SUPPLY—ARMY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE.

HC Deb 07 August 1878 vol 242 cc1456-93

SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

(1.) Motion made, and Question proposed, That a further Supplementary sum, not exceeding £1,845,600, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge for additional Expenditure for Army Services consequent upon the War between Russia and Turkey, and the Native outbreak in the Cape of Good Hope, &c, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1879.

MR. HAYTER

rising, pursuant to Notice, to move that the Vote be reduced by the sum of £25,000, the charge for the erection of Huts in Cyprus, said, he had no wish, in proposing that reduction, to enter into a discussion of the larger political questions which the House had been engaged in debating during the previous week. The object he had chiefly in view was to call the attention of the Committee to the enormous increase which the Supplementary Estimate now under their consideration would cause upon the Military Estimates presented to Parliament in the ordinary manner. Even the ordinary Estimates of the Army for this year amounted to £14,965,000, whereas, for the year 1873–4—the last year that Lord Cardwell was at the War Office—the amount was only £13,231,000, thus showing an increase for this year of no less than £1,734,000. But in addition to the £14,965,000, it had been found necessary to provide a sum of £350,000 for pay and allowances for the Indian troops, and the Committee were now called on for a further sum of £1,845,000, or a total of £17,160,000. There might be a slight deduction from that amount, because of repayments from the ordinary Estimates; but that was so small a matter as to make little or no difference in the calculation. The real fact remained, that the country must make up its mind to expend this year a sum very closely approaching to £17,000,000 for military purposes. The military expenditure in India, also, was about £17,000,000, so that the aggregate expenditure on the Armies of the two countries amounted to no less than £34,000,000. The next point to which he wished to draw the attention of the Committee was that if we were to embark on the totally new policy of taking our Indian troops for Imperial purposes out of India, we should be doing not only a very mischievous thing, as regarded the military efficiency of our soldiers, but also adopting a course which would add very largely to the taxation of the ratepayers of the country. We should be reversing the policy of former times, in accordance with which we drew upon England as the reservoir for India, and making India the reservoir from which troops were to be taken for military service whenever they might be required. That, it seemed to him, was a most dangerous change to make. It would be in the recollection of the Committee that the troops which had been recently brought from India to Malta had been selected from all the three Presidencies—Bombay, Bengal, and Madras —and they included Cavalry and Artillery as well as Infantry. The adoption, then, of that course was tantamount to saying that if another emergency happened to arise, it was intended to use the entire strength of the Indian Army for Imperial purposes in Europe, or anywhere else, where their assistance might be wanted. ["Hear, hear!"] He was not surprised that hon. Gentlemen opposite should cheer any allusion to such a policy; but if they would refer to the Report of the Select Committee of 1869, they would perceive how important were the financial considerations connected with the use which they wished to see made of those Indian troops. It was the opinion of Lord Napier of Magdala himself that the use of them out of India would mate- rially affect the question of the economy which their employment in India secured. If they were to fight side by side with European troops, there must be a very large increase in the cost of their food clothing, and medical attendance, not to speak of the necessity of providing for them those increased comforts in barracks which they would see enjoyed by their European comrades. Then arose the question whether the Indian troops were, in any sense, equal to the European as a military machine. Upon that point he did not wish to say much; but he must call attention to the fact that, with one unanimous consent, our military authorities had decided that no Colony could be left if it had guns to be manned, to be defended by Native troops only. More than that, it would be found that in all the great wars which had occurred in India, there had been a nucleus of Europeans to stimulate and encourage the Native soldiers. It had been so from the days of Plassey downwards; and the European troops had always been called upon to bear the brunt of the fight. At the battle of Plassey a single European regiment had laid the foundation of our military supremacy in India. At Meanee, one regiment, the 22nd, had borne the brunt of the day, and at Ferozeshah—the most desperate battle, perhaps, fought in India—50,000 fresh troops under Akbar Khan had retired without striking a blow, because their rear was threatened by English artillery. Next came the question of the relative pay of the officers and men of the two Armies, and he wished to point out to the Committee that the very lowest subalterns in one of those Native regiments was at the present moment receiving higher, or at any rate equal, pay with the senior officer of an English regiment—the officer, for instance, in command of the 42nd Highlanders. The evidence of His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, he might add, went distinctly and strongly to show that if the officers and men of the two Services were fighting side by side, it would be absolutely necessary to consider the whole question of their relative pay, and to place the officers of both—at least, approximately—on an equality in that respect. Then came the question of using Indian troops merely for garrison duty. The result of so employing them would, in his opinion, be to involve the country in a great expense; for it was undoubtedly the view of the ablest witnesses who had been examined before the Committee, to which he had referred, that they could not be called upon to serve in any of our Colonies for a longer period than three years. They might, of course, be forced to do so; but it was pointed out in the Report of the Committee that such was the desire of these men to return to their homes, that if they were kept away from them for any length of time, discontent would in all probability arise in their ranks, almost amounting to mutiny, and that our prospects with respect to recruiting in India would, in consequence, be seriously injured. The expense, also caused by the camp-followers, who invariably accompanied the Native troops, must be taken into account. On that point, the statistics of the Abyssinian War threw some light. He found from the draft Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Abyssinian Expenditure, that the number of Native troops employed by Lord Napier of Magdala in the Abyssinian Expedition was 15,000, and that they had brought with them an equal number of camp-followers, besides a number of animals. Of these baggage animals, no less a number than 28,673 died, and they cost this country the sum of £1,147,000. He would not go into the enormous expenses for transport incurred during the war, which amounted to no less than £4,000,000 including the hired vessels as well as those belonging to the Government. He trusted before we were again embarked upon such a policy as that, the country might know how far it was intended to carry it. The House ought to know from the right hon. and gallant Secretary of State for War how long it was intended to keep the Indian troops in Cyprus. They knew that those troops were an enormous expense to this country; because not following the precedent of former years—and, he believed, rightly departing from it—the whole of the expenses of these troops would be borne by the Imperial Exchequer. He rejoiced that such a course had been adopted, not only because it was just to India, but because it would now be made apparent to the country what this policy cost us. With regard to the Vote, he would ask if it was likely that any permanent expenditure would have to be made on barracks in Cyprus. He understood that these huts were to be made of a class of iron which he was informed on good authority would corrode with the night dews of the Mediterranean, and wear out very rapidly. Then there were to be metal roofs, which would, of course, get exceedingly hot during the nine months' hot season, with the probability of seriously affecting the health of the troops. He need not point out to the Committee that already an epidemic had broken out amongst the troops, and that many men were down with fever in one of the Indian regiments. He understood that the 42nd Highlanders were to be encamped on the highest parts of the Island, because it would hardly be permitted to treat them with neglect. But these were not the only expenses Cyprus was likely to cost England. A large sum would have to be spent before the roadsteads could be turned into harbours, and this must be done if we were going to hold the Island permanently. The House also knew that a large expense would be required for drainage and water supply. He would detain the Committee no longer. He would only say that the employment of the Indian troops was by no means an economical measure, because we obtained a very inferior article for a much greater expense. He begged to move the reduction of the Vote by £25,000.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That a further Supplementary sum, not exceeding £1,820,500, he granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge for additional Expenditure for Army Services consequent upon the War between Russia and Turkey, and the Native outbreak in the Cape of Good Hope, &c., which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1879."—(Mr. Hayter.)

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

Mr. Raikes, I will not intervene for more than a few minutes between the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War and the Committee. I think it is somewhat remarkable that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman should not have risen in the first instance, and have given some explanation of these Supplementary Estimates. As I understand the Vote was put from the Chair, and had it not been that my hon. and gallant Friend who has just addressed the Committee rose to make the observations which he has made, the Vote would have been passed without any explanations whatever. Sir, I can understand that the Government may not think it necessary upon this occasion to enter into any detailed explanations, or any further explanations, as to the policy of employing Indian troops in Europe. We have already passed Estimates which more or less sanctioned that employment, and I understand the Government do not think it necessary that any further explanation, in the absence of debate, should be given by them upon that point. But these are the first Estimates in which we have had before us any part of the expenses which have been incurred in connection with the military occupation of the Island of Cyprus, and I do think upon this occasion we have a right to expect from the Government that they should place the Committee in possession, of all information which relates to it, and in reference to what has been done, and what is going to be done in Cyprus. Sir, I must admit that in the absence of explanation I am totally at a loss to know what has been the object of the military expedition which has taken place, and of troops being sent to Cyprus. I understood my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to say last night that the ordinary garrison of Cyprus would be 2,000 men; but I believe 8,000 men have been sent there. What have 8,000 men been sent there for? What is there in the state of Cyprus, or in the state of our relations with any European Power in connection with Cyprus, which makes it necessary to send that large Force into Cyprus? Not only was such a course not necessary, but the country has been placed at a great disadvantage by such policy. To begin with, there is a very large expenditure for transport, and far more serious and important than that is the fact that a large number of men have been sent to an Island, as I understand, Sir, imperfectly provided with accommodation to receive them, and an Island the climate of which is not at all conducive to health. I think there is very serious reason to fear, unless we hear an explanation from the Government to the contrary upon the point, that very grave sickness may break out amongst the troops so hastily sent, and without any preparation whatever; and we have a right to expect from the Government some information as to the reasons which induced them to send these troops, and what preparations and precautions they have made for the preservation of health. Sir, it is said that the Indian troops were going to India, and that they would have already been sent but for the absence of transport, and for the difficulties of their being sent through the Red Sea at this time of year. If such orders have been sent out, I think the policy of the Government is still more incomprehensible. If these Indian troops are now sent from Cyprus to India, I think the question will arise, Why were they sent to Cyprus at all? It would not be, perhaps, altogether unreasonable to expect from the Government upon this occasion some explanation as to the permanent military expenditure which is likely to be involved by this occupation. Barracks, I presume, will have to be erected, military stores will have to be provided, and there will be all the other expense which is always connected with the military occupation of any possession. Perhaps, it is probable the Government will not be in a position to give us any full information upon those points. It is quite evident that the policy is one hastily adopted, and I should not be much surprised to find that neither the Admiralty nor the War Office are in a position to give any very accurate or detailed information upon the military or naval value of Cyprus, or as to the works and expenditure which will be necessary in order to make its advantages as valuable as possible. At all events, whether we are to have any explanation or not as to the permanent expenditure likely to be entailed upon the country by this occupation, I do think we have a right to know what were the reasons for this sudden and, as it appears to me, totally unnecessary expedition which has taken place, and what are the preparations and provisions which have been made against the outbreak of disease and sickness amongst those troops which have been so hastily sent.

COLONEL STANLEY

I can assure the noble Lord that it was far from my intention to withhold any information from the Committee, or in any way to shrink from making a statement. The reason I acted as I have was this. The Motion of my hon. and gallant Friend (Mr. Hayter) stood upon the Paper, and I thought it a matter of courtesy to him that he should have an opportunity of at once proceeding with his Motion. I may, perhaps, be out of Order in answering the queries of my hon. and gallant Friend. He has referred to the Indian troops, and I am bound to point out that there is nothing whatever about the Indian troops in the Estimate which is before the Committee. But it is a small point, and, with the permission of the Committee, I will answer briefly the questions which my hon. and gallant Friend has asked me in respect to the Indian troops.

MR. HAYTER

I beg my right hon. and gallant Friend's pardon, but there is a reference to the Indian troops in the Estimate.

COLONEL STANLEY

Oh, yes; so there are a few small charges which have some connection with the Indian troops, but these escaped my notice. Now, with regard to these troops, my hon. and gallant Friend has spoken as if we contemplated using these troops habitually. I do not think from anything I have said, or anything any Member of the Government has said, it can have been taken for granted that the use of these troops would be under all circumstances habitual. The position we have taken is this. These troops were available, and as they had been used several times before, we thought, at the time we employed them, that the emergency was such as justified their employment. But I am bound to say I have carefully endeavoured to guard myself from ever implying that the use of these troops would be habitual; and, on the other hand, I have given a distinct explanation, in a contrary direction. My hon. and gallant Friend has said a good deal as to the expense of these troops; but if he chooses to take that ground, I must say I am of opinion that, as a matter of fact, these troops, taken regiment for regiment, are of no greater expense than the British troops. I will merely state facts—I do not wish to enter into an argument one way or the other; but I make out, taking one establishment with another, it will be seen that the cost of a British regiment is not less than £40,000 a-year, and my decided impression is that regiments of Indian troops would cost, even under the circumstances in which they are now employed, de- cidedly less. Of course, I except transport charges. There is, no doubt, inconvenience, as was mentioned by the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) in bringing officers to serve side by side at different rates of pay. But that arises in this way. We thought that the Indian troops, being entitled to their own rates of pay, should bring them with them; but, at the same time, we did not see, on the other hand, why European troops serving in the Colonies should receive a higher rate of pay merely because they were brought from India. Well, Sir, I do not think I ought to follow this subject more, and I would rather pass on at once to what I have to say with regard to the circumstances of the occupation of the Island of Cyprus. Now, I find myself in some difficulty, because the information I have at present is, as it must be, of a very tentative character. But I have, probably, as good a means of information as anyone can have. But one of the great difficulties is to ascertain precisely what the circumstances of the Island are. The circumstances under which the occupation of the Island took place, I suppose, I need hardly refer to. I will point out that when it was decided that the occupation should take place, a High Commissioner was appointed in the person of Sir Garnet Wolseley. He was chosen as High Commissioner and Administrator in the name of the Queen. Sir Garnet Wolseley, having had some similar experience as it were, took out with him, in the first instance, certain selected officers, well known to him, who had been employed under similar circumstances and other places; and who, by their administrative capacity and vigour, both of body and mind, were naturally considered to be the best to assist him in the very arduous task he has undertaken. The £10,000 mentioned in the Estimate, and of which I spoke the other day to my hon. and gallant Friend, include the Staff pay of these officers. Sir Garnet Wolseley is placed on the same footing as the Governor of Malta and Gibraltar, exercising the double capacity of Civil and Military Governor. He is assisted by those officers who draw their special service pay, amounting, in most cases, to £1 a-day. We have been asked why the charge for government is not larger; and, Sir, I believe if hon. Members had examined the facts carefully, they would have seen the reason for it. The fact is, the charges of the government and administration of the Island will, for the greater part, be paid out of the revenues of Turkey. The High Commissioner has very wisely, as I understand, decided not to disturb, more than he can help, the existing system of administration, at all events, until he is quite certain he has got something better to put in its place. What he has done, therefore—and I am sorry I cannot place the Correspondence before the House, but it is only from private letters I have received from officers —is to send an officer into each district of the Island to report to him, to act as a sort of Resident, and therefore bring the authority of the Island in direct communication with the Lord High Commissioner. He himself has occupied a seat of government at Nicosia, and the troops are distributed in various portions of the Island, the principal portion being in camp in the neighbourhood of Larnaca. I understand that they are in perfect health, and that there is an abundant supply of water. It has been often said there is no water at all in the Island. No doubt, as in all other countries in that part of the world, a certain amount of prudence and care were required, and above all, any unnecessary exposure must be avoided. Those who are there must also take all reasonable precautions against fever and malaria. The greater part of the Island is by no means unhealthy. There have been a few slight cases of fever; but I have had letters up to a week ago, and I have had a communication by telegraph since, and I am not aware that any deaths have occurred. Certainly no epidemic has been spoken of as general; though it has been stated that the weather is very hot, and care therefore is necessary. With regard to the troops going to the Island imperfectly equipped, as the noble Lord has said, I can only say—

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

I did not say imperfectly equipped. I said they had gone without any preparation for their reception.

COLONEL STANLEY

I thought the noble Lord said imperfectly equipped. Well, we thought it was not expedient to make arrangements for these troops until, at all events, Sir Garnet Wolseley had had ample opportunity of inspecting the Island, to say where they should be distributed, and what arrangements should be made for them. The troops took their camp equipments with them, and I understand there has been no difficulty in their camping them at once in the stations which had been assigned to them. And I may here say that nothing I have seen in any paper leads me to think there is any difficulty in landing. A great deal has been said about the necessity of harbours and roadsteads, and a good many observations have been made as to the expenses which will be absolutely necessary. So far as I can understand it, there has been no difficulty in landing stores; and, although the Island does not possess a harbour, in the ordinary sense of the word, there is a considerable trade carried on there, and ships of large tonnage have good facilities for loading and unloading. Then we are asked why the Indian troops were not sent home at once, and how long they are to be kept in the Mediterranean? We are also asked why we sent them from Malta to Cyprus. With regard to the first question, as we hope, and believe, the emergency which induced us to bring them to Malta has passed, there appears to be no sufficient reason why we should keep them longer in the Mediterranean than is absolutely necessary. Accordingly, when the weather and the other conditions admit of their proceeding on their voyage, these troops will return, to India. I am not sure that a few Cavalry horses will not be left behind; but, with that exception, I think we may take it for granted that the hulk of these troops will, in the course of a month or five weeks, be upon their homeward voyage. It may be a few days, more or less, on one side or another; but I cannot say exactly. We must wait for the transports and the weather, and we must trust the work to those who have practical experience, and who know exactly what means exist for the purpose. Then we have been asked, as I said before, why these troops were sent to Cyprus? In the first place, no particular object was to be served, in the long run, by keeping them at Malta; and, secondly, as they carried their camp equipage with them, they were as well placed at Cyprus as at Malta. More than all that, I must remind the Committee of what has been taking place elsewhere—that it is impossible to say, looking at the change of government, despite the fact of the flag of England has been very well received by the Cypriotes, it is not absolutely certain that there may not be a disturbing element in the population, the Government thought they would be acting judiciously in sending not only a sufficient, but an overpowering Force. In coming to that conclusion, it was agreed, also, that these Indian troops should not be broken up, but kept together, under the same commanders, as they had been before. We have been asked a great deal with regard to these expenses, and why we did not propose more expenditure as absolutely necessary? I may say that these Estimates are taken for Army Services. With regard to the Civil Service, there may be, later on, several works which it will be desirable to undertake; but, inasmuch as those have been carried on before, I apprehend the expense will fall rather as charges upon the administration of the Island. Those do not come under the Army charges. I do not see that they come, in any way, under that head; and, therefore, I have not thought necessary in the Supplementary to include them. With regard to the £25,000 for huts, so far as I am aware, hut accommodation can be provided for a somewhat less sum; but, as we know, there are always some incidental charges in connection with buildings of that sort, and I thought it advisable to take an Estimate of £15,000, which will cover the whole cost. I believe these huts will afford accommodation for 3,000 men, and they will afford sufficient protection for them until we are able to say what course will be taken, and how the Forces shall be distributed throughout the Island. As far as I understand, there are existing on the Island buildings which, when properly put in order, may be very properly applied for the purposes of barracks for the troops; but, at the present time, they are not so available, and the medical authorities are not satisfied about the sanitary state of some of the buildings, and we would not put men where it was known to be unhealthy. Therefore, we think they had better have huts, where they can easily be disposed of, and. where they are still within reach of those who may require their services. With regard to the Force it may be ultimately necessary to maintain there, I would ask the Committee not to look upon Cyprus as they would upon Malta or Gibraltar—as a fortress—but as an Island, by no means barren in the way of natural defences. The permanent garrison of the place does not appear, as far as we can tell, to require to be of very great strength, and I should think if we left two European battalions, and, probably, a battery of Artillery there, they would prove sufficient for the internal police and ordinary administration of the Island. I have endeavoured, so far, to give the Committee a straightforward account of the information in our possession. It will be seen from it that the chief officers under Sir Garnet Wolseley are examining into all the circumstances of the district under their charge and are reporting to him. I trust very shortly to receive fuller information; but up to the present time the letters I have had only give the results of a few hours' labour, and before that full information can be given which must be obtained. So far as I understand, supplies are plentiful, and though, no doubt, some enterprizing persons have bought up, as a speculation, a good deal of house property with the idea that rents will be raised thereby, we are by no means in their power, and the provision which the Committee are now asked to make will have the advantage of enabling us to be independent—to ascertain clearly what the resources of the Island are, and how to utilize them best for the Public Service. I hope I have not taken up too much time. I have endeavoured to give the information I possess, and if occasion occurs for supplementing it, the Committee may rest assured I will take advantage of it.

MR. T. CAVE

said, there was one reason why he cordially supported the expenditure of £25,000 on huts. It had been, his duty for many years to superintend the construction of railways in localities similar to the Island of Cyprus, and hence he thought he might be able to give a hint or two to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War as to the management of troops there. In the first place, he might say that persons from the mainland, if they worked during the summer months, suffered great mortality, and as heavy a death rate as 60 per cent had occurred in his experience; whereas if, during the four hot summer months, such workmen were re-conveyed to the mainland, they were able to bear the fatigue of the other eight months with only the ordinary disease and death. The course usually adopted in such climates by natives was that when exposed to the atmosphere before sunrise, or after sunset, at the moments when the transitions took place, they covered their heads, the result being that chill and resulting fever was much less frequent than would otherwise result. Above all, care should be taken that every man should be properly housed at nights, and it was on this ground that he supported the provision of huts for the troops. Any expense which might be occasioned thereby would be repaid by securing the health of officers and men; and in making such a provision he was sure the Government would be supported by the House and the country. Whenever the men he had employed were encamped, the leaders of the party took care that the encampment should not be near marshy or uncultivated ground, where the proportions of fever cases rapidly increased. The water he always took care should be pure and, if possible, filtered. The grapes of the Mediterranean Islands were abundant, and most nutritious; but he advised the Government to reduce, as far as possible, the supply of fermented and alcoholic liquors to the troops in Cyprus.

MR. ONSLOW

said, the officers who had gone to Cyprus had had great experience in India, and he knew no one who would better manage his men in a hot climate than Sir Garnet Wolseley. The House would recollect that Sir Garnet Wolseley had had practical experience in the handling of troops in every conceivable climate. He had looked carefully at the names of the Medical Staff who had been sent out, and he found that those who were chiefly responsible for the health of the troops had had much experience in hot climates, and he could not conceive it possible that they would recommend Sir Garnet Wolseley to encamp his men on marshy or apparently on unhealthy ground. At the same time, he hoped, as the House was soon to be prorogued, that his right hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for War would give some assurance that all special Reports of Sir Garnet Wolseley should be laid before hon. Members during the Recess as soon as possible. He must express a hope that some law would be made for the close time for game, because he could not help thinking that it would be a very wise thing if the game of the Island was preserved. If something of the kind were not done, we should find the game in the Island would become exterminated, considering the number of sportsmen said to be on their way to our new acquisition. He might also say to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War that he hoped the Indian troops would not be hastily withdrawn from Cyprus. Whether it was true or not that the Russians were advancing on Affghanistan, it was a serious rumour, and no troops should be removed from Cyprus until the rumour was confirmed or denied. He agreed that when everything was settled down, two battalions of Infantry and a battery of Artillery would be sufficient to maintain the peace of the Island.

MR. W. E. FORSTER

said, he felt much indebted to his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bath (Mr. Hayter) for having brought the matter on. He had heard the few remarks of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War with some surprise. He had said he was sorry to detain the House; but he (Mr. W. E. Forster) should have been glad to have heard him speak for very much longer. He (Mr. W. E. Forster) really did not feel that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman gave any satisfactory answer to the question of his noble Friend (the Marquess of Hartington) as to why these troops were sent to Cyprus? The right hon. and gallant Gentleman gave three reasons for this being done. The first was that the Indian troops were going home. Well, they certainly need not have taken Cyprus on the way. The second answer was that Cyprus was on the highway to India. Well, he believed that that would cost the taxpayers a considerable sum—the Indian troops going by Cyprus rather than going directly. It would have been much better for them to have gone straight to India from Malta, and he could not see why Cyprus should have been made a halting place. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman had explained the matter by saying that the Government had sent a large and overpowering force to Cyprus to overawe the people if they did not receive the British rule with quietness.

COLONEL STANLEY

I beg the right hon. Gentleman's pardon. What I said was that although the British Fleet might be received very well, there might always be in a large population some disturbing element.

MR. W. E. FORSTER

said, he would accept the explanation of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman. But the large population of which he spoke numbered from 120,000 to 140,000, and he could not for a moment conceive that for the purpose of overawing such a population it was necessary to send to the Island a force of armed and drilled men, who were in the proportion of one drilled man to every three or four able-bodied men in the whole Island. It was utterly impossible that that could be the case; and beyond that it was quite clear that the Government themselves at first did not think it necessary to send such a force, because they despatched Mr. Baring to take possession of the Island before the troops arrived. He did not think they had. had any answer whatever to his noble Friend's question as to why these troops were sent, and he supposed they hardly would get any answer. The hon. Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. Onslow) suggested a forcible answer, but one which he could hardly imagine—that the Government had determined to garrison Cyprus because the Russian troops were going towards Afghanistan. Well, Cyprus might or might not be on the high road from Malta to Alexandria, but it certainly was not on the high road from St. Petersburgh to Afghanistan. One other remark which the hon. Gentleman made was worthy the attention of the Government, and that was whether, as we were sending our troops to the Island, and could not tell what they were to do, they might not afford relaxation for the officers by taking care of the game of Cyprus, as well as everything else there. But the annexation of the Island was a very serious matter with regard to the effect it would have upon future taxation and upon the Revenue, and yet upon it the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had given no information whatever. He had said absolutely nothing as to the objects of the Government in acquiring the Island, or as to sending the troops there, or what the Govern- ment intended to do with the Island, as one of our military defences, in the future. He had simply said it was not a fortress, nor a naval or military station, and that it was quite different from Gibraltar or Malta. But still the House remained absolutely in the dark, and he was quite sure the Government would not throw any further light on a measure which had excited so much attention, and which had been spoken of as a measure of almost magnificent proportions.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

hoped his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bath (Mr. Hayter) would not press his Amendment, because there was one thing which was quite plain, that as the troops had been sent to Cyprus there must be some place there in which to quarter them. He was sure there was no man who would wish that the troops should be exposed to such a climate as it was known was to be found in Cyprus at this present time of year, and they would all wish for proper precautions to be taken to see that the troops were well housed, and protected from the extreme heat of the sun. Therefore, he hoped the Amendment would not be pressed, as he was certain if it was carried the most mischievous consequences might ensue. With regard to what had fallen from his right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) he (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) was bound to say that he rather felt like him—that there had been no satisfactory answer given to the noble Lord. It might be, and it most likely was, that Malta was very much overcrowded at this hot time of the year, and that the troops were to be sent back to India. But, Cyprus having been ceded, it was naturally thought, and he considered properly thought, that it would be a good opportunity to move the Indian troops from Malta to Cyprus. And even if it were done for nothing else, it would show the people of Cyprus— and that would be communicated to the inhabitants of Asia Minor—that England was determined, after having taken over Cyprus, to pursue her policy there; and, having undertaken to carry out that policy with regard to Asia Minor, he was not one of those who would shrink from the undertaking. But that which would be required in the future would need the most careful consideration to determine, because he defied any Government in the world, with so short an experience, to say what would be wanted. He desired to see the Government go gradually forward, and see that no greater expense was incurred than was absolutely necessary. The country having endorsed the policy of the Government, he was absolutely certain the people would not shrink from any necessary expense to enable them to carry out that policy. There was another point on which he wished to say a word or two, and that was one which had been touched upon by the hon. and gallant Member for Bath— he alluded to the difference between the pay of the Indian officers and the pay of the officers of the English Army. This was a hard case, and one which must receive the very serious consideration of the Government. He did not agree, nor did he believe for one moment, that the Government had any notion or idea of employing these troops unless under circumstances of very great emergency. But when such an emergency did arise, and they brought from India 7,000 or 8,000 Indian troops and 2,000 British troops, and took them to Malta or any other place, it was very hard that the Indian troops should receive the same amount of Indian pay, while the English troops should have the same rate of pay as if they had gone from England to Malta, and no question of emergency had occurred. The Government were bound to deal with such a matter, because it was creating great dissatisfaction, and they ought to see that officers had the same amount of pay when called upon to do the same work. Another point for the Government to consider was that in reference to officering Indian troops. At present, officers might be transferred to the Civil Service, and he insisted that they should say whether they would remain in the Civil Service at an increased pay, or serve on in the Army, and not take the increased pay of the Civil Service, and be allowed, afterwards to go back to the Military Service and receive a large pension. It was an unwise thing to allow this to be done. There was only one other point on which he should have liked to have had some information, and that was in answer to the observation of the hon. and gallant Member for Bath that it was unwise and mischievous that English troops should serve beside Indian troops. He could not see anything mischievous in the matter.

MR. HAYTER

desired to correct the hon. and gallant Gentleman. What he said was not that Indian troops should not be employed with British troops, but that the opinion of competent authorities was that they should not be left in English garrisons in sole charge of the guns.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

was very glad to hear the correction, because he could not help thinking that such an assertion would have been very unfortunate seeing the loyalty and earnestness with which these men came forward when called upon. He would only in conclusion say, although the country had been put to great extra expense with regard to many things which had been done by the Government, that expense had not been altogether thrown away. The Government had called out not only the Indian troops, but the Reserves; and he gave every credit to the noble Lord who inaugurated that movement—and he rejoiced at the way in which the Reserves had turned out in obedience to the summons of their Queen.

MR. E. JENKINS

said, that he had read over what had been uttered from time to time by Cabinet Ministers with reference to Cyprus. From the time that the occupation of the Island had been first mooted, there had been great difficulty in ascertaining what the motives and policy of the Government were— how they were going to administer the Island, and what the use of their administration would be? Having regard to the objects that the Government had in view, he would call special attention to what had been said in "another place" by the Prime Minister. He made a very important statement with regard to Cyprus; and yet, last night, the Chancellor of the Exchequer admitted that it was only recently that the idea of occupying Cyprus entered into the mind of the Government. It was clear that this was perfectly true, and that these huts were in existence long before the Government thought of occupying Cyprus; and that, in fact, they were ordered for another expedition. Of course, he did not say that the huts were the same; but a certain number of huts were ordered and delivered, and if they were not in use, they ought to have been made use of for this purpose. It would be desirable to know where these huts were, and what was the expedition upon which it was proposed to employ them. They had been told that the idea of occupying Cyprus was hastily conceived. But, on the other hand, Lord Beaconsfield. said— But, at the same time, I must say, on the part of the Government, that it is a great error to suppose that they decided upon the occupation of Cyprus without being in possession of adequate information. If the Government were in possession of adequate information, they appeared to have had less sense. Lord Beaconsfield went on say— Parliament is entitled to possess that in. formation when affairs are in that state that we think these documents can be produced without injury to the Public Service."—[See ante, p. 27.] But the noble Lord had also said that Europe had now returned to a state of almost Millenial peace, and if that were the case, really the time had arrived when the Government, before asking the House to vote money for this purpose, should lay upon the Table of the House the documents giving the information promised by the noble Lord the Prime Minister. He would ask the Committee to consider that this money was to be voted for military purposes in the Island of Cyprus. But the Ministers had given them no idea of what their policy would be in Cyprus, or how they proposed to administer the affairs of the Island. They had only a vague notion given them of what would be done, but nothing definite. The Administrator, they were told, was to try to administer the government on the lines upon which it had been conducted by the Turks. But what law was it they were going to administer, and how and under what circumstances was it to be administered? Either the Government had no clear and definite idea of administering the Government of Cyprus, or they were concealing from the House some plan which they had in view with regard to the matter. He would ask the attention of the Committee while he briefly pointed out that the occupation of Cyprus was, at that moment, the only thing that this country had obtained in return for the whole of the money it had spent—all it had gained was the miserable opportunity of occupying Cyprus. The point to which he desired to call the attention of the House was the agreement that if Russia should take possession of any further territories then we should interfere. But the Treaty did not say that if Russia should transgress the spirit, but not the letter, of the Berlin Congress, England should take action; it simply stated that if Russia should take possession of any territories, this country should intervene, and that was a very different thing. So far as he could see, under this Convention, Russia was perfectly free to declare war and cross the frontiers, provided she gave an undertaking not to enter into possession of any territories she conquered. In return for the Guarantee given by this country, the administration of the Island of Cyprus had been placed in its hands. But how was it to be administered? In what manner was provision to be made for executing our engagement? They had not heard from the Government how far, and under what circumstances, the jurisdiction of this country in Cyprus extended. They had heard some very singular statements of Her Majesty's Ministers on this question. The right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary, when he was asked with regard to the Anglo-Turkish Convention, said the Porte had engaged to consult this country with regard to the reforms that were to be introduced, and he went on to say that he thought that the Treaty of 1856 would have been broken if England had annexed the Island of Cyprus; but that, as it was, the actual Sovereignty of the Island was still in the Sultan. Thus, it was admitted, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, that the Treaty of 1856 would have been infringed if England had accepted the Sovereignty of the Island. But it was contended that it would not be broken, as he understood the Home Secretary to argue, under the circumstances of the case, by which England had only to administer the government. The Attorney General, when questioned by the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt), said that the Island was to be administered by Her Majesty, who would exercise sub-jurisdiction over the lands and people of the Island. Cyprus, was not to be any part of the territory of the Crown, it was only to be kept and administered by Her Majesty according to the terms of the Convention. When it was asked what the occupation of Cyprus meant, hon. Members were referred to the Convention; and when they questioned the Government as to the meaning of the Convention, they were referred to the occupation; so that they were asked to vote for money for Cyprus, with regard to the policy and administration of which he did not believe that even Her Majesty's Government could form any very definite idea. The only effect of the Convention was that the Island had been occupied, and that they were now called upon to vote money for it; and the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War told them that, in the meantime, the Government would ascertain what the circumstances of the Island were, and lay them before the House. That was in the face of the statement of the Premier, deliberately made in "another place," that the occupation was not undertaken without full information, which should be presented to Parliament in due form. He was surprised that the House should submit to the Government acting in this manner, and he could not think that it was wrong that they should continue, day by day, to press the Government to give them some idea of what was in their minds when they conceived and executed their policy. In conclusion, he would ask the right hon. and gallant Gentleman whether he would not give some definite idea of what the policy of Her Majesty's Government was before he pressed the House to vote money in the dark for these purposes?

MR. RITCHIE

ventured to say that there were very few who would agree with the hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee (Mr. E. Jenkins). He believed that it was the opinion of the vast majority of the country, and a large majority in that House, that the Government had, by a wise and judicious expenditure of money, saved the country from a great and disastrous war, and had restored peace to Europe. Looking at the state of anxiety in which they had remained for many months past, he could not feel otherwise than that Her Majesty's Government had acted wisely and carefully in this matter, and that if they had acted differently this country might now, instead of enjoying the blessings of peace, be in the midst of a desolating war. He could not agree with the hon. Member for Dundee that the Island of Cyprus was all we had got for the money we had spent; in his opinion, its acquisition was one of the smallest gains that we had obtained for our money. It had been said by the hon. Gentleman that there was the greatest difficulty in ascertaining the police of the Government with regard to the occupation of Cyprus. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) had also complained that the Secretary of State for War did not state the reason for the occupation of Cyprus, or what was the policy in keeping it. But they all knew that last night the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated plainly and distinctly what the policy of the Government was in keeping Cyprus. He told them that there were two objects; one was that we might be near at hand and have a basis of operations in case we should be called upon to carry out the provisions of the Convention we had entered into with the Turkish Government; the other was that England should have some place near the mainland where it could show to Turkey that, by just administration, it was quite possible to carry out necessary reforms in Asia. When it was said that no explanation had been given of the policy of the Government, he was bound to say that that allegation was not borne out by the facts of the case. The hon. Member for Dundee alleged that the Government had not had adequate information; or, if they had had proper information, they had not produced it. But the Government were unable to go into minute details as to all the circumstances that might arise in the administration of the Island. It appeared to him that the statement that the Government acted on adequate information was by no means irreconcilable with the fact that the Government were at present unable to go into minute details. When Lord Beaconsfield spoke of information with regard to Cyprus having been obtained, he, no doubt, spoke principally with reference to the policy of the acquisition. It was impossible that the Government could produce a cut-and-dried scheme for the administration of Cyprus; that could only be ascertained by experience. The Government were taking proper measures by the course which they had pursued to place themselves in the best position to get information; and he had little doubt that, after some experience, Sir Garnet Wolseley and the other officers with him would enable the Government to give hon. Gentlemen in that House all the information they desired.

MR. RYLANDS

I do not suppose for a moment that it is the intention of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bath (Mr. Hayter), who has made this Motion, to press it to a division; but it gives us an opportunity—to which, I think, we are entitled—to bring before the Committee, and also before the country, as well as we are able, the circumstances under which we object to this expenditure. My right hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for War has said that Parliament has condoned the Government in the course they have taken— namely, in taking this new departure. Of course, it is a matter of necessity that, if we choose to adopt an Imperial policy, we must be prepared for an Imperial expense. We have in past times done a great deal to spread civilization in other lands; and, I believe, without any display, and without any bombastical expression on the part of our Rulers, we have shown in the face of the world the high influence and character of the British people. We have done all this, but we are now proceeding upon a new line which is expected to be surrounded with much glory and much prestige. We are now departing upon a line on which we are going to seek some new honour and glory, and on that line we must be content, if we choose to pursue it, to follow the example of all Imperial Governments; and we must forget, to a certain extent, the interests, and welfare, and prosperity of the people under our control, in favour of new claims for a higher character of national influence and national control. Well, Sir, we are for the moment in for this policy. I am quite aware that, when we criticize the conduct of the Government, as we are entitled to do, and ask them what they are going to do with this Island, and what is to be the next step, they tell us that it is a tentative step. Well, the whole of their policy has been tentative. I challenge the Government to tell us why they brought these Indian troops to Europe at all. The Committee does not know why they brought these Indian troops to Europe, and we do not know where they intended to place those troops when they had got them into Europe. I believe the first idea of the Government was a filibustering idea. ["No, no!"] But I say yes, and I say it upon the authority of a late Member of the Cabinet, and I have the greatest confidence in that Nobleman. That noble Lord said the first idea of bringing these troops to Europe was a filibustering idea of seizing upon territory in Asia Minor, or upon some Island in the Mediterranean. Will the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War tell us that the Government first intended to place these troops at Malta? I say that we have no evidence that there was any idea of placing them in any particular place. The Home Secretary told us that the Government had acted upon information which they received from a high authority with regard to bringing the Indian troops to Europe; but, when that information which the Government received from a high authority was found to be untrue, it was then, I believe, that the intention to bring these troops to Malta was formed. Now, when you got these troops to Malta, you had again to inquire—what are we to do with them? The Government did not know what to do with these troops. As for the idea of the hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Onslow), that these troops should be placed at Cyprus in order to protect Afghanistan from Russia, I am sure the Government, who think we may be expected to swallow a good deal, will not expect us to swallow that. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War gave us what I thought to be a very extraordinary reason for taking the Indian troops to Cyprus. He seemed to think it was possible that the population — restricted to something like 18,000 or 20,000 adult males—in Cyprus would, on some ground or other, possibly rise up against British occupation. Why, British occupation of the Isle of Cyprus is the greatest God-send that could possibly happen to the people of Cyprus. Why, the Greeks presented our Lord High Commissioner naturally enough with an Address, in which they expressed the great pleasure and satisfaction with which they viewed the British occupation of the Island, and then they charged an exhorbitant rent for the use of their houses. That was natural enough too. To say that the British occupation of Cyprus might possibly lead to a revolution or rebellion that would require 8,000 or 10,000troopstoputitdown is a complete romance. I must say that it appears to me that the whole transaction of these Indian troops is to cost us an enormous sum of money, and I believe the Government have acted without due consideration. I believe, in the first instance, they were led into it by false information. If that is so, when they got new information, there was no need, instead of sending them back to India, to send them to Cyprus. That, I suppose, was done to cover the operation, and it will entail upon this country great additional expense, which might have been saved if the Government had taken different measures. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Dundee (Mr. E. Jenkins) in saying that the Government have not told us what their object and policy is in regard to Cyprus. We have heard two voices in the Cabinet. One class of Ministers of the Cabinet make the maximum representation as to the policy, and the other section minimize the operation altogether. Those taking the maximum view say we have got Britain overlooking Asia Minor, and Britain is prepared to carry by this means into the countries subject to Turkey new branches of industry, new precautions for life and property, a new system of justice, and all the different arrangements which distinguish our civilization as compared with the Government of Turkey. In order to do this we must have a large Force, and spend large sums of money. But that is not what the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer contemplates. Nothing of the sort. He says, in this Island we are to set up a model Government, which will act as an example to Turkey, and we shall then have the Sultan and his advisers adopting the same means to secure the same prosperity. In fact, Cyprus was to be a large model farm. Every hon. Gentleman who has gone in for a model farm knows what that means. It means vast outlay, with little to show for it; and that will be the result of the annexation of Cyprus. The House of Commons, however, is now prepared to swallow anything. AlL the Opposition can do is to protest against the course taken by the Government. But one step would lead to another—one expenditure to a further expenditure; and, unless I am much mistaken, we shall find, in a few years, that this unsound policy will lay on the people of this country very serious responsibilities indeed.

MR. MUNDELLA

would detain the Committee but a few minutes; but he wished to ask the right hon. and gallant Gentleman in charge of the Vote how he proposed to convey to their homes the troops that had been brought from India? Whatever might be the policy of Her Majesty's Government—whether he agreed or disagreed with it—he thought both sides of the House would concur in what he had to say, that those troops should be conveyed home at a reasonable cost. He was sure that no one would be more grateful to him than the Chancellor of the Exchequer for having raised the question in the House. It would be in the recollection of hon. Members that Parliament voted several thousands of pounds for payment of the transport of those troops. The mode of transport and the cost was very much criticized at the time; and the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty promised to give him a Return, showing the total charge of the transport and the chartering of the ships. It was believed at the time that the expenditure in this respect was of a most lavish, wasteful, and, he thought he might say, discreditable nature. He said this in the presence of business men, who would correct him if in error. He would not use one word in exaggeration, but he must say again that the sums charged for that particular service was discreditable and un-business-like. According to the Return which the right hon. Gentleman supplied, it appeared that 28 vessels were employed, steamers and transports, in the conveyance of those troops to Malta. The cost of the steamers ranged from £3,000 to £7,000 per month, and he wished to know whether they were still in the service of the Government? He would ask whether the country was paying a monthly—

THE CHAIRMAN

pointed out to the hon. Member that in his remark he was anticipating the discussion on the Navy Supplementary Votes.

MR. MUNDELLA

understood that the Question before the House had refer- ence to the transport of the troops. He wished to know whether the Admiralty declined to make itself responsible for chartering those vessels to India? If not the Admiralty, who was responsible? Somebody should know, because he saw a note to this effect— The arrangement for the transport of troops was made in India by the Indian Government after communication with the Transport Department of the Admiralty.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

rose to Order. He did not know whether the hon. Gentlemn was quoting from the present Supplementary Estimates or the Navy Estimates?

MR. MUNDELLA

said, that he was not quoting from either, but from the Return which had been furnished to the House. What he wished to know was this—were the vessels which were chartered to convey the Indian troops to Malta still retained in the service of the Government, and what were the terms, as set forth in the charter-parties, and were the transports to be employed in taking the Indian troops back again?

THE CHAIRMAN

ruled that the hon. Member was not in Order in pursuing an inquiry of the kind, upon the Question before the House.

MR. MUNDELLA

would defer the Question, therefore, until it arose on another Estimate.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

considered that the House and the country must feel very much indebted to the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Bath for having raised the discussion; for the result was that some fragments of information had been given as to what the Government proposed to do with the Island of Cyprus. He trusted the hon. and gallant Gentleman, however, would not carry his Motion to a division, however much they might be opposed to the occupation of Cyprus for the purpose for which it was alleged it had been taken. He felt convinced that none of the objects would be accomplished; still, it would be apparent to everybody that the troops should be properly housed, and therefore he hoped his hon. and gallant Friend would not press his objection to the particular item before the House. Now, amongst the objections which were taken by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to the statement of his hon. and gallant Friend, was one which struck him (Sir Henry Havelock) more particularly, and that was that he objected to its being supposed that the policy with regard to the Indian troops was an habitual policy. Now, he considered there was considerable reason for the policy to be so described. Had not the Government thought of the illimitable resources of India, of which those troops were said to be only the vanguard? It was not many days since an hon. Gentleman sitting on his side of the House had drawn their attention by telling them that the arrival of those 6,000 troops had answered the purpose for which they were brought—that they had terrified Russia, and so prevented war. That remark seemed to him (Sir Henry Havelock) to be one of the most extraordinary he had ever heard—

THE CHAIRMAN

reminded the hon. and gallant Gentleman that he was not in Order when he referred to what had passed in a preceding debate.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

continued by observing he could not suppose that that was really the purpose for which the policy of the Government was initiated. Although he should be the last to depreciate the military resources of the Empire, he could not conceive that the employment of 6,000 troops in the Island of Cyprus had had any effect in the way of preventing war with Russia. All the suppositions of hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House were unsubstantial. The occupation of the Island had no basis of reality about it. What did they hear on the previous night, but that the Island was supposed to be of great value, on account of its strategical character? He had since endeavoured to ascertain what truth there was in the assertion, but had not succeeded, nor did he expect to get anything that would enlighten him on the point. It had been indicated that the Island of Cyprus was a strategical place with regard to Afghanistan; and, again, they had been told it was not a strategical place at all. This last statement he believed to carry the greatest amount of probability, if they were to judge from what they had heard from the Secretary of State for War.

COLONEL STANLEY

had wished the House to understand that Cyprus was not to be considered as being like Gibraltar or Malta.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

said, it might not be considered as a fortress, but it was to be a strong place in the Mediterranean. It appeared that the Government did not propose to make it a fortress, or anything of the sort, because they had said that only two battalions and a battery were to be kept there. He would ask the House whether, under those circumstances, Cyprus could be considered as a strategical place? Would a place of great military operations be occupied in that way? It showed that the Government did not know what to do with the Island, nor were they aware for what purpose it ought to be occupied. They had, in fact, dragged the troops from India for a purpose, the precise object of which they themselves did not know. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had contradicted the statement that it was originally contemplated to make some seizure on the coast of Syria, and when he (Sir Henry Havelock) asked him to be kind enough to explain whether that was the construction which they were to put upon the policy of the Government, he was met—as the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) had been—by the most significant silence. He ventured to think that this was a matter to which the attention of the country would be directed over and over again, because it seemed impossible for hon. Members to elicit more information than they had at present obtained. The question of the future employment of the Indian troops was one to which the serious attention of the Government must be directed. He had seen a report in the papers to the effect that these Indian troops, who started from their own country under circumstances of the greatest credit, had become discontented with the monotonous life they had been called upon to live, as well as with the unhealthy nature of the service they were obliged to perform. They said they never suspected, when they were brought from their own country, they would have to do monotonous duty in a small Island in the Mediterranean. Incidentally, he must be allowed to say, before he sat down, he regretted very much that the inquiry on that important point which had been initiated by the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) had, under certain circumstances, ended in nothing at all. He feared there was a tendency to shirk the question for the present, as to whether the Indian troops were to be profitably employed in the future in garrison or other duties in our Colonies? Then, as to the expense of their transport. If it was intended as a stategical measure, when they were brought from India, they had cost just about three times as much as double the number of troops from our own country would have cost. If there was anything in the statement that the Indian soldiers had been taken to Malta by way of a threat to Russia, why the end could have been accomplished from our resources at home, which were doubly and trebly sufficient for the purpose, at half the cost. It had been estimated at £1,000,000; but no doubt it would be at least £1,750,000. He would undertake to say that if the Government intended to make a demonstration, they could, from the Home resources, for the sum of money they had spent, have occupied Malta with at least 21 battalions of British Infantry. The experiment, however, had been tried, and he hoped that no greater strain would be put upon the willingness of the Indian troops than could be helped. There was another question which still remained unanswered. The British Government were going to occupy the Island of Cyprus, but with what force? Was the Force sent there a prelude to the raising of a large indigenous Native Force of Greeks and Turks? He thought that when the matter came to be thoroughly sifted, the people of England would find that they had been put to an enormous expense for no object whatsoever. As a threat against Russia, the movement of troops had been totally inffectual—without result. If it was intended to avail themselves of men at half the cost of British soldiers, the object had failed; and, everything considered, it was evident the Government had no real policy in the matter at all.

MR. CHILDERS

said, there were one or two points which the House ought to understand before they went further into details with regard to the question of Cyprus. He was sure it would be to the convenience of both sides of the House, as well as to the Government, that no misconception should arise in the matter; and, therefore, he had ventured to interpose. He wished the Government to explain to the House exactly and precisely what administrative and financial arrangements would be adopted in connection with the occupation of the Island, an occupation which had been admitted to be of a novel character. To what Minister would Parliament look for responsibility in connection with the civil and military government of the Island? Would the revenues of Cyprus be paid in gross into the Exchequer, and the military and civil expenses be charged on the Estimates; or would Parliament only be asked to defray any excess on those revenues? In what shape would the payment to the Porte appear in the public accounts? Would the payment to the Porte be a varying and not a fixed sum? [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: No.] According to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it was to be a fixed sum. Then, being a fixed sum, would it be charged in the Consolidated Fund, or on the revenues of the Island. All those things ought to be settled by Her Majesty's Government with the approval of Parliament at the outset, so that the accounts of the expenditure and revenue of the Island should be throughout on the same basis. Again, under what Department of the Government would the administration of Cyprus be placed? To whom were they to look as the responsible Minister?—to the Colonial Secretary, or the Secretary of State for War, or the Foreign Office, or the India Office? He hoped the House would see that until these questions were answered any debate on the detail of future arrangements would be imperfect.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

did not object to the questions put by the right hon. Gentleman, and he was not at all disposed to say they were not allied with the subject under discussion. He would therefore endeavour to answer them; and perhaps he might be allowed to do so by making, in the first instance, a reference to an observation which had fallen from the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Sunderland (Sir Henry Havelock). When he spoke of their policy, he said that, as far as he could make out, it was an unsubstantial policy, because it did not appear to have many sides. Now, he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) considered otherwise. The fact of its having too many sides would not give it an air of reality, for, according as it was approached from one point to another, it would present itself differently to the observer. Now, in regard to the charge that, when he was asked a question, he had maintained a significant silence, he wished it clearly to be understood that the history of the movement, which had ended for the moment in the Indian troops going to Cyprus, was simply this. As the House was aware, there was a state of affairs at the time which rendered it probable that some military operations might have to be undertaken by the British Government in the Levant or the Bosphorus. On that account, the Vote of Credit was taken. The Reserves were called out, and various other steps were taken, in order that the Government might be ready for that which might be necessary; and, undoubtedly, when the Indian troops were brought from India, it was with the idea that their employment might be necessary with reference to some operations of war, though it was not stated for what particular purpose they might be required. They were, accordingly, taken to Malta; but the Government found, as they had, indeed, been conscious for some time, that that station was inconvenient for so large a number of troops, and that another movement would be necessary. Subsequently they came to the conclusion that it would be the proper course on the part of Her Majesty's Government to join in a defensive alliance with Turkey with reference to her Asiatic territories, and they thought it important, in order to enable them to fulfil that obligation, that they should have some place, where, in case of necessity, troops could be accommodated other than in the contracted area of Malta. Cyprus was accordingly selected as a proper and convenient station for the purpose. It had been alleged that Cyprus was not a strategic point. He did not know what that necessarily meant—whether it applied to a fortress only, or to a convenient place to contain a body of troops at any time when a large number of troops might be required. The possibility of having a large number of troops there when they were required was a different thing from maintaining there the small Force which was necessary for general purposes in the Island of Cyprus. It was not intended to keep a large Force in the Island. It might, perhaps, be asked— "Why, then, have you taken the Indian troops there?" The answer to that ques- tion must have suggested itself in the course of these discussions. The troops were no longer wanted in Malta, owing to the happy conclusion of the difficulties which had led to their being brought there. The natural course would have been to send them back to India; but it was not convenient to send them back at this season of the year. They must necessarily suffer very much if they were sent back at once, and it was desirable that they should remain in the Mediterranean for some weeks longer. Then there arose the simple question whether they should stay in Malta or go to Cyprus. There were many considerations which made it desirable that they should go to Cyprus. In the first place, Malta was contracted in its area. Then it was an advantage that, on our first presenting ourselves in Cyprus, we should do so with that amount of Force which would show that we were there with a certain power, and that we should obviate the risk of anything like that which had happened in another part of the Dominions of the Porte, to which he did not wish further to refer, as the circumstances there were very different from ours. We had no occasion for anything in the nature of a great display of force; but there was, he thought, some advantage in making, in the first instance, some acquaintance with the country, and in rendering it possible for the authorities there to send detachments of troops to different parts of the Island, in order to ascertain its capabilities and its wants, with a view to future administration. He would now offer an explanation on some points raised by his right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers). The Committee would understand perfectly well that in this matter there was necessarily a good deal which must remain open, for two different kinds of reasons. One reason was that for our own sake it was necessary that we should make adequate inquiries. Although for some little time past we had been considering the capabilities of Cyprus, and although we and been collecting a good deal of information which was valuable, still it was necessary that we should send out responsible officers of our own to conduct inquiries, and to report on the position of affairs. Another reason, which seemed not to have occurred to the Committee, was that we occupied this Island in a very peculiar manner, and under very peculiar conditions. We did not take the Island as British territory, but we occupied it under a Convention with the Porte, which Convention stipulated that the Sovereignty of the Porte should remain. That being the case, it was impossible for us to deal with the Island off-hand, as we might do with an island which we had conquered, or which had been absolutely ceded to us. It was necessary, in whatever arrangements were made, that we should have regard to the views and the feelings of the Porte, and that what was done should be done with due consideration and by arrangements which must be made with the Turkish Government. This, of course, involved also some further considerations. The Government had been asked what was the precise law which they were going to administer in Cyprus, and what would be the precise state of things there? Of course, these were questions of the very highest importance. They were questions which the Government were far from neglecting, but which could not be resolved off-hand without communications that were now going on and that must necessarily take some time. For instance, with regard to the practical point as to the revenue, it was the case that the revenues of the Island would be in the hands of the British Government, subject to the payment to the Porte of a certain sum which was to be ascertained, and which would be a fixed sum. That sum was to be ascertained by taking the average of the excess of revenue over expenditure in the Island during the last five years. The custom had been that the expenses of government were all paid first out of the revenue, and the balance was remitted to the Porte. We had approximately arrived at this sum, and when it was definitively ascertained, an arrangement would be made under which it would be remitted to the Porte. His right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract desired to know whether the revenues would be brought into the Imperial Exchequer, as the expenses with regard to Cyprus were going to be voted by Parliament? That was a matter which would require some consideration. He doubted, however, whether the most convenient course would be to bring these revenues into the Exchequer. The best course, he thought, would be to organize in Cyprus a proper system by which the revenues would be applied there to defraying local expenses; but if there were any expenses so distinctly of an English character that they ought to be borne by the English Government, such expenses would, of course, have to be voted by Parliament. But the expenses properly belonging to the administration of the Island ought to come out of the revenues of the Island. Perhaps it might be asked, what would be done supposing the revenues were insufficient for the purpose? Well, in such a contingency, we should be in the same position in reference to Cyprus as we occupied in regard to a British Colony which was similarly circumstanced. This was a matter connected with the whole question of administration, which we must consider carefully and deliberately. Then he was asked to state under what Department of State the Island was to be placed. This, again, was a point which required very careful consideration. In the first instance, when the troops were sent to the Island, it was under the War Office; because, in fact, the movement was of a military character. Sir Garnet Wolseley was, of course, nominated by the whole Government; but he was sent out by an instrument issued by the Secretary of State for War. It was not intended, however, that the Island should remain under the administration of the War Office. It could not be under the administration of the Colonial Office, for that would seem to imply that Cyprus was a British Possession, whereas it was not a British Possession. At the present moment the Island was under the administration of the Foreign Office—that was to say, the Foreign Secretary was the Minister of State to whom communications were to be addressed, and through whom they would pass. The Foreign Secretary was, however, in communication on this subject with the India Office, in respect to personal questions relating to the selection of officers, and so forth, and also with the Treasury. It was considered important that in all the proceedings which might take place, the Treasury should be consulted, so that that Department might have a voice in the settlement of any scheme in which they would ultimately, no doubt, have a great deal of interest. At the present moment there was comparatively little to do ex- cept to wait for the Reports which were expected from Sir Garnet Wolseley as to the various measures to be taken with reference to the future administration of the country, and the arrangements to be made with regard to the revenue. He hoped the Committee would see that in saying this he was saying all it was in his power to say. There was no wish for concealment on the part of the Government; but the circumstances were of such a character that it was only possible for him now to give this kind of adumbration of the scheme which would be proposed.

MR. CHILDERS

said, he was unable to agree with the concluding words of the right hon. Gentleman, that it was only possible at present to give what he called an adumbration of the scheme for administering the affairs of the Island. Some one Minister must have this responsibility, and there had been ample time to settle who this should be. The Treasury would have, of course, the same powers of finance that it had in every Public Department; but were they to understand that it was contemplated to put the Island under the Foreign Office, in the same sense that Crown Colonies were under the Colonial Office? The Foreign Office was wholly unused to administering the affairs of any country. He hoped the Government would pause before coming to the conclusion that the administration of Cyprus should be handed over to the Foreign Office. He ventured also strongly to protest against any plan which would remove from the control of Parliament the expenditure which might be incurred with respect to the Island. Cyprus was not a Colony, but we were renting it for certain Imperial purposes; and its cost was part of the general Imperial Expenditure.

MR. J. G. HUBBARD

held that, as Cyprus was not to become a portion of the British Dominions, it would be highly inconvenient to bring the accounts of the Island into the general accounts of this country. For his own part, the more he considered the Convention, the more he was inclined to question it on financial grounds. He understood from the Chancellor of the Exchequer that we were about to enter into partnership with the Sultan as regarded Cyprus. Nothing could be more incongruous than for a country like this to enter into a partnership with a despotic and insolvent country like Turkey. The revenue of the Island had been estimated at 22,000 purses, or nearly £100,000 net. Such a revenue could not be raised from 100,000 people without the greatest hardship. He found that should the occasion arise of our having to obtain from the Island, which was not very likely, as it depended upon Russia surrendering the fortresses she had obtained in Asia Minor, that we were not to obtain any compensation for the public works and other works of improvement which we might have carried out there. In his opinion, it would be much better to buy the Island out and out from the Porte, and he would suggest that the arrears which Turkey owed to British capitalists on the Guaranteed Loan might be set off as the price of the purchase.

COLONEL STANLEY

earnestly appealed to the Committee to pass the Vote, as it was of great importance.

MR. LOWE

said, he had had some considerable experience with the Colonies, and with government by the Colonial Office, and he felt there was no possible Department that could govern Cyprus with satisfaction except the Colonial Office. Besides, there were so many more men in that Office than were required for the work that this extra labour could be undertaken by that Department without adding to the expenditure of the country.

MR. HAYTER

expressed his satisfaction with the tone of the debate which had taken place, and begged leave to withdraw his Motion.

MAJOR NOLAN

asked the right hon. and gallant Gentleman to give the amount of travelling expenses allowed from the point at which they set out?

COLONEL STANLEY

invited the hon. and gallant Gentleman to confer with him on the subject.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Original Question put, and agreed to.