HC Deb 13 June 1878 vol 240 cc1391-416
MR. RYLANDS,

in rising to call the attention of the House to the Treaties of 1856 and 1871; and to move— That, in the opinion of this House, all future Treaties between this Country and Foreign Powers under which this Country is engaged, separately or in conjunction with any other Power, to interfere by force of arms, or by armed demonstration, or by the contribution of any military contingent or pecuniary subsidy, to attack or defend any Government or Nation with reference to its internal arrangements or foreign relations, or on any other contingency whatsoever, ought to be laid upon the Table of both Houses of Parliament before being ratified, in order that an opportunity may be afforded to both Houses of expressing their opinion upon the provisions of such Treaties, said: I did not wish, Sir, to trouble the House at any length on the subject of the Resolution which I have placed upon the Paper, although it is a question which at all times is one of much interest and importance; but it is especially appropriate at the present time, when this country is perhaps on the point of entering upon a new Treaty of international obligations. In view of so probable an event, I think we may wisely seek to learn from the history of past Treaty obligations important lessons, which we may read with advantage at the present time. We now stand in the midst of the ruins of great Treaties of guarantee—the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and the Treaty of London of 1871. The history of the rise and fall of those Treaties is so recent, and the period comprised in that history is so very short, that almost all of us can embrace them in our recollections. We can recall the circumstances which gave birth to the Treaty of 1856; we can trace the vicissitudes of its career; and we are now witnessing its untimely end. I think, from this brief but eventful retrospect, we may draw important lessons for our future guidance. The Treaty of 1856 cost this country £100,000,000 and 60,000 lives. It was a work upon which the greatest skill and judgment of the Foreign Office was devoted. It was a Treaty which was negotiated by most distinguished Plenipotentiaries, and subsequently received the approval of great statesmen. Its objects were principally five-fold—to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, to check the power of Russia, to establish the status quo in the East, to preserve the peace of Europe, and to ameliorate the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte. In order to obtain these objects, the British Government came under very serious international obligations, and made the people of this country parties to solemn guarantees. Looking back upon the past 20 years, during which that Treaty has existed, we now see that it has failed in every particular; and not only so, but that its provisions were such that they necessarily led to its failure and to the results which have been recently witnessed. In the short-sighted diplomacy of the Foreign Office, one of the stipulations of that Treaty has been considered least important—I mean the amelioration of the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte—which was, in reality, the most important of all, and the one upon which the permanence or otherwise of the Treaty was based. Before the Crimean War, and the Treaty of 1856, when the Christian subjects of Turkey were suffering injustice at the hands of the Porte, they made appeals to Russia for protection, but we deprived them of that protection. We destroyed the Russian Protectorate, and we substituted absolutely nothing in its stead. We accepted a delusive promise from the Turkish Government, which was not worth the paper on which it was written, and even that was so guarded with limitations, that it gave the Powers no right to enforce its execution. There was recently in the House a curious, but unprofitable, argument to prove that, while under the Treaty we had no right of interference, yet that we retained outside the Treaty a right, in the interests of Europe, to intervene on behalf of the Christians of Turkey if the necessity arose. I have no doubt that there was a right of the European Powers to interfere; but the material fact is that they did not interfere, and no steps were taken to ameliorate the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte: on the contrary, those Christian inhabitants of the Turkish Provinces were subjected to every indignity and every injustice, and our Foreign Office, from the time of signing the Treaty of 1856, were utterly careless of any of those acts of oppression of the Turkish Governors. Our Foreign Office shut its eyes to the misery of the Christian subjects of Turkey. The practical indifference shown in the Treaty of 1856 and by the Foreign Office to the rights and interests of the Christian subjects of the Porte did, in fact, render all the other objects of the Treaty nugatory. It necessarily increased the influence of Russia as the only Power to which the Christians could look for protection; it rendered the maintenance of the status quo impossible; and, so far from consolidating the peace of Europe, it intensified every element of disturbance, culminating in the dreadful war we have just witnessed, and destroying for ever the "independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire." There was another danger by the Treaty of 1856, and it was the putting upon Russia terms which she would not carry out if she could help. Those who look to the lessons of history must read them to little purpose unless they know that at the close of any exhaustive war, and under the influence of the Powers of Europe, when there are humiliating conditions imposed on a Great Power, so long as those humiliating conditions remain, they are a source of great danger to Europe. We put, by the Treaty of 1856, a humiliating condition upon Russia—a condition so humiliating that some of the highest authorities in this country condemned it. Mr. Disraeli said, in this House, that it was "most impolitic, humiliating, and unnecessarily humiliating to Russia." As a matter of course, Russia, feeling the indignity of the stipulation, took advantage of the position of affairs during the Franco-German War, and at once claimed to be relieved from the humiliating condition of the Treaty of 1856—namely, the neutralization of the Black Sea. No doubt, hon. Gentlemen will recall the circumstances under which Russia appealed to this country to have that part of the Treaty done away with, and the end of the controversy was that the Treaty of 1871 was signed in London, and it declared that Russia was no longer to be bound by those humiliating conditions in regard to the neutralization of the Black Sea. I remember all the circumstances. There was a great hubbub; the people said it was a great blow to Treaties, and we heard talked—as we have recently—a large amount of cant about the faith of Treaties, and about public law being outraged, and that we should stand up as a country in order to maintain Treaties and the public law of Europe. Let us take the case home to ourselves, and ask if such a humiliating condition were imposed on us in a time of our humiliation, whether we would not take the very first opportunity of striking out of the Treaty any such indignity? And yet, in 1871, it really seemed as though we were on the verge of war to maintain a gross injustice towards Russia. There was the greatest possible agitation on the public mind, and there were strong despatches sent from the Foreign Office, and violent articles in the Press, in which there was a great deal said against Russia, just as we have had recently. The only difference—and which, I think, is a very marked difference—between 1871, as compared with the present time, is this. The Government of 1871 did not make the excitement of the public mind an excuse to take millions of money from the people. They secured an arrangement of the dispute, which, while it removed the indignity from Russia, was, at the same time, an arrangement which, satisfied all those who had been parties to it. Now, in connection with this episode, I want to point out to the House a most remarkable circumstance in regard to that Treaty of 1856, and the Article in the Treaty in respect to the neutralization of the Black Sea. We had a diplomatic Correspondence subsequently laid on the Table of the House, and a despatch from Sir Henry Elliot, of the date of November 27, 1870, stated that within three years from the signing of the Treaty of 1856—that is to say, before 1859—Italy, Austria, Prussia, and France all encouraged Russia to free herself from the stipulations of the Treaty—so that, in fact, our Foreign Office stood for years like a blind-folded man in the midst of Europe, holding in its hand the Treaty of 1856, entirely in the dark as to every one of the signatories having trifled with the most important of the Treaty obligations. No greater reason can be found for the Resolution which I have the honour to propose, or can more clearly prove that it is the interest of the House to watch over Treaties with the greatest care, than the fact that when we do enter into these guarantees with other countries, we are continually finding out that other countries do not stick to the Treaties. We may, at all events, say this—that while our Foreign Office is very often shortsighted and blundering, I think it is, at all events, honest. I believe our Foreign Office does not put its signature to a document without making a serious attempt to carry it out. That cannot be said of any other Power in Europe; and thus it is that we, the people of England, are in the habit of entering into a curious joint-stock company with other nations with a mixture of limited and unlimited liability, we taking the unlimited liability, and our partners the limited liability. I observe the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary, speaking in Preston, entirely ignored this fact in relation to the Treaties to which I have been referring. If the right hon. Gentleman had only taken the trouble to consider the history of recent Treaties, he would probably have taken a different view of the situation. In fact, one of the newspapers of Lancashire excused his ignorance of foreign affairs by the fact that he belonged to the Home Department. Now, this statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary is so remarkable that I should have liked the right hon. Gentleman to have been present to have given his consideration to it. The right hon. Gentleman said at Preston— If there are to be Treaties between nations, if we are to have a concert of Europe, and if that concert has come to some agreement, I want to know if any person who signs that agreement may tear it up and say—'I do not care the least for all those who have signed it with me.' Then the Home Secretary asked —"What is to be the state of Europe if such a state of things as that is to exist?" And he said that in order to justify the dangerous policy of the Government in insisting upon mere diplomatic technicalities. He asks—"What is to become of Europe if such a state of things as that is to exist?'' Why, it does exist; it has existed. During the whole of this century it has existed. It is the most common thing in the world for parties to a Treaty, without asking the signatories of the Treaty, to depart from it. Now, the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary told the people of Lancashire that they ought to respect Treaties, and he made a very strong appeal as to the sanctity of Treaties. I am sorry he is not in the House, because I was going to make him a challenge; but, in his absence, I will challenge my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to produce any great or important Treaty which has been signed by the Great Powers of Europe during the present century that has not been, in the course of a few years, broken up or evaded by some of the signatory Powers. And yet the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary seems to think that the whole of Europe will come to an end in some marvellous manner if people who sign Treaties can withdraw from the Treaty without permission from other countries. In order to assist the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I will just recall to his mind two or three Treaties as instances of the point to which I have been referring. Take the guarantee given to the Belgians in 1831. I remember very well a most distinguished Member of this House—the late Sir Henry Bulwer—alluding to this fact in the House of Commons in 1870, and he asserted—"That before the ink with which the Treaty of 1831 was signed was hardly dry, there was a negotiation going on between France and Prussia to evade that Treaty." The most important Treaty of this century—of course, I mean the Treaty of Vienna—was, no doubt, the greatest example of a Treaty of Guarantees that was ever known in the history of civilized mankind. It was a Treaty in which this country was deeply interested, because it was the outcome of numerous struggles in which it had been engaged, and which had cost it £1,000,000,000. The sum was incredible—it is impossible to realize it. It is a sum of money which has burdened the Exchequer ever since, and which interferes with the commercial advantages of the British people in the present day. The Treaty of Vienna was signed by all the Great Powers of Europe; and yet I venture to say that it was torn to shreds by all the Powers who had signed their adhesion under the most solemn guarantees. It has been said that if you look at the present arrangement of Europe it forms a practical satire upon the Congress of Vienna. The Treaty of Vienna enjoined that Russia should give a Constitution to Poland, which she refused to do. Cracow was to be an independent Republic, and Austria destroyed it. Savoy and Nice were given to Sardinia, and France took them. Italy was parcelled out into several Sovereignties, and this arrangement disappeared when the King of Italy ruled over the entire Kingdom. Germany was to be governed by a Diet, of which the King of Denmark and the King of Hanover were members, with Austria as its President. This arrangement has been entirely dissolved, and these stipulations have been swallowed up by the great Empire of Germany. I will not trouble the House with any other Treaty except one—the Treaty of 1852. The Treaty of London with regard to the succession of the Danish Throne and the Duchy of Schleswig-Holstein, was signed by all the Great Powers of Europe; and yet Austria and Prussia, who had solemnly guaranteed the succession to the Duchy of Schleswig-Holstein, took possession of it themselves; and in 1864, without asking anybody, proceeded to subvert the Treaty, which was only these few years old, and to which they had signed their names. I recollect the serious danger of war which arose at that time. We were parties to that Treaty. It did not matter to us, and it was not of the slightest consequence, so far as we were concerned, whether Schleswig-Holstein belonged to one Danish family or another German family; but, because we had been entangled into a Treaty with regard to the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein, we ran a great danger of going into a war in Europe, and it was only some personal feeling on the part of the Emperor of the French—who refused to listen to our application—which kept us from being involved in a war with Germany and Austria to settle the paltry Danish succession. Lord Palmerston, when he could not interfere, set up a dictum that has been quoted several times in this House, and it was to the effect—"That Treaties of Guarantee give a right to interfere, but do not constitute of themselves any obligation to interfere." I should be very glad if this dictum were generally acknowledged, as it relieves these Treaties of some of their dangers. Lord Palmerston, undoubtedly, acted upon it on several notable occasions. But the danger of Treaty obligations of this nature arises from the fact that it depends upon the will of the Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary of the day to determine whether we will act upon them or not; and opportunities are given for exciting a war feeling in the country, by inflammatory appeals in the Press, that British honour and prestige are involved in the maintenance of Treaties to which we have been parties. But if Lord Palmerston's dictum is to be accepted—as I am quite willing it should be—what becomes of the meaning of the English language? Take, for instance, the Tripartite Treaty of 1856, between Great Britain, Austria, and France, which reads as follows:— Article I. The high contracting parties guarantee jointly and severally the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire recorded in the Treaty concluded at Paris on 30th March, 1856. Article II. Any infraction of the stipulations of the said Treaty will be considered by the Powers signing the present Treaty as casus belli. They will come to an understanding with the Sublime Porte as to the measures which have become necessary, and will without delay determine among themselves as to the employment of their Military and Naval Forces. If the English language has any meaning at all, it is that we absolutely bound ourselves to maintain the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire by force of arms; and it had been gravely argued that if Austria and France had called upon us in the name of that Treaty to join them, or either of them—in order to fulfil the obligations—we should have been bound in honour to have gone to war, and we should have found ourselves in this position—we should have had to choose between evading our obligation, and undertaking to fight for maintaining the Turkish despotism. Supposing Austria had had some desire to slice out a portion of the European territory; or, supposing France or Austria had any advantage to gain by going to war, they might, with reference to this Treaty, have claimed us to join them. And I say that that is a very dangerous position for this country to be in; and my object is now, that there may not be arising out of the present negotiations any possibility of this country being placed under obligations of this kind, which might involve British honour for purposes for which there could be no justification as connected with British policy or British interests. There is another danger with reference to those Treaty guarantees—that nobody can tell when they will come to an end. John Stuart Mill said, on a former occasion, that "Treaties are not eternal." They are, in fact, as a rule, very short-lived instruments, and the most evanescent of public engagements. The fields of diplomacy are strewn over with the relics of defunct Treaties; but, unfortunately, there are statesmen of a peculiar turn of mind, who seem to take a delight in groping among these dry bones in order to obtain some sign of life, and Lord Beaconsfield is one of these Treaty re-surrectionists, and he is constantly looking out for some vitality amongst the remains of these dead Treaties. I remember, at the breaking out of the Franco-German War, that Mr. Disraeli got up and with solemn import told the House that, under the Treaty of Vienna, we had joined in a guarantee of a strip of Saxony to Prussia, and that, if in the course of the war the French armies took possession of that strip, we should be bound in our Treaty right and obligation to interfere. That seems most absurd now. It is a laughing matter now that we should be called upon to interfere under such a contingency, but it was no laughing matter in 1870. We could see that the pressure then put upon the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich by the Opposition, that we should be involved in war one way or another, had the effect of inducing the late Government to ask for a Vote of Credit for £2,000,000, which, I fear, was to a great extent wasted. The attachment of the Premier to these Treaties is a matter not alone of the past, it is a matter of very recent date; and, perhaps, the way in which the Government has been maintaining the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 during the past two years, has been the occasion of some of the greatest mischiefs which have arisen out of their policy. The fact is, that the attempt to maintain the obligations of those Treaties was far from promoting peace, for it tended directly to war, and, instead of promoting European concert, it raised obstacles to the joint action of the Powers. The Government upheld those Treaties up to a very late period. Lord Beaconsfield has again and again, with all the force of his rhetoric and the influence of his position, said that this country was absolutely bound to support the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. His Mansion House speech of November, 1876, was full of our Treaty obligations towards Turkey; and Her Majesty's Speech, at the close of the Session of 1876, recognized the duties imposed upon Her under those Treaties. At the opening of the Session of 1877, again Her Majesty said— My object has throughout been to maintain the peace of Europe, and to bring about the better government of the disturbed provinces, without infringing upon the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. What effect had all this language about the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire? We know what effect it had. It bolstered up Turkey to resist the Councils of Europe; and Her Majesty's Government refused to join in a European concert, on the grounds stated in the Blue Books—that they could not join in the steps proposed by Russia, Austria, or Germany, because they would interfere with the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire. We have been held in suspense as to whether the Government had or had not given up the Treaties of 1856 and 1871. There ought certainly to have been no mistake on this matter, considering that no other Government in Europe was maintaining those Treaties except ourselves. It has been a most unfortunate and dangerous circumstance, during the past two years, that the Government have had two voices in their foreign policy; and, until a recent period, they have had two voices in relation to these Treaty obligations. The Chancellor of the Exchequer told us, a short time since, that these Treaties were shattered and destroyed—very distinct language—and I was glad to hear it. But almost on the very same day Lord Beaconsfield in "another place," dealing with the obligations to be enforced upon Russia, said—"This is the key-note of our policy; this is the diapason of our diplomacy." Diapason! Why, so far from being the key-note of harmony, it was the keynote of discord in your own Cabinet—the key-note of disunion and animosity in the country, and of alarm and apprehension and distrust throughout Europe. The Congress meets to-day, and I suppose that now we may assume that these Treaties of 1856 and 1871 have disappeared for ever, or, at all events, we have got rid of their mischievous obligations. But of what will take place we are left in ignorance by the Government. They refuse to give us any distinct statement of their aims and policy; they point to Lord Salisbury's despatch; and, no doubt, that celebrated despatch was a masterpiece of cavilling at the Treaty of San Stefano; but it absolutely failed to lay down any definite scheme for the settlement of the Eastern Question. Sir, I am afraid that some of the worst features of the Treaty of 1856 may appear again in the new Treaty which is about to be made. I am afraid that attempts may be made to bolster up the power of Turkey under the guarantee of Europe, under some delusion that that Empire still constitutes a barrier against the growth of Russia. I am afraid that South Bulgaria, the scene of those recent frightful atrocities, may remain under the misrule of Turkey; I am afraid that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the people have lived under Turkish oppression for centuries, there is little prospect for improvement; I am afraid that the aspirations of the Greek nation may be disappointed. I hope these things may not happen, but they are possible. If they do happen, or anything like them happens, then I say that any such policy on the part of the British Government in dealing with this great question would be repugnant to the great masses of the British people; and I believe that nothing could be more unwise or unjust than that a policy repugnant to a great portion of the British people should be irrevocably sealed in a Treaty of Europe with which we are bound, and in which we, as a Parliament, have no voice whatever in the terms of its provisions. I hope I may be disappointed. I hope we may all find that the great mistake of 1856 may not be repeated now. But, whatever the Treaty may be, I do think it is very desirable that the opinion of Parliament should be obtained upon its provisions before it is absolutely ratified. Therefore, Sir, I move this Resolution, which recognises the right of Parliament to have a voice in the discussion of the Treaty before its ratification. The Resolution which I intend to move is one which might apply to all Treaties; but I have confined it to Treaties of Guarantee. I think that Treaties of Guarantee ought to come under the view of the Houses of Parliament, for they impose serious obligations which may lead to heavy expenditure, to an increase of the burdens of taxation on the people; or they may carry us into war, endangering the best interests of the country. I say that no Treaty, having such responsibilities, ought to be ratified without having the approval of Parliament. I may be told that I am striking at the Royal Prerogative. It is really, and in fact, the Ministers of the Crown who determine the Treaties of obligation in which the country enters—and I wish to point out to the House how remarkable it is that we, who are so jealous of our privileges that we will not allow the Ministers of the Crown to impose taxation upon the people without first consulting us; that we, who will not even allow them to pass a Turnpike Act without our consent, give them absolute power to impose obligations upon us which may cost hereafter hundreds of millions of money. It may be said that if my Resolution were carried, it would render the negotiations of Treaties still more difficult; but that, in my judgment, is a positive advantage rather than otherwise. It seems to me that no Treaty of Guarantee should be entered into, unless there is the most pressing and justifiable necessity it is possible to conceive. I have not attempted to say in which way the opinion of the House should be taken on a Treaty of Guarantee. If the House thinks there should be some check upon Government, I am quite sure that the wisdom of Parliament and the ability of leading statesmen on both sides of the House would have no difficulty in determining the best mode. I am only concerned in the principle, and I think I am right in recommending the subject to the attention of the House. I might mention several eminent authorities on the point; but I will simply refer to Lord Derby, who, on June 12, 1871, said— No doubt, there is a great deal to be said, both on theoretical and on practical grounds, for the principle that the Parliament and the country ought not to be bound by the acts of the Executive, whoever at the time may compose it, in making International Treaties, without having an opportunity of considering the merits of those Treaties."—[3 Hansard, ccvi. 1854.] We are all looking forward to a peaceful solution of the Eastern Question. The Times Correspondent at Vienna recently remarked upon the craving for peace which exists everywhere, and to the longing for some sort of solution to the question which has weighed down Europe for well-nigh three years. No doubt that is the feeling in Europe. It is, undoubtedly, the feeling in this country. I have never had great doubt as to the preservation of peace; not because the action of the Government has been calculated to promote the peace of Europe, for it has had a contrary effect. I will tell you why I think peace is certain. I think it is because Russia is exhausted; Germany has great interests in peace; France requires repose; and Austria would by war endanger her very existence. I can only hope that a peaceful solution may be arrived at. I do not think the terms of that peace will be very narrowly scanned; it will meet with a very ready acceptance on the part of the people of this country; and I trust that Her Majesty's Government will not seek to obtain any mere diplomatic triumph in this matter, but will use their influence to bring about a peace on the only basis that gives promise of permanence—by securing the recognition of the national desires of the peoples of the European Provinces of Turkey. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving his Resolution.

MR. E. JENKINS,

in rising to second the Amendment, said, he did so with some misgiving, not, however, because he had any thing to object to in its nature or terms, or in regard to its opportuneness, but because it was not likely to be appreciated by the Government or the House as it would be by the country. It was right that attention should be called to the subject; for he did not know whether it was within the knowledge of the Government, though it was certainly within the knowledge of many in that House, that there had been a growing public opinion, especially in the Midland and Northern counties, and in Scotland, that the manner in which Her Majesty had been advised to exercise the Prerogative was dangerous to the Constitution as all desired to maintain it. It could not but be dangerous that Ministers should advise Her Majesty to use the rights of the Prerogative in such a way that they should become unpopular in England. The Resolution of his hon. Friend (Mr. Rylands), he admitted, proposed distinctly to limit the Royal Prerogative, but only so far as to bring it into harmony with the existing state of Constitutional Government in this country. In discussing this matter they were little concerned with historical questions on the one hand, or with ideas of philosophical perfection on the other. What they had to do was to consider the actual facts, and the practical expediency of the Amendment, which would fall to the ground if it could not be shown that the illimitable exercise of the Prerogative was absurd, inconvenient, or perilous. He would observe, in anticipation of what might be said on the other side, that peculiar notions were entertained by some hon. Gentlemen with respect to the use of the Royal Prerogative; and he thought it desirable that some definition should be laid down as to the meaning of the word "Prerogative." Now, in his opinion, the use of the Royal Prerogative was only such as the law allowed. It was as much the creature of law as were the rights of any subject; it was not an original, but a derived right, and depended upon the will of the people, and it ought to be from time to time defined, in order to bring it into conformity with the Constitutional development of their freedom. This had been done, in fact, from time to time, as when judicial powers, nominally vested in the Crown, were delegated to those from whom they could not now be taken away. The precise right claimed for the Crown in this case was the making of Treaties; but was there, he asked, no danger, inconvenience, or impropriety, in permitting the Crown, upon the advice of Ministers, to exercise this Prerogative? One result of the exercise of this right had been seen during the course of the recent negotiations—the concealment from Parliament of the facts, the nature of the issues, and the difficulties upon which a judgment was arrived at. The consequence was that the House of Commons, which was the most responsible power in the country, and had the duty of seeing that the Executive carried out its functions in such a way as not to overstep the limits of the Constitution on the one hand, nor prejudice the interests of the country on the other, was absolutely without any information as to the facts on which the Government were acting. The Cabinet had for months been carrying on a policy so secret that they had been induced to vote £6,000,000, and to condone a gross breach of the Constitution, on the ground of dangers which the Government had not deemed it necessary to communicate. He could conceive the case of an ambitious and unscrupulous Minister—a gambler, who fancied he saw his way to the attainment of a certain end—advising the Crown to do such things upon information which was inaccurate, and upon a state of facts that did not justify it, and months after they might find it was too late to remedy the evil, and the Minister might save himself from impeachment by being buried in Westminster Abbey. The exercise of the Prerogative was, practically, at this moment in the hands of the Prime Minister. Within an hour of his being in Berlin he had walked round to Prince Bismarck, the Minister of a practically autocratic Sovereign, and with him he discussed matters of the deepest importance. Lord Salisbury, who was supposed to be at Berlin as a check upon Lord Beacons-field's ambitious views, was not present at that interview, and would only learn from the Prime Minister as much as he chose to tell him. At home was what might be called the "rump" of the Government, and they also would know no more of those negotiations than the Prime Minister chose to communicate to them. Was that a safe and proper position for this country to be in? We might be committed by the will of one man—and one by no means the most competent—to guarantees, obligations, and expenditure, which might have a lasting influence upon the destinies of this Empire, but of which the supreme Power in Great Britain—the Houses of Parliament—would only know when they were irrevocable. Could the propriety of such a result be maintainable in the face of the great facts of Constitutional Government and the freedom of the people, especially when extravagant claims as to extensions of right had been claimed by the Government on other matters under the name of the Royal Prerogative? Probably two checks on the Ministers would be mentioned by hon. Gentlemen opposite, and it would be said, in the first place, that a Minister might be impeached. But he (Mr. Jenkins) could attach no great value to that argument, for it was hardly conceivable that any Minister would be foolish enough to lay himself open to an impeachment while there were many ways of evading the Constitution. But, it might be urged, Parliament had the right of refusing Supplies, and had, in short, what was known as Parliamentary control. That, too, was an illusory cheek, for there was little likelihood of seeing it pushed to its direst conclusion, as the events of the last few weeks had shown; and it would be fresh in the memory of everyone that the majority had readily condoned or justified the unconstitutional acts of which Ministers had been guilty. And even if, in the last resort, the Ministry were to be dismissed, it was possible to conceive the case of one who would be ready to run that risk if only he could set his hand to a Treaty that would make himself celebrated. Besides, dismissal would not take place till the guarantees had been given, and till Treaties had been signed, when the House would have no power but that of initiating an unreal debate. A thoughtful writer on politics, the late Mr. W. Bagehot, had referred to the subject, and had argued that Parliament ought to have more control over foreign policy than it at present possessed. Besides, the Representatives themselves were responsible to the country, and ought for that reason to have opportunities not only for review, but also for criticism. It was true that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) had offered objections to the proposition in 1874, on the ground of the necessity which existed for placing implicit confidence in the Ministers who had the conduct of negotiations, and for secrecy during their progress; but he (Mr. Jenkins) believed it would be better for this country if secret diplomacy were swept away; and if they insisted that their diplomatic transactions should be done in the light of day, letting other nations know that when we negotiated with them these negotiations would be subject to daily communications to the Parliament and the country. He saw the Chancellor of the Exchequer blandly smiling at such an idea; but he (Mr. Jenkins) had no doubt that, by-and-bye, they would not only limit the Government in the exercise of this Prerogative in regard to Treaty-making, but expect it to be perfectly open in its negotiations with foreign Powers. He believed it would come to that. He felt that putting forward the proposition of his hon. Friend did not in any degree tend to tarnish the lustre of the Crown of England, and rather hoped that the acceptance of such a proposition might tend to give it greater strength in international negotiations, and more confidence among people abroad.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, all future Treaties between this Country and Foreign Powers under which this Country is engaged, separately or in conjunction with any other Power, to interfere by force of arms, or by armed demonstration, or by the contribution of any military contingent or pecuniary subsidy, to attack or defend any Government or Nation with reference to its internal arrangements or foreign relations, or on any other contingency whatsoever, ought to be laid upon the Table of both Houses of Parliament before being ratified, in order that an opportunity may be afforded to both Houses of expressing their opinion upon the provisions of such Treaties,"—(Mr. Rylands,) —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. GLADSTONE

My hon. Friend who has submitted this Motion to the House (Mr. Rylands) has, I think, framed it, and likewise his speech upon it, in such a temper as to facilitate a perfectly unbiassed and temperate consideration of the question; and I feel strongly that we ought to avoid whatever temptation may beset us upon the present occasion to mix up a discussion of this kind on a question Constitutional in its nature with the particular differences which have arisen during the last year or two between the two sides of the House upon questions of foreign policy. I think such a course would tend very much to perplex and obscure our judgment, if, for example, because some of us think that unconstitutional doctrines have been laid down, or inconsistent acts committed in certain other respects, we were to revenge ourselves for these acts by adopting a Resolution which might have inconvenient consequences, and which could not be defended upon its own general grounds of substantive policy. I am sure my hon. Friends will agree with me in thinking that we should separate recent controversies from the discussion we have before us. What I would urge in regard to the Motion, and the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, is particularly this—that neither has the Mover nor the Seconder shown a case of practical inconvenience which has arisen out of the exercise of this power to which he refers by the Executive. They have shown, I admit, that were the Executive Government, with large powers placed in its hands, to use those powers in a reckless manner, without regard to the interests or the well-understood sentiments of the country, the greatest possible public evils would result. But it is a choice of inconveniences and difficulties. You must, on the one hand, trust the Executive Government in these matters very largely, or you must, on the other hand, run into a greater mischief still—namely, that of committing the transaction of foreign affairs and the conduct of difficult foreign negotiations to bodies—the Houses of Parliament—which are essentially, from their own composition, unfit for the discharge of such tasks. My hon. Friend has agreed with me, in the course of this Eastern Question, in objecting to a great deal that has been done by Her Majesty's Government; but I have never felt, nor has my hon. Friend succeeded in showing that that conduct of the Government was pursued necessarily in consequence of the Treaties of 1856 or 1871, or of the guarantees into which we entered in respect to those Treaties. I can speak with the same impartiality as my hon. Friend; because, not having been a Member of the Government at the time, I am not responsible for the guarantees of 1856, and the guarantee of 1871 was only a renewal of the milder of the guarantees. Practically, I feel that I look upon these questions rather as a spectator than as an actor in the original transactions. Now, if Her Majesty's Government had thought it their duty to act upon these guarantees in the strict interpretation of them, particularly on the guarantees of the Tripartite Treaties, then my hon. Friend would have had a primâ facie ground; because, in that case, Her Majesty's Government would, upon their own responsibility, have committed themselves to some warlike measures as a direct consequence of the obligation of that guarantee. But they have done nothing of the sort; and when, during the last few months, they have made military preparations, and taken proceedings to which some of us have strongly objected, they have not done it upon the ground that they were bound to do it by the guarantees of those Treaties, but in the exercise of their discretion, and in obedience to what they call public motives. My hon. Friend has, therefore, not supplied a link in the argument which would be absolutely wanting to sustain his Motion. I think Her Majesty's Government have used the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 very much as they pleased, that is to say—and I am making no accusation against them—they have acted very largely upon what I believe to have been a dictum of Lord Palmerston and a traditional doctrine of the Foreign Office, that a guarantee gives a title to interfere, but does not impose an absolute obligation to interfere. Under cover of a doctrine of that kind, there is room enough to avoid most serious inconveniences that might arise from these guarantees. We must be content to judge these matters very much in the light of history. I admit that enormous powers are intrusted to Government, and that the misuse of these powers might entail most mischievous and ruinous consequences. That is a condition of necessity attaching to the work of Government. Have these consequences arisen? We must not judge this Motion of my hon. Friend by the opinion we may this moment entertain, aided by the light of experience, as to this or that particular guarantee. It may be there are guarantees which we now see to have been inconvenient and dangerous; but that is not the question. The main question is this—Were these guarantees entered into in conformity with what were believed to be the interests and duty of the country at the time, and in conformity with what were known to be the sentiments of the country at the time? If my hon. Friend goes over the list of the guarantees which have been embodied in various Treaties—gurarantees aimed at by this Resolution—I doubt whether he could produce a single instance of a guarantee entered into by preceding Governments, except where it has been agreeable to the actually prevailing sense of the country. If that is so, it shows that the adoption of my hon. Friend's Motion would only tend to entail a great responsibility upon Parliament; but it does not show that it would have any other practical effect whatever. My opinion, I confess, is that, upon the whole, the Government has upon no occasion known to me run ahead of the public opinion and conviction of the country in any of these guarantees. The guarantees of 1856 were, I think, decidedly agreeable to the generally prevailing sense of the nation at the time. Guarantees have seldom been the subject of such direct discussion in Parliament as to enable the laying down of very positive conclusions upon this subject; but there is one case which is very well worth notice, as it tends to throw light upon this question. It was the Guaranteed Loan of 1855. According to the established practice of this country, the Crown does not make absolute engagements of this kind, but only engages to apply to Parliament for a pecuniary subsidy. In my opinion, this Guaranteed Loan to Egypt was an absolutely bad engagement; and, thinking so at the time, I concurred with others in opposing the Bill. So strong was the objection felt in the House to it, that there was not only a debate and division; but in a rather full House, the Government carried that loan only by a majority of 4, But while that was the case, the Bill passed through every other stage without opposition, because the Government of the day were determined to adhere to it; and it was well understood that if the opposition were prolonged, they would dissolve Parliament, and perfectly well known that if they dissolved Parliament, the country would sustain them to all lengths in that guarantee. What we really desire, and the best we can obtain, is not an infallible security that there shall be no unwise guarantee, but that the Government will carefully adhere to its own views and convictions of what the interests of the country require, and what the opinion and well understood conviction of the country will approve. We come to the application of these considerations of the case which is now before us. All I can say is this—that I think it would be very dangerous if, because we have not been in harmony with the general course thus far of Her Majesty's Government on the Eastern Question, we were on that account to lay down and establish a new Constitutional principle, with respect to which I feel the greatest possible difficulty of giving to it any kind of practical operation. I can conceive it quite possible that we might embarrass, and impede, and distract the course of proceedings, and might discredit the country in the face of Europe, by depriving its Executive Government of that degree of independence and free agency which are absolutely necessary to maintain its influence. How it would be possible, in the midst of diplomatic negotiations, by a constant interchange of information and opinion between Government and Parliament, to arrive at anything like a community of action, I do not know. However much we may have differed from Her Majesty's Government in these matters, yet there are two things which I wish to keep in view. The first is, that we have arrived at a point in which it is not altogether unreasonable to hope that much of the subjects of these differences have disappeared. It is hardly possible to conceive that we may be going into the European Congress which we are now about to enter with any very wide discrepancies of view amongst ourselves generally as to the aims towards which the influence and efforts of this country should be directed. It would be unjust to the Government to suppose that whereas all other Administrations, in all other times and in all other affairs, took a pretty accurate admeasurement of the sentiment of the country on the subject of the guarantees upon which they were about to enter—it would be unjust to them, I say, to suppose that they are likely to rush into new guarantees without having regard to the sentiment of the country. I can scarcely believe such a thing on general grounds, still less should I be justified in believing it when I look at the special circumstances and tendencies of the country at the present time; because it is quite clear, irrespective of any matters which are and have been in controversy, that guarantees at this moment are somewhat damaged in public estimation. I do not wish to push that proposition too far, or to lay it down as an abstract principle; but I think there has been, both on the one side and the other of this great Eastern Question, a dissatisfaction—an uneasy sense of dissatisfaction which prevails even at this moment—that guarantees, upon the whole, have been an embarrassment and an impediment in the way of right action in the management of this Eastern Question. Some may be dissatisfied—no doubt some are dissatisfied—because those guarantees have not been acted upon up to their fullest extent and with the utmost rigour of construction; others are dissatisfied because they have been used, more or less, to promote a line of policy which, in principle, they can no longer approve. But I, for one, entertain no doubt—while carefully avoiding the assertion of any abstract principle—that Her Majesty's Government at the present time have no great disposition to welcome the announcement that a new set of guarantees has been entered into in regard to the state of affairs in the East. Whether any such guarantees should be required or not is not for me to decide; but I entertain the hope that Her Majesty's Government will, in respect to this question of guarantees, bear in mind the principal proposition of the Motion, that this vast power—for it is a vast power—has always been exercised with a due regard to the general sentiments and convictions of the country. And if the Government still continue to act in the same spirit which animated their Predecessors in all former time, then I confess the present arrangement seems to be the best arrangement which, in the many difficulties of the case, is possible; and, in fact, the only arrangement compatible with the effective transaction of the very important class of Business with which the Motion of my hon. Friend deals.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

thought, after what had just fallen from his right hon. Friend, and the evident desire of the House not to further debate the subject, that it was scarcely necessary for him to make many remarks upon it. He entirely concurred in what had been said as to the spirit and temper in which both the Mover and Seconder of the Amendment had addressed themselves to the subject. There could be no doubt that it was a very important question, and one which it was perfectly fair and reasonable for hon. Gentlemen holding their views to bring forward for the purpose of challenging the opinion of the House. They knew that that was not a new subject with the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), and that his Motion had not been prompted by recent or any particular circumstances. Five years since, the hon. Member brought forward a similar Motion in another House of Commons, and with reference to a wholly different set of circumstances to that which now prevailed; and no one could deny that the opinion it contained was one which it was perfectly competent for him and those who agreed with him to express; but, at the same time, he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) thought that the effect of such a Motion being brought forward at a time like the present might lead others who were not aware of the circumstances of the case, especially foreign Powers, to suppose that it had a more direct reference to existing negotiations than he presumed was really the fact, and that thus a misunderstanding might be created which they would all desire to avoid. He fully understood, however, that that was not the spirit in which it was brought forward, but rather that while it was the intention of the hon. Gentleman to take advantage of the existing state of things or of negotiations which had lately been going on, and were still going on, only for the purpose of illustration in support of his argument, the proposition which he advocated, itself was based on general grounds, When he last submitted it to the consideration of the House it was of a still more general character, and was founded on cases connected with our Commercial Treaties, particularly the Commercial Treaty with France. On that occasion the hon. Gentleman had been met very much in the same way as he had that evening by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, who was then Prime Minister. The right hon. Gentleman put the question, he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) thought, very properly in this way—on the ground that it was not a question of merely abstract doctrine, but one of a practical character, and that it was necesssary, if we were to assert great changes of Constitutional principle such as would be involved in the acceptance of the Motion, to face the consequences and be prepared to see how effect could be given to the new proposition. Nobody could deny that they were necessarily liable to inconveniences in our form of government, for in it, as, indeed, in every form of government, there must be inconveniences of some kind. Those inconveniences and difficulties came very much to the surface when we were dealing with questions of foreign policy; but he did not see how, if the Constitution of the country were to remain as it was, it would be practically possible to work upon the lines upon which the hon. Gentleman would have us proceed. There was no similarity between the state of things which existed in this country and in the United States of America, to which the hon. Gentleman on a former occasion referred. There, undoubtedly, the negotiations of Treaties was subjected to the control of a portion, at all events, of the Legislative Body—the Senate, or practically to a Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Senate, which was a kind of supplementary Cabinet, and which acted in correspondence with the Ministry of the day and in secret communication with them. Now, that was a mode of proceeding in accordance with which it would be impossible to act in this country, the Cabinet being placed in a different position towards the House of Commons and Parliament. It would be necessary, too, to have everything done in public and in the face of Parliament and the country. So far, of course, as Parliament and the country were concerned, there would be no objection to that publicity; but, then, everything thus openly discussed was discussed in the face of the whole world, and it would, he believed, be found practically impossible to conduct negotiations with other Powers if they were to be conducted on such conditions. During all the recent negotiations, for instance, delicate as they had been, it would have been absolutely fatal to them if the Government were obliged to say that everything that was advanced must be discussed in public, subject to the criticisms not only of Parliament, but also of the Press and the public, before any step could be taken. Other Powers would, no doubt, look upon us with great suspicion, if when four or five of them had pledged themselves to the terms of a Treaty which England also accepted, that Treaty were subject, after all, to be controlled and generally criticized in the way which the hon. Gentleman suggested. The hon. Gentleman, indeed, did not probably think that there would be any great evil in such a state of things, for a great portion of his argument was directed against Treaties altogether, which he treated as being on the one hand useless, and on the other embarrassing—embarrassing to the honest signatories, and useless to those who were not disposed to act honestly. That was a difficulty which it was impossible to escape, whether a Treaty was ratified by Parliament or not; and if the argument of the hon. Gentleman was worth anything, it would not, he thought, be found easy to stop short of the conclusion that Treaties ought to be dispensed with, and our business carried on independently of other Powers. He was far from saying that there were not some grounds to justify some of the observations which the hon. Gentleman had made; but he was sure that Europe—he was sure that the people of this country would be very much surprised if we were to enunciate it as a general maxim that we were to do without Treaties altogether, and that in those European affairs in which we were interested, things must be trusted to go on without those international understandings and engagements. He ventured, he might add, to hope that the hon. Gentleman would not deem it necessary to divide the House on his Motion. To do so, might lead to misunderstanding not only at home, but abroad; and the case had been so exceedingly well put by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, that there was, in his opinion, no ground for pressing the subject to a division. It was not a question affecting one Party more than another, or a question of overstraining the Prerogative, or anything of that sort. As he had ventured to say the other day, Prerogative was not a question of the personal right or assertion of the Sovereign; it was a part, and an important part, of the Constitution; and if they desired to make so great a change in the Constitution as would be involved directly, and still more by its consequences, in the adoption of such a principle as that would be, the change was not one which ought to be made by a mere Amendment on the Motion that the Speaker leave the Chair for the House to go into Committee of Supply; but it would be a matter which ought to be most solemnly raised, and debated not only in that House, but also in the other House of Parliament. They did not dispute for a moment the right to raise, and, perhaps, the advantage of raising, such a discussion as the present one; but he would repeat his hope that it might not be made the occasion of a division.

MR. RYLANDS

said, that after the appeal of the right hon. Gentleman, he would not press his Motion to a division; but, with the leave of the House, would withdraw it. ["No, no!"]

Question put, and agreed to.