HC Deb 13 August 1878 vol 242 cc1927-43
SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

said, that since Supply had been closed, two or three matters had been suddenly brought to their notice upon which it was very important that information should be given to the country before Parliament separated. Within the last few days interrogatories on the subject had been addressed to Ministers, to which very unsatisfactory replies, or no replies at all, had been received. The hon. Member for the Eastern Division of the West Riding of Yorkshire (Mr. C. Beckett-Denison) put a Question the other day with regard to the reported advance of the Russians in Central Asia, to which no reply at all was given; and a further Question, which he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) addressed to the Government on the same subject the previous day received a reply almost equally unsatisfactory. There were many of them who thought that matters in Central Asia might have continued to slumber for many years, had it not been for the manner in which the clandestine Convention entered into with Turkey had suddenly aroused feeling in Russia with regard to this country. But whatever might be the cause of the sudden activity displayed by Russia in Central Asia, there could be no doubt that there had been a movement in that quarter which was of quite a different nature to anything that had taken place for the last 10 years. In 1869, 1870, and 1873, negotiations were conducted with Russia, and it was agreed to form a neutral zone between the Dominions of England and Russia in Central Asia, that neutral zone being Afghanistan. A difference of opinion afterwards arose between the two countries as to what the boundaries of Afghanistan should be, but that difficulty was ultimately resolved. There was an agreement that no other country should seek to establish a predominating influence in Afghanistan, and that that territory should not be a country in which Russia and England should intrigue against each other, and try to get the mastery. That was the understanding; and he wished it to be explained how it was that Sir Neville Chamberlain, accompanied by a large staff of officers and a whole regiment of Lancers, was about to be sent to Afghanistan on a mission—a mission of such a character being very likely, in such a country, to lead to disturbances similar to those of 1840, if not, indeed, to a war with Russia. The Session ought not to end without some definite statement being made by the Government as to whether the facts brought before them by the papers were true or not. The Chancellor of the Exchequer made an important speech in that House on this subject, in which, referring to the debate that had taken place, he said it had been eminently satisfactory, as there had been no advocacy of a policy of annexation, or of extending the British Dominions, or of a policy of advance, in order to meet Russia midway. He spoke of feeling in favour of keeping within our own frontiers, rather than attempting to go into the country of Afghanistan. He also referred to the danger of creating suspicion in the mind of Afghanistan, and said the feeling of Englishmen of all parties was that we should keep free from the imbroglio of Afghan policy. These were distinct words used in 1869, and he should be glad to hear the circumstances which had led them to depart from that policy, if it was true that Sir Neville Chamberlain, with a regiment of Lancers, was to be sent to Cabul. There had been rumours, founded on articles which had appeared in the Russian papers, stating that an advance had taken place. An advance had, in fact, taken place in two directions; one, probably, in the direction of Merv, and the other across the Oxus, in the direction of the Province of Wakhan. In 1869, it was stated on the part of the British Government, that Wakhan was a portion of Afghanistan. Lord Clarendon, again, in 1872, addressed a despatch to the Russian Government, in which he spoke of it as being a portion of Afghanistan. Earl Granville, in 1873, made a similar statement. They had no official record of the fact that Russia accepted that view; but they found from Hansard that in 1873 both the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) and the Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. Grant Duff) stated in debate that the Russian Government admitted our information to be better than theirs, and agreed to accept our view. The House ought not to be left without distinct information on the subject before it separated. He also desired to ask the Government what information it could give as to Greece and the new frontier, which the Marquess of Salisbury had stated would be reasonable and moderate? He would remind the House that the word used in the Protocol was the French word inviter, which was a much stronger term than the word "invite," by which it had been translated, and it had been thus supposed that the Porte had been merely invited, or recom- mended, to rectify the Greek frontier, which it had evinced a great indisposition to do. The House could not afford to wait in such a matter, as it was probable that a Memorandum would not be officially communicated by the Porte to the Government until after Parliament had risen. If the Porte had not communicated its views to our Government, it had not been sparing in its communications to other persons. Many persons in Constantinople had seen a Memorandum expressing its views. He himself had heard of it by telegram, and our own newspapers gave hon. Members sufficient grounds for asking the Government what they knew about this subject. If they had received this Memorandum, or a telegraphic summary of its contents, the House ought to have it. If they had not received it, he feared it must have been purposely kept back with the view of the Parliamentary Session being closed before the Memorandum was communicated to the Powers. He would not go back upon the consideration of how far we pledged ourselves to Greece last year, but we did so as far as France did; and he should be sorry, indeed, if this country should stand behind France or Italy in connection with the carrying out of the arrangements made by the Congress. The Prime Minister had used words in alluding to this subject which were inconsistent with the Protocols of the Congress. He spoke of what the Congress did as being a mere recommendation to the Porte to rectify the frontiers and increase the territory of Greece; but it was more than a recommendation. It amounted to a direction on the part of the Powers. It was of vital importance that the small concessions made in the Protocols to Greece should be carried out; and he asked the Government, before the Session came to an end, to put the House in possession of all the information they had in their own hands. There was no doubt that difficulties had arisen in carrying out the settlement which this country had sanctioned with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also with regard to Batoum; but these were difficulties which might have been foreseen. The difficulties which had arisen in Central Asia were of great consequence to Her Majesty's Government.

MR. BOURKE

said, that, though the hon. Baronet was quite within his right in bringing forward a question of this kind at this stage of the Appropriation Bill, it was not a very convenient course, because it placed the person who had to answer in this position—that he was obliged to make the best reply he could, without having the Papers before him, and without having known the questions which were to be brought before the House. The first question of the hon. Baronet—that relating to Afghanistan—related to a subject which was perhaps one of the most delicate that could be brought before the House. The hon. Baronet had alluded to the fact that some years ago an agreement was discussed between the Governments of Russia and England with regard to a neutral zone to divide the Russian possessions from India. The agreement with regard to the neutral zone never came to any satisfactory termination. He was speaking from memory, and, therefore, he hoped the House would excuse him if he did not give exactly the details of the negotiations. But, as well as he recollected, those negotiations broke down upon the question whether Afghanistan should be included in the neutral zone or not. In the negotiations it was distinctly stated that England could not agree that Afghanistan should be included in the projected neutral zone. Upon that question the whole country was perfectly united. No doubt, it would never have suited the policy of England that Afghanistan should be treated as part of the neutral zone which would separate India from Russia. Her Majesty's Government had never disguised for a moment that we had interests with regard to Afghanistan which we could not allow a foreign Power to tamper with, and that was the great reason why the negotiations with regard to the neutral zone never assumed any definite form; he apprehended that these reasons held good at the present time just as much as they did then, and we should object now as much as we did then to any interference with Afghanistan, and even more to Afghanistan being considered as part of a neutral zone. With regard to what the hon. Baronet had said as to Wakhan, he perfectly agreed with everything the hon. Baronet had said on the subject. That was one of the topics of discussion at the time, and there could be no doubt that that Province had always been looked upon by our authorities as properly belonging to Afghanistan. Certainly, it was at the time referred to, and the misunderstandings and mistakes which arose on that subject arose out of the negotiations in reference to Mr. Forsyth's mission to St. Petersburgh, and also from the Correspondence which subsequently took place. All those doubts and difficulties, indeed, arose from the fact that a map had been sent to St. Petersburgh, which was entirely erroneously drawn by the Russian authorities in Central Asia. But when it was discovered that the boundaries of Afghanistan did really include Wakhan, that plan was abandoned by the Russian authorities, who admitted the mistake. For his own part, he had never since then seen any document which shook the opinion that Wakhan was properly included in Afghanistan. The hon. Baronet had asked what information the Government had received in reference to the late Russian movements, and alluded to the question of Russians crossing the Oxus. The hon. Baronet seemed disappointed because information was not given in answer to his Question; but the Question did not invite the information referred to. He (Mr. Bourke) certainly did answer the Question as to whether the Russians had crossed the Oxus, and stated that he had not received any information to that effect. That was certainly correct, and he did not know that he could safely give any more information on that subject. The Government did not believe that the Russians had crossed the Oxus. What they might be doing in other quarters, or where the Russian Forces were, these were questions which he did not think he could be called upon to answer now. The Government had heard that a Minister of Russia had reached Cabul; but they had no information as to what the Russian Minister had stated to the Ameer, or as to what negotiations had taken place between them. It was impossible for him to say more than that. If he were to do so, it would merely be to repeat what was mere bazaar gossip, and was not founded on any official information. It was very likely that the hon. Baronet had heard that negotiations had been opened at Cabul between the Russian Minister and the Ameer; but the Government had no official means of knowing what those negotia- tions were. At the same time, he was quite sure that the hon. Baronet and the House believed that Her Majesty's Government were not at all indifferent to the subject. On the contrary, he did not think that a more important subject could be brought before the House, and that made him the more cautious in speaking about it. There could be no subject connected with foreign affairs that was of more importance. Our mission to Cabul would not be of the character described by the hon. Baronet; but it was such a mission to the Ameer as the Government thought suitable to the occasion. Considering the information which had reached the hon. Baronet and the public through the Press, and which had also reached the Government through the Government of India, he had no doubt Her Majesty's Government were prepared to accept the responsibility with regard to any mission they might send at this time to Cabul. He did not think he should be justified in saying more at this time; but he might add that, considering what our interests were in Afghanistan, considering the position we had always taken with regard to it, considering the negotiations of 1869 and 1872 with regard to the agreement between Russia and England, when Russia pledged her word that Afghanistan was outside the sphere of all her interests—considering all these things, he did not think the House would believe for a moment that Her Majesty's Government could look on with indifference upon what they knew was occurring in Central Asia. This was all the House could expect him to say with regard to India. Then the hon. Baronet had referred to Greece. Her Majesty's Government had, over and over again, in unmistakable terms, declared their views on that subject. Certainly the Prime Minister had never concealed what his views were with respect to Greece. He had said, over and over again, that Greece had a future; and his advice to Greece was that if any country had a future, it could afford to wait a little time. As to the views of France on the subject, he would ask the hon. Baronet whether France or any other country stated at the Congress that it was prepared to force its views on Turkey? If any Power had been prepared to insist that Turkey should give up Thessaly and Epirus, it must have been prepared also for one of two things —either to see Turkey broken up, or to go to war. That was a position for which Europe was not prepared. The hon. Baronet had mentioned a certain Memorandum, in which, it was said, the Porte had declined to agree to the recommendations of the Congress on the subject of the Greek frontier. He (Mr. Bourke) had not seen that Memorandum, and he could not agree that it was in the Foreign Office. There was no reason to think that such a Memorandum had been issued. Whether Turkey would agree or disagree it was not for him to say, but the opinion of England had been recorded in the Protocols; and if she were called upon to mediate she would mediate in accordance with the words which had fallen from the mouth of the Premier—that if Greece had a future, it could afford to wait. He had given as much information as could be expected under the circumstances. He did not think he would be justified in saying more. The Government viewed as of the utmost importance the Russian advance in Central Asia and the mission to Cabul; and if the House were to debate the subject every day from this up to Christmas, it could not impress the Government more deeply than it was impressed at the present moment with the capital importance of the subject.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

could not say that the explanation of the hon. Gentleman was very satisfactory. He could have wished that some of the sentences of the hon. Gentleman had not been of so alarming a character. The hon. Gentleman had said upon the subject of Central Asia, that it was impossible, after the events which had occurred within the last two months, for the British Government to be indifferent to Afghanistan. He did not think that statement was one which should be made unless they had been told what those events were. He (Sir William Harcourt) had never been affected by the Central Asian scare. Two years ago, the subject had been raised by the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. Baillie Cochrane), and he thought it had then got a wet blanket which would have put out both the fire and the smoke. He referred to the speech of the Prime Minister, in which he disclaimed the imputation of being a Russophobist, and said that there was room enough in Asia for both England and Russia. He hoped every Englishman would determine to resist any attempt on the part of Russia to attack us in our Indian Dominions. Whether or not an advance upon Afghanistan was of that character was a different question. The authority of every person who had considered the matter was opposed to our disturbing ourselves with reference to the movements of Russia in Central Asia. There was no necessity for our troubling ourselves in the least as far as that matter was concerned. With reference to the frontiers of Greece, the statement which had been made by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was not, to his mind, satisfactory. The hon. Gentleman said that possibly recommendation or mediation would be wanted in reference to that matter; but his (Sir William Harcourt's) experience in reference to this matter led him to believe that neither recommendations nor mediation were of the least use when addressed to the Ottoman Government. On no single occasion had any recommendation had the slightest effect on that Government; nor were they ever likely to have effect, unless tendered at the point of the sword. There were recommendations and mediation on the part of the Conference of Constantinople. The Conference recommended that Bosnia should be given up to Austria; but what happened? Austria had been compelled to carry out the recommendations of the great European Powers at the point of the sword. Re-commendations and mediations continued to be made for two years, until Russia unsheathed the sword, and Bulgaria was emancipated by force of the fact that a Russian Army was present on Bulgarian soil. Her Majesty's Government had recommended that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be evacuated by Turkish troops in favour of Austria; but he did not know that the resistance to the entry of Austria into those countries was not encouraged by the Porte. Further, Her Majesty's Government had recommended that Batoum should be surrendered to Russia; but did anyone believe that save by the force of the sword Russia could have entered Batoum? In short, it must be known to everyone who had studied history that the Ottoman Government had never given up anything except in compliance with force. The Plenipotentiaries who were sent from this country to the Berlin Congress claimed for themselves that they had brought back peace with honour; but, as a matter of fact, there was no fighting when the Congress commenced or closed its sittings, and there had been nothing but fighting ever since.

MR. H. SAMUELSON

believed that both France and Italy had shown a willingness to enforce the recommendations of the Congress with regard to Greece, had they been backed by England. It was now understood that Turkey had sent a Memorandum to Greece to the effect that it was not intended to carry out the recommendations of the Congress; and although Her Majesty's Government denied all knowledge of such a Memorandum, there could be little doubt that the Turkish Government were only waiting for the Prorogation of Parliament to give effect to the Memorandum. The course of the Government had not been to incite Greece to oppose Turkey, but to encourage Turkey to resist and refuse the demands of Greece.

MR. C. BECKETT-DENISON

said, he was quite aware of the danger of speaking lightly on any point affecting our political relations in Central Asia. It was now known, however, that since the middle of July last, a Russian mission of considerable importance, headed by a well known General, had been established, and was now in existence in Cabul. It was also known, though not with the same accuracy, that certain military movements had also been set on foot from various parts of the Russian Empire in the East, the object of which had not been explained by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It was very possible that these movements were initiated at a moment when it was important to create a diversion in Central Asia, and that Russia, availing herself of every means within her power, did not scruple to set in motion these expeditions, with a view to give England occupation in the East; and if, instead of being at peace, we were now at war with Russia, he did not think we could fairly have had much cause of complaint with the course of action which Russia had taken. The question was, whether the presence in Afghanistan of Russia since the termination of the Congress in Berlin, was a hostile or a friendly act? It might be said—and no doubt it would be said— that the delegation of a mere Political Agent, though he was a resident Minister of rank, to the Court of Afghanistan, could not be regarded in any hostile sense by this country, and that we should have no cause to complain. He was not one of those who would use harsh terms towards Russia for pressing her way in Central Asia according to her own lights; nor was he at all frightened, when he raised his voice against the stealthy approach of Russia to our own frontier, at being called Russophobist. He pushed such considerations aside as unworthy of any man who thought seriously on these matters, and who knew what he was talking about. He looked upon the matter somewhat in this light. We had seen that Russia through a long series of years had gone on, by a succession of parallels, approaching her frontier nearer and nearer to that of Afghanistan; and the question was, whether what, she was about to do was sending out, as it were, another parallel in the same direction? He had very little doubt in his own mind that the objective point of the expedition was Merv; and the sooner the House awoke from its lethargy, and realized that Russia once in Merv the next point was Arat, the better it would be for the safety of this country. Khelat was already in the hands of Russia. A Russian Minister, or Political Agent, or by whatever term he might be designated, was already in Cabul; but we had no such Agent. When he read that morning that Lieutenant-General Chamberlain was to be sent out in September, he doubted that paragraph; but he was glad, from what passed that evening, to learn that that officer was a well-known general officer, in whom this country might well have confidence. He had no doubt that the aim and object of the Ameer was now, as it was that of his Predecessor, to rub the noses of England and Russia one against the other. He hoped the English Government would not permit itself to be befooled by the Ameer, or to be frightened by anything he might say or do with Russia. What we had to do was to hold a firm front by them, not to be unduly frightened, and to accept as a matter of fact the existence of the political mission of Russia as it was at Cabul; but to let the Ameer understand that there was a point beyond which we could not allow him to trifle with our interests or to annoy us. We ought to be prepared, and now more than ever. His hon. Friend (Mr. Bourke) did not insist one syllable too much upon the gravity of the occasion; and he would say this in spite of what had fallen from his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt). The speeches which his hon. and learned Friend had quoted from the present Prime Minister had no reference whatever to the present state of things. The Prime Minister was speaking in those days of the emigration of Russia to Beloochistan and Bokhara, two unimportant districts, and very different, indeed, from Afghanistan. The hon. and learned Gentleman spoke, he thought, somewhat too lightly and flippantly in regard to what was called the great neutral zone. He was very well aware that that arrangement never took the form of a Convention or a Treaty; but, still, there was sufficient to be found in the documents and despatches to enable them to speak with full authority on what was the understanding with Russia. The despatch dated from St. Petersburgh, March 7, 1869, from Prince Gortchakoff to Baron Brunnow, stated that there was a zone which separated the Asiatic possessions of England and Russia, and that there was a limit imposed by nature, beyond which it would not be prudent for either Power to go. Russia, Prince Gortchakoff said, felt no apprehension of the ambitious projects of England in Central Asia, and she had a right to expect the same feeling from England. Baron Brunnow was directed to congratulate Lord Clarendon on his desire to avoid a misunderstanding, and to give him the positive assurance that His Imperial Majesty looked upon Afghanistan as beyond the limits in which Russia might be called upon to exercise her influence, and that no desire for any interference with Afghanistan entered into his intentions. These words of Prince Gortchakoff were uttered at a time when there was profound peace between England and Russia; and if this new political Mission had been undertaken at a similar time, it was probable that the sentiments found in that despatch would probably have animated the whole discussion. But we could not forget that this Mission had been de- cided upon at a time when the relations of the two countries were in a state of extreme tension; and it was that fact, more than anything else, which gave to the present position its gravity and importance. The conclusion he had come to was that it would be better for this country to accept the residence of a Russian Minister in Afghanistan as an accomplished fact; and that, as long as possible, we should find the means of living in peace and amity with Russia in Central Asia. But, while we did this, it was well to give Russia to understand that there were certain points, which, if brought into discussion, or attempted to be seized by Russia in her own interests, would create, he was about to say, a cams belli with this country, though he was adverse to using an expression of an unfriendly nature towards Russia. He did not, however, think that the cause of peace in the future would be at all promoted by keeping our policy in our sleeves, or by leaving Russia in doubt as to those points by which we should seek to protect our own interests before all other considerations.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

I cannot think, Sir, that it is desirable to pursue at great length what may be called a hypothetical discussion, for, to a certain extent, any discussion of the proceedings of Russia in Central Asia at the present time must be regarded as hypothetical. The information which we have is not by any means complete, and it will be difficult to form any judgment upon it. Upon one point there is no doubt we have received information, and that is that a Russian Mission has been sent to Cabul, that it has now been there for some time, and that it is one of a character which gives it importance. Undoubtedly, the fact that such a Mission has been sent there is a matter which calls for the attention of the British Government. It has always been considered—and it was very distinctly put forward in the discussion of what has been called the neutral zone—that it would not be good policy, on the part of either Russia or England, to attempt to extend their movements into Afghanistan, and it was also said in those communications that if either party had an interest in Afghanistan it was England. I remember in one of the communications made to us by the Russian Government, it expressly stated that the Russian Government would look to England to use her influence to prevent certain troubles that might take place in Afghanistan; and, no doubt, it was always considered that England had the more special interest in that country. While for some time it has been a matter for consideration whether there should be an English Envoy at Cabul, the idea has always been discouraged, and nothing has been done in that direction; but now we hear that a Russian Mission has been sent there, I think it is a most obviously necessary step that we should send one of corresponding weight and dignity, in order that it may be seen that England has interests to look after, and that she has as much right to look after them as any other Court. It is the undoubted duty of English statesmen, and of the Indian Government, to watch what is going on in these regions; and I can assure the House that Her Majesty's Government are fully alive to their responsibilities. I do not think any good would come of a further discussion. The only information we have to give is that which has been already given; and as to the statement which has appeared in the public journals, I am not able to go into details, but I can say that the information there conveyed is substantially correct. In regard to the other question to which the hon. Baronet has drawn attention—the question of Greece—there is nothing to add to what my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has already said. We have not received any information of the character indicated, or any intimation that the Porte has refused, or intends to refuse, to give effect to the arrangements proposed at the Congress. Nobody doubts that the Porte looks with jealousy upon these arrangements; but we have not received any communication that the Porte has refused, or intends to refuse. Therefore, it is premature to discuss what may be the policy of England in the event of an occurrence which has not taken place. Undoubtedly, it is hoped that the arrangement agreed upon at the Congress will be carried into effect.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

said, it was quite clear that they had no definite information as to what Russia was doing in Central Asia; therefore, he thought it was not well to unduly press the Government upon that point. But what disturbed him was that they had not at present been told that the Ameer had consented to receive the Mission. All they knew was that Lord Lytton had decided to press it upon the Ameer. All the Indian statesmen of experience had earnestly dissuaded Lord Lytton from that course. They had pointed out to him that the policy was dangerous under any circumstances; but that it was a still more dangerous and difficult task, without the consent, and contrary to the wishes, of the Ameer, to force this Mission upon him. It was, in fact, worse than a dangerous policy. That was the advice which had always been given by Lord Lytton's advisers; and he must say he thoroughly agreed with it. He sincerely hoped we should not be led into great complications by the attempt to force this Mission on the unwilling Ameer of Cabul. It was true that their information was at present incomplete, and that this might be only a commercial mission; but he must venture to express his extreme regret that while we were settling greater things with Russia we did not settle this comparatively small affair, and that we had not come to some amicable arrangement with Russia in regard to the frontier of Afghanistan. A great deal had been said in regard to the neutral zone between ourselves and Russia; but he always understood that that proposal ultimately took the shape of an offer from Russia that there should be a neutral zone, defined by a line to be drawn, into which the political influence of Russia or England did not extend, and that that line should be drawn at the Upper Oxus; but that, if circumstances permitted, we should be at liberty to conquer the territory South of that line. We should then have been left to do what we liked with Afghanistan. He believed a reference to the Papers would show that the only reason why that agreement was not carried out was that if that was made the line, we should bind ourselves not to attempt to protect ourselves to the North of the Oxus. At all events, he must express his earnest hope that in this question we should come to terms with Russia in regard to Afghanistan. He hoped the matter would be settled in an amicable manner, and that the Indian finances would be spared a large amount of expenditure. In regard to Greece, he would only express his entire concurrence in what had been said by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt). It was idle to suppose that Turkey would take any steps in regard to Greece unless something was done to compel her to do so.

MR. FAWCETT

did not intend to continue this debate at length; but it appeared to him that the question was one of the greatest possible importance. The wisest Indian statesman among them—Lord Lawrence—had warned them most solemnly against this step which the Government had now taken without giving any notice to the House of Commons. On the present occasion, he only desired to ask the Government whether, before Lord Lytton decided to send this Military Escort to Cabul, any communication was sent to the Secretary of State; and, if so, whether it was considered and approved by him in Council?

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR

said, the gravity of this movement on the part of Russia could not be overrated, and he would earnestly warn the Government to be upon the alert. It was not that he had any fear of Russia, for he had always felt that if England put forth her power she could easily prevent Russia from aggrandizing herself in Central Asia. Indeed, he had always maintained that Russia had far more reason to dread the direct action of England's influence in Central Asia than England had of Russian aggression on the frontiers of India. These intrigues, no doubt, would stir up the many disaffected within India, and thereby cause us to increase our expenditure; but that was the extent of the Russian movements. When they saw, however, the Governor General of India sending the Chief of the Madras Army to Cabul, they ought to attach more importance to the movement than had been given that night. They were thereby attaching to the Ameer's intrigues a far greater importance than they deserved, and making this Chief to be one of power; whereas he was virtually a usurper, recognized by us and strengthened in his position, from which he would fall as soon as it was known that he was our enemy. There was one point which he desired to impress upon the Government, and that was this—it would be remembered that on a previous occasion, when there was reason to believe that Russian intrigues were being carried on in Afghanistan, the English Government were enabled, by sending Lord Durham to St. Petersburgh, to avoid any misunderstanding; and on the pre sent occasion he would earnestly entreat Her Majesty's Government to put this question plainly to Russia—"Do you, or do you not, mean to interfere with our Indian frontier?" He thought the Government could not possibly be too careful in the steps they took to prevent Russia getting a footing in Afghanistan. The bold measure resorted to by Lord Palmerston in 1836–7, of demanding explanations from the Russian Government, at first brought out assurances of our mistake in supposing the existence of intrigues; but when evidence was given of their extensive existence, then came out the truth of orders disobeyed, and of the intriguers being recalled and disavowed. The like result would follow now, for the moment she knew that England was prepared to take prompt and decisive steps, Russia would desist from any course of conduct which could endanger our Indian Empire.

Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.

Bill considered in Committee, and reported, without Amendment; to be read the third time To-morrow.