HC Deb 09 April 1878 vol 239 cc964-1041

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [8th April], That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, thanking Her Majesty for Her Most Gracious Message communicating to this House Her Majesty's intention to cause the Reserve Force, and the Militia Reserve Force, or such part thereof as Her Majesty should think necessary, to be forthwith called out for permanent service."—(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)

And which Amendment was At the end of the Question, to add the words "but that this House regrets that Her Majesty's Ministers have thought it right to advise the calling out of Her Majesty's Reserve Forces, considering that no great emergency has been shown to exist, and that such calling out of the Reserves is neither prudent in the interests of European Peace, necessary for the safety of the Country, nor warranted by the state of matters abroad."—(Sir Wilfrid Lawson.)

Question again proposed, "That those words be there added."

Debate resumed.

MR. E. JENKINS

said, that last night, when the debate was adjourned, some signs of impatience were manifested on the other side of the House; and he only adverted to that for the purpose of saying that it was a regret-able fact that, in the critical circumstances in which this country was placed, there should be manifested, not only in this House but in the country, a desire to avoid a frank and fair discussion of the issues which were at stake. He felt that whatever the current of opinion which swayed the country, and however strongly it might be led by suspicions to feel that its interests were involved when, they were not involved, that it was their duty, with high judicial firmness and discretion, to make a protest against a course which he could not but feel might be in accordance with the feeling of a majority of the House, though he hoped not in accordance with the feeling of the majority in the country. They were steadily and swiftly pursuing a warlike course, without any intimation whatever from the master mariners of the objects and designs to which they were pursuing their way. He could not believe that it was a right thing that a free people should have its destinies at this time left in the hands of a small coterie of persons pursuing an end undefined and unknown. He had very little confidence in the skill and seamanship of those who were steering the ship of the State. He did not say what course he would take if a division were forced on the House, because one might feel he was not ready to challenge a division if he was called upon to do so; but he (Mr. Jenkins) would feel it his duty to enter his protest against the dangerous course which he believed the Government was pursuing. The words and acts of some of Her Majesty's Ministers justly created in the country the gravest apprehensions. They got nothing from the Government but vague generalities, and received no indication of any high principle either of duty or of policy which it was their intention to pursue. It was not merely so in that House. In the higher sphere of Elysium, they found a figure performing there exactly as it used to perform in that House. There, Bobadil still strutted the stage, still flourished his sword, still talked magniloquently all sorts of vapouring ideas and sentiments. The noble Earl still played the part he played of yore in that House. He had been translated, not transformed. From the noble Lord at the head of the Government they had a right to expect some clear and definite statement, but they had heard nothing satisfactory to the common sense and judgment of the nation. Let them look at the despatch which was said to be by Lord Salisbury, but which bore the traces of another hand. He contended that it was not true that when the despatch was written the hopes of a Congress had ceased. In fact, they were rather improving, because Austria was using its best endeavours to bring Russia to make concessions to the public opinion of England. He had looked into it for information of the objects to which the policy of the British Government was directed, and they stated the objects to be the maintenance of the Empire, the freedom of Europe, and the greatness and security of the country. He had listened in vain for any specific information from the Government benches of the manner in which the interests of the British Empire were compromised by the Treaty of San Stefano, or by the proceedings of the Russian Government. "The freedom of Europe" was a vague and curious phrase, and they could tell in a moment who its author was. But something more definite than this was wanted when the House was discussing a question of peace or war. He was sure that Europe would remain as free as she had been, and would continue to develop her freedom without the mischievous interference of Her Majesty's Government. Then, the third object of the Government was declared to be "the greatness and security of the country." Well, these depended on a true conception by the Government of the country's highest interests—namely, just policy abroad, and proper economy at home, a careful husbanding of its resources, and an avoidance of quarrels and useless menaces. But all these things were wanting in the policy of the Government, who were doing their best to make war almost inevitable. In the objects of the Government, as stated in the despatch, he could discern no evidence of any deadly danger to justify a policy which appeared to him to be one of adventure, brag, peril, and want of principle. Last night the Secretary of State for India stated that the Government had done all they could to bring Europe to one mind. When it was thought for the moment that Russia was dangerously menacing Constantinople, did the Government wait for united action with Austria, Germany, and other Powers? Instead of that, they passed the Dardanelles with a Fleet which was altogether too large for the purposes which were avowed. The Secretary of State for India had said that the Government had done all they could do for the purpose of promoting the Congress; but it had been shown the previous night to demonstration in "another place" that the discussion between the Government and the Russian Government was a mere logomachy, and the more he had listened to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on this subject the less he was satisfied that they had any just ground of complaint against Russia. But, whenever there appeared to be hopes of peace, there was some malign influence acting on the Government, causing it to take a step which rendered peace almost impossible. Again and again this had occurred. It happened, when the Fleet was sent to the Sea of Marmora, and when objection was made to the embarkation of the Russian troops at Buyukdere, and just as Russia was about to give way, the Government issued Lord Salisbury's Circular. He asked, whether it was right and dignified to do this just as Russia, under the influence of Germany, was becoming willing to swallow the bitter pill, and to make concessions to us, as he hoped she would do, because it would give her a better moral position, than we had? The noble Lord at the head of the Government had made a speech in "another place" which was full of bitterness, and calculated to rasp and excite the feelings of Russia. Lord Salisbury, in his recent despatch, had said— By the Articles erecting New Bulgaria, a strong Slav State will be created under the auspices and control of Russia, possessing important harbours upon the shores of the Black Sea and the Archipelago, and conferring upon that Power a preponderating influence over both political and commercial relations in those seas. Was this objection sustainable, and wag it consistent with the position of Lord Salisbury at the Conference at Constantinople? There had been a good deal of misunderstanding in this country with regard to the meaning and object of this New Bulgaria. The area of it was no larger than that agreed upon by Lord Salisbury at the Conference; but there was an important difference between the Conference area and that proposed under the Treaty of San Stefano. He held that the Government had no right to suspect Russia because of her possessing ports on the shores of the Black Sea and the Archipelago, and to suggest that the effect would be to give her "a preponderating influence over both political and commercial relations in those seas." He thought their objection was not maintainable. An important strip on the Ægean was proposed to be given to the New Bulgaria. A gentleman, who was a Turk and a Russophobist, had said to him that the power of Turkey was transient, that it would be wise to develop the liberties of the people in the Balkan Peninsula, and that they should have an opening in the Ægean in order that their commerce should flow to the West. What right had we to suspect that Russia desired to obtain a preponderant influence over the political and commercial relations in the Black Sea and the Archipelago when she made a proposal that met with the approval of a Turkish Russophobist? The history of the relations of Russia to the Danubian Principalities was one of the utmost generosity, and reflected great credit on Russia; and if this was the case when Russia and her Rulers were less liberal than they were now, they might feel that, in the future, Russia would carry out that traditional policy of generosity. What was the position of Roumania at the present moment? A spirit was permeating her population which we could not look upon without the highest admiration. Five millions of people were ready, if necessary, to take to the sword in order to vindicate what they conceived to be their rights. Was that not a lesson to us of what might occur in Bulgaria, Servia, and other parts of the Balkan Peninsula? Could they believe that once these people were set free and got independent government, they were likely to be found the tools of any despotic and foreign Government, even if Russia had been able—thanks to the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government—to gain a position of temporary control over these peoples? Nevertheless, he believed that these Principalities would develop into independent and powerful States. There was a question on which a word or two might be said—all the more that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich had expressed himself in rather unjust and severe condemnation—he meant the question of Bessarabia. It had excited in this country a strong feeling, and it was, no doubt, unfortunate that the Russian Government had adopted the manner they had in bringing this matter before Europe. But let them do justice to Russia. He believed that if we had been in Russia's position, we would make the same demand she was now making. Under the Treaty of Bucharest of 1812, the Pruth and the Danube were fixed as the limits between the Turkish and the Russian Empire; while, under the Treaty of Akermann, at a later period, Russia also acquired the control of two of the mouths of the Danube. The Turks fortified the right bank, which ran along the St. George's Channel. In 1856, without any reason except motives of policy, the Western Powers resolved to push Russia back from the Pruth and the Danube, and sought to interpose a line between Russia and Turkey. The Emperor would, undoubtedly, feel that the honour and dignity of his country were affected by what was then done, and one could appreciate the feeling which led him to desire that the natural boundaries of his territory should be restored, and that the lines of the Pruth and the Danube should once more become its frontier. He had high authority for stating, that when General Ignatieff was passing through Roumania in the earlier part of the war, the Roumanian Prime Minister gave him private assurances that there would be no objection to a transfer of this territory. There could be no doubt that Russia was prepared to allow this matter to come before the Congress, and it was the interest of Russia that it should. He had listened with pain, therefore, to the remarks that fell from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) on the subject, because he felt that his magnificent sympathies were thrown away. He (Mr. Jenkins) was anxious to know what was now the position and attitude of Her Majesty's Government. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India admitted that the Turkish Power was overthrown. The Sultan stood in the position of that unhappy master, "whom unmerciful disaster followed fast and followed faster;" but it was to be hoped that out of the ruin of the Turkish Empire there would emerge some independence and some freedom. The Roumanians did not believe in English protection. They knew that England would never fight to give them Bessarabia or the freedom of the Danube. They could not depend upon England, her declarations having been selfishly confined to her own interests. The Government appeared now, however, to have changed their front. They had started by defining "British interests;" and the Secretary of State for India had declared against entering upon sentimental wars, and saying that our only excuse for drawing the sword would be for the protection of these interests. Now, after undergoing a sort of revolutionary education, the Government were going in for vague declamation upon the freedom of Europe and the obligations of International Law. They had started with the idea of using force to compel Turkey to obey the public law of Europe and free her peoples, and now they were threatening to use force for the purpose of preventing Russia giving freedom, to these peoples. The Government had accepted limitations with regard to the Congress from France, and had refused to accept them from Russia. He could state on the highest authority that France had refused to enter the Congress except on the condition that no questions were raised except those which arose directly out of the Treaty of San Stefano. That limitation was accepted by the other Powers; but when Russia reserved the right of withdrawing from the discussion of any question at the Conference to which she objected, the English Government refused to assent to that condition. The Government had hidden from the House many things which its Members could hear of without the least difficulty in diplomatic circles at Paris or Vienna. The Government ought to explain how it was that they had from time to time kept enlarging their demands upon Russia until they were more than that Power could possibly concede. That was a dangerous policy, and one entirely antagonistic to prospects of peace. With regard to Austria, it had last night in the House of Lords been demonstrated clearly that, whatever might happen, this country could not look to Austria as an Ally. It was true we ought alone to face united Europe on a matter of principle; but an Anglo-Austrian Alliance was an utter impossibility. The money we were now spending in war preparations ought to be devoted to a higher and nobler purpose. The magnificent Empire of the Queen contained within it many and diverse nationalities, and to bring together in closer union its disjecta membra would be an object worthy of the policy of statesmen—a policy of wisdom and hope and life. But, as far as he could see from their acts and words, the policy of the Government would only lead us into war, and was, therefore, a policy of madness, disaster, and disgrace.

MR. HANBURY

said, he had heard with satisfaction the assurance by the hon. Member at the commencement of his speech that he would deal with facts, for it had been the complaint on the Government side of the House that the speeches of hon. Members opposite had displayed a singular absence of facts, and had shown too much inclination to rest their case upon sentiment and generous generalities. From an hon. Member who had denounced Poland as a bore, he was not surprised to hear an elaborate vindication of the conduct of Russia towards Roumania. From a man who was inclined to justify conduct of that kind anything might be expected; and, therefore, he should not be surprised to hear the hon. Member defend the conduct of Russia in refusing to submit the Treaty to the Congress, setting at defiance all International Law. All the hon. Member's criticisms upon Lord Salisbury's despatch did not get rid of the fact that Russia came promising to give freedom to those unfortunate people of the Balkan Peninsula; but, after reading that despatch, it was impossible to come to any other conclusion than that this promised freedom was simply a change of masters, and that Russia's promised settlement of the Eastern Question was a peace pregnant with many wars. The war had had some good results—the thunderstorm had cleared the air and dispelled many illusions. The past war had shown two things—that the strength of Russia was by no means so formidable as at one time we supposed it to be; and it proved indubitably, on the other hand, that Russia had not been animated by such honourable and straightforward intentions as it had been the cue of hon. Members opposite to represent her. It had also been shown that the Turkish people could speak out with boldness and energy hardly to be expected of them; but, on the other hand, if they looked at the civil legislation or at the Generals who had commanded the Forces, they must come to the decision that, whatever they might think of Turkey, their Rulers, with but few exceptions, were about the worst in the world, and were a disgrace to any country. Much light had also been thrown on the characteristics of the subject-races of Turkey, some of whom had shown such bravery in war as to excite a wish on the part of every Englishman to do them justice; but he was bound to confess that if the people of the outlying Provinces were to have freedom, it could hardly be expected under the rule of Russia. The whole history of the attitude assumed by Russia towards Turkey forbade such an anticipation. Her recent conduct towards Roumania showed what were her views with respect to liberty and independence. These facts ought frankly to be recognized. No doubt, very considerable changes would have to be made in South-Eastern Europe; but he trusted that we should insist on the settlement of the question being really genuine, upon the bases of nationalities and national rights. The time had already come for such a settlement; and we need not wait for a Foreign Minister, too English to dabble in intrigue, but too timid to meet it with bold speech. That was one evil against which we should have to guard in future; and there was another, resembling in some particulars the fatal Trojan horse—namely, the speeches of hon. Members on the opposite side of the House. As long as Russia intended to give freedom, it was idle to stand in her way; but, when she insisted on giving an illusory and artificial freedom, from which she hoped to gain future advantage, no fear of isolation ought to influence us. As for isolation, many people thought it very dangerous; but all those who most complained of it were the very persons to point out that no alliance was possible. However, no one could ignore the fact that we should ultimately have to face Russia single-handed in Asia, where no other European country had interests. He could understand, if he could not sympathize with, the position of hon. Gentlemen like the hon. Member for Carlisle, who hated war, and who still believed in diplomatic promises; but he could not understand the fatalistic view of the question as a law of nature. It might, indeed, be a law of nature, but certainly not of English nature. With respect to the subject Provinces, he confessed that no one was more pleased than he when the Government asked that Greece should be admitted to the Conference. He was equally disappointed when he bund that Russia had raised an objection. He deeply sympathized with many of the subject-populations that had suffered from the war, and especially with Montenegro; and he hoped that the territory they would receive would be really Montenegrin, instead of that proposed for them, which contained about one-third of Mahomedans. Servia, too, deserved her independence; and no one would grudge it to Roumania—that gallant little Latin State, lying amongst Slav races, which had been treated with so much ingratitude by Russia. There was one great argument in freeing the peoples he had named, which applied particularly to them, that there would be little difficulty in making autonomous States completely free. They had had autonomy, more or less, for some time; but absolute liberty was a much better thing than home rule, which opened the door for foreign intrigues. Again, they were not the heart of Turkey, but outlying Provinces, which had already shown some capacity for self-government. Then, with respect to Bulgaria, he regretted to say he believed the people of that country did not possess one of the qualities necessary for self-government. They all knew that when the tide of Mahomedanism swept over Western Europe a large proportion of the people of Bulgaria embraced the Mahomedan faith. It was all very well to talk of driving the Turks out of Turkey in Europe bag-and-baggage—whatever that meant—whether the people or the Rulers; but if the Mahomedan population of Bulgaria remained, they ought to be secured the same rights and privileges which were to be accorded to the Christian races. But, apart from the question of race, there was the question of the relations of the Christians among themselves. The great vice of those countries was that of fanaticism; and nowhere was there a greater development of it to be found than in Bulgaria. The Christians were predominant; and not only did Christians quarrel with Mahomedans, but the various Christian Churches—and there were several—quarrelled among themselves. The great aim of Bulgaria was not so much to get rid of the Turks as the Greek bishops and priests, who, by their superstition, ignorance, and venality, were a greater curse to the country than any species of despotism could be. Travelling over Turkey, as he had done, one thing struck him especially as to the Christian population—namely, that wherever any element of civilization or progress was to be found among them, those who possessed it had become affiliated to the Church of Rome or to some Protestant Church. It was remarkable to see the progress that was made in those Churches which had come, through the medium of missionaries, in contact with Western civilization. The Russian idea of Christianity was the Christianity of the Greek Church, and the Greek Church would, no doubt, be cared for; but he hoped that provision would also be made for the protection of the Christians of whom he had spoken. Other races had gradually been training themselves for self-government, but the Bulgarians had not. The Christian population had been under the strong hand of the Patriarch of Constantinople, and the bishops and priests he sent them were not men of their own race, but Greeks, who sold the Sacraments and trafficked in their sacred rights, but did nothing whatever to train the people in the art of self-government. He did not think there was a single man in the country capable of taking the lead. Roumania, Montenegro, and Servia had won the right to self-government, but in what respect had Bulgaria done so? In no respect whatever. From time to time the people had been pressed to rebel, and they refused. At last they were goaded into a sham insurrection, and the most had been made of it by Russia; but of all people, the Bulgarians were the least capable of winning their freedom. The sword of Bulgaria was the sword of the Czar, and it might be again unsheathed to amalgamate into one great country all the districts which lay adjacent to Bulgaria, the Ægean, and the Black Sea. He was struck with the letter recently published, written by that true friend of Bulgaria, Lady Strangford, in which she said— "In God's name give us Turks for our masters; let us be Turkish subjects, not Russian!" For his part, he would welcome the day when Bulgaria would be free from Turkish rule, but it would be an evil day when it fell under that of Russia. There would then be no freedom for her people; while if she remained even under Turkish government, the influence of England would, he believed, procure for her practical self-government. Three years ago the Porte gave these people a new Constitution. They had now their own bishops and priests, and would be able gradually to learn the principles of freedom and self government, which would make them a strong bulwark against the power of Russia. It would, in his view, be suicidal for the English Government, if it had the freedom of these peoples at heart, to allow a course to be taken which must inevitably hand them bodily over to the despotic rule of Russia, and so permit the existence of a standing menace to our power in the East. The massacres in Bulgaria, which so thrilled Europe, were, if reports of statements made by Midhat Pasha were true, permitted to take place under Russian counsels. Midhat Pasha was reported to have stated that when Turkey proposed to put down the insurrection in Bulgaria by regular troops, the Russian Ambassador said—"No, let it be suppressed by the Bashi-Bazouks." The atrocities by these Bashi-Bazouks formed the cry with which Russia assailed Turkey; but it should not be forgotten that it was under Russian advice that the Bashi-Bazouks were permitted to become red-handed in the slaughter of Bulgarians. Having regard to the history of her interference in Bulgaria, he maintained that Russia had advanced on a most dangerous principle. With reference to the real condition of Bulgaria—while he did not wish to vindicate or uphold the rule of the Turkish Pashas, he was bound to admit that, if there was one Province to which he could point with any sort of satisfaction, it was Bulgaria, which had been fairly well governed. Why, he asked, was there so much enthusiasm about this persecuted Province in European Turkey, and not for the people similarly persecuted in Asia? Was it on account of their Christianity? From what he had seen of Turkey, he honestly believed that, as a rule, the Mahomedans were by no means the intolerant people they were supposed to be. These persecutions mainly proceeded from the various Christian sects—one persecuted the other, and, above all, there were persecutions of class by class. Above the rank of peasant in Turkey was to be found every kind of corruption, whether among Christian or Mahomedan rulers; whilst amongst the peasantry he knew of no more brave, sober, and honest people, whether Christian or Mahomedan. If Russia, on pretence of her interest in Christianity, invaded Bulgaria, how would she be restrained in her holy crusade and zeal if she once got the power of winning those districts of Syria which were of importance to us, but still more to Christendom, as the Holy Land? We, of all people, were those who ought emphatically to protest against having one argument for Europe and another for Asia. If Turkey in Asia was, as he believed, to occupy in the future an important position which would affect our interests, he hoped the House would be supplied with fuller information respecting that part of the question than the Government had given up to the present time. He believed that the object of Russia in excluding Turkey in Asia from the questions to come before the Congress was that she might gradually take over that part of the Ottoman Empire. In 1872, Lord Granville had telegraphed to their Representatives in Turkey— Let me know by two o'clock to-morrow whether the Turkish authorities generally may be said to be giving effect to the several edicts in favour of Christians? Again, in 1873, Earl Granville had telegraphed, inquiring whether the evidence of Christians was admitted in Courts of Justice in Turkey on the same footing as that of Mahometans, and what were the laws respecting the military service and the devolution of real property in that country? After they had listened to the declamation of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich lately, did they think it possible, that so recently as 1872 and 1873, the late Government were so entirely ignorant of the condition of the Christians in Turkey as these telegrams implied they were? No Foreign Office in the world was so lamentably deficient in information respecting Turkey in Asia as our own. There was an idea entertained in this country that the most oppressed people in Turkey were the Christians; but, from what he had himself seen, he believed that those who suffered most from the misgovernment of that country were the Turkish Mahomedan peasants, who had no one to take up their cause. At the present moment the Foreign Office had no reliable information with regard to the different populations in Turkey in Asia. He trusted that our future diplomatic action would be based upon better information on these subjects than we had hitherto possessed. They must recognize the change which was coming over Russian diplomacy. It had been to a certain extent a European diplomacy, constructed mainly by Germans; but it was now passing into the hands of the Ignatieffs and the Schouvaloffs, and others, who were introducing a new kind of diplomacy into Europe. He trusted that in future the policy of this country would rest upon a less artificial basis than the Treaty of Paris—upon natural and national rights. Let them insist that Russia should not grant a sham freedom, and let there be a generous rivalry between the two countries to see that the freedom which was given should be a generous, hearty, and real freedom. He hoped that the Government would support, so far as it was possible and practicable, the introduction of Parliamentary institutions into Turkey; and by so doing, they would be following the best traditions of their country, supporting the cause of freedom abroad, and maintaining the interests of the Empire.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

was not going to reply to the speech of the hon. Member for Tamworth (Mr. Hanbury). That speech was concerned chiefly with matters of abstract theory and right rather than with practical questions. The hon. Member had told the House, with regard to Bulgaria, that it was, in his opinion, unfit for freedom, that Russia had stimulated the recent insurrection, and was not entitled to profit by it. But, be that as it might, he thought he was justified in pointing out that Bulgaria was now free, and he did not suppose that the hon. Member himself would re-impose her former servitude. Moreover, it must be recollected, that this liberation was due to a course of action which England had permitted. What, however, he (Mr. Chamberlain) rose for principally, was to state the reasons for which he should give his support to the Amendment of the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson). He was, he believed, the first Member who had risen to say that he would support that Amendment, and it was therefore clear that its supporters would be a small minority there, although he believed they were in a large majority out-of-doors. But, be that as it might, the obligation was not the less cast upon them to express their opinions pointedly, and to protest, both by vote and speech, against the policy of the Government, which, rightly or wrongly, they believed to be fraught with national disaster and dishonour. Although he should vote for the Amendment of his hon. Friend, he did not accept all his arguments. He did not indeed agree that his hon. Friend was for "peace at any price," because he had never found anyone who was; but his hon. Friend had certainly placed a higher value than he did on peace, and would limit more than he would, International duties and obligations. If he (Mr. Chamberlain) condemned the policy of the Government, it was not because he was against all wars, but because he believed that the war which was in contemplation was not just or necessary. To say he was in favour of peace if war could be honourably avoided, would be an empty platitude, because everyone was for peace under those circumstances. The Government protested that they were; but, whatever might be the protestations of the Government, they had accompanied their protestations by actions which had brought the country nearer and nearer to the edge of the precipice. The responsibility, however, of carrying the country into a war which, even if successful, must be protracted, and must involve suffering and death to tens of thousands of people, must be such that no Government of English Gentlemen could enter upon it with a light heart, or without feelings of regret and pain. If, indeed, the intentions of the Government had been misunderstood, they had themselves to blame for it; for throughout their debates—and never more than on the previous evening—we had always had to contrast the pacific tone of some Members of the Government with the warlike utterances of others. He regretted that the Government should, by its action, have rendered impossible for the moment the holding of the Congress; and he regretted very much more than the mere failure of the Congress the steps by which the Government had emphasized their withdrawal from the concert of Europe, and by which they were threatening the Power with whom they had to conduct negotiations. It might be said that it was necessary for the Government to take steps and to be prepared for a possible failure of negotiations, and that we must be prepared for war if we would have peace. But ventured to think that he should be able to show the House that such a course of conduct was extremely inconsistent with what the Government had done in the past. It was not always that the Government had held this opinion. Not quite two years ago, the Government entered the Conference at Constantinople—and under what circumstances? In order to consider the state of Eastern Europe, and to promote changes and reforms which had become necessary to secure the better government of the Turkish Provinces. At that time, Turkey, by the common consent of Europe, was clearly and distinctly in the wrong. But the only precaution which the Government then thought it necessary to take was to state that, under no conceivable circumstances, would they interfere to put pressure upon Turkey in case she should refuse the conditions imposed upon her by the Conference. Some hon. Members thought that the Government protested too much, and courted failure by telling Turkey beforehand that, under no circumstances, although she was in the wrong, would England put pressure upon her; and they considered that, in departing from the concert of Europe, Her Majesty's Government had led Turkey to her doom, and provoked her to the contemptuous rejection of the proposals of the Conference. He ventured to submit that if the Government had asked for the Vote of Credit for £6,000,000 when the Conference had failed, and they had called out the Reserves, and had accompanied it by such language as they thought it right now to address to Russia, then this war would have been stopped, and the object which they all desired might have been attained. Why did the Government treat the present proposal of a Conference in a different spirit? He wanted to know why they thought it necessary to bully and menace Russia, in order to obtain the same objects which they would not lift a little finger to wring from Turkey, when they knew her to be in the wrong? Supposing the Government were successful, and that Russia yielded to the humiliation which it was thought necessary to impose upon her, or that, after a long war, England was successful, and beat her to her knees, and that she was then ready to accept the terms which Her Majesty's Government would impose upon her, what then would be the position of that successful Government? They could not ask for more than the terms of the Conference of Constantinople, and when they had obtained them they would have to say that they allowed Russia to go to war with Turkey, and, after suffering the loss of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and imposing untold miseries on her population, and after England had run the risk of a new war between Russia and this country, and, perhaps, after undertaking that war, and having suffered sacrifices still more serious than those to which he had alluded—for nothing was dearer than the blood of our own countrymen—that, after that, the Government had gained nothing more than what they might have obtained without the loss of a single man, or the expenditure of any treasure, years ago. He passed on to the consideration of the despatch of Lord Salisbury. He would not say whether that despatch was right or wrong; but that despatch constituted a new departure of the English Government. It could not be denied, because it had been hailed as a new departure, not only by the Press of this country, but by the Press of all Europe, which said that England had at last put forward European, in place of British, interests. He would also call the attention of the House to the fact that the most important terms and general direction of the Treaty of Peace were, at all events, known to the Government nine months ago, and were not received by the Government with any expression of dissatisfaction. He did not say that the Government had no right to change their mind with respect to this matter, if they believed that they committed an oversight nine months ago in allowing such matters as the retrocession of Bessarabia and the demand for an indemnity to pass without a complaint. He did not say that they might not now ask to have certain new claims treated with due consideration. But what he did say was, that inasmuch as the policy was new, and that Russia could not have foreseen the change, it was an argument for meeting Russia with moderation and with temper, and with a conciliatory spirit. The conditions of the Treaty were not such as he, in common with many hon. Members on that side of the House, could view with entire satisfaction. He had observed that it had been said in "another place" that "it would abrogate Turkey in Europe." If that were all, so much the better for the world. Turkey in Europe was an anachronism, and the sooner she was abrogated the better for the Turkish Provinces. He asked hon. Members opposite, what it was that they proposed to substitute in its place? Did they propose to restore Turkey to the position which she occupied previous to the war? If they did, he ventured to say that the support of the people of the country, of which they were confident now, would certainly be withdrawn from them. He knew that the people of this country were filled with a suspicion of the intentions of Russia, but he was sure that they had no love for Turkey. He was convinced that the English people were too generous, that they had too real a sympathy with the oppressed and downtrodden, ever to allow Turkish Pashas again to stain with blood the plains of Bulgaria, or to desolate the fields of Thessaly and Crete. If that were not the alternative contemplated by hon. Members opposite, as it clearly was not contemplated by the Government—for the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the old order of things had passed away, and that a new one must be substituted—then, for his own part, he said that there was one only other possible alternative—namely, that we should substitute self-governing States, as independent as the circumstances of the case would permit. But, in this case, there were no differences and no alterations which we could make in the Treaty of such transcendent importance to our interests as to justify a war, with all the loss and misery which that would entail. There was one other policy which he wished that he could think it possible for Her Majesty's Government to adopt. He could conceive that an English Government might say that the changes which had taken place in Eastern Europe necessitated further changes. They could not go backward, but they would go forward, and carry out a policy which was recommended 40 years ago by the Duke of Wellington—namely, the re-establishment of the Empire of Greece. He thought that that would be a wise policy, and one which would conduce to the settlement of Europe. It was quite true that the Greeks were a small people; for he supposed that in the whole of the Hellenic Provinces of Turkey, and in the Kingdom of Greece itself, the population would not exceed 5,000,000 or 6,000,000. Still, they had known in past times, that small people had done great things; and they knew that England, in the time of Elizabeth, had cut a considerable figure in the history of the world. The Kingdom of Greece had been cribbed, cabined, and confined, by the narrow limits of the Treaty of London; but still they were a progressive people, with the qualities of a great nation. The Kingdom had made great advances in art and in industry, and its commerce multiplied sixfold, its Navy tenfold, its towns had increased, and some of them had been rebuilt and created anew, and it had a Government which, at all events, was tolerant of religious differences—and, with some trifling exceptions, had been able to maintain peace and order. The Greeks had a claim upon the hon. Member for Tamworth (Mr. Hanbury), which the hon. Member had pointed out the Bulgarians had not; for the Greeks had at least shown that they were ready to fight for their freedom in a war of independence, and to emulate the deeds of the race whose place they filled. If the Greeks had a Kingdom given to them, with boundaries equal to their legitimate aspirations, they would show themselves worthy of their ancestors, and fight again if their freedom or independence should be attacked. He feared this was a policy which, wise as he believed it to be, was impossible for Her Majesty's Government to intend or to carry into effect. They had debarred themselves from adopting such a policy by the pledges which they had given to Turkey, whose independence and integrity they had sought to maintain, and for whom they had promised to secure the "best possible terms of peace." He thought that he had said enough to show that, at all events, he was not an advocate of "peace at any price." He thought there were two cases in which a country was justified, and even called upon, to go into war— the one, in which, he believed, all were agreed—namely, when its interest or its security was really in danger from attack; and the other—on which there might be greater difference of opinion, for he held that great nations had duties and responsibilities like individuals, and there were times in which they were bound to fight, not for selfish British interests, but for great causes which were in danger, or great principles which were imperilled—in order to succour the oppressed, and do justice to the weak. Such a case had occurred when we had expended valuable lives in order to put down the barbarous and odious traffic in slaves. But he said that under present circumstances, neither of these conditions existed. Our interests were not seriously attacked, and our security was not endangered. He feared that if we were to go to war, it would be not to extend the bounds of freedom, but to curtail the limit of independence; and, under these circumstances, he hoped that the flag of England might never float again beside the flag of Turkey. It was said that it was our duty to fight for public order in Europe and for European law. We were patted on the back by those of our foreign admirers, who really did not love us, but who would be glad to see us engaged in struggles in which they were not participators as champions of European order. What right had we to arrogate the title of arbiter of European order? Was it not our duty, considering that we were not a military nation, to leave to other military nations the duty of looking after their own interests, which they were perfectly able to perform for themselves, if they thought fit? He could not, for his part, understand why we should allow an English soldier to perish in order to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for Austria, Germany, France, and Italy, who were perfectly competent to defend "European order." Recent events, and all our past history, showed that the English people were ready enough to resent any slight upon English honour, whether real or fancied, and to defend the interests and the security of the country; and that made it all the more incumbent on a Government which was responsible for the conduct of public affairs, that it should not give any stimulus to this feeling, without at least urgent necessity, and just and adequate cause. He believed that in the present proceedings no sufficient reason could be proved, and he intended to give his vote in favour of the Amendment of the hon. Member for Carlisle.

MR. BAILLIE COCHRANE

said, he thought that the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) was better adapted for the atmosphere of St. Petersburg than suited for the free air of the English House of Commons. He was compelled to say that he did not understand the policy of the noble Lord and his Friends opposite. If the Opposition objected to the policy of the Government, they were bound to bring forward a Vote against it; but he could not understand the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) criticizing every detail of the policy of the Government and then saying that he did not intend to divide the House or propose any Amendment. The policy of the Opposition was not only unjust towards Turkey, but also to Russia, and he contended that the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, in 1876, in reference to what were called the Bulgarian atrocities, was of itself sufficient to lead Russia to think that she would be permitted to take even Constantinople. But now, after sacrificing over 90,000 men, her march to Constantinople was resisted by the united feeling of England, except a few people of extreme opinions. The Opposition had misled Russia, as they had misled Turkey, and they had done more—they had crippled the action of the Government. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich had referred to the communications of nine months ago, and said the Government were made aware of the intentions of Russia. But did he really mean to say that the Government knew that Russia intended to stamp out Turkey altogether, that the limits of Bulgaria had been mentioned to the Government, or that any question had been raised as to the indemnity which Russia now claimed? That indemnity, it should be remembered, would amount to a territorial question. But other questions were left open as between Russia and Turkey. Could the right hon. Gentleman say that any one of the conditions of the Treaty of San Stefano was made known to the Government? As it stood the Turkish Government would almost cease to exist, as two-thirds of the territory and population of Turkey would be added to Montenegro and Servia, and constituted part of Bulgaria. Was it possible, then, that such a Treaty could be permitted to stand? The assurances given by the Russian Government that the war was carried on, not for selfish reasons, but for the benefit of the Christians, were not confirmed by the Treaty of San Stefano. Bulgaria, as now proposed to be constituted, would incorporate nearly the whole of Roumelia, with not less than 2,000,000 of Greek inhabitants. He (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) had the greatest sympathy with Greece, and thought it a most unfortunate thing that when the Greek Empire was founded it was not extended so as to include Thessaly and Epirus, and that Prince Leopold did not accept the Throne. Had that been done, Greece would by this time have been a powerful Kingdom, probably with Constantinople as its capital. That, however, was prevented by Russian intrigue. The question for the House now, however, was what was to be done? A Treaty had been submitted which it was impossible for this country to accept. The despatches of the Duke of Wellington had been quoted by the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) last night, and an hon. Member opposite had endorsed the quotation, to the effect that the Duke of Wellington had advocated the blotting out of Turkey. He had taken the trouble of looking into the Wellington Despatches, and he found that the Duke had expressed himself as follows:— The independence of Turkey is of importance to all the Powers of Europe—its maritime independence and independent exercise of Sovereign authority in its own waters. The noble Duke had also quoted Lord Palmerston in the same sense; but he found that Lord Palmerston, in 1858, said— The policy of Russia has always been to push forward as far and as fast as the apathy or want of firmness of other Powers would allow her to go. To Lord Aberdeen, in 1853— I hope you will order the Fleet to go to the Bosphorus so soon as the Russians enter the Principalities. It was said by hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway opposite, that it mattered nothing to us what Russia did or who possessed Constantinople. They talked as if there were no such thing as our Indian Empire or our Colonial Empire. He maintained, however, that it was England more than any other Power who was interested in this question of Russian progress. There was only one consistent party on the Opposition side of the House—that which was represented by the right hon. Member for the University of London (Mr. Lowe), who in a recent article argued that our Indian and Colonial possessions were of no use to us at all, and that we should be just as well off if we concentrated ourselves in these Islands, and got rid of the Colonies. The right hon. Gentleman went on the "Perish Colonies" line. That was a most extraordinary view for an ex-Minister of the Crown to take. If that view were carried out, it certainly would matter nothing to us who had Constantinople, but it was not intended to carry out that policy; no man considering the matter reasonably could say that, with the continued progress of Russia, our Empire could remain perfectly secure. He fervently hoped that we might not be obliged to go to war; but he contended that it was by this country adopting a firm attitude that war was most likely to be prevented; and the very fact of the Government taking steps which showed their determination to assert the just rights of England, and to guard the safety of her Colonial and Indian Empire, would tend to peace. Seeing the great responsibility which rested on the Government he trusted that the Opposition would show that the House of Commons was unanimous; and he hoped that the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) would not divide the House, or that, if he did, the House would prove that, with the exception of a small minority, it was determined to act with one heart for the maintenance of the Empire.

MR. JACOB BRIGHT

said, the most important subject in this discussion was the military preparations of the Government, which seemed to have been utterly disregarded by several of the previous speakers. A remarkable change had taken place in the character of Parties in this House. During the last Session of Parliament the late Prime Minister brought a proposition before the House, asking for concerted action in order to give good government to the people of Turkey. In the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman, it was said that there was some distant possibility of war; and, because there was that possibility, he was vigorously attacked by every Member who rose from the opposite side of the House, and, no doubt, by some Members on this side of the House. If he asked where was the War Party now, he was obliged to say that the Conservative Members of this House formed the War Party. He judged them from the Government they supported, and he judged the Government they supported by their deeds; and, therefore, he was entitled to make the statement. If he judged them by their language, he should have no right to say they were the War Party; but, when men spoke and acted at the same time, and when their speech went in one direction and their action in another, then he paid little attention to their words, and judged them by their deeds. He affirmed that the Conservative Party was now distinctly the War Party, for the Government had been employing the gigantic Fleet of this country in a policy of menace for a great many months; and it came to this House this Session for a Vote of £6,000,000, the major part of which had already been spent in preparations for war. In his own constituency there were places formerly engaged in peaceful commerce now turned into Government Stores. The Government had been buying horses and guns and ships, and, latterly, he was told, it had made considerable purchases in surgical instruments—instruments to be given into the hands of surgeons in order to lessen in an infinitesimal degree the ghastly results of battle. Now, they went one step further in the direction of war, and the Reserve Forces were to be called out. He should like to ask whether the War Party had considered the calamities of war, and whether they had asked themselves the question, what was to be the object of the war? Some of the calamities of war had already been discovered by the calling out of the Reserve, for already women and children, who had led independent lives, were about to receive parish relief; and if we went to war, we should consume a vast amount of the hard-earned wealth of the country—a country in which there was as much abject poverty as in any part of the world; if we went to war, we committed to bloody graves scores of thousands of our fellow-men. Then, what would be the object of the war? Were we making preparations for war in favour of freedom? Certainly not. That was not entertained at all in the minds of the Government. He judged of the Government by its master spirit; and, if they looked at the views of Lord Beaconsfield, they could not but remember that he had spoken constantly with disdain of the efforts made by the subjects of the Porte for emancipation. Lord Beaconsfield made at one time an almost brutal attack upon that little State of Servia. Yet Servia had been largely instrumental in effecting the freedom of that part of Europe. Were we preparing for war in order to secure any solid interest of this country? He demurred altogether to any assertion of the kind. It had never been shown in this House that the country had vital interests in European Turkey. Nay, the question of our solid interests in that part of the world had never yet been debated in this House. Everybody who spoke on the subject assumed that these interests existed without undertaking to explain them. He did not deny that we had one interest—one national interest, if they liked to call it such—in European Turkey. Every country that had a ship had an interest in the freedom of every waterway; and, therefore, had an interest in the freedom of the waterway between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. But it was not an interest that required a war. So long as there were maritime Powers in Europe, and so long as we were one of those Powers, we could easily defend our interests, for we could put a Fleet at the mouth of the Dardanelles and shut up the Black Sea as we could put a cork in a bottle. Then the War Party—the great Conservative Party—asked us to go into war single-handed. He read a little while ago an article in a Continental newspaper of some reputation, and it said—"England will not go to war, because it wants an object and an Ally." We had a great Party in this country preparing for a war without an object and without an Ally. A good deal had been said by the hon. Member for Dundee about an alliance with Austria, and also by Lord Derby in "another place." It must be pretty certain now that no one could expect an alliance with Austria; and it appeared to him that those who asked Austria to ally herself with this country were asking her to engage in a very unequal war. In England we were absolutely secure, and out of the reach of Russia, while Austria was in such a position that she might receive all the blows. But some men, more heroic than others, urged us to fight alone. Isolated action required numerous sacrifices, and he did not think that such sacrifices ought to be made unless on a momentous question. He had been told, more than once, that the despatch of Lord Salisbury would show what was the object of all those warlike preparations. The despatch of Lord Salisbury was a criticism of the Treaty of San Stefano. It was an interesting criticism; but it became of less value the more it was considered. The more it was understood, the less weight would be attached to it. The speeches which had been made, so far, in this debate, very much lessened the authority of the document. One of the chief complaints was the size of Bulgaria. But the general opinion was, that the larger the Province was the more secure it would be against Russian aggression. They all had their ideas of the Treaty of San Stefano. He himself would like a large Greece, as well as a large Bulgaria, and it would be of great consequence to that part of the world if the Greek King could reign, as far as practicable, over the whole of the Greek population. All who had travelled in those districts would tell them, that when they stepped into a Greek town they found a place with all the signs of freedom and progress, and that the contrast between Greek and Turkish territory was as great as it possibly could be. There was another matter in Lord Salisbury's despatch to which some importance would be attached. The noble Lord endeavoured to excite the susceptibilities of commercial men in this country by telling them that Russia was going to get some great commercial advantage by this Treaty. But, surely, no one thought we were going to fight for commercial advantages. Before we had been at war six months, we should have sunk a sum far larger than the value of our commerce with Turkey. In the Crimean War we spent £100,000,000. That sum would yield £5,000,000 per annum. No one would venture to show that the whole of our commerce with Turkey was worth one-fifth of that amount. Of course, Russia must have great influence in that part of the world. We fought against that influence 24 years ago. Yet Russia was now as powerful as ever; and, in his belief, if we were to fight and defeat her, Russian influence must predominate in the neighbourhood of the Russian Empire. He had not risen on this occasion to give expression to popular views. If he had wished to express the views which were especially current at the present hour, he should not have risen, because they had been already expressed in this debate. But he rose for the purpose of expressing what were his own opinions, and what he believed were the opinions that were growing in the country. In his view, but for the action of England, the Eastern Question would have been altogether a local, and in no sense a European, matter. He thought that this was the fact, because we knew that there was not another Power in Europe away from the scene of disturbance which was willing to spend a sixpence, or to sacrifice the life of a single soldier, upon this question. If they looked beneath the surface, they would see that the same thing happened in 1854, for we were alone then as now. France cared little for the Eastern Question, and everybody now admitted that the man by whom she was then ruled plunged her into that war for his own personal objects. Sardinia had her objects also, but those objects were not associated with any real interest in the Eastern War. Well, if this were so, and if it were true that England was the only Power away from the actual spot which cared for the Eastern Question, how was it that this arose? He supposed it arose from the feeling which had been expressed by the hon. Gentleman the Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. Baillie Cochrane), that there was some connection between the maintenance of the Government of Turkey and the authority we exercised in India. He (Mr. Jacob Bright) believed that this was a delusion, and he would give a reason in support of this belief. If it were not a delusion, the feeling he had spoken of ought to grow with the lapse of years and with the growth of intelligence; but the fact was, that this belief diminished the older we became and the more information the people received. During the Crimean War, almost every man had strong ideas that if anything serious had happened to Turkey, the door to India would be sealed. But at the present day no such idea was entertained. He knew that in the city of Manchester, where there were hundreds of men having large trading transactions all over the globe, and who knew something of the geography and of the politics of the world, there was a large number who cared nothing as far as English interests were concerned, for the question as to who might be called on to govern Turkey in Europe. But there was one matter in which they had an interest. They knew that we must have a road to the Eastern world, and they would unite as one man in defence of the Suez Canal—in fact, in defence of Egypt. That was to say, they would unite to prevent Egypt getting into the possession of a Power that might be dangerous to us. The notion that Turkey was important to us they had given up; but the question of Egypt, and the importance of our road to the far East through the Suez Canal, they considered of the greatest consequence. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) had made an attack on the Government because of its inconsistency, and he had shown that they had folded their arms and had been absolutely neutral at the beginning of the war, and now they were asking England to arm. Well, it appeared to him (Mr. Jacob Bright) that this was as great an instance of the incapacity of a Government as he had ever seen exhibited during his time. If we were now to go to war, to undo what had been done, we should be acting much less logically than if we had attempted, in the first instance, to prevent its being done. The Party opposite had the character of being a prudent Party. But was it showing its prudence by pressing for war? We went to war in 1854 with Turkey as our Ally, and we also had the Army of France at our side, and some little assistance from Italy. At that time, Russia had almost no communications with the Southern portion of her Empire, and yet it took the united powers of England, France, Turkey, and Italy, two years to accomplish, with the immense disadvantages under which Russia laboured, the moderate result which was obtained. If we were to go to war now, when Russia communicated freely from the centre of her Empire to its circumference, how long would it take England, alone, to achieve any result with which she would be satisfied? There was one other consideration which, before sitting down, he should like to address to Conservative Members, and it was this—At the present moment two men had left the Cabinet, and he did not know how many more were to follow; but, at any rate, those who had gone were remarkable for their ability and experience. They were two men with hereditary positions, men who had ancestral estates—in fact, men who might be supposed to have a rather special stake in the future of this country. When such men as these left the Cabinet, and when those of a more reckless or a more pliant character remained, it seemed to him that the Members of that House, no matter on what side they sat, would do well to pause before taking any further steps in the direction in which they were invited. He thought, also, that, appreciating as he did, the grave consequences of the course proposed to be taken, he might fairly ask this question—What was the character of the man who was inviting them to tread these perilous paths? We knew somewhat of the antecedents of Lord Beaconsfield, and he would ask, were they such as to give us confidence in his guidance? Lord Beacons-field began life by making extreme political professions, first on one side and then on another; and he at length obtained an ascendency over his Party by his embittered attacks on one of the leading statesmen of the century—those attacks being occasioned by the circumstance that Sir Robert Peel was unwilling that the people of this country should perish by famine, but said they should have the right to purchase their bread freely in every country in the world. Another matter might be referred to as showing Lord Beaconsfield's character, and as warranting inquiry how far we were justified in placing confidence in him. Not long ago a great Constitutional question came on for discussion in that House. It was one of the greatest questions that could come before the country—namely, in whose hands should we place electoral power? What course did Lord Beaconsfield take on that occasion? He had been hostile to any change. He spoke of degrading the franchise, and he assisted in turning out a Government which had proposed a very moderate measure. ["Question!"] He (Mr. Jacob Bright) was speaking to the question, for he was considering the character of the man who was now inviting the country to enter upon a great European war. Well, in a few months, or, rather, he believed, in a few weeks, Lord Beaconsfield, or, as he then was, Mr. Disraeli, came down to the House and proposed a change, which even now many persons in the House considered revolutionary. He asked the Conservatives, then, whether they would rather be led by the Earl of Beaconsfield or Lord Derby? He asked them which of the two was the more likely to lead the Conservative Party along a safe course in dealing with the great interests of the country? His own opinion was, that if the Tory Party should succeed in plunging the country into war, the result would be that England would lose some of its character for intelligence in the eyes of the world, and the Government which did so plunge the country into war would, in a very short time, sink into deep discredit.

MR. DILLWYN

said, it was erroneously assumed that those who supported the Amendment of the hon. Member for Carlisle necessarily belonged to what was called the "Peace-at-any-price Party," if there was such a Party. Such, however, was not the fact, because he and several of his hon. Friends who intended to support the Amendment, did not agree with the extreme views of the hon. Baronet. Speaking for himself, he had never voted with his hon. Friend for a wholesale reduction of the Army, although he had always advocated economy combined with efficiency. There seemed to be in the House another Party, which might be called the War Party, though that description might be wanting in accuracy, for he did not believe that even those who cheered the bellicose speeches were for war at any price. They believed that the necessity for war would arise much more easily and speedily than others did, who thought there should be a serious case of emergency to justify the contemplation of hostilities. He did not think that any "emergency" had been proved. The casus belli, if it had arisen at all, had been occasioned by the Treaty of San Stefano. He did not think the Treaty of San Stefano contained clauses which might not very well be settled by a peaceful arrangement between the parties. He did not approve all the conditions of the Treaty, he thought some of them ought to be modified; but he was of opinion that this modification could be brought about without involving the country in the war to which we were hastening. A great change had come over the position of Parties since Lord Derby had declared, in "another place," that he did not know what the emergency said to have arisen was, or what had created it. No sufficient reason had been given for the withdrawal of our Government from the Congress. Our insistance as to the terms on which we should enter it had been needlessly stringent; and we should see hereafter that we had been much mistaken in the way we had treated Russia, and that before many years we should find that it was to our interest to come into alliance with her. We should have been content with the conditions which Russia prescribed for herself, and which were satisfactory to all the other Powers. Had we gone into the Congress on those terms, British interests could not have been damnified, and the cause of peace would no doubt have been advanced. He objected to calling out the Reserves before we had exhausted all means of friendly negotiation; and, as he agreed with the late Foreign Minister that no "emergency" existed, he should support the Amendment of his hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle.

SIR GEORGE BOWYER

said, he thought it might be useful to look back for a few moments at the state of things before the Conference at Constantinople. Whether the insurrectionary movements in Bulgaria had been fomented by Russia or were the result of Russian intrigue, was a question on which different opinions might be entertained. Unquestionably, the events which occurred in Bulgaria attracted the attention of Europe, and the right hon. Member for Greenwich preached a crusade against the Turks. The result was to produce a state of things dangerous to the peace of Europe, a strong feeling was excited against Turkey, and Russia was encouraged. After everything had been done which could be done by negotiation, it was resolved to hold a Conference at Constantinople; and he, and many others, believed that what was settled at that Conference should have been made compulsory on Turkey. The Representatives of the European Powers should have signified to the Porte that what they thought ought to be done must be done. There was no use in reasoning with fatalists. You might advise and say that certain things were not only just and expedient, but necessary; they would only answer—"God is great!" and take their chance. But, in this case, they were the more stirred up to resistance because they believed that a crusade was preached against them in England, and the Sultan was on the point of taking the banner of the Prophet from the Mosque of Omar, and proclaiming a Holy War. He did not blame Her Majesty's Government for the course they had taken; because he believed that the noble Lord who was lately at the Foreign Office, and for whom he had the greatest respect, had been a drag upon his Colleagues, and that but for him the Conference at Constantinople would have been a reality, and not a bubble. The course which ought to have been pursued would have saved Turkey, and at the same time given ample security for the lives and liberties of the Christian subjects of the Porte. After the Conference had decided what was to be done and Turkey had rejected it, Russia was left alone to carry it out. War broke out, and the Turks made a most gallant defence; but it was evident that Turkey must be vanquished. No Oriental army had ever successfully resisted a great European army. We had been talking of driving back the Russians and preventing them from taking advantage of their successes. But when once the campaign began, the events of war were irresistible, and we could not by landing in Turkey the greatest number of troops at our command successfully resist Russia. The only period when we could have, interposed our force was at the time of the Conference at Constantinople; for, when once the Armies of Turkey and Russia had met, it was impossible for us to throw back the course of military events. In what position did we stand now? We could not expect Russia to give up all the results of the war. It had been stated in that House to be a principle of International Law that a nation was bound not to go beyond the purposes for which she had gone to war. This was by no means so, and we could not expect that, having gone single-handed to war with Turkey, having achieved the victories which she had accomplished, and having made the sacrifice of blood and treasure which she had done, she would merely be satisfied with protecting the Christian subjects of the Porte and with securing their liberties. On the other hand, it appeared to him that the Treaty of San Stefano did not settle the Eastern Question, and we had a right to object to this. The Treaty made arrangements of territory which were highly convenient to Russia; but it left open certain points which must be considered hereafter, and which in future years might be the cause of war. There was the question, for instance, of the mouths of the Danube, and again there was the Hellenic question. He was inclined to give some weight to the argument that as a general rule to make Bulgaria large would be to contribute to render it, if not independent of Russian influence, at least able to resist such influence; but the details of the Treaty showed that Bulgaria would be in reality a Russian Province. Next came the difficulty that Russia refused to discuss some points of the Treaty which were not specified. Had Russia said— "We will go into Congress in order that the whole matter may be considered, but we reserve to ourselves the right of not acquiescing in conclusions which may be come to upon particular clauses," Her Majesty's Government would not, he believed, have made any complaint. But Russia had gone further than that, and had said that she would not accept the discussion of certain points. What was the use of going into a Conference unless there was to be free discussion? Under such circumstances as he had indicated, Her Majesty's Government had exercised a wise discretion in withdrawing from the proposal to hold a Conference. Had the Government gone into a Congress, hampered as they would have been by the reservation which had been made by Russia, the meeting would in all probability have broken up in bad feeling, and then war would have been inevitable. In present circumstances, he thought the policy of the Government should be to endeavour, by all means, to arrive at some understanding which might render a Conference on a proper footing still possible. A noble Lord in "another place" had said that Austria could not give us any material assistance in case of war. He did not believe that. The Austrian Army was one of the finest in Europe, and the Austrians were a fine, gallant, military people. Seeing that the course taken by Austria was almost precisely similar to that followed by ourselves, he did not believe that the Austrian Government would abandon us. He was glad we had declined to go into the Congress with our hands tied behind our backs, as some hon. Members of the Opposition appeared to desire that we should do this. He supported the Government in their view, because he believed that in the hands of the present Government the honour and dignity of England were safe. It was a nice point in International Law how far belligerents were entitled to retain the fruits of their victories in respect to the rights and interests of neutral Powers; because the general principle was that a war between two Powers could not affect the rights of others and their treaties with the belligerents. But he believed that if the Congress met, that question as regarded Russia would be satisfactorily settled. He should not have supported the Government as he had from the beginning of these difficulties if he had not been convinced that theirs was a truly pacific policy. He believed in the adage, "Si vis pacem, par a bellum." Judging from the reply of Prince Gortchakoff, which had been circulated that evening, he did not despair of a Congress still being held. The document was of an argumentative character, and Russia appeared not unwilling to argue the matter further.

MR. RICHARD

Mr. Speaker—Sir, before offering some observations on the proposal before the House, there is a preliminary question to which I should like to advert for a moment—that is how far this House is entitled, or, at least, justified, in doing anything to oppose the measures of the Government under the actual circumstances? A doctrine has been advanced—which, I think, has met with considerable acceptance even on the benches around me—that, in regard to foreign policy, and on critical occasions, the right course is to abdicate our freedom of individual judgment, to give unanimous support to the Government, and throw upon them the responsibility of the measures they propose., Now, I, for one, utterly and emphatically repudiate this doctrine. Here we are constantly telling each other, in reference sometimes to matters that are comparatively trivial, that we are bound by the obligations we owe to our constituents, our country, and our own consciences, to take a particular course—for instance, to examine and criticize, and, if we disapprove, to denounce and strenuously resist, any measure brought forward by the Ministers of the day. And are we to be told, that on questions of peace and war—questions involving an unlimited expenditure of the blood and treasure of our countrymen—questions which may affect the happiness and well-being of every man, woman, and child of the 30,000,000 of people that inhabit these Islands, that we are to hold our peace, lest we should embarrass the Government? Why, Sir, if the Government are taking to evil courses, the more they can be embarrassed the better. And what do we mean by throwing the responsibility upon Government? Is it not perfectly obvious, that by bringing before us such proposals as they have done, by asking us to vote £6,000,000 for war purposes, and to express our approval of calling out the Reserve Forces, they are, in fact, throwing the responsibility upon Parliament—or, at least, trying to associate us in a common responsibility with themselves. But I hold that we have all an individual responsibility in this matter, and if the measures offered to us lead to war, that no Member of this House can be free from the blood of his countrymen who does not oppose them by his voice or vote. I am quite sure that the course recommended to us by the advocates of that doctrine is not in harmony with the best traditions of the Liberal Party. The great Leaders of that Party in former times did not act on these timid and accommodating principles. When, nearly a century ago, through the stolid obstinacy of the Monarch and the weakness of a too-compliant and timeserving Minister, the country was about to be hurried into a war with its North American Colonies, Lord Chatham did not scruple to denounce the policy of the Government with his most scathing eloquence, and even went so far as to say that he rejoiced that America had resisted. And, Mr. Burke, in the House of Commons, still more strenuously and persistently resisted the war measures promoted by the Ministers, even when public opinion, with that infatuation which so often leads the people astray in this country on questions of peace and war, was loudly clamouring for war—when he was denounced as an "American," as some others are now denounced as "Russian," and when the excitement against him was so violent, even among his own constituents at Bristol, that he declared that, while they were in such a temper, he would sooner have fled to the extremities of the earth than have shown himself among them. Still more marked was the conduct of Mr. Fox, in his opposition to the French War and the measures that led to it. When, at the beginning of the Session of 1792, the Government proposed to embody the Militia as an obvious prelude to war, he resisted it with all the force of his fervid eloquence, and divided against it, though he was left in a minority of 50 against 290. And he persevered in his resistance, though his minority dwindled from 50 to 44, to 41, and, I believe, still lower numbers. I differ wide as the poles asunder in my appreciation of Mr. Fox's conduct from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India (Mr. Hardy). He charged Mr. Fox with having followed an unpatriotic course on the occasion referred to. And are we, then, to understand that when a Member of the Legislature believes, as Mr. Fox most religiously believed, that a Government is about to commit the greatest crime which a Government can commit, by plunging the country into an unjust and unnecessary war, it is the duty of patriotism to allow them to go on unchallenged until they have filled up the measure of their iniquity? On the contrary, I believe that when Mr. Fox, deserted by a large proportion of the Whig aristocracy, on whose ranks he had shed the lustre of his great intellect and splendid eloquence; when he was charged with holding treasonable correspondence with the enemy in France; when he was taunted with having only a score of Followers in the House; when, as he was obliged to acknowledge, he could not walk the streets without being insulted by the mob; when, in spite of all this, he continued battling bravely and loyally for the interests of peace—I believe, with Mr. Cobden, that the annals of Parliament do not record a nobler struggle in a nobler cause. And, surely, there are few now who do not look back with respect and admiration to the course taken in 1854 and 1855 by Mr. Cobden and my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright); when, in the face of a hostile House of Commons, and when overwhelmed with obloquy and reproach out-of-doors, they continued to protest against the war with Russia, the folly and futility of which was now all but universally acknowledged. It seems to me, in spite of the mild and moderate speech made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the previous night, that we are on the brink of a crisis of the gravest possible character. I, for one, must express my gratitude to the right hon. Gentleman for having avoided the use of irritating and offensive language. He might have earned, as others have done, the cheap reward of loud and frantic cheers from the more violent of his own Party if he had adopted a different style. But he disdained those contemptible clap-traps, which, in my opinion, are unworthy of a grave and responsible statesmanship. Still, I am afraid, it is only too clear that amid general professions of peace we are rapidly drifting, or—to use the language of a far higher authority than mine—"rushing" into war, and into a war the grounds and objects of which are absolutely inexplicable. Not one ray of light has been thrown upon this point in the course of the present discussion. Even those who are most vehemently opposed to the policy of Russia seem to have no conception or concern as to what is to follow in case that policy is defeated; or by what means order is to be evoked out of the chaos that now reigns in Eastern Europe. Enough for them to checkmate and humiliate Russia; the rest they are willing to leave to the chapter of accidents, so that to gratify their antipathy to Russia they are ready to plunge into war without a cause, without an object, and without an Ally. I have never judged harshly the conduct of the Government in relation to their Eastern policy. I have refused to join in the indiscriminate censure pronounced upon them, and I have, both in this House and out of it, paid my humble tribute of respect and gratitude to them, and especially to their Foreign Secretary, for the loyal and strenuous efforts he has made to guide the policy of the country into the paths of peace. But it is perfectly obvious that of late there has been a total change of front on the part of the Government. The plea of those British interests, which they had formerly specified as the conditions of neutrality, and which, I contend, have never been infringed or violated by Russia, they have now abandoned, and instead of it we have our old friend, "the balance of power," and "the protection of the freedom of Europe." These pompous and pretentious phrases, intended to "split the ears of the groundlings," exposed us to the ridicule and laughter of the world. I see the German papers are asking, who placed the freedom of Europe in the custody of Lord Beaconsfield? Certainly, if Austria and Germany and Scandinavia and France and Italy, with their 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 of armed men, cannot take care of their own freedom, it is too ridiculous for us to pretend to do it for them. I do not say that the Government is wrong in carefully examining the Treaty of San Stefano. I do not say that Russia is always just and moderate in her demands. I do not know any great Power that is moderate in the hour of victory. What I object to is, that the Government has been so prompt to have recourse to language and measures of menace. A policy of menace is a weak, and not a strong policy; it is a mean, and not a dignified policy; it is a policy of war, and not of peace. In private life, a man who is always swaggering and threatening, pulling up his sleeves to show the strength of his muscles, and flourishing his fists about, is regarded by all as a blusterer and a bully, whom no one respects and everybody avoids. Why should that, which is thought odious and contemptible in a man, be deemed worthy and honourable in a great nation? What do we see? England is invited to a Peace Congress. And what is the reply of the Government which represents England?—"Yes, we will go, but we will go in a coat of mail, armed cap-à-pie. We will go, but we will first ask our Parliament to give us £6,000,000 to buy iron-clads and monster guns, that we may back up our counsels in Congress by this demonstration of brute force." Then, comes a difficulty between them and Russia—a mere difficulty of form, as many regard it—and then the Government come down to this House, to announce their intention to call out the Reserves by way of solving the difficulty. This policy of menace does not answer. It has often been tried, and it has usually ended either in humiliation, when we have been obliged to withdraw from our threats, or it has led directly to war. My hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) has already referred to one instance in which the ostentatious and menacing display of force defeated the hopes of peace before the Crimean War. There were several instances in which the most promising negotiations were frustrated by the same cause. I have referred to the Crimean War; have you not there a warning to which you would do well to give heed? That war, according to Mr. Kinglake, involved the destruction of 1,000,000 of human lives. According to the calculation of an eminent French statistician, it cost in money £340,000,000, and inflicted upon the nations an amount of suffering and misery of every kind that was appalling and incalculable. Its evils did not end with itself. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in an able volume which he published some years ago, said of that war, that— It stirred up in Europe a spirit of restlessness, which set all the world to seek for the means of improving the instruments of attack and defence, and to add enormously, and without stint or measure, to the most unprofitable and unsatisfactory of all possible forms of expenditure. It did worse than all that, for it rekindled the war spirit in Europe, and fostered all evil passions of mutual jealousy, suspicion, and hatred among the nations. And what good came of it to any human being? Did it accomplish any one of the objects for which it was undertaken? It did not settle the Eastern Question, for that is at this moment troubling the peace of Europe. It did not break the power of Russia, for Russia is more powerful than ever. It did not diminish her influence in the East of Europe, but added to it immeasurably, by enabling her to appear as the Protector of the oppressed Christian nationalities. It did not secure the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, for ever since then the Western Powers have been meddling with, dictating to, and snubbing Turkey more than ever. It did not regenerate Turkey, but only hurried it more rapidly to ruin. It did not secure the freedom and safety of the Christian subjects of the Porte. Nay, indeed, it may be said that the only result it really did achieve, was to fasten for a time upon the neck of those unfortunate people the yoke of oppression which neither they nor their fathers were able to bear. The truth is, as it appears to me, that the real cause of the war to which we are being driven, is not regard for British interests, or the balance of power, or the freedom of Europe, but a blind, unreasoning hatred and fear of Russia. There are some of our countrymen who are apt to take these fits of terror and aversion for particular nations. They seem to live in a chronic state of panic. They are never quite happy unless they can make themselves miserable about something. Sometimes it is the French, very often it is the French. On several occasions since I have had some acquaintance with public life, I have found a portion of the people of this country in a state of frantic exasperation against France, representing her Rulers and people as so many brigands or pirates, ready to make an unprovoked descent upon our coasts for purposes of plunder and revenge. Then America became the bugbear. I remember the time when the United States were held up to execration, its Government described in and out of this House as a bullying Government, and its people as the scum and refuse of Europe. Now it is the turn of Russia. And why are we asked to hate and fight Russia? First, because she had strangled Polish nationality, and when the Poles have attempted to throw off her yoke, she has put them down with a high hand. I have no doubt the conduct of Russia towards Poland has been bad enough. But we are a strange people this country. Every now and then we throw ourselves into transports of rage against some Power, because it is oppressing or suppressing some struggling nationality, in apparently perfect unconsciousness that there is no nation on the face of the earth who holds so many nationalities in subjection as we do—and when any of them try to rise against our authority, whether in Ireland, or India, or Ceylon, or Jamaica, we do not scruple to put them down with the most bloody and ruthless severity. I belong to a suppressed nationality myself. It is really amusing to observe the quiet way in which we apply one standard of conduct to ourselves, and another to the rest of the world. My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. Cowen) told me the other day, with horror and indignation depicted in his countenance, that the iniquity of Russia in her conduct towards Poland had now culminated. In. what respect? In this respect—that the Russian Government had suppressed the use of the Polish language in the Courts of Law, and obliged them to use the Russian language. "Are you aware," I said to my hon. Friend, "that that is precisely what the British Government is doing in Wales. Any poor Welshman is liable to be tried for his life, and hundreds of them have been tried for their lives, in a language of which he is absolutely ignorant." This did not seem to strike my hon. Friend as anything out of the way when done by Englishmen in Wales, but when done by Russians in Poland it is horrible oppression. Then, another reason why we are to hate and fight Russia is this—she is an ambitious and aggressive Power. Coloured maps are published to show the annexations she has made in various parts of the world, within the last 100 or 120 years. Sometimes she is drawn in the form of a monstrous and gigantic reptile, stretching out her claws to seize that and the other country—for the most vulgar means are used to excite the prejudices and passions of our people. I do not deny that Russia is an aggressive and aggrandizing Power. But I must say that such a charge in the mouth of an Englishman is about as edifying an example of the Devil rebuking sin as I have known in my experience. Look at our annexations and aggrandizements in all parts of the world. How have we been occupied during the same 100 or 120 years? I will tell the House. During that time, from the French we have taken Canada, the Mauritius, Nova Scotia, Dominica, Tobago, St. Vincent, Granada, and St. Lucia. From the Spaniards we have taken Gibraltar, Jamaica, Trinidad, Honduras, and the Falkland Islands. From the Dutch we have taken the Cape, Ceylon, Essequibo, Demerara, Berbice, and St. Helena. From the Danes we have taken Heligoland, and some forts on the West Coast of Africa. From the Turks—-for we have not spared the Turks—we have taken the Ionian Islands. Aden, and Perim. From the Burmese we have taken Aracan, Tavay, and Pegu. From the Chinese we have taken Hong Kong. From the Hottentots, Kaffirs, and other Tribes, we have taken in South Africa a territory which is said to be larger than the Austrian Empire. Why, what took place last year? A small Colonial official, dressed in a little brief authority—or rather, with no authority at all, for he acted in direct contravention of the instructions he received from the Colonial Office—walked into a territory in South Africa, which, I am told, is as large as the United Kingdom; and, without leave or consent from the Government or the people in occupation, annexed the whole of it to the British Empire, and we all threw up our hats in triumph over the glorious achievement. But I proceed with my enumeration. From the Sultan of Borneo we have taken Labuan and Sarawak; and by settlement we have occupied, without asking anybody's leave, New South Wales, Van Dieman's Land, Norfolk Island, Sierra Leone, Swan River, South Australia, New Zealand, North Australia, and Australia Felix, taking possession of the lands of the Natives whenever it suited our convenience, without the slightest hesitation or remorse. And in India we have been plundering everybody. Within the period we fix as marking the encroachments of Russian ambition, we have in that country alone annexed to our territories, by conquest and intrigue, an extent of country whose population is probably nearly three times as large as that of the whole Russian Empire. Yet we go into hysterics of indignation, and say—Look at this aggressive Russia! But, with regard to the countries we ourselves have swallowed, we are like the woman in the Proverbs, who "wipeth her mouth and saith, I have done no wickedness." I am not saying now—that is not my point—that we were wrong in taking all these places. I know the maxim finds much favour in this House, that England never does wrong. But, at any rate, we who dwell in such glass houses, should be chary of throwing stones at others. And mark our difference of appreciation in the two cases. When Russia makes additions to her territory, we ascribe it to her restless ambition, unscrupulous love of aggrandizement. But do we say the same thing in regard to our own acquisitions of territory in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America? Not at all. If we are philosophically inclined, we say that the Anglo-Saxon race is fulfilling its destinies; if we are piously inclined, that we are following the leadings of Providence. But you may depend upon it there are other nations who are not prepared to allow us to set up this double judgment, one for ourselves and another for others; who look upon our aggressions and aggrandizements with as much jealousy as we do upon those of Russia. I do not contend that Russia is blameless. It is no business of mine to defend her. I have no interest in Russia. I do not hold a penny in Russian Stocks. I have no share in any Russian commercial enterprize. I do not think that I have known more than three or four Russians all my life. I have no doubt she has done many things which I should utterly condemn. But I do not believe that we have any commission from God or man to inflict chastisement upon her for her wrong doings. I remember an expression employed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich many years ago, which seems to me to embody a true and sound principle. "It is not in the ordinance of Providence that one nation should correct the morals of another nation." I was in hopes that our countrymen were beginning to acknowledge the wisdom of the doctrine of non-intervention. But it seems there are among us still, men who adhere to the old policy by which we made ourselves the Quixotes of the world, and got ourselves, as the result, hated by all the world. The best way in which we can reform the world, is by giving an example ourselves of upright dealing in all our transactions with other nations. We have neither the right nor the power to do it by force of arms. There is wisdom as well as wit in the following words of Sydney Smith, in a letter to the Countess Grey, in 1823, when the Liberal Party was agitating in favour of some kind of intervention on the Continent:— For heaven's sake, do not drag me into another war! I am worn down and worn out with crusading and defending Europe, and protecting mankind. I must think a little for myself. I am sorry for the Spaniards. I am sorry for the Greeks. I deplore the fate of the Jews. The people of the Sandwich Islands are groaning under the most detestable tyranny. Bagdad is oppressed. I do not like the present state of the Delta. Thibet is not comfortable. Am I to fight for all these people? The world is bursting with sin and sorrow. Am I to be the champion of the Decalogue, and to be eternally raising fleets and armies to make all men good and happy? What strikes me most in connection with the present crisis is the pitiful impotence of European statesmanship. I remember Sir Robert Peel once saying in this House that diplomacy is a remarkable and costly instrument devised by civilized States to avert war. But if the united diplomacy of Europe cannot find some means of bridging over the chasm which separates England and Russia on this question, it may as well burn its books, retire from business, and confess itself an imposture and a sham. It seems to me that diplomacy has to its hand a means of accomplishing this object. Much has been said about maintaining the Treaties of 1856. Well, among the provisions of that Treaty there is one to which I would venture to call attention, which seems designed exactly to meet such a conjuncture as the present. In Protocol 23 of the Conference, the signatures of all the Plenipotentiaries are attached to the following Declaration:— The Plenipotentiaries do not hesitate to express in the name of their Governments the wish, that States between which any serious misunderstanding may arise, should, before appealing to arms, have recourse, as far as circumstances might allow, to the good offices of a friendly Power. Why not apply this principle of friendly reference embodied in the Treaty of Paris to the present circumstances? I am quite sure of this—that the man in this emergency who will be entitled to the highest credit, who will most command the respect of the world, who will earn the warmest gratitude of mankind and whose name will go down with honour to posterity, is not the man who indulged in the loudest and loftiest and most threatening language; not the man who called out the largest array of troops, or displayed the most powerful fleet; but the man who had the wisdom to devise, and the force of character to give effect to, some peaceable means of settling the matter in dispute, and save Europe from having the scourge of war once more let loose to devastate the and to fill the habitations of humanity with mourning, lamentation, and woe.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

said, he had taken occasion last May to protest against the gospel of selfishness which had come from the other side of the House, and he took occasion now to protest against the same gospel being preached from the benches on which he himself sat. Although he was a supporter of the Amendment which had been moved, he could conceive no speech to which he could listen with feelings of greater pain than the speech which had just been made. He did not think when he came down to the House that he should have heard an apology for the conduct of Russia to wards Poland.

MR. RICHARD

said, he had not made an apology for Russia's conduct; he had said it was no doubt bad enough.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

said, it would be in the recollection of the House, that the hon. Member had over and over again instituted a parallel between the conduct of Russia towards Poland and the conduct of England towards Wales. He had seen something of the treatment of the Poles by Russia; he had been frequently in Poland, and he could assure his hon. Friend that in Poland he would not enjoy nearly the same tolerance for his religious opinions that was his lot as a British subject belonging to the Principality of Wales. In Poland, the churches of the majority were turned by force into churches of the minority. Years after the insurrection of 1863 was put down—in 1864 and 1865—he had seen many instances of the utmost atrocity perpetrated, and masses of Polish prisoners sent in chains to Siberia. He had also seen in Siberia masses of Poles in chains as late as 1871. Besides this, there was much in the speech of the hon. Member to which, although he was supporting the same Amendment as the hon. Member was supporting, he must object. But he did not think that it had any very close connection with the subject before the House. His hon. Friend had, however, condemned the policy of the Crimean War, and in reference to this, as to other matters, he could not agree with his hon. Friend. The policy of the Crimean War, in its inception, tended to prevent the isolated interposition of Russia as the Protector of the Eastern Christians. But that policy had not been carried out to its fullest extent. Had the policy of that war been persistently followed up in the period of peace that had intervened between that time and the present, it would have been found to be a just and wise policy, and one which would have prevented the evils which had now come upon the world. His hon. Friend might take it for granted that the policy of peace-at-any-price, or, perhaps, it would be more correct to say the policy of the Peace Society, was not approved by the majority of the people of this country. His hon. Friend expressed sorrow at the resignation of Lord Derby and his replacement by Lord Salisbury. Here, again, he could not agree with his hon. Friend; for he looked with pleasure on the resignation of the late Foreign Secretary, whose policy was the policy of British interests, and the appointment of his successor who had announced a policy of a wider—in fact, of a European character. That policy commended itself to his (Sir Charles W. Dilke's) judgment. There was a satisfactory answer to the charge which had been brought against the Government by the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain) that, nine months ago, the Government had the terms of peace before them to which they did not then object—and that was that the Government were not then called upon to express their opinion on these terms. It had been expressly stated to them at that time that the whole of the questions arising out of the war would be submitted to Europe, and they rested content with that assurance. Substantially, he thought the people of this country would be of opinion that in not accepting the mild terms in which we proposed that the whole Treaty should be laid before the Congress, Russia had departed from the arrangement she had made to submit the whole case to Europe. In reference to the calling out of the Reserves, he could not agree with the course that had been taken by the Government. The conciliatory despatch of Prince Gortchakoff which had that evening been published in London, showed that no such step was necessary; and he would say, further, that in his opinion the step was not in accordance with the Act of Parliament, which laid it down that the Reserves should not be called out except in circumstances of "imminent national danger or great emergency." It could not be pretended that such circumstances existed at a time when negotiations for a Congress were pending, with every prospect of their proving successful. Another ground he had for approving the despatch of Lord Salisbury was the ground which he took in reference to the Hellenic nationality; and his pleasure was increased by the fact that Prince Gortchakoff, in the reply to which he had referred, held out hopes that the Treaty of San Stefano would be so amended as that the Ægean Sea would be left in the hands of its natural possessor—Greece. He must urge upon Her Majesty's Government the necessity for interfering on behalf of the unfortunate population of Greece, who were being so greatly ill-treated at the present time. After reading all the Papers on the subject, he honestly believed that the outrages and the massacres of the Greek population in Thessaly by the Turks were as bad as those which had so roused the indignation of this country some two years ago. The Turks had let loose upon those unhappy people a number of liberated convicts and Bashi-Bazouks, who had committed upon them the greatest atrocities. The Russians had shown the strongest hostility to the Greek nationality, and there appeared to be much truth in the suggestion that the limits of the New Bulgaria were extended to the Mediterranean Sea for the purpose of cutting off the Greeks from Constantinople. It should not be forgotten that the Greeks were the only nucleus around which the populations of that district could gather, and we should be departing altogether from the traditional policy of this country were we not to do our best to protect these young and rising nationalities. Lord Salisbury was faithful not only to the traditions of his Party, but to those of England, in recommending that Her Majesty's Government should take that course. Lord Salisbury was also right in maintaining that the question of the indemnity should be submitted to the judgment of the whole of Europe at the Conference, not so much in the interests of Turkey as of those of these young nationalities who might otherwise be kept in a state of dependence upon Russia. The question, however, more immediately before the House, was whether it was wise to call out the Reserves at the present time? Although he should not have volunteered to raise this question, still, it having been raised, he must say that he did not see that any national emergency within the meaning of the Act had arisen which could justify that course being adopted. The hon. Member for Birmingham had deprecated our rushing into war; he did not believe that we were about to go to war, but he thought it a most unwise measure on the part of Her Majesty's Government to call out the Reserves, which must necessarily have the effect of disquieting Europe. Had not this step been taken, greater triumphs would have been obtained by diplomacy.

MR. COURTNEY

said, he concurred in the observations of the last speaker, as to the want of wisdom displayed by the Government in calling out the Reserves. It would be well for the House to consider what the emergency necessitating such action was, and how it had arisen. The whole difficulty had occurred from our taking a preliminary objection to go into the Congress on the ground that the Treaty of 1856 could not be altered except with the consent of every one of the parties to it. There was no emergency such as was contemplated by the Act. A great emergency—a great national danger—should be something that required instant action. The preliminary objection which had been raised was fully discussed in "another place" by Lord Selborne; and he (Mr. Courtney) believed that when the matter was quietly considered, it would be found to be one which could not be sustained. If it were sustainable, any one of the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of 1856 might say, with reference to any Article in the new Treaty—"I object to that Article; you cannot put aside the old Treaty and put this in its place." That was not the real meaning of the Protocol of 1871; the real meaning of it was this—that no one Power should, by the mere exercise of its will, set aside the obligation of a Treaty. It was untrue to say that a Treaty could not become obsolete or inoperative except by the consent of the parties to it. He was sure that neither the Chancellor of the Exchequer nor any other Member of the Government would say that, except by the consent of all the parties to it, a Treaty could not be dissolved. Treaties were constantly dissolved by effluxion of time and by change of circumstances. What had been the line taken by Her Majesty's Government? Lord Derby said, that before they entered the Congress, every Article of the Treaty must e placed before it, not for acceptance, but in order that it might consider what Articles required acceptance or concurrence by the several Powers. If this stipulation had been accepted, each Power would have been entitled, of its own motion, to refuse to accept any Article it pleased; and Russia would thus be bound beforehand to submit to the unknown action of every other Power. It was impossible for Russia to assent to this. It allowed discussion. It could not allow the claim to reject at pleasure any Article of the new Treaty. Each Power might discuss at the Congress anything it liked, but could not raise the ghost of the Treaty of 1856 as binding the Powers in 1878; and it was greatly to be regretted that the Congress should have been broken off on such a point. Lord Salisbury's despatch had been pronounced to be a great masterpiece, and so it was; but it was a great masterpiece of indiscretion, for no document could have been issued more calculated to put a peaceable settlement of that question in jeopardy. Her Majesty's Government had received information of the Russian terms nine months ago, but had never raised any objection against them. He argued that the terms which were now so much complained of were very little different from those of the Conference at Constantinople. With respect to the size of the new Principality of Bulgaria, he contended that there was no such increase of it now proposed as could not be revised and considered at the Congress. He also pointed out the great inaccuracy of the statements which had been made with regard to the new Prince of Bulgaria. The Treaty proposed that the Prince should be elected by the people—upon which, if it stood alone, he should lay no stress—that his election should be assented to by the Porte, and should also be confirmed by the Powers. [Sir H. DRUMMOND WOLFF: The Russian Army.] Would, he asked, the presence of the Russian Army affect the confirmation by the Powers? Then Lord Salisbury's despatch alleged that the claims of protection set up by Russia under the Treaty of San Stefano were not less ample than those which she had set up under the Treaty of Kainardji. Now, the Treaty of Kainardji contained an Article to this effect—that the Porte promised to protect the Greek Christians in Turkey, and also to give certain special facilities for the erection of a Russian church in Constantinople. Those were two totally distinct promises. The first gave Russia a right to insist on protection being afforded to all Greek Christians in Turkey. But the Article of the Treaty of San Stefano, on the other hand, only stated that the right of official protection should be afforded to the Imperial Embassy and the Russian Consuls in Turkey, both as regarded the persons above mentioned and their possessions, the religious houses, &c., at the Holy Places, and elsewhere. It seemed incredible that anyone should say this restricted provision was not less ample than the provision of Kainardji. The course taken by our Government was calculated to impress the Russian people with the idea—which he did not, of course, share—that the failure in diplomacy which had occurred was a wilful one, and that we now wished to go back to the position which we had abandoned or had abstained from taking up last June. When they were considering the issues of peace or war, surely they could devote a little time to see what were the real facts of the matter in dispute. What did the Government intend to do? Did they intend to fight? To go into the Conference, or simply to swagger? It was a question of a game of brag or war, and, if brag was not successful, war would inevitably result. This game of brag rested on a false foundation both in theory and fact—the notion that Russia was exhausted. This had misled Her Majesty's Government twice already, and it would seem as if it were likely to mislead them again. Anyone who knew the Russian people, and had realized the motives of the Czar, knew that exhaustion would not stop them. What was the future which Her Majesty's Government had before them? Did they intend to go to war—a miserable war, for miserable objects, which could only have a miserable conclusion? The Government had put themselves into a position from which there was no hope of escape, except by means of war, unless some great neutral Power—might he hope Germany would be that Power?—would come between England and Russia, and endeavour to relieve us from the false position in which we had placed ourselves. He was no more enamoured of the Treaty of San Stefano than hon. Gentlemen opposite; he thought it a great blot in the Treaty that the Bosnians and Herzegovinians, who had first fought and suffered, were left practically uncared-for; but he thought much might be done if the Treaty was considered in a Congress into which Her Majesty's Government would consent to enter in a fair and reasonable spirit.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

If, Sir, I felt convinced that the measure on which the Address now under our consideration is based, was one of a decidedly warlike character, and was calculated to lead us to an immediate and speedy war, I should have no hesitation in voting for the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson). If I even thought that it was probable that that measure would be followed by an ultimatum, and that that ultimatum would be followed by a Declaration of War, I should not hesitate to take that course. Again, if I felt that this was the last opportunity which we were likely to have of discussing the policy of the measure of Her Majesty's Government, I might hesitate before I agreed to an Address which, though in itself pledges the House to nothing but a respectful expression of thanks to Her Majesty for Her Gracious communication, might, nevertheless, be the last occasion on which we might have an opportunity of expressing our opinion on the policy of the Government. But, in circumstances such as those in which we find ourselves, I am of opinion that it is not desirable that we should seek to multiply occasions of difference between one side of the House and the other. I fully subscribe to all that was stated last night by my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), when he explained why, in his opinion, it was neither necessary nor desirable that an Amendment should be moved, and why he did not think that any useful object would be gained by an Amendment. My hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle, in using his superior judgment, has decided otherwise; but, although I fully allow the right of my hon. Friend, or of any other Member of this House to take that course which commends itself to his conscience, I must protest against the course which he has taken on this occasion—a course against which the Forms of the House do not enable us to protect ourselves, and which compels us to take one of three courses, neither of which is in accordance with the wishes and feelings of a great body of hon. Members—either to assent to an Amendment which we consider ill-timed and unnecessary, or to express, as we shall be considered to do in the country, a full acquiescence in the measure taken by the Government, for which many of us see no adequate necessity; or, in the last resort, to take a course which, in my opinion, is rarely justifiable—and in circumstances such as those in which we find ourselves most painful to our feelings—to abstain from giving a vote, from giving any answer to the question, to which either answer, "Aye" or "No," would be far from expressing the feeling's and opinions which we really entertain. Although I am unable to give support to the Amendment moved by my hon. Friend, we are, in my opinion, entitled, on this occasion, to examine the policy of Her Majesty's Government. I am bound to admit there has been some difficulty in arriving at any very accurate idea of what that policy is from the speeches that have been delivered from the Treasury bench. We have heard in this and in other debates, we have heard in this and the other House, conciliatory speeches and threatening speeches. In the debate which took place not long since upon the Vote of Credit, we heard most divergent explanations of the policy which dictated that measure. We were told by one Minister that it was only a Vote of Confidence, and, if it were granted, probably very little of it would be expended. We were told last night by the Secretary of State for India that it was always intended to spend the greater part of it, or the whole, in military preparations. We have heard of declarations scarcely less discordant upon the policy of the measure of calling out the Reserves. We have been told in speeches, to which I have been glad to listen, that it is not a warlike policy, that it is merely a measure of precaution; and, in "another place," we have heard the declaration that it was the sole remaining means by which the balance of power in the Mediterranean could now be maintained, and the sole measure which remained for the protection of the freedom of Europe. Sir, I think I shall be entitled to use language which was used to us last year, and, in my opinion, with far less justification, by the Secretary of State for the Home Department. I shall be entitled to ask Her Majesty's Government to answer to the people of the country, straight out, this question— Will you go to war? … It is a simple question," said the right hon. Gentleman. "It is a vital question. It is a question that admits of no deviation. It can only be answered in a monosyllable one way or the other. Are you prepared to engage the country in a war with Russia as an Ally against Turkey? "—[3 Hansard, ccxxxiv. 459.] I think I should be entitled to ask Her Majesty's Government, after the ambiguous utterances we have heard, to answer, in a single monosyllable, the question straight out—"Are you prepared to go to war with Turkey as an Ally against Russia?" In the critical, the momentous, circumstances in which we now find ourselves, I confess my object is not so much to found a charge of inconsistency in the language which has been held by Her Majesty's Ministers, as to try to find out, for the information of this House and the country, what their policy really is, and to find out whether there is any ground upon which the Government and the Opposition, or the majority of the supporters of the Government and of the Opposition, may unite, and upon which they may act together—for I believe if such a common ground could be found, in that agreement and in that concord would be found the surest and the most hopeful prospect of peace. In that spirit I have listened to much of the debate of the last two nights, and I have read the declarations of Her Majesty's Ministers in "another place." I need not say that I listened with great satisfaction to the speech in which this Motion was introduced by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I heard with satisfaction from him that he recognized that the system established by European Treaties with regard to the East of Europe has finally broken down, and that another system must take its place. With satisfaction, I heard him say that this could only be satisfactorily accomplished by a true Conference, that he was anxious that the Conference should meet, and, above all, that he still trusted it would meet. I heard also with satisfaction, the greater part of the speech of the Secretary of State for India, which was more moderate in its tone than some we have been accustomed to hear from that quarter. I heard the right hon. Gentleman deny that this measure was one of a warlike character; I heard him say that it was a measure of precaution, and I trust that is a correct description. The Forms of this House do not permit me to refer in detail to the declarations, important as they were, which were made last night in "another place." I think I am able to perceive, in spite of expressions of a doubtful character which I regretted to read, that the drift of the declarations was that the Circular Despatch, which has attracted so much attention both here and on the Continent, was intended not as an ultimatum, but rather as an argument; it was not intended as an ultimatum to which the Government demanded the assent of Russia or of Europe, but rather as an argument for the complete and full discussion by Europe of all the conditions of European peace. Well, if I have not placed too favourable a construction upon the declarations made here and elsewhere by Her Majesty's Ministers, I believe I may assume that what they want and what we want is European concert, and that we both believe that that European concert will depend on the assembling of a Congress. It is somewhat strange that the only person who appeared to attach no great importance to the early assembling of the Congress was the late Foreign Secretary; and I may say it was most unfortunate that, in a Cabinet in whose opinion the failure to meet of that Congress made it necessary that warlike preparations should at once be made, the negotiations for the assembling of that Conference should have been entrusted to one in whose opinion it was of comparatively little importance whether the Congress should meet or not. I can fully understand the reasons why Lord Derby thought it a matter of comparatively small importance whether the Congress did or did not meet; but they were reasons which were not shared by his Colleagues. His Colleagues thought it was a matter of vital importance that the Congress should meet, but on their terms—and, I repeat, it was unfortunate that the negotiations for its assembling should have been entrusted to one who did not share their opinion, and that he had no desire that the Congress should meet at all. I shall not go at any length into a discussion of the negotiations which brought about the failure of the assembling of the Congress; but I must say that I do greatly question whether the last reply received by the Government from Russia ought to have been taken as a direct refusal to enter on the Congress upon the terms required by Her Majesty's Government. I may admit—it is open to us to admit—that the condition required by the Government was a reasonable one. It is open to us to admit that the object of the Government was a legitimate one, that the whole subject of the Eastern Question should be open to discussion in the Congress; the Treaties of 1856, 1871, and the changes that have happened since, including the Treaty of San Stefano—all, in their opinion, and in my opinion, should have been open to discussion in the Congress. Very well, Sir; but while I think that the Government were justified in laying down that condition, and that the object they had in view was one they were entitled to put forward, it seems to me that they took a somewhat unfortunate mode in urging their demand on the acceptance of Russia. On one point I think they made a very unfortunate mistake. From whom did the invitation to the Congress come? It came from Austria; and why were not the negotiations left in the hands of Austria? There have been throughout all these negotiations strong differences of opinion between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Russia—a direct Correspondence between these two Governments was not most likely to lead to a satisfactory arrangement. Austria initiated the Congress, and to Austria, in my opinion, it should have been left to settle the bases for the Meeting of the Congress. And then the Government altogether omitted to consider that, although there was right and justice in their view of the case, there were nevertheless two sides to the question; and, while they were justified in the demands they made, there was, at all events, much to be said for the argument put forward by Russia, that by assenting to any special declaration on their part they would enter the Congress on different terms from those on which the other Powers entered the Congress, and would perhaps place themselves in a position of inferiority as compared with other Governments. If it had been a question of summoning Russia and Turkey before a tribunal which was to decide on their conduct in recent events, one could understand that other Governments might be justified in laying down different terms for the participation of Russia in the Congress from those on which they were themselves to enter. But there was no pretension of the sort. Russia had a right to demand to enter on perfectly equal terms with every other Power represented; and, therefore, I think the Government omitted to give sufficient weight to the representations put forward by Russia—that, by submitting to any conditions different from those of the other Powers, she would be placed in a different position from them. While I admit the Government were justified in putting forward their view, I think that the objection of Russia was rather one in point of form than of substance. I shall, therefore, trust, that in someway or other these negotiations may be resumed, and that the Conference will not be indefinitely postponed. I should like to say a word of the Treaty of San Stefano, and the Circular in which it was so severely criticized. I believe that the opinion is very generally held on this side of the House that the Treaty of San Stefano is open to a great deal—certainly not to all—but to much of the criticism raised in that despatch. I think it is held on this side of the House that in some respects that criticism might even have been extended. My right hon. Friend referred last night to the provisions regarding the retrocession of Bessarabia. I shall not say more on that point; but I think it may be added that it is felt here that the limited advantages proposed by the Treaty to be conferred on the Greek subject-population of Turkey, as compared with the greater advantages conferred on the Slavs, are neither just nor politic. I think also greater stress might have been laid upon the little prospect of the permanence of an arrangement which left certain territories under the direct control of the Porte under such anomalous conditions, and under such conditions of inferiority, as compared with territories lying nearer to the centre of the Government. It might have been pointed out that it was a cruel kindness to the Porte to leave it in such a position with regard to the populations over whom, even with the utmost good-will, it was scarcely possible it could exercise with effect any of the ordinary duties of government. I think, therefore, that, without entering in detail into the criticisms of Lord Salisbury on the Treaty of San Stefano, it may be admitted that it is felt on both sides of the House, that the settlement proposed by that instrument is one which, before being cordially accepted by Europe, would require careful and considerable revision. But while much may be urged in condemnation of that Treaty, I am bound to say, that, coming as it does from Russia at the end of a war between Turkey and Russia alone, it is one which it is not unreasonable for Russia to propose, and it is one which, having been considered in a European Conference, might have become the basis of a permanent settlement. At all events, so far as we are concerned, there are reasons why that Treaty should be canvassed in a spirit of conciliation and forbearance towards Russia. I am not speaking now only of the sacrifices which Russia made in the late war. But, if it were possible to put ourselves for one moment in the place of Russia, I think we should feel that after we had been engaged in almost a life and death struggle, after we had lost 100,000 men, after we had made great financial sacrifices—sacrifices far more onerous to Russia than any which it is possible for us to conceive—I think if we can place ourselves for one moment in the position of Russia, we should not view with much patience or forbearance the criticisms of any Power which came between us and the realization of our object. But, putting aside that consideration, I say there was a special reason why we should discuss that Treaty with calmness and moderation. We had during the progress of the war been in constant communication with the Russian Government as to the conditions of our neutrality, and more than as to the conditions of our neutrality—as to the ultimate terms of peace. I cannot accept as satisfactory the reply which was made by the Secretary of State for India last night as to the nature of the communications which passed between Russia and ourselves. I cannot accept the view, which, as I understood him, he put forward in reference to the Correspondence, that the Russian communications were made to us solely with a view to our mediation between Russia and Turkey.

MR. GATHORNE HARDY

I beg the noble Lord's pardon; I said that our mediation was expressly refused.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

I think Lord Derby's first understanding was that the communication was made with a view to see whether we would undertake to mediate between Turkey and Russia. Lord Derby, on the 11th of June, 1877, writing to Lord Augustus Loftus, speaking of a confidential conversation which he had with the Russian Ambassador, says— I thought it right to point out that, even assuming that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to assent to the terms proposed, as to which I must for the present abstain from expressing an opinion"— The House must observe that Lord Derby does not say that he demurred, but only that he did not express an opinion—and he added, "it did not follow that those terms would be accepted at Constantinople." That statement rather appears to bear out the idea that Lord Derby thought the terms which had been communicated were sent for the purpose of being proposed to Turkey. Lord Derby went on to say— Count Schouvaloff answered that the object of his Government in the communication which they made to us was not so much that Her Majesty's Government should use their endeavours to press upon Turkey the conditions of peace referred to, but rather to insure the neutrality of England by the evidence thus afforded of the moderation of their intended demands. As regarded the Porte, he had no expectation that the conditions proposed, moderate as they might be, would be accepted until the Turkish Government had learnt, by painful experience, how inadequate their means of resistance were. That certainly does not bear out the statement of the right hon. Gentleman that our mediation was refused. Count Schouvaloff merely said that the communication had not been made with the view of mediation, but with the view of our knowing what the altered terms of peace to be proposed by Russia were. Therefore, it appears from the evidence of these Papers, that Her Majesty's Government, or, at all events, the late Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister, who no doubt was cognizant of them, did not consider it necessary to demur in any shape or form to the statement made by Count Schouvaloff that the terms were moderate and were not inconsistent with the maintenance of the neutrality of England. Well, if the Government were of opinion that those terms, which, as I understand it to be admitted, do not differ in substance, although they may to a certain extent in degree, from the Treaty of San Stefano, were utterly inadmissible, was it not their duty at that time to protest, if they did not think it their duty to do more than protest—to take active steps to prevent Russia from placing herself in a position to demand those terms from Turkey? How, I ask, can the Government reconcile to themselves the maintenance of neutrality, in a war of the result of which they at that time could have very little doubt, if the terms were, in their opinion, altogether inadmissible? But those were not all the communications which passed between Her Majesty's Government and Russia. At a later date those terms were again referred to in a communication which was made to Colonel Wellesley. The Memorandum of Colonel Wellesley of a conversation with the Emperor, stated that the conditions of peace lately communicated to Lord Derby by Count Schouvaloff would remain the same as long as England maintained her position of neutrality. What was the answer of Her Majesty's Government to that Memorandum? Lord Derby wrote to the effect that Her Majesty's Government had received with satisfaction the statement made by the Emperor as to the object of the war in which he was engaged, and his disclaimer of any idea of annexation. [Ministerial cheers.] It is not necessary for the object I have in view to refer to this matter; but, as hon. Members opposite appear to think that the Emperor of Russia had at that time no idea of annexation, I will read the rest of the paragraph in the Memorandum— His Majesty has no idea of annexation, beyond, perhaps, the territory lost in 1866 and certain portions of Asia Minor. The reply to that was, that Her Majesty's Government received with satisfaction the statement made by His Majesty as to the object of the war in which he was engaged, and his disclaimer of any idea of extensive annexation. This was not the last Correspondence that passed between the two Governments. It may be said, perhaps, that at that time the Russians had obtained no great advantages, and that Her Majesty's Government were waiting to see what would be the probable issue of the war. But in the middle of December, long after the fall of Plevna, and long after the issue of the war was virtually decided, the Imperial Cabinet sent a communication to the British Cabinet. It stated that the Imperial Cabinet appreciated the friendly intentions which had promoted the communication to Count Schouvaloff, and, being animated with the same desire to maintain friendly relations between the two countries, the Imperial Cabinet requested Her Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State to define British interests, with a view of reconciling them with those which Russia was bound to protect. Here, at all events, after the issue of the war was virtually decided, was an opportunity for the British Government to protest, if they had thought it necessary to do so, against what they knew would be the minimum terms of peace that would be demanded from Turkey by Russia. But what was the answer of the British Government to that? It was simply a request that the position of Gallipoli might not be occupied. No reference even then was thought necessary to the terms which Her Majesty's Government had been informed and knew would be the least that would be demanded of the Turkish Government. Well, Sir, I hold that after these communications it is utterly impossible for the Government to refuse to accept the preliminary Treaty of San Stefano, as, at all events, a basis for negotiation. It was impossible for them to contend that the Treaty must altogether be set aside unless they are prepared at the same moment to pass a most emphatic condemnation of their own policy of neutrality throughout the war, and to hold themselves up before the people of this country as grossly negligent of the interests of Great Britain in maintaining a neutrality, the end of which they knew must be the demand by Russia of those terms which they appear now to think to be totally inconsistent with those interests. I will now say a few words on the great change which appears to have come over the whole character of the policy of the Government. Up to a certain point we know what was the charter of their policy. We know what were the landmarks which were laid down nearly a year ago by the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The charter of their policy was the despatch of May 6. But, within the last week, we have heard no more of the landmarks. We have heard no more of the position of neutrality as defined by this despatch of the 6th of May. We do not hear any more of special British interests, but we hear of objections which are urged against the Treaty on apparently European grounds. Well, I do not take any exception to that change. I have pointed out before now that Her Majesty's Government confined their attention too much to purely British interests. I have ventured to point out that a policy which concerns itself with British interests alone might be described as a selfish policy, and that description of it was not, I think, very hotly repudiated by the other side of the House. I pointed out that such a policy must necessarily be an isolated policy, and that we could never hope to get the co-operation of Europe if we ostentatiously proclaimed that we only cared for British interests. But, if it is now necessary for us to make preparations of a warlike character, and if we contemplate the necessity, not of immediate, but of ultimate, war, it must be either for the defence of British interests, or else it must be for a European policy; and the House and the country have, in my opinion, a right to know whether it is in defence of a policy of protection of British interests or of a European policy that these warlike preparations are being made. If the preparations are being made in defence of British interests, then it is necessary to ask—in what respects are these interests more endangered now, and in what respects are the landmarks of the Home Secretary more interfered with now, than they have been at any period during the war? I quite admit that one of the landmarks has been closely approached, and that the Russians are and have been for some time in virtual possession of Constantinople. But if Her Majesty's Government did not think it expedient to endeavour to prevent that virtual occupation of Constantinople at the time it was commenced, what has since arisen to render such a step necessary? Certainly none of the other interests which they defined have been in the slightest degree menaced or approached. Are we going to fight in defence of a European policy? In that case, we are entitled to ask what view does Europe take of your European policy, and what assistance do you expect to receive from Europe in your defence of the rights, privileges, and freedom of Europe? From some language that has been held, one might infer that, as we hold that the Treaty is hostile to the interests and the freedom of Europe, we are prepared to force Russia to alter that Treaty if necessary alone. Well, Sir, I protest altogether against any such doctrine. I have not been sorry that the Government have expressed with freedom and plainness to Russia her objections to the proposals she was making; but plain speaking ought to be made use of to all the Powers of Europe as well as to Russia, and a plain declaration of their opinion in respect to the other States of Europe ought to be made. I hold it is no part of the business of this country to undertake the defence of the interests of other nations or to preserve the freedom of Europe. If Austria, and Germany, and Italy, all having Armies in comparison with which ours is a small Army, are unable or unwilling to take any part in the preservation of their own freedom and their own liberties, I deny altogether that it is any part of the business of this country to protect them for them. I have no objection to the Government saying—I think it is their duty to say—that they are ready to do their part in combination with the other Powers of Europe, but it is at the same time their duty to let it be known that they are not going to undertake the task—which other nations might be glad to see them undertake—of defending their interests and their freedom. If the Government have reason to believe that the other Powers will cooperate with them, that the other Powers take the same view of the Treaty as that which is taken by themselves, why do they not lay upon the Table of this House the evidence of that circumstance? They have laid no such proof on the Table. They have not shown us that their objections to the Treaty are shared in by the other Powers. They have not shown us that the other Powers are prepared to resist the Treaty. I say that until they are able to show that the objections they have taken are shared in by the other Powers, and that the other Powers are prepared to cooperate with them in resisting, they have made no case for going to war in defence of European policy, and it is not necessary to go to war in defence of British interests. This, then, is the proposition to which I wish the Government to give attention. If you contemplate war—and, undoubtedly, you do contemplate the possibility of war—there is no occasion for it on the ground of special British interests, and there is no reason to undertake it in defence of European policy. We have a right to ask the Government, before the close of this debate, to say whether they assent or whether they do not assent to that statement. We have a right to know before we are asked to make the sacrifice, before we are asked to prepare for war, what the answer to that question is which the Government will give. Before I sit down, there is one word I would say, one final appeal which I should like to make to my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle. In my opinion, the danger—and there is a danger—the danger of war arises from two sources. In the first place, there is a danger of the Government, by the language which they hold, rendering any acceptance of modifications of the Treaty impossible by Russia. There is another danger. There is a danger lest, by the language held by a Party in this country, the Russian Government may be encouraged to believe that they will be supported in any refusal to entertain demands, however just. Sir, it does appear to me that perseverance by my hon. Friend in the Amendment which he has moved must, in both these cases, do harm. My hon. Friend knows that the Government will have, if he proceeds to a division, an immense majority. My hon. Friend also knows in what sense that majority will be construed by the War Party in this country. My hon. Friend knows—at all events, he ought to know—that the majority will be represented by those who are not averse to war as an issue which will enable the Government to go to war, and as a majority in favour of a warlike policy. On the other hand, every vote which my hon. Friend receives may be—I will not say it will be—it may be construed by the Russian Government as a proof that they may count upon the existence in this country of a Party which is prepared to back them up against their own Government in resistance to any modification that is claimed, however reasonable. I think my hon. Friend can hardly have carefully weighed the grave issue which he has raised, an issue to my knowledge which he has raised, not only without any concurrence, I will say nothing of the official Leaders of the Party to which he belongs, but even of those with whom he more immediately and directly acts. I trust my hon. Friend will weigh well before he raises an issue of so great, perhaps so momentous, importance in the future of this country; and that he will take the advice that I know has been pressed upon him from many quarters, and will not think it necessary to press this unfortunate, and, as I think, ill-advised, Amendment to a division.

LORD ELCHO

said, he would gladly express the strong view he held, that the resignation of Lord Derby, the despatch of Lord Salisbury, and the measures taken by Her Majesty's Government, would tend to peace, rather than war; but he would abstain from doing so on the present occasion. He had risen simply for the purpose of putting a Question to his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Many Members of the House had noticed that in the earlier part of the evening, between 7 and 8 o'clock, the third edition of The Times, giving Prince Gortchakoff's reply to Lord Salisbury's despatch, was brought down to the House in several batches. About 11 o'clock, he saw the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) bring a bundle down to the House, which the hon. and learned Gentleman distributed amongst his Friends. He believed there were some copies opposite to the hon. and learned Member on the Table at that moment. He had not seen similar bundles brought down by any hon. or any hon. and learned Gentleman on this side of the House. Seeing that there was a difficulty sometimes in the Government getting even Treaties as early as other parties came into possession of them, he should like to know whether that reply had been or was now even in the possession of the Government? Also, whether Lord Salisbury, or any Member of the Cabinet had seen it; and if—as he believed it was so—it was not yet in the hands of the Government, whether the right hon. Gentleman could explain how it happened that a despatch of such importance found its way to the public Press of this country before it reached Her Majesty's Government?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

Sir, I did not rise immediately after the noble Marquess sat down, because I knew my noble Friend was going to put this Question. I think I can give an explanation—or, at all events, a probable explanation—of the publication of the despatch to which he has referred. In the first place, no such despatch has yet been received by Her Majesty's Government; but I apprehend that the despatch, which I have no doubt has been addressed by Prince Gortchakoff to the Foreign Powers, will be communicated by messenger, or by some other means, to the Government of this country in due time. What I presume has taken place is this—that the publication of the despatch, which is in the form of a Circular, has been made at St. Petersburg, and, probably, has been telegraphed by a newspaper correspondent. It must be borne in mind that the Circular Despatch of Lord Salisbury itself was communicated to Parliament as soon as it was drawn up; there is nothing in this to take exception to, although, no doubt, there may occasionally be inconvenience. I will now proceed to say a few words in reply to the observations which have been made in the course of this debate, and especially to those which have fallen from the noble Lord opposite. I wish to repeat in general terms that which I had endeavoured to express when I had the honour of moving the Address to the Crown. I wish to express to the House my conviction that it is an entire misapprehension to represent the series of steps which have been taken by Her Majesty's Government, in the views they have expressed, with respect to the Conference, in the Circular Despatch of the Secretary of State, and in the message which has been communicated to Parliament—it is, I say, an entirely erroneous construction to put upon those steps, to say, or to believe, that they are measures intended, or likely, to precipitate war. I regard them, as my noble Friend regards them, as measures intended, and, I hope, well qualified, to avert and prevent war. Of course, it would be childish to say that we do not recognize the possibility of war, but we do not believe that these steps are in any way calculated to accelerate it. On the contrary, we believe that the best chance of averting the danger is to adopt the measures we have suggested. Now, there is a verb which has been conjugated in this discussion many times over—a verb of evil omen; it is the verb "to drift." On many occasions, from different quarters, and in both Houses of Parliament, we have had the changes rung on it—"We are drifting," "you are drifting," "they are drifting," "we have drifted," "we may drift," "we shall drift," into war. Now, Sir, of all things that are dangerous and objectionable, "drifting" into a state of war, is the worst and the most dangerous. And wherein does the danger of drifting consist? It consists, as I believe, not so much in action, as in inaction, in the middle of a dangerous current. My belief is that a good navigator, who found his vessel in a strong and dangerous current, and in the midst of rocks and shoals, would think it safer to get up steam so as to have his vessel well under way, rather than by doing nothing let her drift. And so it has been the case here. We have found it necessary that this country should take up a firm and distinct attitude, and have a certain amount of way on her, and so be the better capable of being guided. And for that reason, we have taken the steps we have adopted. There is another fallacy, which, to a certain extent, has pervaded the arguments raised against us, and it is the fallacy that Her Majesty's Government object to go into Conference. That, Sir, is the greatest possible fallacy. What we do object to is, not going into the Conference, but the not being able to go into the Conference. We object to take up a position which would lead to what may be called a "sham Congress," without a concert. Some observations were made by the noble Lord upon remarks said to have fallen from Lord Derby, from which the noble Lord inferred that Lord Derby was the only, certainly, one of the few, persons who attached very little importance to going into a Conference. That is not altogether an accurate statement of what I believe to be Lord Derby's views. What I understand Lord Derby to hold upon this matter is this—that a Conference is an excellent thing if it be regarded as a means of bringing together Powers who are in concert, and who understand one another; but that to go into a Congress, unless you have such a concert, would be of very little good. Therefore it was that Lord Derby strongly insisted upon the necessity, before we went into Congress, or Conference, of having it thoroughly understood what it was we were to discuss. We have been most anxious to ascertain whether everything involved in the settlement to be made would be open for discussion at the Conference; and it is only because we have been endeavouring to make assurance quite sure upon that point, that we have not yet found ourselves able to come to an agreement for entering into that Assembly. I see no reason even now to despair of such an understanding being arrived at, and of such a substantial concert being secured as may enable us to go into the Conference—as we should be most desirous, if it were possible, to do. But we are determined that the point we have taken up is a right and sound point, for it is this—that we cannot go into the Congress unless we understand that we are to be at liberty to discuss that with respect to which it is called. What said the noble Lord just now? He said, as I took his words, that the question was whether we had declined to take the Treaty of San Stefano as the basis of the Conference? Why, Sir, our difficulty has been that we have not been allowed to take the Treaty of San Stefano as the basis of the Conference. What we require is that we should have the Treaty, the whole Treaty—and I may add, if you please—nothing but the Treaty, as the basis of the Conference. I was struck by an observation made by the hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. E. Jenkins) in the earlier part of the evening. The hon. Member seems to have some private information, as to what goes on among Foreign Powers, which is denied to Her Majesty's Government. He told us that he had reason to believe that France had made a stipulation, which we had accepted, while we had refused to Russia that which we were prepared to grant to France. He said that France had stipulated that if she went into Congress nothing should be discussed there except what was contained in or sprang from the Treaty of San Stefano. If that be so, France may be said to have held—"If you discuss the Treaty, you cannot discuss anything else;" and if that be a legitimate demand upon the part of France, it is equally legitimate on the part of England. That is the position we take, and we desire that it should be clearly understood. Another fallacy has been promulgated upon this subject. It is said that in making this demand we are desirous of humiliating Russia. Humiliating Russia! That seems to me to be the most absolutely indefensible proposition that anybody could make. Not one word have we said that could tend to humiliate Russia. It has been thrown out that we made this demand in a manner which was presumably offensive to the Government of Russia—when, in point of fact, Russia was not the Power with whom we ought to have been in correspondence on the matter, because the proposal came from Austria, and to Austria we ought to have addressed ourselves. It is true that the invitation came to us from Austria, and it is equally true that we made our reply to that Power. On the 9th of March, Lord Derby addressed a communication to Count Beust, in which he said— Her Majesty's Government consider that it would be desirable to have it understood in the first place, that all questions dealt with in the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey should be considered as subject to be discussed in the Congress; and that no alteration in the condition of things previously established by Treaty should be acknowledged as valid until it has received the assent of the Powers. If hon. Members have this Paper in their hands, they will see that, again and again, communications were made to Austria on this subject, and it was not until a week later that communications were opened with the Government of Russia. On the 14th of March, Lord Derby wrote to Lord Augustus Loftus as follows:— The Russian Ambassador has this day communicated to me a copy of a telegraphic despatch from Prince Gortchakoff to the following effect:— 'St. Petersburg, March 14, 1878. 'All the Great Powers know already that the completed text of the Preliminary Treaty of Peace with the Porte will be communicated to them as soon as the ratifications shall have been exchanged—a matter which cannot be delayed. It will be simultaneously published here. We have nothing to conceal.' It was with the Government of Austria that our communications were opened, as they properly ought to have been; and it was only because there seemed to be some doubt as to the meaning of our demand, that we wished to put the matter before the Russian Government in a manner perfectly clear and intelligible. Then we are told that we are in some degree precluded from entering into any of these questions with Russia, and that we are also precluded from expressing our views freely upon the Treaty of San Stefano, because of the communications which took place in the summer of last year on the subject of the demands which Russia stated she would make if she came to propose terms of peace. A great deal has been made by my noble Friend, and by other speakers, of these communications, and I venture to think that an entirely false aspect has been given to the whole of these proceedings. I am very reluctant to take up the time of the House by going into those matters; but, after the remarks that have been made, it is scarcely possible for me to avoid noticing them altogether. What was the real object of those proceedings? Has the noble Lord taken the trouble to look back at the occasion when the first communication was made? It was made about a month, I think, after the despatch of the 16th of May, by Lord Derby, on the part of the British Government. It laid down propositions with regard to the Congress. In the communication made in answer about a month afterwards, Count Schouvaloff laid down various points, and said that he had the authority of his Government to state that if England would exercise her influence over Turkey with a view of making peace, Russia would accept them? What were those conditions? Every one of those conditions had a certain resemblance to the Treaty of San Stefano, but every one is put forward with a qualification which amounts to the whole question now at issue. Bulgaria up to the Balkans was to be made an autonomous Province under the guarantee of Europe; Montenegro and Servia were to have an increase of territory, in both cases to be determined by common agreement. None of the questions were to be settled, except by a general understanding; so that, one after another, we have those propositions proposed, with the particular qualification upon which we now insist. We do not say that they were conditions which ought not to be considered; on the contrary, we think they ought to be discussed as matters of common interest to Europe. That makes all the difference in the world in the view that we take of the matters having regard to our own interests. What we felt, and what is strongly expressed in Lord Derby's despatch, is that the Treaty of San Stefano, if taken as it stands, places Russia in such a position of command over the territory of Turkey, that it would enable her to exercise a most dangerous and prejudicial influence throughout that quarter of the world in which we have the greatest interest. There are several objections to that Treaty, such as the insufficiency of the guarantees with regard to the subject-population, which might lead to further complications and wars. But, looking at the Treaty as it affects British interests, I say that no one can fail to see the enormous difference between it and the proposals for the Conference. The noble Lord says "that you are going in this matter far beyond the celebrated landmarks of your policy laid down a year ago." But the noble Lord forgets that things have changed since then, and that some of the landmarks to which he refers have been altogether submerged. The war is at an end, and the particular dangers against which we then had to guard are now, in a great part, gone by, and do not arise in the shape in which they might have arisen. But the same points are to be guarded, the same interests have to be protected; and we think and believe that the Treaty of San Stefano, if allowed to remain, would seriously affect British interests. That Treaty threatens our communications with India by way of Egypt; it threatens us as a maritime Power. England has a very serious interest in this matter, and we cannot afford to look with indifference upon a complete transfer of power in the East to the great Empire of Russia. We must know our own interests, and we must look into this matter, and demand that it should be carefully considered by Europe with a view to a settlement. The noble Lord asks whether we are going to fight for British interests or the support of European policy? We are not going to fight at all, but we intend to maintain both British interests and European policy. We hope that the lead we have taken, and our position in coming forward with no selfish object, for what we believe to be the common interests of Europe, will secure to us the support of Europe. If it does not, what, then, is our position? Are we tamely to acquiesce in what we believe is a Treaty that will not carry out the objects we have in view, or to accept the position assigned to us by the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain), who told us that we had better leave the military Powers of Europe to look after the maintenance of the balance of power? But I know that if the hon. Member were to come forward, and say to the people of this country—"You are not a great military Power, and why should you concern yourselves with the maintenance of European order? There are great military Powers—Russia, Austria, and Germany—why don't you leave it to them to settle the question for you? "— I know what the reply would be. I can only say, if that is the doctrine of the Liberal Party, I hope, and I am sure, that it is not the doctrine of the Conservative Party. I do not believe we shall be left in this matter without Allies; but, for my part, I would rather we were left without Allies, than that we should submit to such an arrangement as that. I do not think it is the part of this country to become a mere signatory to arrangements which are to be made by other Powers. Sir, the question really resolves itself into this—For a considerable time past the system of Europe has rested upon certain Treaties, and especially upon the Treaty of Paris. That system is now shattered and almost destroyed. When I say almost destroyed, I hardly know whether I ought to say quite destroyed; because I apprehend there may be many points upon which, although the obligations of others to us are cancelled, we might be still liable—obligations which we ourselves have incurred. But, at all events, that Treaty is past. Are we to have substituted for it any other system, or are we to be left without any system at all? Now, there are two alternatives to consider—either to attempt to replace the arrangements which were made in 1856 by new arrangements, or to go on without any general arrangements at all. If we are to have, replacing the old arrangement, a new one, we demand—and we think we are bound to demand—that we should be parties to the discussion and settlement of that arrangement. And that we should not be excluded from having a voice in all parts of that arrangement, we must be judges for ourselves as to whether this or that stipulation affects us, and we must not be liable to be told—"This is a matter in which you have no concern; you must stand aside." If what we demand is denied us, and if it should be impossible to obtain a settlement of the character we desire, then we have no other alternative but to stand aside and make the best provision we can for our own safety and our own security. I trust we shall not be brought to that result. I trust that a great International arrangement may come to pass; but, if it does not come to pass, we cannot help taking precautions which are necessary for the maintenance of the interests of our Empire; and it is in view of that possibility, which I hope is not a probability, that this measure of precaution has been recommended to the Sovereign. I believe myself that we are taking a wise step in this matter. I believe we have not over-rated the difficulties which beset us in the matter of that Treaty. We have had remarks made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), and by others, depreciating and criticizing the observations of Lord Salisbury upon portions of that Treaty, and we have had pleas brought forward on behalf of the framers of that Treaty to show that its arrangements were not open to all the remarks my noble Friend made. I must say, however ingenious some of those observations and explanations were, they did not carry conviction to the minds of those who have studied the Treaty and despatch. Take the clause, for instance, as to the nomination of the Prince of Bulgaria. My noble Friend described it as a clause by which Russia would be practically the elector of that Prince. I admit that on paper these clauses look well. But we see at the end of a clause a remark as to the influence of the Russian assessor or administrator who is to superintend the whole matter. When I read this, I could not help thinking of the case of some constituencies in this country, of which you see, if you look into the Parliamentary Register, that they contain a population of 5,000 or 6,000, and that the number of registered electors is 700 or 800. But when you go on, you find a little note at the bottom, which states that the Marquess of So-and-so has great influence in this borough. Postcripts are very often important, and the one at the bottom of this Article with regard to the selection of the Prince of Bulgaria cannot fail to strike the notice. Sir, I do not wish to go into any undue criticism of the Treaty of San Stefano. I do not wish to complain of Russia having proposed that Treaty. The noble Lord said—"Put yourself in the place of Russia." I endeavour in every controversy to put myself in the place of my opponent in the controversy. I am quite ready to admit, as far as Russia was concerned, there might be nothing unfair in her proposing that Treaty; but I say we are not bound to accept it because Russia proposes it—we are not bound to accept it because she may not be to blame for having acted as she has. I say that we are bound to look into these stipulations; that we are bound to criticize them; and that we shall fail in our duty if we refrain from so doing. Sir, I do not think it is necessary for me to detain the House longer. I thank the noble Lord for much that has fallen from him. I am satisfied that in much the noble Lord has said he has done good service; that he has done more for the cause he has at heart than he could do by supporting an Amendment such as that of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle. I am satisfied that it is by firmness, by conciliatory language, but, at the same time, by unshrinking language, and by endeavouring as far as possible to present an united front, that we shall, at this moment, be best able to get through the difficulties of our position. I have endeavoured—I believe I may say all the Members of the Government who have taken part in these discussions have endeavoured—to abstain from saying anything that should be harsh, or that should prevent an amicable settlement. But I hope this will not be misunderstood—that it will not be supposed because we speak temperately that we do not feel strongly, and that we are not determined to act if necessary. We trust that no necessity may arise; but, if it should arise, depend upon it we shall know what our duty to our country is, and that we shall not be found wanting in its fulfilment.

SIR WILFRID LAWSON

said, it was only by the indulgence of the House that he could say a few words before this matter was settled. But, perhaps, the House would allow him, after the appeal made to him by the noble Marquess on that side of the House, to say what the course was that he was about to adopt. He might be allowed to say that he was not surprised at the noble Lord asking him to withdraw his Amendment, because his practice was at accord with his precepts; and he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) knew when an Amendment was proposed from the front Opposition bench, it was very often withdrawn. But the noble Lord said if they went into the Lobby, in a very small minority, it might be favourably construed by the War Party—whoever that Party might be. Well, that might easily be obviated by the noble Lord and his Friends supporting the Amendment, which would make the minority a good deal larger. On the other hand, he was bound to say that, as the Government said theirs was a measure of peace, the larger the majority they had, if that were so, the better. But, before he sat down, he must say that there were some of them who sat in that House who had considerations a little higher than Party. They had consciences, he believed. [Murmurs.] Hon. Members murmured at that; but all he could say was, that if he was not allowed to vote conscientiously in that House, he would rather not vote in it at all. Whatever might be said by those who had brought forward that Motion, they had it on the highest authority, none other than that of the late Foreign Secretary, who had said that we were not drifting, but rushing, into war. Therefore, he must say, that he would rather walk out of that House, like the noble Marquess, and never walk in again, than not give his vote upon that occasion against the humiliation and degradation of dragging the country into an unnecessary war. He should most certainly divide the House.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 64; Noes 319: Majority 255.—(Div. List, No. 101.)

AYES.
Backhouse, E. Leatham, E. A.
Barclay, A. C. Lefevre, G. J. S.
Barclay, J. W. Leith, J. F.
Barran, J. Lush, Dr.
Blake, T. M'Arthur, A.
Bright, J. (Manchester) M'Laren, D.
Bright, rt. hon. J. Maitland, J.
Brogden, A. Milbank, F. A.
Burt, T. Morley, S.
Cameron, C. Mundella, A. J.
Campbell, Sir G. O'Conor, D. M.
Clarke, J. C. O'Conor Don, The
Courtney, L. H. Pease, J. W.
Cowan, J. Pennington, F.
Cross, J. K. Plimsoll, S.
Davies, R. Potter, T. B.
Delahunty, J. Ramsay, J.
Dilke, Sir C. W. Richard, H.
Dillwyn, L. L. Russell, Lord A.
Fawcett, H. Samuelson, H.
Ferguson, R. Sheridan, H. B.
Fletcher, I. Sinclair, Sir J. G. T.
Forster, Sir C. Smyth, P. J.
Gladstone, rt. hn. W. E. Taylor, P. A.
Gladstone, W. H. Trevelyan, G. O.
Gourley, E. T. Waterlow, Sir S. H.
Gower, hon. E. F. L. Whitwell, J.
Harrison, C. Williams, W.
Harrison, J. F. Wilson, C.
Holland, S. Young, A. W.
Holms, J.
Hopwood, C. H. TELLERS.
Howard, E. S. Chamberlain, J.
Hughes, W. B. Lawson, Sir W.
NOES.
Adderley, rt. hn. Sir C. Beresford, Colonel M.
Agnew, R. V. Birley, H.
Alexander, Colonel Blackburne, Col. J. I.
Allcroft, J. D. Boord, T. W.
Allsopp, C. Bourke, hon. R.
Anstruther, Sir W. Bourne, Colonel
Arbuthnot, Lt.-Col. G. Bousfield, Colonel
Arkwright, A. P. Bowyer, Sir G.
Arkwright, F. Brassey, H. A.
Ashbury, J. L. Brassey, T.
Assheton, R. Broadley, W. H. H.
Astley, Sir J. D. Brooks, W. C.
Bagge, Sir W. Bruce, hon. T.
Bailey, Sir J. R. Bruen, H.
Balfour, A. J. Brymer, W. E.
Baring, T. C. Bulwer, J. R.
Barne, F. St. J. N. Buxton, Sir R. J.
Barrington, Viscount Callan, P.
Barttelot, Sir W. B. Cameron, D.
Bates, E. Campbell, C.
Bateson, Sir T. Cartwright, F.
Beach, rt. hon. Sir M. H. Cave, rt. hon. S.
Beach, W. W. B. Cave, T.
Benett-Stanford, V. F. Cecil, Lord E. H. B. G.
Bentinck, rt. hon. G. C. Chaine, J.
Bentinck, G. W. P. Chaplin, H.
Beresford, Lord C. Charley, W. T.
Beresford, G. De la P. Christie, W. L.
Churchill, Lord R. Gregory, G. B.
Close, M. C. Guinness, Sir A.
Clowes, S. W. Gurney, rt. hon. R.
Cobbold, T. C. Hall, A. W.
Cochrane, A. D. W. R. B. Halsey, T. F.
Colebrooke, Sir T. E. Hamilton, Lord C. J.
Coope, O. E. Hamilton, I. T.
Cordes, T. Hamilton, Marquess of
Corry, hon. H. W. L. Hamilton, hon. R. B.
Corry, J. P. Hamond, C. F.
Cotes, C. C. Hanbury, R. W.
Cotton, W. J. E. Hankey, T.
Cowen, J. Harcourt, E. W.
Crichton, Viscount Hardcastle, E.
Cross, rt. hon. R. A. Hardy, A. E.
Cubitt, G. Hardy, rt. hon. G.
Cuninghame, Sir W. Hardy, S.
Cust, H. C. Harvey, Sir R. B.
Dalkeith, Earl of Hay, rt. hn. Sir J. C. D.
Dalrymple, C. Heath, R.
Davenport, W. B. Herbert, H. A.
Dease, E. Herbert, hon. S.
Deedes, W. Hermon, E.
Denison, C. B. Hervey, Lord F.
Denison, W. E. Hill, A. S.
Dickson, Major A. G. Hinchingbrook, Visc.
Digby, Col. hon. E. Holford, J. P. G.
Douglas, Sir G. Holker, Sir J.
Duff, J. Holmesdale, Viscount
Duff, R. W. Holt, J. M.
Dunbar, J. Home, Captain
Dyott, Colonel R. Hood, Captain hon. A. W. A. N.
Eaton, H. W.
Edmonstone, Admiral Sir W. Hope, A. J. B. B.
Hubbard, E.
Egerton, hon. A. F. Isaac, S.
Egerton, Sir P. G. Jenkinson, Sir G. S.
Egerton, hon. W. Jervis, Colonel
Elcho, Lord Johnson, J. G.
Elliot, G. W. Johnstone, Sir F.
Elphinstone, Sir J. D. H. Jolliffe, hon. S.
Emlyn, Viscount Kavanagh, A. Mac M.
Errington, G. Kennard, Colonel
Estcourt, G. S. Kennaway, Sir J. H.
Ewart, W. King-Harman, E. R.
Ewing, A. O. Knight, F. W.
Fellowes, E. Knightley, Sir R.
Finch, G. H. Knowles, T.
Fitzmaurice, Lord E. Lacon, Sir E. H. K.
Foljambe, F. J. S. Lawrence, Sir T.
Folkestone, Viscount Learmonth, A.
Forester, C. T. W. Lee, Major V.
Forsyth, W. Legard, Sir C.
Foster, W. H. Legh, W. J.
Fremantle, hon. T. F. Leighton, S.
Freshfield, C. K. Lennox, Lord H. G.
Galway, Viscount Leslie, Sir J.
Gardner, J. T. Agg- Lewis, C. E.
Gardner, R. Richardson Lewis, O.
Lindsay, Colonel R. L.
Garnier J. C. Lloyd, S.
Gibson, rt. hon. E. Lloyd, T. E.
Giffard, Sir H. S. Lopes, Sir M.
Gilpin, Sir R. T. Lorne, Marquess of
Goddard, A. L. Lowther, hon. W.
Goldney, G. Macartney, J. W. E.
Goldsmid, Sir F. Macduff, Viscount
Gooch, Sir D. Mac Iver, D.
Gordon, W. Mackintosh, C. F.
Gorst, J. E. M'Garel-Hogg, Sir J.
Grantham, W. M'Kenna, Sir J. N.
Greenall, Sir G. Majendie, L. A.
Greene, E. Makins, Colonel
Malcolm, J. W. Scott, Lord H.
Mandeville, Viscount Scott, M. D.
Manners, rt. hn. Lord J. Selwin-Ibbetson, Sir H. J.
March, Earl of
Marten, A. G. Shirley, S. E.
Master, T. W. C. Shute, General
Merewether, C. G. Sidebottom, T. H.
Mills, A. Simonds, W. B.
Mills, Sir C. H. Smith, A.
Montagu, rt. hn. Lord R. Smith, S. G.
Montgomerie, R. Smith, rt. hn. W. H.
Montgomery, Sir G. G. Smollett, P. B.
Moray, Col. H. D. Somerset, Lord H. R. C.
Morgan, hon. F. Spinks, Mr. Serjeant
Mowbray, rt. hon. J. R. Stafford, Marquess of
Mulholland, J. Stanhope, hon. E.
Muncaster, Lord Stanhope. W. T. W. S.
Mure, Colonel Stanley, rt. hn. Col. F.
Naghten, Lt.-Colonel Starkey, L. R.
Newport, Viscount Steere, L.
Noel, rt, hon. G. J. Stewart, M. J.
North, Colonel Storer, G.
Northcote, rt. hon. Sir S. H. Sykes, C.
Talbot, J. G.
O'Beirne, Major Tavistock, Marquess of
O'Byrne, W. R. Taylor, rt. hon. Col.
O'Donnell, F. H. Tennant, R.
O'Neill, hon. E. Thornhill, T.
Onslow, D. Thwaites, D.
Parker, Lt.-Col. W. Thynne, Lord H. F.
Peek, Sir H. Tollemache, hon. W. F.
Peel, A. W. Torr, J.
Pell, A. Tremayne, J.
Pemberton, E. L. Trevor, Lord A. E. Hill
Pennant, hon. G. Turnor, E.
Peploe, Major Verner, E. W.
Percy, Earl Wait, W. K.
Pim, Captain B. Walker, O. O.
Plunket, hon. D. R. Wallace, Sir E.
Plunkett, hon. R. Walpole, rt. hon. S.
Polhill-Turner, Capt. Walsh, hon. A.
Powell, W. Warburton, P. E.
Praed, C. T. Ward, M. F.
Praed, H. B. Watkin, Sir E. W.
Puleston, J. H. Watson, rt. hon. W.
Raikes, H. C. Wellesley, Colonel
Ralli, P. Wells, E.
Read, C. S. Wethered, T. O.
Rendlesham, Lord Wheelhouse, W. S. J.
Repton, G. W. Wilmot, Sir H.
Ritchie, C. T. Wilmot, Sir J. E.
Rodwell, B. B. H. Wilson, W.
Rothschild, Sir N. M. de Wolff, Sir H. D.
Round, J. Woodd, B. T.
Russell, Sir C. Wroughton, P.
Ryder, G. R. Wyndham, hon. P.
Sackville, S. G. S. Wynn, C. W. W.
Salt, T. Yarmouth, Earl of
Samuda, J. D' A. Yeaman, J.
Sanderson, T. K. Yorke, J. R.
Sandford, G. M. W. TELLERS.
Sandon, Viscount Dyke, Sir W. H.
Sclater-Booth, rt. hn. G. Winn, R.
SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

said, he intended to withdraw the Amendment which stood in his name, but before doing so, he desired to say a word. On Monday night, after the fair and moderate speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—and the right hon. Gentleman always was fair and moderate where circumstances admitted—he said that although the hon. Member for Carlisle had his sympathy, he would not have his vote. But he then spoke in ignorance of what transpired in "another place," on Monday evening. After he became acquainted with the statement made in "another place," he felt it his duty to vote with the hon. Member for Carlisle, as a kind of protest against the warlike, and what he must call the aggressive, tone of Her Majesty's Government. Having voted in favour of the more direct Motion of the hon. Member for Carlisle, he did not intend to press what he might call the more moderate Amendment which he had on the Paper. But, with regard to the latter part of his Motion, that relating to Bessarabia, he wished to say that he adhered to the view which it expressed. The reply of Prince Gortchakoff to Lord Salisbury, which had been published that evening, was, in so far as he was enabled to gather its contents, satisfactory in all parts except as regarded the provisions, or want of provision, for satisfying the indemnity due to Russia, and, as regarded Bessarabia, for the retrocession of which the Russians had not ceased in their demand. Therefore, before he withdrew his Motion, he must say that he thought it was the duty of Her Majesty's Government—not alone as the Representative of England, but as a member of the European body, to resist in every way that might be possible the forcible retrocession of Bessarabia to Russia contrary to the will of the Roumanian people.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question put. Resolved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, thanking Her Majesty for Her Most Gracious Message communicating to this House Her Majesty's intention to cause the Reserve Force, and the Militia Reserve Force, or such part thereof as Her Majesty should think necessary, to be forthwith called out for permanent service.

To be presented by Privy Councillors.