THE MARQUESS OF HAETINGTON, in rising to move the following Resolutions:—
That, whilst this House has learned with satisfaction that the troubles which have arisen in the East of Europe have been terminated by the Treaty of Berlin without a further recourse to arms, and rejoices in the extension of the liberty and self-government of some of the populations of European Turkey, this House regrets:—That it has not been found practicable to deal in a satisfactory manner with the claims of the Kingdom of Greece, and of the Greek subjects of the Porte:That by the assumption under the Anglo-Turkish Convention of a sole guarantee of the integrity of the remaining territories of Turkey in Asia, the Military liabilities of this Country have been unnecessarily extended:That the undefined engagements entered into by Her Majesty's Government in respect of the better administration of those provinces have imposed heavy responsibilities on the State, whilst no sufficient means have been indicated for securing their fulfilment:528And that such engagements have been entered into, and responsibilities incurred, without the previous knowledge of Parliament;said: Mr. Speaker, I rise to call the attention of the House to the Papers which have been recently laid before us on the subject of Eastern affairs, to the Convention concluded between the Governments of England and Turkey, to the Treaty which has been concluded at Berlin and the despatches which accompanied it, and to the Protocols of the Congress which has lately closed. I am afraid that in doing so, I may have to occupy somewhat longer time than I am in the habit of doing, and I fear that even then it will be in my power but very imperfectly to lay before the House a sketch of those considerations which I think ought to be taken into view by the House, before we vote on the Resolution that I am about to propose. But, in these circumstances, I think I shall best consult my duty and the convenience of the House, by refraining altogether from any unnecessary preliminary observations, and by directing attention as briefly as I can to the main points which I ask the House to consider. The Re-solutions which I am about to move, it will be observed, do not, in any way, attack the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin; but, at the same time, I think the House ought to take this opportunity of considering what are the provisions of the settlement of Berlin, in what respect it alters previous engagements, and in what position it leaves the Turkish Empire and affairs in the East. The Government appear to be desirous of inviting us to consider the Treaty of Berlin in comparison with the Treaty of San Stefano, and to limit our consideration of it to that view. I think that a very inadequate idea of what is accomplished by the Treaty of Berlin would be arrived at in any such manner. The Treaty of San Stefano was avowedly a preliminary Treaty; it was always admitted by Russia that its main provisions—at all events, those provisions which affected other European Powers, should be subject to revision by Europe; and it did not profess to be, on the part of the Russian Government, a final settlement of affairs in the East. I think that a more just idea of what has been effected by the Congress of Berlin would be obtained if we compared, for a moment, the state of things which 529 existed at the close of the Crimean War with that which now exists in Turkey. The principles of the Treaty of Paris, by which the Crimean War was terminated, were, in the main, these — That the integrity of the Dominions of Turkey, as then established, was guaranteed, and the independence of the Sultan, on the principle that he should be complete master within his own Dominions, was there asserted. Well, before the late War broke out, before active operations commenced, a communication was made by the Russian Government to Her Majesty's Government, in June, 1877, informing them what were the demands of Russia in case peace could be concluded without having recourse to actual hostilities. No doubt, those demands made very considerable inroads on the two principles which I have referred to as being the basis of the Settlement of 1856. Still, I think it would be desirable to recall to the House what those demands of Russia, in June of last year, were, and to see how very far short they fall of what has been accomplished by the Congress of Berlin. At that time, Russia demanded that Bulgaria, up to the Balkans, should be an autonomous Vassal Province. As to Bulgaria South of the Balkans, it was proposed to secure to it, as well as to other Christian Provinces of Turkey, the best possible guarantees for a regular Administration; Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be provided with institutions compatible with their internal state and good administration; and Austria was to have a preponderating voice in their future organization. As to the independence of Roumania, that was to be settled by European agreement; as to Montenegro and Servia, nothing was said about their independence, but an increase of their territory was to be determined on by a common agreement; and as to the annexation of territory on the part of Russia itself, nothing was asked for except that part of Bessarabia which was ceded in 1856, and some portion of the territory at Batoum. These were the terms asked for by Russia in June, 1877, and the House will remember in what manner they were described by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, to whom they were referred. Sir Austen Layard declared that they were terms virtually amounting to the destruction of the Turkish Empire, and 530 he proceeded to argue in what way they would have that effect. I do not know— we have never known—what was precisely the view taken by Her Majesty's Government themselves of those terms; but they never expressed their approval of them, nor took steps to urge them upon Turkey to save her from the horrors and disasters of the war which has lately been concluded. Let the House compare those terms of June, 1877, with those of the Settlement agreed to by the Congress of Berlin. Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro have all acquired complete independence; Bulgaria, North of the Balkans, has acquired a larger and more complete degree of independence than that which was stipulated for in June, 1877. The Bulgarians, North of the Balkans, are, in fact, on the high road to complete independence, and following in the footsteps which have been trodden by Roumania and Servia. In South Bulgaria, or, as the Congress preferred to describe it, in Eastern Roumelia, an administrative autonomy has been established. It is true that it is described in the Treaty as remaining under the direct political and military authority of the Sultan. But under what condition is the Sultan to exercise that direct political and military authority? There is to be a Christian Governor, who is to be appointed with the assent and after consultation with the Powers of Europe, and he is to be irremovable for a period of five years. That is to say, the Mahomedan Sultan is bound to appoint, to rule over this Province, which remains under his direct authority, a Governor of a different religion, and he is bound to do that only after consultation with, and with the assent of the Powers of Europe. A Constitution is to be prepared for Eastern Roumelia, not by the Sultan and his Advisers, but by a European Commission, and it is to receive the assent of the Powers. The Sultan is, it is true, to be permitted to defend the frontier of that Province; but even that Prerogative is only to be exercised under certain restrictions. Irregular troops may not be used, even in the defence of the frontier; and as to the internal administration of the Province, he is not permitted to introduce any regular troops for the preservation of order; he is not to be the judge when order in the Province is or is not disturbed—internal order is to be preserved 531 by a native gendarmerie or militia; and it is the Governor General appointed by the Powers of Europe who is to be the judge when the necessity arises for summoning troops for the preservation of internal or external security. Such is the nature, political and military, of the authority which has been reserved to the Sultan by the Treaty of Berlin. What is his position as regards independence with respect to the other Provinces of Turkey? By the 23rd Article of the Treaty, the Porte undertakes to apply scrupulously in the Island of Crete the organic law of 1868. Similar laws are to be introduced into the other parts of the Empire; special Commissions, in which the native element is to be largely represented, are to draw out the details of the new laws, and the Sublime Porte, before promulgating those laws, is to submit them to, and take the advice of, a European Commission instituted for the organization of Eastern Roumelia. Such is the amount of independence preserved to the Sultan by the Treaty of Berlin for the remainder of his Empire. I have now to refer for a moment to the case of Greece and the Greek Provinces of Turkey; and I wish to state, at the outset, that though I have thought it necessary to refer to them in the resolutions, I do not propose to formulate any serious charge against Her Majesty's Government in this respect. Any responsibility that has been incurred—and I think it is a very great one—has been incurred by all the other Powers that met in Congress; but, nevertheless, Her Majesty's Government did, in my opinion, incur with regard to Greece a special responsibility not shared by the other Powers. Throughout these troubles, Her Majesty's Government have been in constant communication with the Greek Government, and assurances and promises in considerable numbers have teen made to the Greek Government with a view of inducing them to abstain from adding to the difficulties of the Porte. I freely admit that the promises of the Government were not of a very distinct or definite character; but I think that their general effect, if I am not misrepresenting them, was that the Greek Government was informed that they would lose nothing by waiting, and that Her Majesty's Government would use its best endeavours, when the time for the final settlement arrived, to gain 532 for the Greeks in Turkey all the advantages and reforms that would fall to the other Christian subjects of the Porte. That being the nature of the promises made by Her Majesty's Government, and the nature of the inducement held out to the Greeks to abstain from taking part in the war, let us now proceed to consider what the results are. Lord Salisbury, in the Congress, asked for and obtained the admission of a Greek Delegate; but what were, respectively, the attitudes of the Governments of the European Powers to the Greeks in the Congress? Who proved to be the friend of friends at the Congress? Prince Gortschak off declared beforehand that he was anxious for the Greek cause, and that the Representatives of Russia were not exclusively concerned with the Slavs, but regarded also all the Christian subjects of the Porte; and when the question came on, he said that he would identify himself with any measures adopted in favour of the Greeks, and would even demand for the Greek Provinces of Turkey an autonomy similar to that claimed for the Slavs, the object of his Government being to draw those races closer together. That being the view taken of the Greek claims by the Russian Plenipotentiaries in the Congress, what do we find is the attitude of the British Representatives? At a later period of the deliberations of the Congress, France brought forward proposals in favour of the Kingdom of Greece which were, no doubt, the result of a preliminary arrangement between the Powers. I cannot say that those proposals, moderate in the extreme though they were, received any warm support from Lord Beaconsfield. The Greeks were informed that they had totally misapprehended the objects of the Congress; they were told—and, after the assurances they had received, with cold comfort—that no one could doubt the future of Greece, and that nations that had a future could, like individuals similarly placed, afford to wait. But as to the proposals themselves, Lord Beaconsfield declared that he looked upon them as open to objections, which, however, his Excellency would withdraw in the interests of unanimity. That is the amount of support which the Greeks received in the Congress from the British Plenipotentiaries, who had before put themselves forward as the champions 533 of their admission and of their claims. Well, Sir, we are told that in point of territory Greece will obtain a great deal. But the Congress does not insist, as it does in other cases, upon any extension of Greek territory, but merely recommends it; and it rests to a very considerable extent upon the goodwill and disposition of the Government of Turkey whether or not Greece will ever obtain that extension of territory. But, Sir, Greece in that matter acted not merely in her own interests as a nation; but she was, to some extent, and was recognized to be, the champion of the Greek subjects of Turkey; and the course she desired to take, but which she was persuaded not to take, was calculated not only to advance her own interests, but also those of her compatriots in Turkey. The Government of Her Majesty promised to use their best endeavours to give them the same advantages as those gained for other races; but what is the result? The Slavs are protected by Russia, and acted just as we advised Greece not to act, and they are now either absolutely free or else in a very advanced position towards acquiring absolute independence; the Greek Provinces, on the other hand, obtain nothing but the extension to them of the Cretan Constitution, which has not preserved their freedom nor prevented the occurrence of continued struggles against the authority of Turkey. Lord Beacons-field, in his speech on Saturday last, said there was a Party not in this country alone—which I take to mean that there is one also in this country—which, for factious purposes, egged on the Greeks to take a violent course. I think Lord Beaconsfield is somewhat difficult to satisfy. When his policy is not directly challenged in the House in which he sits, he complains that it is met only by question and innuendo; when, on the other hand, it is challenged in this House, and when I, acting on behalf of a good many hon. Members on this side of the House, put forward some one of our objections to it, then we are told that we are acting for factious purposes. But I deny the charge altogether that in this country there is any Party that for factious purposes is endeavouring to egg on Greece. Everyone must be aware that after the end of the war—after the termination of the labours of the Congress, it would be 534 perfect madness for Greece to attempt to pursue a violent course. What I regret is that past proceedings will have taught the Greeks a lesson which they will not soon forget, and that on the next occasion of difficulty in Turkey, they will rather be disposed to follow the example, which has been proved to be successful, of the Slav subjects of the Ottoman Empire, than to follow the advice which has been given them by Her Majesty's Government. In future they will be disposed to follow Servia, Roumania, and Bulgaria, who, with the assistance of Russia, have obtained some tangible advantages, instead of listening to the Government that soothes them during the time of possible action with smooth words and promises—words and promises which, when the time of performance arrived, seem to have been so greatly and so unfortunately misapprehended. There is one point of view from which I am perfectly ready to concede that the Congress has done good service to Europe, and also to the cause of Greece. I cannot look upon the Treaty of San Stefano or of Berlin as a final solution of the Eastern Question, though the Treaty of San Stefano was, perhaps, more complete than that of Berlin. I give no opinion whether it is a better solution or not; but the Treaty of San Stefano pointed to a complete solution, which would been entirely and solely in the interests of one race, and that the Slav race. I think that the Great Bulgaria, which was planned in the Treaty of San Stefano, would have left open to Greece an extension in the direction of Epirus and Thessaly; but would, no doubt, have closed to Greece all prospect of extension in the direction of Salonica, Roumelia, and Constantinople. Well, Sir, I believe, as I have said, that the Treaty of Berlin will not prove a final settlement. I believe that the future of the inhabitants of what remains of the Dominions of Turkey will ultimately be determined by internal and natural causes, rather than by causes which are external and artificial; and I rejoice that a temporary solution, temporary though it be, has been arrived at, which will leave scope for those natural causes to work, and which will not replace the military domination of Turkey by the military domination of Russia or the Slav over unwilling races. In the main, Sir, the provisions of the 535 Treaty of Berlin are not repugnant to the views which have frequently been expressed by hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House. We have always looked at the Treaty of Paris as an experiment. It was based on the idea that the institutions of Turkey might be reformed, and that with the chances there given her, she might ultimately take her place among the nations of Europe. We have come to the conclusion, sooner than hon. Gentlemen opposite, that the experiment has failed, and that some policy must be substituted for that which was the dominant policy in 1856. We believed that the only substitute for that policy lay in the gradual development of the Christian races of the Porte. You may disguise it if you choose, you may use what phrases you please about the independence and power and direct authority which are left to Turkey; but, disguise it as you will, that is the principle which is at the bottom of the Treaty of Berlin. So far as the Treaty of Berlin is a complete settlement, it is in the direction of extending self-government to the races which were lately subject; so far as it is incomplete it points to a complete settlement in the same direction; and it is because we believe that it is a step, and a very long step, in the direction of the policy which we have from the very beginning of these troubles advocated upon this side of the House, that we do not repudiate, but rather welcome, the Treaty which has been concluded. I observe that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Plunket) has given Notice of an Amendment, which is about to receive the support of the great majority of hon. Gentlemen opposite, expressing great satisfaction with all that has been done or attempted to be done by Her Majesty's Government. I suppose we may take that to mean an approval of what has been done by the Congress of Berlin. If that be so, and if the Amendment is to be assented to by hon. Members opposite—what greater justification could we desire for the course which we have taken from the very beginning? If you approve what has been done at Berlin, you approve what has been done by the war. If you approve the independence of Bosnia, Servia, and Roumania, and the self-government of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, then you must 536 approve those results which have been brought about by the war. You yourselves tried at the Conference at Constantinople what could be effected by peaceable means. Those means failed, and all that has been accomplished has been brought about by the war; and the course we have taken throughout has been, by every means in our power, to induce the Government and the country to refrain from going to war for the purpose of resisting the enterprize which had been taken in hand by Russia. If, then, you are about to vote approval of all the results of the war, how can we desire any better justification of the course we have taken? But, Sir, it is impossible to look only at results, and to shut our eyes altogether to the course which has been pursued by Her Majesty's Government, and the mode in which those results have been arrived at. The character of English statesmanship and of English diplomacy must always be a subject of no common interest to this House. I am not going now into a subject which has been discussed at considerable length in "another place," as to the good faith and accuracy of statements which were made in both Houses of Parliament. I have no doubt it was extremely inconvenient to Her Majesty's Government, when the secret Agreement, which they entered into with Russia, was inadvertently disclosed. I think that after the Agreement had been disclosed, it would have been as well had a full and complete account of it, and all that led to it, been laid before Parliament. All I can say is that if it was the intention of the Government to give that frank, clear, and complete account of the Agreement, and of the circumstances which led to it, they have been somewhat unfortunate in the replies they have given and in the impression they produced. But, Sir, I do not want to go into that controversy, and I venture to express a hope that we may proceed to this debate without reopening it. But it is important to consider whether the course pursued by the Government, not towards us, not towards Parliament, but towards Europe, has been a consistent one—whether it has been a course consistent with the declarations that they made to Europe, or consistent with the obligations they owed to Europe? We have, since the conclusion of the war, been incessant in 537 our expression of disapproval as to the secrecy with which the Treaty of San Stefano was entered into. We have declared, over and over again, that we should recognize no agreement as binding which affected European or British interests which had not been submitted to Europe, and had not received the approval of Europe. We concluded that the Treaty of San Stefano should be submitted at the Congress as a whole; and I observe that in the despatch of July 13, Lord Salisbury says that the demand had been fully recognized. But Lord Salisbury did not think it necessary to state that before that contention was fully recognized and admitted by Russia, we had entered into a secret Agreement with Russia, by which the main provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano—not certain unimportant stipulations which did not affect European or British interests, but its most important stipulations—were agreed upon between England and Russia, who had all through been considered as the chief opponents in the matter; and that, therefore, practically, they were removed from the consideration of the Congress of Berlin. Sir, that was not the only secret Agreement which Her Majesty's Government entered into before the Congress was held. There was also a Convention with Turkey, which up to that time was also a secret Convention. And now I wish to ask Her Majesty's Government how, in their view, that Convention, which was never submitted to the Congress, and had never received the approval of Europe, was consistent with the declarations they made to Europe? That Convention binds Turkey to do two things. First, it gives to us certain rights of intervention which were, in our opinion, necessary to secure better government in Asiatic Turkey, and next it allows our occupation of the Island of Cyprus. Well, in what respect did the first concession differ from the contention put forward by Russia before the Crimean War as to a Protectorate between the Porte and its subjects, and which we resisted by force of arms, and which it was one of the main objects of the Treaty of Paris to induce Russia to abandon? How is it admissible for us to assume the special right of interference between the Porte and its subjects apart from the rest of Europe, when we prevented the carrying into 538 effect of a similar assumption on the part of Russia? As to the occupation of Cyprus, it may be said that it is no breach of our obligations under the Treaty of 1856, because it has been done with the consent of Turkey, and the question of the extent of territory to be occupied has nothing to do with the matter. But let me put this case. Supposing that before the outbreak of war, either by means of threats or promises, Russia had induced Turkey to permit her to occupy Bulgaria, or any part of Bulgaria which she might designate. If such an agreement had been entered into, would Her Majesty's Government have admitted that the contracting Powers were justified in such a course under the provisions of the Treaty of 1856? If the Government are not prepared to admit such a right as I have suggested, I fail to see how they can reconcile with their international obligations an Agreement entered into behind the back of Europe for the occupation of Cyprus. As to the policy of the occupation itself, I do not intend to trouble the House at any length. If Her Majesty's Government can show that the occupation has been accomplished in an internationally legal manner; that it is an advantage to this country in any respect; that it is necessary for the protection of the Suez Canal; or that England requires another naval station in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean, I shall not be disposed to make any objection to the step which Her Majesty's Government have taken. But I cannot forget that we are in possession of no such information, either in the form of Papers or of statements made in "another place;" and that nothing has been said to show that the occupation of Cyprus will increase our military or naval power, or assist us in any degree in meeting the engagements into which we have entered. I will assume, for a moment, that the occupation of Cyprus is necessary to enable us to fulfil the Guarantees into which we have entered for the protection of the Asiatic Dominions of the Sultan; but surely it can never be intended to embark troops at Cyprus, and then to land them on the coast of Asia Minor, across which country they would have to be transported, although, at present, no roads or provision for the passage of an Army exist. If we are to undertake 539 the defence of Asiatic Turkey, it would be much more easy to make Constantinople, or one of the ports of the Black Sea, a base of operations than the Island of Cyprus. It is, therefore, impossible to see how the military occupation of Cyprus will add to our naval power. I come now to the Convention which has been concluded between the Government of Her Majesty and the Porte. The first question I have to put is as to the necessity for that Convention. If a necessity exists, it is in some degree, at all events, one which the Government has created for itself—or, at any rate, one which the Government had made no effort whatever to avert. The necessity which is alleged is that of preventing the advance of Russia in Asia Minor, and the acquisition of certain territory there; and I have pointed out that up to June of last year the Russian demand did not include the annexation of any part of Asia Minor. [Mr. BOURKE: Except Batoum.] Exactly so, but we have heard from a very high authority in "another place" that Batoum is a port of very little importance; and, if my memory does not deceive me, the despatch of Lord Salisbury placed the alleged necessity for the action taken by the Government, not upon the cession of Batoum, but on the cession of Kars, Ardahan, and the adjoining frontier of Asia Minor. The original terms demanded by Russia did not include any of these points of Asiatic Turkey; and if the Government had been aware that a Russian advance in that direction would be so fatal to the interests of this country, it does seem to me extraordinary that they should not have made some effort to press upon the Government of Turkey the acceptance of terms which did not involve these conditions, when they must have known that a Russian advance in Asia would have been the inevitable result of a war. I am not in a position to deny the accuracy of the statements which have been made by Lord Salisbury as to the possible consequences of a Russian advance in Asia Minor. It is probably true that a weak Government there would grow gradually weaker, and that such weakness would probably end in disorganization, and Russian annexation of the Provinces? I cannot say that I have any such positive knowledge on the subject as Lord Salisbury appears to possess. 540 He seems to know as a fact that the increasing weakness of Turkey can only lead to the Asiatic Dominions falling into the hands of Russia. That may be so; but, at the same time, I must say that it does not appear to me so self-evident as it does to the mind of Lord Salisbury. The Provinces are inhabited chiefly by Mahomedan races who would strongly resist the destruction of the Mahomedan power or annexation to Russia, and even if Russia succeeded in annexing them they would, in my opinion, not only prove a source of very little strength to her, but would, on the contrary, turn out to be a very troublesome acquisition of territory. Assuming, however, that Lord Salisbury is right, I think the House ought to be asked to consider— and they have not yet been asked so to do—what is the nature of the British interests involved in Asia Minor. As far as I can see, our interests in India are not in any way affected by the question of Asia Minor. It is possible that at some future day there may be a railway through the Euphrates Valley; but as to that we have an authority in this House. Not long ago a Committee, presided over by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, sat to consider how far the construction of this railway would be inimical to our interests. That Committee reported in the mildest terms imaginable, and they said that, although the railway might be of considerable importance to the Indian Government, it was by no means an object of paramount necessity. And even if this railway were made, and it was made use of by Russia what would Russia find when she reached the other end of it? She would find the British Navy. I should like to know how, even supposing Russia had hostile intentions, she could, when brought face to face with the British iron-clad Navy at the Persian Gulf, carry out those intentions through Asia Minor. But we are told on high authority that in the event of a Russian attack upon India, the line is not through Asia Minor, but lies through Persia. I believe that is an assertion no one will deny. Persia is as much within the grasp of Russia as Asia Minor. Persia is as misgoverned a country as Asia Minor, and it seems to me if you are bound to assume the Protectorate of Turkey, you are bound to guarantee the protection of Persia. A large use has 541 been made of the word prestige, and I fully admit its importance, particularly as far as Eastern countries are concerned; but when we speak of impressing the Natives of India with our power, a reservation should be made as a condition precedent that the power should be used for objects which all the world approves. I do not think that, in order to maintain our prestige among the Natives of India, we should make an exhibition of our power in connection with objects which we ourselves should not deem it necessary to go to war about. Depend upon it that the Native Princes are too clever to be misled by such a course of proceeding on our part. They understand us well enough when we make a display of force to secure objects of Imperial necessity; but their minds would not be influenced in the smallest degree if we were to lower our standard of statesmanship to the level of their ideas, and if we were to use our power for objects we ourselves did not consider worth contending for, but which an Asiatic Potentate might go to war to obtain. But I want to know when it was first discovered that vital British interests were connected with Armenia and Asia Minor? Certainly, the discovery was a very recent one. It had not been made in May of last year, when the celebrated charter of policy was promulgated by Lord Salisbury. Neither had it been made a little later, when that noble Lord addressed the Merchant Taylors, when he absolutely ridiculed the idea of any vital British interests being involved in Armenia and Asia Minor. Certainly, it had not been made in June, when the Russian terms were made known to the Government. It had also not been made when, on a later occasion, Colonel Wellesley had his interview with the Emperor of Russia, and when the Czar stated that he should require to annex some parts of Armenia, and when Her Majesty's Government expressed their satisfaction that the demands of Russia were so modest. Neither had the discovery been made in November last, when Her Majesty's Government told Russia that a further advance of her Armies in the direction of Constantinople would be resisted by us by force of arms; while, at the same moment, they were looking on unconcernedly at the capture of Kars by the Russian Forces. Well, we are told by the Prime Minister that 542 our responsibilities have not been increased by this Convention with Turkey; but that they have, on the contrary, been diminished by it. The noble Lord said—Suppose now, for example, the settlement of Europe had not included the Convention of Constantinople and the occupation of the Isle of Cyprus; suppose it had been limited to the mere Treaty of Berlin; what, under all probable circumstances, might then have occurred? In 10, 15, it might be in 20 years, the power and resources of Russia having revived, some quarrel would again have occurred, Bulgarian or otherwise, and in all probability the Armies of Russia would have been assailing the Ottoman Dominions both in Europe and Asia, and enveloping and enclosing the city of Constantinople and its all-powerful position. Well, what would he the probable conduct, under these circumstances, of the Government of this country, whoever the Ministers might be — whatever Party might be in power? I fear there might he hesitation for a time— a want of decision—a want of firmness; but no one doubts that ultimately England would have said—'This will never do; we must prevent the conquest of Asia Minor; we must interfere in this matter and arrest the course of Russia.' No one, I am sure, in this country who impartially considers this question can for a moment doubt what under any circumstances would have been the course of this country.Why, I wish to ask, are we to assume that, when the next occasion arises, the Government then in Office will do exactly the reverse of that which has been done by Her Majesty's Government? No doubt Lord Beaconsfield is a very good judge of what is likely to take place in the future Cabinet; because he was, probably, relying on his memory when he said that there might be hesitation for a time, a want of decision, and a want of firmness. No doubt, the noble Lord was speaking from experience; but I cannot see why the future Government should do precisely what the present Government have not done. Lord Beaconsfield goes on to say that this Convention will remove all doubt in the matter. That does not appear to me to be so certain. This is not the first Guarantee that we have entered into with respect to Turkey. The terms of the Guarantee of 1856 and of the Tripartite Treaty were distinct enough, and could not have been more binding upon the high contracting parties than they were; nevertheless, they did not remove all doubt from the mind of Russia, who, notwithstanding them, had proceeded to make war upon Turkey, in which she was so far justified that none of the 543 parties who were bound by the Guarantee had stepped forward in defence of the latter. The fact is that guarantees of this sort cannot possibly bind future generations. The foreign policy of future generations must be decided by themselves according to the circumstances of their own time and according to what is expedient at the time. In his opinion, it was idle for any Government to say that by entering into any guarantees now they would prevent Russian aggression some 20 years hence. It is true that on some occasions the Prime Minister does assume to himself extraordinary power. He says that it is time to say to Russia—"Thus far shalt thou come, and no farther." I wonder when the Prime Minister used these words, he considered where the quotation originated. These words are taken from a passage in the Bible, in which were described the attributes of the Almighty. There is a legend in English history of the courtiers of a certain British Monarch who desired to flatter him with the possession of Omnipotence. The British Canute was not to be deceived by the counsels of those courtiers; but proved to them, by practical experiment, that they were assigning to him powers beyond those he possessed or could possess. But I am not surprised at the Prime Minister using language which would attribute to himself not only Omnipotence, but Omniscience, seeing that he professes to be able to tell us what will be done by the Government of this country some 20 years hence in the event of the Eastern Question arising again at that time. I contend that it rests upon Her Majesty's Government to show to Parliament and to the country wherein lies the imperative necessity and compulsion for us to enter into these engagements. I think that no adequate necessity has been shown by Her Majesty's Government for our entering into them, and that no corresponding advantage has been secured to us in return for our having surrendered our freedom of action. There can, however, be no doubt that we have largely extended our liabilities. It is to defend Turkey in Asia Minor, not when we please, but when Russia pleases. Not to take our own time, not to be our own judges of the interests which are involved; but to defend the territorial integrity of Turkey in Asia whenever and for whatever cause 544 Russia may attack it. Are you perfectly certain that Russia, which has hitherto not been generally considered wanting in astuteness, will always select the time for attack which precisely suits our own convenience, or do you think it possible that Great Britain may be involved in difficulties or wars with other nations and that she may not always be ready at the call of Russia to undertake this military liability you have imposed upon her? I know it is now extremely unpopular to talk about our insular position, although there was, I believe, a time when we were extremely proud of that position. To the strength which we derived from it we owe, in my opinion, the greater part of our power. But, although we have not been content—and I do not complain of it—to confine our Dominions within the Seas which surround these Islands, though we have extended them to every part of the globe, we have hitherto been very fortunate in the way in which those extensions have been made. We have been fortunate in not possessing an extended military frontier. The frontier between the United States and Canada is, I believe, the only extensive military frontier which we have had to defend, and hon. Gentlemen may remember the anxiety which was felt a few years ago when our relations with America were not so good as they are now. In India we have an Empire of vast extent, surrounded on two sides by the sea; while, on the third side, we have been singularly favoured by the nature of our frontier. There we have a chain of the highest mountains in the world, and on both sides of those mountains you find warlike and independent Tribes, who, if they resent encroachment from our side, equally resent it from any other quarter. Indeed, the position which we occupy in India is one which is as secure as it is possible to have. But what is it that we have done by this undertaking of the Government? We have advanced the time for the conflict, if conflict there is to be, between us and Russia, perhaps by 100 years, and we have advanced the frontier open to her attack, to our disadvantage, at least 1,000 miles. We have left behind us a frontier such as I have described in India, with which every military authority has hitherto been satisfied, and we have planted ourselves close to the frontier of our sole enemy, close to his resources, and 1,000 545 miles away from our own. We have left behind us, in India, our Navy and the Navy of India, the resources, the wealth, the railroads of India, the Native troops we have trained, and the population from whom they are recruited—we have given up, I say, all these military advantages, and placed ourselves close to the resources of our enemy, trusting only to the resources of the misgoverned and semi-civilized Turkish Provinces in Asia Minor. If that be not a policy rightly described—as it was described the other day—as an insane policy, I want to know what epithet is to be applied to it? This reminds me of—and this is the last reference I need make to— the speech of the Prime Minister on Saturday. I do not complain of his retort to that description of his policy which was given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich; it was, I think, a fair Parliamentary retort. But when the noble Lord thought it worthy of himself to go on to describe my right hon. Friend asa sophistical rhetorician, inebriated with the exuberance of his own verbosity, and gifted with an egotistical imagination which can at all times command an interminable and inconsistent series of arguments to malign an opponent and glorify himself;when the noble Lord went on to describe my right hon. Friend in that way, I think he was offering somewhat of an insult to the Sovereign of whom my right hon. Friend was for no inconsiderable time the chief Adviser; to the Privy Council, of which my right hon. Friend is still a Member; to this House, which he has led; to the people of this country, whose confidence at one time my right hon. Friend possessed, and the confidence of a large portion of whom he still commands. Sir, I regret that personalities of that description should enter into our discussions, whether inside or outside this House. But, passing by that, I go on to consider the political responsibilities which the Government have undertaken by the policy which they have adopted. Some persons entertain a doubt whether the military engagements into which we have entered with Turkey depend or not on her performance of her promises. But, whether they be or be not unconditional engagements, there can be no doubt about the responsibilities which we have incurred under the engagements which Turkey has made to 546 us. Those responsibilities extend very far, indeed, beyond Asia and the Asian frontier, to the whole external and internal policy of that country. I think it quite clear that when the contingency arises, and when the Asiatic Dominions of Turkey are attacked by Russia, it will not be an isolated attack, but part of a general attack on the Turkish Empire; and the defence of the Asiatic frontier will be, to all intents and purposes, a general defence of Turkey in a war with Russia. Is it possible that Her Majesty's Government can bind themselves to be the Ally of Turkey in any such war, altogether irrespective of the cause for which such a war is being waged? It is inconceivable that Turkey is to be made the judge of her action in bring about a war under such conditions; but, unless we intend to regulate the foreign policy of Turkey when it has relation to Russia, how is it possible we can tell whether the cause of such a war is one we can fight for? It is necessary, therefore, that we should assume some control over the foreign policy of Turkey with regard to Russia. Let the House look at the responsibilities which we have now incurred in Asia, and the consequences to which they may tend. We are assured by Lord Salisbury that our aid is conditional on reforms being introduced in the government of the Turkish Provinces, and that we have the promise of the introduction of those reforms. But are we to rely on the promises which have been made to us by the Porte? Previous experience serves to show us what those promises are worth. Have we taken power to introduce ourselves, or to insist upon Turkey introducing, the necessary reforms into her Asiatic Dominions? If so, then, as negotiations are not now going on, the House ought to be informed what those powers are. All that we have heard is that the Sovereign rights of the Sultan are to be respected; but, then, the problem to be solved is this—how to respect the Sovereign rights of the Sultan, and at the same time not to rely simply on the promises of the Sultan. What machinery are you going to employ to ensure reforms being introduced into Asiatic Turkey? I suppose we shall be told that the problem has been solved by Great Britain in India; but I am surprised that India should be referred to as an analogous case, for the very name 547 of India negatives the idea of the independent Prerogative of the Sultan. We may be told of protected Indian Princes whose governments we have undertaken to and succeeded in reforming, and who retain a shadow of independence. That case has been repeated over and over again. In the first place, we protect a Native Prince; in the second place, we find fault with him; and, in the next place, we correct him for his bad government; and, finally, we disestablish him altogether. Perhaps the Sovereign rights of the Sultan are a mere phrase? Perhaps it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to assume a real authority, and to administer, in the name of the Sultan, the Provinces of Asiatic Turkey by our own officers? Has the House considered, even for one moment, the enormous difficulty that will attend such an enterprise? India, no doubt, will again be referred to, and it will be said we have succeeded there in that task. But how different are the circumstances in the two cases! In India we are the paramount Power; there is no military force that can compete or compare with ours. When we resolve that something shall be done in India, we have the unquestioned military power to enforce our will; and there we are exposed to no interference from any other European Power. No other Power either desires or has a right to interfere with or to question our position in India. With the Protectorate you are about to undertake in Asia Minor the case is far different. There not only every European Power has a right to be present, but under the 61st Article of the Treaty which you have concluded you have given to every European Power that has signed it a right to inquire into, to investigate and supervise the reforms that are to be introduced by the Porte for the better government of the country. Then, again, what are you going to do in the event of insurrection? You are to guarantee Turkey against Russian aggression. But is it merely aggression from without that threatens the Turkish Dominions? And does not such aggression generally begin with insurrection from within? Have you undertaken, or do you intend to guarantee the Porte in Asia against the consequences of its own misgovernment if that misgovernment, is continued, and to use the armed force of England in putting down internal re- 548 volt? Surely .engagements so embarrassing were never entered into with so little consideration? If there had really been any serious consideration of their policy, Her Majesty's Government might have pointed out to the Sultan that there was but one chance left for the continuance of his power either in Europe or in Asia, and that was by the better government of his subjects. They might have offered their assistance for that purpose. They might have said— "We want no more words, but some evidence, however little, that we are to have deeds." They might have given him what assistance he needed to initiate those reforms; and when they had something tangible to bring before us, when they had some reforms made, some improvements effected, in the condition of those Asiatic Provinces, then I could have understood Her Majesty's Government coming to Parliament and saying—"The work of reformation has begun; the Sultan is availing himself of our assistance; the well-being of these Provinces has been secured and will be further secured; and now we ask you to aid in protecting this work against foreign aggression." In such a policy as that there would have been something solid and clear; but there would have been nothing showy, and nothing to justify congratulatory regrets. Her Majesty's Government have given us great professions— immense professions—and I ask them what shadow or tittle of action, or performance, there is to correspond with these professions? We are told that we shrink from the responsibility; that we, and such politicians as we are, would not have been the men to adopt that policy. But to that, my reply is that the Indian Empire has been managed by men on very different principles. They advanced their Dominions gradually and steadily, and they said very little about it. You make very large professions; and I want you to tell Parliament what ounce or tittle of performance there has been for all these professions? Sir, I may be asked what is the object I have in bringing forward this Resolution? and in asking the opinion of the House upon them. From a Party point of view, I have no doubt it would have been easier to have remained quiet, to have bowed our heads to the breeze of popularity which is now carrying forward the vessel of the Government, and 549 to have waited for the time—in my opinion, the inevitable time— of re-action, and to have reaped our own advantage from the disappointment and discontent which follow the exaggerated hopes of an untrue confidence. It would have been easier, perhaps, in a Party point of view, and more politic, if we had adopted that course. But that is not the view which we take of the duty we owe to the country. We have thought that it was more patriotic to endeavour to point out to this House and the country the nature and the magnitude of the liabilities and responsibilities which you are undertaking, and the dangers which we believe are involved. We have thought it better, if those dangers and liabilities are to be incurred, that they should be incurred with a full knowledge of their character. And we wished, further, to prepare the way, if possible, when the time for reflection should come—as come, I believe, it inevitably will—so as to enable the country, while there is time, to retreat from this false, and, as we think, ill-advised, course with honour, and to retire from a position which we believe that neither its interest nor its duty demands that it should assume.
§
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That, whilst this House has learned with satisfaction that the troubles which have arisen in the East of Europe have been terminated by the Treaty of Berlin without a further recourse to arms, and rejoices in the extension of the liberty and self-government of some of the populations of European Turkey, this House regrets:—
That it has not been found practicable to deal in a satisfactory manner with the claims of the Kingdom of Greece, and of the Greek subjects of the Porte:
That by the assumption under the Anglo-Turkish Convention of a sole guarantee of the integrity of the remaining territories of Turkey in Asia, the Military liabilities of this Country have been unnecessarily extended:
That the undefined engagements entered into by Her Majesty's Government in respect of the better administration of those Provinces have imposed heavy responsibilities on the State, whilst no sufficient means have been indicated for securing their fulfilment:
And that such engagements have been entered into, and responsibilities incurred, without the previous knowledge of Parliament."— (The Marquess of Hartington.)
§ MR. PLUNKET, in rising to move to leave out from the first word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to insert the words—
An humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, thanking Her Majesty for communi- 550 cating to this House the Treaty of Berlin, the Protocols of the Congress of Berlin, and the Convention between Great Britain and Turkey; assuring Her Majesty that this House has learnt with deep satisfaction the termination of the late unhappy War, and the conclusion of a Treaty between the Great Powers of Europe; and expressing an earnest hope that the arrangements made and sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government may, under the blessing of Providence, avail to preserve Peace, to ameliorate the condition of large populations in the East, and to maintain the interest of this Empire,said: Mr. Speaker, in rising to move the Amendment of which I have given Notice, I have first of all to say. a word in expression of my sense of the courtesy with which the hon. Member for Stoke (Dr. Kenealy) has given way to me on this occasion, and not imposed on me the necessity of moving an Amendment to the same effect. I think that the House will agree that, however much any of us on this side of the House, at all events, are in accord with the views expressed in the Amendment of the hon. Member for Stoke, we must all agree that as his Amendment seemed only to touch one part of the Motion brought before us, and did not appear, as I understand it, to deal with the Anglo-Turkish Convention, it was more convenient that the sense of the House should be taken on the Amendment which I have framed. Because, Sir, I regard the proceedings of this evening, at all events the Amendment of which I have given Notice, should it be adopted by the House, as doing something towards recording the approval of the country of the conduct of their Representatives here in the House of Commons, and of the acts of the Government, which are really now completed, and as also indicating—as the result of this debate will indicate—the determination of the country to support the Ministers in proceeding with and carraying out that other old, and I think wise, policy which they have now entered upon. Of course, Sir, I am well aware that this Amendment, if carried, will be in the nature of a Vote of Confidence in Her Majesty's Government, and as a loyal supporter of that Government I shall rejoice on that account; but I think it of much higher importance in a national sense, because I believe that the great majority—as I am sure there will be—as the result of this debate, will show to Europe and to the world that after all the controversies, and after all the contentions that 551 have raged in this House upon this subject, we are again I hope thoroughly, as regards our foreign affairs, a united people. The noble Lord who has just sat down, towards the close of his speech, referred to the breeze of popularity which he said was now passing over the land, and he regarded that as only of a passing and temporary character. I cannot agree at all in that view of the extraordinary enthusiasm and unanimity with which the conduct of the Premier and the announcement of the future policy of the country, as regards Turkey, has been received in this country. Nor, indeed, need we surprised when we consider what a wonderful change has passed over the mind of these people within the last few weeks. It is not so long ago since we were all in a state of extreme anxiety and great attention; this peaceable, commercial people had been required to prepare itself for the possibility of a war—a war which, if it began at all, was sure to prove a great and probably a long-continued struggle. We had seen the wonderful resources of this country, which, during times of peace, she had carefully hoarded up, rapidly and easily developed; but while the country, I am sure, would view with admiration and with pride the rapid development of those great resources, should it have become necessary to employ them, when Fleets could have been sent forth by England such as no other country could pretend to equip—whilst we saw not only our own Army rapidly mobilized and in a short time made ready for active service—while we saw with pride the Native troops of India rallying to the Standard of the Queen, while we received from all quarters of the country promises of assistance should we require it, at the same time the feeling of the country was one of extreme and painful apprehension. There was a feeling that when we were preparing with all our energies for war, the horrors which at that time seemed to be impending over the country predominated in the national mind. But, Sir, all that now has passed away. The soldiers who were called out—the Reserve Forces— are no longer necessary on sea or land, and the ordinary course of peaceful life at home has been happily resumed. I do not think that anyone could wonder at the breeze of popularity which is now, as it is said, passing over this land, and 552 over those statesmen who have maintained the dignity of this country in the counsels of Europe, and who have brought back to her from that great Assembly of the statesmen of Europe, "peace, and peace with honour." But, Sir, the noble Lord who has just sat down has taken the Prime Minister somewhat severely to task for a sentence uttered by him at a banquet on last Saturday evening. Now, I really think myself the noble Lord treated that in a somewhat too serious manner. I was under the impression that it was not delivered in a vindictive or in a serious mood. It was received much more with laughter than with any serious feeling. But I must say one word more. The noble Lord has spoken gallantly and loyally for his Chief, and I may say one word on behalf of the Prime Minister in speaking those words. Does the noble Lord think that the Prime Minister had received no provocation? Does he not remember how, not in jest at all, but in sober and solemn earnestness, that Statesman has been denounced now for these three years; how in patience he has endured all those taunts and all those insults, and, I must say, in the most pleasant and good-humoured way? He referred to his great rival at a banquet on Saturday, and I do not think that great blame can be attached to him. Why, I recollect the time when we were told that the Ministry, of which Lord Beaconsfield was the Chief, could hardly be excused; the right hon. Gentleman guarded himself from accusing them of "purposed complicity with guilt." The expression occurs in a famous pamphlet; and not only that, but we were told that the Government of that day had more disgraced the name of England than any Government for years; and we were assured that nothing good would come of their Administration, until they had been taught as "lisping babes." Why, Sir, is all that nothing? I am referring to expressions by the right hon. Gentleman himself in serious earnestness. If you add to those the calumnies of orators and writers on Lord Beaconsfield, my astonishment is not so much that at last he must have said something, or that he should have said something rather more playful than serious, but that he should so long have succeeded in maintaining his patience. I cannot, of course, ask the indulgence 553 of the House for any length of time; and, therefore, I shall at once address myself to the question raised by the Resolution of the noble Lord, and the Amendment that I move. Now, Sir, as to the Treaty of Berlin. The noble Lord contrasted the terms of the Treaty of Berlin with the terms of the Despatch of last June, and also with the principles that were founded on the Treaty of 1856. Now, Sir, I think that is not the fairest or the best way, perhaps, of treating this question. I did not understand the noble Lord that he was led to imply that we should have coerced Turkey to adopt it— I thought the noble Lord himself was opposed to the policy of coercion—or that we should have sooner checked the Russians when they made their advance with the encouragement of the opponents of the Government. I do not see with what object these comparisons have been made; but when the noble Lord went on to say that he has always been against the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the Conservatives of the opposite opinion, he must, I think, have forgotten what occurred before the Conference of Constantinople. In the Session of 1876 the noble Lord himself warned the Government not to depart from the traditional policy of Palmerston, and similar advice was given by Lord Granville. The integrity of the Ottoman Empire has also been the whole foundation of the Conference of Constantinople. So much, however, has occurred since, that I do not see that one can gain much by contrasting the terms of the Berlin Treaty with those earlier documents, and therefore it is much better that we should contrast them with those of the ,Treaty of San Stefano. I will not follow the noble Lord in his analysis of the Treaty of Berlin; but as one of the questions raised by the Resolution concerns that Treaty—the question, namely, of the Greeks—I am compelled to make one or two remarks upon it. The noble Lord said he did not attach much blame to the Government for what had been done with respect to Greece, for that after the representations which had been made on the subject he found that the other Plenipotentiaries took the same view of the case; but he went onto say that some hopes had been held out to Greece by Her Majesty's Government which had misled her. I have selected passage after passage from 554 the Blue Books, which prove incontestably that that has not been the case. On the contrary, Greece has been specially warned that Her Majesty's Government could not pledge itself to procure for her any territorial additions; but it did pledge itself to obtain for the Greek cause, as far as possible, a hearing in the Congress, and to obtain for the Greek Provinces of Turkey whatever was granted to the other Christian Provinces of the Porte. There is not one word in any of those despatches to show that the Government did not in every respect adhere to their promises; on the contrary, when we compare the action of the Government with that of the French, we will see that the speech of the Prime Minister contained very friendly advice to the Greeks, and that, as a matter of fact, the proposals of the Plenipotentiaries were just those agreed upon between the Greek Minister and Lord Salisbury and Lord Beaconsfield, who never did anything to diminish the force of the representations made on behalf of the Greeks. If anything, they wore more in favour of the Greeks than the other Plenipotentiaries; because when the question arose of the demands of Greece, and whether her Representatives were to be present at all discussions touching the various Greek Provinces, they proposed that they should be present, while the French Plenipotentiaries would have excluded them. The results obtained for Greece were very considerable indeed; and though she may not acquire any vast increase of territory, she is a gainer by the Congress, and has a great future before her. One great boon obtained for the Greek Provinces is this—that the duties as regards the supervision of the new arrangements instituted in the Greek Provinces are relegated to a European Commission, and not to a Russian Commission. The real wishes of Greece are stated in a Blue Book of December, 1876, which contains a Minute of a conversation between Lord Derby and M. Gennadius, the Greek Chargé d'Affaires, who told him that the Greek nation could not but regard with apprehension the attempt to extend the Slav Provinces at the expense of the Greeks, for the Greeks formed the most important element in that part of European Turkey, and were a particularly thriving community. It went on to say that, as a body, the 555 Greeks would prefer Turkish rule to the domination of the Slav races. I need not say that the hopes of the Greeks will not be likely to be realized under the supreme control of Russia. In my opinion, next to the strengthening of the power of the Sultan—to whom has been intrusted again the great city of Constantinople and the guardianship of the Straits—the next most important result of the labours of the Congress was the substitution in the disturbed Provinces of European for Russian authority and influence. It is an entirely unfair and an unjust accusation to say that any promise made by Her Majesty's Government to the Greek Kingdom or the Greek Provinces has been in any way violated; or to say that France or any other country exhibited towards the Greeks any greater favour than was shown them by England. Indeed, I had forgotten Prince Gortchakoff for the moment. He did not care if the Greek Provinces were made altogether independent; but that never occurred to him when making the Treaty of San Stefano. Under that Treaty the Greek Provinces would have been subject to Russian predominance altogether. I now come to the only part of the Treaty of Berlin with which the noble Lord appears to find serious fault—I mean the Anglo-Turkish Convention. I was rather struck by the curious series of arguments used on that subject by the noble Lord. They reminded me of a phrase sometimes seen in our charts— "dangerous winds from opposite quarters." Russia, said the noble Lord, would not assail Asia Minor, because she had no desire to come into conflict with Mahomedans. Well, that is a startling statement, considering what Russia has already done in Asia; and then the noble Lord said — "You incur a fearful responsibility." But where is the responsibility as regards the Turkish Provinces in Asia if Russia is not going to attack them? But, said the noble Lord—"You forget the Tripartite Treaty; is it not stronger than any you can make?" Well, I have heard that argument used before. I put it to the House, is it true that a Treaty —which it is the business of three different Powers to carry out, where responsibility is divided, and where there must be great difficulty and delay in bringing it to pass—is at all as binding or as valuable as the Convention which 556 has been entered into by England and Turkey; a Convention by which England, for the purpose of carrying out her guarantee, accepts an important naval station, and undertakes to assist, from day to day, as far as she may be required, or invited to do so, the reforms which the Sultan agrees to adopt? It is obvious that no Russian statesman or soldier could for a moment believe that, under such circumstances, the English Government would recede from the important obligation which they have now incurred. It is a wise policy to defend Asia Minor against future aggression on the part of Russia, and one from which England will not recede. Then the noble Lord, having stated that the Russian Government would not think of attacking a Mahomedan country, proceeded to argue that she might do so with safety so far as this country is concerned. Is it likely that, if the Convention had not been entered into, Asia Minor would have been attacked? If you realize the condition of Turkey in Asia—a country inhabited by divided races, and races belonging to different creeds—if you realize the disintegration of Turkish Government in Asia Minor from the events of the late war, and if you realize all the fortresses which defended the territory of Turkey, and which have passed into the hands of Russia, do you not think that that is a prize which would present an irresistible attraction to the ambition of Russian statesmen and Russian soldiers? With regard to danger being apprehended in the event of the Russians getting down to the Isthmus of Suez, that might come to pass if they became the conquerors of Asia Minor; but would not their first advance on the Southern shore of the Black Sea bring them directly and speedily to the very confines of Constantinople? If it is intended to give a fair trial to the policy which has been undertaken of still intrusting to the Sultan the guardianship of Constantinople and the Straits, it is absolutely necessary that he should be safeguarded in his Asiatic Possessions as well as in his European Provinces. Then, said the noble Lord, we have undertaken grave responsibility as regards reforms in Turkey. No doubt we have undertaken considerable responsibility; but it is a responsibility we were bound to undertake. If we are to protect the Sultan 557 in his Asiatic Dominions, is it not the first and necessary condition for successfully protecting him that reforms should be carried out in earnest? But it will be said there is no use in depending on the promises of Turkey. Well, I do not suppose there is any Member of the Liberal Party who will regret to see reforms effected in the Government of Turkey. What they say, then, is that there is no use in leaving the carrying of them out in the hands of the Sultan of Turkey. He requires aid, and that aid England has undertaken to give him. If the guarantee is to be carried out at all, what have we to do? We have to make an attempt to reform the Turkish Government in Asia Minor, and to redeem from their present miserable condition the subjects of the Sultan. That is not only a duty which we may fairly say we owe almost to humanity, but it is obviously a policy which, if successfully carried out, must be of immense advantage to this country and to the world. Is it not well known that there are enormous resources lying waste in Asiatic Turkey—immense fields of enterprise which have long been lying fallow, and that there is great wealth there to be developed? The people of that country are an industrious people— an honest people; and if their Government could be reformed, there is no reason why the country should not become as prosperous as it has been in times past. Therefore, I contend that this undertaking on the part of Her Majesty's Government to assist in the reform of Turkey is not only a wise, but a generous policy; and one which I am very confident the people of this country will fully approve. But it is said—"Why do you not declare the way you are going to carry it out?" Surely that is not a thing that can be done in a day. The British Government have undertaken to do their best to assist the Sultan in carrying out these reforms, and the Sultan has undertaken to carry them out under the advice of the British Government; but it necessarily will be a matter of time. Hon. Members opposite think it can be done off-hand—done by a stroke of the pen—but no reasonable expectation of any such thing can be formed. It will be necessary to make investigations, and to concert measures in order to secure real practical reforms; but I venture to think that if in other respects 558 the policy of Her Majesty's Government as regards Asia Minor is accepted by the English people, they will not be turned away from carrying it out by those phantasies of responsibility. That, at all events, has not been the history of England. The noble Lord has pointed out that in India we have accepted responsibilities under different circumstances. That is true; but that is no reason why we should not incur these particular responsibilities for the purpose of regenerating the country, developing its commerce, and securing the good government of its people. To shrink from it would not be in accordance with the history of the great achievements of the English people, and which has made us what we are. In former times the English people in these Islands had for centuries treasured up the spirit of freedom, until it became a part of their character, and gave strength and vigour to it. Because they have thus formed a character the most daring and the most capable of sustaining effort, when opportunities have been given to the whole world to visit untried fields, the English have always been the first to colonize and the greatest to conquer. If we conquered, we did not take the vanquished people into slavery; we conquered in order to push forward the cause of freedom. We do not purpose to go as colonists or conquerors to Turkey, but as ancient and faithful allies and friends; and by our advice, example, and experience to endeavour to lead them out of the unhappy condition into which they have fallen; and, as far as possible, to confer upon them the blessings which were intended by nature to rest upon the favoured countries now under Turkish rule. I beg to move the Amendment of which I have given Notice.
§
Amendment proposed,
To leave out from the first word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to insert the words "an humble Address he presented to Her Majesty, thanking Her Majesty for communicating to this House the Treaty of Berlin, the Protocols of the Congress of Berlin, and the Convention between Great Britain and Turkey; assuring Her Majesty that this House has learnt with deep satisfaction the termination of the late unhappy War, and the conclusion of a Treaty between the Great Powers of Europe; and expressing an earnest hope that the arrangements made and sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government may, under the blessing of Providence, avail to preserve Peace, to ameliorate
559
the condition of large populations in the East, and to maintain the interest of this Empire,"— (Mr. Plunket,)
—instead thereof.
§ Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKESir, before I refer to the speech which has just fallen from my hon. and learned Friend, I wish to notice one omission in the admirable speech of the noble Lord. The noble Lord, unintentionally, forgot to support, by speech, the last paragraph of his Resolutions, which is certainly not the weakest point in our attack on the proposals which the Government have placed before the country. I mean, of course, the paragraph in which we express the deep regret we feel that the Government policy has been adopted without the knowledge or the sanction of this House. At a moment when a new departure has been taken in the foreign policy of England, and a Convention signed, which friends and enemies unite in admitting to be of the utmost gravity, no attention has been called to those proposals by the Government in the House of Commons, and it has been left to the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition to raise the matter by his Resolutions. When we are asked to support what I suppose will be termed a grand policy, I cannot refrain from saying that I think that it would have been far more deserving of the epithet if it had been a policy approved by Parliament after it had been laid before Parliament as a whole. It is not in these days that Governments can make Conventions, that will bind free peoples to engage in bloody wars, without the previous consent of Parliament. It is one thing to make Treaties on lines which have been foreseen, and on principles which Parliament has been permitted to discuss; but it is a very different thing to take a new departure and to deal in a clandestine manner with matters which have never been before either Parliament or the country. The clandestine character of the conditional Convention will be the chief of the reasons which are likely to give it a short life. The people will not forget the manner, if they forget the matter, of this Convention. I turn now to the consideration of the speech of my hon. and 560 learned Friend (Mr. Plunket). My hon. and learned Friend is one of the favourite orators of this House; but, if he will allow me to say so, I do not think that his speech to-night was equal to the occasion: and I cannot but believe that it must be the badness of his case which must account for the defective character of his speech. It was not really a defence of the policy of the Government. My hon. and learned Friend did, indeed, ask the House to approve their policy; but instead of explaining it to the House, or defending it as best he could, he indulged in tu quoque observations, and, if I may be allowed the phrase, in "chaff." It is quite true, as my hon. and learned Friend said, that the noble Lord began his speech by expressing satisfaction, not only at the conclusion of peace, but, on the whole, at the nature of the peace which has been arrived at. The majority of the arrangements which have been made in the Treaty of Berlin are satisfactory to both sides. The noble Lord did not refer to the retrocession of Bessarabia, and there is not a man in the House who is favourable to that retrocession, or who would not desire to have seen it avoided. But, with the exception of the case of Greece, it may be taken for certain that the general character of the arrangements was inevitable. It is interesting to observe how extremely like the Treaty is to the suggestions made by the Russian Government in June of last year. It goes a good bit further, but it goes upon the same lines; and it is clear that Russia has gained considerably more by the temporary settlement which has been arrived at than, at this time last year, she expected to obtain. On the whole, the arrangements of the Treaty of Berlin are arrangements which, from the time of the Conference of Constantinople, might have been foreseen. What has been done could not have been avoided when once it had been decided not to prevent the war; but those who, like our Ambassador at Constantinople, foresaw such terrible calamities as he described in changes much milder than those which they themselves have now carried into effect, must surely ask themselves whether the Liberals who supported the policy of the Berlin Memorandum were really, as they were described to be, the enemies, not only of Turkey, but of England 561 herself? The second head of the three main heads of the Motion of the noble Lord is that which refers to Greece. Before I come to the consideration of what has been done, or of what has been left undone in regard to Greece, let me first apply myself to remove a false impression which undoubtedly exists among many in the country, if not among many in this House. It is, that Greece is merely an ambitious Power, like Piedmont before 1859, desirous of obtaining, at the expense of her neighbour, territory, chiefly on the sentimental ground that it is inhabited by her race. Those who have not carefully followed this question for themselves are not aware of the frightful cruelties which have been perpetrated by the Turks close to the Greek frontier, in the Provinces of Thessaly and Epirus. Read the account which history gives of the massacres and destruction wrought by the Turks in Greece in our fathers' time, and you will find the true picture of the state of things prevailing in Thessaly and Epirus now. I should almost think that the Turkish Pashas, knowing that they will be compelled to hand over the frontier Provinces to Greece, have determined to hand them over in the condition of a desert, with every homestead burnt, and the green fig-trees, that will not burn, cut down. I pointed out in the House, some months ago, that the Porte had emptied its gaols, and let the convicts loose upon the Greek Provinces, to rob and murder all the people. Up to that moment, in spite of immense temptations, the Greek Government had preserved neutrality; and when at last they resolved upon action—which was forced upon them by the sufferings of their race, and by the outcry of their population—we checked their action by the promises that we made. One of those promises, which was made over and over again, was, that we would "use our utmost endeavours," and again, "do all in our power," to-prevent the deeds of lawless violence which were being committed by the Turkish troops in Thessaly and Epirus, and in Crete. I have yet to learn that we did much in this sense except talk, through the pleasant mouth of Mr. Layard, to the Turkish Vizier; and I now assert that those deeds of lawless violence are continuing unchecked at the very moment at which I speak. As far as words went, however, nothing could 562 be more satisfactory than the treatment about two months ago by the Government of the case of Greece. The instructions, addressed to the English Plenipotentiaries by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department, are strong and clear upon this point; and as it so happened that the two principal Representatives of England were themselves present at the sitting of the Cabinet, at which the instructions to themselves were drawn up, it must be presumed that the language used had their sanction, although that made use of in Lord Salisbury's despatch of the same day to Lord Odo Russell was far from being equally emphatic. At the first meeting of the Congress Lord Salisbury gave notice of a resolution for the admission of Greece. At the second meeting he brought it forward. At the third meeting he moved it—the debate at the second meeting having been adjourned; and on this occasion England took, or appeared to take, the wider and more liberal view. My hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Plunket) affirmed that England did more for Greece than did France herself—a statement which will provoke the laughter of the Plenipotentiaries. It may be distinctly affirmed, indeed, that at the third sitting of the Congress England showed herself far more liberal to Greece than did France; and yet it is France, and not England, who has left the Congress with the thanks of Greece, for reasons which I presently will show. At the ninth sitting of the Congress Greece stated her case, and asked for Crete, Thessaly, and Epirus. There is only this to be said in regard to her demand for Crete—that the very reasons which were given by the English Plenipotentiaries in support of the demand, introduced by, and actually proposed by, them, to the Congress—that Austria should occupy and administer without limit of time the Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina—apply in the case of Crete. Crete has over and over again been the scene of revolutions, and the government of Crete by Turkey is a permanent menace to European peace. At the 13th sitting of the Congress the Greek case was considered. When the case of Greece was brought before the Congress, it was not upon a proposal of England, but on a proposal of France; 563 and not even on a proposal of France, on behalf of France and England, as was the case with some other proposals submitted to the Congress. The proposal was of a very moderate nature—in fact, far too moderate to give any lasting chance of peace, which could only be secured by giving to Greece her mountain frontier of the Olympus line. To the obvious arguments on behalf of Greece, put forward by France and Italy, the Turkish Plenipotentiary replied—"The sea which surrounds Greece on all sides affords her the means of unlimited development." As the Turkish Plenipotentiary, however, refused to give up the possession of any Island in the seas which surround her, it is rather difficult to know what his suggestion meant, unless that Greece should drown herself. Lord Beaconsfield then spoke, and blamed Greece for not having listened to the advice of England—a statement which was contrary to all history; for I think I can prove that, on the contrary, she listened to it too much for her own good. The resolution of France was then agreed to. So much for the position of affairs as it appears to stand upon a consideration of the Protocols. So much, in short, for the public history; but what has been the private history of these transactions? At the beginning of the Congress Greece found, on the part of England, encouragement and fair words, and had the hope of at least some small prospect of reaping the reward for her abstention from action, or rather, as I would call it, the reward for the action she took, for putting down insurrection on the frontier, at the request of England. Then she had to face the postponement of her case; next, after a long delay, her Delegates were heard; and when they left, Prince Bismarck, in a marked manner, addressed the English Delegates, and asked them what they had to say in regard to the Greek demand? A dead silence followed, and then Lord Salisbury whispered that before any decision was taken, the Roumanians ought also to be heard. Towards Roumania, be it remembered, England had taken no engagement; and she seemed to consider that her formal engagements towards Greece had been redeemed when Mr. Delyanni had been allowed to talk for half-an-hour — an act of kindness extended to Roumania, to whom no English promise had been given. This 564 was the redemption of the English pledge! Greece had had every right to understand from all the declarations which Lord Salisbury had made, that her Representative would have been admitted to be present at the sitting of the Congress at which the Cretan Question was discussed. The Protocols distinctly show that the Article of the Treaty of San Stefano which relates to Crete was considered, and the corresponding Article of the Treaty of Berlin was passed, without any intimation to the Greek Delegate as to when the question would be raised; and it is plain, indeed, that his presence at the discussion, had he known of it, would not have been allowed. The fact that the Cretans are in successful revolt against the very organic law of 1868, which is mentioned by the Article, and that they hold, at this moment, the whole Island as much as the Russians possess Bulgaria, had no weight with the English Plenipotentiaries. In what I have said down to this point, I am speaking of facts which can be proved. I will now speak upon matters which can neither be proved or disproved, but which I have upon the highest authority. I am informed that M. Waddington was privately charged by his Colleagues with the duty of studying the Greek proposals, and formulating a resolution to be submitted to the Congress; that he declared himself favourable to the annexation of the whole of Thessaly and Epirus to Greece; that this proposal was supported by Italy and by Austria, but fell to the ground, in the face of the absolute opposition of the English Plenipotentiaries.
MR. BOUBKEI am sorry to interrupt the hon. Baronet; but will he be good enough to point out in what part of the Protocols he finds the proposal to cede the whole of Thessaly and Epirus to Greece?
§ SIR CHAELES W. DILKEI said nothing about the Protocols. That which I have stated has appeared in those German newspapers which are best informed on foreign affairs; but I did not get my information from the newspapers. I am sure that what I have said will not be contradicted by those who know the facts. M. Waddington then fell back on the territorial limits, which are those mentioned in the Protocol, but proposed a definite and settled annexation. This met with decided op- 565 position from the English Plenipotentiaries, who held that public opinion in England did not allow them to sanction a further dismemberment of Turkey, beyond the lopping off of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which they had themselves proposed. On the very morning of the sitting which was to decide the case of Greece, M. Waddington had an anxious but fruitless interview with Lord Beacons-field at 11, and pointed out in how hard a position he was placed, by those who had asked him to formulate a resolution on the subject of the Greek demands, and who then opposed his minimized proposal, which was, in fact, their own. M. Waddington's proposal was supported, at another interview, by Count Andrassy. The outcome of the opposition of the English Delegates was the proposal of the resolution in such a form that it finds no place in the Treaty; and to a resolution which Lord Beaconsfield, on Saturday night last, declared to be his own, Lord Beaconsfield, in his place in Congress, actually objected. The result of the transactions which I have described is that England has lost the sympathy of the only rising Power in the East which can be set against the Sclavonic friends of Russia. The right hon. Baronet the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) made a speech at Cheltenham the other day, in which he said that the Government had secured a permanent and lasting settlement of the Eastern Question. Now, I venture to assert that no settlement can be permanent or lasting that fails to give satisfaction to the legitimate claims of Greece. The settlement come to is but a truce; and into the future complications and the future wars which must arise, you will venture in this melancholy fashion—that by guaranteeing Turkey and betraying Greece, we have set ourselves on the side of what is dead, or, at least, decayed and dying, and against that race which is young and full of life. I am, speaking myself in the character of one of those who have been deceived; because I rejoiced at Lord Derby's downfall, and at the accession to Office of Lord Salisbury; and I spoke, shortly afterwards, in this House, in support of Lord Salisbury's Circular, and of its policy of running the Greeks against the Slavs. I have spoken strongly of the breaking of the 566 pledges that have been undertaken towards Greece. Now, what were those pledges? On the 23rd of February M. Delyanni addressed our Government at great length on the subject of the representation of Greece at the Congress; and he put his claim for that representation on the ground that the Greek Government were the natural representatives of the Greek population of the Turkish Empire. What was the answer of our Government? Did they contest the justice of this view? Not a bit of it. They only replied, on the 9th of March, that they had considered the appeal—that they thought Greece ought to be represented; and they expressed their opinion on the same day to the whole of the Great Powers, for which they received . the warm thanks of Greece. Surely this justifies me in the statement that, at that time, the Government had in view no limited, but an absolute, representation of Greece at the Congress? Not only is a so-called settlement of the Eastern Question—which leaves in the possession of the Turks that most Greek part of Greece, the Island of Crete—no settlement at all; but it must be remembered that there is at least grave doubt whether, by the arrangements of the Treaty of Berlin, we have made dispositions with regard to Constantinople itself which will last our time. Fresh importance is given to the Hellenic Question by the division of Bulgaria. Bulgaria, south of the Balkans, is, by race, largely Greek. If this new Province of East Roumelia is to form a barrier, in the future, against the advance of Prussia, it can only be by one of two means—either by a pure military Austrian Protectorate, or by the fostering of the Greek element among the people. The former plan offers no prospect of permanence, and it is to the latter, if we are to succeed, that it would be necessary for us to resort. I am aware that there is in this country, and in this House, a certain prejudice against the Greeks. I cannot but think that those who know their ancient history will see in the modern Greeks the virtues as well as the vices of their ancestors. So close is the resemblance, that if it be true, as ethnologists believe, that there is a large Albanian and a large Sclavonic element among the Greek people of our day, we have to fall back upon the supposition, even more flattering to the 567 modern Greeks than the theory that their race is pure—namely, that they are of so conquering and predominating a blood as that they impose upon inferior races, not only their religion and their tongue, but also their love of freedom and their national character. It should be remembered that the Greek people has never been given a fair chance. The Hellenic Kingdom, formed under the protection of the Powers, contains within its present boundaries a quarter only of the countries and of the people who took part in the war of independence against the Turks; and by restraining Greece within those narrow limits, we believe that you not only make it impossible that she should become a Power able to hold her own, but also that you are not, in so doing, supporting the Turkish Power so much as you are labouring for the ultimate triumph of the Pan-Sclavonic idea. I now come to the third part of the Resolution of the noble Lord, which is that in which he emphatically condemns the vagueness of the obligations that we have entered into as regards Asia. My hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Plunket) over and over again referred to the great popularity of the Convention. He said that the country from one end to the other had testified its unanimous delight at this arrangement. I do not know what opportunities my hon. and learned Friend may have for learning the opinion of the country. I, perhaps, have equal chances with him, and I venture to assert the very opposite. I think the country has been filled with wonder and amaze, and has shown its wonder and amaze by silence. Some years ago I wrote in favour of the scheme for the construction, in the interest of our rule in India, of a railroad from Constantinople to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf, with a branch from it to the Gulf of Scandaroon. This line I recommended as an alternative route, and that at a time when the position occupied by France in Egypt made it clear that England could not, at that moment, play in Egypt the dominant part; and I ventured then to prophecy that the glories of Cyprus could be revived, and that it had a second history before it. Since that time the position of affairs, with regard to Egypt, has greatly changed, and our position in that quarter is far more strong. But, even now, I am 568 favourable to the construction of the Bagdad line, and to that amount of intervention in Asiatic Turkey which is necessary to secure it; and I should contemplate a military occupation of Cyprus and Scandaroon in time of war, in order to provide for the security of our line. Now, the question that I ask myself is, whether we have bought the right to have troops at Cyprus in time of peace at too high a price? I have no hesitation in adhering to the view that almost any direct engagement, however grave, would have been better than the enormous, because utterly vague, responsibility that we have undertaken. I am not opposed, in short, to a grand policy; but I am completely opposed to a policy which is not only grand but also reckless. And with regard to the grand policy itself, I cannot but think that it would be all the grander for being—not the policy of two Ministers, or the policy of a Cabinet of 12, but the policy freely resolved upon by a free Parliament and a consulted people. To my mind, the whole effect of the new policy has been destroyed by the clandestine character of the conditional Convention. I had expected to have heard from my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Plunket), who asked us to vote our confidence in the Government, what was to be the future of Asia Minor. I hoped in vain. Not a word fell from him as to the nature of the arrangements to be made. We are placed in a certain difficulty when we try to argue this question in much detail; because, if we speak of our now responsibilities as great, we are instantly assured that they mean nothing. Now, if they mean nothing, I should be still more ashamed of my country's conduct in the matter than is the case at present. Surely, England cannot put her name to such a deed, with the intention of not carrying out her share. But whatever may be the intention of the Government, I cannot but believe that it will be found in practice that our responsibilities are very great. The inventors of this policy with regard to Asia Minor are the men who, in the fullest degree, believe in the habitual resort of Russia to intrigue. Now, by the 61st Article of the Treaty of Berlin, the Porte engages to carry out certain reforms in Armenia, and to guarantee the security of the Armenians against the Kurds; and the Powers are to superintend the execution of those 569 promises by the Porte. When we say the Powers are to superintend, we mean that Russia, as well as the other Powers, is to superintend. Russia, more than other Powers; for what interest can Germany, and Austria, and France, have in the Armenian Question? That is to say, that in Armenia Russia will have her Consuls reporting to her Ambassador at Constantinople every murder and every robbery that takes place. Russia will be urging the British Government to prevent atrocious acts, which undoubtedly will continue to disfigure the government of Provinces, as to which we have assumed, by our clandestine conditional Convention, peculiar responsibility. No Minister will be able to get up here and say that the conduct of the Turks in Armenia is no business of ours. It will be impossible to do so in the face of that Convention. It seems, then, to me, that with England interfering under her Convention, and driven, as she soon will be, by Parliamentary pressure, to appoint Residents in Armenia, and with Russian Consuls, under the clause of the Treaty of Berlin, watching the English Residents, you will have a state of things which inevitably, sooner or later, must lead to war. What kind of war? An inland war, in a country which we cannot reach. If we wanted war, and thought that war with Russia for the possession of Armenia inevitably must come, it would have been better to have faced it frankly, and called upon England to retain Batoum for the Turks. My belief upon the matter is, that we shall be held by Europe to have agreed to secure good government in Armenia; that we have no power to prevent the raids upon the Armenians by the Kurds; and that we shall be held in future morally responsible by Europe for those crimes. I do not, therefore, think, whatever may be the intention of the Ministers, that our responsibilities under the Convention can be looked upon as light; but, on the contrary, I believe that we have displaced the centre of gravity of the British Empire towards the East, and entered upon a course which, if persevered in, must lead to England becoming a sort of rich Dependency upon the Indian Imperial Crown.
§ MR. BAILLIE COCHRANEobserved, that during the last two years the important questions which had arisen, and upon which the destinies of the nation, 570 the interests of the people, and the question of peace or war had depended, had been made throughout Party questions by the Liberal Opposition. He should have thought that on great occasions— and especially on the present occasion, when peace had been restored and war avoided—Party animosities would have disappeared; there would have been a unanimous feeling of congratulation upon that which had been accomplished, or, at least, of recognition of the efforts of the Government, and of the manner in which they had been carried out. He could not imagine, looking to the terms of the Resolution proposed by the noble Lord opposite, that their author had read the Protocols before framing those Resolutions. In the very first Protocol it was shown that Lord Salisbury brought the question of Greece before the Congress; it was repeatedly brought forward; and it almost seemed at first as if the existence of the Congress depended upon the solution of the Greek Question. Many years ago he (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) had charge of the interests of Greece in that House, and he had never lost his sympathy with that classic country; but when he considered what the condition of Greece was, and what were her demands in the present instance, he could not conceive for one moment that those demands could have been granted. During the Greek War of Independence, in 1827, the question arose of annexing Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete to Greece, and if that annexation had been made, King Leopold would have accepted the Throne of that country. It was, he thought, very much to be regretted that that was not the solution of the Greek Question, for it would have been a solution of the great Eastern Question also. Russian intrigues, however, caused the opportunity to be lost; and it would have been impossible for the Congress of Berlin further to partition Turkey by adding to the Kingdom of Greece Thessaly and Epirus. It might, however, be supposed, from the speeches of some hon. Members, and the articles in some portions of the Press, that the Congress had done nothing for Greece. He maintained that a great deal had been done for Greece. The Congress had unanimously recommended to Turkey to grant another frontier to Greece, and there was no doubt that the Turkish Government would carry out that recom- 571 mendation. If that proposal were carried into effect she would gain no less than 5,500 square miles, while the addition to Servia was only 3,800, to Montenegro 1,300, and to Russia in Europe 2,500 square miles, by the retrocession of Bessarabia, although, of course, 10,000 square miles had been added to the last-mentioned country in Asia Minor. It was impossible in these circumstances fairly to contend that Greece had been ill-treated; and he might further point out that the territory which she would acquire would include those mountain passes which were the resort of the brigands who had hitherto infested the Greek frontier, and thus brigandage could be put down. In the whole of the arrangements which had been made, the Government had taken a wise and judicious course; they had obtained for the Christian Provinces great assurances of better government; the disaffected Provinces, which had hitherto been a source of danger to Turkey, had been placed in a more satisfactory position; and, Turkey thus strengthened, and concentrated, would now be enabled to make a very material advance. The Government had been charged with not carrying out their principles. Now, at the time when the war broke out, Constantinople, Gallipoli, and the Dardanelles had been described as English interests; it was certain, however, that, if so, they had been maintained. He did not know what would have happened if the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich had been in Office; or, rather, it was tolerably clear that in that case the Russians would have been at Gallipoli and Constantinople, and we should have had to declare war in vindication of our honour. The Government had avoided that misfortune, and had gained for the country not only the certainty of peace for many years, but a knowledge of its own strength and of the unity of feeling between England and her Dependencies. There was another point on which he wished to touch. It had often been said that we had incurred a great responsibility; but with respect to Asia Minor, there was no better way of protecting the Christians than by showing to the inhabitants of the mainland the advantages of English rule and the merits of Western civilization. Of course, there were great responsibilities and difficulties; but when objection was taken to 572 the occupation of the Island of Cyprus, he was bound to point out that Turkey had always been under a kind of tutelage, and that we had always in a manner had a control over her. Consequently, all we had to do was to carry out our plan, and to get the best possible men for the Consulships in Asia Minor. As for Russia, he neither trusted nor mistrusted her; but he had never believed the debates of last year, in which all good qualities had been claimed for her, and an absolute absence of ambition and cruelty. He had always taken a more just view of her national character; and now, judging from the whole tone of the remarks of Count Schouvaloff and Prince Gortehakoff, he felt confident of the maintenance for a long time of the peace of Europe. He believed, then, that we ran no risk from our policy in Asia Minor. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, who last year had felt so strongly on the question, had on a previous occasion thought very differently, and had said, in the year 1856—
But there was another danger—the danger of the encroachment upon, and the absorption of, Turkey by Russia, which would bring upon Europe evils not less formidable than those which already existed. Such a danger to the peace, liberties, and privileges of all Europe we were called upon absolutely to resist by all the means in our power."—[3 Hansard, cxlii. 96.]Turning to another point, he would remark that Lord Salisbury had been much blamed for the secrecy which had been kept with respect to Cyprus; but he could show that the Congress had had a very fair hint of what was about to be done—Without laying stress on a proposition which seems to him evident, Lord Salisbury asks the Russian Plenipotentiaries whether the considerations which the Representatives of England had brought forward in their private interviews with their Excellencies have affected their determination to retain the fortresses of Kars and Ardahan; in the event of Russia thinking herself bound to persevere in this belief, Lord Salisbury declares that he would reserve for England the right to secure her interest and her influence on the populations by whatever means she might consider fitting.He believed that that extract was only one of many that might be cited in explanation of the policy of the Government; and if the Protocols were circulated throughout the Kingdom, that policy would be generally approved by 573 all parties. The future, he was confident, was peaceful; and it was satisfactory to think that Prince Bismarck had been able thus to speak at the close of the Congress—Gentlemen,—At the moment of separating I do not hesitate to affirm that the Congress has deserved well of Europe. If it has been found impossible to realize all the aspirations of public opinion, history will nevertheless do justice to our intentions and to our work, and the Plenipotentiaries will have the consciousness of having, as far as was possible, given and secured to Europe the great benefit of peace, which was so gravely menaced. This result cannot be diminished by any criticism which the spirit of Party may be able to publish. I have the firm hope that the European understanding will, with the help of God, be lasting.He trusted that a division would be taken on the question before the House; and that hon. Members would show that, although they were unwilling to wound, they would not be afraid to strike—that they would have the courage to stand by their opinions—and that the House would, by a large majority, prove that England had achieved a measure which was not only honourable to the country, but satisfactory to Europe.
§ MR. EVELYN ASHLEYsaid, though the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) had never appeared in the character of a recognized novelist, he ought henceforth to be looked upon as a great master of romance. The hon. Member had certainly attributed the Liberal Party views about Russia that they never entertained. When the hon. Member accused the Opposition side of the House of being actuated by Party motives, he would only point out that the hon. Member was such a Party man himself that he made not only his speeches and votes, but also his confidence or mistrust, his likes and dislikes, depend upon Party exigencies of the moment. For instance, he was astonished to find that the hon. Member had now entire confidence in Russia. He would not refer to the many speeches the hon. Member had addressed to the House against Russia; but he might refer to one on May 26th, 1877, in which he went to considerable length in describing the aggressive character of Russia, and said that whenever Russia and England were contiguous, great armaments must spring up from that contiguity, and the British forces doubled. Another point which 574 proved that the hon. Member was a great master of fiction was his account of 1830 and the affairs of Greece. He had stated that the narrowing of the boundaries of Greece in 1830 were entirely owing to Russian intrigues. Why, it was beyond all controversy that it was solely owing to the Turkish fears and Turkish proclivities of a Conservative Government under the Duke of Wellington. Both the French and the Russian Governments, parties to the Treaty of London, were perfectly willing to give Greece wider boundaries; Crete and Samos were thrust back under Turkish rule, when they both desired and expected union with Greece, by the action of a Tory Government. There was, therefore, special reason why England should have come forward at this Congress and strongly advocated the claims of Greece and Crete. But look at these Protocols! It might be said that it would have been absurd for England to have advanced propositions that had no chance of being accepted. It seemed, however, to him that even if England found she would be in a minority, which he much doubted, it was due to the Greek feeling in this country, due to her own dealings with Greece, that England should have got endorsed in a Protocol her desire to offer a larger extension of the Greek boundaries than the Congress had thought fit to give. Undoubtedly, the English Government had held out hopes to Greece; and they must remember that the question of peace in the South-East of Europe would never be settled until the Greek Question was settled. This led him to the question of the Treaty of Berlin. The hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had explained very fairly the Liberal view of that Treaty. The Treaty, as it stood, leaving its omissions out of consideration, was not a Treaty which the Liberal Party could in any way attack, either justifiably or with pleasure; because, although there were points that must be deplored —such as the cession of territory to Russia in Asia and Roumania—these were points that they foresaw and warned the country of as inevitable when once the war had begun; but as to the other points of the Treaty, these were, in the main, points which they must all rejoice at. Undoubtedly, the Treaty of Berlin had effected an 575 enormous change in the Turkish Question. Undoubtedly, it had given a blow to the old fetish that we had held for years—namely, the "independence and integrity" of the Turkish power in Europe. Undoubtedly, it gave distinct recognition to what they had contended for—that the Christian populations of Turkey were the sources to which to look for the future governing classes. Undoubtedly, it had given such a start to the progress of events in that direction, as soon to leave us no more cause for anxiety as to how that Question, so far as Europe was concerned, might be solved. For do not let hon. Members imagine that by the Treaty of Berlin they had set up a state of things in the East that was going to last 15 or 20 years, or even 10 years. The Plenipotentiaries at Berlin thought they had made a great achievement by calling one of the new Provinces Eastern Roumelia instead of Southern Bulgaria; yet neither that dividing name nor the mountain ridge would prevent Bulgaria South of the Balkans from being united, sooner or later, with Bulgaria, North of the Balkans. Then the proviso that the Greeks should have no extension of boundary beyond certain limits, at a time when the Greek was attempting to free his fellow-religionists, and men of the same race from murder, rapine, and tyranny, would not, he was convinced, cheek the Greek aspirations for freedom. The lesson that it must be by their own swords and their own hands that they must obtain their deliverance, would not be lost upon them. Let him here remark that he repudiated entirely the statement made by the Prime Minister the other day that there were persons in this country who, for factious purposes, were inciting the Greeks to revolt. That was on a par with the conduct of our Ambassador at Constantinople in respect of his statements relating to the right hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone.) All that those who were thus condemned were doing was to recognize existing facts, and to discuss them as such—dealing with things as they are, and not as it might be desired that they should be. It seemed to him that, during the last few years, we had had new exemplifications of how history repeated itself. The same course of events that took place in 1829, under the policy 576 started by Canning, but more than half dropped by his successors, had been repeated now. After a war extremely bloody, the Russian Government, on both occasions, virtually obtained all that she desired. Mr. Canning's policy was identical with what had been lately advocated as the "policy of coercion," and, if pursued, might have prevented the fatal Treaty of Adrianople. In that House two or three years ago, when he ventured to advocate a policy of coercion as the only way in which war could be prevented, he was held up to ridicule as a man who advocated a bloody war. He ventured to say if that policy of coercion had been adopted there would have been no war; Russia would not now be in the position she is; and the Turkish Power in Europe would have been maintained for another quarter of a century. With reference to that, he must contradict the statement of the hon. and learned Member for Dublin University (Mr. Plunket), when he said that the Leader of the Opposition had condemned a policy of coercion. He had not had time to consult the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) since the speech made by the hon. and learned Member; but his memory served him as to no such condemnation having been pronounced; and he well remembered that the noble Marquess had said that if the Berlin Memorandum had been accepted by Her Majesty's Government, very different results would have been obtained. What was the Berlin Memorandum but coercion before war—coercion to enforce a reasonable demand? It was, of course, galling to men who, for the last two years, had been called Russophiles, and similar names, to feel that Russian views had been advanced not by them, but by the so-called friends of Turkey. They had now, however, to look at what the Government were going to do in the future. If Her Majesty's Government would accept the friendly advice that was given to them, they would adopt a more solid and more temperate line of statesmanship. While, however, the country was considering these questions, a Convention burst upon them, which he was, at all events, justified in saying was unparalleled in British history, which had been undertaken without the slightest notice to the people of what was called a free country, or the rest of Europe. The only pre- 577 cedent was one relating to Portugal in the middle of last century. But in that case the only liability we entered into with Portugal—a country with a large seaboard—was, that should war break out, we would send 12,000 men to serve under the Portuguese Government, and would keep the Force recruited up to that number. There our liability began, and there our liability ceased. But the liability under this Treaty, if it was real —that was the question—he wanted to know, was it real?—was enormous, and our responsibilities were dangerously increased. Either this Anglo-Turkish. Convention was a reality, or it was not a reality. If it were a reality, had the Government taken the trouble to examine its full meaning, and to convey any idea of it to others? If it was not a reality, what on earth was the vise of making such a Convention? The first result would be that the Turk would say—"The British Government has undertaken my defence, and I shall trouble myself no further about the matter." If, six years hence, Turkey should call upon the British Government to defend her frontiers, how many Turkish soldiers did they expect to find there? Did they suppose the Turkish Pashas were not going to spend their money in kiosks and seraglios, when they could get a British Army to fall back upon to defend them? If they had to go to war in five years' time, and expected to find a powerful Army ready to take the field, they would find them utterly inefficient. The only lever that could be used effectually on the Turks up to this time was the fear of Russia. If this Convention took away that lever, what had they got to set up? How were they to act directly upon them? They were told that they must send their best men under their own officers, that they must put pressure upon them, and that they must annex Turkey. Now, really, was the word " insane " too strong a word to use when a British Minister undertook, by one stroke of the pen, to manage Asia Minor? That case had been put so well by the noble Lord who moved the Resolution that it would be presumptuous if he detained the House by enlarging upon the point. Since the conquest of the Caucasus and the acquisition of Kars, Russia had got positions of unparalleled strength. We were moving our Indian frontier to the very 578 strongest point of the Russian military system. That was a point he hoped the House would not forget. By this Treaty they had given Turkey the right to call upon them to come forward and execute their bond, and resist any attack that might be made by Russia. Turkey was not a Party to the Tripartite Treaty of 1856 between England, France, and Austria, and was, therefore, luckily held incompetent to call upon us for its fulfilment; but in this case she was not only a signatory, but the only signatory besides ourselves. By this Anglo-Turkish Convention they had completely parted with freedom of action, and had handed over the national honour of England to Turkey. ["No, no!"] Turkey had now the power to ask Great Britain at any moment, however inconvenient, to do that which she could not refuse to do without the loss of national honour. Who knew what might happen under those conditions? There might be an irruption of Kurds. Then would come an advance on the part of Russia to pursue these marauders. The Russians might perhaps take some part of their territory to keep them in order. Then Turkey would call upon Great Britain at once to help her in resisting this incursion, and there would be war between England and Russia. If he were the Russian Government he should withdraw his Ambassador from Constantinople, and should treat directly with the British Foreign Office, because all diplomacy rested on force in the background. If a third party came in to take charge and to guarantee, it was to that party you must address yourselves. If they were going with a light heart to take this unknown and terrible responsibility, they had better make the whole transaction complete by undertaking the regulation of Persia, because Persia was infinitely more valuable to Russia than Asia Minor as a route to India. Persia was completely in the hands of Russia, and she need not require to disturb Asia Minor so long as Persia was so completely in her power. So long as the British Government shut the back door in Armenia, but paid no regard to the front door in Persia, they were not acting in a rational manner. But he regarded the whole thing as an unreality, and to be got out of as soon as convenient. The policy of the Government for the last three years had 579 been a policy of unreality. He did not deny that they had had enormous difficulties to contend with; but he would tell Her Majesty's Government that the greatest difficulties they had to contend with were difficulties of their own creation. [An hon. MEMBER: NO.] The hon. Member who said "no," should wait to hear what he meant. Their chief difficulty arose from their having tried to "halloa" with the music halls, while all the time compelled, and perhaps inclined, to hunt with rational men. Well, the Government, by their self-imposed difficulty of "jingoism," were driven into a secret agreement with Russia. It need not have been a secret Convention if they had not had a Party behind them whom they were fearful to offend by any conciliatory arrangement with Russia. He did not blame the Agreement, but he blamed the secrecy of it, and he said that that Anglo-Turkish Convention was part of the same necessity—a necessity imposed upon the Government by a certain portion of their supporters—that they should not come back from Berlin without something in their pockets to satisfy them. He did not think that sort of thing was beneficial to the country. It was far too like the conduct of a gambler who had lost all his ready money and then staked his inheritance. They were, in fact, pledging those who came after them by that Anglo-Turkish Convention, without running much risk themselves, because it stood to reason that after a convulsion of this sort all the parties were weary, and they were sure of a certain period of exhaustion. They were, for their own Party purposes, loading the Turk into a feeling of false security, and making him believe that he was going to have that assistance from England which would avail him at the last moment. He believed that Turkey in Asia had a good future before it if it only took the good advice of the English nation; but that it might have had without the Anglo-Turkish Convention. The possession of the Island of Cyprus was in one view a matter of congratulation; for he did not hesitate to say that, as an Englishman and a patriot, he was always glad to see, if it could be done with justice, honour, and legality, the maritime bounds of the Empire extended. What he did not want to see 580 was the extension of our territory over Continents where our maritime supremacy would be of no avail, and by the holding of which they would undoubtedly change the complexion of their military and civil burdens. He wished to say one word as to the last part of the Resolution of the noble Lord. He knew that there had been times in the history of this country when it had been most respected, when the Foreign Office sought in Parliamentary discussions their surest aid in the conduct of their transactions with Foreign Powers. But since the last two or three years Her Majesty's Government seemed to take an exactly opposite course. They seemed to keep Parliament in the background; they disliked debates, while they courted divisions and they abominated questions. What they seemed to like to do was this—Having settled their policy, they came down to the House of Commons and said—" The thing is done;" and even then some of their Party would use very harsh language, talking about a "factious opposition" when the Party opposite did what it undoubtedly was the duty of an Opposition to do— namely, asked that a certain amount of information should be given to them. He did hope that such a line of conduct had only been adopted to meet the temporary exigencies of an anomalous occasion, and that it would not be carried out to the extent of depriving Parliament of a voice in matters to which such great liabilities were attached. The Parliament of this country was, after all, the representation of the nation, and he did not think that the history of the past would show that when treated with confidence it did not rally round Her Majesty's Ministers, especially in relation to foreign affairs. He did not hesitate to say that the feeling that had been growing up in the country of late had been one of the results of the action in foreign affairs of the last two or three years. It was felt that an enormous expense had been incurred by the country; but without the country that Parliamentary control over foreign affairs had been gradually diminishing; and that the time was approaching when, if that state of things was to continue, the Liberal Party would have to make it one of their cries that the Prerogative of the Crown, as exercised by Her Ma- 581 jesty's Ministers, had increased, was increasing, and must be diminished.
§ MR. R. E. PLUNKETTsaid; he did not attach much importance to the noble Lord's Resolutions, because he did not believe that in any popularly-elected Assembly in this country, at the present moment, it would be possible to pass a Vote of Censure upon the Government. Indeed, he believed that if the Opposition had acted upon their first impulse, they would have brought forward a Resolution to express "regret that it had not been found possible to dispute, in a satisfactory manner, the claims which the Government had established upon the gratitude of the nation." But although, from one point of view, one was tempted to treat the Resolutions somewhat lightly, there was another point of view from which they had a serious bearing. The question at issue was not merely as to the conduct of the Government, or as to our immediate action in Asia Minor. It seemed to him that the Congress of Berlin had inaugurated a new state of things in Europe, and that what the present debate would decide was the part which this country was henceforth to play in the European system. There were two views which might be taken of our position. One was that we should shake off all Imperial responsibilities and confine ourselves to trade, protracting a miserable existence as long as our coal and iron lasted, and ending finally in smoke and nothingness. The other ideal for this country was that she was a great nation with a high destiny to fulfil, and that her interests were not confined to the narrow limits of these Islands. England was a little nation in Elizabeth's time, and she then defied the greatest Power of Europe. They had humbled the pride of the greatest Monarch France had ever possessed, and were they to shrink before the force of a single Power? Why should they be afraid of holding one side of the frontier, when Russia was not afraid of holding the other? With regard to the Persian Gulf, if an ironclad Navy were to be kept there, he did not see that the scheme of the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) was less hazardous, and certainly not more practicable, than that of keeping Cyprus. With regard to the treatment of Greece, he was reminded of certain benevolent people described by Dickens, who, when 582 they see a fight going on, invariably, in the goodness of their heart, tell the smaller boy to go in and win. If the smaller boy went in and fought, they knew what would happen to him, and no benevolent gentleman would step in to help him. We had said to Greece that she could not establish her cause by fighting, and that she must not fight. There was now open to her, without resorting to arms, a better prospect than she could possibly have secured if she had expended all her little force. The noble Lord's logic was complete. He said—"You approve of the Treaty of Berlin, therefore you approve of the war." It would be a pity to spoil such an argument by handling it, therefore he left it as it was. Then it was said that the Convention with Turkey was an infraction of the Treaty of 1856; but if that was so, why was not the Treaty of 1856 quoted to show where the variance came in? For the simple reason that there was not an article in it which could, by any possibility, be held to exclude that Convention. The object of the Convention was clear. It was accepted on all sides that the misrule of Turkey would never cease until there was some Power standing by her side and ready to exercise pressure upon her. They had tried remonstrances and appeals from a distance, and Heaven know what; but they had seen no result for all their efforts. They had brought pressure to bear on Turkey in Europe, but in Asia they had a population which could not look to Europe. It was with this population which England had concerned herself. In giving a military guarantee to Turkey against Russian aggression in Armenia, England acted for her own interests; but it was to her honour that she had undertaken to protect the people against Turkish misrule, and they must be on the spot to do it; and were they now to shrink back, afraid to undertake the responsibility of the situation? They had been told a great deal about the liabilities we wore undertaking. He held them very lightly, for if Russia was going to attack us, we would now be able to meet her on ground with which we were acquainted, instead of having to send out a hasty Expedition to unknown territory. Two hon. Members had told them they were giving up their insular frontier, which had been our safety hitherto. Where had those Gentlemen been the last 200 years? 583 Since the end of the 17th. century they had not had an insular frontier. The frontier of Canada stretched for 4,000 miles along the border of a country ten times as powerful as Russia, and they had a considerable land frontier in India. During the Eastern debates they had heard a great deal of what was to happen when Turkey split up; but they had not heard anything of what was to happen when Russia split up. Yet in a country like Russia, where the populations differed so much in character, and were only held together by the loose bonds of a common savagery, there was sure to be a re-distribution of power as civilization increased. Long before their power was threatened, they might see an entire re-distribution of the power of Russia. As to the "undefined engagements" into which they bad entered, he thought misconceptions had arisen from a misreading of the first Article of the Convention. Our engagement was not to effect reforms, but to defend Armenia by force of arms; and there was nothing undefined about that. He could not see what was loft of these extraordinary Resolutions, but supposed the Leader of the Opposition felt bound to make a formal protest against a policy which had been pursued until it was a notable success. Perhaps, what was intended to be the sting of those extraordinary Resolutions was the Constitutional objection that these engagements had been entered into without the previous knowledge of Parliament. It was impossible, however, that our Plenipotentiaries could consult the Legislature with respect to the various questions which were raised at the Congress. Either their mission was to be a mere sham, or it was absolutely necessary that they should be allowed to act upon their judgment; and he could not but think that this charge of not consulting Parliament was introduced to furnish a decent tag-end to what the noble Lord must have himself considered a most inconclusive set of Resolutions.
MR. GRANT DUFFSir, the subject which is brought before us by the Resolution of my noble Friend divides itself into four parts—The effect of the recent negotiations on the Turkish Empire in Europe, their effect on the Turkish Empire in Asia, their effect on the British Empire, and their effect on the world at large. On each of these 584 parts I should like, with the permission of the House, to say a very few words. First, then, as to the results they have produced on the Turkish Empire in Europe. No one, I should hope, will grudge to Montenegro the gift of independence and the small accession that has been made to her scanty territory. Some writers and speakers, to whom the existence and history of that gallant little clan seems to have come suddenly as a sort of special revelation during the struggles which have so lately closed, have doubtless made too much of its merits; but after much has been subtracted, much that is creditable and deserving of sympathy still remains. Then as to Servia. Servia has made no great figure in the whole business, and before the foolish war into which she entered, her politicians indulged in preposterous dreams; but we cannot regret that she, too, has obtained some sentimental and some material advantages, though far less than she would have obtained if good sense had prevailed two years ago in the Councils of Belgrade. Nor is there anything in the aggrandizement of Roumania which is otherwise than satisfactory. The pity of it is that she was not made independent 10 years ago. The wiser friends of the Porte urged that. Its less wise and far-seeing friends resisted it, and we now see the result. If Roumania had been in that position in 1877, how much would the difficulties of Russia in the way of attacking Turkey have been increased? Neither can I much regret the retrocession of the too famous piece of Bessarabia. Of course, I know that that district, being inhabited by a Roumanian population, is much more similar in character to Moldavia and Wallachia than is the Dobrudscha, or the other territory which she obtains South of the Danube; but those who go a-hunting with the lion must submit to the lion's terms; and who shall say that, looking to the future, it may not be well for the peace of the Provinces, which are not essentially warlike, that they should not be encouraged to cherish ambitious hopes of being the nucleus of a great Roumanian Kingdom, which might extend from the Bug in the East, a long way towards the Theiss in the West. With, however, the names of Montenegro, Servia, and Roumania, the list of the districts which have received very 585 substantial benefit from the Treaty of Berlin comes to an end. We have now to look at its failures. When we broke the concert of Europe in 1876, by declining to adhere to the Berlin Memorandum, it was our bounden duty to be prepared shortly afterwards with some scheme which we might submit to Europe. Such a scheme must have been based upon one of two policies— either on the old policy of 1856, the traditional English policy, as modified by the Andrassy Note to which we acceded —or on a bold attempt to reach the root of the evil and cure the heart disease under which the Turkish Empire was suffering. That heart disease was the incapable, and more than incapable, character of the Central Power at Constantinople. No half-measures were any longer reasonable. By its acceptance of the Andrassy reforms, the Porte had gone as far in concession as an independent Power could go. If that concession did not meet the exigencies of the case, then there was nothing for it but to acknowledge that the Porte was no longer sustainable as an independent Power, to knit once more the concert of Europe, and with Europe to put something better in its place. We did not do this. We entered with the unhappy Constantinople Conference on the region of half-measures, and we see to what they have brought us. What is the result? We have become parties to the creation of an autonomous tributary Bulgaria, from which those very districts, which our people first learned to call Bulgaria, are studiously excluded. That autonomous Bulgaria will have two great objects in life—first, to get rid of paying tribute, and secondly, to add to itself all the Bulgarian-speaking districts South of the Balkans. Whereas, for 10 years previous to the ineffectual rising which was stamped out so savagely by the Bulgarian massacres, you had Bucharest as the centre of Russo-Bulgarian intrigue in Turkey, you will now have Tirnova or Sofia for the centre of that intrigue. Her Majesty's Advisers make much of having restored to Turkey a defensible frontier in the Balkans; but how idle it is to talk of Turkey having any longer a defensible frontier in Europe. Her garrisons in the Balkans will be a mere source of expense, and a ready means of fixing a quarrel upon her, whenever it may suit 586 her Slav neighbours to re-commence a contest. Then, again, as to the organization of Eastern Roumelia. If its organization is made predominantly Christian, that may be a very good thing; but it is vain to talk of its being any longer a real portion of Turkey, which is Mahomedan or nothing. It is a Province being got ready to be taken from Turkey, as Roumania was three years ago, and got ready by a very clumsy process. Then as to Bosnia and Herzegovina. I am quite willing that they should go to Austria, if it is to the advantage of Austria that she should have them; but it is well known that their annexation is looked upon with the greatest distrust by many of the wisest and most patriotic men in the Empire. They fear that the introduction of those Provinces into the Empire may be the beginning of the end, may break up the arrangements of 1866 between the Domains of the Hungarian Crown and the States West of the Leitha. That is a turn of affairs that could not be looked upon with perfect calmness, even by those who remember the terrible days of 1848–9, when it was said of one aged General—"In his camp was Austria." Of course, it is conceivable that the experiment may succeed; but if it does not, which is but too likely, Her Majesty's Government, by contributing to it, will have had the poor satisfaction of, while they left the Eastern Question unsettled, opening a far more serious Central European Question. Then, again, as to the Greeks. What has been done, or proposed to be done, has stimulated their appetite, and further excited their ambition without giving their wise aspirations any reasonable satisfaction. Nay, so far as anything has been done, they have been led upon a wrong road. They have been incited to think rather of advancing in the direction of Macedonia and Thrace, than of making themselves strong on the coasts and on the Islands. Greece is not like Antae us. Her forces are re-vivified, not by touching the earth, but by touching the water. If, from some fantastic notion of using her as a barrier against the advance of Panslavism, we encourage her to think that she has a great future on the mainland, we do her a cruel wrong. We engage her in the same struggle in which Denmark, in an evil hour, engaged with her great Neigh- 587 bour. I, for one, heartily hated the Treaty of San Stefano; but what Her Majesty's Government has brought us from Berlin is the Treaty of San Stefano disguised, not the Treaty of San Stefano altered. The essential feature of the Treaty of San Stefano was the breaking up of Turkey in Europe, without putting anything that could live with its own life in the place of that effete organization, and without settling the question of Constantinople, which remains a standing menace to the peace of Europe. That, however, would be a perfectly accurate description of the Berlin Treaty. There are differences between the two; but the differences are made merely to gull simples. They are razors good to sell—bad to cut. Of two things, one—either we should have held to the policy of 1856, and tried to keep the sick man on his logs till his natural heirs could have got their full rights in the Balkan Peninsula, or we should have taken our part in putting in his place a Western Prince, as the Duke of Wellington long ago advised. We took neither course, and our sons, who will seethe question of Constantinople opened again, will hardly thank us. And. now I pass to the effect of the recent negotiation upon Turkey in Asia. Well, as to Cyprus, of course what has happened is an excellent thing for Cyprus. There is no doubt about that, and the Anglo-Turkish Convention will be a beginning of great good to Asia Minor, and many other broad lands, if the British people really moan to take a serious view of its responsibilities, not merely to-day or to-morrow, but for the next half-century. But, when we come to ask what is the effect of the recent negotiations upon the British Empire, a very different answer must be given. The Anglo-Turkish Convention either means nothing, or it means something. If it means nothing, it is altogether an imposture. If it moans something, it is well nigh an impossibility. I will not say anything as to the first supposition, the supposition that the Convention was meant to be like one of those quarterly articles by a theologian famous in his day, as to which Mr. Lockhart once said when someone remonstrated with him about them—"Yes, I know it. They tell nothing, they mean nothing, they are nothing—but they go down like bottled velvet!" I will take it for 588 granted that it means something. In that case, I say it is well nigh an impossibility. Never has this nation, in all its long history, taken such a burden upon its shoulders with its eyes open. India, says someone. But did we take India on our shoulders with our eyes open? Assuredly not. We slipped into our Indian responsibilities by a series of accidents—happy accidents—perhaps yes—perhaps no. That is the secret of the future; but accidents undoubtedly. This, however, is no accident—it is a stroke of high policy. How? What do we gain by it? It is replied that we secure our route to India. Our route to India, I rejoin, is not threatened; and if it were, is in no way secured by our engagement with Turkey. Our hold of India is no more endangered by Russia having Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan, than it is endangered by her having Modlin or Cronstadt. All the five possessions are to India supremely immaterial. If Russia were ever to invade India, her route would be from the South-eastern corner of the Caspian, viâ Astrabad and Meshed, to Herat. There are other possible routes, though really none worth considering at present; but an invasion of India by Russia is, as I have often had occasion to show, so entirely out of the question, under any circumstances that can occur in our times, that we may cease to think of it. But if, instead of being a far-off danger, it were a near and present one, it would not be even remotely affected by Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan having changed hands. If Russia, neglecting the only possible line, along which even a man who united the genius of Napoleon with resources such as Russia could only obtain by mortgaging her future for 100 years, might conceivably lead her hosts to attack us in India, were to advance from Armenia to the Persian Gulf, she would only be preparing for herself a defeat even more disastrous than that with which she would meet if she, having taken Herat, advanced down the Bolan. But, it is said, we secure the Suez Canal. Look at the map—what have Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan to do with the Suez Canal? No, Sir, by the unlucky Convention we do not secure the Suez Canal; we take away our thoughts from the country of the Suez Canal, from Egypt, which is of great importance to us, to 589 fix it on a dream and a delusion—to chase some phantom of a railway down the Euphrates, which it would be a most pleasant and desirable thing to have, but which should never be allowed to take off our thoughts from the infinitely more important Egyptian transit. Why do I say infinitely more important? Because Egypt is the only country over which the English flag does not wave where we can, at any moment, be immensely strong both by land and by sea. Far better, if it is intended to spend money in improving our communication with India, to spend it in quickening and improving the service, viâ Egypt, than in getting, at infinitely greater cost, a line which can never be of the same importance to an essentially Naval Power. By all means encourage railways being made in Asia Minor or Syria, running towards the Persian Gulf—the more strings to our bow the better; but do not let us throw away national money upon objects which, however good, are only in a very secondary sense national. But I shall be told—away with these merely selfish considerations; think of the blessings we shall confer on one of the most interesting and unhappy regions of the earth. I do not wish to forget them; but it is a question of relative duties. Is everything in so satisfactory a state at home that we can afford to go world-bettering at the expense of our own people? We can do nothing worth doing in Asiatic Turkey without incurring great expense. That means that we shall impose new, and not take off old, taxes in Great Britain. We shall stint our development at home to restore prosperity to the banks of the Tigris and the Euphrates. Are our own gigantic Colonies and India, trifling in size and in future compared to these, but still so enormous, not a sufficiently wide field for our energies? Must we wander so far out of our way in search of sure excitement and uncertain markets? Then, again, just see what we are doing. We are afraid of Russia in India, and so we, in the first place, give Russia a good reason for wishing to trouble us in India by thwarting her in the Balkans, and then we take up position in Armenia, which enables her to bring her strongest against our weakest part. When I learnt fencing, I used to be told that I should bring the forte of my blade against the foible of my ad- 590 versary's. I rather think my Lord Salisbury took lessons from the same master; but, if so, he has forgotten his cunning, for he does just the opposite. What demon can have tempted any not wholly-mad Briton to give his country a long land frontier? But that is exactly what this Treaty does, since it makes us defend Asiatic Turkey—a country 20 times as large as Scotland—just as if it were Scotland. All I have said is on the supposition that the Turkish authorities in Asiatic Turkey will meet us in good faith, and allow us virtually to govern Turkey; but is not that an extravagant supposition? Why should they? Is it not more likely that they will intrigue against us, and thwart us, and even, if the worst comes to the worst, throw themselves into the arms of Russia? I have long thought that it would be a perfect God-send to all these countries to be governed by Anglo-Indians; but, in order to give the Anglo-Indian fair play, you must change your central authority at Constantinople. English gentlemen acting under the sort of people who have long ruled there would be in a most painful position. And observe, one false step involves another. If it is right to take charge of Turkey in Asia because Russia has got Batoum, Ears, and Ardahan, it is much more right to take charge of Persia. Her Majesty's Ministers have already, in spite of our protests, practically annexed Khelat. A very little encouragement would send them to Cabul, and then we should have everything on our shoulders, from the Mishmee Hills, which look down on the eastern corner of Assam, to the cypresses of Scutari. I confess that, to my mind, such a prospect is more dazzling than re-assuring; and will anyone say that it is a whit more improbable than what we see before our eyes in this Anglo-Turkish Convention? I come now to the influence of these negotiations upon the world at large; and this is certainly not their most agreeable aspect. Before they began, Her Majesty's Government had gained a great deal of credit on the Continent amongst those who, hating Russia and desiring to thwart her, were unwilling themselves to "bell the cat." But when it was found that, far from "belling the cat," Her Majesty's Ministers had made a private arrangement behind the back of Europe to go shares 591 with the dreaded animal, that cheap and noisy popularity, acquired by the readiness to waste British blood and money upon non-British objects rapidly declined. How does Europe stand affected to us at this moment? Russia, of course, hates us cordially, and bides her time. Austria is pleased or acquiescent. Germany thinks we are what we always were—clever traders on high principles, with a weather-eye open to commercial results. France thinks that perfide Albion is, as ever, perfide Albion; and Italy, the country where, for a long time back, there has been more popular sympathy for England than in any other European land, is thoroughly disgusted, and says that the pens with which the Berlin Treaty was signed were taken from the wings of four vultures, one Turkey, and two geese. The wise policy for this country being in every possible way to minimize its military obligations and territorial interests wherever the British flag does not now wave, while we keep up the very best possible Diplomatic and Consular Service, so as to be at once able and willing to assist other nations, as a well-informed, powerful, and disinterested friend to all of them, we have, thanks to Her Majesty's Ministers, taken a precisely opposite line, forfeited the good opinion of our honesty, which some held, confirmed the bad opinion which others held, while we involved ourselves in new and perplexing duties. We have descended from the grand and unique position which history has been more and more giving us, of being in Europe, yet not wholly of Europe; but rather a great Asiatic and Oceanic Power, to make ourselves largely dependent upon the intrigues of Constantinople, one of the most corrupt of European cities. The negotiations of this summer will be what those of 1864 would have been if Lord Salisbury had then prevailed—the very parting of the ways, the beginning of Imperial decline —if we cannot within the next few years overturn them, burying, let us trust, in their ruins, those who had most hand, in building them up. Before I sit down, I should like to say just one word on the Constitutional question to which the Motion of the noble Lord refers at its close. No one doubts, I suppose, that the Crown has full power to conclude Treaties without consulting Parliament; but that is a doctrine which wise Minis- 592 ters will not push to its logical extremity. Our Constitution is good for nothing, if it is permitted to Ministers, without the consent of Parliament, not merely to conclude an ordinary or even extraordinary Treaty without Parliament being consulted, but to utterly revolutionize the whole policy of the Empire. That is what this Convention does, if it does anything at all, and is not a mere deliberate deceit practised on Turkey, on England, and on Europe. The Constitution says, no doubt, that the nation is, in this respect, at the absolute disposition of the Crown, which is another phrase for the Ministers of the day; but the Ministers of the day should remember that complimentary and courteous expressions must not be interpreted all too literally. When a Spaniard or an Italian tells you that his house and all it contains are at your disposition, you may safely understand that he means to be very civil and hospitable; but you must not understand him to mean that he actually transfers his property to you. If you do, it may fare with you as it did with the late Prince Metternich. That statesman being in Rome and in the house of Torlonia, expressed great admiration for an extremely valuable picture which belonged to his host. Torlonia, with the courteous instincts of his country, immediately begged him to consider it as his. Metternich, acting with as little discretion as the present Cabinet, took him at his word, and Torlonia revenged himself by telling the story to the day of his death, with the epilogue, Et le coquin l'a pris. I am afraid the word which he used was rather stronger than coquin, and very like it. Well, Sir, the Constitution being an impersonal creature, will not be able to tell the story to the disadvantage of those who have treated it so badly; but the Constitutional historian will do that for it, and we may be very sure that when he tells the story of the too literal interpretation which has been put upon its provisions, he will end it with an epilogue at least as severe, if not quite so bitterly expressed, as the Et le coquin l'a pris of the plundered Italian. Ministers who try to strain the Prerogative should remember that the violence of the 16th of May was followed by the humiliation of the 14th of December, even if their studies in French history do not go further back, and 593 bring with them more formidable recollections.
§ MR. BOURKEsaid, he was not surprised to hear the hon. Gentleman who tad just spoken say that he expected to see the Government buried under this Treaty, of which he was disposed to take so unfavourable a view. That, no doubt, was the wish of the hon. Gentleman. But he (Mr. Bourke) could not agree in one or two of the remarks which the hon. Member made, especially when he complained of the position this country held in relation to, and in the estimation of foreign Powers. For his own part, he believed there never was a time when we had more friendly relations with all the Powers of Europe than the present; while with regard to the effect which the hon. Gentleman said the Anglo-Turkish Treaty would have upon them, he was convinced that there never was an episode in the history of Europe where England had shown so much influence as she had done in that which closed in the Congress of Berlin. The noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) at the close of his speech made some statements which called for observation on his part. The noble Lord and his Friends who acted with him, thought the most patriotic course for them to take was to bring this question boldly before the House, and state their objections to the policy of Her Majesty's Government. The Government entirely concurred in that sentiment. They had no objection whatever to the course taken by the noble Lord on this occasion; and the only complaint they had to make was that his criticisms had been small and captious, and had not battled with the grave questions involved in the policy before the House. The noble Lord's remarks, in fact, were not calculated to place before the country the grave issues which it would have to decide. There were one or two remarks of the noble Lord which, although of a general character and applying only to the details of the question, he should like to brush away before he came to the great subject under consideration. He hoped the hon. Member for Elgin (Mr. Grant Duff) would not suppose that he was treating him with disrespect when he passed by, also, some of the observations he had made, recurring to others as they arose. The noble Lord said—"If you approve of the Berlin Treaty, you 594 must approve of what was done by the war;" and the hon. Member who had just sat down had stated that he could not understand the object of it. But why did we join in the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Plunket), in approving of the course which Her Majesty's Government had taken? We did so because we undid, by the Berlin Treaty, a great deal of what was done by the war. Therefore, the House must look at the matter in a light exactly the reverse of that placed upon it by the noble Lord. He also said, in his opening remarks, that he thought it more desirable to compare the Treaty of Berlin with the terms of June than the Treaty of San Stefano. These terms of June might be disposed of in a very few words. It had often been said that the Government ought to have insisted on the Porte accepting the terms of June. Well, we were most anxious that the terms of June should be accepted by Turkey, and they still had no doubt that Turkey would have acted very wisely in accepting them. What did Her Majesty's Government do? The course adopted was well known to the House, because it was recorded in a Parliamentary Paper. Her Majesty's Government wrote a despatch to Mr. Layard, and asked him whether there would be any use in bringing the terms of June to the notice of the Porte? It would be in the recollection of the House that at that time the Turkish Army was making a gallant defence on the Danube against the whole power of Russia. It would also be remembered that, according to all the reports we received, we had every reason to think that Turkey was firmly determined to carry on the struggle to the last, and had not unreasonable grounds for hoping that even she, with her small forces, would be able to make terms of peace which would be more likely to be to her advantage than anything we could shadow out in the terms of June. Then the Government heard from Mr. Layard that it would be perfectly hopeless to mention the terms of June to the Porte. Mr. Layard did sound the authorities, and came to the conclusion that we should be losing our influence for good hereafter if we asked the Porte to consent to anything like the terms of June. With regard to the noble Lord's comparison between the 595 terms of June and the Treaty of Berlin, he had this remark to make. The terms of June were not before the Congress of Berlin; and, therefore, the question the House had to decide was the difference between the Treaty of San Stefano and the Treaty of Berlin, which were the two great documents on which the Congress had to decide. It would be disrespectful to the House if he were not to give hon. Members credit for knowing the main features of those great events which had occurred in Europe during the last three years, and the general causes which led to the Congress. Therefore, he would not delay the House a minute by dwelling on those great events. It was admitted that the terms of the Treaties of Paris and the Treaty of London could not be modified without the general consent of Europe It was also seen by every person who gave the subject his calm, attention that, as Russia had waged a victorious war against Turkey, she had obtained advantages and rights which nobody could deny. When the Treaty of San Stefano appeared, that document astonished and alarmed the world. But it was not until after it had been studied for some time that its true significance was perceived either in this country or in Europe. When, however, the real meaning of that Treaty was discovered, a diplomatic struggle ensued between Russia and Europe, the question being how far Europe would modify that Treaty, which had been made between Russia and Turkey. Lord Salisbury's Circular of the 1st of April appealed to the public law of Europe and to the Declaration of 1871. In that Circular it was pointed out that, under the Treaty of San Stefano, a great State would be constituted from the Ægean to the Danube, in the formation of which Russia would have a preponderating influence, and over the future of which she must exercise complete dominion. Moreover, in the future, all the races would be subject to one nationality which hitherto had shown no power of self-government. It was also felt that the power of the Sultan would be reduced to absolute subjection. Europe generally concurred with that Circular of Lord Salisbury's. For a considerable time it was doubtful whether the Congress would meet or not. Some 596 Governments, particularly that of Germany, concurred with the British Government that the Congress would be worse than useless unless the divergent ideas and opinions which existed, not only between England and Russia, but between other Powers and Russia, were smoothed away by preliminary negotiations before the Congress met. It was well known that irreconcilable opinions existed between the Governments of England and Russia, and it was this circumstance that led to that interchange of ideas between the two Governments out of which arose the much-abused secret understanding come to by Count Schouvaloff and Lord Salisbury. He might take that opportunity of reminding the House of the great efforts that Count Schouvaloff made to bring about an understanding—of his journey to St. Petersburg, and of the great influence which he not only possessed with his own Court, but of the influence which he was able to be bring upon every other Court in Europe. He, for one, was glad to take this opportunity, if it would not be considered a liberty, of saying that he believed this country and Europe were very much indebted to Count Schouvaloff for his wise counsels at the beginning of these troubles, and, above all, in the negotiations which preceded the Congress. But the great and cardinal point was that the Treaty was submitted to Europe. What was the object England had in view in going to the Congress? The object they had in view was to build up and not to destroy. They recognized the fact that, bad as the government of Turkey had been, there were elements of good in the country, and that there was much industry, integrity, and valour among the Mussulman population—who, he might be allowed to say in passing, had never been permitted to take a share in the government—that there were elements still in Turkey by which territorial and administrative arrangements could be made in accordance with the interests of the majority of the population, the wishes of the Sultan, and with future tranquillity. The arrangements with respect to Bulgaria were only arrived at after protracted discussion, much of which turned upon the question of the frontier. It was important that a defensive frontier should be given to the Porte, and it would be observed in the Treaty what the frontier 597 was now to be. It was to be laid out by Commissioners, and it was to be not only a geographical, but a really defensible frontier. With regard to Montenegro, the changes effected in the Treaty of San Stefano would, he believed, be hailed with general satisfaction. Herzegovina and Bosnia naturally fell under Austrian administration. It was desirable for Austria that her frontiers should no longer be disturbed, and that consideration more than anything else induced the Congress to confide to her the administration of the two Provinces mentioned. In connection with Roumania, the retrocession of Bessarabia had been made the subject of complaint against Her Majesty's Government; but although Roumania had at the commencement of the war allied herself with Russia, and therefore had not primâ facie any great claim upon our consideration, both Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury urged her claim to be heard, and it was through their instrumentality that the question of Bessarabia was brought before the Congress. The position of Roumania in the matter might be thought one of hardship; but no Power was prepared to make the question of Bessarabia a vital one to the success of the Congress. He did not suppose anyone would contend that it was the duty of England to go to war for every act of injustice committed by one State upon another. Looking generally to the work of the Congress, it could not be denied that great dangers which would have been produced by the Treaty of San Stefano had been averted by the modifications brought about by the Treaty of Berlin. The preponderating influence of Russia was not now to be apprehended, and other influences had been introduced into the countries on her borders. The policy adopted by Great Britain in the Congress with regard to Greece had been attacked that night by the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition, and the hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke); but he thought that the objections which they urged were without foundation. From the first, they endeavoured to impress upon Greece that if she wished to succeed in her aims, she would not do so by insurrection; that by insurrection, indeed, she would perpetuate rather than remove the evils of which she complained. Not only did they do that, but they 598 urged Turkey to behave in a generous spirit towards Greece, so as not to tempt her to any acts of violence, in proof of which it was only necessary to refer to the despatches which had already been published in the Blue Books. In October last, Lord Derby requested Mr. Wyndham to inform the Greek Government that the wisest policy for them to pursue would be to maintain an attitude of strict and impartial neutrality. At the same time, they urged upon the Porte the necessity of preserving a good understanding with Greece. Not only had Her Majesty's Government given that advice to Greece, but they had also urged Turkey to act in a generous manner towards that Kingdom. The Greek troops crossed the frontier into Thessaly; but, owing to the representations of the British Government, the Porte refrained from attacking them. Then, with regard to what took place at the Congress, Her Majesty's Government undertook to represent to the Congress the claims which Greece had to be heard; but, at the same time, they told the Greeks most distinctly that all questions of territorial acquisition must be settled by the Congress, and that they could give no opinion themselves, nor prejudge what the opinion of the Congress might be. Both the noble Lord and the hon. Baronet had spoken as if Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury were indifferent to the claims of Greece; but he thought the Protocols showed that it was very doubtful whether Greece would have been heard at all had it not been for Lord Salisbury. With regard to the indemnity, it was agreed by all the Powers that it was not to be converted into a pretence for further territorial annexations, neither would it affect the interests of the creditors of the Porte. The Treaty of San Stefano, which provided for a cession of territory in lieu of the indemnity, had been considerably modified by the Treaty of Berlin. Bayazid, which, as they all knew, was an important place on the road to Persia, had been restored to Turkey. Batoum had been represented as a place of very great importance, a statement which had been challenged; but, whether it was of great importance or not, the disposition of it made by the Treaty of San Stefano had been changed, and it was made a free port. He could not help thinking that by this change the great danger of 599 the place becoming a naval arsenal for Russia, and so being turned into a serious menace of the freedom of the Black Sea, was avoided. In view of the fact that England was not prepared to go to war for the sake of Batoum and the territory around it, he thought the conclusion which had been arrived at on the subject was perfectly satisfactory. Then, with regard to the Asiatic Protectorate, if Europe was not prepared to assist England in the prevention of the undue aggression of Russia in Asia, Europe could not be jealous of England for taking the course which she thought most desirable to arrest these encroachments in Asia Minor. Lord Salisbury had distinctly told the Russian Plenipotentiaries that, if Kars and Ardahan were taken by Russia, then England must take the measures which, she thought best for preserving her interests in the East. When Russia declared war against Turkey, it must have been perfectly clear to any intelligent observer that the responsibility of England would vastly increase. It was quite clear that under Russian influence, a new state of affairs would arise in the East. Notwithstanding this, England agreed to remain neutral, and it was not until the Turkish capital itself was threatened that England took those measures of precaution which she thought absolutely necessary. The Treaty of San Stefano showed the dangerous condition of Asia Minor, and the menace which was offered to the Turkish Provinces there. Her Majesty's Government were convinced that if some great effort were not made to restore good government in Asia Minor, those Provinces of Turkey must inevitably become Dependencies of Russia. If Russia were to acquire a populous territory in Armenia, she would obtain a large recruiting field and a district from which she might get large supplies, and thus she might apply unlimited pressure upon Persia. He did not say whether a railway would or would not be made in the Euphrates Valley; but there were plenty of districts in Asia Minor where railways, if made, would be of great value and importance in opening up the country. The question was asked, what were their interests in Asia Minor? and it was said that Asia Minor did not touch India. But the same argument might be applied to Egypt and other places. Again, it was 600 said that Asia Minor was not the way to India. But Persia was the way to India, and he had shown that Persia must inevitably fall to Russia if Russia once got possession of Asia Minor; so that it came to this—that whether the Anglo - Turkish Convention existed or not, if Russia attacked and conquered Asia Minor, the consequences to English interests would be serious; and he believed that no British Government could long exist which did not use the resources of the country to avert such a result. From that point of view, therefore, their responsibility was not increased by the Anglo-Turkish Convention. The noble Lord himself said they should tell Turkey once more that she had a chance of reform, that she must reform her Asiatic Provinces, and that if she showed an anxiety to reform—if she carried out their advice in that respect, they might then proceed to offer her protection. Well, that was substantially what that Convention did, with the important amendment that they would help Turkey to reform. But, if the noble Lord's plan were adopted—if, when Turkey had reformed, they were then to say they would protect her, what became of the argument of those who asserted that Asia Minor was of no importance to England? If that country was left alone, it was vain to hope for any amelioration of its condition. The old intrigues and collisions would continue, and the unhappy population would only remain in the miserable state in which they had been for many years; and, in all probability, they would before long see the same scenes enacted in Asia Minor as were lately witnessed in the Balkan Provinces. One of the first conditions for averting such a state of things was that the country should be at peace, that intrigues should cease, and that Russia should be convinced that further conquests in Asia Minor were incompatible with the local reforms which it was the admitted duty of England to encourage in an especial manner. A great deal had been said about the military liabilities they were incurring; but that phrase, however adroitly used, would not frighten the English nation. High authorities assured him that the best military measures they could adopt were the opening up of the country, making roads, providing security for life, and giving the people an interest in their 601 own prosperity. If that were done, the people would be ready and willing to devote themselves to their own protection. In that way he believed the best foundation they could have would be laid for giving strength in a military point to Asia Minor, and also for attaining other valuable ends in connection with its good government. He could not believe that those objects were beyond the resources of Turkey, if she was well advised and assisted morally. It was said that they had pledged themselves to advance 1,000 miles closer to the military resources of Russia. Of course, in one point of view, they had gone 1,000 miles closer to her; but it was entirely an error to suppose that Russia had her great sources of strength in Asia Minor. Russia's object was to obtain possession of the populous country of Asia Minor, in order to avoid the necessity of transporting her troops South of the Caucasus—of a country, in short, which would admirably serve as a recruiting ground. If Russia were not really an aggressive Power, she would not be hurt by their acquisitions, and would desire no advantages in Asia Minor. If that was the case, well and good; but if not, and she had designs on the country, it could be only for one object, and that the ulterior object of further conquest. She had already plenty of territory North of Asia Minor, but no means of recruiting her Army South of the Caucasus— which he considered necessary in view of further conquests. Surely, on such a question, they were a united people? Russia, under the Treaty of Berlin, had taken upon herself great responsibilities as to the improvement of the populations under her care. Austria, too, had undertaken enormous responsibilities; and it was not for them, the only country greatly interested in Asia Minor, to be alone afraid of the duties attaching to their position. It would be observed that they had not guaranteed Turkish territory as had been done in 1856; their guarantee of Asia Minor was conditional on the reform of that country, and if the condition was not complied with the guarantee ceased. The inducements to the Sultan to introduce reforms were very great, because their promise depended on that point, and he would not otherwise be protected from Russian attack; if, on the other hand, he intro- 602 duced no reforms, he would be left to his fate, and England would be obliged to re-consider her position with regard to the territories of Asia Minor. No doubt, in the first case, it would become the duty of England to assist the Sultan in the work of reform, to help him in levying taxes, in police, and in the administration of justice; and, above all, in caking care that men of tried integrity were put at the head of affairs, and should not be subject to arbitrary removal, but should hold office for a certain term of years, without being liable to dismissal by a decree from Constantinople. Now, it might be asked what was the nature of the reforms that would be recommended to the Sultan? but he could imagine nothing more impolitic than that he should stand there and state what the reforms suggested would be, nor would any course be more certain to prevent their accomplishment. Probably, too, the changes they should propose would be canvassed and criticized both in the House and out of it, and so the Sultan would be led to doubt the soundness of the advice tendered by Her Majesty's Government. With regard to Asia Minor, they would all feel that any improvement must be very gradual, and that if they did their duty there could be no doubt whatever of success. The dangers were not very considerable, and he had already indicated those against which it was necessary to provide. He did not know that he need say much about Cyprus; but he wished to say a word or two on what had been called by hon. Members opposite the Constitutional question. It had been called a secret Treaty, while, in fact, it had never been intended to be secret, but to be laid on the Table of the House as soon as it was ratified. In that respect they had exactly followed the precedent of 1856, for the Treaty of 1856 had not been laid on the Table till some days after its ratification. Nothing would have been less judicious than a discussion in the House on a Treaty that required secrecy for its success. Why, the first thing that would have happened, if it had been known that such a Treaty was about to be signed at Constantinople, would have been to try to prevent the Sultan from agreeing to it. The whole question of signing or not signing had depended upon a few men at Constantinople, who might easily have been 603 pursuaded to induce the Sultan to withhold the ratification of the Treaty, and thus the object in view would have been frustrated. As to the Anglo-Russian Agreement, it was one of those agreements which were very common. Hon. Members must know that, when a great international arrangement was about to take place, negotiations often went on for months before, and agreements were come to preliminary to that arrangement, which were sometimes put in writing and sometimes not. But it was absolutely necessary to come to some agreement before the Congress met, because the divergences between the two Powers were so great that, otherwise, in all probability, war would have been the result. With the arrangement which the Government had made the country was, he believed, satisfied. If peace really reigned in Asia, large fields of future industry would be open which would otherwise have been closed to British commerce. By the arrangements made in Asia Minor, they had not added to the responsibilities of this country in the least; but by taking time by the forelock, by telling Russia what they really did intend, they would avoid those difficulties which would certainly have come on the country if they had simply allowed things to take their course. It would require determination on the part of any English Government to carry out the policy which had been inaugurated; but if they exhibited the same character which had distinguished Englishmen in all generations, they need not fear the verdict which history would pass either on the Berlin Treaty or the Anglo-Turkish Convention.
§ MR. HUSSEY VIVIANhad no desire to call in question the statement, made on the Ministerial side, that England had always exercised an important influence in the affairs of the world; but he denied the truth of the customary assertion on the other side of the House that the influence of this country had been diminished during Liberal Administrations. He did not believe that the influence of a great country like this was increased by constant boastful references to its power. The question at present before the House was not to be limited to a comparison of the Treaty of San Stefano and the Treaty of Berlin. In order properly to appreciate the policy of Her Majesty's Government, the House must take into 604 consideration the declarations of the Head of the Cabinet when these difficulties began; and it was a most remarkable thing that the policy he at first enunciated had been entirely reversed. It was the policy of the right hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) that had triumphed; the policy of the Prime Minister had certainly not been secured by the Treaty of Berlin. At one of those meetings at which it is customary for Ministers to state their policy to the country, the noble Lord at the head of the Government had said that he had been labouring for 12 months to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire. As far as he (Mr. Hussey Vivian) was aware, this statement had. never been retracted. But was that a statement of the policy which had been affirmed at Berlin? Why, neither the integrity nor the independence of Turkey had. been maintained. Under the Treaty of Berlin Turkey lost large possessions, and the famous Convention of the 4th June tore away the last rag of the independence of the Turkish Empire. The evidence of this was contained in the speech just delivered on behalf of the Government. From that speech it appeared that we were about to interfere with the most intimate relations between the Sultan of Turkey and his subjects in Asia Minor. It was extraordinary to note how Her Majesty's Government had contrived to persuade the country that their diplomatic defeat was a victory. That they should have been able to do so passed his comprehension. No doubt, there was great cause for rejoicing that peace had been secured; and there was no man in the country who must not, to a certain extent, be thankful that Her Majesty's Government had conducted these negotiations in such a manner as to bring them to a peaceful issue. The Opposition would certainly have taken a different course. First of all, they would never have allowed the peace to be broken. If, at the time of the Berlin Memorandum, the Government had joined the other Powers of Europe in plainly telling the Sultan of Turkey that we would not allow his misgovernment to continue, no European war would have broken out. He believed that the Berlin Memorandum was placed before the country in such a way that our Go- 605 vernment could not with honour have concurred in it. But there was nothing to prevent the Government making such a counter-proposal as the other three Powers would have assented to. If our Government had plainly said to Turkey —''We cannot allow your misgovernment to continue," Turkey must have given way. There would then have been no war. He could not, therefore, give the Government the credit of having secured the peace of Europe. The same might be said of the Congress. He (Mr. Hussey Vivian) had compared and collated the terms of Russia as expressed by the Treaty of San Stefano with the terms of the Treaty of Peace concluded at Berlin, and the differences between them were extremely slight; there was, in fact, an extraordinary similarity between the two documents. In his opinion, Her Majesty's Government were deeply responsible for not instructing Mr. Layard to lay before the Porte the distinct terms which Russia was prepared to accept on the 8th of June, 1877; and which, if they had been submitted to by the Porte, would have been far better than those she had since been forced to accept. If they came to consider the arrangements made by the Treaty of Berlin, it would appear that many points remained unsettled. The internal peace of East Roumelia was to be preserved by a native gendarmerie, or local militia; but he desired to know of what materials it was to be composed? Were the officers to be appointed by the Sultan to be Christians, or were they to be sent by the Sultan from portions of his Dominions other than Roumelia? The wording on these points was not at all clear, while upon these questions the most material issues arose. Again, what would be the position of Turkey 10 years hence, possibly with another war with Russia on her hands, and having this militia, which would certainly be hostile in feeling, in her rear? What would become of the Balkan passes in such a state of things as that? As to the Commission, he looked with the greatest hope to the Russian portion of it; for the Russians throughout had struggled to secure the liberties of Christians, while the Plenipotentiaries who represented England had striven to maintain, as far as possible, the status quo. With regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, those States had been handed 606 over to the military control of Austria. The English people ought at no time to allow such a tyranny to be imposed upon any nation. This he felt from his own experience, having travelled in Italy, when that country was in a similar condition. Knowing what Austrian military rule meant, he could not believe that the freedom of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be thus secured. The fact was that the question of the freedom of those oppressed nationalities had never been present in the minds of our Plenipotentiaries, who, possibly, had to contend with the jealousy of Austria; but who were, nevertheless, bound to "use their best endeavours to secure for them as many as possible of the blessings of that freedom which we enjoyed. The Bosnians and Servians were people of the same race, of the same language, and, largely, of the same religion, although he was aware that many of the former were Mahomedans. Under such conditions, there would have been no difficulty whatever in handing over to Servia a large portion of the Principalities; but, as he had said before, there was Austrian jealousy to conciliate, and our Plenipotentiaries had yielded to it at the cost of Bosnian freedom. Now, with regard to the retrocession of Bessarabia, he thought that no one could feel that the conduct of Russia had been in any respect satisfactory; at the same time, he was bound to admit that he thought the Government had acted wisely in not going the length of declaring war against Russia on that ground. What was the outcome of all this, but that Russia had triumphed on every point, and had obtained the original terms laid down by her? Surely, that was no cause for congratulation on the part of Her Majesty's Government, who had opposed her? Again, the question of the indemnity had been treated at the Congress in the most superficial manner. So long as that immense claim continued to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Turkey, so long would she continue under one of the most severe conditions imposed by the Treaty of San Stefano. It really seemed that no serious effort had been made at the Congress to deal with that question, which would continually menace her independence. It appeared to him that it ought to have been disposed of in some way; but it was, practically, passed over, after a very short 607 discussion. It was true that the Russian Plenipotentiaries had given assurances that the claim would not rank before the prior claims of other creditors of Turkey; but the indemnity would still hang over her. On the whole, he thought he had shown that it was not the Government policy, but that of their opponents, which had triumphed at Berlin. Then as to the famous Convention. They now knew that it was made at the same moment as the Agreement with Russia. Could that Convention have been entered into for the purpose of covering the retreat of Her Majesty's Government after their diplomatic defeat? He very much suspected that such was the object which they had in making that Convention. He was reminded that Her Majesty's Government were somewhat in the habit of referring to The Encyclopœdia Britannica, and would venture to draw their attention to a little matter of natural history, which appeared to him to have a considerable similitude to their action in the matter of the Convention. The Encyclopœdia said that—
The cuttle-fish contained in a certain distinct vessel a fluid as black as ink, which it shed for the purpose of concealing itself when pursued by its enemies.He had a strong suspicion that the Government had used the art of the cuttlefish in covering their retreat. It was also possible that the Convention might have been a portion of the grand idea for the regeneration of the glorious East, which had occupied so much of the mind of the most prominent Member of Her Majesty's Government. He believed the result of it would be to involve the country in great difficulties, because it would bring us face to face with Russia —a result that when we complained of her advance in Asia we had always been anxious to avoid. If Russia ever invaded Asia Minor, it would be at a time when this country was involved in some great difficulty. It had been admitted by the hon. Member who had just spoken (Mr. Bourke) that we must exercise a large influence upon the internal government of Asia Minor. He said that we must advise and assist the Porte in the levying of taxes, police functions, and the appointment of officers who were to be permanently occupied in the administration of justice. By undertaking to 608 mix ourselves up in the local details of a country like Asia Minor, we had incurred enormous responsibilities. How were these engagements to be carried out? Was it to be supposed that the Turks, who had struggled against annexation by Russia, would allow us to take possession of their country in such a manner? And yet it must come to this if we thrust ourselves into the internal management of their affairs. He presumed it would be admitted that there must be a Resident in every important town of Asia Minor; but those Residents would be backed up by no force as in India, where they had the support of the Army. It appeared to him, moreover, that an interminable struggle would go on between the Residents and the Consuls of the various other Powers, which would produce difficulties that before long would involve the country in actual war either with Turkey or Russia. It had not been made clear to his mind why we had undertaken these serious responsibilities. Lord Salisbury, in his despatch of the 30th May, 1878, to our Ambassador at Constantinople, had described the Turkish Dynasty as one that rested more upon active power than upon the sympathies of nationality; and he went on to say that the defeat which its Army had sustained would produce a belief in its decadence and speedy change; that the only way to prevent this was an engagement on the part of a Power strong enough to fulfil it—that in future it would be defended by force of arms. The decadence of Turkey formed no reason why we should undertake such enormous responsibilities as were involved in the undertaking to put matters right in Asia Minor. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Bourke) had said we must undertake some responsibilities, because other countries had taken responsibilities upon themselves. But he denied that Austria, who had simply to march her Army, which was quite ready, and to take possession of two Provinces, had incurred any responsibility whatever. He had also used words which had certainly somewhat alarmed him, when he said that "there were imminent dangers in Asia Minor." When an hon. Gentleman holding the position of his hon. Friend made a statement of that kind, they had a right to expect that he should tell 609 them what those imminent dangers were. The necessity of guarding the Euphrates Valley, which had been dwelt upon to a very slight extent, was not now urged as a necessity for undertaking the grave responsibility which we had assumed. It was not mentioned in Lord Salisbury's despatch, and the Government did not seem to treat that matter as one of very great weight. Great weight had, however, been attached in "another place" to the influence which our action in Asia Minor might have upon the Mahomedan mind; and a noble Lord, well acquainted with India, lost no time in pointing out that though we had poured out our blood and treasure in maintaining the Dominions of the Porte during the Crimean War, we had no sooner done so than the Indian Mutiny broke out. He repeated that we had. incurred a great responsibility, and that, too, without the sanction or knowledge of Parliament. Parliament, by a tendency of the Government to make these great strokes of policy without its consent, had become little else than a Registry Office. He would only add, that as long as he had strength to raise his voice, it should be raised in that House against such engagements as this being contracted without Parliament being in any way consulted.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."— (Viscount Sandon.)
§ MR. GREENEwished to make an appeal to both sides of the House. The debate had been the dullest he ever remembered. The House had always been indulgent to him, and he wanted to get away to attend to his business. He thought that the debate should terminate the next night, as there had been the greatest possible difficulty in carrying it on. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) had made a very able speech; but all who had followed him had spoken in the same terms. He thought the noble Marquess would be doing an act of kindness in causing the debate to finish next evening.
§ MR. GOSCHENsaid, the Government had not assisted to bring about the end desired by the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Greene). At 12 o'clock, a Cabinet Minister had proposed to adjourn the debate, and 610 then there was the remarkable fact that during the whole course of the debate no Cabinet Minister had condescended to address the House. They had had in the course of the proceedings many departures from ordinary precedents; but they had now come to this—that on the first night of one of the most important debates that could occupy the attention of the House, no Cabinet Minister had risen to defend the policy of the Government. He could not express surprise at this, for it was in accordance with the course pursued by Ministers through the whole of the negotiations.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHE-QUERThe remarks of the right hon. Gentleman are very amiable, no doubt; but, considering that we were challenged by the Leader of the Opposition to a most solemn debate upon the most important action of the year, or, indeed, of many years, it is rather remarkable that there should be so small an attendance, and that so very slight an interest should have been manifested during a great part of the evening. I cannot, of course, account for that; but, although my noble Friend was perfectly ready, and had intended to address the House, yet it seemed that there was a certain slackness, and that it would be a better economy of time—for, at this period of year, we must economize our time— not to proceed with the debate, but to take it up to-morrow with perhaps a little more spirit, and, in the meantime, to get some through some of the Orders. When it is said that no Cabinet Minister has spoken, it must be remembered that the Under Secretary, who represents the Foreign Department in this House, has spoken with great ability, and his speech was a complete answer to the observations addressed to the House on the part of the Opposition early in the evening. I thought that his speech deserved an answer from the front Opposition Bench. It is, of course, impossible for us to control the course of debate so as to render it agreeable to everyone, and I know how difficult it is to arrange a debate of this character in a way that will give a due and fair place to everyone who is naturally desirous of speaking. I should be glad if we could continue it a little longer; but I am afraid the House has fallen into luxurious habits in this respect, 611 and we do not often carry on a debate after 12 o'clock. Although I am not sanguine enough to imagine that the debate will be concluded to-morrow, I hope it may terminate on Thursday next.
§ MR. LYON PLAYFAIRsaid, it was explained at the beginning of the evening that the Endowed Schools (Scotland) Bill would be brought on at a reasonable hour. The object of adjourning at present was, he believed, to enable that measure to be proceeded with. It was understood, however, that the Bill would not be brought forward except at a time when the Scotch Members could fully discuss it. He thought the debate should be continued.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONcould hardly hope that the debate would be closed until the end of the week; indeed, he was not sure that it would terminate then, unless there was a disposition on the part of hon. Members to facilitate that result by somewhat curtailing their remarks and confining them to one or two points. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had referred to the fact that the speech of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was not answered by any Member on the front Opposition Bench. Two of his right hon. Friends were extremely anxious to have an opportunity of replying to that speech; but it did not tend to bring a debate to a conclusion if too much time, especially in the earlier part of the debate, were occupied by Members on the front Benches. There was a reasonable feeling that fair opportunities ought to be given to speakers in other parts of the House.
§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKEsaid, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld) rose to reply to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
§ MR. M'LARENsaid, he was unable to agree with the right hon. Member for the University of Edinburgh (Mr. Lyon Playfair) as to the desirability of postponing the Scotch Endowed Schools Bill.
§ MR. RAMSAYsaid, the Endowed Schools Bill for Scotland had been read a second time in April last, and he put it to the House whether it was reasonable, when they were promised a full discus- 612 sion of the question to proceed with it at that hour of the night? The right hon. Gentleman must recognize that there had been undue delay in bringing forward the Bill. He was of opinion that the business should be taken on another occasion.
§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLwished to know with what object it was proposed to adjourn the debate, whether for the purpose of proceeding with the Scotch Bill, or the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill?
MR. ASSHETON CROSSreplied, that he intended to proceed with the Scotch Bill.
§ SIR EDWARD COLEBROOKEwas also of opinion that the House should be made aware of the statement of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Assheton Cross) as soon as possible.
§ Motion agreed to.
§ Debate adjourned till To-morrow,