ADJOURNED DEBATE. [SECOND NIGHT.]

HC Deb 10 December 1878 vol 243 cc530-622

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [9th December], "That the said Address be now read a second time."

And which Amendment was, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House disapproves the conduct of Her Majesty's Government which has resulted in the War with Afghanistan,"—(Mr. Whitbread,) —instead thereof.

Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question.

Debate resumed.

LORD JOHN MANNERS

observed, that the hon. Gentleman who introduced the Amendment on this subject wished them to confine themselves to the past, and told them he would refer neither to the present, nor to the future. But the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. W. E. Foster), who concluded the debate last night, took a somewhat different line. He explained to the House the alternative policy of which, if there were a change of Administration, his Friends would seriously recommend the adoption. The right hon. Gentleman fairly faced a difficulty which the hon. Gentleman who introduced the Amendment shrank from. That policy would be the old, exploded, barren, and useless policy of "masterly inactivity." He (Lord John Manners), proposed to make a few observations, first, with reference to the criticisms which had been made on the policy of the Government; and, secondly, on the alternative policy of "masterly inactivity." He gathered from the observations of the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition on the first night of the Session, that there was no material difference of opinion between the two sides of the House as to what ought now to be done. The noble Lord told the House that he was prepared to vote all the Supplies which were necessary to bring the existing war to a satisfactory and honourable conclusion. Before he proceeded to make his observations, he would reply to two questions with which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford concluded his observations. The right hon. Gentleman, fixing upon an isolated paragraph in the record of a conversation between Lord Lytton and his own confidential Agent, asked with great triumph: "Are we upon the eve of a second secret Treaty with Russia?" He did not know whether the right hon. Gentleman expected a solemn and serious answer to that question; but if he did, he might rest assured that there had been no secret Agreement or Treaty between this country and Russia on the subject of Afghanistan, and as long as the present Government remained in power he ventured to say there would be none. Should, however, the Amendment before the House be carried, and should right hon. Gentlemen opposite, as a consequence, return to power, what the result would be he did not claim to decide. From their past conduct and language it might not be uncharitable to suppose that overtures of that kind from Russia might receive a somewhat more favourable hearing than they were likely to do so long as the present Government remained in office. The right hon. Gentleman asked another question, also on the subject of Russia. He asked, if we were content with the answers received from the Russian Government as to the Russian Mission to Cabul; and, if so, why did we make the reception of that Mission one of the principal causes of the war? The answer to that question was, that as soon as the Government heard of the reception of a Russian Agent at Cabul, they lost no time in making proper remonstrances on the subject at St. Petersburg; that those remonstrances had been successful; and that the Envoy had been withdrawn. That being so, did the right hon. Gentleman mean to say that we should pick a quarrel with Russia? But, then it was asked why, if Her Majesty's Government and the Indian Government were satisfied with the withdrawal of the Russian Envoy, they had made the reception of that Mission one of the principal causes of their quarrel with the unfortunate Ameer? Now, if the right hon. Gentleman who put that question would read the Proclamation of "War he would find that no less than seven causes of war were carefully enumerated, and that the reception of the Russian Mission came sixth in order, and merely led up to the seventh, which was, no doubt, the principal motive which caused the war which was now unhappily being waged. We had not quarrelled with the Ameer because he had received the Russian Mission, but because, having received it with great pomp and unwonted solemnity, when the Indian Government asked him to receive a peaceful English Mission, he not only refused to do so, but refused with insult and violence. He now came to the main charge which was brought against the Government with respect to their past policy, and he really trembled when he thought of the number of quotations which had been made on the previous evening from the Yellow Book. [Ironical cheers.] There were various modes of trembling. He had brought down to the House a number of extracts from it also; but for the sake of hon. Members he hoped he should be able to continue his observations without untying the elastic that was round the volume. Well, the whole of the great charge brought against the Government and which had been supported by such voluminous quotations, was that they had changed what was called the traditional policy of this country with regard to Afghanistan. Now, to that statement he demurred. He contended that, in the true sense of the word, the policy of the Government had not been changed at all. What, he would ask, had been the policy of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook? It had been to establish, if possible, on our North-Western Frontier in India, a State which should be strong, friendly, tolerably well-governed, and, in a certain sense, independent. That policy we endeavoured to carry out during many years by the method of what was known as "masterly inactivity." He was not about to say that 10 or 20 years ago that might not have been a very proper method to pursue. All he was contending for was that the change of circumstances, the immense advances which had been made by Russia, and the feeling which from year to year more and more animated the Ameer himself, all necessitated a change in the method of establishing a policy in which statesmen generally concurred. So long as Lord Mayo lived, his personal ascendency over the Ameer enabled that method to be successfully maintained; but no one could study the records before the House without seeing that after Lord Mayo's death the Ameer began to feel year after year more discontented with his position, seeing the pressure of the Russian advance towards his dominions, more discontented with the position which he occupied with regard to the Indian Government, and more and more pressing for a change of relations between him and that Government. It was true that up to the very last Lord Northbrook was not prepared to admit that the time had come for a change; but he contemplated that at some period the necessity of a change for the purpose of securing an independent ally in the Ameer might arise, his contention being that up to the moment of his departure from India that time had not arrived. Lord Northbrook went further, it having been his opinion that it would not arrive until Russia was in occupation of Merv. Now, that was a position which it was, of course, perfectly competent for any hon. Gentleman in that House to maintain; but it was not the opinion of Her Majesty's Government. They felt that they could not view with indifference the advance of Russia to Merv or to the neighbourhood of the northern boundary of Afghanistan. Their views in that respect were, he might add, shared by the Ameer. Year after year he had been impressing on the Indian Government the necessity of taking more vigorous steps to secure his dominions against the onward pressure of Russia. Time after time, however, those representations had been disregarded by Lord Northbrook and his Government; and at last the Ameer, as it seemed to him, in despair, recognizing the fact that the Indian Government did not share in his apprehensions, and were preaching their unlimited belief in Russian goodwill, apparently prepared to throw himself into the arms of Russia. That being the state of the case, when Lord Salisbury came into office the feelings of the Ameer had been still further injured by Lord Northbrook's interference on behalf of his son, Yakoob Khan. Lord Salisbury accordingly instructed Lord Northbrook to attempt, by a more vigorous policy, to recover the lost confidence of the Ameer, and to improve the relations which existed between the two Governments. Now, all through the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford it had been assumed that Lord Salisbury's instructions and those-given to Lord Lytton were hostile to the Ameer. He would, however, venture to say that that was a complete misapprehension and misstatement of the facts of the case. It was to cement and strengthen the relations between England and Afghanistan that Lord Salisbury desired. The Ameer had for years been pressing a particular point on the attention of the Indian Govern- ment, and Lord Salisbury's instructions were that those points on which the Ameer had laid so much stress should be conceded with the natural and proper condition that the Indian Government should have the power of verifying the real facts of the case. Lord Northbrook was, therefore, instructed to make the proposal to the Ameer, that if he would consent to the establishment of a British Agent at Herat, the objects which he had at heart should be substantially complied with. Lord Northbrook gave the reasons why, in his opinion and that of his advisers, that course should not be taken, and it was not carried out during the remainder of his Vice-royalty. Then Lord Lytton went out with full and complete instructions and information on the subject; and what, he would ask, could have been more friendly than Lord Lytton's mode of acting upon those instructions? Lord Lytton, in the first instance, proposed that the Ameer should receive an Agent at Cabul to discuss the matters to which he had referred. On the Ameer's declining that proposal, Lord Lytton was not betrayed into any act of animosity, but accepted the counter-proposal of the Ameer, which was that his own confidential Prime Minister should go to Peshawur and there discuss and consider the important subjects of deliberation. Surely that argued no animosity on the part of Lord Lytton to the Ameer. The Prime Minister was in the confidence of the Ameer, and nothing could have been more considerate than the arrangement made. What had happened? Lord Lytton had made it perfectly and distinctly understood by the Ameer that unless the primary condition of his acceptance at Herat of an English Agent was conceded, it would be impossible that the large boons he requested should be granted. That was the basis of the negotiations. Three weeks were consumed by the Prime Minister of the Ameer in a very long statement of his master's wishes; but not a single step was gained towards the primary condition on which the whole Conference was based. At the end of that period the Prime Minister died, and Lord Lytton naturally thought it best to close the Conference. Enough had passed to show that there was no sincere intention on the part of the Ameer to come to any conclusion whatever, seeing that three weeks had elapsed and the preliminary condition had not even been assented to; so that the Indian Government could not but fall back on the status quo and terminate the Conference. Upon that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford had seemed to think that the Ameer had some considerable grounds for his discontent, and had been deprived, by the action of the Home Government, of certain securities for which he thought he had a right to look. He could not quite understand how the right hon. Gentleman established that proposition. He had read a paragraph in a very remarkable way, so as to omit the statement and to quote the consequence. He was able to supplement the omission, and to give the extract as it really occurred. It was in a despatch of Lord Salisbury's, summing up the whole subject; but the following preceded and governed the passage quoted by the right hon. Gentleman:— His Highness has now been informed in unmistakable language that under the terms of the Treaty of 1855—which alone of the two Treaties contracted between the British and Afghan Governments has a character of perpetuity—the British Government has incurred no liabilities whatever on his behalf; and it has been distinctly intimated to him that neither by Lord Mayo in 1869 nor by Lord Northbrook in 1873 was any assurance given of unconditional protection, nor any obligation contracted towards him which was not dependent on his future conduct towards the British Government and his own subjects."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, pp. 223–4.] That showed that what Lord Salisbury had said was that the Ameer had then learnt distinctly what was in the minds of Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook; and that throughout the whole of the Correspondence the Ameer had previously had an impression of obligations on the part of the British Government much larger than they were willing to admit. So, instead of the Conference at Peshawur being unfavourable to Shere Ali in its results, it was genuine kindness to him to show him the true facts of the case and his real position. And apart from that, anyone would fancy, from the speeches that had been made, that Lord Lytton was hostile to the Ameer, while, in fact, from the moment the Conference was terminated, no part of his conduct was so in the least degree, either in word or deed. The Ameer was left perfectly free to conduct the affairs of his territory in any way he chose, and neither by Lord Lytton nor by any one else was the slightest pressure put upon him.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR

Will you tell us when Quetta was taken and occupied? ["Order!"]

LORD JOHN MANNERS

But what had that to do with the question? Did the hon. and gallant Gentleman not know that in occupying Quetta we were acting under our Treaty rights and wanted no permission? He had really been surprised at such a suggestion from so learned an Indian pundit as the hon. and gallant Gentleman. He contended that for 14 months the Ameer suffered no pressure either from Lord Lytton or the Government, and he might have gone on in the ordinary way for a considerable period, had not a Russian Mission made its appearance at Cabul, and had not he, for reasons of his own, accorded to it an ostentatious welcome, and received it with unwonted solemnity. What was the Indian Government to do? He now came to the alternative policy, which, he supposed, hon. Gentlemen who had supported the Motion would be prepared to undertake. But what was the Indian Government to do when the Mission had been received in the manner he had described? Were they to do nothing? He heard no response from the front Opposition benches to that question. A sudden silence seemed to pervade those benches. Or were they to rest content and wait? Was the policy of "masterly inactivity" to be followed on such an occasion? If the Indian Government were not justified in waiting, and if some action was required on their part, what action, he asked, was it right to take? He ventured to argue that the course adopted with the sanction of the Home Government was a friendly and not a hostile course. A distinguished soldier, who was well known to and highly appreciated by Shere Ali, was selected as the head of the Mission, and no effort was spared to give the Mission an amicable character. The escort, moreover, was cut down to the very lowest point compatible with the dignity of the Envoy and the safety of the Mission itself; and letters were written to the different officials on the road in order to avoid even the possibility of a collision. That being the character and purpose of the Mission, how was it received? As all know, with violence and insult. He asked, again, what would the critics of the Indian Government and the censors of the Government at home have done had they been in the same position? The Mission, he repeated, was rightly sent; and though it came with a friendly object, its rejection was accompanied with insult and violence. Was the Envoy of Her Majesty the Queen of England and Empress of India, and the Representative of the Viceroy, to wait outside the gates of Ali Musjid until it pleased the Ruler of Afghanistan to admit him to his gracious presence? Was he to be, like Charles XII. at Bender— Condemned, a needy supplicant, to wait While ladies interpose, and slaves debate? Was that the answer the Opposition were prepared to give? Well, after this insult and violence had been perpetrated, was the next manifestation on the part of the Indian Government one of hostility? He might answer, quite the reverse; for a considerable period was given to the Ameer to reflect upon his conduct and upon the impropriety of the steps he had taken. Did Gentlemen opposite condemn that; and were they going to pass a Vote of Censure on the Government because they afforded the Ameer time to reply to the remonstrance against his insulting conduct? To resume; the time of grace having expired, the Government felt that the necessary consequence was an expedition to enforce submission to their modest and reasonable demands. Was the Government going to be condemned for having, after so much pains and forbearance, vindicated by the only legitimate means left to them the honour and dignity of the Crown of England? That being so with respect to the past, he felt confident that the House would reject the Vote of Censure moved by the hon. Member for Bedford; but he appealed to the House with ten times more confidence when that Vote of Censure was coupled with the future policy of those who would succeed to power. What was it the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford told the House? He did not know whether the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) gave the right hon. Gentleman authority to speak in his name, or if it was a voluntary effort on his own part; but one who filled so important a position in the councils of Gentlemen opposite must be taken to speak on behalf of the whole of the Opposition. The right hon. Gentleman told them that after all these steps had been taken—after the war had progressed and been brought to a satisfactory and glorious issue—he was prepared to recommend that the Indian Government should fall back into the old beaten groove of "masterly inactivity," and trust to the chapter of accidents to recover or not recover our influence at Cabul.

MR. W. E. FORSTER

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but he has not given a fair account of what I said. It was this:—That I thought, speaking for myself, the Government ought to return to the old policy, and I defined that as, first, to try to convince the Ameer that it was neither our interest nor our wish to take from him his territory or deprive him of his independence; and, secondly, to convince him that it was our interest and intention to guard him against any unprovoked aggression of Russia or any other Power. I said that that was my definition of the old policy; and that what I considered the new policy brought in by the present Government was that they assured the Ameer of protection against Russia solely upon conditions, which he considered—and considered rightly—would destroy his independence.

LORD JOHN MANNERS

replied that this was precisely what he meant to summarize under the title of "masterly inactivity." He wanted the House to understand this clearly, and also that when he spoke of the old method as being exploded, he did so on the authority of men of great weight. In the course of that debate the opinion of Sir Henry Norman, of Sir William Muir, and of Sir Arthur Hobhouse and others had been quoted against this view. But every person of authority on these matters did not agree with them. The old policy had been condemned not only by the facts of the case, but also by men of high authority. In Lord Lytton's despatch of May 10, 1877, occurred these words— Whilst still alive to the difficulties and risks inseparable from any attempt to enter into closer and more responsible intercourse with a barbarous neighbour so suspicious, discontented, and untrustworthy as Shere Ali, we certainly could not regard with unconcern the increasing inconvenience, and possible peril, of the extremely ambiguous and uncertain character of our existing relations with him. It was impossible to deny that the practical results of the Afghan policy, patiently pursued by us for several years, were far from satisfactory."—[Ibid. p. 165.] This despatch was signed by Sir E. C. Bayley, Sir A. J. Arbuthnot, and Sir A. Clarke, who had in the previous year signed the Minute approving Lord Northbrook's despatch. He remembered that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett), in the course of a speech some time ago, had made a point of the opinion of Lord Napier of Magdala, as being unfavourable to the policy of the present Government. Well, on page 226 of the Blue Book he held in his hand, Lord Napier of Magdala's opinion was given in these words— Our policy of masterly inactivity, or rather of receding from every difficulty until what were matters easy of suppression have grown into serious dangers, has continued too long, and if it is maintained will lead us to disaster. He thought that on such authorities as these he was justified in saying of the policy to which the right hon. Gentleman would have the country return, that it was a policy condemned both by the facts of the case and also by the authority of some of the greatest living statesmen and Generals of India.

MR. FAWCETT

rose to disclaim having misquoted the words of Lord Napier of Magdala.

LORD JOHN MANNERS

said, he did not accuse the hon. Member of misquoting Lord Napier's words, for the Book containing them had not at that time been published. Many years ago the policy of masterly inactivity might have been good and proper; but wise men did not adhere in a bigoted manner to opinions formed in one condition of things when the circumstances had altogether changed. What did the right hon. Gentleman do? He asked the House not only to censure the past policy of the Government, but to place on record their approbation of a recurrence to this condemned policy, and that at a moment when the lives of our gallant British, Irish, and Native Indian soldiers were being risked, when feats of the greatest heroism and endurance were being performed. At such a moment the right hon. Gentleman said to them and the world at large—"Never mind what sacrifices are made, what victories gained, they shall all end in nothing; we will turn back to the old exploded views of 30 years ago; and we will in that manner humbly hope that the Ameer will at some time or other—we can't presume to indicate when—think better of his conduct and graciously permit us to look upon Afghanistan as a real protection in future to the advances of Russia." Surely neither the House nor this country would never sanction such a policy. If they were asked what end the Government placed before them, they would reply—"We must prosecute this war until the Ruler of Afghanistan makes due submission; and then we shall be prepared to grant terms as moderate and as generous as would be consistent with the inviolability, the security, and the peace of our Indian Frontier."

MR. GLADSTONE

I wish to advert for a moment to the closing sentence of the speech of the noble Lord. He says he will prosecute the war until the Ruler of Afghanistan makes due submission. He has bound himself by that pledge in the face of the country. But suppose, Sir, the Ruler of Afghanistan does not make due submission? The Rulers of Afghanistan do not always make due submission. They have a habit of disappearing. Suppose Shere Ali, without making due submission, disappears from the scene of your military operations: what is the noble Lord to do then? He is, I presume, to keep an army of occupation in Afghanistan. How long is he to keep that army there? Quarrels with Afghanistan are not apt to reach a very speedy conclusion; and I think that if the noble Lord saw fit thus liberally and generously to give us his future intentions, he ought to have contemplated an alternative which is perfectly possible, and which, if we are to judge from the case of Dost Mahomed, might even be more probable than the due submission he contemplates with so much complacency. Now, Sir, the noble Lord assumes to himself two privileges, which undoubtedly very greatly facilitate his task. In the first place, he thinks himself entitled to ask of hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House not only in what respect they differ from and condemn the general features of the policy of the Government, but when the Government have entangled themselves by their own errors and misdeeds—in consequence of which we have had to travel over the ground of a multitude of embarrassing situations at every stage, produced by those errors—he thinks it fair to turn upon hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House and say—"What would you have done then?" No doubt the ingenuity of the noble Lord suggested to him that he should fall back upon that. But the noble Lord puts forward another claim, the justice of which I must contest. He claims not to be compelled to refer to the Papers laid upon the Table of the House. ["No!"] I beg pardon—what the noble Lord said was that he would not remove the india-rubber band with which those papers were bound; and he delivered to us a lengthened narrative of the proceedings of the Government, which was not supported, as it should have been, from point to point, by proofs drawn from these Papers. That, therefore, is a claim which I cannot assent to. No doubt it suited the purposes of the noble Lord that he should make that claim, and insist upon it; and that upon only one or two occasions should he furnish us with even so much as a thread of proof of any assertion he made. Our course is a very difficult one. The noble Lord taunts us with going back—that is, with going back to the evidence. It is true that we do not put forward unsupported assertions but with as much care and caution as our unfavourable circumstances and conditions will admit. ["Hear, hear!"] Yes; I thank the hon. Member for that cheer. I thank him for admitting that we do occupy an unfavourable position, when five days before a debate of this character commences, when five days before the speech from the Throne, we are saluted with 500 closely-printed pages of documents and are invited to pass judgment upon them. But, short as the time has been for mastering the Papers, I shall not follow the easy mode of dealing with them of the noble Lord the Postmaster General. In fact, I cannot follow his example and allow the Papers to remain tied up in their tape. On the contrary, Sir, I shall have to refer to these documents; and, more than that, I shall have with great reluctance, but with great deliberation, to impeach those documents. I shall have to point to them as containing the most gross misstatements of fact—I will not say such as raise the suspicion of wilful untruth, because it is far from my mind to impute that to anyone—but misstatements of fact involving a reckless negligence, of which, so far as I know, there has been no example in connection with a subject of Imperial policy ever before in my experience presented to Parliament. That is a startling assertion, and I am not going to ask you to accept it until proved. I will, in the first place, refer briefly to the observations of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain). My hon. Friend said that he could not have voted for any Motion which would have confined the debate to the merits of the war and which would not have included the manner in which Her Majesty's Government had acted on this occasion with reference to the privileges and the rights of Parliament. I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. I certainly could not have voted for any Motion as one adequate to the occasion which did not leave it open to us to comment upon the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in denying to Parliament its proper position. As far as I know, the concealment practised by Her Majesty's Government upon this occasion is alike without precedent and without excuse. For two years and a-half a policy has been deliberately carried on by Her Majesty's Government, and the nature of that policy has been kept back with the utmost care from the knowledge of Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer says—and I really was surprised to hear him say it—that he apologized for the late appearance of these Papers, on the ground that there was such a number of them, and that it was very difficult to prepare and arrange them. The right hon. Gentleman speaks of them as though they had resulted from the transactions of the last few weeks; whereas, in fact, they are the result of transactions which have been spread over a series of years, and the major portion of them have been in the pos- session of Her Majesty's Government for a long period. I ask, is it right that Parliament should have been kept in the dark so long on this subject? Is there any reason why these Papers should not have been laid before us long ago? I can understand that there are many occasions, when diplomatic or executive steps are being taken, when it is fitting that Papers of this character should be kept back; but there are many stages in the course of such negotiations when a fresh start is made, and when all reason for keeping back such Papers ceases to exist. I take it that such an opportunity for producing these Papers occurred at the time of the total change of the Government policy which followed upon the solemn Conference at Peshawur between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Prime Minister of the Ameer. I ask whether, when Her Majesty's Government resolved upon that total change of policy, they should not have communicated that fact to Parliament? All that Her Majesty's Government did at that time, however, was to say that there was no change in their policy. How happened it, I ask, that Parliament being prorogued on the 16th of August last, the Mission to Afghanistan was despatched on the 19th? That was the crown and consummation of that policy of concealment from Parliament which has marked the conduct of the present Government; and which in the case of the Anglo-Turkish Convention did so much to endanger the continuance of the Treaty-making power of the Crown and to jeopardize the Prerogative of the Crown to make peace and war. I will not enter into that point, however, upon the present occasion. My belief is, that they have broken the Statute; and, at the proper time, I shall be prepared to give my reasons for that belief. I am now going to call the attention of the House to what I believe to be a very grave matter, and that is the total untrustworthiness of the allegations of fact contained in the most important documents in the Book which has been presented to the House. I do not refer now to the famous paragraph 9 in Lord Cranbrook's despatch, in which the art of saying one thing and of suggesting another has been carried to such a pitch of perfection that I doubt whether the future, with all its development, will ever be able to improve it, I hope that the noble Lord will begin to remove his elastic band I now. In order that there may be no mistake, I say that I impeach the trustworthiness of the allegations of fact contained in the despatch from the Government of India, dated the 10th of May, 1877, and in that equally important Paper read by Sir Lewis Pelly to the Envoy of the Ameer at Peshawur in November, 1877. I take first the despatch of the Government of India. Of course, it is an essential part of the case of Her Majesty's Government that the Ameer had a great and growing stock of grievances against the Government of India at the time of the departure of Lord Northbrook; and in this despatch, which will be found at page 167 of the Papers, it is stated that the Indian Government had discovered that the Ameer had four special classes of grievances. First of all there was the grievance relating to Yakoob Khan; the second was that which related to the Seistan boundary; the third was with reference to the Chief of Wakhan; and the fourth was that which was involved in our refusing to conclude a defensive alliance with him. Let us turn to the source of the account of the grievances of the Ameer. Now that we have got the Papers we know what were the materials upon which they founded that statement. They had before them two accounts of the grievances of the Ameer, and the account that they have given does not correspond with the other. Those two accounts are very different in authority and value. One of them was a report by our Native Agent. It purported to be a statement of the Ameer. He did not say that he knew the grievances of the Ameer. It was only upon being hard pressed by the Viceroy or by the Agents of the Viceroy—I do not recollect which—that he would consent to give an account of what he thought were the grievances of the Ameer, so that in truth the opinion he gave was only his own opinion of the grievances of the Ameer. Perhaps this may be doubted, and I would therefore read from the Book the authentic record— Being pressed to explain more in detail the views or wishes which the Ameer expressed at his interview, the Agent repeated that the Ameer had no further wishes than those already on record, and deemed that a renewal of the request for their fulfilment would lead to no solid result, as nothing had come of his previous efforts. The Agent was then requested to state in particular his own estimate of the feelings and causes which had estranged the Ameer from the British Government, and had induced His Highness to object to the reception of a complimentary Mission. The Agent replied that he could not pretend to be acquainted with all that passed in the mind of the Ameer on the above subjects; but as far as he could ascertain them the grievances were as follows."—(Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 180.] Then he goes on to repeat, not four special causes of grievance, according to the doctrine of the despatch of the English Government, but eight causes of grievance, with no speciality at all marked out among the eight, and to say that these eight were among the causes of complaint which the Ameer may have resting upon his mind. That was the inferior source of information to which the Government resorted, and even that they could not state with decent accuracy, for they mis-stated the number of the grievances and they mis-stated the specialities. The truth is—and I challenge contradiction—that they set forth four grievances when there were eight, and they stated that there were four special grievances, while the Agent stated that there was no speciality whatsoever. The Government had before them at this time another statement of the Ameer's grievance, which was of a very different character—a statement made by the Prime Minister of the Ameer himself in writing directly and authoritatively from the Ameer when he met Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur. And what was the case then? He gives them only four grievances—only the list does not include that which the Indian Government hoped as the special and great grievance—namely, the refusal of an offensive and defensive alliance. They resort to an inferior authority, because that inferior authority does give them, among the grievances, that one specially marked. They pass by without any note the authentic statement of the Ameer's grievances. [An hon. MEMBER: Give the page.] Page 206. Why do they resort to the inferior authority and pass by the superior? Listen to the list of grievances made by the inferior authority. He had received no reply to a Paper about some Kalut Chiefs; then the affair of Yakoob Khan, and the arbitration of Seistan. So that, according to the statement of the Ameer's Minister, this great and special grievance of the refusal of the defensive and offensive alliance does not appear in the list at all. According to the intention of the British Government, resorting to inferior authority they obtain that which they wish to bring out. ["Oh, oh!"] What I say is this—I do not suppose that these gentlemen were conscious of what they were about, but that is the observation—that they did give the statement of an inferior authority inaccurately, and pass by the statement of the superior authority; and the statement of the superior authority does not contain that one point that it is material for Her Majesty's Government to make—namely, that the Ameer has a grievance, that being, the refusal of former Viceroys to grant him an offensive and defensive alliance. Well, that is the case. I will mention another point, which is certainly a small one, but goes to prove the reckless carelessness with which the Papers were compiled. On page 170 you will find that owing to the Envoy's increasing ill-health several weeks were occupied in the delivery of his long statement. What a statement, that it occupied several weeks in the delivery! The fact is the statement was begun on the 8th of February, and was closed on the 12th of February, and the official statement says it occupied several weeks. I will pass from this point of minor importance to one which I regard as by no means possessing that character. In that famed despatch of the 10th May, 1877, paragraph 32, there is a long series of charges brought forward against the conduct of the Ameer. You will find in paragraph 33 that Sir Lewis Pelly Demanded from the Envoy an explanation of the reported hostility of the Ameer's language and conduct, at a time when the representative of His Highness was still engaged in friendly and pacific negotiation with the British Government."—[Ibid. p. 170.] You would suppose from that Sir Lewis Pelly had demanded an explanation of the charges which had been laid before the Viceroy, but which we now know were not in the statement of the Ameer at all, and he never had had an opportunity of being heard upon them as they stand in that despatch. Sir Lewis Pelly made a quite different appeal to the Prime Minister of the Ameer and, in fact, only touched upon one of the eight raised in the preceding paragraph of the despatch. Is it tolerable, I ask, that these gross inaccu- racies upon vital parts of the proceedings are to be made the basis of the official case which we are called upon to criticize and answer? That may be the view of the noble Lord; but it is not the view of those who think a judgment in a case of this kind ought to be based upon evidence. In the beginning of paragraph 34 the Envoy replied that— The reports which had reached us of the Ameer's utterances and proceedings were, he trusted, much exaggerated; he feared, nevertheless, that since his own absence from the Cabul Durbar His Highness had fallen under mischievous influences which he himself deplored and condemned; he would lose no time in addressing to the Ameer strong remonstrances on the subject."—[Ibid.] I ask Her Majesty's Government to refer me to an authority for one word of that statement. Where is it? "There is great silence on the opposite Benches," to use a phrase of the noble Lord; but as the noble Lord has doubtless studied these Papers, perhaps he or any other Member of the Government will give me a single passage in support of the statement. Some new Papers were produced yesterday, and in these new Papers there is an appeal made by Sir Lewis Pelly, which does not in the slightest degree correspond with the description of the misconduct alleged by the Viceroy, and there is also the answer of the Ameer's Envoy to the appeal. The Envoy's answer is on pages 12 and 13 of these Papers. I ask you to give me one word out of that answer which supports a single assertion of the Viceroy as to the answer given.

MR. E. STANHOPE

I distinctly challenge the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, and state that in the letter will be found distinct authority for that statement.

MR. GLADSTONE

Read it. ["Order!"]

MR. E. STANHOPE

I will not read it.

MR. GLADSTONE

You will not read it! Oh, yes; but I have seen you ready enough to read—["Order, order!"] Well, I am desirous to know, and hoped references would have been given me to a portion of that letter. Will anyone give me those references? [An hon. MEMBER: No.] No; no one will do that. I have, as the House knows, read to you frankly the statement of the Viceroy which I challenge; and I ask that it may be proved or withdrawn—as, if it can be proved, it establishes a great portion of his case against the Ameer. You produce what you call your authority; and, so far as our best energies go to read and study, there is not one word to support the statement of the Viceroy, and you are not able to refer us to one passage that supports it. The substance of that Paper is that evil rumours are in circulation; that news letters are not to be believed; that he knows nothing of any of those statements; and it is a general protest to the effect that to entertain such statements upon such slight and worthless evidence is contrary to the friendship between States. There is a great regard for Order, and no one will read anything in my speech; but I hope the Gentleman who next rises to speak on behalf of the Government will read again that most important passage from the despatch of the Government of India which I have read, and those most important assertions which it contains, and will show us how those assertions are supported from any Papers now on the Table. I think I have laid something before the House with regard to the reckless negligence with which this Paper has been compiled. I am now going to refer to another Paper, in which the proceedings are in no degree less extraordinary, and that is a very important one, which is attributed to Sir Lewis Pelly, but which appears to be the production of the Indian Government. It is the answer to the statement of the Ameer. I must use the name of Sir Lewis Pelly; but I wish to add I have not a word to say against the accuracy of Sir Lewis Pelly. This was a Paper supplied to him, so far as I can see; and I place no mark of carelessness or of inaccuracy against him. It appears to me this is a genuine production of the Government of India, and it bears the same character of reckless assertion which I have already proved upon the despatch of the 10th of May; and here I may say that if I have not dwelt upon other cases it is not that there are none to dwell upon, but I think I have quoted enough to the House. Now, in this Paper of Sir Lewis Pelly there is a sort of indictment brought against the unfortunate Minister of the Ameer; and I must say, that while the language of Sir Lewis Pelly appears to be usually courteous and kindly, the language of this indictment of which he was the vehicle and the mouthpiece does not deserve such a description. On the contrary, it is discourteous almost to the point of vulgarity. But I will deal with two of the assertions. Two things are said— The British Government has never desired or attempted to re-open the question of appointing a British officer to reside at Cabul."—[Ibid. p. 215.] And yet, though they never attempted to re-open that question, they complain that the Envoy talked about that and nothing else. With regard to the desire not to re-open the question, that is not a very accurate statement. Sir Lewis Pelly's instructions are full of injunctions to re-open the question. It was proposed to bind the Ameer by Treaty to receive an Envoy at Cabul as often as an Envoy was required; but the statement that the Envoy had incessantly discussed this question—which is made a ground of complaint against him—is totally without foundation. The Envoy never discussed it at all. I have read through these long statements with all the care I can; but again I ask Her Majesty's Government to point me to any one sentence of the statement of the Envoy in which he discusses the proposition that a Resident should be sent to remain permanently at Cabul. I believe there is no such passage from beginning to end. But what am I to say of the second accusation made against him? It is this—that while he discussed the question not before him, he carefully and studiously avoided discussing the question that was before him—namely, receiving British officers on the Frontier. I must here quote Sir Lewis Pelly's words— You have carefully avoided all reference to the reception of British officers in other parts of Afghanistan."—[Ibid.] And again— You have left altogether unnoticed the proposals which are the only ones your Excellency is authorized to discuss. That is a very remarkable allegation—that the Envoy had entirely declined to discuss the proposal of the Viceroy, which was that British officers should be placed on the Afghan Frontier. It is totally untrue. [A laugh.] The gallant Admiral (Admiral Edmonstone) laughs. He frequently does laugh. He is an experienced Member of this House, and he is one who opens his mouth oftenest. But perhaps the gallant Admiral has not read these Papers. Perhaps not; but I will give him information which, with his intelligence, he will value. While Sir Lewis Pelly is instructed to say that the Envoy nowhere touched the subject of placing British officers on the Frontier of Afghanistan, there are 11 passages in which he distinctly and expressly discusses this matter. If you are disposed to question my statement—and I think you should question it—I will give you all the passages. You will find them at pages 200, 202, 207, 208—four times over—211, 212, 213—twice over—making 11 in all. Really this is a most extraordinary method of the transaction of public business. The Envoy of the Ameer is arraigned for a kind of insolence—and he is arraigned with something approaching it—in discussing that which he never discussed at all, and in avoiding the discussion of a matter which he frequently discussed. After saying that, I ask the House whether I am justified in challenging the trustworthiness of these official Papers? That despatch of the 10th of May, from which I have quoted such gross misstatements, is the very despatch which receives from Lord Salisbury the cordial approval of Her Majesty's Government, and especially for the "patience and discrimination" with which it handled the subjects to which it referred. I do not know what to suppose about the Members of the Government. I ought to suppose that they have studied this Conference at Peshawur fully. If so, have they discovered these things? If they have not discovered them, why not? And why is Parliament, which has nothing to go upon but this information, produced after two years and a-half, entertained with documents that are absolutely contradicted in most material points by others to which references are made and on which they profess to be founded? So much for the question of the untrustworthiness of the two Papers to which I have referred. It is an extremely irksome and painful process to track all these gross and unpardonable errors. As a rule, we receive with absolute confidence all the statements of fact contained in official Papers laid on the Table of this House. We have had these Papers ten days in our hands, and the labour, therefore, of reading them is great; but it is increased fourfold when we have to watch them at every turn, and track the extraordinary deviations from fact in the statements they contain, and in which I am afraid they too much abound. There has been a great deal said—and no doubt there remains still a great deal to be said—ranging over the whole of these transactions; but I shall not attempt to go over the entire history of the case. It appears to me the case is brought to a head in one portion of it, on which the Government, not unnaturally, perhaps, have hardly touched at all. The Under Secretary of State touched with a very light hand indeed on the Conferences at Peshawur. They are not the most agreeable reading, and they are voluminous and very closely printed; but here we have the whole case brought into a focus. We can there see what is the course of action that has placed us in our present position. It is the abandonment of the old policy and it is the adoption of the new; and the first price we have to pay for this new policy is a war that has now begun. It is a war attended with this remarkable feature—that, as the Duke of Wellington said, a victory was the most woeful thing next to a defeat; so in this war military success will be the most painful and embarrassing next to military disasters, which might shake the whole fabric of the Indian Empire. Now, I want to know by the light—the ample and redundant light—which these Conferences afford, what was the situation of things when Lord Northbrook quitted India? There had been no change in the Indian policy between the accession of the present Government and the departure of Lord Northbrook from India. That was not owing to the present Government. Lord Salisbury, at the earliest period, began to feel the pulse of Lord Northbrook on the subject of a change. The reception of the first overture was not favourable. He devised a more formidable attack. He instructed the Government of India to alter its policy. The Government of India, in the first place, ascertained that some short time would be given; and, having ascertained that, they wrote a despatch, manful and dutiful, but, I think, in bold resistance to the injunctions of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State returned to the charge, and repeated his injunctions. The Indian Government and Lord Northbrook returned to the charge, and repeated their objections, and what I do not mean to call refused in any unbecoming or improper sense, but returned an answer declining, and giving reasons against the injunctions of Lord Salisbury. That is the great epoch. Lord Northbrook then quitted India, a new Viceroy was sent out with new views and new ideas, and what we want is to make an effective comparison of the old and the new. Well, we have the best opportunity of doing that in the Conferences at Peshawur, because the persons are each of them potential, fully authorised and instructed; and because the Papers which were exchanged, and the records which were drawn, give us a most copious account of all that had taken place, but, at the same time, enabling a judgment to be formed. The noble Lord opposite described this old policy with the following epithets. He calls it old. I should have thought that might have been an epithet of praise from the noble Lord. He calls it battered. He calls it beaten. He calls it exploded. He calls it barren, and he calls it useless. Those are the epithets which he applies to the policy of Lord Canning, of Lord Lawrence, of Lord Mayo, of Lord Northbrook, of the other Viceroys of India since the time of the first Afghan War, and of every Government, including his own Government, that have held office in England during these 25 years. That is the description he gives of this policy, I cannot for a moment think of checking the luxuriant imagination of the noble Lord in his choice of epithets; but when the noble Lord, leaving the ground of imagination, passes from adjectives to substantives, and when he deals with matter of fact, I beg leave to contest outright his fundamental propositions, although I fully admit that I have no means of confuting them, except by reference to the Papers which have been produced. The noble Lord says that the Ameer from year to year became more and more anxious for a change in his relations with the British Government, That is the statement of the noble Lord. It is on the ground of a statement like that that he absolves himself from reference to the Book, "He became more and more anxious for a change in his relations with the British Government, and he desired that more vigorous steps should be taken, and that desire he expressed time after time." A change in his relations with the British Government is the cardinal phrase of the statement of the noble Lord. What I say is this—that the change in policy was that undoubtedly the present Government renewed the promise of protection which had been given by Lord Northbrook in a manner substantially the same, but somewhat less cautiously worded. Lord Northbrook, in the words which my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India said he did not understand, described the kind of assistance that he was disposed to give. I have such an opinion of the intellect of my hon. Friend opposite that I know not how to comprehend his words, and I do not understand his not understanding. There never was a plainer passage than that in which Lord Northbrook conveyed his assurance of support to the Ameer.

MR. E. STANHOPE

explained that what he said he could not understand was the telegram of the right hon. Gentleman's Government.

MR. GLADSTONE

I am sorry if I misunderstood my hon. Friend; but I thought I heard him say the explanation was obscure. As to whether he understands the telegram which was not sent to him, it is a matter of very little consequence, because Lord Northbrook understood that telegram. As the Ameer knew nothing about the telegram, but only knew what Lord Northbrook said to him, I do not think we need trouble ourselves with that matter; but I beg pardon of my hon. Friend if I misconstrued him. The difference between the assurance given by Lord Northbrook and the assurance given by Lord Salisbury, as I understand it, is this. Lord Northbrook said—"I affix two conditions. One is that you must not bring the war upon yourself by your aggressive policy; and the other is you must be guided by us in the questions of policy that arise with regard to that war." These were the two conditions he laid down. Lord Salisbury, I think, cut off—certainly did not repeat explicitly—the second condition. I cannot say that was an improvement. It might be that the Ameer might be engaged in a war not brought on by his own aggression, and yet he might have brought it on by such folly and mismanagement that it would be very hard that we should be liable to assist him in it; and, therefore, I cannot say that I think that was an improvement on Lord Northbrook's definition of the conditions. They are the only two he affixed, and they appear to me to have been perfectly just and wise. But, at any rate, in the main I take it the same or nearly the same assurance of protection was given as Lord Salisbury contemplated in the despatch in which he first instructed Lord Lytton. Lord Lytton undoubtedly, and the Government of India, went beyond what Lord Northbrook had promised, and I should have said seemingly beyond what Lord Salisbury had enjoined, but I do not dwell upon that. They promised the Ameer apparently a total identification with his foreign policy. That was not what the Ameer wanted at all. He did not want them to be identified with his foreign policy; and it is quite evident that the reason why he took alarm was that he was afraid of interference with his foreign policy, and through his foreign policy of interference with his independence. But the present Government of India, while granting to the Ameer more than Lord Northbrook had been disposed to grant, annexed to it conditions which were absolutely intolerable, and which, in the view of the Ameer and of his people, in their ultimate operations were fatal to the independence of his country. Why, I will not quote the 11 passages to which I have referred; but I will read a few words from one of them. The Ameer says— In the first place, the people of Afghanistan have a dread of this proposal, and it is firmly fixed in their minds, and deeply rooted in their hearts, that, if Englishmen or other Europeans once set foot in their country, it will sooner or later pass out of their hands. In no way can they be re-assured on this point, and it is impossible to remove these opinions from their minds, for they adduce many proofs in support of them, the mention of which now would greatly prolong this discussion."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 208.] He speaks of it there with regard to the reception of these officers generally; in almost all the 11 passages he refers especially, and in terms, to their residence upon the Frontier, and urges against them, in a great variety of forms of expression, the very same objection that I have read. Well, now, the case of Her Majesty's Government is this—that the old policy was worn out; that it was necessary to have a new one; that the results were unsatisfactory to both parties—unsatisfactory to the Indian Government, and unsatisfactory to the Ameer; and, as I have quoted from the noble Lord, the Ameer from time to time, and from year to year, more and more pressed for a change in the policy of Her Majesty's Government. I have promised to confine myself to the Conferences at Peshawur in a great degree, and consequently I will not quote the declaration of Sir Richard Pollock, which referred to a date early in 1874, and which was founded upon information confidentially obtained about the sentiments of the Ameer. It will be remembered that the effect of that declaration was, that there was no unfavourable change whatever in the sentiments of the Ameer. But I will take the evidence which I suppose is the strongest in the case. It is said that the Indian Government of that day on the one side, and the Ameer and his Government on the other side, were fundamentally dissatisfied with the relations which subsisted, and that, consequently, there arose the necessity for a change. I will contradict that statement by the most distinct evidence that can be conceived on the part of the Government of that day, and likewise on the part of the Ameer. I will take first the Indian Government of that day. In January, 1875, these are the words of Lord Northbrook— This being so, and if we have formed a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Ameer towards the British Government, the main objects of the policy which was advocated by Lord Canning in the time of Dost Mahomed—which was renewed by Lord Lawrence on the first favourable opportunity that occurred after the death of Dost Mahomed—which was ratified by Lord Mayo at the Umballa Conferences—and which we have since steadily pursued—are secured. We have established friendly relations with Afghanistan: that country is stronger than it has ever been since the days of Dost Mahomed, and our influence is sufficient to prevent the Ameer from aggression upon his neighbours. It is to be regretted that old animosities and other causes have hitherto prevented the establishment of true intercourse between European British subjects and Afghanistan, and the location of British Agents in that country. But we believe that these things will naturally follow in course of time when our motives are better understood."—[Ibid. p. 134.] There is the difference clearly brought to issue. The Government assert that the object of our policy had not been attained; but the Government of India of that day, who were the paramount authority at the time, give it as their opinion that it had been obtained—at least in substance. And the Paper from which I have quoted was signed by Lord Napier of Magdala, in whose case the charge relied upon by hon. Gentlemen opposite has reference not, I apprehend, to the question of policy generally, but to the occupation of Quetta. The two Governments are, in fact, directly at issue with one another. The present Government, on the 10th of May, 1877, say— It is impossible to deny that the practical result of the Afghan policy, patiently pursued by us for several years, were far from satisfactory."—[Ibid. 165.] Now, that is a statement which is perfectly at variance with the passage which I have just quoted from the despatch of the Indian Government of Lord Northbrook. I have shown that the two Governments were entirely at issue; while Lord Northbrook, at least, completely contradicts the view of the noble Lord opposite with respect to the temper of the Ameer. And what was the temper of the Ameer? I will state it in the shortest possible form, in order to save the time of the House. It is a matter so important, however, as it comes out of the Conferences at Peshawur—since it entirely destroys the case of the Government with regard to his discontent and dissatisfaction—that I must trouble the House for a few moments with the evidence. The Cabul Envoy, in his interview with Dr. Bellew, says— The Ameer and his people thoroughly appreciated the friendship of the British Government."—[Ibid. p. 202.] On the 10th February the Envoy says to Sir Lewis Pelly— That very arrangement and agreement at Umballa is sufficient, so long as from the side of Her Most Gracious Majesty, the great Queen of England, the foundation of friendship shall remain intact and stable."—[Ibid. p. 205.] How does he go on? You will find him saying at page 206— Therefore, till the time of the departure of Lord Northbrook, the previous course continued to be observed. Again— Lord Northbrook left the friendship without change, in conformity with the conduct of his predecessors, and in conformity with the preceding usage."—[Ibid. p. 208.] What does the noble Lord now think about his representation of the Ameer being from year to year in a state of greater excitement, becoming more and more dissatisfied with his relations with the British Government, and demanding a change? What says the noble Lord to this? The declaration of the noble Lord is, that it was the desire of the Ameer that a great change should take place in his relations with the British Government. The exact reverse was the case. His wish was—"That the usual friendship should remain firm upon the former footing." Then, says the noble Lord, the Ameer was in a state of great alarm about Russia. No such thing. For the Envoy, speaking of Russia, declares, after referring to the communications made to him in consequence of the understanding between the late Government and Russia, that Lord Northbrook had thoroughly reassured him. Well, how did the Envoy sum up all this; because recollect that these alleged disturbances in the Ameer's mind are the only foundation for that change of policy of which we have heard so much. The Envoy says— Therefore the authorities of the Government of Afghanistan have the most perfect confidence that there can be no deviation from the tenor of these writings "—the writing's he had received from Lord Canning, Sir John Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook—"which have been briefly mentioned, in respect to the peace and tranquillity and lasting friendship of the States, in accordance with the reply of His Highness the Ameer to the letter of Lord Northbrook of the 6th September 1873. If there should be a want of confidence in the substance of these successive writings approved by Governments, or the probability of a causeless want of confidence in them becoming a reason for displeasure to the Governments, what propriety is there in this?"—[Ibid. p. 202.] Then, further on in the same page the Ameer says— The Ameer is, with sincerity of purpose, in accord with his Excellency the Viceroy, in accordance with those communications and the former course. And, as to according his Excellency the Viceroy a 'means,' I beg to say that no better means exist than those of the past, which formerly, in the time of perplexity, and subsequently up to the present time, have produced sincerity and good deeds from time to time. Here we have a flat contradiction of the description which has been given us by the noble Lord. The Envoy winds up with a final appeal to the Viceroy and the Government of India, and with the expression of an earnest hope for the welfare of the two Governments, and That his Excellency, through your good offices, will, with great frankness and sincerity of purpose, act in conformity with the course of past Viceroys, and that by means of his own good acts the relations of friendship and unity may be increased."—[Ibid. p. 213.] Note the words—"By his acting in conformity with the course of past Viceroys." What, then, becomes of the main allegation of the noble Lord? We have two parties in relation to one another—the Government of India and the Ameer's Government. The present Government of India say, in substance, that they felt that their relations with Afghanistan had become unsatisfactory. The past Government of India declare that to them those relations did not appear unsatisfactory; and, on the other side, the Government of the Ameer, on whose supposed dissatisfaction Her Majesty's Ministers build their case, in every one of these citations which I have made simply appeals to Lord Lytton to let them alone and to act upon the relations which already existed, merely improving them; but, whatever was done, not to insist, above all, in making that most perilous and fatal proposition for the admission of British Residents into their country. That evidence as to the state of the case up to 1876 is complete. It does not leave a gap, a rift of any kind, for the suggestion of a defect. I know there were certain subjects of dissatisfaction in the Ameer's mind; but the Envoy is careful to make it understood that, whatever be these subjects of dissatisfaction, they are collateral to the main issue, and you have heard his own word in which he again and again beseeches and entreats the Representatives of the Government to let present relations subsist. The Prime Minister of the Ameer within four days of death said he wished to put a meeting off, and it was said it was evident he was trying to gain time. The poor man was trying to gain time. Death had laid his hands upon him in four days after that kind suggestion was made. The Ameer wished to send another Envoy. The former Envoy had found that you were immovable and inflexible. You knew that you had superior power. You knew that you were secure from the scrutiny and criticism of Parliament. You knew that no criticism could be directed against you; and I do not hesitate to say that if these Papers as to the Conference at Peshawur tad been laid on the Table within a short time of that Conference you would have had no Afghan War. The iron hand of necessity was on the Ameer; and after all he had said about the prospect of danger to his country and its independence, still he knew that he could lean only on England, and he clung to that hope with a kind of desperate fidelity and tenacity. He was prepared to send a new Envoy, and, when driven to the last extremity, to concede all you demanded and to run the risks and danger of internal disturbances, which he had described to you in such just and pathetic and such moving terms. But he was not permitted to send a new Envoy to a new Conference. The Viceroy believed that concessions would be made; but he would not allow them to be made, because the Ameer was not eager enough to make them. A strong Power—the strongest in the world—dealing with almost the weakest in the world, forced that weak Power to concessions, which it shows in 11 pleas for another Conference meant its future ruin; and when they express their readiness to make those concessions you refuse them the opportunity, because they have not shown eagerness enough to give in to those terms which they believe in the long run would ultimately destroy their country. These things are hardly credible, and if they had not been known they could not have been believed. You find the Ameer satisfied in the main, though dissatisfied on minor points with his relations with you, and he begs you for God's sake not to disturb and tamper him. How did you leave him? Did you leave him as you had found him? No; you entered upon a discussion of Treaties with him. I have sometimes heard the "faith of Treaties" and the "sacredness of national engagements" talked about from the Bench opposite. But what was the mode of action that was adopted? We had certain engagements with the Ameer, and we proposed to give him our opinions about those engagements. What was the first communication made to him by Sir Lewis Pelly? He actually went to the length of using these words— The only obligations ever contracted between the British Government and the Barakzai Rulers of Afghanistan are embodied in two Treaties, of which the first was signed in 1855 and the second in 1857. The second of these two Treaties was contracted for a special and limited purpose, and with exclusive reference to an occasion which has long since passed away. This second Treaty, therefore, belongs to the class of Treaties known as transitory Treaties; and on both sides the obligations contracted by it have lapsed, as a matter of course, with the lapse of time."—[Ibid. p. 216.] In the first place, I conceive that that statement is an untrue statement. The Article in question—the second Treaty—has not lapsed, for there is no time fixed at which the obligation under that Article is to lapse. But that is not the point to which I wish to call the attention of the House. It is this—The declaration of Sir Lewis Pelly on the part of the Government as it affects the only two Treaties ever contracted by the British Government and the Rulers of Afghanistan. Lord Mayo had said that he would view with the utmost displeasure the acts of those who might try to disturb Afghanistan. Lord Northbrook had embodied his declaration in writing, and sent it to the Ameer, to the effect that he would assist the Ameer against unjust aggression. The present Government of India, representing the gentlemen who are eloquent on the subject of the faith of Treaties, informed the Envoy of the Ameer that the engagements of 1855 and 1857 constituted the only obligations of the British Government towards him, and that the promises of Lord Mayo and Lord North-brook were cast away to the winds. I think that the minds of the Gentlemen opposite, if I may say so without offence, ought to be sensitive on that subject—a little more sensitive than they are. Those obligations of Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook were extinguished by implication, and I am now showing that they are expressly extinguished by the declaration of Sir Lewis Pelly. He referred to the writing on which he depended, and to which he said nothing beyond could with advantage be added. There is a statement that protection would be given to the Ameer if his inclinations wore in accordance with those of the British Government. On page 219 you will read as follows:— But His Highness has evinced no such desire; and it is absurd to assume that, because the British Government would have viewed with severe displeasure in 1869 any attempt to disturb the throne of a loyal and trusted ally, it is, therefore, bound in 1877 to protect, from dangers incurred regardless of its advice, the damaged power of a mistrustful and estranged neighbour. The declaration of Lord Mayo is, therefore, distinctly annihilated. He then proceeds lower down the page to deal with Lord Northbrook's promise as he has already dealt with Lord Mayo's promise. Lord Northbrook declined to give the Ameer the Treaty which His Highness asked for. And therefore, as in the previous case at Umballa in 1869, it is clear that any subsequent verbal assurances given by Lord Northbrook to the Envoy were not intended to commit, and could not possibly commit, the British Government to any of those liabilities which it would have contracted on behalf of the Ameer had the Viceroy felt able to comply with the request of His Highness by signing with him a Treaty of Alliance. What is the meaning of that sentence? It is this—"Beware of certain obligations contracted towards you by Lord Northbrook as there have been by Lord Mayo in 1869. You have declined to go into a Treaty of Alliance which the Viceroy has offered to you; and as you have declined to go into it, it is absurd to suppose that the British Government now stands by any promise which it then made." That annihilated the protection which the British Government had held out over the Ameer, and leaves him entirely exposed to every blast of adversity. That is the condition of the Ameer at the close of this Conference, but that was not all. You closed the Conference; you shut the door in his face; you stripped him of the protection which had formerly been granted to him; you denied that the promise of Lords Mayo and Northbrook remained in force. But that was not all—you adopted other measures of hostility towards him—you occupied Quetta. The answer of the noble Lord to that is, that you occupied it in accordance with Treaty right. True; but suppose France occupied Belgium in conformity with Treaty rights, how would that satisfy us? In former days the great confidence of the Afghans always lay in the fact that the great Power lay outside the Khyber and the Bolan Passes. Was it nothing, then, to occupy Quetta, and was it not likely to prove a grievance with the Ameer? At page 242 of the Afghan Papers there is a reference which uses these words:—"He reiterated his Quetta grievances," showing that they had been a usual subject of discussion. But it was not Quetta alone. You had built a bridge across the Indus and amassed your troops in a way that must have conveyed to the mind of the Ameer very great alarm. Whether the object of that military occupation was to attack Afghanistan or somebody else beyond it is not necessary for me to inquire. It was not very pleasant for the Roumanians when the Emperor of Russia had to attack Turkey on the other side of their territory; and the Ameer must have viewed with dread your military preparations on the Indus. You had encouraged the Maharajah of Cashmere to move troops towards his Frontier, and were, by a variety of measures, doing everything in your power to increase his sense of destitution and weakness. When you had reduced him to that feeling, in what condition did he stand? Was he still to maintain the same attitude towards Russia as he was glad to do when he had your promises of support? And now occurred the great offence of the Ameer. He received a Mission from Russia; but he did so only when you had annihilated your promises of support; when you had withdrawn from him your Native Agents, and left him without the slightest token of amity remaining; and now, last of all, and, perhaps, least credible of all, you have treated this reception of the Russian Mission as an offence, and have visited it with the penalty of war. For if this Proclamation is intelligible at all, it has this meaning—that at a time when you have accepted the pretexts of the Russian Government, you have made war upon the Ameer for accepting the Russian Mission. They are thin, transparent allegations. Well, Sir, there may be those whose knowledge is wider than mine; but I will say this—that the Ameer did not voluntarily accept this Russian Mission. It was an unwilling reception on his part. You turn round upon him now and say he accepted it with much pomp and display. But I have not been able to find this in the Papers. That is one of the conveniences of not referring to the Papers. The Central Asia Papers last presented to us show this—that the Russians forced their Mission upon the Ameer; but the Russians knew how to go about it, and, in consequence of this, although they sent an urgent and imperative demand, they sent that demand beforehand. We also sent an urgent and imperative demand; but then, instead of waiting to let the Ameer have time to settle that matter with his own subordinate agents, we sent an Envoy on the heels of our demand, and, in consequence, he was met by the subordinate agents saying to him—"We have had no instructions, and have, therefore, no authority to let you pass." And that you call an insult. It is no insult; it is merely a consequence of the grossest blundering. What does the Ameer say? Major Cavagnari says, on the 16th of June, 1878— The Ameer desires that Afghanistan may remain independent, and that there should be no Envoys of a different religion to Mahom-medanism in his kingdom."—[Central Asia (No. 1), p. 139.] We are supplied with a document of the 5th of June, 1878, that tells us the Ameer's first impulse was to send a Mission to Tashkend to deprecate the Russian Mission; but before he did this, we are told, A letter was received by him from Kauffman, corroborating the Agent's statement, and adding that the Envoy must be received by the Ameer at Cabul, as he had been sent by the express commands of the Emperor."—[Ibid. 140.] Now, Sir, the Russians sent an absolute command to the Ameer; but, being men of business, they sent that command to him without sending the Mission on its heels, and thus they enabled the Ameer to take his decision without shaming himself in the face of his own servants. But you send your demand with your Mission close behind it, before he has time for consideration; and the consequence is it is stopped, not by the act of the Ameer, as you most unjustly accuse him, but by the act of his subordinates, who could not let it pass without authority. Such are the circumstances in which, the Ameer received the Russian Mission. But what have been our transactions in Russia? The India Office appears to avow a good deal more courage than the Foreign Office. It suggests, on the 8th of August, The adoption of such language at St. Petersburgh as may be best calculated to bring about a result such as the engagements of Russia entitle us to expect."—[Ibid. 143.] So Lord Salisbury writes to Mr. Plunkett— Should it prove that there is any truth in the statement that a Russian Mission has proceeded to Cabul, you will express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that it may be -at once withdrawn, as being inconsistent with the assurances so frequently received from his Highness."—[Ibid. 150.] And then M. de Giers writes to Mr. Plunkett that the Mission is of a provisional nature, and one of simple courtesy; it cannot, therefore, interfere in any way with the pacific assurances which you mention."—[Ibid. 164.] But Lord Salisbury did not ask whether it was a Mission of a merely courteous and provisional character; he asked whether there was a Mission at all, and, if there was, he asked that it might be withdrawn. And the answer is—"We have got a Mission, but we think fit to call it a Mission of courtesy and of a provisional character." But I should like to know who is to draw the distinction? If there was such a distinction at all, it should have been embodied in Lord Salisbury's letter, and directions should have been given to ascertain of what character it really was. The Russians refuse to withdraw the Mission, and say it is within the understanding with our Government. Her Majesty's Government have committed themselves to that. But I venture to say that it is not within the understanding, and I think I have some right to speak upon this matter. The understanding was, that Russia should exercise no influence in Afghanistan, and the sending of a Russian Mission to Cabul was an exercise of Russian influence. Russia justified her military measures by the disturbed state of relations with her which you had created. Why did not she justify on the same ground, her Mission to Cabul? Why, if she had done so, the Mission to Cabul must have passed away at once, and it could never have been renewed. But she put it upon a new ground, as to which she may have obtained information beforehand, that you were prepared to admit it. And, therefore, Russia has got now, by the allowance of the Government opposite, and for the first time and in complete derogation of the communications with Lord Clarendon and Lord Granville, a title to send what she may think fit to call a Mission of courtesy and of a provisional character to Cabul as often as she pleases. That is the humiliation to which you have subjected yourselves by first making a demand and then tamely submitting to the rejection of it. And, now, how are the facts? Has the Mission come back? It is of no avail whether the Envoy has come back. You have established and allowed a title which may be renewed at the pleasure of the Russian Government. But we do not even know that the Mission has come back. It may be there at this moment, while you are making war against the Ameer. I do not like to appeal to national pride; but I think it requires a very small share of national pride to feel sentiments of very strong aversion to a tame submissal to Russia, while at the same time you are making glorification of marching your legions to Cabul. My hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) referred last night to vicarious punishment, and he did so with considerable justice. You have a ground of complaint against Russia, and you make war on the Ameer; and, having made war on the Ameer, you are going to exact compensation from the Border Tribes. The policy of Her Majesty's Government has been to make war upon the innocent for the faults of the guilty. First, the Ameer must be punished for the offence of Russia, and then the Frontier tribes must suffer for the vicarious faults of the Ameer. I do not know whether the House is aware of it, but I have here a curious document. It is a Treaty with the King and the Chiefs of Old Calabar and Duke Town, made by the Representative of Her Majesty, Mr. David Hopkin. The names of the Chiefs I need not attempt to read. The substance of the Treaty is this—"That the undersigned King and Chiefs of Duke Town, Old Calabar, undertake to forbid the old practice of inflicting punishment upon the innocent in room of the guilty in the whole regions of Old Calabar." The Government will not object to this reference. The noble Lord has declared, in language which must recommend itself to all the Liberals in the House, that we should always be ready to change our ideas and our measures, and to re- ceive instruction from all sources. Do not let Her Majesty's Government, then, be ashamed to take a lesson from Old Calabar. Let them put an end to this system of making the innocent suffer for the guilty. If the Ameer has offended you—justly offended you—do not visit his sins upon the Frontier tribes; and if Russia has broken her engagements with you, do not visit the punishment of the breach of engagement upon the Ameer. I have now touched upon nearly all the points to which I need refer. The House has done me great kindness in listening to me for so long; but this question has an enormous range, and it requires time to deal with it. You have proceeded, as I have already stated, to make the reception by the Ameer of the Russian Mission a cardinal ground of offence and of aggression upon him at a time when you left him no other option whatever, and at a time when he was ready to endanger his own independence as a Sovereign for the sake of pleasing you. When you sent your Mission you received Reports from your own Vakeel on the 17th and 18th of September which should have led you to pause before you pressed its reception upon the Ameer. The Vakeel was a man you trusted; you had no other Agent; there was no other person to whom you could refer; and your own Agent, as reported by Sir Neville Chamberlain, advises you to postpone the project. He says the Mission should be held in abeyance, otherwise some harm will ensue. On the 18th you sent that to which no Member or Representative of Her Majesty's Government, so far at least as I know, has supplied the slightest answer. On the 18th September Sir Neville Chamberlain telegraphs another message— Another letter received from Nawab Gholam Hasan Khan after an interview with Wazir Shah Muhammad, who assured Nawab, on his oath, that the Ameer intimated that he would send for the Mission in order to clear up mutual misunderstandings, provided there was no attempt to force this Mission upon him without his consent being first granted according to usual custom; otherwise he would resist it, as coming in such a manner would he a slight to him."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 242.] What had the poor man done? He had lost the advantage of all your promises, and he had seen your hostile preparations at Quetta and elsewhere, and he had even been ready to endanger the internal tranquillity of his country for the sake of meeting your views, and was now ready to receive your Mission, if you would only send it in such a way as to preserve his honour, his self-respect, and his dignity in the face of his Asiatic subjects. But then we are to be told that this poor quarrel did not turn upon the rights or wrongs of the Ameer, but upon the supposed necessity for the creation of a scientific Frontier. Before Lord Mayor's Day the whole world was filled with idle rumours and with newspaper tales; but on that day, when Ministers were to unbosom themselves, all these foul vapours were to be dispersed by the rising sun. But what the rising sun did was to show us the necessity there was for our having a scientific Frontier in India. I am really loath to dwell upon the historical aspect of these extraordinary transactions. We are now at war; our gallant Forces are engaged in mortal strife. You have made this war in concealment from Parliament; in reversal of the policy of every Indian and Home Government that has existed for the last 25 years; in contempt of the supplication of the Ameer, through his Minister, that you would let things alone; in determined refusal to hear a new Commissioner, when the Commissioner he sent to Peshawur was dead; in opposition to the views of your own Vakeel at the moment when he told you that the Ameer, if his sense of honour and self-respect were spared, and the men were withdrawn, would grant you a Mission; at the time when you had accepted the Russian Treaty; at this time you declared that you wanted a scientific Frontier. Such are the extraordinary circumstances in which you are placed. And it is impossible to refrain from the recollection that an Afghan War is no new war. We made war in error upon Afghanistan in 1838. To err is human and pardonable. But we have erred a second time on the same ground, and with no better justification. That may also be human; and if, as such, it be pardonable, it is certainly, to say the least, lamentable, and repeated error is a grief. This error has been repeated in the face of every warning conceivable and imaginable, and in the face of an unequalled mass of authorities, and in the face of your own Agent on the spot. It is proverbially said that history repeats itself; and certainly the repetition is in some cases singular and touching. There has rarely been an occasion in which there has been a nearer approach to identity than in the case of the present and the former wars. We have plunged into war upon the same ground, to act against the same people, and to fight against the son of the same man whom we previously fought against. There is still many a living being in Afghanistan whose memory bleeds at the recollection of the horrors we carried into their country and which we ourselves endured not yet 40 years ago, and yet all this is to be done over again. May Heaven avert the omen which may next suggest itself! May Heaven avert that catastrophe which befel our Army in 1841, and that sanguinary massacre which followed upon that catastrophe! But Her Majesty's Government must surely feel that the terrible calamities of those four years could not pass away without leaving upon the minds of the people of Afghanistan most painful traces. How is it possible they could look with favour, except as the result of the long-continuance of kindly relations, upon the people who had invaded them without cause, and had suffered and made them suffer so profoundly as the consequence of that invasion? However, it so happened that after 1842, and after the successful march of Pollock and the operations of Nott, 25 years of wise and cautious and far-seeing government prevailed, both in England and in India, and every effort was made to efface these painful memories, and to lay the foundation of a lasting concord. I remember a beautiful description of one of our modern Poets of a great battle-field during the Punic Wars, in which he observed— Wherefore a moment Nature was laid waste, and nothing but the tokens of carnage were left upon the ground; but day by day and hour by hour she, returning to her kindly task, removed one by one, and put out of sight these hideous tokens, and restored the scene to order, beauty, and peace. It was a crisis like this that the Viceroys of this country were running through, and the Governments of this country, irrespective of Party, supported these Viceroys. I now ask, is all this to be undone? The sword is drawn; the bloody hand is to be manifested again, and is already manifested, in that unhappy country. The struggle may, per- haps, be short. God grant that it may be short! God grant that it may not be sharp! But you, having once entered upon it, cannot tell whether it will be short or long. You cannot tell what will be its limits. You have again brought in devastation and again created a necessity which, I hope, will be met by other men, with other minds, in happier days; that other Viceroys and other Governments, but other Viceroys especially—such men as Canning, Lawrence, Mayo, and Northbrook—will undo this evil work in which you are now engaged. It cannot be undone in a moment, although the torch of a madman may burn down an edifice which it has taken the genius, the skill, the labour, and the lavish prodigality of ages to erect. As I have said, it cannot be undone in a moment. The best way we can act is to look for the re-instatement of that pacifying and mitigating process which will ultimately, though remotely, result in success. In the meantime, I should have some hope of this Division, if I really believed that many hon. Members of this House had made themselves individually masters of the case which is disclosed in the deep recesses of those two volumes of Parliamentary Papers. They have not done and cannot do this, and, therefore, this vote will go as other votes have gone. You will obtain the warrant of Parliament and the triumph of military success for the moment. That military success has not been quite so unchecked up to the present; but it has in substance corresponded to that which led us on in 1838, and blinded us to the perilous nature of the step which we were taking. Be that as it may, however, you will probably obtain sanction and the warrant which you seek. The responsibility which is now yours alone will be shared with you by the majority of this House. Many will decline to share it. Many will hope in the ultimate disapproval and reversal of your course by the nation; but even if the nation should refuse, and should indeed bow in submission to the tribunal of ultimate appeal, they will still feel they have discharged their duty in this critical moment—a duty absolutely incumbent on them, as they believe, if they are right in thinking that truth and justice are the only sure foundation of international relations, and that there is no possession either for peoples or for men so precious as a just and honourable name.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

I feel, Sir, that I rise at an immense disadvantage in following the right hon. Gentleman; and I must, therefore, ask the indulgence of the House while I refer to some subjects which he has mentioned, and some, perhaps, to which he has not alluded. I cannot but give my admiration and entire concurrence to the concluding sentences of his speech; for I should be one of the last men in this House who would wish to see this country engaged in an unjust and unnecessary war. But while I admire that passage in the speech of my right hon. Friend, I cannot help saying that I thought the first part of his speech was marked by a very narrow and bitter spirit. I fail to see why a man of his eminence should have thought it necessary to enter into a close and narrow verbal criticism which, surely, does not constitute the point at issue. I was also surprised to hear the right hon. Gentleman object to the observation of the noble Lord who commenced the debate this evening, that "we shall continue our hostility until we have received the due submission of our enemy." The views of the noble Lord are those of a majority of this House, and are shared, I believe, by a very large section of the public, both at home and in India; and I cannot, therefore, understand anyone, in face of the fact of such a policy being approved, expressing a hope that our Forces should turn back until the object with which they were put into the field had been attained. Again, the right hon. Gentleman was rather hard upon the noble Lord when he charged him with having made statements that could not be verified by the Books and which had no shred of truth. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Proof.] Well, proof. Then, again, he charged the Government with having saluted the country with 500 pages of information, and then asked the House, at a short notice, to give an opinion upon that information so afforded. But the right hon. Gentleman has spoken often enough on this subject in the country, and has, in language sufficiently strong to satisfy anybody, attacked the policy and the conduct of the Government without having in his possession a single one of those 500 pages. We know perfectly well that he has been making his case without sufficient facts to support his statements and arguments; and it is, therefore, rather hard for the right hon. Gentleman to come down here now to charge the Government with reckless negligence and gross mis-statements in the course of these Papers.

MR. GLADSTONE

I do not wish to be misunderstood. I have only made the charges this evening against two documents.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

It is quite true that the charges have this evening only been made against two documents; but in the country he has charged the whole Government with reckless and gross misconduct and mis-management. [Mr. GLADSTONE: No.] But I say yes; and I intend to prove it. The right hon. Gentleman says there has been a broken statute; but he defers his proof of his statement to another day. I, however, do not propose to let that statement alone. I am going to call attention, not only to what the right hon. Gentleman has said in this House, but to speeches which he has made beyond its walls—speeches which ought, in my opinion, to be brought to the bar of public opinion by means of the debates which proceed in this House. Before proceeding with this branch of my subject, let me say, in reference to the speech of the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread), who raised this debate, that I never heard a mass of Parliamentary Papers handled with more precision and accuracy by a Member occupying a seat on a back Bench than was shown by the hon. Gentleman. He based upon his quotations and references some rather sweeping charges against the Government; and the House will agree with me that there never was a time when more sweeping invective was applied to an Executive Government than has been used within the last three months. As I have said, the hon. Member for Bedford used some rather strong expressions; but they were the very milk of human kindness compared with what we have been lately accustomed to; it is like sucking painted lollypops, after the expressions we have so recently heard out-of-doors—expressions the consideration of which ought not to be postponed, but at once proceeded with. Once so brought forward, it is easy to show the country how little foundation there is for the charges, except in the fever by which they were engendered. On another point, also, I must give credit to the hon. Member for Bedford for the way he advocated the case of Lord Lawrence. He has tried to make out as good a case, perhaps, as could be made out for the Blundering and impotent policy of Lord Lawrence. ["Oh!"] That it was blundering and impotent I can prove from documents laid on the Table of the House. Lord Lawrence has taken a very active part in this matter; therefore, I am desirous to refer to him for a few minutes. He is an ex-Viceroy of India, and the confidence and the favours of the Sovereign have been heaped upon him. He is at this moment the head of the Ameer's Afghan Committee in London. It is the same Lord Lawrence whose epistolary indiscretions have astonished the town; and it is he to whom, not through any Party feeling, the public opinion of the country, through the papers and correspondents, points as one of the principal authors of the mischief and troubles in which we are now placed. ["Oh!"] That may be contested; but I shall prove it. I take the opinion of one of the best of the men who have written on this subject—Sir Henry Rawlinson. I look upon Sir Henry Rawlinson as a most impartial witness. [A laugh.] The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) laughs at that; but no one can doubt that Sir Henry Rawlinson, from his long experience in matters affecting Eastern interests, is fully capable of giving an opinion on such a question. Well, he says our troubles commenced with the hesitation of Lord Lawrence in recognizing the Ameer Shere Ali as the rightful Ruler of Cabul after the death of Dost Mahomed; and if the noble Marquess questions the accuracy of Sir Henry Rawlinson, I must refer him to the Duke of Argyll, who, in a letter published in the newspapers, also admits the troubles with Afghanistan have been owing to the period while he was in the Gladstone Administration. After finding that repeated over and over again in the papers, I was surprised to hear the hon. Member make this audacious statement. The hon. Member said—"The front of the offence was Lord Salisbury's letters in 1875, and to him must be attributed the cause of the present war." I have been in Parliament a good many years, and heard a great many statements and hostile remarks against the policy of Members of different Governments; but I do not think that I ever heard a more unfair or ungenerous statement in attacking a Government than to assert publicly that the cause of this war is due to Lord Salisbury. I was anxious to bring the point before the House, in order to show that the Papers cannot sustain that view of the hon. Member for Bedford. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich says he has listened to everything in the course of this debate, and has read all the Papers. I have also listened to the debate, and have read the Papers with as much ability as I can bring to bear upon them; but I must say that after all the explanations and declamations against the Government, I fail to recognize or to accept the full weight and burden of the indictment which has been so freely levelled not only against the Executive of this country, but against Parliament itself which has supported the Executive; and, indeed, one of the accusations of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich is that Parliament having supported the Government, that Parliament ought to be got rid of. I am anxious, however, to express my feeling—which, I believe, is shared by a great many hon. Gentlemen in this House as well as in the country—and that is a feeling of anxiety and concern as regards these affairs that are going on in the North-Western Frontier of India. It is an anxiety which arises, not from any mistrust as to the result of the military operations in the difficult Passes and mountain fastnesses which separate Afghanistan from our Indian Empire. I hope—and I am sure I am expressing sentiments which everyone will share—that the arms of England, under God's Providence, will be completely successful in the work in which they are engaged. We trust that the gallant little army—not "our legions;" the right hon. Gentleman says we are pouring our legions into Afghanistan; there is an army of 30,000, not one-half of them within the Ameer's territory at present—will rival and emulate the heroic valour and discipline of the British arms, which have on every field shone conspicuous. Even at this moment we have proof of that in the successful strategic achievement of General Roberts and his comrades. No one can doubt or mistrust the success of this expedition; but I share the opinion expressed to-night by the right hon. Gentleman. I see dangers that may arise from the very success and the victories which we may achieve. I think nothing has been more truly said than that our difficulties will arise with the anxieties and troubles of the diplomatic negotiations which must ensue not only in dealing with the Ameer of Afghanistan, but probably, and most certainly, with an enemy concealed behind the Ameer's back, who has had, no doubt, a great hand in these troubles. It is because I share the anxieties of both sides of the House in this respect that I am glad the suggestion of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington), on the first night of the Session, did not find acceptance. I am glad that the Motion of the hon. Member for Bedford has given this House an opportunity of stating its opinion frankly and fully before Christmas. We shall now know fully the views entertained upon this most serious and grave question. No doubt the object, in a Party sense, is to pass a Vote of Censure upon the Cabinet; and if the hon. Member succeeded there would, probably, not only be a change of Government, but, what is far worse, a change of policy also. The right hon. Gentleman has said a good deal to-night, in answer to the noble Lord (Lord John Manners), about the old way and the new way, and I think he has put a very unfair construction on the object which the noble Lord had in view when he made that remark; but certainly I should be very much surprised if, after the vehemence of the right hon. Gentleman, the suggestion of the noble Marquess had been allowed, that we should say nothing. It is important to bear in mind the sudden change of front made by the Opposition. Let us recollect the first night of the Session. Earl Granville said—["Order!"]—perhaps you will repudiate it—["No!"]—Lord Granville said—

Mr. SPEAKER

Order, order!

SIR ROBERT PEEL

It was observed by Lord Granville the other night—["Order!"]—I think, Sir, I am in Order in referring to this? Well, Lord Granville was understood to say that it was almost impossible to move any Amend- ment expressing any definite opinion upon the action of the Ministers. In this House, the same night, the noble Marquess went a great deal further. He was most emphatic. On the first night he said—"The Papers are so voluminous, and the matter is so new and requires such careful consideration, that no hon. Member would be justified in calling attention to this grave question and pronouncing a final opinion on the conduct pursued by Her Majesty's Government." A great change, then, has come over hon. Members. I have referred to strong language. The hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) used some strong language. He was very angry with the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) for making the suggestions he submitted on the first night of the Session, when so many hon. Members were ready to rush into the fray. The right hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. Goschen) made use of an expression also bearing upon the policy of the Government, and said that the Government had intentionally kept back the Papers. I must say that, in my opinion, if ever there was a Government which has been lavish not only in the information it gave, but in the anxiety and desire it has shown to communicate it, it is the present Government. Why, the House has had a Book of 500 pages got ready for its use in the course of a few days. Then there is the junior Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain), who is not satisfied with the statements of anyone. The hon. Gentleman will excuse me for saying so; but he has not had much experience in this House, and he is always ready to bring forward his patent medicines for remedies. "Chamberlain's plans" are so constantly brought forward in the Midland Counties that I am quite sick of them. Then there is the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett), who, of course, cannot sit still, though I must say that the hon. Member's knowledge of Indian affairs always commands the respect of the House, and although many lion. Members do not share his opinions they are sure to catch the attention of the House. This change of front on the part of the Opposition is very curious. Here we have seven or eight malcontents—what a hideous chorus of malcontents from every Liberal point of the political compass—all finding fault with the noble Marquess for what he has done, with the policy and wishes of Lord Granville expressed in "another place," and with the policy of the Government. From whence comes this change of front? It is quite clear that the fever heat, the virulent spirit, and the active mind of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, is the cause of it. The Motion of the hon. Member for Bedford is a Vote of Censure and Want of Confidence. That is the broad issue; but the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich calls it a "narrow issue." There must be a difference even in the mind of the right hon. Gentleman between broad and narrow. It is quite clear from what we have heard to-night that if he did not want to turn out the Government, he wanted a change of policy in the affairs of India, and to bring back those who in his Administration had been the cause of the war. I think that the difficulties which have arisen have been occasioned by the policy of the Gladstone Administration; and that the stain to which the right hon. Gentleman eloquently alluded in his concluding remarks, notwithstanding all the apologies for ex-Cabinet Ministers, all the profuse recriminations and epistolary correspondence of ex-Viceroys of India, must be on the Members who acted in that Administration. The right hon. Gentleman said he should like to see those who had broken the statutes brought to the bar of public opinion. The right hon. Gentleman is one of those who has for a very long time, from very incomplete information, been indulging in severe charges against the Government; and he and Lord Lawrence are, perhaps, the two men who have most embarrassed the Government. Lord Lawrence has published a correspondence of 17 columns of The Times. I do not know whether hon. Members have read it, but I have, and I must say it was most weary, weary reading. Lord Lawrence is a man of very great authority; but, under the circumstances, I should pay very little respect to his opinion on this subject. Lord Lawrence has made many statements in the country as to the Ameer and to the Committee in London, and he is one of those who have given the most information to our enemies. Lord Lawrence, however, when invited to attend a public meeting at Bradford to discuss the war, and the causes which brought it about, wrote to the Committee declining to attend—the Papers having then been presented—and said—"I am so busy with the Papers on the Afghan affair that time alone would not permit me to be present at your demonstration." Now, we must recollect that for weeks before Lord Lawrence was so thoroughly well-informed on the case, in his own opinion, that he had been attacking the policy of the Executive, and making accusations in the newspapers, which everyone thought were wholly uncalled for. Well, then, there is a Member (Mr. Childers) whom I see the solitary occupant of the front Opposition Bench. I hope he may have a vested right in that Bench. I do not wish to disturb him from it; and I think he is most likely to have a vested interest in that Bench, if the Members of the Opposition to which he belongs continue to be so profuse in their differences of opinion. I was shocked at the remarks which he made the other day at Pontefract on the conduct of the Government; for it would be wiser for a man who has been a Cabinet Minister to abstain from criticism until he is able to inform himself of the facts of the case. But what we most complain of on both sides of the House is the vulgarity with which Lord Salisbury has been treated, and the bad taste that has been displayed with reference to Sir Bartle Frere. I must say I believe Sir Bartle Frere is one of the most distinguished servants of the Crown. He has administered a Colony, and is serving his country in very difficult circumstances. An immense responsibility has been cast upon him; and I do think it was a bold thing, not to use a stronger term, for the right hon. Gentleman to have made use of the sort of expression which he did with regard to Sir Bartle Frere.

MR. CHILDERS

The right hon. Baronet will forgive me for interposing. The expression I made use of, to which I presume he alludes, did not in any way refer to Sir Bartle Frere. It was altered in a newspaper in such a way as to make it refer to Sir Bartle Frere. The moment I read that misconstruction of what I said I wrote to the newspaper in question, stating that the expression was not rendered as I had rendered it; that I, being one of Sir Bartle Frere's oldest friends, and valuing most highly his public services, could not by any possibility have used such an expression about him. That letter has been printed; but I presume the right hon. Baronet cannot have read it.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

I am extremely sorry if I have misrepresented the right hon. Gentleman. But the right hon. Gentleman will, no doubt, feel indebted to me for having given him an opportunity of making the remarks he has just made. I now come to the opinions expressed not only here, but elsewhere, by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich. He is one of those who indulge in violent invective, and the violence of his invective against the present Government almost exceeds the bounds of probability. His speech at North Wales and his speech at Greenwich contain language that is almost surprising. The contents of his speech at Greenwich, I am sorry to say, I have at my fingers' end. He spoke two hours by Greenwich time. The right hon. Gentleman began his indictment against the Government in this way. He said—"During the last three months we hoped we might have a period of repose." Now, nobody can for a moment suppose that the right hon. Gentleman stands in need of any repose. All I can say is, that during that period he found himself at leisure to interfere in a great many things, and, amongst others, in election matters in the borough which I have the honour to represent (Tamworth), although I am not at all afraid that his interference will produce the effect which he may have anticipated from his kind good office. But the right hon. Gentleman, on the occasion to which I am referring, went on to say— We cherished a hope that by refraining from criticism—a hope even against reasonable expectation—the aim of the Government might at length be directed towards appeasing the prolonged troubles and perils which they had so considerable a share in creating. How were we rewarded? By the disclosure of a now danger, a now peril, in the controversy which has been opened with the Ruler of Afghanistan. Now, let me observe, in passing, that this question, instead of being only now opened by the Ameer of Afghanistan, is a question which, I think, ever since the time of Lord Dalhousie, has been con- stantly under the notice of the Government of this country. One of the last acts of Lord Dalhousie's official life was to invite the attention of the Government of the day to the necessity of having—what the right hon. Gentleman was pleased to sneer at to-night, though I was glad to observe his sneer fell flat on the House—a scientific Frontier on the north-western portion of our Indian Empire. The right hon. Gentleman also complained of the Government having studiously withheld information from the country and Parliament in regard to their dealings with Afghanistan; but the charge, like many others, met with little encouragement. Well, the speech of the right hon. Gentleman from which I was quoting runs on very much in the same groove. He seems to be of opinion that the occupation of Quetta, which was not in the territories of the Ameer, was a great cause of complaint and a just offence to that Ruler. [General Sir GEORGE BALFOUR: Hear, hear!] The hon. and learned Pundit, I am not surprised to find, concurs in that opinion. But the right hon. Gentleman further pointed out that if any offence had been given it had been given by Russia. "Russia," he said, "solemnly undertook to abstain from all interference in Afghanistan. The agreement was made with us." Well, no doubt an agreement was made in 1869 that Russia should not interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan or have a Mission there; but I was sorry to find the right hon. Gentleman follow up his statement by the question—"Why do you fight with Afghanistan? why do you not go to war with Russia? Why attack the poor Ameer, a poor weak savage; why not fight Russia?" The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that that is not the real way to look at this question. You may, by means of your rhetoric, put it with some apparent force in that light; but, in my humble judgment, that is not the way in which it ought to be regarded. A great insult has been offered to this country by the Ameer of Afghanistan, and for that insult he ought, in my opinion, to be made directly responsible. But the right hon. Gentleman goes on to say—"I hope the people of England will make some comparison between the England of 1873 and the England of 1878." Well, I think they have already made such a comparison, and that public opinion has in the clearest manner run entirely counter to the policy of the right hon. Gentleman's Administration in 1873. More than that, we now occupy a position in the eyes of the world which we could not then command. I have taken pains to find out not the opinion of the people of England, because that we know, but that of foreign nations; and there are few things to my mind more remarkable than the way in which the Government of 1873 is spoken of by eminent foreign statesmen in Germany, France, and elsewhere. How, for instance, does Prince Bismarck speak of the Gladstone Administration in the Memoirs which have been recently published? He treats it with contempt. We are told that when Prince Bismarck read Lord Granville's despatch about Russia and the Black Sea, he smiled and said— They speak of future complications. Future, indeed! that is not the way in which resolute people speak. They are Parliamentary talkers, and dare not do anything. No; nothing is to be feared from them, just as nothing was to be hoped for from them four months ago. I will now give the House the opinion of M. Gambetta, who is decidedly the first man in France, and who will occupy a great space in the future history of that country, if he will only keep himself from fighting duels at less than 35 paces. In a remarkable article in The République Française he expresses his astonishment that the revelations made by Lord Cranbrook, saddling the Gladstone Administration with the responsibility of having alienated the Ameer, should not have silenced the Liberals. The République Française says— This does not prevent the Afghan Committee, which has the support of Mr. Gladstone, from pursuing its task of harassing the Government, even at this critical hour. Lord Lawrence is no more deterred now by the reflection of the ill he can do to his country than was Mr. Gladstone during the crisis in Eastern Europe. That is a very remarkable statement to appear in such a journal. But to return to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. He goes on to say— It is the duty of the people of England to think of the condition in which we are as citizens and politicians. Government by reserve, government by mystery, government by breach of law, government by bringing the Crown out of the position in which the Constitution has placed it to expose the Sovereign to personal responsibility! It is idle to tell you that the attempts of the present Government have been to magnify the Sovereign. Make her Empress, forsooth! Yes, ladies and 'gentlemen ("I should think the ladies must have been pleased at the compliments to their Sovereign") the Liberal Party will be the special champion, at the next election, of the ancient Monarchy against those who, that they may cover it with flattery and adulation, are adopting measures but too likely to sap its foundations. Now, it appears to me that for an ex-Prime Minister to allude to his Queen and Sovereign in that way is open to the gravest objection, and I should have thought that he would have abstained from that sort of language. The right hon. Gentleman comes next to the despatch of Lord Cranbrook. We have heard a great deal about the famous paragraph 9, and I have listened to the right hon. Gentleman when, almost in solitary grandeur, he said seven times over that it was not only with the 9th clause he found fault, but that there were many other counts of indictment against the Government which he intended to bring under the notice of the House. How does the right hon. Gentleman talk of Lord Cranbrook? He says—"I will endeavour to avoid severe epithets," and then he goes on to characterize this able despatch and says—"The entire effect of paragraph 9 produces an impression absolutely false." He says—"The despatch asserts what is totally untrue." "It is also untrue," he adds, "that the Viceroy was instructed to postpone the subject," which subject, however, according to the Papers, he did postpone. Then he goes on to say—"This paragraph conveys a totally wrong impression, as if it had been expressed in the severest language of calumny." But these, of course, are not severe epithets! Then, again, "these Papers are garbled." What can go further than this? And the right hon. Gentleman is not using severe epithets when no language can be made more severe. I am really ashamed to trespass on the time of the House with these extravagancies of language of the right hon. Gentleman, and I will not now go through these Papers. I do not even wish to give an outline of that despatch of Lord Cranbrook; but I should like to warn the House that they must not believe a great deal they hear about the responsibility resting on Lord Salisbury. This question of the Ameer was always to the front since the time of Lord Dalhousie, who, with the approval of Lord Aberdeen, made the Treaty to which reference has been made. Then came the transfer of the Government of India, and then the internal troubles of Afghanistan. Lord Lawrence was in India in 1869, and pursued that policy of masterly inactivity, which, to my mind, was the most blundering shortsightedness any Viceroy could employ. The way in which he regarded the various claimants to the Throne of Afghanistan is instructive. Within a few months we find him recognizing three sons of Dost Mahomed as each comes up. No doubt it is a want of decision in his character that led to the difficulties in which we are placed, and where a man like Lord Mayo would certainly have created a very favourable impression on Shere Ali. Matters went on, as we have heard, till this Mission, which the right hon. Gentleman has described in strong terms. May I state the conclusions to which I think we must arrive and pray the attention of the House for a short time longer? We must recollect that affairs in Central Asia in 1878 are not as they were in 1876, and why? Surely owing to Russia. Now, the question is—and it is brought home to the country—can Afghanistan be safely surrendered to Russia? Does the altered position of Russia in Central Asia entail a corresponding change of policy on our part? The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) endeavoured to show that we had left the old path; but new events obliged us to leave it. The Duke of Argyll himself said that we ought not to allow Afghanistan to become in any degree subservient to Russia; and yet look at the position of Merv and Herat, and see how Russia is gradually drawing its meshes round Afghanistan. You cannot deny it. The Duke of Argyll, however, qualified his remark by saying that "the ordinary consideration of an enlightened policy are enough to guide us." That is a beautiful and philosophical expression; so philosophical, in fact, that the Ameer did not understand it. Hence Russia is pressing on every side but the North-West Frontier of our Indian Empire on the territory of Afghanistan. And, lastly, one point that has not been referred to in the debate rises in my mind; you may blame the conduct either of this Go- vernment or of the last; but the real fact of the case is that there is a fundamental difference between the policy of the two. I will tell you in what it consists. It is a difference in the manner of regarding Russia. The former Administration made common cause with Russia; the present Government is not blind or indifferent to the interests of this country. Over and over again I have heard the right hon. Gentleman use the expression—"Let us imitate the good deeds of Russia." That was the policy of the late Government, and they were sent about their business. This present Government adopts the wiser policy of Lord Palmerston, which was expressed in these words, and which said of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg— When there is moderation at St. Petersburg you may be quite sure it will be followed by duplicity of action. Take the advice of Palmerston—the most truly British statesman that ever ruled the country; recollect how all through his life he foresaw our difficulties and always set his face against this Power. Over and over again have I expressed my dissatisfaction with the action of Russia; and I am a disciple of Palmerston, and advocate facing the intrigues with which Russia works her way. When I condemn the action of Russia I condemn it as a most hideous despotism, which accepts no law but the will of an Autocrat, and recognizes no liberty but its own licence. For these reasons I differ from the right hon. Gentleman opposite, and concur in the policy of the present Government. During these troubles in India many people have expressed an opinion that the burden of Government is too great for this country. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich concluded his remarks to-night with a most eloquent peroration about the services of Lord Canning, Lord Mayo, and many others, in which he told us how their great object was to sow peace and prosperity on the borders of our Empire. And this is very true. But we must recollect that the right hon. Gentleman is one of those who think that our Indian Empire is too much for us to bear, and that, therefore, we might part with it. ["No!"] The hon. Gentleman says "No;" but there is a periodical called The Nineteenth Century, in which, the right hon. Gentleman had an article on the duties of England, in which he says, with regard to our Possessions in India— Here is a tutelage unexampled in history, one-sixth of the human race. The truth is, we are mot on every side with proofs that the cares and calls of the British Empire are already beyond the strength of those who govern and have governed it. What does that mean? Does that quotation not bear out my statement with regard to the right hon. Gentleman? Perhaps, under another Government than the present we might possibly find its cares and calls too much for those who attempt to govern it. I have to thank the House for the kindness with which it has listened to my remarks; and, in conclusion, I will venture to supplement them with only another sentence. I recollect on the first night of the present Session an hon. Member said—"After all, Afghanistan is but a buffer, as it were, between England and Russia." I, in common with many others, repudiate altogether such a sentence as that. England requires no buffer between herself and any other Power. She meets her Allies with frankness, and her enemies face to face. We require no buffer in our dealings with any other Power. It is, therefore, with feelings of confidence that the Government will follow a wise policy in these matters, difficult though they may be, that I am prepared, on this grave occasion for the country and the House of Commons, to support the Government as against the Vote of Censure that has been proposed. And, in spite of all the bickerings of Party malice, in spite of the grave indiscretions of those who ought to have known better, and—I say it with feelings of shame and sorrow—in spite of the attempts that have been too often made of late to run down our country to the profit of our enemies, I believe from my heart that the Executive in these grave and serious circumstances have followed the straight and honest path of duty, of honour, and of national self-respect, without which qualities the character and the influence of the proudest nation in the world—like Carthage of old and Rome in her decline—must soon wither and decay.

MR. LEATHAM

Mr. Speaker, the right hon. Baronet who has just sat down (Sir Robert Peel) has made, as he always does, an amusing and energetic speech; but I do not think that he has given us very much to reply to. He has taunted us with making a change of front. There has been no change of front. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington), on the first night of the Session, distinctly referred to the Motion of my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread); and if he stated that he would not pronounce an opinion until he had read the Blue Books carefully, his hesitation was probably due to the fact that he did not possess the remarkable memory of the right hon. Baronet. I will not follow the right hon. Baronet in his attack upon the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, for he is here to defend himself, and is quite able to do so; but I think the right hon. Baronet might have spared him the comparison with a pettifogging attorney, which was rather a strong expression to fall from so great a purist as the right hon. Baronet. The right hon. Baronet has found fault with the right hon. Gentleman for the terms in which he has referred to Russia, which he said were unbecoming in an ex-Minister; but before he sat down he himself spoke of Russia as "a hateful and insidious Power." In attacking Lord Lawrence, who is not hero to defend himself, the right hon. Baronet attacked his own Friends, who were in Office at the time and fully approved of the policy of Lord Lawrence. In his despatch of 26th December, 1867, the right hon. Gentleman the present Chancellor of the Exchequer writes to the Indian Government, that there was nothing in the Treaty of 1855 requiring Great Britain to support the pretensions of Shere Ali Khan, or of any other Chief, unless his policy appeared likely to promote the internal tranquillity and independence of Afghanistan. With regard to the progress of Russia in Central Asia, Her Majesty's Government "see no reason for any uneasiness, or for any jealousy." The conquests which Russia has made, and, apparently, is still making, in that region are, in their opinion, the natural result of the position in which Russia was placed, and afford no ground whatever for representations indicative of suspicion or alarm on the part of this country. The right hon. Baronet attributed the whole of the present difficulties to; the policy of the late Government. I regret very much that the Government had not the benefit of the right hon. I Baronet's counsel. It might have saved them from the "stains" of which he spoke. But I do not attach much importance to the controversy—as to whether or not the late Government can be made to appear, remotely, indirectly, and wholly unintentionally on their part, responsible for the present war. I cannot help thinking that the plea which we so constantly hear, whenever the acts of the present Government are impugned, that the late Government said something, or did something, which countenanced or caused what the present Government are doing now, is a little unworthy of Her Majesty's Ministers. Surely, it is neither very dignified, nor very courageous, the moment your policy is assailed, to seek to throw the blame upon an Administration which ceased to exist nearly five years ago; but I have observed that this is the course which is almost invariably resorted to by the apologists of the Government, whenever they find themselves in an awkward corner. For example, if we call public attention to what we regard as the extravagance of the Government, we are told that the vast expenditure of the country is not due to extravagance, but to measures which were passed by the late Government eight or ten years ago. Now, no doubt measures were passed which gave an opening for expenditure; but the opening has been most diligently improved. Again, I remember that when the Government found itself in what I must call its first scrape—with reference to the Slave Circular—the Diplomatic Correspondence of the last 50 years was ransacked in order to find something which Lord Palmerston or Lord Clarendon had written, which was supposed to justify the course then being pursued, by the Government, but which they afterwards happily abandoned. And, now, when we complain of this Afghan War as unnecessary and unjust, we are triumphantly told that but for something which Lord Northbrook said to the Ameer five years ago it would never have occurred. Surely, Sir, we have had a great deal too much of this "Please, Sir, it wasn't me" line of defence; a great deal too much for the credit of a Government which ought to have a policy of its own, and one which is susceptible of defence on its own I merits. Every one admits that it would I have been preposterous if the late Government had done what the Ameer demanded, and engaged to defend him, through thick and thin, against all comers, without taking adequate guarantees that their support should not be abused. How were they to know what whim might enter his head with regard to his own succession? Were they to make themselves parties to all the intrigues of an Oriental harem? and as regards his foreign relations, how was it possible that they should guarantee him against the consequences of acts over which they could exercise no control? The late Government was not quite so ready with its guarantees and protectorates; it was not quite so eager to back everybody's bill, and to mortgage the resources of the country. But I will engage to say that even the present Government, lavish though it has been beyond all precedent with the national guarantees, and prodigal beyond all example of the national future, would have paused before they committed themselves to that kind of guarantee, the denial of which is now assigned as the reason for the estrangement of the Ameer. Indeed, we have the despatch before us which contains the instructions of the Government to the new Viceroy upon this very point; and if we take into consideration the new condition as to Residents in the Afghan cities, the assurances to be given to the Ameer were certainly not more liberal than those which Lord North-brook gave him. Well, then, if placed in the same circumstances you would have acted in everything which is essential in the same way, is it generous, is it quite manly, to seek to lay this disaster—for disaster it is—at their door? I must confess, Sir, that if I had not formed an opinion already as to the justice of this war, I should conceive the gravest prejudice against it merely from the line of defence which has been adopted by Her Majesty's Ministers. First we have this attempt to shuffle off the responsibility on to other shoulders. Then we have the secret despatch, prepared with a strict regard to publicity. Or is it because the Government wholly despair of keeping anything whatever secret that they send a document, which is not intended to see the light, to the Press before the ink is dry? Why is there this extraordinary discrepancy among the authorities as to the object of the war? Why have we so much circumlocution at the India Office, and so much candour at the Mansion House? Why is it that we hear nothing about a scientific Frontier at the India Office, and nothing about anything else at the Guildhall? To read the despatch one would suppose that we were driven into war by the intolerable insults of the Ameer. To listen to the Prime Minister one would suppose that we were making war with the most brutal indifference to right and wrong. Whom are we to believe—the Secretary for India, writing secrets for everybody to read, or the Prime Minister proclaiming before Gog and Magog reasons which everybody would desire to keep secret? The Prime Minister's reasons I must decline to discuss. It is enough that there is no living casuist, except perhaps The Times, who would dare to defend them on moral grounds. This is a Christian country; and if the Premier wishes to know what is to be said against his reasons, we must leave him alone with the Archbishops. Well, Sir, if that be so, an observation which is attributed to one of the greatest of our living poets exactly describes the situation. He said— Now that the robbery had commenced, he hoped it would be conducted with as little murder as possible. But are the reasons of the Indian Secretary much better? If we refer to the Ultimatum, we find the casus belli described in effect as follows—namely, the reception of a Russian Envoy at a time when a war was believed to be imminent, in which England and Russia would have been arrayed on opposite sides, and the repulse of the English Mission. The Secretary of State says— Such Missions are customary between friendly neighbouring States, and are never refused except when hostility is intended."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 254.] Now, surely, there is an exquisite naïveté in these words. Just as though the controversy as to whether such Missions should be received at all—or any Missions—or whether any Englishman, official or non-official, should be admitted to the territory of the Ameer had not been going on all through this voluminous Correspondence. It is simply absurd to treat the Ameer as though he were an European Power, who understood, and had made himself a party to, all the courtesies and requirements of European international life. The Ameer stands altogether outside such requirements. If he did not, all your diplomatic representations would have been unnecessary, and your Mission would have gone to Cabul as a matter of course. But he stands so far outside them that he will not permit even your traders to penetrate into his territory. It is laughable, after indulging in negotiations extending over many years with the view of bringing about a state of things which may approximate in some degree to that which exists as a matter of course among European nations, to turn round upon this half-savage Prince and to apply the rules of Europe. In Europe you receive Embassies, as a matter of course, from every nation with which you are not in a state of war. Why? And this leads me to the kernel of the whole matter. It is because in Europe Embassies are not sent with a view of dictating your foreign policy and crippling your independence. But will the hon. Gentleman, who represents the India Office in this House (Mr. E. Stanhope) deny that those were the objects of the Mission which we proposed to send to Afghanistan? Who ever heard of an European Mission 1,000 strong, and armed to the teeth? But if such a Mission presented itself at any European Court, where is the Court so craven as to receive it? And let the House bear in mind that we had received no encouragement to send this Mission. No attempt had been made to ascertain whether it would be distasteful to the Ameer. Everything which had occurred would lead to the inference that it would be distasteful in the extreme. You had no right to expect that your Mission would be received in a friendly manner; yet, because it was not received in a friendly manner you pronounce the act to be one of "enmity and indignity against the Empress of India," and the right hon. Baronet talks about the "direct insult" which the country has sustained. But the Ameer, basing his notions upon the state of things which you had not only permitted, but sanctioned—the practical isolation of Afghanistan—and upon the understanding which you had with him, and with Dost Mahomed before him—that these Missions should not be sent without his permission—could not fail to regard the approach of an armed and uninvited British Mission as an act of enmity and indignity done to himself, and an insult which he could not put up with, if he were to retain the respect of his subjects. As it seems to me, no pains were spared to insure the failure of this Mission. Not only did you demand its admission in a peremptory tone—not only did you back it up by the assembling of a great armed force, but you proclaimed throughout all India what you were about to do; and you went the length of summoning neighbouring Native Princes to witness the success of your exploit. Your exploit did not succeed; and I must say that I respect the Ameer for the line which he took. It was not a prudent line; perhaps many persons will consider it almost a foolhardy line; but the act was the act of a man who did not lose his self-respect in the presence of great dangers, and who resolved to fall an independent Prince rather than to live on in shameful vassalage. But no doubt I shall be told that the Ameer had departed from his position of isolation by admitting the Mission from Russia, and that he did so at a time when his marked preference for Russia was very galling to this country. I admit it; and if the war with Russia had taken place, you would probably have been justified in regarding him as the ally of Russia, and in making war upon him. But the war with Russia did not take place; and this episode in your quarrel with Russia ought to have gone the way of the quarrel itself. There have been diplomatic representations with regard to the Russian Embassy; and we are told that they have been successful. But the point to which I wish to draw the attention of the House, after the remarks of the right hon. Baronet, is this—that the offence for which you are chastising the Ameer was not the offence of one man. There were two parties to it. There was the man who received the Embassy, and the man who sent it. Who is the greater offender—the petty Prince who yields his trembling friendship, or the great Emperor who demands and extorts it? His designs, at all events, were distinctly hostile. His Mission was intended at the moment as a deliberate menace. If there is anything about the Mission which constitutes a casus belli, you are fighting the wrong man. Nothing appears to be too bad for the weak one; the strong one you leave altogether alone. Is it because you very much prefer punishing the weak one? If so, I commend your prudence; but I have no words of commendation for your magnanimity. And what a moment you have chosen for this war? Granting, for the sake of argument, almost everything which you ask; granting that you had a right to make this war; where was the supreme necessity of making it at a time when every enterprize in the country absolutely demands repose? Right hon. Gentlemen seem to live in a paradise of their own, and in utter ignorance of what is passing around them. The oldest Member of this House cannot recall the time when all the great interests of the country have suffered as they are suffering now. There have been periods of depression in trade, periods of depression in manufacture, and periods of depression in agriculture; but when have all three been smitten by the same simultaneous overthrow? Do right hon. Gentlemen reflect that if the cloud which is hanging over the country be not speedily removed, we shall have to face times of the most frightful penury—if not of the most dangerous discontent? Is this a time to go about brandishing your sword in everybody's face? You have reduced the industry of the country almost to despair already by your incessant menaces and your perpetual appeals to arms. Hardly have we escaped one danger before we find ourselves in the presence of another. But, whether escaped or not, they are all equally costly. Did anyone ever hear of such preparations as those for this Afghan Expedition? I hear that we have purchased 60,000 camels—that is, a chain of camels tied head to tail and extending for 120 miles! The first camel would be marching into the market place at Bristol when the last camel was still stalking through the streets of London. It is monstrous that such expenses should be thrown upon the half-bankrupt Treasury of India. It is almost equally monstrous that they should be thrown upon us, with our declining resources, saddled, as we are, with another war, and thrown upon us, too, for the maintenance of a policy which we have never sanctioned? What is that policy? Is it the policy of the Mansion House? That is a policy from which the conscience of the country openly revolts. Is it the policy of the India Office? Are we making war because the Ameer will not receive our Residents into his cities? That is the concession which only the other day Lord Mayo pledged the good faith of the country should never be asked of him. Some persons say that we have gone to war because the Government have roused a war spirit in the country which they cannot control, and which they are anxious to gratify at the least risk. That reminds me of the story of the learned attorney, who was being run away with in his carriage, and cried out to his coachman—"John, can you stop the horses?" "No, sir," said John. "Then drive into something cheap." But whatever may be the object of the Government in making war, there is an uncomfortable suspicion abroad that the quarrel has not been forced upon us, but that we have picked it. How otherwise can we explain the breaking down of the Conference at Peshawur? No one can read this Correspondence without arriving at the conclusion that the Government resolved to force our Residents upon the Ameer by fair means or foul. To crown all, comes the declaration at the Mansion House. I must confess, Sir, that I find it quite impossible to reconcile all this with a policy of prudence and justice; and therefore that I am unable to sustain the Government by any vote of mine in a course which, I am convinced, all honourable men, when they cease to be blinded by Party and prejudice, must eventually condemn.

MR. FORSYTH

said, it was highly improbable the Government would, in the present state of trade and commerce of the country, drive the country into war if it could be avoided. He did not think the people of England would take much interest in recriminations in Parliament. What they were concerned about was the question—Was the war a just and necessary war? If it were proved to be just, they would approve of it; if not, they would condemn it, and the Government who were responsible for it. He believed the war was just; and an attentive perusal of the Papers had convinced him that the man who was to blame was the Ameer himself. It was his perversity, obstinacy, and folly that brought the calamity on his country. Those who blamed Lord Salisbury for a change of policy should bear in mind that the policy of a country changed with circumstances. To show how capricious and untrustworthy this Ameer was he would like the House to see what appeared in page 126 of the Papers on this subject. They would there find the following telegram from the Viceroy to the Deputy Commissioner at Peshawur:— The Viceroy has been informed that Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan came to Cabul under a safe conduct from the Ameer, and that notwithstanding the safe conduct he has been placed in custody by His Highness. The Viceroy, as a friend and well-wisher to the Ameer, hopes this report is untrue, and desires strongly to urge His Highness to observe the conditions under which the Sirdar has come to Cabul. By so doing the Ameer will maintain his good name and the friendship of the British Government. From first to last the Ameer had insisted upon an offensive and defensive alliance with England—first, to guarantee him against civil war, to uphold him on the Throne against all rivals, and to guarantee to him the nomination of his son as heir apparent; and next, to guarantee him against external aggression, and hold him harmless against all foreign foes. Our policy had been not to entangle ourselves with intestine quarrels with Afghanistan, irrespective of the good conduct and rule of the Ameer. At a time when Europe was in a most critical state, when Russia was on the confines of Turkey, and a war was about to begin, the issue of which no man could foresee, and in which we might ourselves very possibly be engaged, we made a request of the Ameer that an Envoy should be sent from Simla to Cabul to discuss with the Ameer the relations between the two countries. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich said that the Government took the statement of that Envoy, and treated his representations as containing a true account of the grievances of the Ameer, when we should have relied entirely on what was said by the Cabul Envoy who came subsequently to Simla. That contention on the part of the right hon. Gentleman was, in his opinion, altogether wrong, for the Agent whose version of the Ameer's grievances was accepted gave it to us after having been in the most confidential communication with the Ameer. Upon the statement of the Ameer himself the Viceroy was justified in saying that the grievances put forward by that mouthpiece were those upon which the Ameer insisted. At the Peshawur Conference between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Ameer's Envoy, the latter was informed that the Ameer's accepting a British officer to reside on the Frontier would be the condition of our agreeing to an offensive or defensive alliance. The Treaty was actually proposed, and it rested on that condition. The Envoy said he had no power to accept the condition, and the negotiations were broken off. Then it was said we had, in that case, acted precipitately, because another Envoy was on his way, who had full powers to treat. Why should they believe that, when we had for months before been negotiating with Envoys from Afghanistan, and all this time four or five Russian Agents were intriguing at Cabul? The Russian Mission to Cabul was, he might point out, received with great pomp and parade, and was by no means to be regarded as a matter of mere courtesy, as was shown by the evidence contained in the Papers. What, then, were we in those circumstances to do? It had been said that we ought, instead of dealing with Afghanistan, to have gone to Russia; but we had taken that course, and had asked for explanations. As a matter of mere self-defence we were bound to do something to prevent Russia from intriguing in Afghanistan and converting it into a Russian Province. But it was a mistake to suppose that we intended the Envoy whom we proposed to send to the Ameer to be a permanent official; we had merely asked the Ameer to allow us to send an Envoy on a temporary Mission for the purpose of placing the relations between the two countries on a more satisfactory and a sounder footing. It was contended that we had violated International Law by trying to force an Envoy on the Ameer; but that was not so, and it had been distinctly laid down by that eminent jurist, Sir Robert Phillimore, that to refuse to receive an Envoy at all amounted to a breach of International Law. Our Mission having been rejected by the Ameer, we had given him ample time to repent of the insult which he had inflicted upon us; and he wished to know from hon. Gentlemen opposite what other course they would, in similar circumstancs, have pursued than that which had been taken by the Government? Were we to retire from Afghanistan baffled and defeated? Such a course would, he maintained, be unworthy of England, and would have disgraced us in the eyes both of Asia and Europe. The war, therefore, in his opinion, had been forced upon us not by any fault of our own, but by the misconduct of the Ameer himself, and we were bound to uphold the honour, safety, and dignity of the country.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

said, that his hon. and learned Friend who had just sat down had set out by declaring that although there might be those who would not agree with him, he believed that the sole cause of this war was the conduct of the Ameer himself, and he ended his speech by a statement which implied that he evidently believed that he had proved what he asserted; but the whole tendency of his remarks went to prove that the cause of offence came from Russia. His hon. and learned Friend had remarked that it had been asserted that there was another Envoy on the road at the time the Conference was ended at Peshawur; and he used words, which he afterwards qualified, that he would not believe a word of it, and that the Envoy had no power. [Mr. FORSYTH: I said no power to accept a Mission.] The hon. and learned Member could not know that. The Viceroy evidently believed it. At page 222 would be found these instructions to Sir Lewis Pelly— If, in the meanwhile, new Envoys or messengers arrive to continue negotiation you will tell them that your powers are terminated. So that it was quite clear that Lord Lytton had considerable reason to believe that there was another Envoy on his way with permission to treat, and even to agree to our proposal. His hon. and learned Friend had said it was a just and necessary war, and he defined a just and necessary war as a war in which there was a just cause for offence. In order to ascertain whether a war was just and necessary, the first document to which it was usual to refer was the Proclamation. Any hon. Member, however, who looked into the Pro- clamation of Lord Lytton, which had been circulated only that morning, would find that it consisted of unsupported assertions, hardly any one of which was capable of direct proof; and it was somewhat singular that no speaker who had followed the right hon. Member for Greenwich had taken up his challenge to justify the terms of that document. He now came to the speech of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth (Sir Robert Peel), which to those who sat waiting for the customary fireworks gave the impression that for once the powder must have been damp. The right hon. Baronet had referred to Sir Henry Rawlinson as being an impartial witness on the Afghan Question; but the fact was that, eminent though Sir Henry Rawlinson might be in many respects, he was upon that question a very one-sided authority. The right hon. Baronet then went on to speak of the foreign policy of the late Government; but it was somewhat singular that he, who had at the time supported it, should now lose no opportunity of making an attack upon it. Again, the right hon. Baronet probably knew that the language used by M. Gambetta referred to a transaction of which he had most warmly approved; and when he spoke of the policy of the Opposition as supporting Russia over much, he might remember that no speech was ever more strongly Russian than that of the Prime Minister in 1876. The case against the Government was that the Ameer was not, on the whole, unfriendly until he had been forced into the arms of Russia by Lord Lytton's policy, as revealed to him in July, 1876. To this the Government speakers had replied that a few communications had passed between General Kaufmann and the Ameer before that date. Now, those communications had been made known by Shere Ali to the British Agent; they were not important, and they were made by means not of Russian, but of Russian-Afghan Agents. They were, in short, communications of which just complaint should have been made to Russia rather than to the Ameer. The Under Secretary of State for India had declared that Lord Salisbury had had the gift of prophecy, and had foretold the attempt of Russia to establish influence in Afghanistan. But he was reminded by that statement of that astrologer who prophecied long life to an English King. The King having died immediately, the astrologer, in disgust, prophecied his own death upon a given day, and killed himself in order to make his prophecy come true. Lord Salisbury, by his instructions to Lord Lytton, had made his own prophecies come true—that the Ameer would be thrown into the arms of Russia. It was not his intention to examine once more the question that was at issue between the occupants of the two front Benches. He thought the verdict of the country would be that on this secondary point victory rested rather with Lord Northbrook than with the Government, in spite of the casuistry of Lord Salisbury. The Government speakers had tried to show that the late Government had refused to guarantee Shere Ali against foreign conquest; and that for that reason he had thrown himself into the arms of Russia. That was not the case. The late Government had offered to guarantee Shere Ali against foreign conquest; but he wanted a guarantee against domestic insurrection. It might just as well be said that the present Government had refused to guarantee him, for they had made conditions—conditions which they knew he would not accept. Lord Northbrook would not consent to force Residents on the Ameer at the certain cost of war; and Lord Lytton, a more convenient person, had been found—not so much a Viceroy as a diplomatist; a Secretary of Legation rather than a ruler of men, and consequently a puppet in the hands of the Government at home. War had been determined upon. Everybody knew, but Lord Lytton said he did not know, that war was the certain outcome of the policy devised in Downing Street, and carried out by him. War for prestige; war for the rectification of a Frontier. His hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain), in the addition to the Amendment which he had placed upon the Paper, but which he had not moved, had singled out for special attack the concealment by Government from Parliament of their policy. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had already said his say with regard to that concealment. The Government would seem to have been too busy preparing the candidature to the Bulgarian Throne of his hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) to lay Papers at the proper time before the House. For example, Lord Lytton's Proclamation of War, published on November 22 at Lahore, and which ought to have been published in London on the 23rd, had not been circulated till the morning of December 10. Had it been published at the earlier date they would have been able to have verified its astounding and apparently unsupported statement that— The Ameer had openly and assiduously endeavoured by words and deeds to stir up religious hatred against the English, and incited war against the Empire of India."—[Afghanistan, No. 2, p. 20.] Lord Lytton did not come into court with clean hands, for he had made, also without proof, a year and a-half before, a similar assertion in his memorable despatch about Khelat and Quetta. That Quetta case was, indeed, worthy of more notice than it had received; for it was both the strongest of all the instances of concealment of information from the House, and the main cause of the present Afghan War. There had been frequent allusions in that House, in the other House of Parliament, and in the Press, to many debates in which various Members of the Government had, on different occasions during the last three years, declared that they had initiated no change in our Indian Frontier policy. Little allusion to the Quetta debate had yet been made; for his hon. Friends the Members for the Border Burghs and for Birmingham had quoted it only for another purpose. Now, the only open sign of the change of policy which had occurred had been the advance to Quetta. That advance—the vast moment of which was clear now, but obvious at the time to all who were acquainted with the history of our Frontier policy—had been, according to the practice of the present Government, made without the knowledge of Parliament. Several Questions which had been put in that House had elicited a portion of the facts; but again, according to the practice of the present Government, re-assuring words had been spoken, the effect of which had not afterwards been confirmed. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had, as usual, talked to the House in the manner in which a dentist would talk to a child. The force sent forward had been called an "escort." The House had, over and over again, been informed that the occupation of Quetta was not intended to be permanent. Now, even at that time, it was intended that the occupation should be permanent, and contracts for permanent barracks had been made. He himself (Sir Charles W. Dilke) was not opposed to the occupation of Quetta from what might be called the military point of view; indeed, he had written in its favour as long ago as 1867, distinguishing carefully between political and military considerations; but the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the debate of August, 1877, had taken exactly the opposite view, and had declared that he was opposed to the occupation from the military point of view, and that political considerations alone might be adduced in its favour. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his speech, said that he belonged to the school which was rather for keeping back, and not committing us to advancing beyond our Frontiers … I have always demurred to the idea which has been put forward by some, that the best way to meet danger is to advance beyond our Frontier, and have always held that the true lines we ought to lay down for ourselves are these—to strengthen ourselves within our Frontiers, and to do so by a combination of measures, moral and material. … It is most important that we should in every possible way endeavour to husband the wealth and resources of India. … rather than that we should expend our force by distance, and weaken ourselves by an unwise advance."—[3 Hansard, ccxxxvi. 718–19.] The Chancellor of the Exchequer went on to explain that these were the views which he had always held as to the best means of protecting India from attack, and "there was no change whatever in the policy of Her Majesty's Government." Looking to the vast importance in its bearing upon our relations to the Ameer—that was to say, from the political point of view, which our occupation of Quetta had had—it was interesting to note that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had used the words, "as to the occupation of Quetta, or rather what has been called the occupation of Quetta"—for he denied that there had been an occupation— If we are to regard that advance from a military point of view—a step in the nature of taking up a certain position to defend ourselves against an apprehended attack—then I should maintain the opinion that it would be a false move. But, he went on to explain, all that had been done had been to send an Envoy there … accompanied by a sufficient escort to secure him an honourable reception."—[Ibid. p. 720.] Now, it was very singular to notice that those were exactly the same words which were afterwards made use of by the Government with regard to the despatch of Sir Neville Chamberlain and his lancers as Envoy and escort to Cabul. He did not know whether Shere Ali read the Parliamentary debates: they had his own statement for the fact that he read Sir Henry Rawlinson's books and memoranda, so perhaps he did. If he did, or if he was advised by those who did, he must have drawn his own conclusions. With regard to Quetta, at all events, the mask was off; and it must be borne in mind that the House had been kept in ignorance of the advance until the occupation of Quetta had become an accomplished fact. The House had then been assured that it was no occupation at all, and had been told that all that we had done was to send an Envoy accompanied by a sufficient "escort" to secure him an honourable reception. Yet, at that very time, the erection of permanent barracks had already been begun; the telegraph had partly been laid down; and a survey had been made with a view to the extension to Quetta of the Indian railway system. There was another singular resemblance between the action of the Government in the Quetta matter and their action in the present case. The Papers with regard to Khelat and Quetta had been asked for in March, 1877, and they had been pressed for anxiously in April. They had been promised "immediately" in April, and they had been distributed on the 21st July, when it was altogether too late for the House of Commons to interfere. Three and a-half months appeared to be the usual time during which the present Government was accustomed to keep back Papers of vital moment which they had promised to give "immediately." Now, even Sir Henry Rawlinson had admitted that the occupation of Quetta was a most serious matter, and had said— It is doubtful how such a proceeding would be regarded at Candahar and Cabul. … If, as is more probable, the tribes in general regarded this erection of a fortress—above the passes, although not on Afghan soil—as a menace, or as a preliminary to a further hostile advance, then we should not be justified, for so small an object, in risking the rupture of our friendly intercourse."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 41.] That was exactly the view which he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had always taken. It was the view which the present Government had taken at one time, and their sudden departure from it had had the effect which everybody, which even Sir Henry Rawlinson himself, had anticipated. Yet, as he had shown, the Government had kept all knowledge of the momentous step from Parliament until it was too late, and even after it was accomplished had assured the House that there was no occupation, and no change of policy. He would now, for a few minutes, dwell upon the facts revealed by the Papers "Central Asia, No. 1." It was a humiliating story. On August 8 last the India Office had written to the Foreign Office to the effect that Shere Ali had received a Russian Mission backed by "four columns" with "15,000 men," and suggesting that he had received the Mission "under pressure." The India Office insisted that the Russian Government should be brought to book, the "Russian Cabinet" as they said—a phrase which was rather wild, as there was not, and never had been, a Cabinet in Russia. These were their words— It is the Russian Cabinet alone which is responsible for the acts of its Agent, and it is the Russian Governor General of Turkestan, rather than the Ameer Shere Ali, who, with or without authority, is at this moment pursuing a policy of which the effect must be to seriously agitate the minds of Her Majesty's subjects throughout India."—[Central Asia, No. 1 (1878) p. 143.] He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) thought so too; but what had their valiant Government done? They had begun by the use of brave words. They had informed Russia of what they, very properly, had called her "breach of her engagement." They told Russia that she was "menacing" the "integrity of Afghan territory." It was Russia, not England, who, according to England, was menacing the integrity of Afghan territory in September last. On the 19th August, and again early in September, we had been defending the integrity of Afghan territory. On the 9th November we were "rectifying our Frontier" by helping ourselves to Afghan soil. Looking to the present condition of Afghanistan, it would seem as though our defence of the integrity of the Afghan territory had been as fatal to that integrity as our defence of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire had been fatal to the integrity of Turkey. Our Government had told Russia that it was "impossible for us to ignore or overlook" what had occurred. They insisted that the Russian Mission should "be at once withdrawn." Russia had laughed at us. The Russian Foreign Minister was away; the Czar was away; the Acting Minister was away, having left the capital without sending a note to the British Embassy, although he had been courteously informed by the Embassy that we wished for an immediate answer. On the 10th September we had again insisted. Our Government then said that there was "no excuse" for what had occurred, and "pressed for a reply." At last, after more than three weeks' delay, we got a sort of reply. The words used with regard to the Russian Mission to Cabul were those which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had used a year-and-a-half before with regard to our "Mission" to Quetta. The Russian Mission to Cabul was "of a provisional nature." Naturally dissatisfied with this reply; afraid to hit Russia, yet determined to hit somebody, our brave Government hit Shere Ali; in fact, they tied him down to hit him, not giving him time to get away. He had received a Russian Mission, received it, as we ourselves admitted, "under pressure" from "four columns" of "15,000 men," and because he had done so we, shrinking from the possible consequences of our big words to Russia, fell on Shere Ali. The conduct of the Government had been the conduct of a bully; of a big boy afraid of another big boy, and hitting that big boy's acquaintance, who was small. England had suddenly turned from its defence of the integrity of the Afghan territory in September, and in November was "rectifying her Frontier" by the annexation of the Koorum. What could we expect to be the consequence of this cowardly policy? Had it made us any the safer against Russia? The result would probably be the occupation by Russia of Merv, which had been, over and over again, declared to be the key to Herat, itself the key to India. The rectifi- cation of our Frontier would do nothing towards preventing that occupation. Had or had not our Government, by their action, made our possession of India more secure? The attack on Afghanistan, like the bringing to Malta of 7,000 under-officered black troops, like the Anglo-Turkish Convention, like the occupation of Cyprus by a fevered battalion as a "strong place of arms," were all measures which had had for their object the security of India. Was India more secure at the present moment than it had been in the days of Lord North-brook's rule? What was to be the outcome of the quarrel in which, by the action of the Government, they had become involved? They had been assured that there was to be no large annexation. But it was necessary to provide securities that the well-meaning section of the Cabinet should not be dragged by Indian fire-eaters into an annexation, or veiled annexation, of Afghanistan. Annexation had been disowned, but Sir Henry Rawlinson was still awake and active, and possessed great influence with the present Indian Government, and with some members of the Cabinet. The first Napoleon had said—"There is but one disease of which great Powers die; they die of indigestion." The Government had swallowed Fiji, Cyprus, and the Transvaal, and these had not agreed with us too well. They had the power, if they so pleased it, to swallow Afghanistan; and in the spring their friends were certain to insist that they should do so. Should we be able to digest it? It was a tough morsel, as we should find to our cost. He denied that our Indian prestige could possibly be raised. On the contrary, he asserted that it must be lowered by conduct of the kind he had described. The rectification of our Frontier was, of course, intended to make us safer against the advance of Russia; but he doubted whether it would have that effect; and a rectification of our Frontier obtained at such a sacrifice of honour and dignity as had been incurred could certainly have no consequence of the kind. And as regarded its material and physical effects, the probability was that Russia would think that her prestige in Asia would receive a blow if she did not make a move, which we would not be able to prevent, and our material and physical prestige would have suffered vastly more than it would have gained by this unjust war.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON

said, it was with great regret that he found himself, for the first time, taking part in a Party debate on Indian affairs; but he should not complain if the debate had been carried on calmly, deliberately, and in argumentative language, such as the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea had throughout used. But his charge against the Government for withholding information about the occupation of Quetta was most unjust. His (Lord George Hamilton's) own statements on a former occasion were perfectly consistent with the Papers now laid upon the Table of the House. In 1875, owing to the policy—or rather to the want of policy—which had been adopted, the affairs of Beloochistan were in frightful confusion. Lord Northbrook had before him three alternatives—first, the annexation of that country; second, the total abstinence from interference with it—in which case, in all probability, some other Power would have interfered—and, thirdly, the course which Lord Northbrook himself had adopted. At the time that Lord Lytton was on his way to India he telegraphed to Lord Northbrook not to send an Envoy to Beloochistan until he arrived, because he wished to state the reasons for his interference in Beloochistan to the Ameer of Cabul, in order to allay any suspicions he might have as to our objects. Lord Northbrook, however, did not comply with that request, but sent his Envoy a week before his successor arrived with his own instructions. Major Sandeman succeeded in temporarily pacifying that country. Lord Lytton was far from wishing to occupy Quetta; even up to the end of 1876 he was adverse to it. The only reason of his doing so at last was because Major Sandeman and the military officers who went with him reported that Quetta was the only place the occupation of which would protect our trade, and fulfil the objects of our interference. He believed that if Lord Northbrook had been Viceroy he would have pursued the same policy. They might, however, dismiss altogether this question of Quetta in discussing the affairs of Afghanistan. In the early part of the evening a very remarkable speech was made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich. The right hon. Gentleman had carefully selected extracts from the context for quotation, the words of which were capable of bearing the exact construction which he wished to have placed upon them, and he made the choice for that sole and special purpose. Upon those quotations the right hon. Gentleman based one of the most formidable indictments, or rather series of indictments, ever thrown at any Government. He stated positively that when Lord Northbrook left India the relations between the Indian Government and Afghanistan were perfectly satisfactory.

MR. GLADSTONE

No. In the main.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON

Oh! In the main.

MR. GLADSTONE

Yes, certainly. I said, "in the main;" and I repeated the phrase over and over again.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON

said, he would accept the correction of the right hon. Gentleman that he used the phrase "in the main"—whatever that might mean. The right hon. Gentleman next said that at the time at which we came into Office there was no reason whatever for attempting in any way to alter those relations. The right hon. Gentleman next said that the Indian Government deliberately and wantonly, contrary to the opinion of everybody who had any experience of Afghanistan, insisted upon forcing upon the Ameer officers whose location in Afghanistan would have been absolutely fatal to the independence of that country; that the negotiations were so conducted that they were intended to fail; that at the very moment the Viceroy knew the Envoy was coming to accept his terms, he deliberately broke off negotiations lest they should be accepted; and that the Indian Government had forced and hunted the Ameer into a corner, and had then on some frivolous pretext made war on him. The right hon. Gentleman then expressed his own opinion that the policy of the Government had not been what they pretended; but that their sole object throughout had been to annex a certain portion of Afghanistan. And the right hon. Gentleman, before he undertook to prove these allegations, took a course which it was to be hoped, for the credit of the House, would not be taken again—he deliberately stated that documents, signed by the Viceroy of India, the Commander-in-Chief in India, and six of the ablest men in the most incorruptible service in the world, were, he would not say false, but contained gross and unpardonable errors and extraordinary deviations from fact, which, as they all knew, was merely an oratorical device for stating that the despatches of the Indian Government were not true. The right hon. Gentleman then found that there was one person in whom he could place implicit confidence; one whose every syllable was true, and against whose word any utterance of the Viceroy or his Council was not for a moment to be placed—this was the Envoy of the Ameer, who came down to Peshawur to negotiate on behalf of his master with the Indian Government. Now, the right hon. Gentleman had had 50 years of experience in political life, and he must know that when negotiations of that kind were entered upon it was the invariable custom for the negotiators to assume things which were not altogether correct for the purpose of obtaining the successful issue of such negotiations; and that all through these Conferences the Afghan Envoy always acted upon the assumption that the Ameer had got everything he wanted, though this assertion was the exact reverse of the language used by the same Envoy in 1873. The right hon. Gentleman then proceeded to charge Lord Lytton with having thrown to the winds all the assurances of Lords Northbrook and Mayo; but it was capable of proof that the interpretation put upon those assurances by Lord Lytton was identical with those of the right hon. Gentleman's own Government. In support of the charges which the right hon. Gentleman made against the accuracy of the Papers, he commented upon a statement in them that certain negotiations occupied several weeks which only took up a few days; but if he had examined the Papers a little more closely he would have found that these negotiations occupied exactly three weeks. Then with regard to the number of the grievances of which it was said the Ameer complained, the right hon. Gentleman endeavoured again here to make a strong point; but here again he would find that the statements made by different Envoys were described accordingly; and, further, that all the statements as well as the reports upon them were fully set out in the Papers which had been presented to Parliament, without any attempt at concealment. All the Indian Government did was, finding there were eight grievances stated by the first man, of which four were very trivial, to select four out of the eight, calling them special grievances; and, as regarded the statement of the Afghan Envoy, they call especial attention to it in the following words:— The statement of the Afghan Envoy, which is herein enclosed, in an interesting, instructive, and important document. He could not understand how an ex-Prime Minister, possessing more official experience than anybody in the House, could come down and deliberately state that he would put implicit confidence in the statement of an Envoy from Afghanistan—when it was in accordance with his own views—and would not credit what was set forth on their authority by the Viceroy and his Council. He regretted the right hon. Gentleman should have adopted such a course. Speaking from his own knowledge and experience as Under Secretary of State for India at the time when these transactions took place, he could assure the right hon. Gentleman that the officers whose statements he had impugned were men of honour as high as was his own. The right hon. Gentleman had eulogised every other Viceroy, but had held up Lord Lytton to the opprobrium of the House. He could not understand why Lord Lytton, whose responsibilities and difficulties since his assumption of office had been so grave and continuous, was to be thus treated by a political opponent. Lord North-brook had recently made some amazing statements; but the noble Lord was a man of honour, and he (Lord George Hamilton) implicitly believed in his good faith. He saw no reason, therefore, why Lord Lytton and his advisers should not be treated with a moiety, at any rate, of the confidence and consideration which we reposed in his predecessor. The charges launched against them by the right hon. Gentleman were very formidable; and he hoped the House would excuse him if he went at some little length into what the actual state of affairs in India was when the present Government assumed office. If everything was at that time perfectly satisfactory, then he would admit they were unwise and deserving of blame in altering the situation. If, on the other hand, it could be shown that their relations were unsatisfactory; that every year they were getting worse and worse; that they might at any moment have been involved in a war with Russia, on account of entangling and undefined obligations, then he thought the position was altered, and that that which was in the one case unwise would be in the other absolutely necessary. It seemed to him that it was not thoroughly understood why successive Viceroys had attached such enormous importance to having a friendly and independent Power in Afghanistan. Afghanistan had a Frontier from which at any moment the Natives could invade or make a raid on India. The people who inhabited those mountains were, to use the language of Lord Lawrence, "a faithless, lawless, plundering people," who would join en masse an invasion of India from the West. It was an utter delusion to suppose that mountains were insuperable obstacles to invasion. India and Italy resembled each other in their geographical peculiarities; but no two countries had been so frequently and so successfully invaded as Italy and India, and in every single instance, save in our own case, the invaders of India came through the mountains. The reason there was so little danger there was that England was stronger in military power than Afghanistan. It was because they placed a large number of soldiers along the Frontier that they overawed the Afghans; and in proportion as the Afghans became disciplined and organized, so must we increase our Frontier forces and our military expenditure. It was said that it would be much better if they devoted their attention to internal reforms rather than to strengthening their Frontiers externally. This was true to a certain extent, but to a certain extent only. In any country, the people of which were homogeneous and self-governing, the more contented the majority were, the stronger was the Government of that country. But the people of India were not homogeneous, nor in any sense self-governing. The history of India for centuries before our advent was the rule of successive warlike minorities over peaceful agricultural majorities. The intrigues, cruelty, and rapine of these warlike tribes and castes made India for many years one battle-field; we were, in con- sequence, forced to interfere, and little by little to absorb the whole country. We, by the strong arm of the law, gave to the majority of the Natives of India a protection, such as they had never had before, from those who for centuries had fattened on them. To keep these elements of turbulence and disorder under control, we sent large numbers of troops from this country, and their presence maintained peace and order. The larger the number we had to station on the Frontier, the less there were for this purpose. To put our position in a graphic way before the House, let us assume that England was in such danger of invasion that it became necessary to garrison Portsmouth and Plymouth with Metropolitan police. The absence of the guardians of the peace might incite the criminal classes of London to do that which their presence would effectually prevent. It was for grave practical reasons such as these, and not for any chimerical dread of a Russian invasion, that we declined to allow the influence of any European Power to become predominant in Afghanistan, for the presence even of a few European officers with money and artillery would give us an infinity of trouble and expense. The next thing they had to consider was the means by which to attain that object. They made a mistake in 1838. They attempted internal interference and they failed, and for many years afterwards they did nothing to re-establish friendly relations. The history of Afghanistan for that period was well known to the House; but he must express his opinion that the policy which was sometimes called the "masterly inactivity" of Lord Lawrence, in 1864, had one great merit. It was a safe policy; but in every other sense it was absolutely unworthy of a great civilized Power. What he said to the Afghan Princes was this—"You may fight and kill each other; we shall keep the ring. Nobody shall interfere with you; and the successful combatant, who shall temporarily establish his Sovereignty, shall be entitled to the recognition of the English Government." To such an extent was this carried that there was a record of a letter being sent to the then Sovereign of Cabul, and the messenger was instructed to be careful who got it, as someone else might be in power when he arrived there. When Shere Ali over- came his opponents Lord Lawrence departed from his policy, and assisted him with arms and money. That was done at a time, certainly, when Shere Ali least required them; but he was grateful. Lord Mayo succeeded in ingratiating Shere Ali at Umballa, not because he followed the policy of Lord Lawrence, but because he departed from it; for there was no identity whatever between the original policy of Lord Lawrence and that of Lord Mayo and Lord North-brook. Lord Mayo said that the policy which his Government had adopted was an intermediate policy. An intermediate policy meant that it was the natural consequence of something already done; and, in this instance, consisted of laying down certain lines of action capable of expansion as time went on. The right hon. Gentleman opposite had said that Lord Lytton had extinguished the promises of Lord Mayo; but what authority was there for that assertion? If the right hon. Gentleman would look at the official letter addressed by Sir Lewis Pelly to Shere Ali, he would find these words—"The British Government repudiates all liabilities on behalf of the Ameer. It does not withdraw from any obligation previously contracted by it; but it emphatically denies that it ever incurred such obligations as those alleged by Shore Ali, and will never undertake such obligations without the amplest guarantees." The interpretation which Shere Ali's Envoy put on Lord Mayo's assurances was that which already had been repudiated both by the Duke of Argyll, in 1869, and Lord Northbrook in 1873. Lord Mayo, during his Viceroyalty, succeeded in satisfying' Shere Ali. He succeeded, not because he acceded to all or to most of his requests, but because Shore Ali felt that he was dealing with a man he could thoroughly trust. Between 1869 and 1873 our relations with Shere Ali were most satisfactory—more so, indeed, than they bad been at any period before or since. Then Lord Northbrook succeeded Lord Mayo, and was Viceroy from 1872 to 1876. He had a very high personal opinion of Lord Northbrook; but it could not be denied that during the time Lord Northbrook was Viceroy Lord Lawrence's policy absolutely collapsed under the management of the late Government. The basis of that policy was this. "Be quiet in your Frontiers; do not in any way frighten the Afghans: and the nearer Russia approaches towards Afghanistan, the more she will gravitate towards you—not from love to you, but from fear of the Russians." What Lord Lawrence predicted took place. The Ameer became thoroughly alarmed at the advance of Russia, and applied for definite assurances of protection. The Papers showed that his one object was to obtain definite assurances against Russian aggression. There had been some recrimination with regard to what took place in connection with the meeting at Simla. He thoroughly accepted Lord Northbrook's assurance. But the question was not what interpretation we now, in 1878, placed upon Lord Northbrook's assurance; but what interpretation Shere Ali placed upon it in 1873. This was a point of some little importance. Shere Ali believed, as was clearly shown by his letter, that his request with regard to an alliance had been unconditionally refused; and what steps did the late Government take to remove that impression? With the single exception of two telegrams from the Duke of Argyll, there is not a single line in the Office of despatches from the Duke of Argyll to Lord Northbrook on the subject during the whole time he was in India. When, however, the Duke of Argyll found his Party interests or his personal reputation attacked, he was not content to defend himself with meagre telegrams, but wrote three columns in The Times of vigorous invective. If but a moiety of the same industry had been displayed in 1873, in correcting Shere Ali's misapprehension, how different would our relations with him have been. While, on the one hand, Shore Ali found that his advances for an external alliance were rejected, on the other hand, unfortunately, Lord Northbrook was compelled to interfere, by protesting against the imprisonment of his son, Yakoob Khan. Thus the two principles of our previous policy were reversed; we refused an external alliance; we interfered internally in what Shere Ali believed to be the most sacred of the internal affairs of Afghanistan. When he contrasted the state of the relations which existed between Shere Ali and the Indian Government when Lord Lytton arrived in India and those which existed on the arrival there of Lord Northbrook, he was, he must confess, surprised at the observations on the subject which, had been made by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. During the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook the advance of Russia in Central Asia had been greater than during any former period. Khokand had been annexed; Khiva had been annexed, contrary to the assurances which had been given by the Russian Government; and a Treaty had been made with Bokhara which made Russia practically supreme in all those regions. If, therefore, there was any efficacy in the policy of Lord Lawrence Shere Ali ought to have been more friendly to us when Lord Northbrook left India than when he arrived there, because Russia was much nearer to our Frontier. Now, everybody who knew Lord Northbrook must be aware that he would leave no stone unturned to bring a policy in which he so thoroughly believed to a successful issue. Neither was he in any way overruled by the Home Government. Let the House contrast our relations with the Ameer in 1873, when he was ready to receive an English officer on a friendly Mission to Cabul, and those which subsequently existed in April, 1876. The first act of Lord Lytton was to make exactly the same request, which was curtly refused. Up to 1873 Shere Ali gratefully received a subsidy from the Indian Government; for years previous to 1876 that subsidy was sullenly refused. Up to 1873, almost to the end of 1874, not only were the letters of General Kaufmann sent to the Indian Government, but they were asked to answer them. In the year preceding 1876 the Ameer made no such request, and there was reason to believe that he was receiving a far greater number of letters then than before. Up to 1873 every request of the Indian Government and all their advances were graciously granted and accepted by Shere Ali. Between 1873 and 1876 they were invariably ignored. The Ameer positively refused, in the most discourteous terms, to allow Mr. Forsyth and other Englishmen to pass through his territory. He absolutely ignored altogether Lord Northbrook's intervention on behalf of his son; and he could not, in short, conceive a more unsatisfactory state of affairs than that which then prevailed. That was not all. During the time Shere Ali received 12 cannons, 21,000 rifles, 1,200 carbines, and £250,000. How, under those circumstances, he would ask, could the right hon. Gentleman the Mem- ber for Greenwich contend that our relations with the Ameer were so satisfactory, as he had described them to be? The right hon. Gentleman had used very strong language with regard to certain statements which had been made by Lord Lytton; but he should like to call the attention of the House to a statement which had been made by the right hon. Gentleman himself. The right hon. Gentleman, speaking a short time ago, said— We found the Indian policy of the country justly and wisely guided by a man who, though he did not belong to our political Party—I mean Lord Mayo—yet was as honest and as good a Governor General as ever hold the high Office of Viceroy of India. Within three or four months after we acceded to Office a meeting of the most friendly character was held at Umballa, where Shore Ali, the Ameer of Afghanistan, and his favourite son, stood upon the platform as friendly, by the side of Lord Mayo. Lord Mayo, at a fixed point in the proceedings, produced a jewelled sword, and handed it to Shere Ali, and said—'I trust Your Highness will use this sword with effect against your enemies;' and Shere Ali replied—'I will use it against every enemy of the Queen of England.' That was the state of feeling; that was the state of affairs which prevailed at the commencement of our government on the North-Western Frontier of India; and that was the state of affairs when we handed them over to the charge of our successors in Office.

MR. GLADSTONE

said, that he was not responsible for the accuracy of the newspaper reports from which the noble Lord quoted; but he, in truth, spoke of the state of affairs as being substantially the same.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON

said, that the word "substantially" did not appear in any report of this speech. But that our relations were, at the time of which he was speaking, eminently unsatisfactory, he thought he had demonstrated. He now had to deal with by far the most embarrassing part of the circumstances which they found to exist on their assumption of Office. Lord Northbrook had undertaken that, under certain circumstances, the Indian Government would assist Shere Ali by force in resisting Russian aggression; but he had made no arrangement whatever for carrying out that assurance. At any moment General Kaufmann might advance, and we should have found ourselves in this position—either we must acquiesce in his annexation, and imperil our influence as well as the sanctity of our assurances, or else go to war with Russia. Her Majesty's Go- vernment believed the maintenance of peace to be one of the greatest of British interests; they declined, therefore, to allow the greatest of British interests to rest on no safer foundation than the validity of General Kaufmann's assurances, or the whims of a sulky and semi-civilized barbarian. He had, he thought, revealed a state of affairs that called for some remedy. Lord Salisbury, he wished to add, had not acted in a haphazard or hasty manner in the matter. He had deliberately looked through the records, and he had ascertained, upon evidence which to his mind was perfectly indisputable, that Shere Ali was willing, in 1869, to receive British Agents in certain places. Captain Grey, whoso opinion was of the greatest weight—for he was not a mere interpreter between the Ameer and Lord Mayo, but had been specially told off to attend to that Potentate—had said that the Ameer did freely consent to the appointment of British officers in Balkh, Herat, and other places. That statement was confirmed by the terms of the despatch from Lord Mayo, as well as by the letter of Shere Ali in 1869. Yet they were now told by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich that the introduction of an Agent into Afghanistan was impossible and inconsistent with the independence of that country. In the year 1869 the language of Shere Ali was exactly the reverse. He said— I strongly hope that the British Government will always do good and be kind to me, and keep me under its protection."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 91.] Lord Salisbury, therefore, communicated with the Indian Government, and asked them to take measures to ascertain whether Shere Ali would agree to the appointment of an Agent at Herat. That Agent was to be placed there simply in order to report the proceedings and advances of the Russians, and thus to give the British Government in India time to avert a collision which everybody wished to avoid. If there was any doubt upon the matter, the reply of the Indian Government was conclusive. They said that if Russian authority were established over Turkestan It would then become necessary to give additional and more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan that we are prepared to assist him to defend Afghanistan against attack from without. It would probably be de- sirable to enter into a Treaty engagement with him; and the establishment of a British Resident at Herat would be the natural consequence of such an engagement and of the nearer approach of the Russian frontier."—[Afghanistan, No. 1, pp. 134–5.] To that despatch Lord Salisbury had replied that he could not accept the opinion that we ought to wait until Merv was occupied, as then our opportunity would, in all probability, be past. Then he said that, although a refusal to receive an Agent would illustrate the feebleness of our interest with the Ameer, yet no useful purpose would be served by keeping up an appearance of influence with him without the reality. He went on to say that he considered it of paramount importance that our whole relations with the Ameer should be put upon a satisfactory footing. The first stop would be to induce him to receive an Envoy, for which a pro-text must be found, or, if necessary, "created." To this expression "create" a great deal of strong language had been very needlessly devoted. He would undertake to say that there was not a sensible man in that House who, finding that, through misapprehension, his relations with some neighbour were becoming unfriendly, would not take an opportunity—or, failing that, create an opportunity—by which he could correct that misapprehension. That was what Lord Salisbury did; for the Envoy was to be sent for the purpose of discussing matters with Shere Ali and ascertaining what his real views were. In reply to that despatch the Indian Government once more invited the Home Government, if they wished to establish fresh relations with Shere Ali, to give instructions to the Viceroy to do so, and that was exactly what Lord Salisbury did. He gave instructions, in the most definite terms, to Lord Lytton to act in as friendly a manner as possible towards the Ameer. The hon. Gentleman opposite had assumed that our relations with the Ameer were thoroughly satisfactory. He thought he had proved that nothing could be more unsatisfactory and dangerous than the state of those relations when they came into Office. Such being the real state of affairs, it might be a matter of opinion how best they could be remedied. Some were inclined to do nothing; shut their eyes to the danger of the position, and trust to the chapter of accidents. Such a policy of inactivity was justifiable and "masterly" on one condition alone—that time was on your side. But if every year your difficulties grew, and your position became worse, a policy of inactivity was both culpable and cowardly. We wished to avert war; and, with the unhappy precedent of the Crimean War before us, we believed war could be best averted by plainly stating what we could allow and what we could not. The first essential of such a policy was to obtain accurate information as to Russian movements in Central Asia. Those who placed implicit confidence in the assurance of an Autocrat, because he had, or was supposed to have, complete control over his servants, committed a great blunder. The more autocratic a State was, the more dependent the Sovereign was upon the good-will of his Civil and Military Services. When once any policy of aggression became so ingrained in the minds of a Service as to become a tradition, there was nothing to prevent the realization of that tradition except the personal will of the Head of the State. He was liable, however, to removal by death, and other agencies. The prosecution of the policy of aggression was continuous, whilst the opposition was intermittent and uncertain. Everybody know that there was a tradition among a certain section of Russian society that it was their mission, one day or other, to conquer India. It was also known that there were certain adventurous generals in Central Asia who utterly disregarded the assurances given at St. Petersburg; and until the British Government had the power to put an Agent at Herat they were in continual danger of the outbreak of war with Russia. Every possible precaution was taken to insure the success of the Mission to the Ameer. But the tone which Shere Ali had adopted towards the Indian Government was one in which it had never been addressed before; his Envoy throughout had endeavoured to cause delay. At the very time—at the very moment—when we were proposing to concur with his master in an unconditional alliance, by which we should undertake to support him under all circumstances, there came rumours from all quarters that he was engaged in stirring up a Jehad, or religious war, on the Border. These rumours were the source of the greatest possible anxiety to Lord Lytton's Government, though they did not like to break off negotiations on that account, for it would then have been necessary to make it a casus belli. But, on the other hand, Lord Lytton did not think, in the exercise of the discretion with which he had been intrusted, that he would be justified in concluding a dynastic Treaty with a man who was endeavouring to promote a war of extermination against us. He must again protest against the manner in which the right hon. Gentleman had quoted from the despatch of Lord Lytton—that the negotiations were broken off simply because the Ameer did not show sufficient eagerness to reciprocate our friendship. If he had only read one line lower down in the despatch he would have seen what Lord Lytton's real reason was, and how, by promptty seizing the opportunity afforded by the death of the Envoy, he extricated himself from the difficulty. A great deal had been said about a change of policy, and much hard language had been used against the Government in consequence of that change having led us into war. What was this change of policy? There was no proposal to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, nor had it ever boon proposed to force upon the Ameer a Resident at Cabul whose presence would have overshadowed the authority of the Ameer. No such proposal was ever made; and it was a totally different thing to sending an Agent to the Frontier to enable the Indian Government to carry out the guarantee that had been entered into with the Ameer. In the Instructions given by Lord Lytton to our Native Agent at Cabul, which would be found on page 186 of the Papers, it was stated that It will be the duty of any such British Agents to watch the external affairs of the Frontier, furnishing timely and trustworthy intelligence thereof to the Ameer, as well as to the British Government. Should the Ameer at any time have good cause to complain that any British Agent has interfered in the internal affairs of the country, the Agent will at once be recalled. The present Government were in agreement with the late Government as to the internal policy in Afghanistan; but as regarded the external policy there was this difference—that Lord North-brook had offered the Ameer a binding, but not unconditional assurance; whereas the present Government had given an assurance which was unconditional, except for this one stipulation—that if we undertook responsibility in the matter we must have an Agent on the Frontier to prevent Shere Ali from embroiling us in war, as without it he could have done at any moment he liked. The main reason for making our assurance unconditional and definite was the evidence, of which the Indian Government were possessed, that Lord Northbrook's proposal in 1872 being conditional had caused great displeasure to the Envoy from the Ameer. In 1873, when the Ameer's Envoy came to Simla and asked Lord Northbrook to give him an English guarantee, that noble Lord, in reply, gave him a Russian assurance to the effect that General Kaufmann's intentions were perfectly friendly. He scarcely liked to refer to the sarcastic observations of the Envoy on the subject of the introduction of the name of Russia into the negotiations. He said— As regards the name of Russia, which I mentioned in connection with aggression, it was owing to an observation made by Lord Northbrook in the interview of the 12th of July, who said, 'It is necessary that the Ameer should be informed that, since the country of Afghanistan is a 'buffer' between the territories of the English and Russian Governments, it is therefore advantageous for Hindustan that Afghanistan should be strong and independent.' Therefore, since he called Afghanistan the buffer against Russia, does this, or not, prove the aggression of Russia? Ultimately the Viceroy observed that 'even a friendly Government can become an aggressor. But the English Government, considering the repeated certain assurances which they have received from the Russian Government, cannot entertain any likelihood of it.' After hearing this, I remained silent, because I thought that unity and friendship between Governments is a matter of the greatest importance."—[Ibid. p. 205.] He did not know how the English Government, with the knowledge it possessed that Russia did not care for its own assurances, could expect Afghanistan, which was most liable to attacks from Russia, to place implicit confidence in its assurances. He thought that he had shown that the situation which existed when he came into office was one with which it was absolutely necessary for them to deal. His firm belief was that if right hon. Gentlemen opposite had been in Office, and had known the facts, they would have taken the same course. Unfortunately, the Ameer did not trust the sincerity of the British Government; from first to last he had played with them. Then came this unhappy business of receiving the Russian Mission. When hon. Gentlemen opposite said that we had gone to war with the Ameer because he received the Russian Mission, they totally and entirely mistook the cause of the war, which was not because he received the Russian Mission, but because he by force refused to receive ours. For years past the Ameer had said that he would not receive any English Mission, as he could not be responsible for their lives; and that if he received English officers he must also receive Russian officers. At a moment when our relations were most strained with Russia he ostentatiously received a Russian Mission at Cabul, thus plainly showing that his previous reason against receiving English officers was a mere pretext. It must be remembered that the Ameer of Cabul was not the only Asiatic Prince with whom we had to deal. There were a great number of Princes under our protection who possessed far greater wealth and power than he did, and who were besides far superior to him in culture and intelligence. They would never be allowed, and they had never attempted, to treat the English Government in the way that the Ameer had. But because a man was a barbarian he could not be allowed to set us at defiance. They were watching our conduct in this matter; and, in all probability, if we were to act without firmness in his case some of the Indian Princes would be adopting the tactics of the Ameer. He trusted that he had shown that the action the Government had taken did not in any way deserve the language which had been applied to it; and he hoped that he had also shown that a very considerable number of the charges which had been brought against the Government were mere fictions. There was another question which had been raised. It was said that if we went to war with anyone we ought to have gone to war with Russia. But the main object and policy of the British Government as regarded the North-Western Frontier of India was to have upon it not only a friendly, but also an independent Power. If they had had a war with Russia because it had sent a Mission to Cabul, they would at once have made Russia responsible for the conduct of the Ameer, and, by making her responsible, have placed Afghanistan under Russian tutelage. We should then have had to fight Afghanistan, plus Russia; and the object of the war being to maintain the independence of Afghanistan, we should, at the outset, have destroyed it. If we were successful in the war having destroyed the independence of Afghanistan, we should have been compelled to annex it, a consummation all wished to avert. He could not conceive any single object which would have been gained by going to war with Russia. Had a little more care and attention been exercised some years ago, it was his firm opinion that the necessity for war at the present time would have been avoided. If, on the other hand, finding matters as they were, the British Government had allowed the Ameer to set it at defiance, and had not insisted upon the reception of its Mission, war would only have been postponed for a time, and would have inevitably broken out at a later period; perhaps under more disadvantageous circumstances. Before he sat down, he wished to say a word concerning the Viceroy of India, who, he thought, had not been very fairly treated in the course of that debate. It had never been the fashion before to distinguish between the Viceroy and the Government under which he served, and to hold him up to opprobrium and ridicule on questions of veracity. And if any man might have expected exceptionally considerate treatment, surely that was Lord Lytton. He was not, it should be borne in mind, a Member of one of the great political Parties, like Lord Northbrook or Lord Mayo, with many great and powerful friends in the Legislature. He had served for many years with distinction in the Diplomatic Service, and it was known that he, with great reluctance, accepted the office of Viceroy of India. From the moment he arrived until the present day, he had had to deal with a succession of the greatest difficulties. He had had to contend with famine, financial and currency difficulties, great administrative changes, and the anxiety any Viceroy must always feel when there was a great upheaval in the social and political affairs of the Eastern world. Throughout all this Lord Lytton had shown the greatest courage and ability. It must be admitted that he had not been I always understood; but there never was an abler, more courageous, and, he might say, more industrious Viceroy. And Then Lord Lytton's tenure of office came to its natural end, and it was possible impartially to consider his conduct, and, to study the numerous State Papers which, on almost every conceivable subject, he had written, he was sure that the almost universal verdict would be that under the genius of the poet there lay the true instincts of the statesman. He was very much obliged to the House for the attention with which it had listened to him while he had thought it his duty, at very great length, to endeavour to lay before the House what the course of events had been. He would not attempt to anticipate what the decision of the House would be. If adverse to Her Majesty's Government, they would once more resume their place as an united Opposition; but if, on the other hand, the verdict was in their favour, by a majority much in excess of that which they generally obtained from their supporters, he thought they might fairly take that majority as a censure upon the peculiar tactics of the past two years—tactics which, while they had elevated and popularized the Government they were intended to degrade and destroy had, on the other hand, systematically endangered those great national interests, to promote and protect which should be the common object of all.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(Mr. Grant Duff.)

Motion agreed to.

Debate further adjourned till Thursday.