SUPPLY—ARMY ESTIMATES.

HC Deb 02 March 1876 vol 227 cc1236-78

SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

MR. GATHORNE HARDY

said, in moving for the first Vote under the Army Estimates it was usual to make a statement as full as possible as to the condition of the Army, and the proposals which the Government had to make respecting it. He hoped the Committee would do him the credit of saying that in the Estimates which he should put before them there was more plainness, openness, and completeness, than had appeared before. There was an index which would enable anybody to find in a moment what was there referred to, so that any hon. Member would have no difficulty in ascertaining any point which he might have to consider. He regretted very much that it should be his fate to produce before the Committee enlarged Estimates; but again he might ask the Committee to consider the course he had taken in the last two years. During that time, at least, he had not asked for Supplementary Estimates, and he had not exceeded the Estimates assigned to him. That there had been difficulties which caused him some uneasiness he admitted.

He wished to pass over some of the subjects on which he had been addressed, not to get rid of them, but as not being directly connected with the Army Estimates. First of all, promotion and retirement. That question was being most exhaustively and thoroughly considered. That it had become important no one who looked at the position of the officers of the Army could for a moment doubt. Stagnation of promotion was growing rapidly in it—much more rapidly than was expected. At the present moment there was no doubt that great numbers of officers were holding back in order to see what the terms might be on which they might be able to retire. He considered himself bound, as he thought every Secretary of State would be by the pledge given by his Predecessor on the abolition of Purchase—that care ought to be taken that promotion should be as adequate under non-Purchase as it had been under Purchase. That pledge was practically given by Parliament as well as by the Secretary of State, because that was the foundation of the scheme—that promotion should not be suffered to lag behind, but kept up at the same rate as it was before. Therefore, in any proposal he might make for dealing with the subject when they had the Report of the Commission, the evidence, and the actuarial calculations, he should endeavour to effect that object to which his Predecessor pledged himself.

The question of Paymasters had been hanging over, and he considered that it was wrapped up with the question of retirement. At all events, there would be great difficulty in dealing with it finally, unless upon the principle of coming to a decision either that they were or that they were not to assist retirement. His own impression was that they ought to assist retirement. They ought to take great care in appointing Paymasters taken from the Army that their fitness was carefully tested; they should not take them as a matter of course, but require that they should show their competency before they were admitted to the functions of the Pay-mastership.

He would dismiss, as rapidly as possible, what he called the non-effective Votes, because really these were not very much in their power. There was one point on which the Committee would agree with him in rejoicing that it could be done—that great numbers of officers on half-pay without their own fault had been brought back to full pay. As many as 80 officers had been brought back in this way, and it was a matter of justice to them that they should again have an opportunity of serving their Queen. This had been done so cheaply that he was sure the House would not grudge the small sum of money expended to complete the changes relating to Adjutants in the Militia.

The hon. Member for Glasgow (Mr. Anderson) the other night, in speaking of desertion, mentioned a subject which was apposite to a good deal that had passed to-night, and he should take into consideration the suggestion thrown out of marking on the arm, so that everybody should show that he had served his Queen. The honourable profession would not be disgraced in any way by that kind of treatment, and he believed that this might tend to limit the operation of military law as at present. There was another point. In the case of recruiting sergeants finding a deserter and informing against him, they got a greater reward than when they enlisted him. He was far from saying that a sergeant would enlist a man, if he knew him to be a deserter; but if he got a larger amount for detecting the deserter it would keep him on the alert, and tend to check the practice of desertion which was too prevalent at present.

There was another question which was not included in the Estimates, but it affected the amount that was wanted, and that was the Purchase Commission. He was happy to say, from the information he received from the Commissioners, that they would not require so much this year as last by £172,370, and as the Exchequer receipts would also be in excess of last year, there would be a deduction of nearly £200,000 on that account, which he hoped would balance some of his smaller excesses. As he had usually mentioned the question of fortifications he might now state that, with the exception of one at Spithead, the whole of the forts to be erected under the loan would be completed by the end of 1876–7, and would have a portion of their more important armaments mounted. Last year, when a great deal was done in the way of facing the forts, £230,000 was spent, and he hoped the fortification loan would be brought to a conclusion without exceeding the original Estimates. There was a mistake in the Chaplain General's salary which he should point out. The salary had been put down at £1,000, instead of £800, to which the amount was lowered when Mr. Gleig left, he having received the higher salary under exceptional circumstances.

He now came to the question of the Medical Department, in which since 1873 there had been a good deal of agitation as to the merits of the old regimental system and the staff arrangements, with the general and larger hospitals now in force. He thought the time had come when he ought to pronounce his opinion, and he had come to the conclusion that the idea of going back to the regimental system after what had been done was simply out of the question. It was impossible that it should be done without making re-arrangements and alterations which could never work in time of war. The system which he had approved enabled them to utilize the services of medical officers at the places where they were wanted; whereas under the regimental system they were bound to have medical men in particular positions where they might not be wanted. But by the control which the Head of the Department had in bringing those men to places where they were particularly wanted he was able to have a much larger consulting staff, to select the best operators for one class of cases and the best physicians for another; while he had in those large hospitals means and appliances in abundance which it would be impossible, without enormous expenditure, to have in the smaller hospitals. He believed that the effect of all these advantages would be that the health and efficiency of the soldier would be improved. The Staff system also had the advantages of bringing under the eye of the Chief of the Department everyone qualified to rise; and under the system which he had to propose the principle of selection was one which would conduce to making the higher ranks of the Medical Department more efficient—though he was far from saying they were not efficient now—and of enabling promotion to go on more rapidly and more in accordance with the deserts of the men; and that it would enable them to pass by those who did not wish to go forward, while others would have the opportunity afforded them of obtaining that to which they would be entitled if they continued to serve—namely, a pension. There were two points that were brought prominently before him with respect to the Medical Department—first, the want of candidates to enter the service; and, secondly, the want of promotion for those who were in it. These points he hoped to meet by the scheme he was about to lay before the House. He approved, then, of the general hospital system, and he ventured, with great distinctness and plainness, to say that he was not prepared any longer to listen to complaints on that subject. He had come to a conclusion upon the subject, and it was a conclusion on which he meant firmly to act. His new scheme was this. He proposed most liberal terms. The candidates who would have to undergo a severer examination would, on entering the service, have £250 a-year from the beginning, and at the end of 10 years they would be presented with £1,000 on leaving, and the heads of the Medical Department would have the power of selecting from among them such a number as would be sufficient to fill the vacancies in the higher ranks and to keep up the flow of promotion. That might be regarded as being a very dear system; but he believed it would ultimately be found to be a cheap one. In the first place, much less would come upon the non-effective Vote; and, in the second place, the localization or mobilization scheme would be assisted by the fact that there would be numbers of medical men who would be able to act upon an emergency, and who, although, because of being married or from other causes, they might desire to retire at the end of 10 years, yet would continue to retain their military predilections, and would not regret to find themselves again among their old comrades. Then, the sum of £1,000, though not a very considerable amount, was one which might enable a man to purchase a practice, while it would be known throughout the country that the service was a good service, that the pay was fair, and that it opened to those who were clever and skilful in their profession the prospect of promotion by selection. But, in order to carry out the scheme fully he must go a step further, and he proposed that those who went on after the 10 years, for the first two years should have their pay increased and should have 17s. 6d. a-day; that at the expiration of 12 years they should become surgeon majors with £1 a-day; and that five years after that they should have £1 6s. a-day. By diminishing the supply below, too many would not be brought into the upper ranks. The bottle was a good deal larger than the neck, and as they could not force all the contents into the neck at once, they must draw some off below, in order to get a fair proportion above. In that way the most expensive retirements would be diminished. He should not on the present occasion enter into details which would appear in the Warrant in due course; but he might mention that if a man during his 10 years of service should, from sickness or otherwise, require a provision for retirement at certain periods, he would receive a portion of the £1,000, so that he would not go away as a pauper, but as a man who had done something for his country. The medical officers then would have £250 a-year for 10 years, £320 for two years after that, beyond that time they would have £365, and after five years more £1 5s. a day, or £456 a-year. A good prospect would, therefore, he thought, be held out to them. Those who were going on would be placed still more advantageously than those who left, for they would attain rank, more money, a pension, and what men liked in that profession as all others—distinction, the distinction of selection and due reward for the services they rendered to the country. He would add to that the £40 a-year they received for quarters and the £18 for servants. Think what it was for a young man to secure those prospects, and what inducements would be held out to the medical schools to send some of their best young men to us. That had not been the case, for they had 45 vacancies the other day, and only 12 candidates, some of whom had been rejected on former occasions. In some cases, he was sorry to say, they had been driven to accept medical men about whom he might have doubts. At all events, he did not think the Army ought to be obliged to take a low class of medical men in any respect. It ought to get its pick, because they had very delicate and difficult services to render, and very great dangers to encounter; though it should be remembered, to the credit of medical men, how large was their loss in proportion to that of the combatant officers. He proposed, he might add, that Surgeons General and the Deputy Surgeons General should retire at the age of 60 instead of 65, and that their retirement should be compulsory, without any exception, for the making of exceptions only tended to all sorts of inconveniences. Great pressure was sometimes put on the Department to retain men under special circumstances; but it was better that they should receive just compensation for the net loss they might sustain, as would be granted in the present instance on account of the substitution of the age of 60 for 65. He hoped the Committee would see that the proposal which he had sketched was a fair one. The non-effective Vote would, of course, be now increased by the fact that a certain number of men would have to retire at the age of 60, and it would go up for a certain number of years, but it would then begin to diminish again. Up to 1880 it would, he thought, practically remain at about the same point, £90,000 or £91,000; but that was the whole Vote, and was not all caused by these changes. The effective Vote, which was about £200,000 this year, would vary also; but if the system of which he spoke went on it would in 1912 be £150,000 instead of £200,000. He could not, he might add, hope to please everybody; he had long ago given up the idea. As for pleasing all the members of the medical profes- sion, that was also a thing he was afraid he could not accomplish. He had read a great many pamphlets on the subject, and he had been very slow in arriving at a conclusion with regard to it; but every sort of scheme had been tested by calculations, and he must say that that which he had laid before the Committee seemed to him to be the most effective, and likely to be the most beneficial to the soldier. By its means educated, earnest, and able men would, he believed, be induced to enter the Army, some of whom afterwards the heads of Departments might feel justified in promoting to very difficult situations.

He would now pass from the Medical Department to the Auxiliary Services. With respect to the Yeomanry, he had last year the services of a Committee, to which the country was greatly indebted, for they had investigated the questions relating to the Force at much inconvenience to themselves. That Committee had come to conclusions on which the Department had acted. That was to say, they had determined to treat the Yeomanry as Light Cavalry. The appendage of guns was one that could not be continued with advantage to themselves; and, therefore, with great regret, and with due acknowledgment to those who had maintained and served in those branches of the Yeomanry Corps, they had, for the advantage of the Service generally, got rid of the cars used by the Wiltshire Yeomanry, the Artillery of the Buckinghamshire and Essex, and the dismounted men of Northumberland. Again, they had improved the position of the Adjutants in pay and allowances. So, also, with the permanent Staff. He was aware that the Yeomanry had been made the subject of a good deal of remark; but on consulting military men they found that in the event of that necessity which they all hoped would never arise, of meeting an attack upon this country, the Yeomanry would be in many places of the greatest advantage, from their knowledge of the country and the skill with which the greater number of them could ride. This was not a very easy country to ride over, and it was not a bad thing to have people who, wherever they put them, would be able to ride well.

He must next refer to the Volunteers. To the estimate for that force was added £20,000; but let the Committee be satisfied, for it was entirely in consequence of increased efficiency. He had received very good reports of the Volunteers; but he would not enter into details until the Vote itself was under discussion. He would then be able to show that they had improved greatly in many respects. They had taken very much to camping out and got more drill in the course of a week than they used to do in months, because they were under good Staff officers, were intelligent men, and picked up a knowledge of drill a great deal faster than people thought. In 1873 there were 58 camps; in 1874, 69; and in 1875, 77 camps; and there was a steady increase in the number camping out from 19,000 in the first of those years, to 27,000 in the second, and 31,000 in the last. The progress made in their training would, he hoped, be satisfactory to the country. Again, it was proposed to put the Adjutants on a footing which he trusted would be satisfactory to them. The old Adjutants would be allowed to continue to serve on the old terms, but newly-appointed Adjutants would be treated in the way proposed. The Adjutants of Volunteers would henceforth he relieved from the duty of recruiting, for which, in fact, they had little time.

Now he came to another part of the Army which might be said to be both Auxiliary and Regular—he meant the Reserves. The Reserves, he might remark in passing, were not his Reserves, but had been instituted by others—first by General Peel and then by his noble Friend who was at the head of the War Department in the last Administration (Viscount Cardwell). Everybody admitted that if Reserves could be got they could not have more efficient soldiers. The men would have served six years in the Army, and consequently would, on joining the Reserve, be from 24 to 26 years of age. If they could have them available and to be depended upon, no one could say that they were not most efficient men. Everybody felt, however, that the appearing for pay, and that in advance, was not the sort of appearance which the Reserves ought to put in. Everybody also felt that there were many difficulties in calling out men who were in business and different occupations for any long period of time. Everybody would likewise, he thought, agree that when the men were called out they ought to come, and that if they did not come they ought to he treated as deserters. He wanted to impress on the minds of hon. Members that the Reserve men ought to be treated not as civilians playing at soldiers, but as soldiers on furlough, and that being soldiers on furlough they ought to answer to the call, whenever it was made. He admitted that the pay they received was not very large. He admitted, too, that perhaps there were not all the inducements which might be held out to them in comparison with other services. Therefore, he proposed to increase their pay, and, at the same time, to increase the stringency of the conditions. If any of the men did not like to take the additional pay under the new terms, he should not compel them to do so, for he thought it especially desirable to keep faith with soldiers. He proposed that in future the men, instead of being paid in advance, should be paid in arrear. At present they got £1 to provide themselves with necessaries, and they were then paid a quarter in advance; after which we lost sight of them, and they might be anywhere at the end of the quarter, and might not have done a day's work for the money. He proposed that they should be paid every two months, and that they should appear at the end of each year to be medically examined, in order that we might not keep men who were not fit to remain in the service. "When the men came up at the end of each year they would receive an additional 2d. a-day or about £3, from which sum, however, he proposed to deduct the £ I now allowed for necessaries, because that £1 was practically not expended in necessaries. He proposed instead that when the men were called out for active service they should have a free kit. In the autumn he hoped they would answer to the call; but they would be sent back to their business as soon as possible. He wanted to see them; and when an Army Corps was mobilized this year, it was intended to call out also a certain number of the Army Reserve. He hoped that they would appear in their places; and he would take care that no unreasonable service was put upon them, and that they should get back as soon as possible to their avocations. The men must keep the War Office informed of their places of residence, and when they came to the mobilization they must bring with them what was necessary—namely, shoes, two shirts, and two pairs of stockings. There was an increase in the clothing Vote, and part of that was to be attributed to the necessity of clothing those men when they came up, but the sum was not a large one. This year the additional expense of the Reserve would be practically nothing; but when all the 84,000 were called out they would cost £255,000, and if available they would be very cheap at the price.

Now he would pass to the Militia. Although disparaging remarks were sometimes made on that Force, even the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms) must admit that the Militia, considering the amount of drill it received, presented a very creditable appearance. The recruits had three months' drill and one month's training. He should like to add to what he said the other night the authority of two very distinguished officers. General Knollys, who had had a great deal to do with the Militia during the Crimean War and afterwards, had written to him that he was ready to bear testimony to the fullest extent as to the excellence of those troops, and the rapidity with with which they could be brought to efficiency. Again, Sir Thomas Steele, the General Officer in command at Aldershot, stated that many of the Militia regiments at Aldershot would, with very little additional training, be able to take their place by the side of the Regulars, and he added that in general appearance, drill, and discipline they were highly satisfactory. A good many questions had come before him as to the billeting and encamping of the Militia. The proposals of his noble Friend who preceded him in office was that training barracks should be erected in certain places for the Militia. He was sorry that more of these barracks had not yet been provided; but the truth was that great difficulties had arisen in coming to terms about land. Still, the erection of barracks was being pressed on, and he hoped that in many instances there would be training barracks to which the Militia could be sent instead of being exposed unnecessarily to camp life. As for billeting, he was most anxious to get rid of it wherever he could. In connection with the Militia, he might mention that its Medical Department had been transferred to the Medical Vote. He should have a few words to say later on respecting the mobilization; but he desired now to remark that his proposal would necessarily involve some Militia regiments being brought to the head-quarters named for them. This, he believed, they would readily agree to, A great many questions were daily arising about the Militia, and he had felt a great inclination to do in regard to them what he had done with the Yeomanry last year—namely, to get a certain number of Militia officers to confer with those who were qualified at the War Office, in order to consider such questions as recruiting, re-enrolling, quarter-masters, and a variety of other subjects constantly pressed upon him. Thus the Committee might next year have before them information concerning the Militia that would to some extent perhaps obviate the difficulty which might exist at present of the Militia recruiting interfering with the Army recruiting. Nothing would give him greater pleasure than to have a training in the Militia before a recruit was taken for the Army; but this he thought was almost impossible, and, after all, he believed that they now got from the Militia those men who were inclined to join the Army. However, it was a question he would re-consider hereafter. Coming to the expenditure upon Brigade depôts and other works for the localization of the Forces, he might state that already as much as £2,600,000 out of the loan of £3,500,000 was actually pledged, and that the other £1,000,000 would be spent.

With regard to tactical stations, it had been found almost impossible to establish a very large one, with all the necessary conditions, in the North of England. There would, however, be stores and barracks at York; and one advantage in this location was that it was acceptable to the people of the City, and they had no wish to get rid of it. Knavesmire would, he hoped, afford great facilities; and arrangements had been almost made with the lord of the manor for the purchase of Strensal Common, 1,150 acres in extent, and situated four miles from York, and he understood that they would find the railway companies and other people very accommodating. Having failed in getting a tactical station on a large scale, with 4,000 or 5,000 acres, in the North of England, he turned his attention to Aldershot, and he hoped that negotiations would be concluded which would enable the War Office to acquire 6,600 acres for the use of the troops there. At present the difficulties of moving the troops there were great, and were daily increasing from the purchases of land and the inclosures that were being made in the neighbourhood. It had been necessary, in order to obviate these difficulties, to bring in Bills, not for the purposes of the Autumn Manœuvres, but even of the ordinary summer drills. The additional acreage would give great facilities in manœuvring the troops. He mentioned this to the House, although, under the Act, he could divert the money sanctioned for the purpose of the station in the North to the acquiring of additional land at Aldershot, with nothing more than the assent of the Treasury, and he hoped that this assent would be given. The Votes for Provisions and Forage were high. Forage was not quite as high as it was last year, but it had made a frightful difference in the Estimates both last year and this. The increased cost of forage this year would be £37,000. With respect to clothing, it was absolutely necessary that they should have a certain amount of reserve, and it was for that reason that that item was increased. He did not think they should go on in a hand-to-mouth system with respect to clothing, which they might suddenly want to increase without the power of doing so; but it would be seen from the amount stated that they did not want to have a very extravagant amount of reserve. Stores were, no doubt, very high; but it must be remembered that there was a repayment of £25,000 less this year. The Admiralty had an excess of £77,000 over last year, and it took of this Vote altogether £309,000. He now came to another increase which arose from peculiar circumstances. The War Office were led to believe that India would last year require a much larger number of Martini-Henrys than she actually needed. The consequence was that what she was intended to take we should have to pay for from Imperial funds, and that amounted to £80,000. Another sum of £45,000 was passed over from last year to this, and was not a real increase, Altogether there was a sum of £243,000 mainly due to exceptional causes.

As to works, he was anxious to keep the charge as low as possible, and accordingly had restricted them to sanitary requirements, such as married soldiers' quarters. An hon. Member had called his attention to cases of overcrowding. He was glad that he had done so, and he intended to stop it. But with respect to the general subject of married soldiers' quarters, they were getting rapidly an Army of short service, and in time they would have a great number of soldiers, who had no claim to marry during the period they were in the Army. In ordinary life young men of that age were seldom very prudent if they married. He did not condemn them, because he was afraid it he did he should be condemning himself; but, though he did not want to lay down a rule that people should not marry unless they could fulfil certain conditions to the satisfaction of the Government, still they must remember that those men were only to serve six years, that they would leave you at 25 or 26 years of age, and that, therefore, you could not be called upon to provide a large amount of married soldiers' quarters. The provision for married soldiers under the long-service system was for 7 per cent; but under the new system they would not have the same number of soldiers who might be considered of a marriageable age, and who, therefore, would be entitled to be married. He was sorry to put the least check on anything that might tend to morality or to the stability of soldiers as reliable men; but he suggested whether the country ought to be called upon, under the short-service system, to build a large additional number of barracks for men who had not such special claims in respect of marriage as they might have under a system of long service. "We should take care that our soldiers were well provided with quarters; but he trusted that might be done by diminishing the number we required and extending the area for married soldiers. There was one small item in connection with building which it had appeared to him was worth incurring for the sake of doing a kindly act to one of our colonies. The noble Lord the Governor General of Canada (Lord Dufferin), to whom that result was chiefly owing, wrote him a letter stating that Quebec was to retain its ancient fortifications, which were a great ornament to the city, but that it would be necessary to make several gates in the walls in order that access might be had to the streets. Lord Dufferin thought that he (Mr. Hardy), on the part of the British Army, might present the city with one of those gates, and the noble Lord proposed with great good taste and feeling, and with a desire to draw together the bonds of the English and French settlers, that it should be called the Wolfe-Montcalm Gate, after those two illustrious men who, though they were opposed in arms, were equally celebrated for the gallantry of their conduct, for their high and noble dispositions, and for the generosity they always displayed to their soldiers and to each other. It struck him that the Committee would not be disinclined to sanction this expenditure. It would amount to only £200, and would be most grateful, he believed, to the French Canadians, as well as to the descendants of those who had gone out from among ourselves.

He came now to the great question how to keep up our Regular Army. He could not shut his eyes to the position in which he should have stood next year if nothing had been done now, and thought it would be imprudent to delay till then any proposal for encouraging recruiting, but that any experiment should be tried in the year before the great pressure came. For this reason he proposed certain changes, which he hoped would tend to bring additional men, and, to some extent, superior men. On a question of pay, however—Vestigia nulla retrorsum. If the pay were once given, they could never recall it. They could not break faith with the men once they had given it. Many would say that he had dealt with them in a rather niggardly way; but he had acted to the best of his judgment and upon the best advice he could take. He had had advice from soldiers and from civilians well acquainted with the Army, and their opinion was that the propositions he was about to make would supply the deficiencies which they might expect in future years. The hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Captain Nolan) had called attention to the youth and physical qualifications of the recruits who were received at the present time, and he said, with perfect justice, that to a certain extent the War Department were able to obtain better information than the House. The Recruiting Return which the Inspector General had placed on the Table of the House was as much in the possession of the Committee as in his own; but, at the same time, he had, in consequence of communications with the Inspector General, endeavoured to obtain, as far as possible, accurate information to give to the Committee with respect to the recruiting of last year, and in a little more detail than the House could have had it otherwise. In the countries to which reference had been made—France, Germany, Italy, and Russia—the system of police inspection enabled them to know every man's age, and, with conscription, they could fix the age at which they wanted recruits, and at once lay their hands on the men they wanted. It had been shown by discussions in the House, and he believed it would be shown by discussion in Committee also, that this country was not prepared for conscription; and therefore he had to deal with this question as one that concerned a Volunteer Army. Though he might wish in some instances—he would not say in all—to get men of 20 years of age, he was not dissatisfied to take them at from 18 to 19; and of this he was quite sure, from what he had heard from his gallant friend at the head of the Recruiting Department and from Cavalry officers, that those officers did not wish to see their recruits so old as 20, as they believed they could teach riding better when the men were younger. He had heard himself an officer say to a young man—"You are over 20; it will not be easy to teach you how to ride." He believed the Cavalry officers were satisfied with younger men, because they could teach them more easily to ride than if they had stiffened more into form, as they would when they had reached the age of 20. When the recruits of 18 or 19 arrived at 20 they were, as regarded their physical condition, much superior to the men that were picked up at the latter age, for they had had a training specially fitting them for their work. They were physically developed—they were trained soldiers; whereas the man you got at 20 must have his year's or half-year's training before he was fit—he would not say physically—but in all respects to do duty as a soldier. He did not agree with his friend Sir Lintorn Simmons that no one was fit to fight until he was 21. He was strongly of a contrary opinion. He had known distinguished officers who had led young men into action with satisfaction to themselves, and he had heard Sir Garnet Wolseley say—"Give me young men; I like to lead them." And why? Because they would yield to discipline; they would be more amenable to drill, and would be more readily trained to be soldiers than older men. If you caught them young they might have some difficulty at first in carrying their knapsacks; but the time would speedily come when they would be disciplined men and physically fit to take the field. The Committee perhaps thought that we were below all other nations in the conditions in which we got recruits. But what were the facts? And first as to height. The minimum size of recruits in Austria was 5 feet 11–5 inches; while we doubted about taking an officer, who might perhaps be mounted on horseback, at 5 feet 2 inches. In France the minimum was 5 feet 2¼ inches; in Germany, 5 feet 1¾ inches; in Italy, 5 feet 1½ inches; and in Russia, which approached nearest our own standard, it was 5 feet 4¾ inches, and rather more for the Sappers. It was quite true that in Austria, France, Italy, and Russia the men must be 20 years of age at the period of the conscription. In Germany they must have completed 19, so that there in age they were nearer to ourselves than in other countries. He would like, if he did not weary the Committee, to give them some idea of what he had gathered on this point from the Returns furnished by the Colonels of different regiments. Let not hon. Members turn away and say—"Oh, they only know what the recruits tell them." That was all very well, but if we said—" Don't take recruits under 20," we should have just the same difficulty; the recruit when asked his age would say he was older than he really was. But hon. Members could make all the allowances they thought necessary on this point. Well, in heavy Cavalry the average age of the recruits of 1875 was 20 years 7½ months; height, 5 feet 9 1–20 inches; width round the chest, 35 19–20 inches. We need not be ashamed of such men. For the medium Cavalry, the average age was 20 years and 9–10ths of a month; average height, 5 feet 8 1–12 inches; measurement round the chest, 35 7–30 inches. For the light Cavalry the average age was 19 years 7 2–7 months; height, 5 feet 6 4–5 inches; round the chest, 34½ inches. Such was the class of our recruits belonging to the Cavalry. He told the House last year his experience at Aldershot, and Cavalry officers, in answer to his inquiries, had informed him that they had no reason to be dissatisfied with their recruits, and he hoped the Committee would not be dissatisfied either. He came now to the Artillery, and he wished they had more of them; because it was in that branch of the Service that the greatest difficulty of getting men was experienced, and it was in that branch that the greatest number of desertions occurred. The hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Captain Nolan), who was a distinguished member of that Force, would feel with him the great importance of restoring that most important arm to a better condition. But when the hon. and gallant Gentleman complained that we did not propose to give additional ready-money pay to the Artillery as well as the Guards, he might remind him that the Artillery had a higher rate of pay than the ordinary regiments of the Army. [Captain NOLAN said, he had not urged that point.] Then he must have mistaken the hon. and gallant Gentleman. It might become necessary to give them higher pay in future, but he hoped not. No doubt the desertions from the Artillery were very great. The work was, however, very heavy, and it required very large and strong men, and they could not expect to get men of that class without paying for them. Well, the average age of the recruits for the Royal Artillery was—gunners, 20 years 9 months; drivers, 20 years 6 months; the average height—gunners, 5 feet 8½ inches; drivers, 5 feet 5 inches. The average chest measurement was 35⅝ inches and 35¾ inches respectively. Now, according to his view, these were recruits of which the country need not be ashamed. For the Royal Engineers the average age of recruits was—Sappers, 21 years 2 months; height, 5 feet 7 inches; chest measurement, 34¾inches. The average age for drivers was 19 years 7½ months, height 5 feet 4½ inches, round the chest 35⅛ inches. For the Foot Guards the average age of recruits was 20 years 3½ months, average height 5 feet 9 1–5 inches, round the chest 35⅝ inches. For the Infantry of the Line the average age was 20 years, height 5 feet 6⅛ inches, round the chest 34½ inches. For the Rifles (60th Regiment and Rifle Brigade), who were generally smaller men, the average age was 19 years 10 months, height 5 feet 5 1–5 inches, round the chest 35 7–25 inches. These were the average ages, heights, and chest measurements of the recruits we got last year. He knew that averages were rather uncertain, and he therefore felt it right to ask for the two extremes, as he did not wish to delude the Committee. Excluding the boys he found that there were 213 aged from 17 to 18, 4,787 from 18 to 19, and from 19 to 20, 3,967. The oldest among last year's recruits was 25 years of age; but, of course, there were very few of such men, and there were 135 up to the age of 24. Therefore he might expect that the recruits of 1875 would be efficient men, and such as they should not be ashamed to see in the ranks.

Having said so much on that subject, he would now state that he proposed to add somewhat to the first 18 regiments for service abroad, and he did so on many grounds. Everybody was aware from the newspapers of the difficulty which we experienced—and it was a real one—when any regiment was going out to the Colonies or to India, to get it up to the required, strength in time. We necessarily had a number of recruits not in a condition to go abroad. What was the consequence. They had to draw on other regiments, either by calling for volunteers or upon the linked battalions. There was nothing so disheartening to commanding officers as to see men filched away from one regiment to supply other regiments when they prided themselves on the efficiency of their own. It had happened that a regiment had gone to India in the Mutiny, having been denuded of its best men by volunteers to other corps, and they found themselves fighting beside another regiment in the highest possible condition, filled with their own men who had volunteered, while they themselves were in an almost decrepit state. It was galling to the officers, and still more so to the men, for it discredited their regiment when it would really have been in the highest state of efficiency had it not been deprived of men to fill up the ranks of other regiments. It was, therefore, thought desirable that there should be a long period of recruiting—namely, from the time that regiments got on the roster for Indian or Colonial service—and in this way to meet the difficulty to which he had referred. He did not propose to go into the market as if he wanted 3,000 men at once, but to get them gradually. Nothing could be more objectionable than raising a large additional number of men for the Army in undue haste; and, in fact, the sudden increase in our military force a few years since by 20,000 men had done an injury from which it bad not yet recovered. He could assure the House, therefore, that if they granted him the increase in the number of men he asked for the number should be increased gradually and as opportunity offered. It was true we were not at war. He hoped with all his heart war might never happen while he held that office, or in the time of his Successor. He believed there never was a more peaceful War Minister than the one who now held the Seals of office. He had no desire for war; but he had a desire that the machine entrusted to him should be in as efficient a condition as possible; and he knew if we were called upon, not to engage in a large war, but in a small one, it would be discreditable if we were not found thoroughly prepared. He asked whether it was a creditable thing to this country that when we went to war with Ashantee, we should have had to resort to the practice of drawing men from one battalion to fill up the ranks of another. Thus, when we were sending out the 42nd Regiment we had to draw men from the ranks of the 79th to raise the former to fighting strength. It was a strong proof of the love the men entertained for their own regiments that, on their return from Ashantee the men who had been so transferred from the 79th to the 42nd were anxious to resign all the special distinction they would have enjoyed by remaining in the latter in order to get back to their old regiment, and he thought it was only a fair reward to those excellent men to gratify their wish in the matter. That circumstance showed how very distasteful it was to the men to be drawn away from their own regiments to serve in others. It was with the wish to avoid those unpleasant contingencies that he desired to raise a certain number of regiments up to a more full complement. It must also be re- membered that we were under numerous Treaty engagements and other obligations that might render it desirable to have a small force in readiness to act without delay, and if we had one or two well equipped Army Corps of full strength in addition to the three regiments of the Guards, we should have an available force of something between 30,000 and 50,000 men. The maintenance of such a force could not be regarded in the light of a threat held out towards any other Power; and, indeed, it was simply carrying out a part of the original plan contemplated by the noble Lord who preceded him in office, when he effected the changes he had done in our Army. His proposal then, as appeared from the Report of the Localization Committee, was that the first 18 regiments on the roster for foreign service should be raised to the strength of 820 men each. At present we had only four regiments of that strength. It had been proposed then also that the next 18 regiments should consist of 700 men; but, in fact, we had no regiment at all of that strength, a few of them numbering 600, and the rest 520. He was not going so far as was originally projected by his noble Friend; but he was taking only those first 18 regiments, because with the Guards we should have a very respectable Army Corps with full equipment and ready for foreign service. Then came the question, how were we to get the men? There were two inducements that could be held out to men to enlist in the Army. The first was that which had been pressed upon his attention ever since he had held office by the hon. and gallant Member for Galway, and which, had it not been for circumstances over which he had no control, he would have held out last year—namely, that of putting the non-commissioned officers in a better position, so as to induce them to remain in the force, and so as to offer greater prizes to well-conducted men in the ranks. The second inducement was to increase the pay of the men themselves. I Nothing had done the Army greater injury than one fact to which he would direct attention—namely, that those who might have been very well off, or fairly off, and who having squandered what they had were reduced to beggary, were pointed out as men neglected by their country, and held out to young men as having been left in a miserable condition after serving in the Army. There were men who left the Army who had had but a small pay, and although he would not go so far as to say that they could not save, still they could not save a great deal, but might put something by day by day, if they chose to do so. There were military savings banks in which they could place their money; but possibly—that was a subject worth consideration—it would be for the benefit, both of the Army and of the country, if those savings banks were consolidated with the Post Office Savings Banks. If that were done, he believed it would give a greater feeling of security, and the soldiers would feel that they were acting together with the whole country when going out of the Army if they could, as quasi civilians, draw their money from the Post Office Savings Bank like other people. There might, however, be difficulties in such a change which fuller information might disclose. He intended to give the men 2d. a-day deferred pay, which would amount to something like £3 a-year, so that at the end of their six years of service they would on leaving the Army be entitled to the sum of £18, which would enable them to obtain a start in life. He proposed that the men should not be paid the whole of that sum upon their discharge, because it was a great evil that the moment men were discharged there were persons who fixed upon them as long as they had anything left, and consequently they returned home to their relations with ruined health and in a penniless condition. He therefore intended that the amount of the deferred pay should be divided into two or three sums, which should be paid through the Post Office Savings Banks, at the places where the men intended to reside—the men of course continuing in the Reserve and still receiving the pay of 2d. a-day. It was a well-known fact that recruiting for the Royal Marines had been easier than for any other branch of the Service; and that was because, as the men had no opportunity of spending their money when on board ship, they frequently took home with them on their discharge comparatively large sums which they had saved during their term of service, and this circumstance induced young men to join a branch of the Service in which so much money was to be gained. By the course he proposed to adopt our soldiers would return to their villages with a whole year's pay in their pockets, and this would, he hoped, be the means of inducing others to enlist. Then he thought we treated them rather hardly in another way. When a soldier had his full pay formerly he, had to find everything; but since we I began to furnish him with rations, in, stead of giving him Is. 6d. a-day on furlough, which included the cost of the rations, we gave him only Is. 2d. But as it was of benefit to them and to the Army that they should have those little holidays, we proposed to add to their pay 4d. more. When, therefore, they I went on furlough they were to have 1s. 6d. instead of 1s. 2d. The item, which this addition represented, was not large; but it was given for the welfare of the soldiers, and put them on the same footing when they were in the Service and when they were at home. Those were the experiments which he proposed to make upon the Army generally.

Then he came to the question of the Guards. He quite admitted that when the pay of the whole Army was raised to 1s. a-day the Guards actually lost nothing, but relatively they were worse off than the Line by 1d. a-day, which they had always received above the ordinary pay of the rest of the Army. The reasons for the Guards receiving superior pay was obvious—thus, they were men of greater stature than the ordinary soldier, and therefore more difficult to get; their clothing was more expensive, and their continual residence in London entailed additional expenses upon them. Under these circumstances, he proposed to increase their pay by 1d. a-day, so as to restore them in this respect to the position, relatively to the rest of the Army, they had formerly occupied. The Guards were 400 or 500 short of their complement; and therefore it was absolutely necessary to take some steps of this kind to induce men to enlist in these regiments, because, as they were always the first on the list for foreign service, it would be unreasonable not to keep them up to their full establishment strength. This increase in the pay of the Guards would cost £8,000 a-year. They would also have the deferred pay; and he hoped that, as the soldiers of our Army saw funds accu- mulating for them at the rate of £3 per year per man, they would hesitate before they deserted from the Service. For it must be borne in mind that desertion would result in the absolute forfeiture of every penny of deferred pay. It was hoped that by this means considerable loss would be avoided. When a soldier deserted he frequently took his kit and other property with him; and, even if he did not go this length, there was the cost of providing a successor to him, and much inconvenience arising therefrom. This deferred pay, then, would be a safeguard against evil, and would at the same time act as an encouragement to the soldiers. If hon. Members would look at the desertion Returns for the past year they would find that the total number was less by 1,000 than last year. There was, however, too large a number, and it included several cases of what might be called skilled desertions—a class of offence which must be put a stop to by some means. Those who might be most properly termed deserters were those who ran away in the second or third year of their service, and this class of offence would most probably be checked by the knowledge in the minds of the men that in proportion to the length of their service was the amount of their deferred pay accumulating, and therefore the greater their loss as the penalty of desertion. No doubt this system would cost money; but against that must be placed the fact that the expense of filling the places of deserters would not be incurred, and the morality of the Army would be improved. The cost of deferred pay in the present Estimates would be very small—not more than £6,000. In the case of the Guards the amount of the additional 1d. would be £8,000. The Imperial charge next year would be about £31,000, the year after £65,000, and when the normal condition of things arrived, the amount would be £329,000; and he therefore quite admitted it was a question which the House had a right to weigh, because it was a growing payment, although he believed it would be a cheap payment if it secured the object he had in view. He further assumed that it would in the end diminish to a certain extent the pension list, because it would diminish the number going out on pensions.

The next proposal he had to make was one to increase the pay of non-commissioned officers, and this would involve an extra expenditure of about £104,000; and a sum of £39,000 would fall upon the Indian Government. He proposed that sergeant majors should receive 6d. additional pay; that sergeants should receive 2d. additional, and after two years' service in the ranks, 4d. That was to say, their present pay being 1s. 11d., with the addition of 2d. it would be 2s. 1d., and after two years' service it would be 2s. 3d. Corporals were to receive an additional 1d. a day. They were allowed to keep their good conduct pay, which the sergeants were not. From the increased pay of 1s. 1d. or 1s. 5d. a-day they would be advanced, after two years' service, to 1s. 5d. or 1s. 6d. a-day. Another proposition was with regard to lance corporals and lance sergeants. At present, a private who was thought well of by his officers was made a lance corporal, if he chose to be one; but he got nothing for it, though he had the invidious duty of keeping up discipline among his own late comrades. He trusted, therefore, it would be considered a reasonable request that he should receive payment for those services. He proposed, therefore, to increase the pay of these officers to the present pay of their substantive rank, so that lance sergeants of Infantry would receive 1s. 11d. and lance corporals 1s. 3d. per day. This would offer an inducement to smart soldiers to accept positions which at present they were often very unwilling to fill. Holding, as he did, that the stability of the Army depended very much upon its non-commissioned officers, he was most anxious that they should be fairly treated and induced, if possible, to remain in the service of their country. He proposed further to improve the position of the Staff sergeants, who were the picked men of their rank in the Army. Under existing arrangements the allowance made to these men for lodgings was altogether inadequate; and he should therefore ask the Committee to consent to a Vote which would raise the allowance of Staff sergeants in the first class from 8s. 6d. to 12s. 3d., and in the second class from 4s. 3d. to 7s. per week for lodging money. About £1,500 would cover this payment, and he believed it would give the greatest satisfaction to a most estimable body of men.

There had been a good deal of talk now and again of our Volunteer Force being organized "not for defiance, but for defence," and he could assure the House that the mobilization scheme had been entered upon strictly with a view to the defence of the country. It had been prepared with the view, if ever the necessity should arise from a hostile invasion, that there should be no confusion and no difficulty; that every man, whether in the Regular Army or in the Auxiliary Forces, should know the headquarters to which he must repair; that not a moment should be lost in finding out what he had to do, and that he should at all times have be fore him clearly laid down where he was to go. He could assure the House that no labour or pains had been spared in making those arrangements. Every time-table had been arranged and every route prepared by which the men could be brought to their proper head-quarters in case of necessity without delay. The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms) had said that it was a scheme not worthy of a schoolboy; but whether that were so or not he (Mr. Hardy) at least could not help seeing the labour, the toil, and the intelligence devoted to it by those who had worked out its details. He did not suppose they were so proud of their work as to think it incapable in every particular of amendment; but no one could deny that great care and enormous diligence had been exercised in its preparation. He proposed to call out two of those Army Corps (at some period which, of course, he could not indicate), and bring every man in them to the head-quarters assigned to him, so that they might see what appearance they would present under such circumstances, and not with a desire or with a view to putting their forces on a war footing. The hon. Member for Hackney, in two speeches which he lately made, accused him of that intention, and he said in one that they must increase their Militia to 250,000 men, and in his last speech—at Manchester—he gave somewhat different figures, and said 221,640 men. Neither of those figures was correct. The hon. Member in his hurry had evidently made the mistake of reckoning up each Army Corps as if it were com- posed only of Infantry. He forgot, too, that Militia regiments could not be increased, except within certain boundaries and within the limitations of the law. Those 104 Militia battalions and 64 Regular battalions made up 168, just the number for making eight Army Corps; but they had no idea of filling those Corps up to what might be considered technically their full number. That was never intended. What they wanted was a system on which all this work might be based; and without any very extraordinary expenditure they would create cadres which might afterwards, if requisite, be filled up. It was not intended to use more than the number taken in the Votes of last year—namely, about 134,000 Militia—and they believed that with that force they could do all that they expected to do with' all those Army Corps. One word as to the long distances which it was said some of the men would have to come. That was an arrangement that might be altered again and again. The hon. Member spoke of the hardship that would result from bringing men from Scotland and other remote localities. The regiments themselves took a different view from that taken by the hon. Member, and would think themselves ill-used if they were left out. In fact, one colonel wrote to complain that his regiment was not brought down into the South of England, where the fighting would be sure to take place. The best military authorities were all of opinion that if an invasion took place it would be between the Wash and Plymouth. He did not say that there might not be a diversion in the Highlands; but if there were he should take care that action should be based upon that fact; and, further, that the regiments of which the Scotch were so justly proud should be sent without delay to the Highlands, where it could not be doubted they would fight like true Britons in defence of the mountainous and wooded country which they loved so well. But, to return. They had had to deal with Regulars, Militia, Volunteers, Yeomanry, Pensioners, and Reserves, and had found places for them all. The Volunteers were selected for coast and garrison duty, and had been so treated out of no disrespect to them or distrust in their zeal. With a view, however, not to press too hardly on them, one-fourth only would be taken in to service at a time, and three-fourths would remain at home. He wished to add that there were some Volunteer Artillery and Engineer corps which they might not be at all ashamed to place in charge of guns. His gallant friend, Mr. Darby, deserved the greatest credit for the organization of his Corps, and it was known that the feats performed by the Sussex Volunteer Artillery had rivalled the performance of the Regular Artillery. They had tried to increase the number of such corps, and had found regiments ready to change their condition and become Artillery and Engineers, and thus render themselves more adapted for the service which might be required of them than they could be as Infantry only. Many of the men were employed in the kind of work which specially fitted them to be Engineers, such as mining, quarrying, and other heavy work in which they had to observe engineering rules, and these men, as sappers, miners, and gunners, would be most useful for coast and garrison service.

Such was his proposal. It might be a mistake. It was to be tested. All those things were tentative. He spoke in the name of those military men who had put the scheme on foot. For himself, he was only responsible for having adopted it, thinking it would be an admirable one, and for bringing all the forces at their disposal into the best position for the work required of them. He by no means thought the scheme a perfect one. Defects had been pointed out which might easily be remedied; but he thought it most desirable that officers and men should be ready—that they might be able to say to every General, every Colonel, every man—"This is the place to which you are to go;" that without confusion, hurry, or fuss, those who were to proceed to the front should go there, while other Army Corps might fit themselves as rapidly as possible. Some of the Army Corps would be ready at once to take the front, and the others would be drilled so as to be fit in a few weeks for active service; and no invasion could be successful in that time, or in as many months if the Fleet was in its place and did its duty as they all knew it would.

He thought he had now gone through all the subjects on which he wished to touch. He was afraid he had wearied the House by so much detail; but he wished the Committee to test everything he had done. He had done nothing for concealment—all was as open as the day. If the House of Commons voted anything he asked they should do it with their eyes open. What he asked them was to pursue a system the expense of which he did not say they had seen the end. It would be large; but its object was to render every branch of the Service efficient. To improve the contentment of the Army, to prevent desertion, to improve their reliefs for India, and to prepare here in case of danger a certain number of regiments always ready, were the first objects he had in view. All this he had done with no offensive intention to any foreign Power; on the contrary, with a great desire to preserve peace, but with a great desire, too, that England should be known not to be giving up the position to which she was entitled in Europe and in respect of her colonial possessions. They claimed the right, without insult or threatening to foreign nations, to bring into as good a condition as possible their Volunteer Army, and so to prepare for the defence of their country, of their colonies, and of India, and for the fulfilment of any Treaty or other obligations that they might be called upon to recognize. They wished to be able to say to all the world that without excessive expenditure England would never be wanting in that due expenditure which would make her armies as efficient as they had been in times past; that they would not be sent forth merely to earn a transitory and temporary glory, but to do their duty to a country the stability of which interested not only herself, but all the world. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the Vote for 132,884 men.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 132,884, be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and for Depôts for the training of Recruits for Service at Home and Abroad, including Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, from the 1st day of April 1876 to the 31st day of March 1877, inclusive.

MR. PEASE

expressed his regret that so few Members were in the House when the right hon. Gentleman rose to make his Statement. There were at the outset but seven Members at the right hon. Gentleman's side of the Table, and not more than double the number on the other side. It was due to the right hon. Gentleman to say that he had never listened to a more able or interesting statement, and he deserved the thanks of the Committee for the manner in which the Estimates had been prepared, and the digests which had been furnished. The right hon. Gentleman had proposed a large increase in the number of men for the Army, and a correspondingly largo increase in the money for their maintenance. He told them at the close of his speech that this increase was needed to guard against panic, to guard against invasion, to relieve our Army abroad, and to keep up the honour and dignity of the country. For these purposes he asked for a force of 526,000 men, the largest force that this country had ever been asked for at any time, and was certainly, in his opinion, larger than the country required. In 1873, the last year of Lord Cardwell's administration, the cost of the Army was £13,231,100; in 1874 it was£13,293,800; in 1875, £13,488,200; and now, in 1876, it had risen to £13,989,000, being an increase in three years of £750,000, while the Army Appropriation Accounts had not yet been laid upon the Table. The Army Estimates having increased by £750,000, the Navy Estimates had also gone up £1,500,000 during the same time, besides a deficit of £281,000 in the Navy Appropriation Accounts, being altogether an increase in these two Services of £2,400,000. At present it appeared that there were 95,000 regular troops at home, besides 30,000 of the reserved forces, and the Militia, Volunteers, and Yeomanry were all declared to be in an efficient and satisfactory state. For what was all this money to be spent? To guard against panic, to prevent invasion, and to sustain the honour and dignity of the country. Taking the panic argument first, he would ask what was a panic? It was, he believed, a sudden fright. Well, we had several panics of late years. We had one in 1858–9 when the French officers were denouncing this country for having given an asylum to political refugees. That panic brought into existence an army of Volunteers amounting to 180,000 men. But the panic was groundless. We had lived to see the Emperor Napoleon, then upon the Throne of France, a refugee in this country, and his son was lately a cadet at Woolwich. In 1858–9 there was another panic, in consequence of the taking of several persons from under the protection of the British flag on board one of our vessels. The Government sent 10,000 men to Canada to overawe the United States, which had 800,000 men ready shortly afterwards. Well, the presence of the Volunteers did not allay the panic. Another panic occurred at the outbreak of the Franco-German War, when Lord Cardwell asked the House to vote £2,000,000, and to increase the Army by 20,000 men, who still remained on the Army List. The argument now was that the Army was to preserve us from invasion. He confessed he looked around in vain to discover from what quarter we were to be invaded. Her Majesty, in her Speech from the Throne, spoke of her relations with foreign Powers as being "most cordial;" and yet the way in which we repaid our neighbours for their friendliness was to propose an increase of our Army to guard against invasion, which was, under the circumstances, an insult to the Powers with whom we were on such cordial relations. There were only three or four Powers in the world from whom an invasion could be, with any possibility, expected—Germany, France, Russia, and America. The last two might be left out of the calculation entirely. France and Germany were armed to the teeth against each other—one to retain the provinces she wrested from France during the war, the other to regain those provinces whenever they thought they were strong enough to make the attempt. There was not the slightest possibility of our being invaded by either country while such was their attitude to each other. He would add that France and Germany should be a warning to us against large armies and huge armaments. As regarded this country, the panic argument and the invasion argument fell together. There never was a time when, apparently, we were more free from attack and when our diplomatic intercourse was carried on in a more conciliatory spirit. With respect to the relief of our Army abroad, Lord Cardwell was quite satisfied with a smaller Army at home for that purpose, and the requirements then were the same as they were now. The honour and dignity of the country were not con- sulted by maintaining unnecessary armaments in time of peace. By so doing we Were acting in violation of the teaching of political economy, and we were inflicting upon our population the evils of war in time of peace. An Army expenditure of £15,000,000 was an insurance premium out of all proportion to the risk we were running. We were asked to spend £1,000,000 more than last year and £2,400,000 more than four years ago, and that at a time when the state of trade made it absolutely necessary we should economize. A Liverpool merchant said the other day—"Two years ago we were living on faith, last year we were living on hope, and this year we are living on charity." At the same time, while trade was falling off and the country approaching a state of stagnation, the requirements of modern society were largely augmenting local burdens concurrently with this increase of Imperial taxation. The demand for public education, for the Poor Law administration, for lunacy boards, and for sanitary boards was yearly increasing, and he said the country could not afford at the same time to spend in a time of peace such large amounts upon an Army far larger than we required. He proposed to reduce the Army by 10,000 men. The right hon. Gentleman had confessed that he had a great many men whom he would like to get rid of, and that he would be glad to obtain the services of a better class. Then why did he not get rid of the objectionable men? But what was the right hon. Gentleman doing? Why he was raising the pay of the men. It seemed to him that when doing so he was bound to reduce the number. He had come to the conclusion that whether they looked at the state of things abroad or at home they were not justified in voting these large Estimates. Perhaps the great majority of the Committee would be against him—still he felt bound, on behalf of his constituents and the country, to raise his voice against this extravagant expenditure, and which was not needed, looking at the state of the country or at the state of Europe.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That a number of Laud Forces, not exceeding 122,884, be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and for Depots for the training of Recruits for Service at Home and Abroad, including Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, from the 1st day of April 1876 to the 31st day of March 1877, inclusive."—(Mr. Pease.)

SIR WALTER BARTTELOT

said, it was all very well for the hon. Member for South Durham (Mr. Pease), who felt all the comforts of peace, to make such a Motion; but the old adage still held good—the best way of maintaining peace was to be prepared for war. The hon. Member proposed to reduce the Vote by 10,000 men. Would he say from what branch of the Army they were to be taken? Was it from the Infantry, from the Cavalry, or from the Artillery? That question had been formerly pressed upon the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), who was obliged to admit that he had not considered it, and the hon. Member for South Durham seemed to be in the same position. The speech of his right hon. Friend the Secretary for War was one that would do him credit not only with the Army, but also with the country. He had clearly stated the views for au expression of which they had been looking forward for some time past. He said the other night he was determined to do away with that feeling of anxiety with regard to the Army which caused men to say they did not know what would happen next; and he (Sir Walter Barttelot) hoped he had gone far towards removing that feeling. He had determined that the deficiency in the number of medical officers should no longer exist, and he had laid down principles which would obviate the scandal that in the absence of candidates the authorities had been compelled to accept the services of men they had formerly rejected. That was most lamentable, and it was not fair to the Army. The new scheme of his right hon. Friend he hoped would have the effect of preventing the recurrence of such a state of things. The scheme was a fair and a liberal one, and he hoped the medical profession in the Army would be satisfied, though whether it was the best or not he would not now argue. One of the questions in which the House was most deeply interested was that of the Reserves. The whole case of the noble Lord who brought in the short service rested on the Reserves. Had matters gone on as they were now, he felt certain the Army of Reserve when called out would not have been found. But by increasing their pay from 4d. to 6d., and by allowing deferred pay to accumulate for men now serving and to serve in the ranks, they had now a chance of getting that Reserve which the country wanted in case of emergency. There was one point here, however, on which more explanation was required. His right hon. Friend said those Reserves were to be called out for a certain period every year. The time now was only 12 days, and that time might well be increased; but, if the men were found up to the mark, they need not be kept out. They might be dismissed to their homes as soon, as they were pronounced efficient. There was one point which his right hon. Friend had missed altogether, and that was with regard to forage allowance to Field Officers. He said forage was never so high as at the present moment, and he was now giving a Field Officer 1s. 10d. a-day for forage, but it could not be bought for the money now given. The increase of pay to noncommissioned officers was one of the best things proposed by his right hon. Friend. It would give universal satisfaction to that class of men who were, in fact, the backbone of the regiment. He did not think his right hon. Friend had increased their pay too much; but the increase was fair and liberal, and he believed the non-commissioned officers of the Army would feel that tardy justice had at length been done to them. He did not observe from the Estimates that his right hon. Friend had dealt with a grievance which was felt from the want of room in the Royal Academy at Woolwich. [Mr. GATHORNE HARDY said he had.] He was very glad to hear it. It was not right that four cadets—young fellows who might be from Eton, where they each had a separate room—should be placed in one room. That was an evil that ought to be remedied. He was also glad to learn—although upon this point it would be premature to express any definite opinion—that his right hon. Friend intended to call out two Army Corps; the whole country would then know what the mobilization scheme was, and could judge what its effect would be. On one important point his right hon. Friend did not touch, except in an indirect manner—namely, the arming of our soldiers. The Martini-Henry rifle was, no doubt, a weapon wonderful in its performance when in good order; but when he asked the Surveyor General, year after year, how that weapon was going on, the reply always was it required a little repair, and that 2s. 11d. would cover the whole expense. That little alteration, however, would require an expenditure of £75,000. In the Malay expedition it had not answered the expectations of the officers. It had a trick sometimes of not going off when required, and also of going off when not required. This subject required careful consideration from the authorities. The spiral spring in the lock, which was apt to become loose or rusty, was, he thought, fatal to this weapon. But having once been adopted, it was rather difficult to get rid of. For himself, he would say he would rather to-morrow go into action with the old Snider rifle than with the Martini-Henry rifle. Our soldiers should be armed with the best weapon we could find. He hoped his right hon. Friend would look closely and fairly into this matter. They must all have admired the clear, able, and straightforward manner in which he had brought forward these Estimates, and he was quite sure he would do nothing which he did not believe would conduce to the best interests of the Army and the country.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he would add his testimony to what had been said in praise of the very full, clear, and candid statement of the right hon. Gentleman. He only regretted that it was delivered at a time when so few Members were present to hear it. The principal measures which the right hon. Gentleman had brought before them were the additional pay to the non-commissioned officers, the grant of increased pay in the shape of deferred pay to the entire Army, and a slight increase of pay to the Guards. With regard to the first, he was very glad that the right hon. Gentleman had seen his way to propose it. Three years ago, when a small addition was made to the pay of the Army at the time that the ration stoppage was abolished, the late Secretary of State had it in contemplation to improve the position of the non-commissioned officers; and it was his intention to apply to this purpose the balance of the sum which would ultimately be saved by the lapse of the re-engagement penny—the part of that sum which had already, accrued having been taken to the credit of the stoppage arrangement. He (Mr. Campbell-Ban- nerman) mentioned that, not in the least by way of detracting from the credit due to the right hon. Gentleman, but only to show how sincerely he could express his agreement in the policy the right hon. Gentleman was pursuing. He (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) trusted it might have the effect he contemplated—of increasing the attractiveness of the Army—and he would congratulate the right hen. Gentleman on having his name associated with so useful an improvement. As to deferred pay, no doubt there was a great deal to be said in favour of the theory; but there were two considerations, which he would urge as having some weight on the other side. In the first place, were they sure that the men to whom they would offer it would "understand and appreciate it? The men knew what it was to get money in their hand, and sometimes, unhappily, made a bad use of it; but would they appreciate the fact, and would it have the effect we expected if they knew, that at the end of their service a certain sum would accrue to them? Another point was—it was one of the advantages of deferred payment that it gave us a certain hold over the men. That particularly applied to the Reserve. If a man knew that at the end of his term of service he would, if he conducted himself well, be discharged with a certain sum of money in his pocket, we should have a hold on him which we had not at present; but we could not have a hold upon him without, to some extent, his having a corresponding hold on us; and he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) thought that difficulties might arise in some cases in consequence of a man's conduct, near the period when a large sum of money would be due to him, being such as to render it undesirable that he should be retained. Difficulties of that kind occurred in the case of an established workman who was going on pension, with whom we could not deal so freely as with a man hired in the open market. This objection, however, to deferred pay was not an insurmountable one. As to the additional penny which the right hon. Gentleman proposed to give to the Guards, was he quite sure that it would cure the evils from which they suffered? The Guards had a stock fund, which had been abolished in other regiments, into which payments were made by the public, and with which they conducted their own hospital arrangements and recruiting. He (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) wished to know whether the inquiry which had been instituted into that anomalous system had been continued; and also whether explicit instructions had been given to the Colonels of districts to give every facility in their power to the recruiting of the Guards? It was quite true the Guards had to keep themselves in a smarter condition than the rest of the Army; but surely their recruiting ought to be assisted by their prestige and by the fact that they had the very best quarters in the Army; and he was disposed to believe that if recruits were not obtained in sufficient numbers for the Guards, it was not so much owing to inadequacy of pay as to the fact that they were shut out from the benefit of the general recruiting machinery of the Army, and especially from the district recruiting. He thought no objection could be made to the proposition to give an addition of £2 a-year to the Army Reserve, because the better we made their condition the stronger would be the call we should have upon them. He did not think they should be called out for more than 12 days, because otherwise we should seriously interfere with their civil employment. We called them out, not so much for the purpose of drilling, as to see them assemble and ascertain their condition. He had little to say-as to the mobilization scheme. The right hon. Gentleman had bestowed great labour upon it. It might be necessary for the military authorities to know where each regiment of the Militia and the Line should go on the outbreak of war; but why should the information be published on the house-tops? He did not see any particular advantage in every man in every regiment in the country knowing where he should go. It appeared to him that all that was required was that the authorities in the War Office should know where a regiment should be ordered to go, and have their plans ready for execution at a moment's notice. What was said as to the general condition of the Army, he thought, must be satisfactory to everybody. The right hon. Gentleman appeared to him to take precisely the right line with regard to the condition of the Army. He was neither too sanguine in his estimate of it nor did he yield to those exaggerated criticisms which were common out of doors. As to the proposition made by his hon. Friend behind him (Mr. Pease) to reduce the number of men by 10,000, it did not appear why his hon. Friend had selected that number; indeed, his argument was almost in favour of disbanding the Army altogether. Her Majesty's Government must know better than the House or any private individual what was the state of political affairs; and therefore he (Mr. Campbell-Banner-man) felt very much disposed to bow to their opinion as to the number of men that ought to be voted. There was only one other subject to which he wished to allude—namely, the medical department of the Army. Nothing had delighted him more for many a day than the decided tone in which the right hon. Gentleman had spoken on the general hospital system of the medical department; and notwithstanding the pressure that had been brought to bear upon the right hon. Gentleman, he felt sure that the more he looked into the question and consulted the competent authorities, the more he would see the absolute necessity of the Staff system. His proposals for improving the position of the medical officers appeared to be excellent. One suggestion which he would venture to make, with a view, not, perhaps, to its immediate, but its ultimate adoption, was that the medical officers who went out of the Service after 10 years might be employed for the Militia and the Brigade Depôts, whereby, while discharging those duties, they would have the opportunity of settling in practice in a country town. In referring to the medical department the right hon. Gentleman expressed the opinion—which it was to be hoped he would bear in mind in connection with the greater questions of Army promotion and retirement—that it was dangerous to enter a great number of young men at the bottom, because they would have to provide for them when they attained higher rank. That was a consideration which lay at the basis of all sound schemes of promotion and retirement.

COLONEL NAGHTEN

offered some suggestions in regard to recruiting. He recommended, among other things, that after serving three years in the Militia any man who wished to join the Regular Army should have his bounty paid to him partly on joining the Regular service, and partly on completing the period which he would have completed if he had remained in the Militia. He also thought that, instead of enlisting immature youths in the Army, it would be better to enlist them in the Militia even under the present standard; and then three years afterwards, when they had developed considerably, they would be fit as well as pleased to join the Regular Army as grown men, and would have a liking for the Service. In his opinion, the Militia ought to be made more a nursery for the regular Army than it was now. He thought it would be well to remodel the Ballot Act so that it might be used, if required, and in the meantime to do everything possible to encourage men to go into the ranks.

MR. SULLIVAN

said, he hoped that although it was a Colonels' night a few words from a civilian would not be in-acceptable to the House. He recognized the difficulty of the position in which an English Minister of War was placed. By means of conscription vast armies were being organized on the Continent of Europe, and industry and trade were crushed under overwhelming armaments. The question was, whether England was to obey her peaceful instincts, or take part in the mad competition for inflated armies? As a compromise, we were making a halting step towards adopting the new system; but there was this difficulty to face, and he had not yet heard any one attempt to grapple with it. If England was to, take part in that wild struggle for military supremacy, what was to be her position as an industrial country? He could understand that the Secretary for War, in view of the great military strength of continental Powers, had a patriotic desire not to see his country altogether unprepared for the possibilities of an evil day; but it was idle to pretend that if England had to encounter the armies of the Continent it was merely upon her military strength that she could rely. With regard to the mobilization scheme, he might observe that the Irish Militia were singularly neglected, and whether that circumstance was due to political considerations, or the mere accidents of military strategy, he had yet to be informed. However that might be, the foreigner who criticized our new military system would be at no loss to notice that in Ireland, once our best recruiting ground, not one of the native Militia regiments was to form part of the local Army Corps. It was all very well for a Minister to pet certain classes of people in the country; but in the end the people themselves would turn upon the system under which the process was carried on. Underlying the whole subject before the House there was the great question—How were we to get men? One thing he could tell the Secretary for War was that branding in the Army would not help him to get recruits—it would, at all events, not help him to get recruits in Ireland. It was a painful fact that while they were adding to the Army at one end it was falling away at the other; desertion, in fact, was nearly keeping pace with recruitment. But it was not from an exclusively military view that this subject was to be regarded, and he invited the Committee to inquire how it was, after all that had been done to increase the comfort of the Army, that we found it harder to get soldiers to-day than 50 years ago, even although the requirements of height and physical development had been gradually lowered. What had become of the splendid material that fought the British battles 40 or 50 years ago? How came it to pass that it was so difficult to recruit now as compared with former times? It was because the rural population of the country had disappeared into the large cities and towns, and because the conditions of life, the sanitary conditions of the humbler classes, were not conducive to the production of a military race. He made no reflection on the men of the cities and towns; many of the greatest battles in the world were fought and won by them, and the Royalist forces were defeated by the Parliamentarians. Nevertheless, it was only in the green fields and the cottage homes of the country that stalwart class of men could be produced. How came it that they were gone? It was because in England, as well as in Ireland, within the last 50 years a terrific revolution had swept the people from the fields into cities and towns. This great change had not been so much felt in England, which had big towns like London, Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield, and Birmingham; but in Ireland the change had been keenly felt, because they had no Manchesters and no Birminghams to absorb the thrust out population. In Ireland what were the chances of recruitment? "While the whole population were in a state of discontent and dissatisfaction they need not expect their chances as to recruitment to improve in Ireland. He knew something of his people, and he knew something of the excitement among them whenever a great military question arose. They knew they were not trusted by the Minister for War, because there was no Volunteer force in Ireland. The best military strength that they could supply would be to satisfy the Irish people and make the military service popular in Ireland. They could not get what they-wanted by offering 2d. more a-day, and he said to the Government—" Do not think that Irishmen, at all events, are to be won merely by 1½d. or 2d., with the advantage of branding into the bargain." If they had to call on the arm of Ireland for aid or defence, it could not be given while the people entertained their present feelings; and, without any reference to a question of money, the sense of national honour and duty would induce them not to enter in any considerable numbers into the military strength of the Empire.

COLONEL EGERTON LEIGH

said, he did not agree with the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken. He had had several Irishmen under his command, and he was very much pleased with them, and he believed that they were well pleased with him. He would not wish to have better soldiers than Irishmen. It was said that grumbling had made England the country that she was; and if grumbling could do anything for the Army it would be one of the greatest armies going. It was, so far as he could see, in anything but a bad way, and he thought the changes now proposed by the Government would be great improvements. He was particular gratified at the increase of the pay of non-commissioned officers, and he should like that those of them who had been a certain time in the Army should have a pension. It was said that England was at peace with all the world; but she was never absolutely at peace, and within the last six months had been on the point of war with China and Burmah. An immense country like "ours must always expect to have some little or great war on hand, and we ought to be prepared for any emergency which might arise.

MR. J. HOLMS

said, that as it was desirable to have further time to consider the very important statement of the Secretary for War, and also the important Amendment of his hon. Friend the Member for South Durham (Mr. Pease), he should move that the Chairman be ordered to report Progress.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. Holms.)

MR. GATHORNE HARDY

said, he hoped the Committee would grant a Vote for the men that night. The information which had been in the hands of hon. Members was very full, and was quite a guide to them; and therefore he could not see that there was any ground for stopping the discussion at that hour—half-past 11 o'clock. If the Committee came to a conclusion that night it would enable the House to go on with the Mutiny Act, which was this year important in connection with some questions affecting the Militia.

MR. WHALLEY

supported the Motion to report Progress, on the ground that the hon. Member for Hackney, who had been so frequently referred to in the course of the debate, was entitled to get time to consider his reply. He complained that the Secretary for "War had omitted all reference to the Volunteers, upon whom the country must rely for its defence, and declared that nature was against the maintenance of a standing Army in England. The speech of the hon. Member for Louth (Mr. Sullivan) was well worthy of consideration. It showed that there was an enemy in the very citadel. He was reminded of what the Duke of Wellington once said, that he would not have roman Catholics in the Royal Artillery or Engineers, simply because of their uncertain allegiance. The older Members of that House had been striving to conciliate by civil means, and also by religious concessions, that particular section of the community, and yet they were now told there was discontent.

THE CHAIRMAN

I must remind the hon. Member that it is not considered a convenient course to discuss the main Question in detail on a Motion to report Progress.

MR. WHALLEY

said, what he had stated was only by way of parenthesis. He was quoting the authority of the Duke of Wellington. How could an Army be relied upon that numbered so many in its ranks who did not recognize the supremacy of the Sovereign?

MR. ANDERSON

said, he thought that it would save time by reporting Progress at once, because it was quite evident there were so many Members who desired to address the Committee that the Vote could not be taken to-night. He might say, at the same time, that nearly all the proposals of the Secretary for War, being in his opinion reforms, would have his support, though other important subjects had been raised which required most careful consideration, and he certainly could not agree in the proposal to increase the number of men.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

said, he thought it was hardly possible to take the Vote to-night. It was always understood that the discussion on the first Vote extended over a wide range of subjects; and he did not think that the right hon. Gentleman would wish to limit a preliminary discussion which would, perhaps, facilitate the progress of the remaining Votes.

MR. DISRAELI

consented to postpone the Vote till Monday, when the Committee would be taken as the first business.

Question put, and agreed to.

Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.