HC Deb 25 June 1877 vol 235 cc223-51
MR. J. HOLMS

, in rising to move the following Eesolution:— That, having regard to the fact that men of the First Class Army Reserve, when called out last autumn, appeared in a larger proportion than any other branch of Her Majesty's Forces, this House is of opinion that it would be expedient to allow at least five thousand men now in barracks, who are over thirty years of age and have had ten years service, to retire into that reserve, said, he was sorry that so long a period as three and a-half months had elapsed before an opportunity was afforded to the House of discussing the Army Estimates. He regretted this the more, because, in the first place, the matter could be discussed without anything of Party feeling; and in the second, because he thought the House was bound to inquire now how far the plan of Lord Cardwell had answered, and more especially, seeing the state of affairs in the East, and the existence of a war which might extend over Europe and even to our own shores, to consider what was the state of our military Forces. He gave the Secretary of State for War every credit for the loyalty with which he had endeavoured to carry out the plans of Lord Cardwell in re-organizing the Army; but, as the years of transition from the old to the new system had passed by, it was now both wise and expedient that the public should have a full and frank diagnosis of the condition of the Army. His object was to state certain facts in order to show that the existing condition of things was unsound, and then to ask some questions of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War as to the means to be taken in order to provide a remedy, and to which he hoped the Committee would get satisfactory answers, before any more money was voted. Rumour said that the Government contemplated asking for a vote of £5,000,000, and in about six weeks Parliament would have ceased to be sitting. Under these circumstances the interests of the nation demanded a full and careful investigation of, and an intelligent criticism upon, the condition of our military Forces. At the time of the reforms introduced by Lord Cardwell it was generally agreed that the condition of our military Forces was such that it was essential to the safety of the country that they should be put upon a sound footing; and that the cost of our Army was out of all proportion to the number of men that we could bring together in case of emergency. The remedy that was proposed was that in future, in time of peace, the Army should create and maintain a Reserve of young men who, in time of war, should rejoin the Army, and it was predicted that the country would receive its reward in having a thoroughly efficient Army and a diminishing military expenditure. So far, however, from the expenditure having decreased, it had increased, and was still increasing. Comparing the year 1874 with 1877, he said the Estimates in the former year were £14,485,700, while the Estimates for the present year amounted to £15,443,700; but there were Supplementary Estimates, which had been already voted, amounting to £140,000, making altogether £15,583,700, or an increase upon the year 1874 of £1,098,400. Last year the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War proposed to give an increase of pay to the extent of 2d. per day to a certain class of men in the Army, and he did so with a view, as he stated, to reduce the enormous amount of desertion which then prevailed. As a matter of fact, this had just worked the other way, and he (Mr. Holms) ventured at the time to express a different view as to the result of the proposal from that taken by the right hon. Gentleman; for he held that the effect of giving an increase of pay to one class of the men would be to increase desertion among those who would not come within the scope of the proposal. Its financial result was this—that in five years the additional charge would add £200,000 to the Estimates; in 10 years it would add £300,000; in 15 years, £400,000; while in 20 years and every year afterwards it would add £500,000 to the Estimates. Then, again, India this year was called upon to pay £260,000 more for her recruits than she paid last year, not because she was getting more, or a better article for the money; on the contrary, she was getting less, and a worse article. She was, under the existing system, always called upon to pay for our experiments and our failures. Well, he thought he had shown clearly, as he had said, that our military expenditure, both at home and in India, had greatly increased since 1874, and that it was still increasing. And now he would consider how was 1877 as compared with 1871 as regarded actual numbers. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War stated, in introducing the Army Estimates, that our Establishments were full, and he was perfectly right in saying so. But while that was so, the actual number they had now was 4,048 men fewer than they had throughout the year 1871. It was stated in the annual abstract that the average Force throughout that year of non-commissioned officers and men was 183,471, which, with 3,448 of the First Class Army Reserve brought the total up to 186,919. In the beginning of the present year, there were 181,875 non-commissioned officers and men and 6,062 of the First Class Army Reserve, making a total of 187,837. That would at first sight appear to be an increase; but a close examination of the Estimates for each year would show that this year 5,066 men were transferred from the permanent Staff of the Militia to the Regular Army. Thus in comparing the numbers they ought either to add these to 1874, or to subtract them from this year. If this was done, the result would be, as he had stated, to show that we had, at the present time, 4,048 fewer men than in 1871. Again, in 1870 and 1871 we had the enormous force of 64,000 men rated as old pensioners. This year they were asked to vote 68,234 of the same class, at an expense of £153,000 for them more than they had voted under that head in 1871. The right hon. Gentleman, in introducing the Army Enlistment Bill in 1876, said that his object in doing so was to induce a better class of men to enter the Army—a class which would greatly reduce desertion. Well, it had not had that effect; and, in fact, the condition of our soldiers at that moment was not creditable to the nation. He would compare the amount of military crime with that of civil crime, as between the years 1873 and 1875. They had recently had before them a measure of considerable interest— namely, the Prisons Bill; and in the course of the discussion to which it gave rise facts were stated which showed a satisfactory condition on the part of the people of this country—a moral advancement among its industrial population which was highly satisfactory. They were told, on the authority of the Government, that our prisons were far too numerous, and that it was possible to close at least 50 of them in England and Wales; and that this was due not so much to higher wages or the spread of education, but in no small degree to the prevalence of a kindlier system — a stretching out of the hand towards men to give them self-control and that self-respect, which, as his hon. Friend the Member for Leicester (Mr. P. A. Taylor) had well said, was the foundation of all respect. They had, however, on the other hand, a system of treatment in the Army which they had a right to expect would have prevailed in the 16th or 17th centuries rather than at the present day. What were the facts? The proportion of crime, or what was included under that head, in the Army was infinitely greater than that of the civil community. The number of criminal convictions in the United Kingdom in the year 1870 was 18,400; while in 1875, with a great increase of population, the number had fallen to 15,580. The number of sentences by court-martial in 1870 was 6,900, or, as the Army was small then, the corrected number would be 7,600, while in 1875 the number had increased to 9,000, and that among 93,000 men. If they only had the same proportion as between the numbers of the Army and that of the civil population, they would have only 93 soldiers in prison instead of 2,060. He visited Millbank the other day, and there, within three-quarters of a mile of that House, he found 550 military prisoners, about 500 of whom, under a more common-sense system, would not he there at all. If there were 62 Bulgarian prisoners confined in a prison, questions would be asked in that House, and there would be a full attendance of hon. Members; but the existence of things at Millbank was regarded as a matter for no comment. The punishments in the Army had by no means decreased. In 1870 there were 1,616, in 1871 there were 1,032, and in 1876 there were 1,682 punishments inflicted. No fewer than 164,OOOminor punishments were inflicted upon soldiers in 1875. Those were the years when they were told that the condition of the soldier was improving; but, in his opinion, it was getting steadily worse. The truth was that the condition of the Army was such that no respectable young man would enter it, even if the pay were raised to 10s. a-day, and the conditions of the Service must be altered before they would be able to attract them to join. At the beginning of the Session the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester (Colonel Naghten) asked the Home Secretary, whether he was aware of the great number of criminal offences committed wherever large bodies of troops were stationed, and whether, if those offences were not diminished, it was the intention of the Home Office to send down an increased force of police at the cost of the Government? It used to be said by Sir Robert Peel and Lord Palmerston, when the number of military Forces was objected to, that they acted as police to preserve peace and order; but, in this case, the Government had been invited to send down police to keep the troops in order. They had received Returns as to the state of the Army in 1874 and 1875, and he thought that, as a Member of the House, he ought to be furnished with the fullest information as to its state in 1876. The all-important question connected with the Army, as showing what the hold was they had on the men, was the crime of desertion, and the test of desertion was the number of men branded as deserters by being advertized for by the War Office. In 1871 the number thus advertized for was 6,971, and in 1876, 7,610, as belonging to the Regular Army. The number in the Militia was, in 1871, 6,641, and in 1876, 11,469. Last year was the crowning year of desertion; for, while in 1871, 13,600 were regarded—and justly—as an enormous number of deserters, the aggregate number who deserted from the Army and the Militia was about 19,000. In a single month of last year—namely, October—the desertions were from the Army, 854, and from the Militia, 1,600, making a total of 2,454. The War Office was in despair, and these desertions were causing such deficiencies in the ranks that something desperate had to be done; the physical standard had to be lowered, and they were taking young men or old, long men or short. He warned the House not to be carried away with any idea whatever that the Army was improving—it was doing nothing of the kind; it was steadily sinking and subsiding from every point of view. During the quarter ending in March the deserters advertised for were—last year, 1,750, and this year, 2,020. As to crime in the Army, if it were regarded as a blot in 1871, it was greater and darker in 1877. The expense of dealing with these criminal offences was not inconsiderable. The sickness and mortality which were also regarded as too great in 1870 or 1871 had increased, but the increase was so small that he would say it was infinitesimal. He would next ask the House to look at a more serious question. The cardinal principle which was laid down in 1871 of having an annual Reserve of trained men had not been at all successful. All the discussions of that time centred upon the Reserve, and the Preamble of the Army Enlistment Bill recognized the same principle, while all the speakers in the debate insisted upon it, that it was essential to have sufficient time in order to create a Reserve. Captain Vivian, on the faith of actuarial calculations, was glad to be able to tell the British taxpayer what he might expect, and he told us, to a man and to a day, how we were to get these Reserve Forces. In seven years ending on the 12th of August this year we were to have 61,266 men; next year, 81,811; and in 1883, the 13th and final year of the scheme, 178,964, who were to be under the age of 31. These were actuarial calculations of what was necessary for the safety of the country; and our position was worse now than when they were made. The House would observe the exactness of these numbers and would remember that those men were to be under the age of 31 years. He would like to know how many of those 61,000 men would turn out on the 12th of August of this year? He had endeavoured every year to show that these anticipations could not be realized at the rate at which we were obtaining recruits; and he was told— "Only wait until 1877, when our plans will be matured, and then we will discuss it." Well, then, let them discuss the question that evening. Last year, the Secretary of State for War said the Reserve was not large, but he expected that this year it would be numbered by as many thousands as there were hundreds last year; and on that account he said last year it would be contrary to common sense to adopt the revolutionary system advocated by the hon. Member for Hackney, as it would throw everything into confusion just at the moment the new system was coming into operation. Was the right hon. Gentleman satisfied with the new system now that it was in operation? He might have had the wrong figures handed to him at the War Office; but it was astonishing he should have adhered to them.

MR. GATHORNE HARDY

I never said anything of the kind; if the hon. Member will look to what I have said, he will find I never anticipated more than about 7,000 or 8,000 men this year.

MR. J. HOLMS

said, he would not attribute to the right hon. Gentleman anything he could not find in Hansard. On the 1st of January this year, there were 6,062 men in the First Class Reserve, and in 1871, there were 7,022, so that in six years, in place of an increase in the Reserve for which we had paid millions, there was a decrease of 960 men. The right hon. Gentleman said he could not depend upon more than 3,000 men being added this year, and His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, in his evidence before the Militia Committee (Question 7,843), said it was not probable the Reserve Force would reach 21,000 in the course of the next four years. Would the House be justified, if it recognized this condition of things without a protest? If a Birmingham manufacturer had undertaken to deliver 61,266 rifles by the 12th of August, 1877, and when the time came he had only 9,000 ready, but pointed to the capacity of his establishment and his stock of raw material, he would not be trusted in future; and the complaint against the War Office was, that it pointed to the raw material, instead of producing the manufactured article which had been promised and paid for. If the promise had been kept and we had 60,000 men living at their homes, the result might have been fewer men living in barracks by 30,000 or 40,000, and a reduction of the Estimates by £1,000,000 or £2,000,000. This was the central question, to which we were bound to look. Of the 3,889 men called out last year, only 1½ per cent failed to appear, and high eulogiums were passed upon their appearance by the Secretary for War, while none of them got into difficulties. That showed they were the sort of men they wanted, that they constituted the best and cheapest Force, and that the safety of the nation did not depend upon the number of men in barracks, but upon the number of trained men in the country. This was the direction in which we must look if we were to get rid of crime and desertion. If the safety of the nation was dependent upon the prospective Reserve in 1871, it was still more dependent upon it in 1877. The Secretary for War had made no sign for three years, and he could scarcely expect the House now to refrain from expressing an opinion. The result of all the endeavours to form a Reserve was, that it did not exist. He must now come to the quantity and quality of the raw material. And with regard to that, our condition was worse than it was in 1871; it was worse also in comparison with the other Armies of Europe, which had been improving, while ours had been retrograding. If the Government could not get recruits, they ought to take the House into their counsel. Superficial observers went to Aldershot and saw a handful of battalions, containing, as they were told, a number of recruits, and they were satisfied with the condition of the British Army; but they overlooked the fact that what they saw was but a handful, and forgot that the difficulty was what they did not see—those who were discharged as incorrigible, those who were playing hide and seek, and the raw recruits who were being manufactured into soldiers. In dealing with the quantity and the quality of the raw material from which our soldiers were manufactured, he would refer to the statement made on the part of the Government on the 9th of March, 1871, that the number of recruits which would be necessary annually to enable us to maintain our Army and the Reserve upon a proper footing was 32,449. But, looking at the number of recruits enlisted during the five years commencing in 1871, he found that instead of our having obtained 163,400 recruits in that period, as we ought to have done had the Government programme been carried out, we had only enlisted 97,600, being 65,800 short of the proper number Parliament and the nation had been led to expect. Yet, in view of these facts, we were told year after year that recruiting was in an excellent state, and that we were getting all the men we wanted. He denied the accuracy of that statement altogether. Instead of obtaining 32,500 recruits in 1876, we only enlisted 29,370, leaving us, in round numbers, 3,000 short. In our modern system, with respect to quality, it was absolutely necessary that a certain age in regard to recruits should be closely observed. The recruit was the raw material out of which the soldier was made; and all Europe was agreed that the life of a soldier—the fighting period of his career — only lasted 12 years—namely, from 20 to 32 years of age. The limit of age for enlistment had been fixed by the War Office Memorandum of 1873, at from 18 to 25, that for passing into the Reserve being fixed at 31. For two years that limit had been strictly adhered to, and no recruits were enlisted in the Infantry regiments above the age of 21, the average age of recruits up to April, 1875, being from 19 to 20. He would now proceed to lay before the House figures which would show them to what a pass recruiting had come. The War Office were now taking men as recruits who were 30 years of age—that was to say, within one year of the age which was the limit for their being passed into the Reserve. During the first five months of 1876 we obtained only 8,754 recruits; and in the five months following, when the limit of age was set aside, we obtained 10,000. Then the War Office lowered the standard from 5ft. 5in., at which it had remained since 1871, to 5ft. 4½in., and the result of both changes was to give us 29,370 recruits for the year. The consequence was, that recruits were taken at an age which rendered them practically useless for continued service; and he did not hesitate to say that there were 5,000, 6,000, or 8,000 of the numbers for the year who ought never to have been taken at all, and would never have been taken in any previous year. In January of the present year, the number of recruits obtained was 4,046; in February, the Order respecting the limit of age was again enforced, and the number fell at once to 2,600, and in March, to 1,719, showing that the number had steadily fallen month by month. In the meantime the recruiting sergeants for the Militia were all over the country, and enlisted 38,000 men for that Force in the year from among the agricultural labourers between 19 and 23 years of age, just the very men that were wanted for the Army. Ours was a military nation, and there would be no difficulty about obtaining proper recruits if the matter was properly gone about. Passing to another point, he would ask what was the condition of our Army organization at the present time? He regretted to say that, in his opinion, its condition was very unsound. Not one of the Army Corps in the country was complete. In not one case had the General who was to be at the head of the Corps, and who was to be responsible for everything, been appointed. A military man, whose opinion he had asked as to the condition of the Commissariat and Transport Service, which it would be remembered had so completely broken down in the Crimean War, had assured him that very few men, even among those connected with that department, knew much about it, so great was the muddle and confusion which prevailed. The facts he had stated, drawn from official sources, showed, he submitted, that the condition of the Army was worse at present than it had been in 1871, and, in particular, that the Reserve had utterly and signally failed. He had shown that during the last three years the expenditure had increased by over £1,000,000; that the number of men in the Regular Army and First Class Reserve was 4,048 fewer than in 1871; that the number of old pensioners —not fighting men—had increased by 4,016; that the number of men constantly in prison had increased in four years by 400; that the number of Army and Militia deserters advertized for had. increased since 1871 by 5,471; and that, beyond doubt, thousands of recruits had during the past year been taken who would certainly up to 1876 have have been rejected. It was, therefore, impossible for the War Office to declare that that which was black in 1871, and blacker in 1877, could be, as it was sometimes called, rose-colour. He hoped that the House would not vote one penny of the £11,000,000 that remained to be voted for the Army until the Secretary of State for War had clearly stated his opinion on the state of our Forces. He asked the Government whether they were satisfied with our present position with regard to the Army; secondly, did they intend to maintain and encourage the system inaugurated by their Predecessors of forming a Reserve of trained men under 31 years of age, or not; thirdly, if so, how and when they proposed to bring up the number of such Reserves; and, fourthly, if not, what was to be their military policy? His Motion would go in the right direction. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had said, on the 5th March, that— The Committee will be pleased to hear that recruits are coming into the Army in such numbers as, I believe, will enable us to fill up our Reserves more expeditiously."—[3 Hansard, cexxxii. 1408.] If the Motion were carried the number would be but 14,000, which was within the limit of the Vote proposed. He hailed with satisfaction the Amendment that had been placed on the Paper to his Motion, to pass into the Reserve as many men who had served more than three, and less than six years, as could be conveniently spared from their regiments, in order to carry out the original intention of the Army Enlistment Act of 1870, if over 30 years of age. No doubt, the British Army had done great deeds, and won imperishable victories; but they were bound to remember that it was their duty to take care that they maintained their Army in future as their forefathers maintained it in the past. The destinies of the country were in their hands, and it was not only their duty to maintain the Army for the safety of the country, but to maintain it with a due regard to the social advancement that had been made by all classes, as a means of improving rather than of deteriorating their population. He would conclude by moving the Resolution of which he had given Notice, which he regarded as extremely moderate and practicable, inasmuch as he only asked the House to assent to what would be the beginning of a sound system.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "having regard to the fact that men of the First Class Army Reserve, when called out last autumn, appeared in a larger proportion than any other branch of Her Majesty's forces, this House is of opinion that it would be expedient to allow at least five thousand men now in barracks, who are over thirty years of age and have had ten years' service, to retire into that reserve,"—(Mr. John Holms,) —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

COLONEL ALEXANDER

said, he was surprised that after the excellent speech which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms) had just made, he had concluded with so feeble a Motion. He could scarcely believe the hon. Gentleman to be serious in making that Motion, than which nothing more impotent could be conceived. The Motion, was, in fact, only a peg on which to hang the speech; but there was another Motion which the hon. Gentleman had been twice prevented from bringing before the House, which would have been a better peg for the purpose; because that Motion challenged the soundness of the whole military policy of the late, as well as the present, Secretary of State for War. That Motion raised a distinct issue as to the expediency of remodelling our Army on a new basis. That Motion would have been perfectly intelligible; but the object of the present Motion he (Colonel Alexander) confessed he was totally at a loss to understand. He would refer to a few practical difficulties which were, in his opinion, inseparable from the hon. Gentleman's proposal. The hon. Gentleman now proposed that the Secretary of State for War should transfer into the First Class Army Reserve a number of men not exceeding 5,000, who had completed a service of not more than 10 years with the colours. If these men were to be forced into the Reserve, it would be a monstrous injustice. On the other hand, if they were not to be forced into the Reserve, the hon. Gentleman would find it very difficult to persuade them to sacrifice themselves in order to gratify his fancy. Previous to 1847, enlistment was nominally for life, but practically for 21 years; and there were now in the Army men who had enlisted for life. He knew a man in his own battalion who had enlisted in 1844, and had now completed 33 years' service, and this man had a son serving in the same battalion who had nearly completed 11 years' service. In 1847 the Limited Enlistment Act was passed, under the provisions of which men were enlisted to serve for 10 years, with the option, if approved of by the commanding officers, of re-enlisting for another term of 11 years, in order to complete 21 years' service with the colours. That Act remained in force until the passing of the Short Service Act in 1870. The effect therefore of the hon. Gentleman's proposal would be to transfer into the First Class Army Reserve all men enlisted between the years 1857 and 1867. As he had said, it would be monstrously unjust to force into the Reserve those men who after 10 years' service had elected to serve 11 years longer under the colours. The hon. Gentleman might, perhaps, say that the men would volunteer for the Reserve; but he would certainly be disappointed in that expectation. His (Colonel Alexander's) own experience had satisfied him that they would not do so. After the First Class Army Reserve was initiated, it remained for several years at a merely nominal figure. It was supposed to consist of men who had completed 10 years' service with the colours, and officers were bound to ask their men at the expiration of that period whether they would enlist in the Reserve Force. The reply was almost invariably "No!" A fortiori, men who had enlisted for a further term of 11 years would not be persuaded to join the Reserve. Moreover, if men of this class could be obtained they would never amalgamate with the remainder of the Reserve, for they would be double their age. In his book the hon. Gentleman proposed three years' service with the colours and four with the Reserve, and that at the end of that time every man should pass into civil life. But now the hon. Gentleman proposed to pass into the Reserves men who had seen nearly double that amount of service. Again, the hon. Gentleman had spoken about raw recruits, and he was always lamenting the youth of the Army; but his present proposal would tend to make the Army still younger, and deprive it of the only element which steadied and leavened the great mass of youths of whom the Army was composed. The great value of these men was shown by the fact that even now 25 per cent of the recruits for the Line were allowed to be taken for long or 12 years' service. In his (Colonel Alexander's) opinion the only way to obtain a Reserve was by enlisting men, as we were now doing, for six years' service with the colours and six for the Reserve. Men enlisted for service with the colours only would never take kindly to the Reserve. The hon. Gentleman was impatient at the slow progress which the Reserve was making; but it should be remembered that Prussia, to which he referred by way of contrast, had been re-organizing its Army for 50 years. He thought, therefore, we should not be downhearted, because we had not succeeded in filling up our Reserves in six years. It was yet too soon to talk of the deficiency in the Reserves. As he felt quite sure that the element which the hon. Gentleman proposed to infuse into the Reserve would by no means strengthen it, and as the proposal would create the maximum of inconvenience to the Army, with no appreciable advantage to the Reserve, he hoped the House would decline to entertain it.

GENERAL SHUTE

considered that a great deal of time was being wasted over a question which was not a very practical one. The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms) seemed to think that the Army was good for nothing, because of the number of boys it contained. Yet he now proposed to take away the few old soldiers and put them into this, as he appeared to think it, phantom Reserve. We insisted on a purely voluntary enlistment on short service, and we were trying to form a Reserve. Under those circumstances, the only way of getting men of sufficient age was by inducing men in considerable numbers to join the Army from the Militia, and that could only be done by doing what he thought the country would never consent to—namely, balloting for the Militia and keeping it up to its full strength. He hoped shortly to see a revision of the Ballot which he could not but admit in its present form was very objectionable. He would remind the House that in France and Germany no one was allowed to enter the Army until he was 20 years of age; but boys of 15 and 16, nominally 18 and 19 were taken in this country. The fact was, that before 20 every Englishman who was worth his salt had learned a trade, and would not enlist in the Army. To-morrow there would be a large parade at Aldershot of all the troops employed in the Manœuvres. A leading journal said it was a splendid Army, and no doubt the writer of that article was well acquainted with military affairs. He (General Shute) had, however, received a letter from a field officer, who stated that a commanding officer at Aldershot told him he had in his regiment 700 men under one year's service; colour-sergeants of two and three years' service; 300 or 400 recruits at drill, with no men fit to instruct them. The records and office work were frightful, and the regiment was now only a drilling establishment. Deserters went away in squads. Such was the result of short service, for which the present Secretary for War was not responsible. Everyone knew that we had sacrified a great deal for the Reserve. It was to be hoped that the Reserve was not altogether a myth, and they had had a proof last year that it was not so much of a myth as he and other hon. Members had imagined. He wished that, at all events, some inducement could be found to induce men and not boys to enlist, and that good recruits were more numerous; but all these details had much better be left to the Secretary for War instead of being discussed in the House.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

said, that what struck him most in the speech of the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms) was the conclusion, in which he had said a word or two on the Motion itself. He had said a good deal on the subject of prisons and prison labour, but nothing as to the means by which practical effect could be given to his proposition. It seemed to him (Sir Henry Havelock) that the hon. Member's object would be better accomplished by leaving out of his Motion all the words after "expedient," and by inserting these words— To pass into the Reserve as many men who have served more than three and less than six years, as can be conveniently spared from their regiments, in order to carry out the original intention of the Army Enlistment Act of 1870. That was an Amendment of which he (Sir Henry Havelock) had himself given Notice, but which the Rules of the House prevented him from moving. The hon. Member appeared to have changed his views, and was evidently on the horns of a dilemma, for he now agreed that the young soldiers should be passed into the Reserve. He had further said in his book that "real short service had never been tried. That he (Sir Henry Havelock) granted at once; but he could not think it right to pass old soldiers into the Reserve, or to send home men who had received 13 or 14 years' continuous training while the younger men were kept in barracks. [Mr. HOLMS explained that he had not proposed to do so.] The question, however, came to this—Which of the two could best be spared? The young or the old soldier, or did the hon. Member intend them both to pass into the Reserve, in which case there would be no Army? He would venture to criticize one or two of the hon. Member's figures, and would remark that he had certainly not stated the whole case. The British Army, for instance, could not be said to be in a worse state now than in 1871, merely on the strength of the fact that at that time there were 183,000 men in the ranks, and only 3,448 in the Reserve, whereas both these branches were now diminished by about 2,000 men each. Nor was it true that we were now in a worse financial position, because the amount charged for pensions had increased by about £150,000. Surely the hon. Member did not suppose that any one had expected, by initiating in 1870 the formation of a Reserve, that the pension list would be wiped out by 1876? The pensions would necessarily require an increasing sum of money for several years to come. Again, it had been said that in 1874, 1,101 bad characters had been discharged, and that this number had been much larger in 1876—a statement which only meant that the Army machinery had been greatly improved. A "bad character" was simply a man who pursued a trade which the false sentiment of the House itself had done much to foster—namely, that of enlisting from time to time, and who had been at last detected. He was glad to have an opportunity of exposing the delusion which still clung to the word "branded." The hon. Member had spoken of 19,000 such men who had been branded, and had spoken as if it had been done as in former times, when it was done with a hot iron; but such was not the case, for after all, it only came to this—that they were marked "B C" by the perfectly harmless and painless operation of tattooing. As a result, it most certainly had the effect of preventing men enlisting over again. As for the number of these men, it had indeed slightly increased; but the 19,000 deserters of whom the hon. Member spoke represented the accumulation of many years. There was one point on which he was able to agree with the hon. Member, a point which deserved the serious attention of the Secretary for War—namely, that it was matter for regret that the Reserve which both sides of the House had long been endeavouring to form, had not assumed greater proportions. It seemed to be stationary, just as if right hon. Gentlemen had been rolling a stone up a hill, and it was constantly coming back on them. A remedy was required, and the Amendment which stood on the Paper in his name pointed to a remedy; and he hoped a fair trial would be given to it. The fact was, the proportion of exceedingly young men in the Army was so great, that the object of the Act of 1870 could not be accomplished. Lord Cardwell said that in 1883, or 12 years after the Reserve system was begun, he hoped, if his intention was carried into effect, we should have in the Reserve between 60,000 and 70,000 men. In that matter he feared the right hon. Gentleman opposite was not exercising the full powers given him by law, and that he was not resisting as he ought the military pressure put upon him. The Army we had now was one of the youngest Armies in Europe, the great difficulty of commanding officers being to maintain discipline and give anything like formation to those young soldiers. In the Aldershot Division at present the proportion was 35 per cent of men under 15 months' service; he believed he would be right in putting it at 12 months. About a fortnight ago His Royal Highness reviewed some 7,000 men, of whom no fewer than 5,000 were under one year's service. What would be the effect if, out of these regiments you were to take the men of 12 years' service? There would be nothing left to work upon. If the right hon. Gentleman would insist that the men who, after three or four years' service, desired it, should pass into the Reserve, we should soon have a considerable Force. But if we aimed at turning old soldiers into Reserves, we should never have a Reserve Force. One of the most difficult problems we had to solve was how to combine short service with the demands of India, and the sooner the right hon. Gentleman brought that question to an issue, the sooner the country would get something for its money. If the right hon. Gentleman would suggest to the Indian Government that the average service in India should be six years, and not for an indefinite time, he would do better for the Indian Government itself as well as for the Reserves. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Hackney had stated that we were no better off now than we were in 1874. But, in 1874, we had not anything like the Reserve we had at present, which, taking the Militia and Army Reserves together, amounted to some 38,000 men. The real economy would be found in passing men after three or four years' service into the Reserve, and then we should have in them a Force disposable for service in India as well as at home. If the events which occurred in India 20 years ago were to happen now, the 38,000 men we had in the Reserve would be quite available for India at six weeks' notice. There was another point to which he wished to refer, and that was the great objection which young soldiers, as well as old, entertained that their pay was not sufficient to keep them from a state of starvation. Many of the men who passed to the Reserve did not like to go back to their old regiment, and would rather go to another, because they considered their chances better, and he would therefore suggest that it should be made punishable for a man to re-enlist without declaring that he had served before; and if he made the declaration, that he should be allowed to serve in any regiment he liked. He shared in the opinion which had been expressed by his hon. Friend the Member for Hackney that the Reserve ought to become a reality. The Commander-in-Chief had stated, in his examination before the Committee, that he hoped before the end of four years there would be a Reserve of 21,000. He (Sir Henry Havelock) hoped that would be the case; but was of opinion that unless more active measures were taken, the Reserve would not reach that number.

MR. GATHORNE HARDY

said, that the hon. and gallant Member who had just sat down (Sir Henry Havelock) had connected the Indian with the English Service; but he would not enter into that subject, because it was not connected with the points which had been discussed by the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms). He would, however, assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman that he was quite alive to the importance of the subject, and that it was an object at which the War Office was aiming in common with the India Office, and he trusted they were advancing towards the point which the hon. and gallant Gentleman wished to see reached. With reference to the speech of the hon. Member for Hackney, he could not help thinking that it would have been much more appropriate if that hon. Member, instead of concluding as he had done with an impotent Motion, had moved for the impeachment of the late and present Secretary for War, and the complete reversal of our whole military system. The hon. Member had presented a very sad and dreadful view of the British Army—it was composed of the halt and blind, its physical quality had been altogether deteriorated, and it had more sickness and mortality prevailing now than at any former period. The hon. Member, in illustration, had used figures taken from sources which had been refuted over and over again; although he had documents quite at hand which were completely reliable, he went to the police and to The Hue and Cry for information as to the amount of desertions; but that afforded no test as to the true state of the case. There was a document on the Table which gave the official details of desertions, but he did not choose to refer to its details. In 1874, there were 5,582 desertions, but of that number 2,052 returned to the Army, and the total loss was 3,530. In 1875, there were 4,373 desertions, or more than 1,000 less; but 1,944 of those men rejoined the Army, and the net loss was 2,429; and in the year 1876, when there was an increased Force and a greater number of recruits than there ever was before in the history of the Army, the desertions were 4,878, as against 5,582 in 1876; but of those men 2,063 rejoined the Army, so that the actual net loss was 2,815. Now, when the hon. Member had that document in his hand, was it just or fair to go to The Sue and Cry, when the official figures showed that there had been a steady decrease from the year which he took as his normal year? [Mr. J. HOLMS: I took the year 1871, not 1874, as the normal year.] Certainly the hon. Member took 1874 as the normal year, for he said it would relieve him from all Party considerations, as that was the year when the present Government came into office. He (Mr. Hardy) had not the Returns before him for 1871, but he had for 1872; and in that year the net loss to the Army from desertions was 4,006, therefore it appeared that the further the hon. Member went into his figures the further he went from that position which in all fairness he ought to have placed before the House. With respect to 1871, again he had imposed on the House. In 1871 a Vote was taken by his Predecessor for 20,000 additional men. There were not now so many men in the Army by something like 6,000 men, and the hon. Gentleman was bound to inform the House of the particular circumstances which had occurred in 1870, yet he said not one word about the number of recruits in 1871. Then the hon. Member went into the question of pensions; but he had not adverted to the notorious fact that a great number of 21 years' men who had been enlisted for the Crimean War were just taking their pensions last year. The hon. Member made no allusion to the special circumstances that had occurred, and offered no explanation of the increase of pensions on that account. It was not fair that the House should be so misled. As to crime, the hon. Member had thought it proper to blacken the Army as steeped in crime out of all proportion to the civil population; but the hon. Member had not stated that there were offences in the Army which were peculiar to it, such as insubordination and offences to superior officers— offences which were not known in civil society. Now, though he was sorry to say that there was more crime in the Army than could be wished for, yet these men made capital soldiers in active service, and were as ready to do their duty to their country as others; and he did not think it was wise to make it appear that all the worst characters entered the Army; rather it should be shown to men that there was as good an opportunity of doing as well in the Army as in other positions of life. The hon. Member would prefer men who should be paid 10s. a-day; but he must say he did not believe in getting such men by a system of voluntary enlistment. The worst enemies of the Service were those who, like the hon. Member for Hackney, spoke as if men lost their character by entering the Army, and that there was no opportunity of getting on in the Service. He (Mr. Hardy) believed there never was a time when men received better treatment in the Army, or when officers paid more attention to the comfort, character, and condition of the men, or were more anxious that they should succeed. There was the greatest demand for good soldiers as non-commissioned officers. And with reference to crime he would remind the hon. Member for Hackney that Lord Shaftesbury two years ago when the Autumn Manœuvres took place in his neighbourhod, went to see them, and described their conduct as excellent. No offences were committed by them, and it could hardly be known that there was such a body of men in the district. Last year, again, when two Army Corps were mustered, no crimes were committed by those men. The neighbourhood was undisturbed; they were occupied in their military duties, and when released from them their conduct was exemplary; there was no marauding; the neighbourhood was absolutely surprised at the quietness, decorum, and order that prevailed. He had never stated, as the hon. Member seemed to imply, that the 2d. a-day of deferred pay would cure desertion; what he stated was that when a man had a considerable sum saved, he was less likely to desert, and he said so still. At any rate it could not affect the present state of things as it could hardly yet be said to be in operation. It was not on that account therefore that desertions were now so low. Desertion in 1876 was extremely low; nevertheless 30,000 men were recruited, and principally from a class which did not deserve the severe reprobation the hon. Member for Hackney had applied to them. With reference to lowering the standard, he believed very few had been enlisted over 30, or below the standard. The hon. and gallant Member for Brighton (General Shute) spoke of "young soldiers;" but he (Mr. Hardy) did not believe they would ever get anything but young soldiers in England. The hon. Member for Hackney asked if he (Mr. Hardy) was satisfied with the present system. He was satisfied with nothing so long as improvement could be made. But he believed, if they were to have Reserves, if they were to raise their Army to a point at which they might be satisfied, there was only one way to it—he meant by short service. On the other hand, he never would advocate the using up of all their best men, and then falling back on untried men. The hon. and gallant Baronet opposite (Sir Henry Havelock) spoke of what they should do to prevent desertion. It was pleasant to be praised by one so well able to judge of military matters, but that was exactly what he (Mr. Hardy) was doing. Early in the present year, finding the recruits coming in so numerously, he had directed letters to be written to all the regiments in which there were more than the proper number, directing the officers to offer to place those who had served three years in the Reserve, with the understanding that such men should be well conducted and have the means of gaining their own living. That was a most important thing, as nothing could be worse than to turn out men after three years' service who had nothing to fall back upon for a living. The Reserve pay was not a living, and unless a man had other means of gaining a livelihood you would do him harm rather than good, only tempt him to enlist again, and, in fact, to do much worse. Under that Circular 1,100 men, 746 of whom had fulfilled their first service, had been passed into the Reserve, which on the 1st of April numbered 7,310. He had always said that the formation of a Reserve would be a slow process, but this year he believed they would get from 5,000 to 6,000 men. That brought him to another point to which the hon. Member for Hackney had adverted. The hon. Member had again used the figures of Captain Vivian in that House, which certainly did not apply to the present system. Lord Cardwell, who instituted the present system, never dreamt of putting before the House such figures as those to which the hon. Member alluded. Nor had he (Mr. Hardy) himself ever pretended that they could get up to tens of thousands by this time. He had always said it would be a slow process. Last year the Reserves were coming in very slowly, but he said he thought they would come in in thousands this year, and he was justified in that remark, because the probability was that, as he had stated, they would have between 5,000 and 6,000. But he spoke with diffidence, because he knew that there were many circumstances which might interfere. There were the re - engagements in India, sickness, and many other possibilities. If soldiers were like chessmen, and could be moved at will into the Reserves, the case would be different; but there were circumstances in men's lives which would at times disappoint all calculations. He had always sought to avoid misleading the House by exaggerated expectations in regard to the Reserve, and Lord Cardwell had stated that the utmost they could obtain under that system would be 84,000 men. Then the hon. Member for Hackney, having disparaged the Reserve by comparing it with what he supposed it would be, but what it was never intended to be, went on to the Militia recruiting, and complained that they had got 38,000 men for the Militia last year. No commanding officer of Militia would echo that complaint. The men in these days knew perfectly well what they were enlisting for, whether it was for long or for short service, whether it was for any particular arm of the Service, and certainly whether it was for the Militia or for the Line. The fact was that those who enlisted for the Militia were a different class from those who enlisted for the Line, and although the Militia was an admirable school for the Line, it did not at all disturb enlistment for the Army. Those who went into the Militia knew it was a different service altogether, but it gave many of them a taste for soldiering; they found it more agreeable than they expected, and they passed into the Line. He could not, however, say that the Militia was to be relied upon as an auxiliary to the Reserve. Next, the hon. Member attacked the Commissariat. Up to that point he had been very diligent with his figures; but when he came to the Commissariat he described it as a combination of meddle and muddle, on no higher authority than a letter which he quoted from some one who knew nothing about it, and who wrote for information to someone who knew less, and he added that people in that department were so dissatisfied that they really could not tell him anything about it, and that, therefore, it was in a bad state, and could never come to any good. Now, he (Mr. Hardy) was far from saying himself that the Commissariat did not require improvement. He had made changes in regard to the Control department; he did not despair, if he was let alone, of yet making a better business of the Commissariat; and he hoped the hon. Member for Hackney would quote a correspondent next year who knew something about it, and who found it not nearly so bad as he had supposed it to be, and that, on the whole, the country got all that it could reasonably expect. He agreed with the hon. Member on the unhappy condition of things resulting from getting volunteers from regiments low down in the roster to fill up those which were at the top. Last year the House, with great wisdom, filled up the first 18 regiments to 820 men. But they must see that in the first year those regiments must be full of recruits. It would not be wise or just to send on service regiments which had many recruits in them; and, therefore, it would be necessary to get men from regiments which were lower on the roster. The men could be easily obtained by means of a bounty; and he trusted that those regiments would be better filled up as time went on, and that there would be men in them who had served longer. But in the case of regiments that had many young men it would be advisable to leave those young men with the depots at home, and fill up their places with older men. With respect to Army Reserve men and Militia Reserve men, he should be disposed to keep them for a second reinforcement rather than put them immediately into the first line. But that was a point which would have to be considered hereafter. It had been found necessary to divide recruiting for the Army into long and short service, and it was said that there would be no taste in the country for short service; but the fact had turned out exactly the reverse, because the proportion who enlisted for short service was much greater than that which enlisted for long service. He was sorry, to some extent, for that; because, with a view to those who remained, it was important to have a certain number of long-service men for the position of non-commissioned officers, and this disposition towards short service had interfered with the supply. Still, would it, he asked, be wise, under the difficulties in which they found themselves, to rush suddenly to another extreme, because, as had been pointed out, the hon. Member for Hackney had changed his front this year? They used to hear of men with one year's service; but if they had such a system as that, in what state would their regiments be, and how fit would they be for service? But, again, would it be desirable wholly to rely on three years' service? If the three years' service men had the means of supporting themselves in civil life, that might be desirable; but to cut down the six years to three years would be a most objectionable system. The new view of the hon. Member in regard to the Reserve was an extraordinary one. If they took those 10 years' men, as the hon. Member suggested, in three years they would be free from the Reserve, because 12 years was the outside period for which the hon. Member thought a man ought to be called upon to serve. The hon. Gentleman asked when and how they would form a Reserve? There was but one way, and that was the method they were adopting. He admitted it was a slower method than he could desire; but it was the only one—namely, by passing the men through the ranks of the Army. They must take those who wished to stay till the end of six years. As it stood, they would get some 12 years' men, and as three years' training in the Army was a very sufficient training, their nine years' men would prove effective. He did not despise the Militia Reserve, which he believed was one to which the country might look with very considerable confidence. He did not say it would be wise to place it at once into the front ranks; but after a few weeks' training it could be made fit to be put side by side with the soldiers of the Line. If that was so, they had practically at that moment a Reserve of 35,000 men available, and that was more than people looked forward to five or six years ago. The actual Reserve of men who had passed through the Army was this year beginning really to increase. If they got their 5,000 or 6,000 men this year—and it was really the first year in which the system had had a fair trial— they might calculate that they had fairly began; that it would go on, and yield them 5,000 or 6,000 annually. Though slow, it was safe; every man would be well trained, and fit to take his position beside the soldiers of the Line in any ranks or places to which they wished to send them. Had not this country gone through a very long military probation? It had not a vast force of Regular troops in its Service always ready to take the field; but it had trained a great number of men who, although they had not gone through the ranks, would be available for the service of the country at any moment. Moreover, it was to be borne in mind that in their Second Reserve they had some 24,000 who, though they might not be fit for active service in the field, yet would be quite available for garrison duty, and would prove a great stay to our Volunteers, who would also, he believed, do good service. He could not hesitate to express the opinion that, in addition to the 170,000 or 180,000 men we would have at our disposal, there would be 500,000 or 600,000 who, having passed through the Volunteer Service, would be able to render effective aid, if the country were put on its defence. He also expected that we should find young men to send abroad, for the military spirit which had been invoked by the Volunteers had produced such an effect that, so far from there being a difficulty in getting men to send abroad, his belief was that a greater number in proportion to the population would be ready to rush to the front than on any former occasion. He might be wrong, but that was his opinion, taking into account the military spirit which had been called forth in the country within the last 20 years. He must apologize to the House for having trespassed upon its time so long, and for the minuteness with which he had gone into the question. But he wished to part with all good will from the hon. Member for Hackney, of whom he had said some hard things, but who also had used some strong expressions with regard to him, which certainly were not undeserved if he had been guilty of all that had been laid to his charge. But, be they little or much deserved, he could assure the hon. Gentleman he would forgive him for all that had fallen from him in the course of his speech.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he was anxious that the House should get into Committee, and he would not, therefore, occupy much time. While generally concurring in the main object which the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms) had in view, he must express his dissent from many of the assertions which he had made. His hon. Friend had said that the promises which had been held out at the time the Short Service Act was passed had not been fulfilled, and had called up the ghost of Captain Vivian's figures, which had been laid again and again, in support of the statement. Now, he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) was anxious, not only for the sake of Captain Vivian, but of the Government with which he was connected, to explain in what circumstances those figures had been quoted. His hon. Friend stated that the House of Commons was asked in 1870 to pass the Short Service Act, and that Captain Vivian had promised that in eight years after the institution of the system the Reserve would reach 81,811. These figures, however, had not been quoted as one of the conditions of the passing of the Bill, and, indeed, were not quoted until 1871, when the scheme of Army reform which had been propounded by the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho), and which had been examined by the actuaries of the War Office, was under consideration, and found to be utterly impracticable. It was then, in contrast with the noble Lord's proposal, that Captain Vivian stated what, under certain circumstances, would be the result of the Short Service Act. But those particular circumstances had never come into existence, and the proportion of short service men, which Captain Vivian's statement pre-supposed, and which he expressly quoted as the basis of his calculations, had never yet been enlisted. And lest it should be thought, after all that had been said by his hon. Friend, that there was now, after all, no Reserve in the country, it might be well to state the fact that in 1870, 2,400 men—in round numbers— were enlisted for short service; in 1871, 9,000; in 1872, 10,000; in 1873, nearly 10,000; in 1874, nearly 13,000; and in 1875, 13,000; making, in all, up to the close of 1875—the latest year for which we had an official Return—57,693. So that he presumed they must have at that moment at least 70,000 or 80,000 men serving in the Army, all of whom—subject to the usual casualties—would pass into the Reserve. Those were important facts which the hon. Member seemed to have overlooked. No one could deny that the formation of a complete system of Reserves required time; but he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) trusted the right hon. Gentleman and his military advisers would strive to accomplish the task as soon as possible.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR

said, he stood up in defence of the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms), who deserved great credit for the attention with which he studied the condition of the British Army, and urged the importance of rendering it in all respects an efficient Force. With regard to the Reserve, the hon. Member for Hackney referred to the German system, and indicated how well it worked. No doubt, the German system was based on compulsory, as well as universal liability for some military service, by all the fit youths of the country; but as compulsion was impossible in the present state of feeling in this country, there was no reason why the views of the hon. Member for Hackney in favour of an extension of our short service system should not be favourably considered, and, if deemed suitable for our Army, extended to a far greater extent than hitherto applied. He agreed that if the principle that short service and an effective Reserve growing out of it was the best thing for the Army and for this country, then, to his mind, the number of old soldiers comprised in it was perfectly alarming, assuming the German system and the present short service of this country to be sound in principle. This was the essence of the opinion avowed by the hon. Member for Hackney, and it was a question of the gravest importance, deserving of the fullest investigation. It had never been properly inquired into by either of the Commissioners on recruiting, though it well merited the serious attention of a Select Committee of this House. He therefore cordially and heartily supported the hon. Member in his earnest endeavour to induce the House of Commons to take up this question of the highest national importance.

Question put.

The House divided,:—Ayes 207; Noes 46: Majority 161.—(Div. List, No. 192.)

Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," proposed.