HC Deb 08 August 1878 vol 242 cc1567-86

SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

MR. W. H. SMITH

said, he thought this would be a convenient opportunity for stating, as far as the Navy was concerned, what changes had taken place in the programme during the four months which had elapsed since he made his Statement in March last. It would be in the recollection of the Committee that application was made to Parliament for a large sum of money, and that of that sum £1,500,000 was to be spent in the purchase of ships. As no Statement had been made to the House as to the results of that purchase, or the application of the money which was to be used for the purpose, he proposed to state to the Committee precisely how the money had been applied so far as shipping was concerned." The sum of £1,434,070 had been expended out of the Vote of Credit in the purchase of iron-clad ships. The ships purchased were the Neptune, formerly the Independencia, the Superb, the Belleisle, and the Orion. Of these, the first three were completed, so far as the owners were concerned, and this last— the Orion—was building on the Thames at the time she was purchased, and the amount which had been spent upon her was only partially paid out of the Vote of Credit. The sum paid for the Neptune-was £614,350; for the Superb, £452,895; for the Belleisle,, £240,000; and for the Orion, as far as she had been built, £126,825. In addition to these iron-clad ships, there were also purchased two ships—the Tyne, late the Mareotis, of 2,020 tons gross register, as a transport vessel; and the British Umpire, estimated at 3,400 tons, as a transport, but more particularly "as a typical armed cruiser for the protection of commerce and torpedo depot. For this latter vessel £79,000 was paid out of the Vote of Credit, and £16,000 fall on the Estimates of the year. The total sum paid out of the Vote of Credit for shipbuilding was, in round figures, £1,600,000—that was, £1,445,000 for the Neptune, Belleisle, Superb, and Orion, and 10 small craft for torpedo service, and about £140,000 for the other two ships. The result was that 14,608 tons of iron-clads, and 4,839 tons of unarmoured ships, being a total of 19,447 tons, were added to the Fleet under the Vote of Credit. In the Statement which he made in March last he said that the tonnage which was expected to be built up to the 31st March, 1878, was 15,598 tons; but the actual result, as shown by Parliamentary Return No. 245, was the completion of 16,563 tons, being an addition of nearly 1,000 tons to the amount which the Admiralty expected to build. That result was due to the increased number of hands employed in the Dockyards and to overtime. The gross result, therefore, of the shipbuilding in the Dockyards for the year ending 31st March last, and the purchases under the Vote of Credit was an addition to the Navy of 21,721 tons of iron-clads, and 14,289 tons of unarmoured vessels, making a total for the year of 36,010 tons. He felt that the addition of so large an amount of tonnage out of the Vote of Credit justified him in re-considering the programme he had laid down. The addition under the Vote of Credit was practically the amount of shipbuilding which could ordinarily be attained in one year. Few Administrations had been successful in adding more than 20,000 tons in all, and certainly not more than 14,000 tons, of armour-clad ships in any one year; and he might therefore state with some confidence that the effect of the special Expenditure of the year had been to add to the Navy one year's shipbuilding. And, moreover, this had been accomplished within the year. Ships which would take three or four years to build had been added to the Navy in a state ready for sea; or, at least, as forward as they would be if they had been launched from Her Majesty's Dockyards, after being three or four years under construction. He stated in March last that it was proposed to build four iron-clads, and he indicated to the House in a general way what they would be; but stated, at the same time, that at a later period he proposed to give more detailed information on the subject. He had come to the conclusion that it was reasonable to lay down three iron-clads instead of four in the present year, with a view to economy in the use of the resources they had, and still more with a view to the maintenance of the ships which existed in a perfectly complete state; so that as soon as any ship was brought to the Dockyard, and was worth repairing, it could be put into a proper condition both as regarded the hull and machinery. They proposed, therefore, instead of laying down four ironclads, to lay down three, and they would be of a type which he would now venture to describe. Two of them would be improved Agamemnons. Those hon. Members who took an interest in shipbuilding would understand it better if he described it as a type of the ship known to them. The Inflexible was now nearly complete, or would be so, he hoped, in the course of the current financial year; but the Ajax and the Agamemnon were not so far advanced, although great progress had been made with them. They would not, however, be completed within the year. It was proposed that two ships of the Agamemnon class should be laid down, and that they should be armed with guns of about the same weight as those of the Dreadnought— namely, about 38 tons, mounted in two turrets. Those guns, and the citadel within which they worked, would be protected by the same armour as the Ajax and the Agamemnon—that was, a maximum of 18 inches—the maximum of the Dreadnought being 14 inches. The engine power would not exceed that of the Ajax and the Agamemnon, but would be capable of producing a speed of 14 knots, or one knot higher than the Agamemnon class would have, by increasing the length of the ship to equal that of the Dreadnought and the Inflexible, and suitably arranging the form. The machinery, and all the vital parts of the ship, would be protected either by horizontal or by vertical armour. The ships would be capable of ejecting torpedoes below the water or from behind armour, and of being employed as rams. They would be much smaller and less costly than the Dreadnought and Inflexible, as the displacement tonnage would be about 9,000 tons; while the Dreadnought was a little under, and the Inflexible over, 11,000 tons, and the Ajax and Agamemnon were about 8,500. The principal alteration in the case of these new ships would be that they would have a larger supply of coal, be able to keep the sea for a longer period, and would have greater speed; but, in other respects, they would be very similar to the Ajax and the Agamemnon. The third ship which it was proposed to lay down was intended to be an improved Rupert. Hon. and gallant Members who were acquainted with the Rupert had a very high opinion of her. Naval officers had described her as being a very handy and convenient vessel. It was proposed to build another vessel of the same class, with more powerful guns in her single turret—namely, guns of 38 tons instead of 18 tons. It was proposed to construct the hull of steel, and it was hoped that the experiments which had been made with steel armour would justify its use for the armour of that ship, and also the new Agamemnon, so that the advantage of great resistance to penetration might be secured without cracking. He was bound to say that up to the present time they had not been successful in obtaining a steel plate which had altogether answered the expectations they had formed; but he had great hopes that the ingenuity, the skill, and the determined perseverance of the manufacturers of steel plates would ultimately produce plates capable of resisting a blow without cracking. If they could do that, they would obtain a very valuable result indeed, and he hoped that they would be successful in obtaining these plates before the vessels were ready to receive them. There was no doubt about the power of a steel plate to resist shot, and that, in this respect, it was of much greater importance and value than an iron plate. It was perfectly certain that if a shot went through the iron plate into the citadel it would disable the ship, while if a shot was stopped by the steel plate, even although the steel plate cracked, those who were in the citadel would be safe, and the ship would be manageable and capable of keeping the sea. But he and those who advised him wished to reserve their judgment on this question. They had, however, reason to believe that from the advance which had been made in the manufacture of these plates, they might produce plates within a period in which these ships would be ready to receive them, which would offer a very much greater resistance to shot than iron, and make the ships very much more invulnerable than 18 inches of iron had done. He would now explain to the Committee what it was proposed to do during the coming year. In the programme which he presented to the House in March last, he stated that he hoped they would complete 9,831 tons of iron-clads in the Dockyards, and 1,717 tons by contract; 3,737 tons of unarmoured ships in the Dockyards, and 2,982 tons by contract, making a total of 11,548 tons of iron-clads, and 6,719 tons of unarmoured ships, or a gross of 18,267 tons of shipping as the product of the year. The alteration of the programme, as he had already stated to the Committee, had to some extent altered the whole of those figures. They had made the commencement of three iron-clads, and abandoned one. In the place of the one which had been abandoned they proposed to build an unarmoured ship, the design of which had not been absolutely fixed; but it would be something between the Iris and the Boadicea. The result would be that they would complete 8,578 tons of iron-clads in the Dockyards, 1,717 tons by contract, and 4,830 tons of unarmoured ships in the Dockyards, and 2,982 tons by contract; making a total of 18,107 tons. They had further completed the ships which had been mentioned as having been bought by the Vote of Credit, to the extent of 1,661 tons, being a total of 19,768 tons of shipping commenced, advanced or completed during the year, as against the gross total of 18,267 tons, which he stated in March last, the alteration being that they had substituted an unarmoured for an armoured ship. He thought he ought also to state to the Committee some of the other modes in which the Vote of Credit had been expended. His hon. and gallant Friend on his right (Captain Pim) had stated in the early part of the evening that he had no confidence in merchant ships, as ships capable of being adapted for purposes of war. Well, the Admiralty were going to try whether a merchant ship could be made useful as a ship of war; and one of the first purchases under this Vote of Credit was the purchase of a merchant ship, the Hecla; which would, in the first instance, be fitted as a cruiser with guns—a typical merchant ship, with small engine power, large stowage, and great conveniences in other respects. He thought it was probable that the ship would be a success in that capacity; but even if she were not, she would become a most valuable transport, and an economical ship for that purpose. But he should state to the Committee that he had thought it his duty during the period through which we had passed to provide guns, magazines, and all the fittings which were necessary for 30 fast merchant steamers in case they were adapted for cruisers. They had all been surveyed, and we could within three weeks of the present time, if it became necessary, send these ships to sea armed and equipped in all respects as fast cruisers. They would be armed with six guns on the average. The guns were in store, the fittings were in store, the magazines were prepared, everything was ready to be put on board, and even the crews were told off. [General Sir GEORGE BALFOUR: What kind of guns?] They were long range 64-lb. guns. Even the gunners to man these ships were all ready in case it should be necessary to employ them. He could only express his very great satisfaction—a satisfaction in which the Committee would share— that it had not been necessary to employ these ships at all; but there had not been a single shilling wasted in the preparations that were made. All the stores were in hand, and would be available either for the purposes of the Navy, or for this particular purpose, if at any time it should become necessary to make use of them. In the arrangements which had been provided for, no single ship had been diverted from the traffic and trade in which she was engaged; but we could within a very short time have laid our hands upon them, and thus we should have had a very large fleet which could have been increased without much difficulty or loss of time, and which would have been capable of clearing the seas of any ships of their class with which they might come in contact. [Captain PIM: How many?] Thirty. He thought he had now stated to the Committee how the programme of the year had been affected by the Vote of Credit. He had also stated what ships had been purchased under the Vote of Credit; but he would reepat the statement now because these facts were rather apt to be forgotten. There were four iron-clads, three of which were completed—as far as they would be completed if launched in Her Majesty's Dockyards; but requiring, of course, a good deal of alteration in the hands of the Admiralty. One of them—the Belleisle—was in the Reserve Fleet; the Neptune was being got ready for sea at Portsmouth; the Superb was being got ready at Chatham; and the Orion was being completed in the Thames. The Admiralty had purchased the Hecla, a typical armed merchant steamer, which would also be used as a torpedo depot. She would carry torpedo boats at her davits, have sub-marine mining stores on board, and would be armed with four or five guns. He had already mentioned her tonnage. She was built by the builders of the White Star Line of ships, and if she were not retained as a torpedo vessel, she would become a very useful and economical transport. The effect of the Supplementary Estimates now before the Committee had been to employ in the Dockyard a number of men, which, spread over the whole year, amounted to 17,565 men, as against 16,111 men originally contemplated. The result of the employment of these men had been the bringing forward ships for commission, the increase in the tonnage which he had stated, and the very large amount of additional labour in the Dockyards, which the events of the last six months had required. He thought that at that late period of the evening it would be hardly desirable that he should go into further particulars; but the Committee were aware that very considerable expenditure had been incurred for torpedo boats out of the Estimates of the year. As many as 81 torpedo boats had been acquired. These boats had been constructed by various builders, for he thought it his duty to endeavour to find as many builders as possible who were capable of producing these boats, so that, in case of emergency, we should be able to fall back upon a number of persons to supply them at short notice. The sum of £140,240 had been expended on first-class torpedo boats, 32 in number, and £80,000 on what he should call second-class torpedo boats, of which there were 81; so that they had acquired 113 of these torpedo boats at a cost of about £220,000. Other ships had been advanced, but the new ships had been delayed. It was intended to have built 3,273 tons of new armoured ships this year; but the delay which had taken place, and the postponement of one ironclad had resulted in this—that only 1,176 tons of new ships would be built this year. That falling-off, however, was more than compensated by the advancement of the Inflexible, the Ajax, the Agamemnon, and other armour-plated ships; so that instead of any deficiency in the shipbuilding programme, they should have a greater quantity of shipbuilding than that previously contemplated—that was to say, instead of building on the whole 18,267 tons in the year, they should build 19,768 tons.

(1.) Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £1,350,140, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Expenses of the Dockyards and Naval Yards at Homo and Abroad, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1879.

MR. RYLANDS

said, that when the Navy Estimates were before the House, now several months ago, a discussion took place in connection with the first Vote in reference to the Inflexible, and very grave doubts were expressed by many hon. Members on both sides of the House as to the wisdom of the construction of further vessels of the same type as the Inflexible. In consequence of that discussion, and in consequence also, he was bound to say, of the First Lord of the Admiralty not being able to reply satisfactorily to the grave criticisms which had been advanced in the House with regard to the Inflexible, an undertaking was, as he understood, given by the right hon. Gentleman that before Votes 6 and 10 were taken, there would be a further explanation as to certain modifications of the Inflexible type, which were to be carried out in the Ajax and the Agamemnon. He saw that the First Lord shook his head, but if he was wrong in supposing that any undertaking was given, perhaps the right hon. Gentleman would now give the Committee the information which he had understood was promised. It was perfectly well known that the perusal of the evidence given before the Commission and of their Report left upon the minds of many hon. Members, and of many persons outside that House, very serious doubts as to the satisfactory character of the Inflexible. He certainly understood from the First Lord of the Admiralty that if the Votes were passed on that occasion, the Government would take care that Votes 6 and 10 were brought under the notice of the House at a time when this discussion could be continued before they proceeded to vote large sums of money for the completion of the Ajax and the Agamemnon. Well, now, in what position did they find themselves? The discussion to which he had alluded took place on the 15th of March, and from that time until the present moment, two of the most important Votes in connection with the Navy Estimates had been allowed to slumber. He thought they had very good reason to complain of the conduct of the Government in this matter. He did not know that he could blame the First Lord of the Admiralty, because he believed that if the right hon. Gentleman had his own way, he would have been glad to have brought these Votes before the Committee at an earlier period of the Session. But still they were placed in this position—that they were called upon to pass two Votes, amounting altogether to an expenditure of £3,600,000, at the very close, almost, of the Session, when it was utterly impossible for the Committee to discuss the questions involved with any prospect of a satisfactory result. They were asked to vote these large sums of money practically without any consideration. In the circumstances in which the Committee were placed, he did not intend to move the Amendment of which he had given Notice. His object in putting that Amendment down upon the Paper was, when these Votes came, to secure a discussion of the serious question as to how far it was advisable for the Government to continue to build enormous vessels of questionable construction involving a great outlay of money, and in respect of which very serious doubts were entertained by competent authorities. He complained that not only the present Board of Admiralty, but former Boards, acting under the advice of their Chief Con- structor, or of some other person, had proceeded to build three or four vessels of a certain type without taking any opportunity of testing the type of vessel to see whether it was good or not. The result had been that vessels had been put upon the stocks, and pushed forward, of a type about which there had been some question, and those vessels had become obsolete before they had actually been sent to sea. To rush into the construction of vessels of a particular type, more especially of the Inflexible type, at a time when every year brought forth suggestions of costly change, was to incur needless and extravagant expenditure. He hoped that the First Lord of the Admiralty would be able to tell the Committee that the Ajax and Agamemnon had been so far changed in their construction that the defects which had been pointed out with reference to the Inflexible were not likely to be found to exist in the vessels which were now being built.

CAPTAIN PRICE

had thought that the controversy respecting the Inflexible had been finally closed; but, as that question had been raised again, he must say that he sympathized, to a certain extent, with the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) in the doubts which he had expressed as to the desirability of going on with the building of vessels of the Inflexibletype. But he did so for exactly the reasons which he gave when the question of the safety of the Inflexible was discussed. The hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. E. J. Reed) stated that ships of that class, on being subjected to heavy artillery fire, would become perfectly unsafe; and he (Captain Price) argued that the Inflexible was a perfectly safe ship, inasmuch as it would be impossible, under ordinary circumstances, to fire a sufficient number of shells into her to cause such a destruction of her unarmoured ends as to render her unsafe. It was for that very reason that he thought the Board of Admiralty were making a mistake in building these ships to carry a few very heavy guns. He found that that was the opinion also of many able naval officers. Quite lately this subject had been brought very prominently before the Navy. Several naval officers had competed for a prize given by the Admiralty, with, regard to the general designs of ships, and one of the points upon which they had all touched was this question of the number of guns. One officer had stated that a vessel of the Inflexible type, having four 80-ton guns, and firing at a similar vessel, could only be expected to hit from two to 15 times out of every 100 shots. That view had been very curiously verified in the action between the Shah and the Huascar. The total number of projectiles which was fired from the Shah and the Amethyst at the Huascar was no less than 430. How many of these projectiles did the Committee suppose struck the Huascar? Only eight—that was to say, something like 2 per cent. [Mr. D. JENKINS: At what distance?] That was the point. If they were always at Shoeburyness, and knew the range, they might put more shot into their target; but the distance was just one of the elements of uncertainty. What he wanted to argue from this was, that the Admiralty seemed to be running a-head rather too far in the matter of guns and armament. People asked, very naturally, where was all this to stop? They said that there was practically no end to it, and that civil engineers must decide for them where the end was to be. He entirely denied that. He maintained that naval officers ought to decide where the end was to be, and he thought that they could decide it. With regard to these monster guns, it was all very well to bring the greatest science of the country to bear upon their manufacture. No doubt, they produced an article which certainly was a very magnificent and beautiful weapon. They spent thousands of pounds in making it, and they spent hundreds of thousands in putting it afloat; but they did not ask themselves fairly, and by experiment, what they were to do with these guns when they had got them on board. Because, when the supreme moment came that they had to use these guns in action, they placed them under the control of a human, fallible creature, with all his imperfections visible upon him, and they could not say whether the shell which was under his control would hit the enemy or not. That must be so. They could not poise it. Therefore, what he maintained ought to be a part of their policy in building ships was that they should have a greater number of guns. The number of rounds which the Inflexible, with four 80-ton guns, could fire in 10 minutes was only 12, the weight of projectile thrown out in that time being nine tons. Besides considering the weight and size of the guns that were put in a ship, it was very desirable to consider what chance there was of hitting with those guns; and in future ships they ought rather, in his opinion, to have a greater number of moderate-sized guns than a diminished number of specially heavy guns.

MR. BELL

doubted whether it would be quite safe for the Government to follow the advice which had been given them by the hon. and gallant Member who had last spoken. It would be difficult to say where they should have been landed if they had only naval officers at hand to advise them during the last 50 years. But one thing was quite certain, that they had had to wait for Sir William Armstrong to devise a gun of the necessary power that was now required in order to penetrate the iron plates of their vessels. There was no question that the manufacture of iron was, at the present moment, in a state of revolution. It was difficult to say what the future might be. They talked easily and lightly of iron and steel when, in point of fact, those best acquainted with the subject had not yet determined what was iron and what was steel. He mentioned this in order that the authorities might use that caution which they had up to this time exercised. With great prudence and propriety, they had consulted the manufacturers as to the mode of procedure to be pursued; because it was quite clear that without the assistance of the manufacturers and those well acquainted with the mode of preparing the metal, and with its quality when so prepared, very little way would be made without great hazard. There was no doubt in his mind that England might claim the merit of being foremost in the manufacture of armour plates; but he would caution the First Lord of the Amiralty against believing that other countries, and notably France, were not coming to the front in this particular industry. While in France recently, in the capacity of a juror at the Paris Exhibition, he had an opportunity of examining a new form of armour-plating of cast iron, which he took the liberty of recommending to the First Lord of the Admiralty, and he believed that the right hon. Gentleman was about to send someone to examine into that system of armour-plating. The question of armour-plating was one essentially of experiment. Their own Government went to a great amount of expense in testing armour-plates with ordnance of various calibre, and the results of these experiments were very properly detailed in a Blue Book. But in this matter, he had to reproach the Government with a certain parsimony. He had been unable, except in the Library of the House, to obtain a copy of this Blue Book, which was one of the works which ought to be in the hands of every practical ironmaster who wished to promote the object they were discussing.

MR. BRUCE

said, it appeared to him to be the duty of the Admiralty, while seeking to obtain the best scientific advice available, to keep up the strength of the Navy on the best models which, for the time being, could be suggested to it for that purpose. It was perfectly true that these models were invariably subjected to very hostile criticism. There were many gentlemen, very well informed, who said that all the ships the Admiralty were building would inevitably go down, and that those which did not happen to go down would be useless for the service for which they were intended. But that was no new complaint, and he hoped that the Admiralty would continue to produce ships after the test models at their command, so as to keep their Navy at the head of the Navies of all other nations with which they might be brought into contact. It was said that certain of their great ships—such, for instance, as the Inflexible—might, under very extraordinary circumstances, be unsafe. He was no judge of these matters. He pretended to no knowledge on the subject; but it had always appeared to him that if they were to build a powerful ship on the understanding that after her two engines were blown up she should then be as good as at the beginning, they were proposing a problem very difficult to solve. Be that as it might, it would appear that the class of vessel of which the Inflexible was a type, had been very largely adopted, and there could be no doubt that under ordinary circumstances, when their two ends were not blown away, they would be very formidable fighting ships. It would not be expedient, therefore, for the Admiralty to leave this country dependent for its protection on vessels which were inferior in fighting power to those of other countries; because vessels of the type he had mentioned might possibly, at some period, become unworkable. It was the business of the Admiralty to maintain their Navy at a point which would give it superiority over the Navies of other nations, even although, in so doing, they did not obtain the ideal model which the hon. Member for Burnley had suggested. They had heard some remarks from hon. Members on both sides of the House, with regard to the construction, equipment, and plating of iron-clads, which certainly ought not to be lost sight of, and which he was sure would not be forgotten by the First Lord of the Admiralty. They had often, on former occasions, heard the opinions of hon. Members who were fully able to discuss the question; but he ventured to say that there were gentlemen other than those in the House whose opinions were worth hearing. If they went upon the information obtained within the House alone, the Admiralty would lose the advantage of external authority which it might use, and which might prove to be very valuable. He thought it to be our duty to maintain the Fleet of England in the best condition possible, both with the lights al- ready before us, and the lights which the Admiralty could get from other sources. The question raised by the hon. and gallant Member for Devonport (Captain Price), as to whether a ship should have more than a small number of guns, was one of very great importance; but it could not be decided within the House. It was, in his view, necessary to trust to the Admiralty when they came forward and proposed any particular form of ship; and although that form might be open to objections, we must give them power: to adopt the form which, in their judgment, appeared to be the best suited to our requirements.

MR. CHILDERS

might, perhaps, be allowed to say, speaking for himself only, with regard to the amended programme for the year, that the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty had taken a very wise course, on the whole, in changing the number of iron-clads. He now proposed to complete three instead of four ships, and he (Mr. Childers) was not at all surprised that he had found this plan to be a more convenient one than that which he at first intended to carry out. But this was not the point which most concerned him at the present time. It struck him that the present was a good opportunity for the Admiralty to determine, in a greater degree than heretofore, to carry through with the utmost expedition work taken in hand, so that when a new ship was laid down, nothing should be allowed to interfere with continuous work on it. He was quite aware that it was very difficult to make a change in the system under which the Dockyards had been working for so many years, under which changes were perpetually proposed in ships after they had been laid down, and they were again and again delayed until those changes were determined upon. Of course, his remarks did not apply to the question — the most important question—of change in the character of the iron or steel armour which had to be applied to some of those new ships. There could be no doubt that the discussions which had been hold on that point had been of great advantage. He had listened with great attention to the observations of the hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Bell), who possessed a practical knowledge of the subject, and he quite agreed with him that the improvement of steel and iron now in progress, as well as the improvements in the character of metal which could be applied to the sides of our ships, led to the opinion that we were on the verge of some valuable reform in that respect. But whatever might be the character of the armour ultimately to be applied, it was, in his opinion, desirable to push on the framework of the ships themselves, so that there should be no delay when the armour question was ultimately settled. He desired to refer briefly to another matter. The First Lord of the Admiralty had described the Hecla as a ship of small engine power, and added that he thought she would be very useful as showing what we could do when it became necessary to fall back upon the Merchant Service for ships required for certain purposes, and he said that she would be otherwise useful as a cruiser or transport. Now, he would very much regret to find the statement with regard to her small engine power to be correct; because the special merit of these steamers taken from the Merchant Service was their great speed. When it was remembered that ships of 13, 14, and 15 knots were employed in the Merchant Service, he thought it would appear that we had bought what was of very little value for the purpose intended. He should, therefore, be obliged if his right hon. Friend would give some information upon that point.

MR. W. H. SMITH

said, he cordially agreed with the opinion of his right hon. Friend, as to the expediency and necessity of accelerating the work when once it had been undertaken at the Dockyards. But there were conditions which his right hon. Friend himself was aware of, which pre-eminently required a certain amount of consideration, and the particular matter of armour was one that was giving Her Majesty's Government a great deal of anxiety, and which might possibly involve delay in the completion for sea of the Inflexible, Ajax, and Agamemnon. He would not be justified in coming to a conclusion at present upon a question which was admitted to be one of very considerable importance. Her Majesty's Government agreed most completely and thoroughly with the principle laid down by the right hon. Gentleman, that the work should be finished as quickly as possible; but it frequently happened that they were obliged to make some alteration in the work to be undertaken which was the cause of delay. He was hardly in a position, at that moment, to give an answer that would convey sufficient information on the effect which the year's expenditure would have upon the future Estimates. They were only now beginning to draw breath; but he could assure his right hon. Friend and the Committee, that there was no one more desirous than himself to bring the expenditure for the Navy to a point which would be thoroughly satisfactory to the House and the country. He had, with the assistance of his Colleagues, considered the subject; but he did not wish to be committed to any statement of opinion. With regard to the Hecla, her horse power was 2,000, with a tonnage of 3,400; her speed was stated to be 12½ knots. She was purchased as a transport, and would be fitted as a transport by way of experiment; and unless the ship had been bought, it would have been impossible to get hold of a merchant ship to be treated in this manner, As soon as their experiment was complete, and they had satisfied themselves that such description of ship could be used with safety for the purposes intended, she would go into the general transport service. His hon. and gallant Friend (Captain Price) had spoken of the importance of having more guns of less heavy calibre. This question had been very often under discussion, and with regard to it there existed great differences of opinion. It was to be borne in mind that a great many guns meant a great many men to work them, and that they would have to be spread along the sides of the ship in a manner that would interfere with the design of the armour. The engagement between the Shah and the Huascar had resulted, according to a good authority, in 2 per cent of the shots striking. He thought this case afforded an argument in favour of ships being armoured in their vital parts, because, had the Shah closed with the Huascar—which, being a large unarmoured ship, she could not do—at short range, a single shot from the Huascar would have sunk her. The hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) was a great authority on these questions, and he (Mr. W. H. Smith) would be exceedingly sorry to treat with any want of respect the remarks which the hon. Gentleman might feel it his duty to make. He believed there was probably no higher authority in the House. The Admiralty had no preference for any particular construction. They had consulted those best able to advise them, including the officers who would be called upon to go to sea in those ships, and, perhaps, fight them; and their object was to keep their eyes open to every kind of improvement, and, by setting the form of one ship against another, to arrive at last at the very best that could be obtained. They felt themselves deeply responsible, not only to the House, but to the country. Although like other men, they were liable to error, they believed that, on the whole, the form adopted was the best in itself, and one which, on the whole, would tend most to strengthen the Navy of this country. They had no favour for one plan over another, but bestowed weeks of anxious consideration in considering the plans submitted. The plan of the ships decided upon was the best result of their judgment, and he hoped the House would sanction the course which they had adopted. With regard to the Inflexible, and the remarks of the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) in relation to that vessel, he certainly had not undertaken to bring on the subject in any form, nor to make any alteration, as far as the Inflexible was concerned. It was impossible to have a perfect ship —that was to say, a ship that would keep out any shot, that would be absolutely safe under all circumstances, which would be available for every condition of warfare, and, at the same time, be capable of causing the greatest amount of damage to the enemy with the least possible risk to herself. All he could say was that if any hon. Gentleman could design a vessel uniting all those qualities, he would be deserving of the greatest possible reward. The ships now building were not perfect ships; but were the best which, under the circumstances, the Admiralty could devise.

MR. WHITWELL

wished, in looking back to the time when the subject of the Admiralty Votes were before the House, to express his great gratification at the freedom from accidents during the administration of the right hon. Gentleman. At the same time, he did not for one moment express any approval of the propriety of the movements of the war ships. He believed we had now in the Mediterranean a larger amount of tonnage than had ever been in that sea before. It had been crowded during the last 12 months, and they had not heard of any ship getting on the rocks, and being afterwards towed off. He therefore desired to express his feeling of gratification at the good management in the Fleet which had been exhibited. The right hon. Gentleman had alluded to the ships which the Admiralty could at any time lay hands upon readily. He understood the right hon. Gentleman to state—and the country would hear it with gratification—that at any moment he could lay his hand on ships of greater speed than 12½ knots an hour, and that the equipment of those ships was in hand. He also understood him to say that he had not yet negotiated with the owners of those ships, and had not paid any money for the right of pre-emption. He (Mr. Whitwell) would be glad to know whether we had power to take possession in such a way as was possessed by the American Government, or whether the transference would at the time be simply a matter of purchase?

MR. W. H. SMITH

said, that the hon. Member for Kendal (Mr. Whitwell) had been good enough to attribute to him a great deal more than he deserved. If it were the case that there had been no disaster whatever in the Mediterranean Fleet during the last year, it was due to the conduct and care of the gallant officers in command of the ships. He was quite prepared to accept any credit which might fairly belong to him; but, in the present instance, no credit whatever was due to him. With regard to the merchant ships that had been surveyed by the Surveyors to the Admiralty, they could acquire a much more considerable number than 30—probably 100 vessels, when they were needed— but he had not thought it right to make any bargain whatever with the owners. If any necessity arose, there would be no difficulty whatever in acquiring these ships at prices which would be for the occasion cheap; but any bargain which he might now make would be onerous to the country. It would, moreover, disturb their multiform arrangements, which he desired should go on in regular course. If occasion arose, he should instantly obtain powers from Parliament to deal with the subject.

CAPTAIN PRICE

asked, whether the right hon. Gentleman could hold out any hope that the examination referred to in the foot-note to the Estimate, relating to the clerical department in the Dockyards, would take place? The matter was one of very great anxiety for the officers, and he (Captain Price) had a strong wish that it might be taken into consideration.

MR. W. H. SMITH

replied, that the Accountant General's Department had received the necessary sanction, and would shortly proceed to consider the subject referred to.

Question put, and agreed to.

(2.) £1,199,300, Naval Stores for Building and Repairing the Fleet, &c.

(3.) £1,042,000, Steam Machinery and Ships built by Contract, &c.

(4.) £148,802, Greenwich Hospital and School.

(5.) £678,000, Supplementary sum in respect of Extraordinary Naval and Transport Services.

(6.) £434 7s. 5d., Greenwich Hospital and School (Excess, 1876–7).