that those who were loudest in their professions of being ardent for liberty were not always the safest guardians of it themselves. He had every respect for the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement, but the House was not engaged in an academic discussion of the origin of English liberties. No one would venture to say that great liberties did not exist—which had grown up gradually in our English Constitution—or that any Minister who undervalued those liberties would not be justly open to impeachment as well as to the condemnation of his fellow countrymen; but when he spoke of miserable technicalities, he spoke of the discussion which did not deal with great principles like this, but which, instead of dealing directly with the action and conduct of the Government, simply asked a decision of the House on a dry and abstract question, which must be interpreted by different people for or against the Government. Other nations would look to what was not contained in the Resolution; in fact, how many hon. Members had thought it their duty to confine their observations to the language of the Resolution; but what other nations would do, would be to ask themselves whether our free institutions were so cumbrous and unmanageable that, for the preservation of the interests and existence of this country, we could not avail ourselves of all the resources at our command, or send a single soldier from India, without first passing an Act of Parliament. If this Resolution were not repudiated by an overwhelming majority, other nations might well think that, in building up our liberties and protecting ourselves against internal oppression, we had really forged fetters for ourselves, so that we could not move even for our own safety. The argument used by hon. Gentlemen opposite was that this country must wait till its enemy had struck the first blow before it could release itself from its Constitutional restraints—that although its interests were so far reaching, yet, on account of some antiquated notion, some forced construction of the language of the Bill of Rights, apart from its spirit, and wholly beside that which gave life to every law—namely, the meaning and the spirit which inspired its authors when they drew up the declaration of our rights—no soldier could be moved from one part of Her Majesty's Dominions to another. He maintained that Her Majesty's Government had recognized the authority of Parliament to sit in judgment on their conduct afterwards; but hon. Members opposite would take from their hands the power which the Act of Parliament had expressly given to the Government of acting in emergencies, by supporting a Resolution which avoided challenging the question whether there was an emergency or not, and which insinuated, while it would not state, that Her Majesty's Government had been guilty of unconstitutional conduct.

SIR HENRY JAMES

said, it was now some two years since the policy of Her Majesty's Government, in respect to Eastern affairs, had attracted the attention of the House. During that period many discussions, on various portions of that policy, had taken place within those walls; he had never yet taken part in any one of them, and he trusted the House would not think it unnatural on his part that, looking at the form and nature of this Resolution, he should desire not to allow the debate to terminate without taking some part in the present discussion. He agreed with his hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General as to the difficulty which must exist in engaging the attention of the House upon such a subject as this, and especially at that hour of the evening; but he would promise that he would not wander from the real subject of discussion. He could not, however, refrain from alluding to the form of the Resolution, and of the Amendment that would be submitted from the Chair. It certainly was necessary for the Home Secretary to remind the House that they ought not to forget the Amendment which had been proposed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It was very likely, if they looked at what was the real subject of discussion, that they would forget that Amendment. It was an Amendment which, in its form, was bad all round if it were intended for an answer to the Motion. It denied nothing, it confessed nothing, and it avoided nothing. It was simply a dilatory plea, saying that at that moment it was not right to embarrass the Government. It must share the fate of every dilatory plea, and it must be taken to confess the allegation which it was directed to meet. It was, however, more important to know why this debate had been commenced at all. What was the form and what was the nature of the Motion of his noble Friend? The Attorney General, with a taste which he would not criticize, had endeavoured to trace, from some innate knowledge, the hand that drew that Motion; and the hon. and learned Gentleman complained that it did not recite certain Statutes, on which, in his opinion, the Motion ought to have been framed. The House, he thought, would agree with him, that he would be guilty of very bad taste if he made a statement one way or the other as to the framing of that Resolution; but, now that the Resolution was before the House, he thought his noble Friend could support its object and its terms. When Constitutional precedents seemed to be thrown lightly away, it must be some satisfaction to the noble Lord to know that he had framed his Resolution, at least, on the precedents of his Party. This Resolution was in its terms precisely in accordance with the terms of the Resolution that was brought up by Mr. Grey, in 1794, under similar circumstances, when that Gentleman deemed it right to propose an abstract Resolution in reference to an infringement of the Constitution committed by the Prime Minister of the day. Mr. Grey framed his Resolution, not in the form of casting a Vote of Censure on the Ministers for the policy which they had adopted, but in these terms— That the employing foreigners in any situation of Military trust, or bringing foreign troops into this Dominion, without the consent of Parliament first had and obtained, is contrary to law. It was exactly upon the lines of this Motion that the noble Lord had drawn his Resolution; and he was certain that if a specific Motion had been made that the Government were deserving of censure on account of its policy, the House would have been told that the Opposition cared nothing for the abstract Constitutional question, but sought at this moment to embarrass the Government by charging it with a policy which it dared not explain, because it was necessary for it to keep secret the reasons on which it had acted. In speaking upon the form of the Motion, and the criticism which had been applied to it, he could not help referring to the speech which they had heard that evening, and which had been so loudly cheered by hon. Members opposite, but which some Members of the House must have listened to with great pain and regret. He meant the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck). He might say, unreservedly—and he had no doubt that those to whom he was speaking would agree with him—that the Parliamentary position of the hon. and learned Member entitled him to every due respect in the House. It was not only his long service in that House, but the age at which he had arrived, and to which they might all arrive, which entitled him to that respect which, he thought, personally they were all willing to accord him. But men of any position, and of any age, who entered into the conflicts of public life, and deemed it right to become the censors and condemnors of others, could not shield themselves behind their position or age, and prevent answers being made to what they said. He said—and he was sorry he could not say it in the presence of the hon. and learned Member, but he said it in the presence of the House—what right had he to apply the language he did to those who had brought forward and supported this Resolution? He knew it would be distasteful to his noble Friend, and it would be unbecoming in himself, to utter one word of personal reference to him; but he appealed to hon. Members opposite with the greatest confidence, as well as to the Supporters of the noble Lord, whether the hon. and learned Gentleman had any right to say that no honest, no patriotic man, would have acted as his noble Friend had done in bringing forward this Motion? He left it for the House to judge, from his career, and from the course which he had taken towards the Government with reference to the Eastern Question, whether it was becoming in anyone to say that the noble Lord was not acting as an honest and patriotic man would act, because a difference of opinion existed on this Constitutional question? He was not now going to refer to some acts of the hon. and learned Member, nor to the way in which he had opposed Ministers on certain occasions. The hon. and learned Member for Barnstaple (Mr. Waddy) read a portion of the hon. and learned Member's speech, when he attacked the Government of the day for sending troops to Persia and carrying on war without the consent of Parliament; and he would take the House into his confidence, and confess that he had at first intended to make some observations on that speech, in support of the present Motion. He would not do so, however, but would only refer to the course the hon. and learned Member had taken at the time of the Crimean War, during a time when the country was in the face of the enemy, when he introduced a Resolution condemning the Government of the day. It was not desirable to engage the attention of the House in such considerations; but when he heard the cheers from hon. Gentlemen opposite when the hon. and learned Member referred to the disunion of the Liberal Party, and congratulated them upon the patriotic cohesion they had shown, his mind dwelt with pleasure upon the recollection of some portion of the words of the hon. and learned Member which it had been his delight and instruction to read. The House would forgive him if he read a short extract, and hon. Members opposite would then know what opinion the hon. and learned Member had entertained of their political cohesion, and how much he deprecated the differences that existed in the Tory Party. While he had been a professing Liberal, the hon. and learned Member had, as he now said, always disparaged the action of the Liberal Party. During the time of the French War, he deemed the Liberal Party unpatriotic. With the permission of the House, he would read what had been written by the hon. and learned Gentleman; it was an extract from a pamphlet entitled, Parties in the House of Commons, Disunion among the Tories; by John Arthur Roebuck— There is also another reason for the apparent harmony existing amongst the Tories. Political principles with them are matters of very secondary importance. Their grand object is place, and the means of living on the public, Anybody that will afford them the opportunity of thus fleecing the people"—

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLF rose to Order. He contended that quotations from a pamphlet, written many years ago against the Conservatives, had no bearing on the question before the House.

MR. SPEAKER

said, that he considered the remarks of the hon. and learned Member were in Order, having regard to the course of the debate.

SIR HENRY JAMES

resumed the reading of the extract. Anybody that will afford them the opportunity of thus fleecing the people will not be much troubled with any peculiar fancy or crotchet which they may entertain respecting Government. Feed a Tory well, and you will silence his scruples, and obliterate from his mind any notion of an independent opinion. With morality such as this, it is not at all extraordinary to see great harmony existing amongst them. But this is a harmony which bodes no good to the public; they agree in order to plunder, and are good friends at the Nation's expense. He was asked for the date of the document he had read; he would give it; it was since the Napoleonic Wars. It was written since the period when the hon. and learned Member said the Liberal Party acted so unpatriotically. He quoted from that pamphlet to show that, at different periods of his life, the hon. and learned Member had treated them all alike. He regretted he was not present to hear him; but he ventured to say that, if the hon. and learned Member, at this period of his life, believed his political Friends to be all dishonest and unpatriotic, it would be more gratifying to them if he would sit amongst his Allies opposite. He hoped that the House would forgive him for yielding to the temptation of answering the hon. and learned Member; but he was sensible that he had to deal with far graver subjects. He had not only to deal with the actions of Her Majesty's Ministers and their effect, but with the light thrown upon those actions by the statements of responsible Ministers in that House. It might be that the actions of the Government had resulted from their having to deal with an emergency which they could not control. In that case, the House might have treated the Government as Parliament usually treated Ministers who had acted in an emergency. But that was not the position Her Majesty's Ministers chose to occupy. They justified every act they had done, and they said that those acts were within the Constitution, and they naturally put forward the first Law Officer of the Crown to support the Constitutional position they had assumed. He must ask the House to consider for one moment the proposition put forward by the Home Secretary. That right hon. Gentleman had asked the House, in fairness to the Government, not to make them responsible for the statements of the Attorney General. Against that doctrine he protested.

MR. ASSHETON CROSS

explained that what he had said was that the action of the Government was one thing, and the language of the Attorney General was another.

SIR HENRY JAMES

was quite willing to take it in that way. The Home Secretary was treating the Attorney General as the Prime Minister had once before treated that hon. and learned Gentleman. He was glad to have an admission from the Home Secretary that he accepted all the propositions of the Attorney General. [Mr. ASSHETON CROSS dissented.] He would give the right hon. Gentleman his choice either to accept the propositions of the Attorney General or not. The Home Secretary placed him in this dilemma—when he said that he repudiated the language of the Attorney General, the Home Secretary contradicted him; and when he said that the right hon. Gentleman accepted the Attorney General's propositions, he shook his head. Under those circumstances, he must accept his own reading of the right hon. Gentleman's language, and should take it that the Government accepted the propositions of the Attorney General. If the Home Secretary meant to accept those propositions, the responsibility of the Government was far greater than he had anticipated; but if he intended to repudiate them, he, for one, must protest, on the part of the Attorney General, at his being placed in such a position. It was not his intention to refer to past debates; but what was the position of the Government when they were challenged on a Constitutional question? They put forward their Law Officer to defend them, and supported him with their applause. But when the hon. and learned Gentleman's numerous errors had been pointed out to them, they said it was not fair to saddle the Government with his statements. In the speech of one Member of the Government it was said that the statements of another Law Officer, the Lord Chancellor, would be allowed by history to have properly set forth the Constitutional views of the Government. Thus, they were asked to receive, and were told history would accept as correct, the statements of one Law Officer, while they were told that it was unfair to take the words of another. From the speech of the Attorney General he deduced the position in which the Government had placed itself. Their acts might have been, as he had before said, justified by an emergency, or on the ground of policy; but the Attorney General justified them on the ground of Constitutional right; and the propositions which he put forward, and which the Government must either accept or repudiate, were three distinct propositions as representing the Constitutional position of the Crown in relation to Parliament. The Attorney General said that, by virtue of its Prerogative, the Crown, before the Bill of Rights, had a Constitutional right to maintain a standing Army anywhere, without the consent of Parliament, and that that Prerogative right had been limited by the Bill of Rights. As a deduction from those two propositions, the Attorney General informed them that the Crown could maintain a standing Army, without the consent of Parliament, anywhere except in the United Kingdom. He believed he had fairly stated the propositions of the Government. Of course, he was aware that it was said that this power was checked by the necessity of obtaining Supplies from Parliament. That proposition had been put forward in the early part of the debate, and was one which was not disputed. On those three propositions he took issue, and said that they were unfounded, and could not be supported on principle or by precedent. He would first deal with the proposition of the Attorney General, that by virtue of the Common Law, the Prerogative of the Crown gave it a Constitutional right to maintain a standing Army anywhere, without the consent of Parliament. That must bring them to a pre-Bill of Rights period. The Attorney General, with perfect frankness, did not shrink from that proposition, but said clearly that before the Bill of Rights, the Crown had the Prerogative of maintaining a standing Army in the country, whether Parliament assented to it or not. That was the fundamental question in this debate—whether the Crown was subject to the Constitutional limitation contended for in the Motion of the noble Lord; and it was against the assertion of such a power without limitation, which the Solicitor General had spoken of as a miserable technicality, that the Motion was aimed. They must look very carefully to see whether the contention of the Attorney General could be supported by any act of the Crown or Parliament. He could not help saying, in passing, that this argument of the Attorney General was an old one. It was exactly the same argument by which the Crown Lawyers used to support the imposition of ship-money, and the dispensing power of the Crown, and by which they claimed the right to tax our Colonies. In supporting this proposition, which anyone would see was absolutely illegal, the Attorney General threw away all considerations relating to Constitutional principles. He charged the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Oxford with being a masquerader, and with shaking a bladder full of empty wind, because he referred to Constitutional principles. That was a perfectly consistent argument in the mouth of the Attorney General, for he treated Constitutional principles as if they were of no moment at all. But their arguments rested not on mere Statutes, not on mere decisions of Courts of Justice, but on the law and usage of Parliament; and it was on these alone that this Motion was to be supported. He would call attention to what Parliament had done in this matter. Before the Bill of Rights was passed, Parliament dealt with this subject as affecting important Constitutional principles. He quite admitted that it might be unwise to take the Resolutions of Parliament during the time that it was in conflict with the Crown; and, therefore, he should not go beyond the period of the Restoration of Charles II. After that time, the Attorney General said that the Crown had a right to maintain a standing Army in the Kingdom without the permission of Parliament. At that time—in 1677—Parliament resolved—and it must have been against the Prerogative of the Crown—that the maintenance of a standing Army, other than the Militia, was a great grievance. But the contention of the Crown of the days of James II. was brought finally to an end. He committed illegal act after illegal act, and one was the maintenance of a standing Army without the consent of Parliament. In consequence of that he was obliged to leave this country, and the Bill of Rights was passed as a declaratory Act of what was the Common Law of the country in relation to the specific illegal acts which had been committed. If the Statute Book were searched through, there would be found no Act more clear and declaratory in its terms than the Bill of Rights. It declared that James II. had committed divers illegal acts, which it recited were against the established usage and laws of the country, and it asserted, amongst other things, that a standing Army was illegal. The Act was not intended as a codification of the Constitution, nor as declaratory of all the rights under Constitutional usage; but its operation was co-extensive only with the evils mentioned in its Preamble. Its enacting part was intended to go no further. James II. had kept no standing Army out of the Kingdom, in time of peace, and the Act, after it declared the law so far as it had been broken, did not touch the Common Law beyond. Hon. Members who took an interest in the matter might read an explanation of the Act by Serjeant Adair in the debate of 1794. He was one of those men whom the hon. and learned Gentleman would have told them had wild and fantastic notions; but he explained that the Bill of Rights was declaratory only in relation to certain acts which had been committed. Mr. Fox gave two statements in reference to the Bill of Rights. He said that it was to be considered as declaring the Constitution on particular points, and not as declaring the whole Constitution. In what book the Attorney General had found it stated that the Bill of Rights was an enacting statute controlling the Prerogative of the Crown instead of declaring the rights of Parliament he could not conceive. There was one passage, in a work of Lord Beaconsfield, in which he said that the English Constitution under William III.— Did not secure greater powers or privileges to Parliament than it possessed under Henry IV. But the Motion was founded not upon any statute nor upon technicalities, but it was founded upon the long usage of Parliament, and on the principles in support of which Parliament had struggled against the Crown. For one moment only he would refer to what occurred immediately after the Bill of Rights. What definition did it receive by the men who had fought for it, and by so doing had helped "to make a small country great?" They said—"You may lay before us your Estimates; you may take your money; but we must have not Estimates only, but, along with them, the heads of the proposed expenditure." There was one Member (Sir Thomas Clarges) who must, judging by recent events, have been a stout old Tory, for he was Member for the University of Oxford, who said, when the Estimates were presented— Do not give us your Estimates only, let us have also a statement of the heads under which this money is to be expended. That was their idea of Parliamentary control. Not only did they grant money, but they saw to its disposition. Mentioning the action of Parliament immediately after the Bill of Rights, brought him to the statements of the Lord Chancellor. He had been quoted as one whose words would be read hereafter, as being an authoritative exposition of the Constitutioual law of this country. If he might be permitted to say so, he had never uttered one word in that House, except in acknowledgment of the high position which the noble and learned Lord occupied. He was aware of the pride with which the Bar regarded the Lord Chancellor, and there was no doubt that feeling was more than shared by the Members of Her Majesty Government. If the Government would not accept the responsibility of the Attorney General, they surely would accept that of the Lord Chancellor. What views the Lord Chancellor entertained as to the rights of Parliament and the Crown in this matter were now well known. He was told that the Lord Chancellor held that Parliament could not interfere with the Prerogative of the Crown to raise and maintain troops or a standing Army out of the Kingdom, and that the Chancellor supported his argument by stating that during the whole of the past century, more than 100 years, the Crown maintained a standing Army in Ireland without the assent of Parliament, and that at a time when Ireland formed no part of the United Kingdom. If the noble and learned Lord were right, then it must be admitted that the argument in support of the position of the Government was very strong. The question for the House to determine was whether the Crown could outside of the Kingdom—that was, in a narrow sense, England—raise and maintain an Army without the consent of Parliament? During the last century, before the Union, Ireland was no part of the Kingdom, in that narrow sense. If, therefore, the Crown could maintain an Army in Ireland, without the assent of Parliament, he could see no reason why it should not maintain it at Malta at the present moment. This was the crucial point. But, on the other hand, Members of the Government would admit that if the Crown asked the consent of Parliament to maintain an Army in Ireland, that was a very strong argument in favour of the contention that the Government ought to have consulted Parliament before maintaining an Army in Malta. He must say he was struck at the time by the strong position of the supporters of the Government, when so high an authority as the Lord Chancellor stated that Parliament had had no power to prevent the Crown maintaining an Army in Ireland. It was a very strong argument on the part of Her Majesty's Government; but there was this one thing wanting to it—namely, that it was without foundation in fact. He could conceive now why they had had the movement of troops; it had been directed under a total misapprehension of the facts as to this question. The assent of Parliament was given to the maintaining of troops in Ireland, and, without that assent, the Crown never would have dared to have maintained them there. He would ask the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer to say, in his reply, whether, if the fact were proved that the Crown, before it maintained a standing Army in Ireland, had the assent of Parliament, he would maintain that the Crown had a right, without the assent of Parliament, to maintain an Army in Malta? From 1691 to 1698 the English Parliament voted the Irish troops. In 1698 the English Parliament came to the resolution, and also enacted that all the troops should be disbanded— That all Forces entirely—except 12,000, and those Her Majesty's born subjects, to be kept and maintained by the Kingdom of Ireland—be hereby disbanded. In the face of that statute, would the chief Advisers of Her Majesty's Ministers assert, as a Constitutional question, that those troops in Ireland were maintained without the assent of the English Parliament? What, then, became of the doctrine that the Parliament had had no voice in the matter, and no power to prevent the Crown maintaining troops in Ireland for 100 years? But the matter did not rest there. The House would bear in mind that by the Statute of 1698, the Crown had the power to maintain 12,000 troops in Ireland. In 1767, the English Parliament, growing, probably, a little uneasy about the American Colonies, thought it advisable to add 3,000 troops to the Irish Establishment. If the argument of the Government were right, of course the Crown could have added those 3,000 troops to the Army of Ireland without the need of going to the English Parliament, even for money; for the Irish Parliament had to vote Supplies to maintain them. In those days they had men who had "wild and fantastic notions," but who did not treat Constitutional principles as "air in a bladder;" men like Lord Chatham and Lord Camden, who were careful about the Privileges of Parliament, for to them those Privileges meant the same thing as the rights of the people. And when the Crown in those days wanted, for the public good, an addition of 3,000 troops to the Irish Establishment, they did not tell the Crown that its Prerogative enabled it to raise the troops and get the money from the Irish Parliament; but they came to the English Parliament, and obtained its assent to an Act of Parliament for the sanction. The Act to which he referred was passed in 1767. It recited the previous Act of Will. III., giving assent to an Establishment of 12,000; it further recited the necessity for 3,000 more, and it gave authority to His Majesty to raise and keep in Ireland a number of troops of His Majesty's subjects, not exceeding 15,000. In the face of that statute, the Lord Chancellor had asserted that the English Parliament never gave its assent to the maintenance of troops in Ireland. There must have been a necessity for the Act he had quoted. The King assented to it, and the King's friends at that time were most powerful, and guarded the Prerogative of the Crown, as against the power of Parliament, in those days. That being so, did the Attorney General know of that statute? Did the Lord Chancellor know of it? He could not help coming to the conclusion that in the secrecy kept there was no consideration of the grave questions arising, and that there was little care or time to inquire either into the precedents for, or the principles of, the policy that Her Majesty's Government had adopted. He was sorry to occupy time in referring to the subject; but the Home Secretary had criticized what had been said by his right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich. It was suggested that he did not read a passage he ought to have read. With all deference, he thought that observation was uncalled for. In point of fact, the passage was read by the Attorney General, perhaps in the absence of the Home Secretary, and his right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich read nothing, but only quoted Hallam's views from memory. But there was another passage from Hallam which neither the Attorney General nor the Home Secretary had read, though it followed that which was quoted.

MR. ASSHETON CROSS

said, that he commented upon the passage, although he did not quote it.

SIR HENRY JAMES

would ask the permission of the House to read the passage. Mr. Hallam said that— It (the keeping up of a standing Army without the permission of Parliament) was, at least, unconstitutional and tending to endanger the established law; so, as Hallam said, even if the proposition as to absolute illegality were too wide, it still should be considered as virtually correct. The Home Secretary had made another mistake, in the instance he gave that the Colony of Jamaica did not come within the Common Law of England. He had before him the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice of England on the subject, in which his Lordship laid down that it did come within the Common Law of England. Now, his hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General thought it right to make a suggestion as to the form, and by whose hand the Motion of his noble Friend was framed. He would not follow him in entering upon the question by whom this policy of the Government was to be guided; but let the House consider under what circumstances that policy was taken. He could fancy the Cabinet Council being held at which this certainly novel act of removing troops from India into the European Possessions of the Crown was considered, and at which grave consideration was given to the matter. He gave the Government full credit for that. He presumed they took the advice of their Legal Advisers—both the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney General—and let him point out to the House into what errors those who gave that advice fell. The Attorney General must have told the Cabinet that a standing Army was a Constitutional right by the Prerogative of the Crown; he must have told them that the Bill of Rights was not a declaratory, but an enacting, statute. He must have told them that the Crown could now maintain a standing Army anywhere out of the United Kingdom, without the assent of Parliament. The Attorney General must also have told them that the precedent of 1775 did not apply. The Lord Chancellor must have told them that during a century the Crown had maintained a standing Army in Ireland without once procuring the assent of Parliament. The Colonial Secretary must have said—"I agree; for, in 1870, the additional 20,000 troops were not voted." And the Chancellor of the Exchequer certainly must have supported him by adding—"I have sent for the Statute Book of 1870, and those troops are not mentioned in the Appropriation Act." And then, he could fancy the Attorney General interposing and saying he was quite sure he could meet any objections by the Opposition, because, in 1863, the Liberal Government brought Indian troops, which had not been paid for or included in the Mutiny Act by the English Parliament, into New Zealand. The Home Secretary, too, must have given his advice, and said—"Oh, yes, this does not affect Colonial matters, because the Common Law of England does not apply to any of the Colonies." Now, those were the notions of Her Majesty's Government at the time they determined upon this policy. Upon those errors they had acted. Those errors had been acknowledged, and yet, because the Opposition were discussing whether this act of the Government was a Constitutional one, they were told they were factious critics. They had followed the advice of their Legal Officers, and had acted under ignorance of the primary and elementary rules of the Constitution. He said the statements of the Attorney General were in opposition to the elementary rules of the Constitution. But, although the Government thus had erred in this matter, they had committed a graver error still. With consideration, and with knowledge of their position, they had infringed the provisions of a statute which declared that they had no right to apply the Revenues of India to any Imperial purpose without the consent of Parliament. But they had so applied the Revenues of India. It was no answer to say the money was to be repaid. Supposing Parliament refused, now, to vote that money, how were they to pay that money back? There was no excuse for the Government for the errors they had committed, or for their ignorance of that statute. There was one Member of that Cabinet who must have known it by heart, for he must have had it impressed upon his memory. In 1867, at the time of the Abyssinian Expedition, the Government, of which he was then a Member, broke that statute. And what did the right hon. Gentleman do then? He would use his very words. He came down to this House, and said—"We are very sorry for having broken it." Why did not the Government say that now? He would tell them. A Ministry would never act unconstitutionally, unless they had a large majority, and it was against Ministers with a majority that they had to contend that night. But, in 1867, the right hon. Gentleman belonged to a Ministry which was in a minority, and then, having done less than they had done now to infringe the Constitution—for then no Indian troops were brought into the Possessions of the Crown, but only into Abyssinia—he came to this House, and said—"We are very sorry for what has happened." Why did not they do that now? Because they were in a majority and not a minority. They relied upon the certainty that, having erred alike against Constitutional principles and the statute law, which the Attorney General said alone they might look to, they would be supported by their majority. They trusted to their majority not to say "this is a case of emergency;" not to say "we justify you because you acted for the public good"—as he admitted Ministers ought to in time of emergency—but to say "you have neither broken the Constitution nor infringed a statute." The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck), who he was glad now to see in his proper place, on the Conservative side of the House, asked—"Who is enjoying less personal liberty in this country at this moment because Indian troops are moved to Malta?" He thought the answer which would come from everyone would be "Nobody." But, was that the question they had to determine now? What they were doing now was to maintain the right of Parliament to say—''You shall have no troops in your possession without the consent of Parliament." It was not a question now so much of a standing Army; it was a grave question of policy. The Parliament of England gave to the Crown the right of making war or concluding peace; but they kept that great Prerogative power of war or peace always in check by determining the number of troops at the disposal of the Crown. The policy of a Ministry must depend upon the means which they had of carrying it out; and, therefore, when they asked to have at their disposal the right of voting the number of troops which should be maintained by the Crown, they exercised a power over the Crown as to whether it should maintain excessive Military or Naval Forces—whether it should have the power of making war at any time. They had been asked why they had brought forward this Motion? They had brought it forward in the hope that what had been said and the protests which had been made would counteract the action of the Government as a precedent in relation to the Constitution. The debate of 1775 had been quoted over and over again. The majority, then, was overwhelming against those who protested. But at what did they look in that debate? They looked at the words of the men who spoke, at the words of Lord Camden, Lord Shelburne, and others, in order to learn what was the Constitution of this country. Since then 100 years had passed, generations of men had come and gone from that House, and generations of men would come and would go; and so, in the future, there would be men seeking to learn from the discussion of to-night the principles which governed them in this time, and, as they turned over the pages on which to-night's history would be written, on which page would their minds dwell? It would not be on the record of the division which would tell only of the blind cohesion of a Party. No, they would turn to the sayings of such men as the noble Lord and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, and would learn that there were those amongst us who refused to desert the imperilled privileges of Parliament, and so to sacrifice the best interests of the people.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

Mr. Speaker, the hon. and learned Gentleman, more than once in the course of his speech, apologized to the House for being obliged to detain us upon "dry and technical points of law." Now, Sir, there is no Member of the House, I will venture to say, from whom an apology of that kind—especially when he is speaking upon a subject of a legal and Constitutional character—is less required than from the hon. and learned Gentleman. There is no one who has a better title to be heard or whom the House would more attentively listen to upon such a question; but I was sorry that the hon. and learned Gentleman should have felt so much diffidence in his own power of commanding and retaining the attention of the House at this hour, if he had confined himself to dry legal details, that he thought it necessary and expedient to enliven his speech with a great deal of unnecessary warmth, and with a good deal of matter which had nothing whatever to do with the subject before us, and some of which I regretted to hear fall from his lips. Now, considering the large matters which the hon. and learned Gentleman had to speak upon, and how much he had to say, I think we might have been spared some part of that attack—I will not use the word attack; but of that disagreeable criticism in which he indulged with regard to the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck). It seems to me that it was not altogether necessary for the purposes of debate, and that it was scarcely justified by anything which had fallen from an hon. and learned Member who is so justly and largely respected in this House, to rake up some old forgotten pamphlet about the time of the close of the Napoleonic Wars, and which contained what was then the opinion of the hon. and learned Gentleman of the Tory Party. Whether the Tory Party have improved since that time, or the hon. and learned Gentleman has learned to know them better, I cannot tell; but certainly, the opinion which he was good enough to express with respect to us this evening was more favourable, and at this time of night it appears to me we might have been employed otherwise than in discussing that matter. I will endeavour to abstain from imitating the hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down, in various ways. I cannot pretend to cope with him in discussing the legal points which are involved in the question under our notice; but I will, as briefly as I can, remind the House what is the real point which it appears to me is now at issue. We are asked by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition to pass an abstract Resolution—I will not trouble the House with the words—with regard to what is required by the Constitution as to the keeping of the Forces by the Crown, and we are asked to do so in circumstances which distinctly show that no direct charge is made against the Government as to anything which they have done. Nothing of that sort is contained in the terms of the Resolution, the meaning of which undoubtedly is that there is a necessity that Parliament should place upon record the doctrine which it enunciates as to the conduct of the Government. I put the matter in the way in which hon. Gentlemen opposite wish it to be put. They do not consider the case is one in which it is their duty to bring forward a direct Vote of Censure; they do not consider the case is one in which it is right or necessary to discuss even the main lines of the policy which are involved in the measure we have adopted. Some of those who have spoken have travelled a little outside these bounds; but these are the limits which the noble Lord and the leading Members on the opposite side have prescribed to themselves. Well, we say in reply, whether your doctrine as you propose to lay it down be true, or whether it be false, we are equally convinced that there is no occasion whatever for your coming forward and laying down such a doctrine in an abstract form. We believe, and we ask the House to affirm, that existing statutes and existing practice with regard to the maintenance of troops by the Crown are sufficient to preserve and maintain all that the Constitution desires should be preserved and maintained. And we say it is even weakening those safeguards unnecessarily to place any new Resolution on record, and that there is nothing whatever in the circumstances which have occurred which justifies or calls for such a Motion. Therefore, we do not attempt to raise questions in any other form than this—that we move an Amendment to the effect that the Constitution is sufficiently expressed in the Acts of Parliament which exist on the subject, and that the Constitution is sufficiently fulfilled by the course which is to be taken with regard to the voting of the men, and voting the money and Supplies, and so forth. There is nothing in the conduct of the Government now or at any other time which calls for any other declaration. That is the issue which is before us; and I maintain, whatever may be the result of isolated questions upon particular points which have been discussed, that that position is sound and unassailable. Now, I wish to say one word, and one word only, upon the question of Prerogative. We have heard a great deal said in the course of this debate, and elsewhere, which would lead one to suppose that the Prerogative of the Crown was in some way or other opposed to the Constitution of the country, and that, in this instance, there was a struggle between the Prerogative and Constitutional rights. Now, Sir, that is not at all the view I take of Prerogative. I consider Prerogative, so far from being opposed to the Constitution, is, in fact, part of the Constitution. The Constitution of this country would not be what it is if it were not for the Prerogative which the Crown has entrusted to it, and which is exercised, let me say, not for the personal or selfish benefit of the Crown, not for the personal advantage of the Sovereign, but for the general good of the community. The constitution under which we have the happiness to live is a Constitution which has been framed with the view of attaining the best objects and working of Government, and it has been the opinion of our ancestors, and it is our own opinion, that the Prerogatives of the Crown are essential to the proper working of the Constitution. And, therefore, the Crown is entrusted with certain Prerogatives—as, for instance, in the case which is now before us, the Prerogatives of declaring peace or war, commanding the employment and administration of the Army, or the other Forces of the country. But the exercise of those powers is subject, of course, to the control which Parliament possesses. The Crown exercises every Prerogative not absolutely nor despotically, but is subject to Constitutional checks which have been devised, and which were not devised at one time, but in consequence of exigencies which from time to time have occurred. We have been talking, and necessarily must talk, of the Bill of Rights, and the other important statutes passed at about that period. But, as we have been told by many hon. and learned Gentlemen and others, that was not the beginning of all things. There was a great deal of Constitutional right before that. There have been many changes in the practice, and many changes in the circumstances, of the country since then; and the position of affairs is by no means the same as it was at the time the Bill of Rights and the other legislative enactments were passed. Well, now, what have we come to? We have come to a state of things in which all those dangers against which the Bill of Rights was especially directed have become practically impossible. Parliament has obtained such control over the action of the Crown in these matters as to make it utterly absurd to talk of being in danger. It would be utterly absurd to talk of seeing any danger of the action against which the Bill of Rights was directed. In the course of the debate we have heard a great deal about the words "this Kingdom." I cannot go into the question as to how far such words may possibly extend; but what I will refer to particularly is, that our ancestors passed this Bill of Rights as a declaratory Bill of their rights with regard to the Crown, and not with the view of directing the action of the Crown in foreign affairs, or in foreign wars. It was for the express purpose of preserving their own liberties at home that the Act was passed. They suffered from the maintenance of Forces which had been raised by the Crown, and which, to a great extent, were paid out of its private resources. They suffered by the maintenance of Forces, which were sometimes raised to overcome Parliament, and sometimes to oppress the people of this country, and to oppress them in this particular form. Not under the form of billeting, which in our own day causes a certain amount of inconvenience to particular traders when the inhabitants of a place have to find quarters for troops, but in the shape of billeting, which in those days was a very disagreeable thing indeed, and that carried with it a great deal more than mere accommodation for soldiers. When in any particular place soldiers were put under martial law, and the martial law extended not only to the soldiers but to the place in which they were billited, then there was good reason to object, and hence the protest that was made. But, since that, a different state of things has grown up—Parliament has asserted, and has obtained, a complete control over the Crown in the matter. It possesses great power of granting and refusing Supplies, and, although that power may be evaded for a few months, it is the great cardinal power by which the House governs in these matters. And Parliament possesses a great deal more than this, for it possesses, in the case of any trespass or abuse being attempted by Ministers, the power of turning them out, and at once bringing about a new state of things. But its power goes beyond even that. Parliament possesses the power, which it usually exercises, of passing the annual Mutiny Act, and by that means it enacts and makes it legal for the Crown to keep on foot a certain number of men, under whatever conditions or at whatever places they are kept. It does no more than say that it shall be legal for the Crown to have 135,000 as a standing Army. For the space of one year, Parliament, by the Mutiny Act, enacts that the Crown shall deal with these men and keep order and discipline amongst them. If that Act were to expire—if it were not renewed when it came to an end—the power of the Crown over the Army would stop, and it would be impossible for the Crown to keep that Army on foot. Therefore, there is a very clear and distinct power which Parliament, and this House especially, exercises over the right of the Crown to keep a standing Army. Well, then, we come to the question, how far is it that this state of things limits the power of the Crown? What we have always understood, and what, I think, all on both sides of this House will agree to—at least as a minimum—is this, that it is not legal for the Crown—it is not legal for the Ministers to advise the Crown—to bring into this country—into the United Kingdom—any Force beyond the number authorized by Parliament. What is the number authorized by Parliament? There is certainly the fixed number authorized in the Preamble of the Mutiny Act—namely, 135,000 men; but there are other Forces which it is perfectly legal to maintain in this country, because they are authorized by Parliament under other laws—I mean the Militia and the Reserves. These are not included in the number voted in the Mutiny Act, but they are authorized by Parliament under certain other statutes. Therefore, though not in the Mutiny Act, it is with the consent of Parliament that you employ them in this country. If that is true, that you may maintain certain Forces in this country which are not specified in the Mutiny Act and yet raised with the consent of Parliament, it follows that you cannot say because any particular Force is not mentioned in the Mutiny Act it cannot have the consent of Parliament. I wish that principle to be applied to the Indian Army, for it is one which the Crown maintains without its being inserted in the Mutiny Act; but it does not maintain it without the consent of Parliament. It maintains it by virtue of the authority given to the East India Company long ago, and subsequently transferred to the Crown. The power given to the Crown by Act of Parliament is given without limitation of numbers, and, therefore, it is upon very different terms from that which is given us to maintain the 135,000 men mentioned in the Mutiny Act. That the Indian Army is one which is duly authorized by Parliament is what I will venture to contend. I will not weary the House by attempting to go into the technical question; but these are our contentions—we contend that the authority given by Parliament to the Crown to maintain this Army, which is also duly raised under Parliamentary power, and which is raised upon terms that bind the soldier to go wherever he is ordered, gives authority to use those troops wherever they are directed to be sent, except when they are prohibited. It is, primâ facie, the right of the Crown to use that Army which is regularly authorized, and regularly constituted—an Army which is under proper discipline—it is, I say, the primâ facie right of the Crown to use that Army anywhere, except where it is forbidden by statute to go, and except under such limitations as are imposed by statute. What are they? One of these limitations is directed against bringing that Army into the United Kingdom. I know that there is one point which is at issue between us and hon. Gentlemen opposite. They deny that "Kingdom" means all the Dominions of Her Majesty. We dispute that point, and contend and believe that there is no ground—I may say, not the shadow of a ground—for maintaining that that is the correct view. Take the language of the Bill of Rights; that does not seem to carry more than the Kingdom of England as it was then. Take the precedents that have occurred from time to time—the changes that have taken place in the language of the Mutiny Acts—and see how the "United Kingdom" has gradually been substituted for "this Kingdom," and how the interpretations placed upon the language of Parliament, and upon the Constitution, by those who drew up and passed the Mutiny Act from year to year, are consistent with our contention. The hon. and learned Member quoted the language of those who took part in the debates in former years, particularly in the year 1775. I will not go into the question as to whether their language bears the exact meaning attributed to it or not; but I say that the alteration made in the Preamble of the Mutiny Act is the more forcible, and the more valuable, and, I may add, the more sensible interpretation of the meaning of Parliament than anything that can be gathered from it. Parliament may have changed its intention, if you like; or it may be that a former Parliament knew better than we do what its intentions were. Look again at a matter which may be fresh in the recollection of those who have attended these debates. There is a clause in the Mutiny Act—the 4th clause—which is nonsense, unless it mean that troops that must not be brought into the United Kingdom may be sent into the Colonies. It provides for troops to be drafted into the Colonies that cannot be brought into the United Kingdom, because those troops are not in the Mutiny Act. I have not heard any explanation given of the meaning of that clause by the hon. and learned Member for Taunton (Sir Henry James). How that 4th clause is to be explained, unless there is some such inference, I am not able to say. So much in regard to the restrictions imposed by the Mutiny Act upon the Prerogative of the Crown. We contend that it does not apply to the Dominions of Her Majesty outside the limits of the United Kingdom. But, then, it is said—"What a monstrous assertion you are now making; you are advancing a claim on behalf of the Crown to keep a standing Army of unlimited amount in any of the Dominions of Her Majesty outside of the United Kingdom without the consent of Parliament." If language is to be tortured, and we are to be pressed into extreme and absurd difficulties of that sort, we may as well close our debates altogether. All those clauses are subject, of course, to the Constitutional control which Parliament exercises over the Ministers. Take the question of the Prerogative of declaring war. It is very truly said that if you put in an extreme claim to construe the Prerogative strictly, the Crown has the right to-morrow morning, without the consent of Parliament, to declare war against France, Spain, Germany, or any other country, for any cause, or even for no cause, simply because it suited the fancy of the moment. But everybody knows that, although strictly the Prerogative of the Crown, it is as utterly impossible for any such thing to be done as it would be for us to commit any other act of madness or folly. Because it can be pressed to such absurd conclusions, it does not follow that the doctrine is not true; for almost any doctrine, if applied without reference to common sense, may be reduced to absurd conclusions. I know that absurd conclusions have been suggested by the hon. and learned Member for Durham (Mr. Herschell), and to those observations I make the same reply—that we make this claim subject to the reasonable and Constitutional construction of it. I am told that there is another limitation expressly applicable to the case of the Indian Forces. It is the express limitation, of which you have heard so much, in the 55th section of the Government of India Act. I should be wearying the House unnecessarily were I to repeat the whole history of the clause. I need hardly say that it is well known to have been introduced, in the first instance, by the right hon. Member for Greenwich to prevent the Indian troops being sent outside the limits of India, except in the case of invasion or other imminent danger. It was objected to by many great authorities—and none the less eminent because they belonged to the Liberal Party—Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, and Sir Cornewall Lewis expressed an opinion that it was not right to limit the Crown in that manner. They quoted history, and gave illustrations to show how injuriously it would work. Upon these representations, the clause was altered and another substituted. What was the meaning of putting in another clause permitting the troops to be sent where they were wanted, but providing that the Revenues of India should not be used to carry on a war without the knowledge of Parliament, if it were not wished to allow Her Majesty to make a proper use of her Indian Forces? I reminded the House some time ago that the clause received its construction not only from the language which was used at the time when it was proposed and discussed, but from the interpretation that was put upon it in the Votes of the same year by the Government of Lord Palmerston itself. In the case of the China Expedition, the troops were sent from India to China without the knowledge and consent of Parliament. That was done; and, for some time, at all events, a charge was made upon the Indian Revenue, but ultimately a Vote was taken to replace the cost. My right hon. Friend says he could justify that case, because it was a case of emergency. [Mr. GLADSTONE: A sudden, immediate necessity.] I certainly heard that, and I think, also, it was the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) who, in a very able speech on the first night of this debate, in commenting on the clause, said—"It was perfectly evident that the case of an invasion and an emergency applied not to an emergency that might arise in any part of Her Majesty's Dominions, but only in India." But this was not the case with regard to China. That was no part of India, but a place where the British flag had been insulted, and a sudden emergency arising, it became necessary to send troops. The Government of the day acted very properly—and, I think, Constitutionally—in taking the Indian Forces, and sending them at once, because they were the nearest and most convenient to the scene of action, just as we sent them to Abyssinia because they were the nearest. We have sent them to Malta for the same reason, because, under the circumstances, they were the most proper troops to send. But, let me just say one word with reference to what has been done since as regards the financial control. Whether the point is or is not as to the payment of these troops out of the Indian Revenues, I do not care. It may be one or the other. But the action taken in 1860 was much more calculated to defeat either or both of them than the action we have taken. The Force was sent out several months before it was mentioned in Parliament, and the expenses were incurred by the Indian Government, and it was not for some considerable time afterwards that Parliament was asked to repay the Indian Government the sum disbursed. We propose to repay the Indian Government at once. We do not even propose that the Indian Government shall be any money out of pocket if we can help it. India has undertaken a commission for England. She has sent a certain number of troops, and it is proposed that we shall undertake, on the part of this country, to repay every farthing of the expenditure so soon as we can get the information necessary to enable us to lay an Estimate before the House. I said, three weeks ago, that we should be able to lay that Estimate on the Table shortly, and on Monday I hope to do so. In the meantime, we keep the House informed of what we are doing, and we give the House an opportunity of pronouncing, at the earliest possible period, on the propriety of that expenditure, and we feel satisfied that they will make it good. Short of coming to Parliament for its previous consent before the measure was undertaken, I do not see what the Government could do more than it has done. Those who complain that Parliament is going to be put in a cleft stick by our course, are hardly consistent in saying that we ought to have asked for a Vote of Credit. If we had asked Parliament to do what I have no doubt this House would have done—re-voted the remainder of the credit of £6,000,000 not expended—if we had done that, we should have been told that those expenses ought to have been paid out of the Vote of Credit already taken. If that were so, we need not have come to Parliament for a Vote at all. I expressly stated, in bringing in the Budget Statement, that we did not propose to ask for a re-vote; we think it better to come with a Supplementary Estimate. Then, as to the concealment. It would not have been in my power, and it would not have been my duty, to have given information as to this particular measure which was then in contemplation, and which for military reasons it was necessary should be considered and matured in the breast of the Cabinet, in consultation with the Indian Government, before it was made public. If, Sir, we are not to be trusted in such a matter as the transfer of troops from India to the Mediterranean—a subject which could not be conveniently discussed or canvassed openly in the House of Commons—why, no doubt, we must be most incompetent and unfit to be Ministers of the Crown. I wish to say that, in what we have done, we have, so far as it was in our power, endeavoured to act strictly in conformity with what we believe to be the law. We do believe that we have kept the law—that we have not violated the provisions of the Bill of Rights, as we understand them—notwithstanding all that we have heard in this debate against our construction of it, we believe that we have not violated the provisions of the India Government Act. If we have done anything that can be called illegal—and I hardly think we have done even that—it is that we have committed ourselves to a certain expense, for which we are going to ask a Vote of Parliament. We have committed ourselves to that expense before we knew whether Parliament will sanction that Vote. This is a step which in one sense is illegal; and yet I doubt whether, in this case, it really is illegal, because we have Votes from this House for transports and pay, and it is only under these heads of Service that the expenses have been incurred. True, the sum we have taken is not sufficient to meet the charge of these troops; but, so far as it has gone, it is not true that if Parliament rejected this Vote, the expense would be thrown upon India. It would place the Government in a grave and awkward position, and would cause great confusion in the Army and Navy Estimates. However, even if Parliament refused the Vote, it would not involve the expense being thrown upon India. A great deal has been said about the conduct of General Peel and the language he used. He has been appealed to as a very high authority upon these matters. No one respects his authority and his opinion upon these questions more than I do; and in this particular case I respect it the more, for at the time General Peel was raising the question I had the honour to sit next him on that bench, and I was in frequent consultation with him upon the line he was taking. What was it he complained of? He was not contending that you could not raise the troops without having put them in the Mutiny Act in the first instance; he was not raising the question of the propriety of the expenditure at the time these troops were sent; what he objected to was their being kept at Hong Kong and Singapore, and maintained as a regular part of our Forces without their being put into the Mutiny Act. I quite agreed with him there, and I quite agreed that it would be most wrong to maintain troops for a long period as a part of the Regular Army without putting them into the Mutiny Act. When calling attention to the fact, General Peel complained that the Government did not put down these troops at all. He could not find out how the troops were to be paid for. It remained on the Estimates and accounts between the War Office and India, and Parliament knew nothing of it until General Peel forced the Government of the day—that of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich—to put those troops in the Army Estimates. There is no doubt, if a similar matter should occur—if these troops were maintained for a long period in the Mediterranean—it will be the duty of the Government to deal with them. But the point I advance is, that General Peel's action has nothing to do with the present position. There are many other points to which I might direct attention, but I feel ashamed to detain the House. It is not necessary for me to go into all the legal points which have been so well argued. But I must allude to one thing—namely, the remarkable case brought up against us by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich. He said we had forgotten all about the precedent of 1816, when there was a considerable British Force in France, and it was proposed that no money should be voted for these troops, because the French Government were ready to pay for and maintain them. And he says that sort of thing might happen again. I fancy someone threw out the idea, that possibly we might have the Indian Army brought into the Mediterranean and subsidized by the Government of Austria. I can only promise that if any such proposal be brought before the Government, the House shall have most ample means of considering it. But, really, the thing is too ridiculous to discuss. The control—the proper control—of Parliament over the employment of the Forces of the Crown is not weakened in the smallest degree by that which we have done. If we thought it had been, we should be the first to say—"Let us lay down any principles which are necessary to secure it." But we do not believe it, and, that being so, we cannot assent to any unnecessary and superfluous, and, therefore, mischievous Resolution. Sir, the fact of placing a superfluous and unnecessary Resolution upon the Books of Parliament, even if it were true, is in itself inconvenient. It is an imperfect expression. A Resolution that the first five Commandments were binding on Christians would be true, but the omission of the other five would give rise to considerable discussion as to why they had been left out. We say that we are acting in a spirit of loyalty to the Constitution. We say, in supporting the Prerogative of the Crown, we are not impugning the Constitution, but we are strengthening and maintaining a most essential part of it. We say the object for which we are doing this is an object, not for conspiring against the liberties of the people, but for the sake of maintaining great Imperial interests abroad. We have in view the protection of the interests of the Empire, and there is no idea of reversing the policy of the great men who passed the Bill of Rights. Nothing can be further from our thoughts. We know very well that the policy we are carrying out does not commend itself to everybody. We know perfectly well that there are some who dissent entirely from the line of policy we have adopted, and there are others who, although they do not dissent from our objects, are yet sceptical as to the course we are taking. They do not believe it is a proper course, or one that will lead to the results to be desired. We have, under a sense of deep responsibility, and under a sense of very great anxiety, endeavoured to do that which we thought was our duty to our country; and we have taken a course of measures which we believe to be best calculated to obtain a proper hearing for this country in the Councils of Europe, and to enable the country to take a proper position for the attainment of objects which I believe the great majority of the nation in reality demand. Of course, when we are discussing the propriety or impropriety of a particular step with Gentlemen who do not agree with that course itself, we stand at some disadvantage, because we are really arguing with different ideas in our minds. I give credit to right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite for being actuated by as patriotic motives as ourselves; and I believe, although I think them mistaken on some points, that they are equally desirous of maintaining the interests of the country. I claim from them that they should give the same credit to us, even though they may think the course we have taken is unwise, and that they will believe we have taken it honestly, and to promote no sinister object. We have taken the step of summoning a certain small, but gallant, portion of the Forces of our Indian Army to come to aid, if it should be necessary, in maintaining that which is not more a British than an Imperial interest, and, if an Imperial interest, then I am bold to say an Indian interest also. I believe the interest which the Indian Government has in this matter is far superior to any it had in the Peiho or Singapore Expeditions. There is a necessity laid upon us of seeing that our communications with India are uninterrupted—that is of importance to both sides of our Empire; and it is not unreasonable that we should call, if so advised, for some aid from our Indian Forces in maintaining these communications. Whether that be so or not, I entirely agree with what has been said by more than one speaker—that, however important the objects you are seeking may appear to be, their attainment would not be worth their price if it involved the sacrifice of the precious principles of the British Constitution. Attaching, as I do, great importance to the step we have taken—attaching, as I do, the greatest importance to the prosecution of the policy in which we are engaged—I would not recommend it if it infringed the principles of the Constitution. I do not believe that it does infringe those principles. Fully believing that the principles of the British Constitution are safe, and that there is no necessity for any superfluous vindication of them, I call on the House to reject the Motion of the noble Lord, and accept the Amendment of my right hon. Friend.

MAJOR NOLAN

said, it was not the custom of the Irish Party to follow the rules which governed the supporters of Ministers or ex-Ministers, and consequently he desired to make a few remarks. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had not made out any case for employing the Indian troops without the sanction of Parliament being first obtained. He did not see why the Chancellor of the Exchequer should not, before the adjournment for the Easter Recess, have acquainted the House with the intentions of the Government. Considering the right hon. Gentleman had not made out any case of urgent necessity for the employment of the Indian troops he (Major Nolan) intended to vote for the Resolution of the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition. He wished it to be distinctly understood that he did not object to the employment of Indian troops with the consent of Parliament, but he strongly protested against such a course being pursued without Parliamentary sanction, and hence he should vote against the Government. The proceedings of the Ministers in this respect either meant nothing or that this country was on the verge of a serious war. This step on the part of the Government seemed to him to be the natural sequence to what was called the Empress policy. It was a dangerous proceeding for the Government to deal with the resources of India without the consent of Parliament. The control of Parliament over the establishment and movement of troops at home was, to a large extent, a guarantee of our Constitutional liberties, and he thought this country ought to be even more jealous of the movement of Indian troops without the consent of Parliament than of the English Forces.

MR. BROMLEY-DAVENPORT

asked the indulgence of the House for a few moments. It was his duty not to give a silent vote on that occasion. He represented a large and important constituency (North Warwickshire), but which up to that time had been misrepresented in that debate. His constituency was second to none in its loyalty and patriotism, and he asserted, on its behalf, that he considered the conduct of the Government in this great, dangerous, and imminent crisis had been worthy of the highest praise. He considered that under the unprecedented and difficult circumstances in which the Government had been placed, they had acted with the greatest prudence and patriotism, and with the intention of, if possible, carrying out a pacific policy. He asked the attention of the right hon. Member for Greenwich to this fact. As long as the nation was influenced by his great eloquence what was the result—war, which he thought everyone must consider was a horrible, cruel, and brutal war. He believed he was quoting the words of the right hon. Gentleman correctly, when he said that the right hon. Gentleman had described it as a great and mighty enterprize, and that its results were glorious. But the nation now had a very different opinion, and the moment the nation ceased to listen to the brilliant eloquence of the right hon. Gentleman, what was the result? Peace, or the immediate prospects of peace. He asked his hon. Colleague (Mr. Newdegate) to remember that on the dimensions of the division that morning very much depended in the interests of peace, and that if he voted with the Opposition he would be voting directly in the interests of war.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

The speech we have lately heard from the Chancellor of the Exchequer has tended to cast somewhat of a calm and pacific influence over a rather warm discussion which preceeded it. When I listened to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman I was almost inclined to think that I was rather listening to a mediator between the two contending parties, than to one who was himself taking part in the contest. I really cannot say whether he did not argue as much against the extreme pretensions which have been put forward on the subject of the Prerogative of the Crown upon his own side, and, indeed, by some of his own Colleagues, as against anything which has fallen from this side of the House. The strongest thing he said was that there was no necessity for this Resolution. Now, I did not hear him say a single sentence which contradicted any proposition I have laid down; he merely says what the Home Secretary said—there is no necessity for what I have done. I have one word to say, and that is that we think the action taken by the Government, coupled with the declarations which have been made on this occasion, are in themselves mischievous; but we think that far more than anything they have done at present, their action tends to the establishment of a dangerous precedent which may hereafter be injurious to the liberties of the House and the liberties of this country. That is why we think the action of the Government, coupled with the declarations by which it has been supported, cannot be passed over. The right hon. Gentleman has begged the House not to press abstract truths to what he has called absurd conclusions. He said, and it is undoubtedly true, that it is the Prerogative of the Crown to make peace or declare war; but he says that that Constitutional axiom may be pressed to an absurd conclusion. I do not fully share the right hon. Gentleman's confidence in the accuracy of that statement. It appears to me that it would be perfectly possible for a Government to advise the Crown to declare war, and place Parliament and the country in a position from which they could not recede, however much they might repent it. That, it is clear to me, would be to press the Prerogative to an absurd conclusion. The right hon. Gentleman gave one illustration, which seemed to me to show, almost better than anything else, the real character of the pretensions made by the Government. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer said the Government would have been placed in what he called a cleft stick if, instead of taking the course they have adopted, they had asked the House for a Vote of Credit to meet the expense of moving the Indian troops to Malta. Now, let me suppose that the Vote of Credit which was obtained by them some time ago, instead of being expended within a few months, remained unexpended for eight or nine months longer—what necessity, I would ask, would there be that they should come to Parliament at all for the necessary money for the removal of these troops? This is entirely within the Prerogative of the Crown, the only control Parliament having being the providing of the expenses. But supposing, I say, the Government were in possession of an unexpected Vote, and had funds at their disposal, what necessity is there to come to Parliament at all? According to the Government dictum, the troops might be moved from India to Malta, and the whole transaction never brought before the attention of Parliament at all, until after the Vote of Credit had expired. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman would call that an absurd conclusion; but it appears to me to follow upon the assertions and pretensions put forward by the Government. The right hon. Gentleman, I may add, paid but very slight attention, in the course of his remarks, to the Amendment which has been moved by Her Majesty's Government. I still fail to see to what provision of law the Government refer in their Amendment. It does seem to me, with all the ingenuity and legal talent at the disposal of the Government, there is no law to be found, neither in the Mutiny Act, in the Bill of Rights, nor in the Indian Mutiny Act, which puts the uncontrolled disposal of these troops in the hands of the Government. Her Majesty's Government rest their defence upon two pleas—they plead that they are perfectly justified in what they have done; and, further, that an emergency existed which justified them in so acting, even if against the letter of the law. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies charged me with being either unable or unwilling to recognize that any emergency existed. Now, Sir, I am perfectly willing, for the purpose of argument, to admit the existence of an emergency in the present case. I am bound to admit that a very short time ago the House voted the existence of an emergency. But because that has taken place, are we to be perfectly blind to the nature of the emergency, and to say that it is one which would justify the Government in taking any measure which they may think fit? Why, what is the emergency upon which we voted a short time ago? We are told by the Government that it was one which rendered necessary some preparations. We are told that measures of preparation only were required. But is this one of the measures of preparation? What is the object of it? Not to place 7,000 additional men as soon as possible in Malta, as that object would have been accomplished a great deal more expeditiously by sending troops from England. The object was not to increase the resources of Malta, but to show to the whole world that you have power to move and dispose of the Forces of your Indian Empire for the purposes of European policy. If that emergency was one of such instant and urgent necessity that Her Majesty's Government were obliged to move those troops in such haste that Parliament could not be consulted or informed of it until afterwards, I quite recognize the point, for it might be right to use the whole of the Indian armament for the purpose of European policy, yet the measure taken is one which would have been more effective if it had been deliberately sanctioned by Parliament before being carried into effect, instead of being done in such a hasty manner that Parliament is unable to do anything in it, except vote the expense which has been incurred in the Estimate that will be presented to it. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck), in language to which we are now tolerably accustomed, criticized somewhat severely the conduct of the Opposition, and proceeded to compare the conduct of the Opposition with that of the Government, in that impartial and judicial manner of which he is a master. He said the Government must know the state of affairs better than anyone else, and that the measure which they proposed must be the best which could be taken in the emergency. Referring to our conduct, he said we knew nothing at all about the matter, and suggested that our conduct could only have been dictated by Party animus. Well, if that be the state of the case—if the Government are the only people who can know anything about the matter, and if we have no pretensions to represent the opinions of the country—what is the use of keeping Parliament in Session? If it be unpatriotic to discuss in any way or to raise the slightest doubt about the perfect wisdom of the course taken by Her Majesty's Government, why are we given an opportunity of discussing it? Why are the Estimates presented to us? And why are we asked to vote the Supplies for the year, if we are not to discuss them? Her Majesty's Government had better send us home as rapidly as possible if we are not to be given an opportunity for taking this factious and unpatriotic course. The hon. and learned Gentleman wound up with a rather strong declaration as to the unpatriotic course we have taken, and I think he said that it is not what honest and patriotic men would have done. The hon. and learned Member ought to be a good judge of these things. He has not always been sparing of criticism on a Government for their proceedings in reference to war. He moved no less than three Votes of Censure on Administrations for their proceedings in war, before war, and during war. His experience, therefore, ought rather to have influenced him in favour of the wisdom of the course we are taking in criticizing the proceedings of the Government while the measures are in contemplation. I do not think after the war was over there would be any use in discussing the matter. It would be as dead as Julius Cæsar. The hon. and learned Gentleman did not think it unpatriotic, while war was going on, to criticize the proceedings of the Ministry, and he was then successful, for he turned them out; and, not satisfied with that achievement, when he got a Minister more to his taste at that time, at any rate, for he was a most energetic supporter of the war—when Lord Palmerston succeeded Lord Aberdeen—the hon. and learned Gentleman did not leave off his attacks. When Lord Palmerston appealed to the hon. and learned Gentleman, to refrain for the moment from pressing his Motion for the immediate appointment of a Committee to inquire into the administration of the Army in the Crimea, he would not hear of it, and it is certain that he did not then think that the Government were the only people who could possibly know anything about the matter. At all events, I must say, that great as may be the influence and authority of the hon. and learned Member, I must decline to receive from him, or from any other Member of this House, instructions as to my course. I assert that I, and those who act with me, are as honest and as patriotic as the hon. and learned Member himself. Sir, I confess that I should like to have said something about our old friend the Bill of Rights. I beg the House, however, not to be alarmed upon that subject, for I see that the hour is too late for me to do so, and I will not trespass upon the attention of the House by entering upon the legal argument. We have had an extremely interesting discussion of the legal points between the hon. and learned Members of this House. But I think too much importance has been attributed to the interesting speech of the Attorney General. In the course of this debate, the House will observe the great importance attached to that speech by both sides. I think almost undue importance has been attached to it, for able as was the argument of the Attorney General, it must be recollected that he stands towards the House and the Government, of which he is a Member, in a peculiar position—in a position which is unexampled, so far as I know in history, of any Member of any Government of this country. I read the other day a speech delivered by the hon. and learned Gentleman during last Easter Recess to his constituents at Preston. I think I may trouble the House with a short extract, to show the relation in which the hon. Gentleman stands towards the Government. The Attorney General said— It was, in his humble and honest opinion—and he would say so at the risk of getting a good 'wigging'—a most unjust war waged by Rusaia against Turkey. He went on to say he would have declared to Russia as soon as war was declared—"If you send a single soldier across the Pruth we will declare war against you." I do not know whether the hon. and learned Gentleman got the 'wigging' which he anticipated; but, at all events, his speech shows that the Attorney General occupies a somewhat remarkable position towards the Government. He is bound, no doubt, to defend them in this House, but he is evidently not bound to agree with them. We know now what his opinion really is about the policy to be pursued when war broke out. The hon. and learned Gentleman made a very good speech in May last year in defence of the foreign policy of her Majesty's Government, which I am under the impression was not a policy of declaring war against Russia when she crossed the Pruth, but a policy of conditional neutrality. Therefore, I think that we ought not to attach too much importance to the opinions advocated by the hon. and learned Gentleman on this occasion. He has defended the action taken by the Government, as it was his duty to do; but what his real opinions are as to the Prerogative of the Crown with regard to a standing Army and the Privilege of Parliament, we must wait for until six, nine, or twelve months hence, when he goes to address his constituents at Preston. My right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich, I think, conferred a benefit upon the House and the country by the statement, which I will not weaken by repeating, as to the contentions virtually made by Her Majesty's Government in this House. The Under Secretary of State for India reduced those contentions the other day to an arithmetical form for the assistance of the House, and I think he stated the case rather neatly, although, at the same time, not quite accurately. The Under Secretary of State for India said that the Mutiny Bill authorized the Government to keep so many men out of India, plus so many men in India. Well, that appears to be a very accurate way of putting it; but the hon. Gentleman really asked the House to assert that the Mutiny Bill and the other Acts bearing on this subject enabled Her Majesty to maintain this number of men—the number voted in the Estimates, and included in the Mutiny Bill—plus the number serving in India, plus the number who may have been serving in India, but who are brought out of India to serve anywhere else. That is a sum which does not agree with the sum given by the Under Secretary of State for India, and I venture to think that my way of putting it is more accurate than his. We have been told that there is no necessity for any great jealousy of a standing Army in these days. That may be so; but if the House is to relax its jealousy of a standing Army, it ought to be done deliberately and in public. I do not think the people of this country have relaxed their jealousy of a standing Army, whatever the House may have done. I am by no means certain that this House has relaxed its jealousy, and I do not think it ought to do so. It is said that it is absolutely impossible that our liberties in these days can be menaced by a standing Army. I do not know that, Sir. In the recollection of all of us we have seen countries in which liberties have been lost through the influence of standing Armies; and we hear from time to time that our Army is not a large one compared with the resources of the country. We have also heard great complaints of the small number of our soldiers; and there is a proposal for something very much resembling universal conscription. Who knows, but that under some fancy or some desire to take a more prominent part in the conflicts of Europe, our standing Army may not be increased? How is it possible to foretell that under no circumstances a standing Army may not encroach upon the Privileges of Parliament. If it be true that there is less reason now to fear that a standing Army will conflict with the liberties of the country than there used to be, there seems to be one danger far greater than it was 200 years ago. No doubt, as we are told, the Crown has, and always had, the power of making war, but it has it far more completely and absolutely now than it ever had it at any previous period. Formerly wars were conducted on a comparatively small scale, and with comparatively a great expenditure of time. Government did not want large Forces of men then, nor large pecuniary resources. Preparations had to be made long before hand, and after they had been made and the Expedition sent out—things not being conducted on the scale of modern wars—both Armies went into winter quarters; and there was plenty of time to consider, and perhaps to give up the war. But now, with the great Armies and great resources at the disposal of our Government, and telegraphic communications all over the world, the Government may give an order which, within a week, may make a great war absolutely inevitable—a war over which Parliament can have no control whatever. It is useless to tell us we have a control over the proceedings of Government by our privilege of voting Supplies. We know, in this instance, what that privilege of voting Supplies means. It would be utterly impossible—however much Parliament might desire it—for it to refuse to vote the expense of the 7,000 troops coming to Malta. A Government may give orders, which will make inevitable a war in more than one quarter of the globe, over which it would be impossible for Parliament to exercise any control where it has once broken out. Sir, I maintain that the powers of the Government for making war are far greater than they have been at any previous period. I believe the precautions and restrictions which Parliament has always thought it necessary to take against the existence of a standing Army should not be relaxed, but rather strengthened. Repeating again, that the action of the Government, supported by the reasons that they have given, does tend to relax these restrictions, which, I maintain, ought to be strengthened, I still prefer the Resolution I moved to the Amendment which has been proposed by the Government.

MR. O'DONNELL

could not support the action of the Government, since it had been defended on absolutist principles. From what had been said by the Government, it seemed that their main reason for the course they had taken was the necessity of maintaining secrecy. That was the necessity of maintaining secrecy towards the lmperial Parliament, but not to anyone else. He knew that long before the news had reached this country—before even that a definite order for the despatch of the Indian troops to Malta had left the Goverment at home—the measure had been discussed and criticized openly in India; long before the 15th of last month, the removal of the troops to Malta was already common talk in India. At that time, colonels were trying the state of feeling in their regiments with regard to their willingness to embark on an European enterprize. He was perfectly sure that what had been kept secret from Parliament was no secret at all, and was well known to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh. The only quarter in which the Government were able to maintain secrecy was the quarter in which their maintaining it was the most indefensible—namely, in respect of the Imperial Parliament. He maintained there was involved in this matter a very important principle beyond the mere question of the justice of the expenditure incurred in the matter. By the action of the Government, in keeping secrecy as to its intentions with them until it had carried them out, the House had been deprived of an opportunity of considering beforehand what would be the effect of the measure upon the domestic conduct and upon the future policy of India. It could not be denied that the House had been deprived of the opportunity of discussing the propriety of calling upon Indian mercenaries—engaged to maintain in India the defence of that Empire—of calling upon them to take part in an European war. The most disastrous administration was being carried on in India by imposing a vexatious taxation upon the country against its protests, till it amounted to financial oppression. It could not be denied that this House had a right to consider the whole bearing of this demand upon the military resources of India. What was the example now being held out to our Indian fellow-subjects? The worst of the Natives of India were induced by prospects of gain to leave their country, while the industrious taxpayers of the country were as far off as ever of receiving protection of Her Majesty's Government. He heartily and entirely concurred in the sentiments of the hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Major Nolan). The Irish Members had a double interest in resisting the advance of absolutist principles; for, if the British Constitution should be worsened, it must be taken for certain that the Irish would get the worst of the worsening. After taking the step of removing the Indian troops without consulting that House, the Government came forward and pretended to be acting for the benefit of the Constitution, even while advancing such exaggerated views of the Royal Prerogative. He trusted, that in years to come, it would not be found that the voluntary champions of an exaggerated Prerogative—the champions of that Party whose views were to be read in a recent article in The Quarterly Review—had injured that Prerogative, and lessened the respect in which it ought to be held.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 226; Noes 347: Majority 121.

AYES.
Acland, Sir T. D.	Cross, J. K.
Allen, W. S.	Davie, Sir H. R. F.
Amory, Sir J. H.	Davies, R.
Anderson, G.	Delahunty, J.
Anstruther, Sir R.	Dickson, T. A.
Ashley, hon. E. M.	Dilke, Sir C. W.
Backhouse, E.	Dillwyn, L. L.
Barclay, A. C.	Dodds, J.
Barclay, J. W.	Dodson, rt. hon. J. G.
Barran, J.	Downing, M'C.
Bass, A.	Duff, M. E. G.
Bass, H.	Duff, R. W.
Baxter, rt. hn. W. E.	Dundas, J. C.
Bazley, Sir T.	Earp, T.
Beaumont, Colonel F.	Edwards, H.
Bell, I. L.	Egerton, Admiral hn. F.
Biddulph, M.	Ellice, E.
Blake, T.	Errington, G.
Blennerhassett, R. P.	Evans, T. W.
Brassey, H. A.	Eyton, P. E.
Brassey, T.	Fawcett, H.
Briggs, W. E.	Ferguson, R.
Bright, J. (Manchester)	Fitzmaurice, Lord E.
Bristowe, S. B.	Fletcher, I.
Brogden, A.	Foljambe, F. J. S.
Brooks, M.	Forster, Sir C.
Brown, A. H.	Forster, rt. hon. W. E.
Brown, J. C.	Fothergill, R.
Bruce, Lord C.	Gladstone, rt. hn.W. E.
Burt, T.	Gladstone, W. H.
Cameron, C.	Goldsmid, Sir J.
Campbell, Sir G.	Gordon, Lord D.
Campbell-Bannerman, H.	Goschen, rt. hon. G. J.
	Gourley, E. T.
Carington, hn. Col. W.	Gower, hon. E. F. L.
Cave, T.	Grant, A.
Cavendish, Lord F. C.	Grey, Earl de
Cavendish, Lord G.	Grosvenor, Lord R.
Chadwick, D.	Hankey, T.
Chamberlain, J.	Harcourt, Sir W. V.
Chambers, Sir T.	Harrison, C.
Childers, rt. hon. H.	Harrison, J. F.
Cholmeley, Sir H.	Hartington, Marq. of
Clarke, J. C.	Havelock, Sir H.
Clifford, C. C.	Hayter, A. D.
Clive, G.	Henry, M.
Cogan, rt. hn. W. H. F.	Herschell, F.
Cole, H. T.	Hibbert, J. T.
Colebrooke, Sir T. E.	Hill, T. R.
Collins, E.	Holland, S.
Colman, J. J.	Holms, J.
Conyngham, Lord F.	Holms, W.
Corbett, J.	Hopwood, C. H.
Cotes, C. C.	Howard, hon. C.
Courtney, L. H.	Howard, E. S.
Cowan, J.	Hughes, W. B.
Cowper, hon. H. F.	Hutchinson, J. D.

Ingram, W. J.	Pennington, F.
Jackson, Sir H. M.	Perkins, Sir F.
James, W. H.	Philips, R. N.
James, Sir H.	Playfair, rt. hon. L.
Jenkins, D. J.	Plimsoll, S.
Jenkins, E.	Portman, hon. W. H. B.
Johnstone, Sir H.	Potter, T. B.
Kay-Shuttleworth, Sir U.	Power, J. O'C.
	Price, W. E.
Kingscote, Colonel	Ralli, P.
Knatchbull-Hugessen, rt. hon. E.	Ramsay, J.
	Rathbone, W.
Laing, S.	Reed, E. J.
Law, rt. hon. H.	Richard, H.
Lawrence, Sir J. C.	Robertson, H.
Leatham, E. A.	Russell, Lord A.
Leeman, G.	Rylands, P.
Lefevre, G. J. S.	St. Aubyn, Sir J.
Leith, J. F.	Samuelson, B.
Lloyd, M.	Samuelson, H.
Lowe, rt. hon. R.	Seely, C.
Lubbock, Sir J.	Sheridan, H. B.
Lush, Dr.	Simon, Mr. Serjeant
Lusk, Sir A.	Sinclair, Sir J. G. T.
Macdonald, A.	Smith, E.
Macduff, Viscount	Smyth, P. J.
Mackintosh, C. F.	Smyth, R.
M'Arthur, A.	Stansfeld, rt. hon. J.
M'Arthur, W.	Stanton, A. J.
M'Lagan, P.	Stevenson, J. C.
M'Laren, D.	Stewart, J.
Maitland, J.	Stuart, Colonel
Marjoribanks, Sir D. C.	Sullivan, A. M.
Marling, S. S.	Swanston, A.
Massey, rt. hon. W. N.	Tavistock, Marquess of
Matheson, A.	Taylor, D.
Meldon, C. H.	Taylor, P. A.
Middleton, Sir A. E.	Temple, right hon. W. Cowper-
Milbank, F. A.
Monk, C. J.	Tracy, hon. F. S. A. Hanbury-
Morgan, G. O.
Morley, S.	Trevelyan, G. O.
Mundella, A. J.	Villiers, rt. hon. C. P.
Muntz, P. H.	Vivian, A. P.
Murphy, N. D.	Vivian, H. H.
Newdegate, C. N.	Waddy, S. D.
Noel, E.	Waterlow, Sir S. H.
Nolan, Major	Weguelin, T. M.
Norwood, C. M.	Whalley, G. H.
O'Brien, Sir P.	Whitbread, S.
O'Conor, D. M.	Whitwell, J.
O'Conor Don, The	Williams, B. T.
O'Donnell, F. H.	Williams, W.
O'Shaughnessy, R.	Wilson, C.
O'Sullivan, W. H.	Wilson, Sir M.
Palmer, C. M.	Young, A. W.
Palmer, G.
Parker, C. S.	TELLERS.
Pease, J. W.	Adam, rt. hn. W. P.
Peel, A. W.	Kensington, Lord
pender, J.

NOES.
Agnew, R. V.	Arkwright, A. P.
Alexander, Colonel	Arkwright, F.
Allcroft, J. D.	Ashbury, J. L.
Allen, Major	Assheton, R.
Allsopp, C.	Astley, Sir J. D.
Allsopp, H.	Bagge, Sir W.
Anstruther, Sir W.	Bailey, Sir J. R.
Arbuthnot, Lt.-Col. G.	Balfour, A. J.
Archdale, W. H.	Baring, T. C.

Barne, F. St. J. N.	Eaton, H. W.
Barrington, Viscount	Edmonstone, Admiral Sir W.
Barttelot, Sir W. B.
Bates, E.	Egerton, hon. A. F.
Bateson, Sir T.	Egerton, Sir P. G.
Beach, rt. hon. Sir M. H.	Egerton, hon. W.
Beach, W. W. B.	Elcho, Lord
Bective, Earl of	Elliot, Sir G.
Benett-Stanford, V. F.	Elliot, G. W.
Bentinck, rt. hon. G. C.	Elphinstone, Sir J. D. H.
Bentinck, G. W. P.	Emlyn, Viscount
Beresford, Lord C.	Estcourt, G. S.
Beresford, G. De la P.	Ewart, W.
Birley, H.	Ewing, A. O.
Blackburne, Col. J. I.	Fellowes, E.
Boord, T. W.	Fielden, J.
Bourke, hon. R.	Finch, G. H.
Bourne, Colonel	Fitzwilliam, hon. C. W. W.
Bousfield, Colonel
Bowen, J. B.	Floyer, J.
Bowyer, Sir G.	Forester, C. T. W.
Brady, J.	Forsyth, W.
Brise, Colonel R.	Foster, W. H.
Broadley, W. H. H.	Fraser, Sir W. A.
Brooks, W. C.	Fremantle, hon. T. F.
Bruce, hon. T.	French, hon. C.
Bruen, H.	Freshfield, C. K.
Brymer, W. E.	Gallwey, Sir W. P.
Bulwer, J. R.	Galway, Viscount
Burghley, Lord	Gardner, J. T. Agg-
Burrell, Sir W. W.	Gardner, R. Richardson-
Buxton, Sir R. J.
Cameron, D.	Garnier, J. C.
Campbell, C.	Gibson, rt. hon. E.
Cartwright, F.	Giffard, Sir H. S.
Castlereagh, Viscount	Gilpin, Sir R. T.
Cave, rt. hon. S.	Goddard, A. L.
Cecil, Lord E. H. B. G.	Goldney, G.
Chaine, J.	Gooch, Sir D.
Chaplin, Colonel E.	Gordon, W.
Chaplin, H.	Gore-Langton, W. S.
Charley, W. T.	Gorst, J. E.
Christie, W. L.	Goulding, W.
Churchill, Lord R.	Grantham, W.
Clive, Col. hon. G. W.	Greenall, Sir G.
Close, M. C.	Greene, E.
Clowes, S. W.	Gregory, G. B.
Cobbold, T. C.	Guinness, Sir A.
Cochrane, A. D. W. R. B.	Gurney, rt. hon. R.
Cole, Col. hon. H. A.	Hall, A. W.
Coope, O. E.	Halsey, T. F.
Cordes, T.	Hamilton, Lord C. J.
Corry, hon. H. W. L.	Hamilton, I. T.
Corry, J. P.	Hamilton, right hon. Lord G.
Cotton, W. J. R.
Crichton, Viscount	Hamilton, Marquess of
Cross, rt. hon. R. A.	Hamilton, hon. R. B.
Cubitt, G.	Hamond, C. F.
Cuninghame, Sir W.	Hanbury, R. W.
Cust, H. C.	Harcourt, E. W.
Dalkeith, Earl of	Hardcastle, E.
Dalrymple, C.	Hardy, hon. A. E.
Davenport, W. B.	Hardy, hon. S.
Deedes, W.	Harvey, Sir R. B.
Denison, C. B.	Hay, rt. hn. Sir J. C. D.
Denison, W. B.	Heath, R.
Denison, W. E.	Helmsley, Viscount
Dick, F.	Herbert, H. A.
Dickson, Major A. G.	Herbert, hon. S.
Digby, Col. hon. E.	Hermon, E.
Douglas, Sir G.	Hervey, Lord F.
Duff, J.	Heygate, W. U.
Dyott, Colonel R.	Hick, J.

Hildyard, T. B. T.	Naghten, Lt.-Colonel
Hill, A. S.	Newport, Viscount
Hinchingbrook, Visc.	Noel, rt, hon. G. J.
Holford, J. P. G.	North, Colonel
Holker, Sir J.	Northcote, rt. hon. Sir S. H.
Holland, Sir H. T.
Holmesdale, Viscount	O'Byrne, W. R.
Home, Captain	O'Gorman, P.
Hood, Captain hon. A. W. A. N.	O'Leary, W.
	O'Neill, hon. E.
Hope, A. J. B. B.	Onslow, D.
Hubbard, E.	Paget, R. H.
Hubbard, rt. hon. J.	Palk, Sir L.
Isaac, S.	Parker, Lt.-Col. W.
Jervis, Colonel	Peek, Sir H.
Johnson, J. G.	Peel, rt. hon. Sir R.
Johnstone, Sir F.	Pell, A.
Jolliffe, hon. S.	Pemberton, E. L.
Jones, J.	Pennant, hon. G.
Kennard, Colonel	Peploe, Major
Kennaway, Sir J. H.	Percy, Earl
King-Harman, E. R.	Phipps, P.
Knight, F. W.	Pim, Captain B.
Knightley, Sir R.	Plunket, hon. D.R.
Knowles, T.	Plunkett, hon. R.
Lacon, Sir E. H. K.	Polhill-Turner, Capt.
Lawrence, Sir T.	Powell, W.
Learmonth, A.	Praed, C. T.
Lechmere, Sir E. A. H.	Praed, H. B.
Lee, Major V.	Price, Captain
Legard, Sir C.	Puleston, J. H.
Legh, W. J.	Raikes, H. C.
Leighton, Sir B.	Read, C. S.
Leighton, S.	Rendlesham, Lord
Lennox, Lord H. G.	Repton, G. W.
Leslie, Sir J.	Ridley, Sir M. W.
Lewis, C. E.	Ripley, H. W.
Lewis, O.	Ritchie, C. T.
Lewisham, Viscount	Rodwell, B. B. H.
Lindsay, Col. R. L.	Roebuck, J. A.
Lindsay, Lord	Rothschild, Sir N. M. de
Lloyd, S.	Round, J.
Lloyd, T. E.	Russell, Sir C.
Lopes, Sir M.	Ryder, G. R.
Lorne, Marquess of	Sackville, S. G. S.
Lowther, hon. W.	Salt, T.
Lowther, rt. hon. J.	Samuda, J. D'A.
Macartney, J. W. E.	Sanderson, T. K.
Mac Iver, D.	Sandon, Viscount
M'Garel-Hogg, Sir J.	Sclater-Booth, rt. hn. G.
Majendie, L. A.	Scott, Lord H.
Makins, Colonel	Scott, M. D.
Malcolm, J. W.	Selwin-Ibbetson, Sir H. J.
Mandeville, Viscount
March, Earl of	Severne, J. E.
Marten, A. G.	Shirley, S. E.
Master, T. W. C.	Shute, General
Mellor, T. W.	Sidebottom, T. H.
Merewether, C. G.	Simonds, W. B.
Miles, P. J. W.	Smith, A.
Mills, A.	Smith, F. C.
Mills, Sir C. H.	Smith, S. G.
Monckton, F.	Smith, rt. hn. W. H.
Montgomerie, R.	Smollett, P. B.
Montgomery, Sir G. G.	Somerset, Lord H. R.C.
Moore, A.	Spinks, Mr. Serjeant
Moore, S.	Stanhope, hon. E.
Moray, Colonel H. D.	Stanhope, W. T. W. S.
Morgan, hon. F.	Stanley, rt. hn. Col. F.
Morris, G.	Starkey, L. R.
Mowbray, rt. hon. J. R.	Starkie, J. P. C.
Mulholland, J.	Steere, L.
Muncaster, Lord	Stewart, M. J.

Storer, G.	Watney, J.
Sykes, C.	Watson, rt. hon. W.
Talbot, C. R. M.	Welby-Gregory, Sir W.
Talbot, J. G.	Wellesley, Colonel
Taylor, rt. hon. Col.	Wells, E.
Tennant, R.	Wethered, T. O.
Thornhill, T.	Wheelhouse, W. S. J.
Thwaites, D.	Whitelaw, A.
Thynne, Lord H. F.	Wilmot, Sir H.
Tollemache, hon. W. F.	Wilmot, Sir J. E.
Torr, J.	Wilson, W.
Tremayne, J.	Wolff, Sir H. D.
Trevor, Lord A. E. Hill-	Woodd, B. T.
Turnor, E.	Wroughton, P.
Wait, W. K.	Wyndham, hon. P.
Walker, O. O.	Wynn, Sir W. W.
Walker, T. E.	Wynn, C. W. W.
Wallace, Sir R.	Yarmouth, Earl of
Walsh, hon. A.	Yeaman, J.
Walter, J.	Yorke, J. R.
Warburton, P. E.
Ward, M. F.	TELLERS.
Watkin, A. M.	Dyke, Sir W. H.
Watkin, Sir E. W.	Winn, R.
Words added.

Words added.

Main Question, as amended, put. Resolved, That this House, being of opinion that the Constitutional control of Parliament over the raising and employment of the Military Forces of the Crown is fully secured by the provisions of the Law, and by the undoubted power of this House to grant or refuse Supplies, considers it to be unnecessary and inexpedient to affirm any Resolution tending to weaken the hands of Her Majesty's Government in the present state of Foreign affairs.