MAJOR BEAUMONTrose to call the attention of the House to the advantages that would arise from the construction of a Central Arsenal. In doing so, he hoped the gentlemen upstairs would 1453 convey his remarks to the public, who, he doubted not, took more interest in it than the House appeared to feel. Whatever might be the differences of opinion as to the question of the offensive forces of this country, there could be none so far as the defence was concerned. Had the Forms of the House allowed him to do so, he would have moved for a Committee to consider whether the cost of the removal of the Arsenal from Woolwich to a central position would not be covered by the diminished cost of the raw material and its manufacture. He thought he could show that the change he advocated would not only involve no cost to the country, but would be a positive gain. The present was an unfortified Arsenal in connection with an unfortified capital. It was, besides, situated upon a river, which, on strategical grounds, was not a proper position for an Arsenal. The objection to Woolwich was, however, mitigated by the fact that the fortifications were more or less completed at the mouth of the Thames and by the great increased power of defence afforded by the use of torpedoes. At the same time that was not an answer to the objection, and he doubted whether such conditions as obtained with regard to the relative positions of Woolwich and London were to be found abroad. If an enemy attacked the country, his endeavour would be to march upon the capital and to destroy the Arsenal, and in this case, as he had stated, the capital and the Arsenal were alike unfortified. He did not rest the suggestion he made on his own opinion merely; it was justified by the practice of foreign nations and by the views of the Royal Commission appointed in 1859 to consider the subject.
Notice taken that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members being found present,
MAJOR BEAUMONTresumed—The Report of the Commissioners stated that the Arsenal ought to be placed in a secure locality, and further mentioned that a complete system of fortifications might be constructed around Woolwich at a cost of from £3,000,000 to £4,000,000. Such a system would, however, be in connection with the fortification of London, and he could not recommend the fortification of the me- 1454 tropolis, as the extent of the works would be so great and the cost so enormous. Therefore, it was practically impossible to fortify the Arsenal of Woolwich. Besides it was unnecessary, for there were many other sites that could be readily made available for the purpose. For instance, he had heard that arrangements had been made for the purchase of 1,500 acres at Strensall Common, near York. He might also refer to the circumstances that the Government had sent down qualified persons to Cannock Chase and to a place near Leeds for the purpose of seeing how far either place might be suited for the formation of a central Arsenal. The arguments against removal were—first, that the Arsenal was there; and, secondly, that there would be a difficulty and expense in removal; but he believed that he could show there would be no extra expense incurred by the proposal as he had before observed, neither would it be of such an amount as to prevent them having an Arsenal in a locality that would make it less liable to a successful attack from an enemy than Woolwich. He proposed to leave the store and gun departments there, and to shift the carriage department and the laboratory.
Notice taken that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members being found present,
MAJOR BEAUMONTresumed—The reason why the laboratory departments should be removed and placed together was the necessity for supplying ammunition rapidly to an Army in the field. It would be little less than a national disgrace and breakdown if there was a failure of supply in such a case. As to the argument of the hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Boord) last year, who proposed to put the work into the hands of private manufacturers, instead of doing it in the national establishments, the answer was that, under present circumstances, there was practically no other demand for these stores in the open market, except that from the national establishments; and in the case of a war, very little assistance could be obtained from the private contractors, and it would be difficult to transfer any portion of the Staff from Woolwich to Devonport or elsewhere in time to have any 1455 effect upon a campaign; while, at the same time, the workshops in these places were too small to bear a sudden strain upon their resources. He came now to the most important part of his case—the cost of removal as compared with the economy of removal. There were in the Arsenal at Woolwich some 40,000,000 cubic feet of building, the proportion of iron to brick being as 11½ to 29½. To shift half of the departments as he proposed would be, therefore, to shift 20,000,000 cubic feet of building. The average cost of this building would be 6d. per cubic foot, a sum which would well cover all charges, including the foundations. Thus, the cost of removal would be £500,000, as far as the buildings were concerned, while he estimated that £300,000 would provide for the purchase of land, and £200,000 for the cost of shifting machinery. The total charge would be £1,000,000, for which sum he was certain that the carriage and laboratory departments could be removed from Woolwich. Our fortifications were paid for by Terminable Annuities spread over 30 years, and, at the same rate, £56,000 a-year would be the charge required. If, therefore, he could show that the change would result in saving more than £56,000 a-year, his case was proved: First, there was the value of the land vacated at Woolwich, which would be considerable. He, however, thought it would be wise to shift to this vacant ground the clothing department at Pimlico and the Indian Store Inspection department, which had ground at Lambeth. If that were done the value of the two sites thus relinquished would be very large indeed. When he proposed that last year, he was told that it was important these establishments should be under the eye of the Government. But they all knew that they were conducted mainly by letter, and there would be no more difficulty in transacting the business by letters which had to be sent six miles than two. It was unwise for the Government to have establishments like those on such expensive sites, and, for all practical purposes of communication with the War Office, they might as well be at Woolwich. He estimated that by the change they would save £15,000 a-year in coal, £20,000 in iron, £10,000 in labour, and £15,000 in the manufacturing of stores. This made a total of £60,000; but he believed the actual 1456 saving would be far larger. If the proposal he suggested should be carried out, great economy might be effected. At the same time he did not rest this proposal merely on the ground of economy. What was of vast importance was, that if our first line of defence was forced, we should have a sufficient reserve elsewhere. The hon. Member for Greenwich, in addressing his constituents last year, in opposition to the erection of a new central Arsenal, said the Royal Commission who had recommended it were men who were afflicted with "Gallophobia." That was a view of the case which could not be justified when they looked at who were the eminent and experienced men who composed that Commission, and who were the least likely to be actuated by any fears from that quarter. He had shown, he thought, good reasons why, for important strategical reasons, it was highly desirable that the central Arsenal should be established, and also that, with greater efficiency in every department, we should have greater economy. He hoped to hear from the Treasury Bench some answers to both of these reasons. In conclusion, he thought he was entitled to ask what reasonable fault could be found with the estimates he had put forward? If, as he contended, there was none, as the strategical advantages would be in themselves very great, the House would act wisely in acceding to his Motion.
§ MR. BOORDsaid, he could hardly help feeling that the discussion invited by the hon. and gallant Member for South Durham involved a waste of the time of the House—especially when he remembered the small encouragement a similar Motion had met with last year. On that occasion the hon. and gallant Gentleman was told, in very unmistakeable terms, that his own Party would not have been prepared even to grant him a Committee, much less to take his proposal into serious consideration, if they had been in office; and he was also informed, on the authority of the Secretary to the Royal Commission of 1860, that if that Commission could be re-appointed, it would now report differently; besides he had failed to show that the Committee he desired would be able to collect any information beyond what was already in the possession of the Government. If the hon. and gallant Gentleman had succeeded 1457 in proving anything, it was that his own calculations were utterly unreliable, for whilst last year his estimate of the saving to be effected by the change he advocated amounted to £90,000 per annum, he now made it £60,000; then he required 7,000 acres of land for his purpose—now he was content with 1,500—a difference which, no doubt in the exercise of a wise discretion, he had omitted to explain. However, he (Mr. Boord) was not going to quarrel with that; for, if his requirements continued to decrease at the same rate, there was some hope that he would not find it necessary to occupy the attention of the House next Session with the same proposition. The hon. and gallant Gentleman had stated the consumption of coal in the arsenal to be equivalent to £30,000 annually, and that he could save £15,000 of that outlay; but although he professed to estimate the saving, he did not appear able to give the number of tons consumed, which was a necessary element in the calculation.
MAJOR BEAUMONTsaid, he had obtained the amount of £30,000 from the Estimates of the year, and that the number of tons was not given.
§ MR. BOORDsaid, he was perfectly satisfied with the correctness of the quotation from the Estimates; but that did not alter his opinion that £15,000 was a very large amount to save out of £30,000, and he doubted if it could be satisfactorily explained. The Royal Commission of 1860 had three schemes before them for the protection of Woolwich by land; and the wide difference between them, both as to cost and character, sufficiently proved the divergence of opinion that prevailed amongst the Members, and tended to show that its appointment might be traced to the invasion panic then prevailing. But the most conclusive proof that nothing further was required in the direction of the Report of that Commission was to be found in the fact that absolutely nothing had been done since towards carrying its recommendations, with regard to a central arsenal, into effect; and even within six months of its issue General Sir de Lacy Evans had been counted out whilst calling attention to the subject—a misfortune that had twice very nearly befallen the hon. and gallant Gentleman that evening. Even 1458 if it were otherwise, the Report on which the hon. and gallant Gentleman relied did not appear to be so favourable to his views as he would have the House believe. It said that the arsenal must be near the sea, so as to be convenient for the shipment of stores and for other reasons—how did he propose to adapt his site in Yorkshire to these conditions? But the whole of his argument was based on an assumption to which he (Mr. Boord) objected entirely—that our first line of defence would be forced. The country was called upon annually to provide enormous sums of money for the Naval and Military Services, and no effort was spared to maintain those Services in an effective condition, yet we were to be called upon to increase our outlay almost indefinitely on the mere supposition that those Services would prove useless in an emergency. He was surprised that such an argument should be seriously brought forward in that House by an officer of the Army. The hon. and gallant Gentleman had made another statement that filled him with astonishment; he had said that private manufacturers were unable to supply arms of precision such as were required for the service of the Army. That was the first time he had ever heard it alleged that there was anything which private industry in this country could not accomplish, and he felt sure that if the hon. and gallant Gentleman took the trouble to inform himself he would arrive at a different conclusion. In case of necessity private firms would be found ready to place their services at the disposal of the Government, a fact which alone rendered the construction of subsidiary depôts and arsenals, to the extent contemplated by the Royal Commission, unnecessary. But what was needed in that direction was already in progress, for he believed the Government were putting the gun wharves at Plymouth and other places in such condition as to render their development a matter easy of accomplishment; therefore we were by no means in so desperate a condition as the speech of the hon. and gallant Gentleman would seem to indicate. The objections to his scheme were sufficiently weighty and numerous to counteract any theoretical advantage, which at first sight it might appear to offer. It would be found very inconvenient to separate the Carriage department, as 1459 proposed, from the Gun factory; the first cost would greatly exceed the estimate, already extravagant, which the hon. and gallant Gentleman had submitted; he had taken no account of the increased annual cost for maintenance, nor of the extra accumulation of stores, which must necessarily follow the multiplication of such establishments; and, lastly, he had entirely ignored the disadvantages attendant on the publication of the evidence, for the benefit of foreign nations, of a Committee whose chief object would be to discover the weak points in our system of national defence. For these reasons, he sincerely trusted that his noble Friend below him would adhere to the determination he had expressed last year in reference to this proposal.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, that this was not a new question. It was brought forward in 1860, when a Royal Commission was appointed, and the subject was then very fully discussed. He said last year that if the Commission assembled together again, it would not, in all probability, take the same view as at that period.
Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members being found present,
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILproceeded to say, that he made that observation, as he stated last year, on the authority of the distinguished officer, Sir William Jervois, who was Secretary to the Commission, so that it was not a haphazard view which he expressed. The hon. and gallant Member had divided his arguments into two heads—strategical and financial. It was on strategical grounds that the arsenal was kept in its present position. There was no doubt that if our first line of defence was forced; if an invading army did by any chance land in this country, and if our Army was unfortunately beaten in the field, the consequences would be very disastrous; but he did not believe they would be so disastrous to Woolwich as to London. His impression, and that of military authorities, was that the invading force would advance on the Metropolis, and having captured it, the capture of Woolwich would be a small matter. As to attacking Woolwich by water the defence of the Thames 1460 was, he might say, complete. There were now eight iron-clad forts in different parts of the Thames; and if anything more in the way of defence was necessary, it could be supplied by the admirable system of torpedoes which they had now, he hoped, brought almost to perfection. As far as approach by water was concerned, Woolwich was, in the minds of military authorities, impregnable. It was of far greater importance that the arsenal should be within easy access of the officials than that it should be centralized in a given situation. Again, Woolwich was admirably situated as an arsenal if it were a question of embarking troops in the case of an invasion of any country abroad. Turning to the financial aspect of the matter, he might state that the figures upon which the hon. and gallant Member had based his arguments were fallacious, more especially with regard to iron. Then, in regard to coal, the average price of coal at Newcastle in 1874–5 was 17s. per ton, while the price for which it was delivered at Woolwich Arsenal was from 22s. to 22s. 6d., showing a difference of 5s. or 5s. 6d. per ton, instead of 10s., as stated by the hon. and gallant Member. In 1875–6 the average price at Newcastle was 14s., while coal was delivered at Woolwich for 20s. The hon. and gallant Gentleman next told them £20,000 would be saved in metal; but he (Lord Eustace Cecil) was informed that metal was quite as cheap at Woolwich as it would be in the centre or even in the North of England. Then, with respect to labour, the ordinary rates of skilled labour were slightly higher—perhaps 5 per cent higher—at Woolwich than in the North; but unskilled labour was fully 10 per cent lower at Woolwich. Piecework was a time and-a-half, and double time; whereas, at the arsenal, it was a time and a-quarter as a rule, and a time and a-half was the exception. Therefore, the great economies which the hon. and gallant Member expected from the adoption of his recommendations would probably fall to the ground. Moreover, the hon. and gallant Gentleman either proved too much or too little in regard to the removal of those departments. If it was necessary to retain the Gun factory where it was, the same argument would apply, more or less, to the laboratory and the carriage factory. As to 1461 the concentration of stores at Woolwich Arsenal, no doubt it would be unwise to place all our eggs, so to speak, in one basket; but we had at least 30 different stations spread over the United Kingdom where we had stores of one sort or another. We had two small manufactories at Plymouth and Devonport which could be made use of at any moment, and which would no doubt in time be very serviceable. Besides that, we had under the local organization some 66 brigades scattered all over the country, where it were proposed, more or less, to have stores of some kind. When, therefore, the hon. and gallant Gentleman supposed we had such a great concentration of stores at Woolwich that if Woolwich was taken we should have nothing to fall back upon, he was under a misapprehension. Moreover, we should also have the private manufacturers to fall back upon. The hon. and gallant Member had spoken slightingly of the private manufactures; but at Birmingham it was perfectly possible to have rifles and ammunition made. The Messrs. Armstrong also could manufacture very good guns and various laboratory stores, while the great ingenuity of Sir Joseph Whitworth in those matters was equally well known. There was not the least doubt that if anything like a stimulus were given to the private manufacture of guns and warlike stores, we could have them in any quantity. It certainly would not be in our present state a matter of wise economy to do away with an old-established manufactory and arsenal like Woolwich. It turned out good work, and it did so economically. Before we abolished it we must be quite sure of a better place for placing an arsenal in. The hon. and gallant Gentleman had spoken of Cannock Chase and other sites for an arsenal, but they were all considered in 1860, and the recommendations then made were not carried out for a good economical reason. The Government, however, had given this subject their best consideration. At this moment they had bought 1,500 acres near York, and they were proceeding to erect an arsenal there, not for manufacturing purposes, but for a collection of all warlike stores in case of necessity. He thought a central depôt of that kind in the North of England would give us all the extra warlike stores we were likely to require in case of an emergency 1462 or an invasion. And he thought it was not necessary—and in that he was backed up by all the military authorities who had considered the matter—to have a manufactory in addition to that which we had at Woolwich. If a Committee were granted, it could not furnish any more information than we had already on this subject. A Committee would probably put on the Table of the House an extra Blue Book, which he supposed would not serve any other purpose than that of giving us a mass of printed matter which might be extremely serviceable to the hon. and gallant Gentleman when he next brought forward a Motion.
§ CAPTAIN NOLANsaid, he thought the project of separating the different departments of Woolwich Arsenal and transferring two of them northwards was particularly unfortunate. It would be dangerous to remove the laboratory and carriage departments from the vicinity of the Metropolis, where the services of the best workmen could always be readily procured. He did not think, however, that the House ought altogether to disregard the remarks of the hon. and gallant Member who brought forward this subject, for if Woolwich Arsenal should by any chance be destroyed, we ought to be prepared for the emergency. We had the Elswick factory, the establishment of Sir Joseph Whitworth, and other arsenals in the North of England; but these were deficient in some departments, and, in his opinion, what we ought to do was in some way to inspect these arsenals and to supply what was wanting in them. With regard to his main principle of transferring Woolwich Arsenal to the North of England, he thought the hon. and gallant Member was totally wrong.