§ MR. DILLWYNrose to call attention to a matter of principle, bearing on the question of the Government coming forward year by year and proposing Supplementary Estimates. In 185 7 the Civil Service Estimates amounted to £9,396,000—last year they had risen £21,756; and even that was found insufficient; and they were now called upon to vote £338,000 to complete the Services of the year. Moreover, on looking into this Supplemental Estimate, he was afraid that one of the great checks this House had established over 1506 the expenditure was being evaded. It was a primary rule of their procedure that if a saving was made under one head of the Votes, while under another head the Vote was exceeded, the saving on the one could not be used to supply the excess of the other; the balance must be returned into the Treasury, and a distinct Vote applied for to cover the increased expenditure of the other. But that was not so as regarded sub-heads under the same Vote—in that case the excess of one sub-head was frequently applied to make up the deficiency of the other. Now, in looking into the Estimates, he frequently found that the money voted for one purpose had been applied to another. For instance, in Class IV., under "Science and Art Department," it was reported in the Appropriation Account that they had exceeded the amount voted to them by more than £12,000; but they had taken various sums that had been saved under other sub-heads, and which ought to have been surrendered to the Exchequer, and applied them to sub-heads, the Votes on which had been greatly exceeded. The Report of the Auditor General said—
The sum thus voted proved insufficient to meet the charges thrown upon these sub-heads, hut the matter was met by the saving on the other sub-heads, and the total amount of the head was not exceeded.The proper course would have been to come to this House for a Supplementary Vote for the deficiency where it had arisen. The system of transfer from one head to another was against the principle of the rule to which he had alluded, for by it the Government were able to use money intended to be spent on a popular Vote on one that was very questionable, and for which they might not have been able to get as large a Vote as they wanted. It was the more objectionable, as the Estimates amounted already to an enormous sum, and were increasing year by year. He wished to insist that the rule should be adhered to which required that surplus balances should be surrendered to the Exchequer, and that any addition to be made to other heads should be obtained by a Vote of the House in the regular way, and not by transfer from one head to another. He thought the attention of the House ought to be called to the enormous expenditure they were now 1507 asked to vote for Civil Service Expenditure. He found fault with the spending disposition of the Government, which was unexampled, and he thought it was a great pity that supporters of the Ministry should come in from the smoking-room, knowing nothing of the arguments that had been adduced, and out-vote those who had attended to what they were voting on, and took an active interest in reducing the expenditure of the country.
§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURalso complained of the increase in Supplementary Estimates, thinking the time had come when the House should try and remedy this state of things. He pointed in particular to the increase of expenditure on the Royal Palaces. Whatever was required for supporting the dignity of the Royal Family he was in favour of being given with a liberal hand; but there was a large expenditure connected with those Palaces not in the occupation of the Crown that could be avoided. He strongly objected to these vacant Palaces—so far as the expression referred to the Crown—being inhabited by other parties. If it be desirable for the dignity of the Crown to have the means of benefiting individuals, then let money be voted, to enable the Crown to give funds to parties to hire suitable houses. It was unwise to continue the bad practice of housing respectable people in Palaces. He likewise complained of an increase in expenditure on law and justice, which the people could not get administered, of no less than £1,500,000 within seven years. Then as to the transference from one head of money voted to it to another, he pointed out that this was an evasion of the law. Last year the attention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was called to this point, and he now again called attention to it, and particularly asked for attention to this bad practice on the part of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury. He pressed upon the hon. and gallant Member that no sum of money should be taken from the one purpose to which it was voted and applied to others. He did not mean to say that the sum first voted should always be held to have been sufficient for the purpose. No doubt, circumstances might occur to necessitate a Supplementary Vote. But the necessity should be fully established before the Treasury 1508 permitted any such estimate to be put forward. Where such need should arise, then he proposed that a sum should be set apart for meeting deficiencies, and that a Department which went to that fund and got assistance from it should be obliged to come before the House at the earliest possible moment, and ask it to make good the deficiency in the fund. As an instance of the irregularity, he referred to the application to Dover Harbour of money which had been voted for other harbours, and expressed a hope that measures might be devised by which a more effectual control over the expenditure would be secured to the House of Commons.
§ COLONEL STANLEYsaid, the twofold objections of the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn) were rather contradictory. The hon. Member had demurred to the extent of the Supplementary Estimates, and then with equal force to the system of applying money voted for one purpose to another. So far as theory went, he agreed with the hon. Member for Swansea, and with the hon. and gallant Member for Kincardine (Sir George Balfour), as to the un-desirableness of having Supplementary Estimates at all; but he was bound by what was practicable. Supplementary Estimates were chiefly due to three or four causes. It was, first of all, the custom, the wholesome custom, to regulate the Estimates more closely in accordance with the Services for which they were intended than formerly. The Estimates were also presented to the House at a much earlier period of the year, and it was obviously impossible in a case in which sums so large in amount were involved to form as correct an estimate for 14 months as for 12. It must also be borne in mind that there was a source of expenditure over which neither the Treasury nor the other public officers had a very great control—he alluded to those instances in which extensive operations were being carried on in the nature of contracts. Another source of expenditure was that which, however great the sums laid out might be, was in itself actually reproductive, whether in a money point of view, or in that of the general convenience of the public service, and with respect to which, after the expiration of the year, it was therefore deemed advisable that a further outlay should be incurred, 1509 That remark applied to such Services as our Postal and Telegraphic systems. Motions made in that House, he might add, were a further cause leading to expenditure, and although he was quite of opinion that it was not desirable to transfer the amounts voted under one sub-head to another, he would ask the House what the alternative was to be? He quite agreed with the hon. Member that the control exercised by the House over the Public Accounts was, to some extent, ex post facto; but the greater part of the expenditure could only be decided and apportioned by the Departments themselves. The House, however, had, besides its proper control over the Departments, the right of questioning their heads, and thus obtained an additional guarantee for the propriety of all expenditure. He hoped the House would be satisfied with that practical control which it already possesed.
§ MR.RYLANDSSir, I cannot think that the statements of the hon. and gallant Gentleman(Colonel Stanley) are perfectly satisfactory, although I am willing to give to the Treasury credit for desiring to check as far as possible the transfer of Votes of money from one purpose to another. I had the honour formerly of being on the Public Accounts Committee, and that was a point which was continually under our notice. I quite agree that this Committee does watch Estimates with a great deal of jealousy; but they are not able to prevent large sums of money voted for the purposes of one sub-head being applied to another subhead without coming under review by the House; and, so far as this practice is adopted, I am quite sure it must have an evil tendency in increasing expenditure. I know, and so does the hon. and gallant Gentleman, that in every Department outside the Treasury there is a continual pressure put upon the Treasury to provide more money for the permanent service of the Crown. The effect of this is, that there is obliged to be a constant endeavour, on the part of the Treasury, to keep down expenditure. When the Estimates are presented to the House and fully criticized, and the House votes certain sums of money, it is quite true that these criticisms have a tendency to check undue expenditure; but you lose a great part of that control if the Votes of this House can be made 1510 use of to the extent of putting the sums so voted from one sub-head to another sub-head. The object of the Exchequer and Audit Act, under which it is necessary to surrender to the Exchequer all amounts not expended by the Departments, was clearly for the purpose of preventing the improper application of money Votes; and my hon. Friend is only seeking to apply the same principle on a smaller scale in connection with the sub-heads of expenditure under the different Departments. I believe the Treasury would find that the course recommended by my hon. Friend (Mr. Dillwyn) would strengthen their hands in resisting the demands of public Departments; because the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Stanley) knows perfectly well that there will be numbers of such applications made to the Treasury to sanction expenditure by putting it from one head to another. Supposing the Treasury were perfectly aware they could give no additional sum without a Vote on Supplementary Estimates, it is quite clear their hands would be strengthened by adopting the suggestion of my hon. Friend (Mr. Dillwyn). Now I come to the next point. The hon. and gallant Gentleman said that which is quite true—namely, that if the proposal of the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn) were adopted, it would increase the Supplementary Estimates. Of that there is no doubt. My hon. Friend objects to the large volume of Supplementary Estimates for this year; but we would very much rather have additional Supplementary Estimates than that the House of Commons should lose its control over the Votes for certain purposes. We are quite willing for these Supplementary Estimates to be introduced if the Department for which they are voted is able to put before the Treasury sufficient justification for the expenditure contemplated, and if it could be shown that such expenditure was urgent and necessary. I am quite willing to admit that the hon. and gallant Gentleman has given good reasons why there should be Supplementary Estimates introduced when they were shown to be necessary; but we are only anxious that such Supplementary Estimates should be kept down to the narrowest limits. I do hope that, although the hon. and gallant Gentleman has not given my hon. Friend much encouragement, in the next 1511 financial year he may be inclined to look more favourably upon the proposal, and that the rule shall be laid down that no sum of money shall be applied for any other purpose than that for which it is voted, and that any sums required for unexpected emergencies shall be placed in the Supplementary Estimates, so that the House shall have control over the expenditure, and every opportunity of considering the application of the money for the purposes in which the Treasury shall sanction it.