SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

HC Deb 08 March 1875 vol 222 cc1413-69

(In the Committee.)

(1.) 129,281 Land Forces, for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland at Home and Abroad.

MR. GATHORNE HARDY

Mr. Raikes, in moving the first item in the Army Estimates relating to the number of Men, it is usual for those who fill the office I have now the honour to hold to make a general statement as to the condition of the Service, both as regards its personnel and its matériel. Notice has has already been taken this evening that there is an additional expenditure this year over that of last, but if hon. Members will be good enough to refer to a Paper issued this year, called "The Army (Variations of Numbers)," they will find a very full explanation of the causes of the difference between the expenditure proposed for the Effective Service of the two years, and therefore I shall not feel it necessary to go minutely into the matter now, and the more so because an opportunity will be afforded to hon. Members to discuss it when the various Votes are before the Committee. I may, however, mention that some portion of the general increase in the expenditure is due to the unusually high price of forage this year; to the supply of the necessary horses for the autumnal drills and manœuvres at Aldershot; and to the large item of £25,000 occasioned by the additional day in Leap Year. With regard to the latter item, however, we may hope that my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will receive such an additional sum as may more than balance the increased charges of the two Services occasioned by the extra day having to be provided for. In addition to these sources of increase there is that of the naval charges. It has been urged that much advantage would be derived from treating that item on the principle of repayment, so as to prevent its appearing in the Army Estimates; but the subject having been considered very fully by those who are anxious to bring about a proper balance between the Navy and Army charges, the conclusion that has been arrived at is, that, if the Committee wishes to have a thorough audit of the accounts for the two Services at the end of the year, it is absolutely impossible to adopt the principle of repayment. Therefore, it is that the charges for the Navy, amounting to £232,000, appear in the Estimates now before us. I may here remark that I am most anxious to furnish to the House the very fullest information I can with reference to the Army, but that information has already been published in its most compendious form in "The General Annual Return of the British Army," and therefore I hope that hon. Members before moving for Returns in reference to the Army will consult that work, and move for them in the lines there laid down, they will thus avoid throwing an unnecessary strain upon the Department, the regular work of which is sometimes brought almost to a stand-still in consequence of the clerks being engaged in the preparation of some special Return, which is, perhaps, only consulted by some five or six Members. I can assure the Committee that it is our wish to make this general Return as complete as possible, and that every suggestion for its improvement shall receive our most careful attention. If hon. Members will look at the end of the present work they will see that we have added a new and very useful Return at the end of the Report of the Inspector General for Recruiting, which shows the increase and the decrease in the Army during each month of 1874. That, I believe, will be found extremely useful. Before I proceed to deal with, the general subject of the Estimates, perhaps the Committee will allow me to make a few observations on the question of the recommendations of the Commission upon Officers' Grievances, which have been referred to several times. It is my intention, when I bring forward the Vote for the Army Purchase Commission this year, to call the attention of the Committee to three of those recommendations, and to ask for an additional sum on account of them; therefore, it is unnecessary that I should go into the subject at the present moment, further than to say that as inasmuch as the subject which was before the Officers' Grievances Commission is so intimately connected with the question of promotion, until the Commission on that question has reported, and ample time has been allowed us for considering that Report, we shall be unable to deal finally with it. The principle laid down by my Predecessor in office was, that as adequate a flow of promotion must be maintained in the Army as was maintained under the Purchase system. That subject is now under the consideration of the Committee, and it will be recollected that in the Report of the Commission on Officers' Grievances all the recommendations were based upon the assumption that promotion must be kept up in accordance with the principle laid down by my Predecessor. I may remind the Committee that I have been required to complete a great deal of unfinished work, and therefore I hope the Committee will extend to me some consideration on that account. My Predecessor had commenced a great many subjects, and as far as regards the Abolition of Purchase, he left office without having laid down any principles upon which the future system of promotion and retirement from the Army should be conducted. As time went on, it became necessary that the latter question should be taken into consideration, because, in consequence of the Purchase system dying out rapidly, the difficulties connected with promotion would be growing day by day. Leaving these questions, I should wish to give the Committee some information with regard to the matériel before entering upon the subject of the personnel of the Army, and in doing so I will refer very shortly to the different heads under which my remarks will occur. In the first place, I should wish to call the attention of the Committee to Vote 12, relating to the Stores. The Stores were formerly under the management of what was called the "Control Department," but I have taken upon myself—I hope not without the assent of hon. Members opposite—to abolish that title, which has led to every sort of jealousy and ill-feeling, it having been supposed that department was created to regulate and control everybody in the Service; and, although that was not the case, it was not thought desirable to retain a title which gave such great offence, and therefore we have divided the department into two branches, one to be called the Ordnance Store department, and the other the Supply and Commissariat department. The officers in these two branches will be placed upon two different lines of promotion, one set being placed under the Director General of Artillery and Stores, and the other under the Director General of Supply, both remaining under the Surveyor General of Ordnance. I hope the alteration will be carried out immediately. There is no immediate intention to interfere with the Transport, which for the time remains under the Commissariat, although the time may come when it may be necessary to deal with that branch of the Service. It will be noticed that under the Vote for the Supply and Manufacture and the Repairing of Warlike and other Stores there is an apparent increase of nearly £16,000; but the reason of that apparent increase is, that there will be a less repayment in the year than there was a right to expect of about £65,000, and therefore there has been an actual saving under this head of £49,948. I may state that a considerable reduction has been effected in the cost of the manufacture and repair of small arms through the various improvements which have been introduced into the machinery. On the whole, the reduction is very considerable. In connection with the Ordnance Stores, it has to be noted that we are still engaged in making an 81-ton gun, I capable of throwing a 1,600 pound shot—a monster surpassing anything which has yet been known. Of Artillery, we have 372 field batteries manned, equipped, and horsed, as compared with 180 in 1870; and we are keeping up our I Reserves steadily. This is one of those defensive Forces to which, perhaps, even the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) would not object, for it is scientific and complete in every way. With respect to small arms, the Martini-Henry rifle has been supplied to all the troops at home, and I am happy to say that the reports of it are extremely favourable—that the men, instead of being distressed with the recoil, do not feel it at all, and that the weapon is one that gives great satisfaction. On the 31st of March this year, we shall have a reserve of 400,000 Martini-Henry and Snider rifles, 57,000,000 of ball cartridges; our store of gunpowder is fully maintained; and, with regard to all other stores, I may say that the supply is adequate. I need say nothing at present about the Commissariat. It will be sufficient to enter into the details of that part of the subject when we come to the Votes. I have endeavoured to obtain the latest information with respect to the condition of the brigade depôts. The expenditure under that head is not in the Estimates; but inasmuch as the time must come when it will materially affect them, I think the Committee ought to be told as much as possible on the subject. There are to be 70 of these depôts. New barracks are to be constructed for 32 of them. At present 15 of these are under contract; plans are ready for seven; plans are in progress for other five, and with regard to the remaining five, negotiations for land are going on. As to the other 38 depôts, existing barracks are at present being adapted for 20 of them, and plans are in hand for the adaptation of 16 more, while two are tentatively occupied. In the other cases, alterations are under consideration. There has been a great desire to have training bar-racks for the Militia—that is to say, there is an objection to going under canvas. Warley, we hope, will soon be available, and negotiations for land are going on at Lichfield which I hope will prove satisfactory. With respect to the Northern Tactical Station, which I mentioned last year, I am sorry to say we have not made much progress. The mere sight of a cocked hat in any neighbourhood where it is supposed land may be wanted for troops has a most prejudicial effect in raising the price, and the sum demanded is sometimes enormous, we have therefore to look around us very carefully before purchasing any land for this purpose. But the scheme to which I I refer has not been lost sight of, the matter being at present in the hands of the general officer commanding the Northern district. I cannot conceal from myself that the difficulty in regard to land is growing day by day, and that we are constantly becoming more "cribb'd, cabin'd, and confined"—a fact which is, perhaps, natural in this thickly inhabited country. For many reasons land is becoming more valuable—the means of bringing it under cultivation are increasing; and oven at Aldershot, on account of the increasing difficulty we experience in moving outside the ground on which the camp stands, we shall have to face that difficulty by extending the area of our possession if we are to continue to have manœuvres on an extensive scale—manœuvres which I need not say are of great advantage to the different branches of the Service. Passing from that point, I may mention that new barracks have been built at Colchester for the Artillery; that additions have been made at Shorncliffe, with a view to having a complete tactical station, and that additions have been made at Glasgow in order to have a Cavalry and Artillery station. No Militia having yet been annexed, we are not in a position to give any information as to the probable working of the brigade depôts when they are in complete order. During 1874–5 £200,000 will have been expended on fortifications that are being built under the loan, and I think I may say it has been mainly spent on iron shields for the forts. It takes a long time to procure these shields, as there are only two firms which supply them, and the process of putting them up is tedious. Plymouth and Pembroke are now complete; Portsmouth is approaching completion; and there is a prospect that the whole amount which so many years ago was taken for the works in question will not be needed. Such a result would, no doubt, be highly satisfactory to the Committee, and I am bound to say that it would be chiefly due to the distinguished officer—Colonel Jervois—who has had charge of the works. Sir Frederic Chapman, the Inspector General of Fortifications, reported as follows on this subject in February, 1874:— These results are mainly due to the engineering skill, administrative ability, and untiring zeal of Colonel Jervois, on whom has devolved the general conduct of the business relating to these national defences from the first conception of the design to the actual execution of the works. In that opinion I entirely concur. Colonel Jervois is now going into a new sphere of action. He has been appointed Governor of the Straits Settlements, and those who have been connected with him in the War Department have every reason to believe he will be as successful in his new post as he has been hitherto. With respect to the fortifications which are referred to in the Estimates, I have to state that the fort at Landguard is nearly complete. There is a turret being constructed at the Admiralty Pier at Dover, and the works at Gibraltar are nearly ready for heavy ordnance. The outer defences at Malta are rapidly advancing, and at Bermuda and Halifax there is not much remaining to be done. About 800 heavy guns will have been provided by the 31st of March, and a large proportion will be in their places. The smoothbores will have, in a great measure, been replaced by the converted rifle guns, which have been proved to be a very effective weapon. Coming next to the subject of military education, I must allude to the very satisfactory Reports which I have received in regard te the schools for the soldiers' children. I will not go into details upon the present occasion, but I cannot refrain from saying a word about a gentleman to whom great credit is due in connection with the establishment and promotion of these schools—I mean the Rev. G. R. Gleig, the present Chaplain General of the Army. At a great age, that reverend gentleman has resolved to retire from a post which he has occupied for a long period of time with great advantage to the service, and I am sure the Committee would not like that I should pass from the subject without referring to his services. Anyone who has read his interesting and fascinating book The Subaltern about the Pyrennean campaign, and who knows the localities referred to in it, must have been struck by the accuracy of his descriptions; and we know also how gallant was his behaviour. Afterwards he served with distinction in America. He has gradually reached the position he now occupies, and for which his great exertions in establishing military schools and bringing them into an efficient state pointed him out as fit. I am sure the Committee will not overlook the good service he has done, but will heartily wish him a peaceful and happy retirement. With respect to the military education of a higher class, I want to call the attention of the Committee more especially to Sandhurst. Last year a system existed by which young gentlemen, after having succeeded in the competitive examinations, received their commissions and were sent for a year to their regiments, after which they were sent back to Sandhurst to complete their school training for another year. The House showed last year that it considered this plan as sure to fail. You could not treat officers who had been in a regiment as boys are treated, and it was certain to lead to the difficulties to which it did lead. We have now altered that; but I am not satisfied that we have gone far enough, and I look forward to a time when, after a young man has passed his examination, he will go to Sandhurst upon the same footing as cadets go to Woolwich; that instead of the country having to pay them as commissioned officers they will pay for themselves during the year they are at Sandhurst. By the plan we propose we shall get rid of the difficult and complicated system of antedating commissions, as those who obtain commissions will proceed straight to their regiments and stay with them from that time forward. That seems to me a much better plan than the present, and it is most important that we should get rid of an irritation to which that system has given rise. I cannot pass from Sandhurst without calling attention to the estimate in which that school has been held by one of the present Kings of Europe. The present King of Spain went to Sandhurst last year and conducted himself in all respects very much as any other cadet would have done—showing himself anxious to submit to the discipline of the place and to take advantage of the instruction to be obtained there. It is, I think, to the credit of Sandhurst that it should have been selected by those who were interested in the new King, as the place of his education. With respect to Woolwich, we know that we have had there one of a very high position, who not only made use of that military school, but attained a very high standard in almost all the subjects of examination. I think that England has been honoured by those two military schools having been selected for the education of those two distin- guished persons to whom I have referred. I should add that the Reports from Woolwich have been favourable during the year, as have been the Reports from Sandhurst also, and so far what was proposed last year has proved successful. I am thankful to say that, although the students at Sandhurst have had to submit to considerable inconvenience in consequence of their increased numbers, and the new buildings not being completed, they have done so with great good humour and good feeling. I come now to a point as to which I was questioned last year—the Medical department. That department has, I frankly own, given me infinite thought and received from me much consideration, and I am sorry that even at this moment I am not prepared to make any very definite proposal. The fact is, that there has been a very great change made in the Medical department. That department was in 1873 regimental, and is now departmental. It has become a Staff, and until it has settled down it is most difficult to arrive at a conclusion as to the best mode of dealing with it. Indeed, members of the Medical department have issued publications which are extremely interesting, but which are by no means unanimous in the opinions they express, for there are in the pamphlets I have read, strong advocates for the Staff system, for the regimental system, and for a combination of both systems. Whether it would be possible to combine both is a very serious and difficult question; but certain trials are being made with a view to solve the difficulty. Whatever the result may be, I think it is but right to allow of a fair trial for the existing system; but there are, however, one or two points as to which the Medical department have a right to know what my view is, and the first is the question of promotion. For my own part, I do not see the difficulty which was seen by my Predecessor in office of allowing what practically they get—namely, their promotion in 15 years. They want to be secured in it, and I do not see any great difficulty in securing it, although I have not yet arrived at any definite conclusion on the subject. So, also, as to the question of fixed retirement at a certain period—that is a subject which presses itself upon my mind, although until I come to a conclusion upon it, I would rather not make any promise in respect of it. While I was still considering and making progress as to the Medical department, I was, I must say, somewhat startled by the Warrant which was issued by my right hon. Friend near me for the Medical department of the Navy. It may be said that the two Medical departments stand on a totally different footing, but, to a certain extent, the two services must compete for the young men entering the profession, and if the Navy gets too many of them, it may be necessary that we should raise our terms in order that we may get our fair share. That also has stood in the way of my coming to a definite conclusion; but I may say I am most anxious to settle a matter which affects so much the interest of the Army, and of a profession which has done its duty so thoroughly well as regimental officers, and as I have no doubt they will in their present position. With respect to the health of the Army, the foreign Reports have not all come in, but, substantially, it is satisfactory. There are some local fallings off as compared with 1873, but, taking the last 10 years, there was a fairly low ratio of sickness in the Army during the year 1874. The deaths in the United Kingdom were 9 per 1,000, which is, I am told, identical with that of civilians of the soldiers' ages. In India the deaths were 13.41 per 1,000; and that is by no means a high average. With respect to one expedition which wont out last year—that to the Gold Coast—the medical service was so highly satisfactory that it would be wrong in me to pass it by without a word. The deaths amounted to 63 from disease, or 31.4 per 1,000, and 18 who were killed or died from wounds. Nevertheless, the troops seem to have been in good health since their return from that pestilential climate. There have been some cases of ague, but very few, and I am told by the Director General of the Medical department that this most satisfactory result, considering the nature of the service and of the climate, was mainly owing to the skill, care, and intelligence of the medical officers accompanying the expedition. With respect to the non-Effective Service—the out-pensions—there is an increase of £42,000, which arises from arrangements with India, which I will explain when I come to deal with that branch of the subject, as also an increase on account of general officers. I may again mention, as I did last year, that we do not propose this year to have manœuvres on a large scale. I am led to that conclusion by many considerations—to a considerable extent by the very large price of horses and forage which would have greatly enhanced the cost of such manœuvres—and I thought that, inasmuch as the drills last year were very useful and advantageous, we might this year go on with them at Aldershot in connection with the Militia regiments as before. I have mentioned some distinguished names in the course of what I have said, and I may be allowed to mention one more. A most distinguished officer who commanded at Aldershot has died within the last few days, and I cannot proceed further without referring to the name of Sir Hope Grant. As a Cavalry officer he was one of the most daring and intrepid that ever led Cavalry into action. He was beloved by subordinates and soldiers, and when he was promoted and became a General he was found to show the same consideration for his men and for his officers, and the same trust was reposed in him by his officers, as when he commanded a regiment. And, although some persons conceived that a Cavalry officer was not best suited for the command which Sir Hope Grant held, yet it was found that in India, during the Mutiny, and China, he distinguished himself in the face of the enemy in the highest manner, and returned to this country having added to the lustre and honour of the British name as to his own. I cannot help saying that Sir Hope Grant was one of those officers of whom England may well be proud. He raised himself entirely by his own exertions. He owed nothing to favour—everything to his own right hand—and his modesty was equal to his courage. I have no doubt we shall always find officers equal to the occasion; but it is something worthy of note that, when an officer who for a long time has been in comparative obscurity, is suddenly called upon to fulfil duties of the utmost responsibility, conspicuous ability and high qualities are proved by the difficulties of the position in which he is placed and the manner in which they are met and overcome. Such a case occurred in the career of Sir Hope Grant. Now, Sir, there is one department for which an addition is proposed to be taken for special service—I mean the Intelligence department. I have read an interesting book written by the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms), in which, speaking of the Berlin War Office, he says that there is no road, no river, no stream in a country which they did not know as well as the people of it, and that more is known at Berlin of the streams, roads, and hills of our southern counties than in London. It seems to me to be extremely desirable that the Intelligence department should complete as soon as possible the information which they are to furnish, and we have with that view added a small sum tentatively. The staff is small, but it does an immense amount of work, which will, I have no doubt, prove most beneficial to the country. I now come to an item of increase which I am sure the country will approve. For years past the neglected state of the Crimean graves has been a subject of great regret, they having been plundered by the Tartars, and it is now proposed to take a sum of £5,000 for the purpose of putting them in order. They will then be handed over to the charge of our Vice Consul, who will have them properly guarded, and to Captain Anstey is entrusted the duty of seeing that the money is properly expended. There is another item of an exceptional character—the payment of £5,000 to Major Moncrieff at the end of his connection with the War Department, as was promised. I trust the Committee will forgive me for detaining them so long from the question as to the men who are to form the Army for the coming year. The number of men we ask for this year is 129,281. It will be observed that this is a few more than last year. It partly arises from a change in the Artillery, which accounts for 131 men, and there are 91 who enlisted before, but who were treated as clerks and were not in the ranks. The Army at home and abroad, including the Indian Army, will number 186,432. The number of Militia voted will be 118,000, but my impression is, that the number enrolled will not be more than from 103,000 to 105,000. We must, however, take the outside number, as we may recruit up to it. The number of Volunteers who are efficients is 161,150. The Yeomanry will be 12,500. The Enrolled Pensioners will be 21,995, and Class A of the Reserve Forces will be 7,829. The total number of men will be 450,755, but not in the sense, as the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle will have it, of being an offensive Army. We must look to the Regular Army as the offensive Army. The Artillery has been, changed, as no doubt many hon. Members are aware, for the purpose of improving the reliefs in India. The proposal is, that there should be three brigades of Horse Artillery at home and three in India; six brigades of Field Artillery at home and six in India. So that there will always be a balance kept, which has not hitherto been the case, and that will be an important change in working the Indian reliefs. The Committee will see in the Estimates a full statement of the distribution of the Forces, although the distribution cannot be exactly in accordance with that memorandum. There will be one small variation in the first instance, because 50 Engineers are going out to Fiji to survey the land of the islands, so that we may know what we have really got. They will go out not so much as soldiers as quasi-civilians. To a certain extent they will receive pay from the Colonial Department, although they will receive their usual pay from the Army. I now come to the great question—as to what is to be done with respect to the men who supply the Army. It seems to have been supposed, although not in this House, that it was my duty to begin my career by attacking the late Secretary of State for everything he had done. Even if I had differed from him on every point, I should have thought that exceedingly bad policy, for by such a course I should only have misled others, and inflicted an injury upon the Service. I give the noble Lord (Viscount Cardwell) the credit, which I am sure he deserves, for having done his best to put the Army into an efficient condition; but he has left a very unfinished work, and I hope the Committee will not think I am acting unwisely in proceeding very slowly. Patience and a very impartial consideration for everything connected with the Army are what the country will expect. It would be easy for me to make great changes and reconstructions; but it would be acting an unwise part, because lines have been laid down at an enormous expense which have been sanctioned by Parliament, and which have never received a thorough trial, and if I had done away with what has been done by my Predecessor, I should have put myself in a position which neither my knowledge nor ability would have justified. There has already been so much change, that it would be unwise to make I every one feel that the state of things was thoroughly unsettled. A great many attacks have been made on the condition of the Army; but few who have attacked and criticized have laid clown a scheme for the reconstruction of the Army. The hon. Member for Hackney has been bolder; but I think he assumes too much, and I cannot see that he has laid any ground for supposing he at he will obtain the particular class of men from 20 to 25 that he hopes for, instead of the younger men who now enlist. His plan is based to a great extent on that of Prussia and Germany; but he does not sufficiently allow for the distinction that conscription exists in Germany, while the British system is founded on voluntary enlistment. With respect, however, to the details of the hon. Member's plan, they are worthy of great consideration, especially with regard to Army Corps. That might lead to decentralization, and create emulation among the officers, which might have desirable results; but, at the same time, we must not forget that we have a system of organization which is on its trial, and we must give it a fair patient one. We must watch, too, lest defects should creep in which we cannot remedy. What I would ask the Committee to permit me to do is to look carefully into this system of organization, for we have a system of Brigade Depôts for recruiting which has not yet been brought to a state of full development. In what I have said I have endeavoured to give my attention to all the points that have been brought before me, whether relating to officers or men; it is a very laborious occupation, and one which takes a great deal of time, and if I proceed slowly, that must be my excuse. There was the question of Indian Ordnance Officers, which I was able to settle last Session. The Commission on Officers' Grievances reported last Spring, and there are certain recommendations which I hope, after Easter, to bring before the House. With respect to the great question of promotion and retirement, I am waiting for the Report of a Commission which is fully competent to examine all the circumstances before I present a scheme to the House. Having referred to the question of the officers, I now come naturally to the men. It has been generally supposed, and indeed there is no doubt, that there is a general disinclination on the part of a better class to enter the ranks of the Army. It must be admitted that the Army is not recruited from that class of men which my Predecessor hoped would come in; but, practically, the recruits remain of the same class as before, although to a certain—perhaps not a very great—extent they are younger than they used to be. With respect to recruiting, Reserves, and desertion, and all these subjects, I have formed a Departmental Committee in the War Office to collect information. They have been busily engaged in so doing; but they have not yet reported to me, and I want to be sure, before I make a step forward, that I shall not afterwards have to take two steps backward. No one can regret more than I do that Colonel Anson is not now a Member of this House; but it is a matter of regret that he should have supposed that the moment a gentleman became connected with official life, he would begin to plaster over every defect, or that he would have any other object than to toll the truth relating to the Army. I apply that remark to his references to the Inspector General of Recruiting. He has sent in a Return which is, I am sure, founded on his own unhesitating belief, and the honesty of his character might be an assurance that he has no object except to give the War Department and the country the fullest information about recruiting. I have myself endeavoured to ascertain what is the position of recruiting in the Army. I find that the recruits under two years' service in the Guards amount at this moment to 847 men out of 5,132 men. In the Infantry they amount to 8,294, out of 33,800. So that very young recruits in the Infantry and the Guards are a very considerable minority, although, of course, a growing minority, and they will in time become a majority. We send all the elder men as reliefs to India, so that the cadres at home are seen in their very worst condition, and seem to be very much composed of young men. In former days there was a greater appearance of solidity and age in the men from the mixture of the older and younger men, and that is very different now. A Commission on Recruiting was appointed in 1866, composed of some of the most eminent men in this country. They were told in a letter from the War Department that for two years there were not a sufficient number of recruits to fill the Army, so that there was a difficulty in procuring recruits under the system of long service. They said there was no disposition on the part of the young men of this country to look to the Army as a profession, and they stated that great complaints were made of the extreme youth of those who were sent to India. I mention this to show that the same complaints were made as to the ages of recruits under the system of long service as are made now. Now one word with respect to the Reserves. Suppose we wanted to fill up, both in this country and in India, the cadres to 1,000 men. What should we do? We should require a Reserve of 58,000 men. We have, under the present system, a Militia Reserve which I will not put higher than 28,000. I believe the Militia Reserve is not by any means so unreal as an hon. Gentleman opposite supposes, nor am I inclined to think with him that the Militia itself is an expensive toy. A great many officers say that the Militia is becoming a very serviceable corps indeed, and that it supplies the Army with very serviceable men. If I put the Militia Reserve at 3,000 lower than 28,000 added to the A Reserve of, say, 7,000 men, that, no doubt, leaves a considerable deficiency. But I should like the Committee to consider that there are in this country a very large number of discharged soldiers; there are besides a great many men who have been trained in the Militia. Under pressure we could obtain at least 25,000 of these men. That would, at all events, give us a sufficient number to start with. There is no doubt that pressure is needed to bring up the Reserves, and that, as far as possible, steps must be taken to expedite the process of filling up the Reserves, so that we may be in a position to complete all our ranks whenever occasion requires. [Lord ELCHO asked, whether the Militia Reserve of 25,000 would not be deducted from the Militia?] The Militia Reserve must, of course, be deducted from the Militia, and that will so far reduce the Militia. I do not want in the least to put forward any glowing or glozing account of the state of things. I want the Committee thoroughly to understand where they are, and I want to keep nothing back upon this grave subject. With respect to the question of long and short service, I will mention a few facts, because they tend to show whether the country is prepared to go with short service or not. One- fourth of the recruits for the Line may enter for long service and three-fourths for short service. For long service only 1,444 recruits were enlisted in the Infantry, and 10,613 for short, which certainly gives one the impression that recruits at present can he got more readily for short than for long service. With respect to the quality of the present recruits, I know there has been a very great difference of opinion. I should like very much to read a short statement that was given to me by the Director General of the Medical Department, Sir William Muir. It occurs in his Report to me with respect to the recruits. He says— The question of the physical stamina of the recruits obtained in 1874 is one on which reports have regularly been received from the principal medical officers of districts during the year. In them the notices are generally favourable, but occasional mention is made of the apparent youth of some of the recruits and usually by the same officers, but not of their having contributed disproportionately to the number in hospital or of invalids. From the absence of this mention it is to be inferred that after joining young lads become robust, and that even at first they are equal to the duties required of thorn. The other day I went to Aldershot to see the recruits. I believe notice was given of my intended visit only on the night before. There was no parade whatever, nor did I see any soldiers mixed with the recruits. I saw the recruits only of 1873 and 1874. I believe I saw altogether about 4,000. I will tell the Committee very candidly what I saw and the impression I derived. It was an extremely cold morning. It was one of those very frosty mornings which would make a very well-dressed and comfortable man look rather blue and pinched and cold. Therefore, it was a very unfavourable morning to see men not very well or warmly dressed. Some of the men were in their uniform, others were in a loose sort of undress. I spoke to the officers of Light Cavalry, and they all said they never had so good recruits in the Cavalry as at the present moment. As for the Artillery, there was no concealment at all on that subject. I was told that the gunners in the Artillery were not of a high class—that many of them did not seem to be men of that physique which would enable them usefully to work with very heavy guns. But with respect to the drivers I cannot say I saw any deficiency, nor did I hear any com- plaint with respect to them physically. I then passed on to the Infantry. I was greatly struck with the extraordinary difference in the regiments, and of course I do not think it would be advisable for me to give the names of the regiments. But there were certain regiments in which it did seem to me that the recruits left little or nothing to be desired. First, as to the recruits of 1873:—They were men who, by the year that they bad had in the service, had grown into strong and useful soldiers. In a good number of cases—I may say in the majority of cases—those who were of the 1874 class were men of whom I think I may fairly say they were becoming very much the same as those of 1873. But when I came to one or two regiments the men appeared to me to be not only deficient in physique at present, but not to have in them the capacity of becoming strong men. Upon inquiry I found these recruits were obtained from a class not likely to furnish the best supply of strong men. I am sorry also to say some of the men were not of the very best character. That, of course, will not be taken to apply to all recruits who were physically deficient, but certainly there were some complaints on the subject also. Well, the impression which this cursory view made upon my mind was, that the men were generally young; but in the majority of cases they were, as I ascertained from the leading officers, of exactly the same class as they had always got. They thought that, perhaps, to a certain extent, they were younger, but that after a short time they would become as physically able as the men they had in former days. I should be extremely glad, however, if a class of recruits would come forward of a higher class than the majority of those I saw. But when I am asked to take none but men of 20, I say is it possible to procure men of 20 while labour in this country is in its present state? A labouring man of 20 has settled down to a particular work; in most instances he is devoted to some particular pursuit, which occupies his attention, and being satisfied with it, he does not think of changing into the Army. With respect to obtaining recruits for future years there is a great experiment going on in the Brigade Depôts. The Brigade Depôts are to become the recruiting centres. The object in establishing these Brigade Depôts was to obtain recruits from the districts in which, they were established, and it has been supposed by many that the time will come when there will be found in these depôts a new source for recruits, who will do more credit to the Army than those whom we obtain at present. I, however, think it is some-what doubtful as to the localizing effect of these centres, for I believe that generally recruits enlist at a distance from their homes in order to avoid the sneers of their neighbours. However, greater facilities will be given for recruiting the Army by establishing these Brigade Depôts, because a person desiring to enlist, and, at the same time, to avoid exposure, will be able to accomplish his purpose by travelling no great distance from his home. There are some districts which I believe have never furnished many good recruits. There appears to be rather a hostility to recruiting in those districts, and if we find we are not getting efficient men, we must remove to some other quarters and endeavour to get them there. An other point connected with this subject is under examination by the Departmental Committee to which I have referred. All kinds of proposals have been made with a view to stopping desertions. It will be found that in 1859 desertion was carried on on a larger scale than it is at present. I think that in 1859 it was as high as 42 per cent on the recruiting, and therefore, although I am not going to extenuate the present state of things, I must ask hon. Gentlemen opposite not to "set down aught in malice" in comparing the amount of desertion now with that of former periods. We do all we can to punish desertion; but I am sorry to say magistrates often inflict wholly inadequate punishments, and seem to act upon statutes which are not the statutes at present in existence. That, I think, is very much to be deplored, for if a man has deserted more than once or twice, it is high time he should be punished for violating the oath he has taken to the country. Some persons had suggested "marks." Now, if I were an officer or a private, personally, I should not object to being marked with any mark showing that I had belonged to Her Majesty's Army; there is no great harm in it; but, at the same time, if there is a general objection to marking, it might throw back the recruiting. Therefore, I am not prepared, at all events at present, to resort to that course. With reference to the suggestion which has been made respecting the clothes and kit, I find that in many instances of desertion neither are disposed of. In very many instances of desertion it is difficult to say why men go. Sometimes they go merely for a lark, and it will be found that out of 5,702 desertions upwards of 2,000 come back. These have been put down as deserters because they were absent for a certain number of days without leave. Again, it must be remembered that in the total of 5,702, those who desert many times are counted over and over again. Still, no doubt, it is a very costly proceeding to keep picking up recruits and dressing them, and then to lose thorn in this way; and the matter is receiving my most anxious attention, and I hope to be able to devise a mode of checking it. I now wish to say a few words on the subject of the non-commissioned officers, to which the hon. and gallant Member for the county of Galway (Captain Nolan) called the attention of the House last year. I then said they deserved very great consideration, not only because they formed the mainstay and backbone of the Army, but also because it was most desirable they should meet with such treatment as would make them really the best recruiting officers for the Army. Well, I hope that before the Session is over I shall be in a position to present to the House a scheme on that subject, but as I have not yet received the Report, I cannot at present go into the question further than to hold out a hope that I maybe able to improve their position. And now I come to the Militia. They are taken at 118,000, and, as I before observed, we expect that about 103,000 will be enrolled. Before the Session is over I hope to lay on the Table of the House a Bill to consolidate the motley and medley statutes which constitute the law of the Militia. I do not expect to be able to deal with the question of ballot this year, but everything that has to do with the voluntary law of the Militia I hope to consolidate into one statute, and if the House sanctions this we shall have a much better-groundwork in future years to move upon in respect to the ballot and the enrolment of the Militia. An improvement in the Militia has been effected in consequence of the extended training of recruits. In 76 regiments the recruits were drilled for 12 weeks, and such a period of training makes the groundwork for a man to become a soldier. Then the officers are becoming much better instructed. They take a great deal of pains to become proficients, and are perfectly qualified to command and discipline the regiments with which they are connected. The Staff of the Militia is being absorbed gradually into the Line, and will become connected with the Brigade Depôts. The House is aware it was proposed that as the Militia adjutants had nothing to do except with their own Militia, and had practically nine months of the year to themselves, they should, under the Brigade Depôt system, recruit for the Line, and undertake a number of other duties which had not previously devolved upon them. Complaints have reached us on this subject. The adjutants say that increased duties have been thrust upon them, which were not contemplated when they undertook their duties, and we have had one instance of an absolute refusal to recruit for the Line. Now, I think there is something to be said in support of the objections which the adjutants make. I propose, therefore, that all adjutants who are above 60 years of age shall be called upon to retire on the advantageous terms which I would also propose to all the present adjutants of Militia. On the expiration of 15 years' service in all, and five years as a Militia adjutant, a man may now retire on 3s. a-day; after 20 years' service, with seven years as a Militia adjutant, he may retire on 4s a-day; after 25 years' service, and 10 as a Militia adjutant, he may retire on 5s. a-day; and after 30 years' service, and 15 as a Militia adjutant, he may retire on 6s. a-day. That scale is hardly likely to induce them to retire. I propose, therefore, to all those who signify their acceptance before the 1st of July the following terms:—Under five years as adjutant they will retire on 7s. a-day; under 10 years on 8s. a-day: between 10 and 15 years on 9s. a-day; and over 15 years on 10s. a-day. The Committee, I think, will agree with me that these are extremely liberal terms to offer, and, indeed, I should think that if there were no compensatory scheme, they were too liberal. Then we propose that the adjutants should be in a position to count their captain's service in the Militia towards the honorary grade of major, and have companies offered to them in the Militia regiment; so that they may continue there as officers, though they will no longer be adjutants. We shall take captains on full pay from the linked Line regiments to act as adjutants to the Militia, and to undertake all the duties which the present Militia adjutants regard as an additional burden. These captains will hold their posts for five years, and we shall propose to fill up the regimental vacancies from the half-pay list. We shall thus get adjutants who will not only be qualified and ready to promote the interests of the regiments committed to their charge, but, as a part of their understood duty, will become instruments of recruiting for the whole Brigade Depôt. Surely this will be far better than having officers who might think the imposition of these duties unjust, and perform them grudgingly? With respect to the Militia of Guernsey and Jersey, Guernsey has practically adopted the suggestions of the Government, and therefore we shall accept the scheme proposed there. As to Jersey, there has been some recalcitrancy, and the Committee may depend upon it that we shall not give way unless the Jersey Militia is made something really serviceable. I come now to the Yeomanry, a subject upon which I know that many hon. Friends of mine are anxious. The Yeomanry is being gradually improved, but great defects exist in it. Cavalry exercises are of a different class from those which were in vogue among the Yeomanry, and in the changes which occur in modern tactics we may see new uses of cavalry developed. There are many points which require consideration with regard to the Force, and I propose that they should be considered, not by a Commission, but by calling together for friendly counsel four officers of the Yeomanry, four Cavalry colonels, and three Representatives of the War Office to confer upon the changes which may be necessary. As to the Volunteers, the Committee will observe that the number of efficients has largely increased. It has been said that there is a great dearth of officers; but that statement is exaggerated, for though there may be fewer officers in one respect, a great number of what are called supernumerary officers are available. I feel, however, that I need not trouble the Committee on any points connected with the Volunteers till we come to the Vote itself. The officers themselves, I may say, are taking great pains to acquire a knowledge of their duties. The percentage of proficients to enrolled members in the year is 8–06, and this number is constantly increasing. As to the Artillery Volunteers, the report from Shoeburyness is of a very favourable character, and many of these Artillery Volunteers are in a position in which their services, in case of difficulty, might be of the greatest possible utility. I think I have now gone over the items connected with the Estimates. I confess I have no great expectation of arriving very rapidly at the results anticipated by the hon. Member for Hackney, for I fear we cannot hope to procure at present a high class in the British Army, and that we must rely for a long time upon the class which has hitherto supplied us with men. As to conscription, too, I expect that, if ever it comes, it will come at a distant day. We have only one compulsory force, and that is under the ballot for the Militia, which is suspended year by year upon grounds which hitherto have commended themselves to the country. I am bound, however, to say that I have been extremely struck lately at finding in many quarters where I should hardly have expected such a feeling, a growing inclination to try in some shape the ballot for compulsory service. Whether the time will come for such compulsion I cannot say; but I am quite sure that the time never will come unless public feeling pronounces very generally and strongly in its favour, so as to enable any Ministry to carry it into effect. My great object will be to watch carefully what is going on in the Army, asking the House meanwhile to grant me its indulgence that I may have time and be able to show the requisite caution. I do not deceive myself as to the difficulties of the position; but I wish to give a fair trial to the existing system till I see myself obliged, if I should be obliged, to confess that the system is a failure. If I do make that discovery, I shall not hesitate to say that I have been wrong in giving it so long a trial, and I will ask this House to sanction such changes as will make the Army efficient for the purposes for which it is intended. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving that the number of men during the financial year should be 129,281.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR

said, he had great pleasure in complimenting the right hon. Gentleman on the speech he had just made and on his efforts to improve our military organization. There was one change shown by the Estimates which, though long expected, might now be assumed to be accomplished, and that was the alterations in the designation of the department known as that of the Control branch. That department was created in the former Administration of the present Prime Minister, and its importance was considered sufficiently great to justify its formation being honoured by mention thereof in the Speech from the Crown. Useful results were expected to be achieved, not only by an improved administration in various branches of the War Office, but also great economy in an expenditure for Stores, Commissariat, Transport, and other supplies, amounting to nearly one-half of the whole Army Estimates. There could be no hesitation in claiming for that department the credit of having effected great good in the transaction of duties relating thereto, but also in effecting such important savings as to enable Lord Cardwell to announce to the House, that it had enabled the Government to diminish the military expenditure below the amount which had been incurred since the war with Russia. All who knew the difficulty of bringing down military charges, especially those added on to meet the requirements of war, would appreciate the efforts which must have been exerted by the Control department in order to aid the Secretary of State in arriving at that result. He (Sir George Balfour) therefore contended that the Control department had substantially succeeded, notwithstanding the defects in its organization and in spite of opposition of the most serious character, from open and secret enemies. He thought it was a mistake to put into the House of Commons the officer at the head of that department, the whole of whose time was required for the discharge of his onerous duties. The system initiated, however, had never been fully carried out, for it had never been intended that the officers of the Commissariat and Store departments should be confined to the discharge of those duties. He and Sir William Power had strongly, and would still recommend that, as in India, a number of warrant officers should be appointed from the ranks who would be the executive officers in charge of these stores. By creating that new grade, the status of non-commissioned officers might be improved, and the service would be made more attractive, they would be carrying out what was intended to have been one of the chief features of the Control department. With regard to the promotion and retirement of officers much remained to be done; but as that must involve a very heavy outlay, he suggested whether the position of officers might not be improved by diminishing their numbers. The number of officers in the British Army was greater in proportion than the number in the armies of the other nations of Europe, and the tendency was for that proportion to increase. For instance, we now had 1,000 officers in excess of the number in 1854, though we then had more privates in the Army than we had at present. The number of battalions, of companies, of squadrons, and of batteries, were all in great excess. With regard to the Depôt Centres, the right hon. Gentleman was quite right in expressing some doubt whether that system would be so successful in obtaining recruits as had been expected. The important changes made for the purpose of facilitating Artillery reliefs in India, again, did not appear of such pressing necessity as to justify the addition of brigades. A few years ago we had 16 brigades in India, but now we had only 13, and the present changes appeared to have no other effect than to add to the numbers of superior officers. He would gladly see the whole brigade system broken up, and the old plan, formerly existing, up to 1858, of carrying out the reliefs by batteries, restored. The organization of the Artillery was calculated to add to the Indian military expenditure in an unnecessary degree. The four brigades of garrison artillery now in India could be reduced to two brigades by amalgamating the 28 batteries into 14 of the existing strength. The right hon. Gentleman had given a very satisfactory account of the state of our stores; but nothing could be more detrimental to the efficiency of our naval and military forces than to be supplied with stores kept too long; and with regard to ammunition, the better plan would be, to be prepared to provide all that was wanted in large quantities when occasion should require it, than to have a large amount laid by which could never be consumed except in time of war, and which then would be far from effective against an enemy. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would watch with great care the working of the long and short service systems, regarding which he (Sir George Balfour) had never been able to enter into the feeling which was prevalent on the subject. Some men might desire to enter for a long service, while others preferred a short one, and encouragement ought to be given to both. Certainly, as regarded India, it would be preferable and equally desirable to give men that option. The Commission over which Lord Dalhousie presided, and of which he (Sir George Balfour) was a Member, distinctly pointed out that the Indian service was one which men about to become soldiers greatly desired, and which attracted them when other services could not. He hoped that in the reorganization of the Army the right hon. Gentleman would make provision to enable them to realize that desire. As for the Medical department, that branch of the public service might be safely left in the hands of the right hon. Gentleman, who was giving the subject the greatest attention. They were men who deserved well of their country, and he hoped they would find a friend in the right hon. Gentleman. He regretted very much that general hospitals should supersede the old-fashioned system of regimental hospitals, for he doubted whether a general hospital was as well adapted for the Army as regimental hospitals were. No doubt, a general hospital would be more efficient in the treatment of disease, in consequence of the larger staff; but it would be wanting in that control which could be exercised in regimental hospitals, where men were known to the regimental medical officers, and malingering easily detected. The curing of disease was not the only duty of a medical officer, but also the detection of feigned diseases by men desirous of skulking from the hardships of military duty. It was well known that soldiers often entered a hospital when there was no necessity for doing so, and, therefore, a knowledge of the characters of the men such as could be obtained in regimental hospitals was very desirable. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would turn his attention to the enormous military staff at present maintained at headquarters, and to districts, which, measured by the military strength, must be viewed by all acquainted with the requirements of an army, as truly most objectionable. The right hon. Gentleman would, doubtless, endeavour to ascertain whether it was necessary to keep up those two different departments, the Quartermaster General's and the Intelligence department. With regard to the Intelligence department, while admitting its growing importance, he wished to point out that the staff maintained, under the designations of Quartermaster General and Intelligence, was much too large. In any change that might be made, he would strongly urge that that staff should be reduced, and he believed if the staff were reduced and useless appointments abolished, the service would be improved. He mentioned that excessive staff, because no one could be blind to the fact that if the expense of the Army went on increasing at its present rate the country, especially in a time of distress, would rise up against the whole military system, and then great changes would be made, leading perhaps to serious defects in the military system of this country. As to the Militia, he had never been a great admirer of that force, though it might probably be desirable to maintain it in its present state. In conclusion, he congratulated the right hon. Gentleman on the full and satisfactory exposition of our military affairs which he had made to the Committee, and he could only express a wish that, instead of speaking out all the useful details which he and his Predecessors so laboriously and so ably acquired, to meet the demands for information which hon. Members of the House might apply for, it would be much to the public interests to have the information printed and circulated before the Estimates were moved. This change could be effected with ease by extending one of the present Returns, designated "Variations in Numbers," so as to comprise all the many-figured statements and statistical details which the Secretaries of State now felt bound to collect and to retain in their memory in expectation of Questions often not put.

COLONEL ALEXANDER

said, he wished to make a few remarks in reference to the Guards, a branch of the service with which he was intimately acquainted, and which had obtained special prominence in connection with the question of recruiting, by reason of the last Report of the Inspector General. He dissented from the rose-coloured view which was taken in some quarters of the question of recruiting in that branch of the service. Last year, the hon. Member for Stirling (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) stated to the House that the Guards were responsible for their own recruiting, and that the Government had nothing to do with it—a statement which was tantamount to saying, that for five years the Government had silently acquiesced in the extravagant management, or rather the mismanagement, of their recruiting by the Brigade of Guards. The Report of the Inspector General, which imputed no such mismanagement, was a complete justification of the view which he took of the subject when speaking upon it last year. What was bad last-year, was infinitely worse this year, owing to the condition of the labour market, and the superior attractions of civil life. The deficiency in the number of recruits of a physique qualifying them for the Royal Artillery and the Brigade of Guards had been noticeable for some time past, and he ventured to predict that it would be noticeable for some time to come, unless the incentives to enlist were increased. The Brigade of Guards was, he believed, about 500 men short of what would be full efficiency at present, and in two years' time, the full effects of the short-service system would be experienced, and if it was found impossible to fill up the void in the ranks now, what would be done when so large a number of men would take their discharge? The Report said that the recruits for the Guards were scarcely of the stature and physique of those who joined in former years, and yet it was also said that the recruiting system was satisfactory. These two statements were hardly consistent. Nobody could read the Report without seeing that it was the Report of one who was attempting to put the best face on the matter, but who was compelled to admit the weakness of his case when he wrote that the recruiting machinery might be expected to grow proportionately more satisfactory, "provided there should be no outbreak of war." During the past year, 58 men had been employed recruiting for these regiments, and they had only obtained 226 soldiers, which gave an average of three and a-half recruits for each individual recruiter. Surely that was keeping up a very expensive machinery for such miserably small results. There was a rumour that the Secretary for War intended to restore to the Guards the additional 1d. per day, which they formerly enjoyed, in consequence of the exceptional duties they were called upon to perform in London. He hoped that was true; because he was quite sure the money would not be begrudged them by their fellow-soldiers of the Line. It was interesting to watch the course of public opinion in reference to the matter. To him it was almost incomprehensible that The Times newspaper, which largely and beneficially influenced public opinion on most questions, should, in this particular case, have clung to an optimism which struck him as being infatuated and even pernicious. This optimist view culminated a few days ago, when The Times said—"The Report of the Inspector General is, on the whole, a thorough vindication of our recruiting system;" and this, though it appeared that in the three years ending 1873, more men had been discharged from the Army with bad characters than in the three preceding years. Nor was that fact surprising when they considered, as the Report allowed, that the unsatisfactory condition of recruiting did not end with the paucity of numbers; because, to his certain knowledge, men enlisted, misstating their ages, and after having served not very creditably in other regiments. What he thought would make the position of the soldiers more satisfactory than it was at present, would be to increase their pensions. He advocated that especially in the case of the non-commissioned officers. The present pension of a serjeant-major, 2s. 6d. a-day, was totally inadequate for a man who filled so responsible a position. It should be at least 3s. a-day. Pensions generally should be increased throughout the grades of other non-commissioned officers. The pay also of non-commissioned officers and men should be fairly, though not largely, augmented, and this increase should be in all cases progressive. Every man who had served six years should receive 2d. a-day additional, as a proof of his increased value; and, at the discretion of his commanding officer, that increase should be liable to forfeiture for crimes specially mentioned. Not only should the actual non-commissioned officers be paid, but those who now did the duty gratuitously—lance-sergeants and lance-corporals. No regiment could possibly be effective, the non-commissioned officers of which were not thoroughly trustworthy, and no money could be ill-spent in encouraging such men. One other point he wished to mention in connection with the pay of the soldier. Lord Cardwell held out the attraction of 1s. a-day and free rations. In military parlance, however, rations only consisted of bread and meat; and in the Guards, 3d. a-day was deducted from the 1s. for groceries and vegetables. It was not too much to expect that the country should give its soldiers food as well as lodging free. He also considered that three-quarters of a pound of meat was too little for a soldier. The fact was, that they received too much bread, much of which was wasted, and too little meat. In conclusion, let him say one word on the subject of conscription. Without advocating its adoption, he could not help agreeing with the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) and the hon. and gallant Member for Sunderland (Sir Henry Havelock), that they ought to recognize the principle that every man ought to serve for some period of his life in the Reserves, for until they did that, they would be unable to weld the component parts of the military system into one harmonious whole.

MR. A. H. BROWN

said, he was sorry to see that so little progress had been made with the Brigade Depôt system. No doubt, considerable difficulties had been experienced in their establishment, in consequence of the purchase of land and from other causes, but he hoped they would be overcome. Until these Brigade Depôts were formed, it would be impossible to form a correct opinion of the value of the Brigade system. The Brigades would in their turn test the value of the present system of recruiting, and hence it was doubly valuable to ascertain the real results of the system. The right hon. Gentleman had given an interesting description of his visit to Aldershot. Would he state, for the information of the Committee, whether the recruits in some regiments whom he found not so satisfactory as some others were recruited at the Brigade centres? If, as had been asserted, our recruits were deteriorating, it was high time that a method was discovered to put an end to the declension. With regard to the Reserves, he hoped that in any system that was adopted the Reserves would be made from men who had served under the colours. As he had last year the honour of sitting on a Committee respecting the subject, he should be glad to know whether any agreement had been arrived at on the part of the heads of the various Government Departments, in order to prevent undue competition between them in the purchase of stores. Passing to the Volunteers, his belief was, that all that they wanted was officers. There was a disinclination on the part of young men to come forward to serve as officers, and the consequence was the full benefit was not got out of the force. He thought that if the Warrants and Regulations on the subject were revised, much good would be done. The service would be rendered more popular, without any loss to its efficiency. As to the whole subject of recruiting for the Army, it was at present in a very exceptional position, because wages in the labour market were higher than perhaps they had ever been before. But the moment there was danger and the trade of the country was affected, wages would go down, and the number of recruits would increase, and they would be better recruits both in physique and height. He believed that voluntary enlistment was best and cheapest in the long run, and he hoped that no attempt would be made to introduce conscription or the ballot for the Militia—a system that would break down through the odium it would excite.

CAPTIAN CORRY

said, he was of opinion that they would soon get a better class of young men as recruits than they had got for some time past. Young fellows entering the service at 18 years of age had been criticized as not developed; but it should be borne in mind that a young man of 18 had two years more to grow, in which his physique was developed. Besides that, lads of 18 were more amenable to discipline, took better to their profession, and turned out better non-commissioned officers than older recruits did. That remark, however, applied more strongly to the system of enlistment for 18 or 20 years than to the present short service. He was more or less alarmed at the state of the Militia, and should be sorry to see anything done that was likely to lessen its numbers, for it was principally composed of the ablest bodied men in the country—the agricultural labourers. It comprised only 103,000 men, of whom 25,000 belonged to the Militia Reserve, thus reducing it to 78,000—a strength totally inadequate for the defence of the country. At present, 7 per cent of the men in the Army were allowed to be married. They were a great incubus on every regiment on its moving, and they thought more of their wives and families than of their duty. As for the men married without leave, their difficulties were greater than those of the men married with leave, as the former did not enjoy the allowances which were made to the latter class. If, however, the number of married men in our Army were increased, and if they were allowed to go to their Brigade Depôts, being put on the supernumerary lists of their regiments and attached to the Militia, the Army would become greatly more popular. They would be ready to come forward when occasion required, and would be of great service. Then, if we wanted to get men of good physique and good character, we must raise their pay. Our non-commissioned officers ought to be better paid than they were, their, present pay being really lower than that of any other official servants of this country. When it was found that a Staff sergeant was paid rather less than a London labourer, it was obvious there must be something wrong. He considered it of more importance to increase their pay and improve their condition in barracks than to give increased pensions. He thought conscription would be most unpopular, and most prejudicial to the good of the Army. In England, conscription meant universal liability to service. This might lead to a demand for universal suffrage, for men might argue that they ought not to be asked to serve unless they had a voice in the matter.

MR. J. HOLMS

said, he thought the general effect of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War was to show to the Committee and the country that on the whole the present condition of the Army was not unsatisfactory, and that if the organization scheme of 1871 were allowed to go on for two or three years longer, the country would be satisfied with the result. At the same time, he thought he detected in the right hon. Gentleman's remarks an occasional gleam of hope by something like a hint that by-and-by the re-organization scheme of 1871–2 would be thrown aside; and he thought it would be appropriate to recall for a moment the circumstances which led to the adoption of that scheme. In 1870 this country and Europe in general were startled by finding Prussia to be a military Power so great that she could send not only thousands and tens of thousands, but hundreds of thousands of soldiers from the centre of her own into an enemy's country within a couple of weeks. These soldiers were highly trained and of great individual intelligence. Moreover, they were men, not boys—none of them under 20, or, with the exception of the non-commissioned officers, over 32; and the organization of their Army seemed as perfect as it was possible for human intelligence to make it. Well, the cost of that army, including even the fortifications, was only £10,500,000 a-year, whereas our own small Army, incapable of expansion, and in numbers equal to only about an eighth part of that of Prussia, cost about £3,000,000 more. Alarmed at the strength of Prussia, it was resolved to vote an addition of 20,000 men to our Army? What was the result. We got 20,000 of the sweepings of the streets. [Lord ELCHO: That was in five months.] In five months, as the noble Lord had said. It was found at the time to which he was referring that the Army was composed in a great measure of boys and of men over 35; and that its general condition as regarded crime and immorality was something repugnant to the people. Moreover, dissatisfaction was so rife that it was almost impossible to hold the Army together. Under the conviction that it was necessary above all things to obtain a better class of men, the re-organization scheme of 1871–2 was adopted. What was the change which had been effected? Why that, practically, our Army was dearer now than it was in 1870, costing as it did over £13,400,000. He would not trouble the House with details as to crime and immorality, but he thought it could be shown they had considerably increased. The two great touch-stones he would apply had reference to the outgoing and incoming of the men. As regarded the outgoing great dissatisfaction was shown to exist. He would ask did we find dissatisfaction in the ranks of the 43,000 police, or in the Civil Service, or in the Post Office, or in private institutions? He found very little of the kind. In the desire that was shown to desert, the Army was totally unlike any other service or occupation in the country. Leaving it by purchase—the legitimate way—had been facilitated, and the number so leaving it had increased; and, under these circumstances, it might naturally be expected that the number who left in an illegitimate way would diminish, but the contrary had been the fact. In 1870 as many as 4,480 men were advertised for as having deserted, and seven out of every ten of them succeeded in getting clear away. The country was willing to spend a large sum of money to remove that blot. Well, had things improved under the new system? No, for last year, on the contrary, no less than 6,904 were advertised for as deserters, and 5,572 of them were never apprehended. If things went on in that way, all that a soldier would have to do a few years hence when wanting to leave the Army, would be to salute at the barrack gate and walk out. If one point more than another was to be marked in the Armies of Europe, it was the increase in the Artillery. Their Army was improving in that particular; but while the numbers were increasing, the desertions were increasing also. The Artillery formed 19 per cent of their Army, yet last year its percentage of desertions was 30, and therefore they were losing their artillerymen, who were the most difficult to train, faster than any other class of men in the service. In 1870, 8,200 men were advertized for as deserters from the Army and Militia; but in 1874 between the Militia and the Regulars 17,400 men were advertized for as deserters. Clearly, it was impossible to carry on a proper system of discipline under such circumstances. The men were beginning to see they could do pretty much as they chose with the authorities, and they were practically making fun of the War Department. Men enlisted in the Militia from which they immediately deserted and sold their kits, and then reenlisted in the Regular Army, from which they speedily deserted to enlist and desert again. Such a fact was most humiliating to a great country like this, and it was really astounding to think that, looking at the desertion of the past few years, there must be, at least, some 20,000 or 30,000 men running up and down the country amusing themselves at the expense of the authorities. Strong comments were made in 1870 upon the large proportion of officers to men in our Army as compared with that of Prussia, there being then 6,645 officers to 128,400 men, whereas in the present year we had 7,076 officers to 122,200 men—that was to say we had 429 officers more and 6,200 men less. Turning to the results of our recruiting, he found that in 1873 Lord Cardwell stated that 23,000 men were required to keep up the strength of the Army and to give us a sufficient Reserve; and that in March, 1871, Captain Vivian, who was the then Financial Secretary to the War Office, stated in the House of Commons that we should require 32,449 men to keep up those branches of the service when the scheme had come into full operation. But what were the facts? in 1871 we obtained 23,500 recruits; in 1872, 17,800; in 1873, 17,300; and last year, 20,640, a number that appeared to have rejoiced the heart of the War Department. We were, therefore, considerably behindhand in our number of men. Let any one ask for a reduction to be made in the number of the men in the Army, and the War Department would flutter its wings like a hen over her chickens, and declare that it could not do with one less than it demanded. The Department had, however, permitted the numbers of the Army to go gently down. It had been stated that the increase of the 3,400 men in the number of the recruits this year was owing to the fact that 33 out of the 70 Brigade Depôts had been established, but in his opinion the establishment of those 33 Brigade Depôts had not secured 33 additional men for the Army. The increase in the number of recruits was owing to the fact that last year the trade of the country was a little depressed, and in all probability, if trade did not improve, the number of recruits obtained during the present year would be greater still. But was that a sound principle to go on, that the number of our recruits was to depend entirely upon the depression of trade? Dealing with the question of the Reserve, he would remind the Committee that in introducing his scheme, Lord Cardwell had declared that the system of Reserves he proposed would result at once in economy and efficiency, and in 1872 he stated that the Reserve, which was then 7,000, was to be raised to 10,000. But the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War had told them that evening that after all the expenditure that had been incurred, and after three years' additional trial of the system, that our Reserve force consisted of 7,829 men only. With such a result as that, it was a dismal mockery to talk about our waiting to see what such a system would bring about in the course of time. He affirmed that that system was the most utter failure that had been known in modern days. With reference to the subject of conscription, he contended that it was utterly unnecessary to resort to such a means of filling our ranks. The fact was, that we were the most military nation in Europe, and there really was no difficulty in getting the men; it was the want of system in dealing with them that did the mischief. We obtained 50,000 recruits last year between the Militia and the Regulars, and therefore we were getting too many men, if the War Department knew how to keep them when they had got them. At the present moment they were getting 150 men a-day, and were losing them at the rate of 50 a-day—could anything be more absurd? In 1871 he had advocated the establishment of a Running Away Department in the War Office, and now the right hon. Gentleman might think it was worth while to establish such a branch in the War Office. Passing to the consideration of the quality of the recruits we were getting, he wished he could place 25 of the recruits who daily passed into the Army, as a sample for the Committee to look at, in Westminster Hall, and could station behind them 25 of the police, for the Committee to compare with them—a glance would be sufficient, because it would be evident to all that each policeman could catch up one of the recruits under each arm and could run with their burdens up to Charing Cross. The fact was, they were taking mere boys into the Army, when they might get men equal to the British police, who would become a Reserve on which they might rely in time of need. He could not take hon. Members to look at recruits in Westminster Hall, but he would refer them to the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting. With respect to the Infantry, the Inspector General said that the chief ground of objection was on the score of youth and want of physical strength; but he added that, under the influence of good feeding and regular habits, the lads would grow up into good soldiers. Still, he said, the complaint was a serious one. No doubt, it was, but as to regular habits they had acquired them—that was to say, they were regularly in the habit of running away. There could be no greater mistake than that of enlisting mere youths; for they were at the very outset put to the heaviest work that would be required of them, and that was one reason of their disappearing. With respect to the Engineers, the Inspector General pointed out the difficulty of obtaining artizans and mechanics to join, a difficulty which did not exist some years since, resulting in the fact that they were obliged to take men whom they would formerly have refused; and in reference to the Artillery, he said it was very hard to obtain men of sufficient stature and strength. The same Report admitted there could be but little doubt that the system of fraudulent enlistment was on the increase, and had become a regular trade among a certain class. It was, therefore, idle to speak of our recruiting being in a satisfactory state, for they were not getting the right class of men into the Army, and it was but poor statesmanship not to listen to the inexorable logic of facts. Of this, he was convinced, that the longer the re-organization of the Army upon sound principles was delayed, the more bitter would be the disappointment in the end. He therefore trusted that before long they would have an opportunity of discussing what was the cause of the present state of things, and what were the remedies to be applied. He was of opinion that both sides of the House were responsible for the existing condition of affairs; and he thought the more suggestions they could get, the better it would be for the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War if he were about to introduce a new scheme.

GENERAL SHUTE

congratulated the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War on the moderation he had shown, for the conciliatory terms in which he had introduced these Estimates, and for stating that he proposed to give the scheme of his Predecessor a fair trial. The right hon. Gentleman's task had been a difficult one, owing to the chaos which prevailed, from the fact that a great deal had been pulled down, and very little had been built up. With respect to recruits he fully agreed with the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. J. Holms), that if they were to have short service, they must not enlist boys. The thing was absurd. They must have men, not boys—they must have bone, not gristle. When they had long service, they could enlist boys, because there was always a proportion of old soldiers fit for the field; at the same time, he admitted there was little reason to find fault with their recruits in the Guards and Cavalry. With respect to the depot centre system, he felt satisfied that linked battalions never could answer, because recruits generally had a special inclination for one particular regiment, and in that only would they enlist; while, as regarded the service, more men enlisted with the object of going abroad than of staying at home, but all liked to know whether they were really enlisting to serve in the first instance at home or abroad, which this system rendered uncertain. As to pay, he was not for increasing the pay of the young soldier. Men were quite ready to begin on a little, if they had something to look forward to. He, however, would be inclined to double good-service pay, which would induce men to stay in the Army, making a portion of it Reserve pay. He also thought, in respect to non-commissioned officers, that lance-sergeants and lance-corporals ought to have additional pay, and that every three years a sergeant, if he was a good sergeant, should have some slight increase to his pay. Further, he would suggest that the men upon being enlisted should receive a thoroughly free ration, and upon going on furlough should be allowed ration money, full pay during their absence, and a warrant to convey them home and back again to their regiments. At present the men arrived among their families as paupers, and were obliged to be treated by their friends, and instead of being examples of the pecuniary and other advantages of the military service, they were peculiarly the reverse. He had now to speak of pensions, of which he was a great advocate, for he thought that every man who had ever been a soldier should have a pension of some sort or kind. And here he would say that the idea he was going to express was not his own, but was borrowed from the writer of one of the sixty-nine prize essays on Enlistment which, as one of the appointed judges, he had lately read. He would not have any man of 65 years who had served in the Army go without a pension, and he would make a reduction from that age according to the time the man had served. If he had served five years the pension should begin when he was 60 years of age; if he had served 10 years, it should commence when he was 55 years of age; for there was not anything which had a more discouraging effect upon enlistment in their villages and towns, than to see men who had served their country well and gallantly compelled in their old age to go into a poorhouse. There was in the Army a fault which was not generally known, but which, if not checked, would make itself known in a disagreeable way. There was in the Army a great deal of petty insubordination, which was not treated with the severity it deserved. With respect to desertion, he regretted it was a thing looked upon with sympathy by the population, because they looked upon it as only a military crime, whereas it was in reality a civil crime, and ought to be dealt with by civil, conjointly with military, tribunals. When a man deserted he committed a gross fraud on the taxpayers, and it was for that fraud he ought to be tried and punished. He would empower the police to bring a deserter before the magistrates in Petty Sessions, who should commit him for trial at the Assizes or Quarter Sessions. If that course were taken, there would be much less sympathy, and, though it was originally his own idea, he believed it was now so treated in America with good effect. There was another matter which he wished to see well considered. There were in the patronage of the public Departments about 100,000 minor appointments, and the Earl of Derby had stated last year at the United Service Institution, that there were only about 10,000 of them which required to be filled by men of special aptitude or education; all that was required to qualify a man for any of the others being habits of obedience and order. These situations he should like to see more frequently bestowed on discharged soldiers. Were he to move for a Return of the number of messengers employed in the Horse Guards and the War Office, and the number of gatekeepers to the Parks, with a statement of their antecedents, the House would be surprised to find how few of them had been soldiers. He was glad to hear the right hon. Gentleman was about to do something for the non-commissioned officers, and therefore he would not take up the time of the House in speaking on that part of the question. With regard to the Cavalry, he was extremely sorry it had not been augmented. Every nation admitted that they could not extemporize Cavalry, and he should like to have seen our force augmented in order that it might be ready for service at any moment. There were nine regiments which, were he a sailor, he might call advanced regiments, and these could not turn out more than 340 horses. There were 10 other regiments, and they could only turn out from 270 to 280 horses each. If each of nine regiments first for service had added to it every available man and horse of one of the 10 weaker regiments, it would only then just be made up to a sufficient strength to embark for war service. He would also suggest that every Cavalry regiment should have a reserve troop for the recruits and young horses. The drill sergeants should also be attached to the troop, from which all the service troops should receive their formed men and horses. Everything about a Cavalry regiment should be organized in peace as it would be in war, and he believed that the reserve troop could be formed at a small expense. He was sorry it should go forth to the country that there was the least difficulty in non-commissioned officers and soldiers exchanging into different regiments; but, as a rule, transfers only, which were frequent, were necessary, as regiments were seldom complete in men. Having been challenged to produce such cases, he could say that he had known of several exchanges which had been effected with the consent of the commanding officers of the two regiments, and he now held in his hand a memorandum lately given him by a captain late of the King's Dragoon Guards, of two exchanges which had taken place between men of that regiment and two of the 12th Lancers, £5 having in one of these instances been paid for the exchange. In some respects the non-commissioned officers and men were more favoured than the officers. The former were not sent to India until they were 20 years of age, while he (General Shute) was unexpectedly sent out at 19. They were never sent to India after 18 years' service, while he was sent out after 24 years' service, at the shortest possible notice.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

desired to offer a few words on the subject of recruiting and desertion. The air had been full of sinister rumours on the matter for some time past; but he thought the Committee would consider that the opinion expressed by the Inspector General of Recruiting was sufficient to put aside the most virulent of those rumours. It must be remembered that the Inspector General of Recruiting was an exceedingly responsible officer, and he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) conld express no sympathy with those officers in the Army, or those persons outside of it, who ventured to insinuate that the Inspector General cooked his Report to suit the views of the heads of the War Office. The present holder of the office of Inspector General was appointed to that office when he was very slightly, if at all, known to the late Secretary of State for War, and nothing was certainly known of his views on vexed questions connected with the Army. All that was known was, that he was not a political partizan of the late Government. He could not, therefore, be accused of partiality; and, in the two Reports he had furnished to the House, he had given, on the whole, a satisfactory account, not only of the numbers, but of the quality of the recruits who had joined the Army. The House ought not lightly to set aside views so expressed. But they had now the means of checking any statements that were made as to the character of the Army. The new "General Annual Return" of the Army, which he hold in his hand, afforded them the means of comparing the condition of the Army with what it was as far back as 1861. Now, the first thing he would venture to point to in this Return had already been alluded to; but it was so important that he thought it right again to call attention to it—he meant the number of desertions. In 1861 the proportion of desertions to recruits was 41 per cent. In 1862 it fell to 32 per cent. and a gradual diminution then took place until 1870, when the percentage was 12. During the last two years, indeed, it had risen to be 33. But this was still much lower than the proportion in 1861, and, as had been already pointed out in the discussions on this subject, not only were wages very high in the country during those two years—a fact which of itself would go far to account for an increase in the rate of desertions—but our experience showed that when there was a sudden increase of the Army and large numbers joined it, there followed, after an interval, a corresponding increase in desertions. Now there had been such an influx in 1870, and it was followed by an efflux in 1872–3. Allowing for this, the figures compared well with 1861. Again, the number of courts-martial had greatly decreased. In 1865 they were at the rate of 109 per 1,000 men; in 1868, 144 per 1,000; while in 1871, 1872, and 1873 they were respectively 81, 78, and 76, and this, let it be remarked, notwithstanding the abolition of flogging. There was also a steady increase in the number of good conduct badges, and a marked educational improvement. All these facts showed that the character of the men who entered the Army was nothing like so bad as it was represented to be—that, indeed, it was good—and that the "boys"—or "children," as they had been called tonight—who joined as recruits turned into steady and respectable men. As regarded numbers, his hon. Friend the Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms) had referred to figures given by Mr. Vivian some years ago, when he estimated that 32,000 recruits would be required annually when short service came into operation. But at that time Mr. Vivian contemplated short service being carried out to an extent that had not yet taken place, and it must be obvious to the Committee that the number of recruits required would increase or diminish according as they made the period of service with the colours shorter or longer. His hon. Friend had alluded to another fact in a way which required explanation. He said that owing to the number of deserters and the difficulty of recruiting, the establishment had been allowed to drop gradually, with a view to cover the deficiency, and he implied that this had been done surreptitiously, and, as it were, behind the back of Parliament. The establishment of the Army had indeed been reduced, but not in the way suggested. It was done openly. The late Secretary of State, when moving the Estimates in 1873, stated to the House that, since the addition of 20,000 men during the German War in 1870— The British Establishment proper had been reduced by 8,980 men, the Colonial Establishment by 1,102, and that two Madras Regiments which were at that time voted on our Estimates,… numbering' 1,760 men, have since been returned to India."—[3 Hansard, ccxiv. 858.] Similarly, every other change that had occurred in the establishment had been made with the full knowledge of Parliament. But in discussing the present state of things, they must not forget that it was a state of change; and when they made a change of system they could not help one system overlapping the other, so that they had many of the disadvantages of both, without the full advantage of either; and due weight ought to be given to that consideration. The hon. Gentleman complained of the smallness of the Army Reserve, notwithstanding as he said, the expenditure of £3,500,000. But all the money was not yet expended, the machinery for recruiting was not yet fully set up, and they must wait until the first term of short service had expired before the Reserve could begin to assume its proper dimensions. Until that time, the Department having no power to transfer men to the Reserve against their will, the force consisted merely of those who had volunteered to enter it. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. G. Hardy) had taunted the late Secretary for War (Lord Cardwell) with having failed to produce a scheme of promotion and retirement for the Army. Now it was impossible, he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) might almost say, for any-one to have worked out a proper scheme of promotion as long as Purchase affected the retirement of officers, and even now he considered that it would be a question of the greatest difficulty to deal with—the right hon. Gentleman or the Royal Commission would find it a most delicate problem to adjust promotion, so that the rate in the various branches of the service should be, from year to year, tolerably equal. He would be glad to see how, with the imperfect data which alone could now be obtained, the question could be settled. The right hon. Gentleman had announced that he had put an end to the obnoxious name of Control, and he was very glad to hear it. The late Sir Henry Storks, whose name was much associated with the Control department, when a Member of that House, said he disliked the title; but the Control department was no work of the late Government; it was instituted by Lord Hampton under the Government of the right hon. Gentleman opposite. The right hon. Gentleman had spoken of the Brigade Depôts, and of what he would do, if he found the present state of things did not work satisfactorily. That, he (Mr. Campbell Bannerman) thought, implied that they did not work well; but when the right hon. Gentleman came into power, only a small sum of money had been expended upon them, and, therefore, it would have been better for him to have held his hand, if he had contemplated altering the system, until he had reconsidered the matter. But the localization scheme was very carefully elaborated, before it was adopted, by a most able Committee, comprising, among others, General MacDougall, one of the first theoretical soldiers, and Sir Garnet Wolseley, one of the first practical soldiers of the day; it was their opinions that were acted upon, and he trusted that the right hon. Gentleman would not without very good reason infringe upon it. As regarded the Medical department, it had come, some time ago, to an absolute block, and it had been necessary to do something. A Committee reported in favour of the staff System as against the regimental, and he trusted that the right hon. Gentleman would give every weight to their reasons. He approved of the grant to the Intelligence department, and he presumed that the survey of England, of which the right hon. Gentleman spoke, was of the nature of a continuation of the survey of the South of England which had been for some years conducted by the Royal Engineers. He was also glad to see in the Estimates the item with regard to the Crimean graveyards. It was approved of last year; but there was some question when the late Government were leaving office, as to whether it should be a civil or military charge, and, in consequence, it dropped out of the Estimates. He was disappointed that the Report of the Committee, which the right hon. Gentleman said he had appointed on Recruiting had not been laid on the Table before the Estimates were discussed, because it would have thrown much-needed light on the subject. He approved increasing the pay of non-commissioned officers, as the were, perhaps, the most important elements in the whole military force, and it was most important that they should be well treated and thoroughly contented; but it was to be hoped that they would not, from what had been said, form too exalted ideas of what they were to expect. He also agreed, in the main, with the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman for an increased scale of retirement for adjutants. With regard to what fallen from his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Ayrshire (Colonel Alexander), he did not last year find any fault with the Guards on account of their Stock Purse Fund; he only pointed out that it was managed by themselves, and he still thought that if the public once apprehended the fact that the Guards had a fund of their own, that they managed their own hospital arrangements and their own recruiting, and that the accounts received no regular audit, it would be impossible to maintain that system very long. He did not say there was any pecuniary loss to the country by the arrangement, which was being inquired into when the late Ministry left office. At all events, it was not the fault of the general recruiting system if good recruits were not got for the Guards, because the Guards obtained recruits for themselves; and he would venture to suggest that they might, perhaps, get a better class of men, if they were relieved of the irksome duty of watching public buildings, which could be much better watched by the police. The "free shilling," to which allusion had been made was not intended to be a shilling exclusive of all deductions, but a "round shilling," from which certain deductions were continued. He hoped the discussion would reassure the public mind that there had been great exaggeration as to the condition of recruiting, and that the subject was not regarded with indifference by those who were responsible for the Army.

COLONEL EGERTON LEIGH

said, their great object should be to get rid of rascals who were making money by enlisting, deserting, and re-enlisting. That might be done by returning to the system of marking them—say, under the arm, or some place where, though unobserved by the public, it would be detected when they presented themselves after reenlistment for examination by the doctor. He would suggest they should be marked by cupping, which was comparatively painless; and from personal experience he could say it would not hurt a baby, but was everlasting in its results, and which could not be tampered with, as branding with the letter "D" used to be, by adding "aniel," and "avid," and thus producing names in which many deserters tried to re-enlist without detection, but an army surgeon would be always suspicious if he found any mark or scar, and reject the recruit.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

complimented the Secretary for War on the better arrangement of the tables in the Estimates, and the introduction of some new ones, and the honesty and frankness with which he avowed that he continued many operations on the lines laid down by his Predecessor. He wished to point out the difference between the state of the Army in 1870, when Lord Cardwell's reforms began, and in 1874, when Lord Cardwell was removed to another sphere. When Lord Cardwell took in hand the subject of our Reserves they numbered only from 4,000 to 5,000; they were now 35,000 at the least; and of them 30,000 were fit to be put into the ranks to-morrow. In 1870 our field Artillery numbered only 180 guns. When Lord Cardwell left the War Office it numbered 360 fit to go into the field. In 1870 our troops were scattered all over the world, but now we had 70 battalions at home. In Australia and Canada the policy of Lord Cardwell with reference to the military defence of our Colonies by the Colonies themselves had achieved great success. In fact, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War had admitted that the system which Lord Cardwell had initiated was successful almost in a greater degree than he could have anticipated. But what was the condition now with regard to our Infantry? He did not wish to disparage unduly the state of the Army, nor to throw a slur upon ruby-coloured Report which had been made on the recruiting service; but those who were acquainted with the condition of soldiers in this and in other countries must be aware that the securities we were resting on were merely a delusion, full 20 per cent of our Infantry troops not being fit for service. He had asked many officers of experience whether the men they were now getting were equal to those 20 years ago, and his reply was—"Nothing like them; they could not carry their arms, accoutrements, and knap-sacks on the march, and we should have to leave many of them behind." It was a pity they had not before them the Report of the Recruiting Committee alluded to the other night, and also the Returns he had asked for, but which the right hon. Gentleman refused on, to him, the incomprehensible ground that they were Departmental or confidential. He wished the country to understand its real position, before they were awakened to it by some grave disaster. The failure of the attack on the Redan on the 8th September, 1855, was due to the fact that the ranks had been allowed to become so depleted that it was necessary to replenish them with young men of immature age, who, though they possessed the courage of their race, were not equal in physique to the service on which they were sent. He had accompanied the German Army on many of its marches in the War of 1870, and particularly on that march—the most disastrous to the French—which terminated in the capitulation of Sedan. The French Army had the start of the Germans by 72 hours; yet the Germans by superior marching were able to outstrip them, shut them in, and eventually force them to capitulate. This country had not fallen in physique. In every street and at every railway station we saw the men whom we wanted, but had not in our Army. The rise in the price of labour prevented us from getting them. It was supposed that a soldier was to get 1s. a-day clear, but he got only 8½d. clear. It would be a wise expenditure to give him 1s. a-day clear. Many penal remedies had been suggested to put an end to desertion. He (Sir Henry Havelock) believed the simple means of allowing 1s. a-day clear to a soldier, and putting 3d. of that into the bank for him at 3½ per cent interest, would attach him to the Army and cause desertion almost entirely to cease. In the Reserve a man received only 4d. a-day, and many persons would not employ men who were in the Reserve. He would suggest that the pay should be increased to 8d. a-day. The charge would not be very great, and 2d. a-day might be put into the bank to the credit of each man, who would receive the accumulated amount when he returned to civil life. With respect to the Cavalry, which was deplorably deficient in numbers, and had no Reserve of horses, he suggested that we ought to adopt the system which had proved so effective in the armies of the Continent, where each regiment had in time of peace a fifth or depôt squadron, available for increasing the fighting force in time of war, and keeping up a constant source of supply. He hated conscription as much as anyone, but he believed we were gradually tending to a system of more general training, which was not conscription, and which would give us much better results. One of the defects of our system was, that we had three branches of the service which were all more or less in competition with each other. He should like to see that competition stopped, and it was only a matter of organization. We were gradually coming to an emergency which, with our present means, we should not be able to cope with; and sooner or later we must adopt some modified form, not of universal service, but of universal training to arms in this country, a system which he believed would be popular, because it was realty the only means by which we could ever be enabled to reduce our standing Army and our Army Estimates. It was a thing totally distinct from conscription, and the sooner we began to look it in the face the better. It was true we were at present in a state of profound peace; but, without desiring to create any alarm, he could not shut his eyes to the growing armaments of at last one great power—Russia—with which there was a possibility of our coming into collision. When her present organizations were completed, she would be able to put 2,000,000 men into the field, and her railway facilities had multiplied almost indefinitely since the Crimean War. He was not an alarmist; but as the boundary line between Russia and our territories in India was conterminous, that fact should be kept in mind. He trusted that what the Secretary of State for War had said about Brigade Depôts was not to be taken as an indication that he in any degree proposed to interfere with the existing system in that respect, believing, as he (Sir Henry Havelock) did, that these Brigade Depôts afforded the best machinery we could have for bringing the Army, the Militia, and the Volunteers into closer union. In conclusion, he declared that while he was an advocate for the principle of arbitration, not from fear, but from a thorough love of the principle, he held it to be highly necessary that our military force should be complete in, at least, its organization, and thus in the power of largely increasing its numbers in case of necessity.

COLONEL MURE

said, that the hon. and gallant Gentleman who had just spoken had said that the cause of their failure in getting recruits was because of the labour market, and not Army organization. It seemed to him (Colonel Mure) that it was efficient organization which was required to cope with the labour market, and the object they ought to have in view was an organization suited to voluntary enlistment in a commercial country. A commercial country was always liable to the labour market being high or low, and if they had a defective organization they could not cope with it. Now, although the existing organization was devised by the Party to which he belonged, he had no hesitation in saying that it was defective, and that it was breaking down every day. He gave the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the War Department every credit for the earnestness with which he had applied himself to the duties of his office; but, as the present Government had only been in office for one year, he thought it would be extremely impolitic if they were too suddenly to upset a system, although it might be defective, unless it could be clearly shown to be injurious. If there was any hon. Gentleman in that House who looked upon the officers of the British Army with respect and esteem, it was himself, and it was with the greatest pain that he found that sometimes they were spoken of in sneering terms in the course of debates in that House. ["No, no!"] It had invariably been the case, as far as his experience went, when officers' grievances were under consideration. It was, therefore, with pleasure that he had heard his hon. Friend the Member for the Border Burghs (Mr. Trevelyan), in a generous spirit, the other night withdraw certain expressions regarding the affairs of the Army which he had used in the heat of debate. But he could not help observing that those officers who were within the pale of selection were afraid to speak out their real opinions with reference to the Infantry of the Line for fear of the consequences. Moreover, from force of habit, officers, particularly those who never had seen German troops, had not perceived the gradual deterioration, and had accustomed themselves to a lower standard of soldier—like a young man who, in early life married a young and beautiful bride, as time passed, did not remark that she was gradually changing. His friends remarked that she became older, and was losing her beauty, but he remained perfectly satisfied, and, perhaps, laid her in the grave, or parted with her on his deathbed, still honestly thinking she was the beautiful girl of 18 he married 50 years ago. So the officers did not like to acknowledge that the recruits were worse than formerly. They did not like to speak out from an esprit de corps; but also—and this was a grave and sad fact—because they were apprehensive that if their statements came to the ears of the Commander-in-Chief, their prospects might be injuriously affected. He had put the question to four different officers of high standing whether it was not really the case that they were afraid to speak frankly for fear of incurring displeasure, and, as it was called, being blackballed at the Horse Guards or War Office, and the answer had been uniformly in the affirmative. He had, moreover, received letters from about a dozen officers, five commanding battalions, and the remainder officers of high reputation and character, actually in the service, all of whom spoke in melancholy terms of the Infantry. One stated that the recruits were all boys calling themselves 18, but in reality under 16. The next described the physical and moral qualities of the recruits as being of a low standard, while a third letter stated that they were enlisted from the lower strata of the population, and that when a recruit first joined the service he was unable to handle his rifle from sheer weakness. The writer of another letter pointed out that while formerly they recruited strong hard-drinking fellows, now they got nothing but feeble hard-drinking lads. Another officer of the highest distinction gave it as his opinion that one-third of the present recruits would never be fit for soldiers, while a fifth said they were of very inferior quality compared with the Prussian soldier. What they should remember was that they would not always be called on to fight the Ashantees or Abyssinians. The fact was, while the armies of other European countries were improving in physique we were deteriorating, and yet it was by other European armies that we ought to fix our standard. Formerly, when he was in the Army, they recruited principally from the agricultural classes, and especially from the agricultural classes in Ireland. The recruits were often half starved and badly clothed; but they came of honest fathers and virtuous mothers. They had been brought up in fresh air, and they made excellent soldiers. They did not obtain the same class of men in the Army now. They obtained the scum of our large cities, sons of infirm parents—youths brought up in the haunts of vice and crime, who had breathed foul air from the cradle, and who were morally and physically inferior to those obtained from the agricultural districts. The House might recollect the description of the "Casual," in The Pall Mall Gazette some years ago. The hon. Baronet (Sir Henry Havelock) recollected what an Army went out from this country to the Crimea! It was drawn from the labouring population, and not from the sweepings of the towns. But by degrees, after the Alma and Inkerman and the work of the trenches, that generation passed away and was replaced by hastily recruited boys from the lowest haunts of disease and vice of our cities. The hon. Baronet might remember the 8th of September, that miserable day, when the same Divisions, but with the men changed, were ordered to attack the Redan. The officers behaved as British officers always did and always would do. The noncommissioned officers and a few of the old privates, who had survived their comrades, went forward with their officers into the traverses of the Redan. The miserable recruits, they also darted forward and ran to the parapet of the Redan, but there they lay down four deep in the trenches, firing wildly in the air, and at last were stamped to death by the more mature Infantry of an inferior race. He appealed to the hon. Baronet below him whether, since the Crimean War, there had not been a deterioration in our Army; and, also, whether in the Indian Mutiny the regiments which had suffered much in the Crimea, and had been hastily recruited with youths, chiefly from our crowded towns, had shown the same endurance and vigour which were the ordinary characteristics of mature British soldiers. His hon. Friend knew that they had not. Now, we might have a good Artillery and a good Cavalry, but if we had not an Infantry upon which we could depend, we might as well save the money which the country was now spending on them. The right hon. Gentleman himself had admitted that a considerable proportion of the recruits were inferior lads, and it had been proposed by the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) to strike 20,000 men off the list. He (Colonel Mure) thought that this might be done with advantage, if they went over the various regiments and dismissed those who were so inferior in physique as to make it improbable that they would ever be good soldiers. A vast number were perfectly useless, and it would strengthen instead of weaken the Army to cut them off. By stereotyping the numbers of our Army we were in reality preserving useless creatures, who would cost the country an immense sum of money, because on service, numbers of men would break down in the line of march; numbers would fill our hospitals; and a considerable number of good soldiers would be required to look after them. The reason why Lord Card well's scheme had broken down was, that it assumed we should get recruits of 18, whereas they were between 16 and 17—even under 16. They were kept two years, and then, believing them to be 20, we sent them to India, contrary to the opinion and advice of our medical men. Our recruiting system was abominable—a positive cruelty. The recruit was a wretched lad, between 16 and 17, who enlisted because he was starving; the recruiting sergeant whispered—"Say you are 18," and got his bonus, and by the time the recruit was 18 or 19 he was sent off to India. Major General Taylor was a most honourable man, but his Report on Recruiting was most illogical. It was founded on honest evidence, but being himself both judge and jury, he had decided wrongly, and had drawn the wrong conclusion, and brought in a verdict contrary to the evidence. The Report had been quoted as most satisfactory and encouraging; but it was, in fact, the most unsatisfactory Report which had been drawn up for the last six years. Speaking of the Brigade of Guards the Report stated that the class of recruits recently obtained was satisfactory; but it was afterwards admitted that they were scarcely of the proper stature and very deficient in numbers. What did the word "satisfactory" mean? The recruits for the Royal Artillery were also described as fairly good; but it was admitted that they were scarcely sufficient in physical development for the duties they had to perform, and this the Major General called "fairly good!" Then as to the Infantry of the Line, it was said in a large majority of regiments the quality was satisfactory; but the Report went on to say a small proportion were very good, but, in many instances, complaint was made that they were far from satisfactory. Was that satisfactory? It was strange that, in the face of such a Report, the right hon. Gentleman came to the conclusion that recruiting was going on satisfactorily. There was a gross deception in the system of chest measurement, and the test of vision had been reduced. It was usual to measure the chest below the scapula) or shoulder blades; but in the Army it was now the practice to ask recruits to hold up their arms, to pass the tape close under the armpit, and then to lower the arms and measure the chest, with the tape passing over the shoulder blades. That method was most deceptive, as most recruits—and, particularly, weak youths—had prominent scapulae, and between the scapukæ there was a deep hollow, analogous to the "kick" of a champagne bottle. That was no test of the power of heart and lungs, nor was it the original intention; it had gradually crept in, in order to meet the difficulties of obtaining recruits. In this way an advantage was sometimes given to a weedy man, who came out with a magnificent chest, whereas, if he were measured properly, he would have none at all. Formerly the sight of recruits used to be tested at a distance of 15 paces, but two or throe years ago the distance was reduced to 10 paces. If we had to fight foreign nations, let us recognize our foe; let us not go by numbers only; for if we did we should incur expense and disaster. Much had been said of officers' grievances; but what grievance could be greater than that of leading lads recruited from the slums of our towns, who would succumb to fatigue on the march, and require the help of their stronger comrades? How disappointing it would be to find that they were not able to advance when the time for action arrived, or that they would not follow when their officers were ready to lead them on.

MR. GATHORNE HARDY

said, he would assure the hon. and gallant Member, that if some of the statements he had made were correct, they were contrary to information received at the War Office; but he should consider it his duty to institute a careful inquiry, particularly as to what had been said about chest measurement and the testing of vision. [Colonel MURE hoped no inquiry would be made as to who his informants were.] What he proposed to inquire was, whether there was any ground for representing the physique of the Army as of such a low standard. It would indeed be a very serious thing if the examinations of vision and measurement were of so superficial a character as had been represented. But when the hon. and gallant Colonel told the Committee of the wretched and miserable class of recruits that were obtained, he would ask him to settle some of his accounts with the hon. and gallant Baronet (Sir Henry Havelock) below him, who had come forward with a eulogy upon Lord Cardwell, who he (Mr. G. Hardy) wished most emphatically to observe had not been attacked by him. The hon. and gallant Baronet had complained that some one had spoken of skeleton regiments, but he himself had indulged to his heart's content in the same line of remark, for he stated that 20 per cent of them were at the present moment a delusion. The hon. and gallant Baronet also expressed himself as very much opposed to conscription; but when he proposed that every man when he reached the age of 21 should be balloted for and serve four years in the Militia, he was advocating what the country would scarcely, he thought, be disposed to look upon as voluntary service.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK

asked whether he might be allowed to explain?

THE CHAIRMAN

said, the hon. Baronet was in Order if he thought that anything he had said had been misrepresented; otherwise, it would perhaps be more convenient to follow the usual course, and defer his explanations until the right hon. Gentleman had concluded.

MR. GATHORNE HARDY

said, he was very far from wishing to misrepresent the hon. Baronet; but the words in his letter were to the effect that every Englishman, without exception of caste, should be liable to the ballot at 21 years of age. He thought that was hardly misrepresentation. Much, he might add, had been said in the course of the discussion as to the inferiority of our recruits, especially by the hon. and gallant Gentleman who had just sat down, but no one had pointed out how a better class of men were to be obtained. He had heard, too, a proposition made which he thought would frighten his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with respect to the increase of the rations of the soldier which would add £500,000 to the Estimates if it were acted upon. But it should be borne in mind that the Army Estimates were already very large, and that it was his duty to keep as far as possible within those Estimates, although he, at the same time, should, if he found they were not large enough to make the Army efficient, have no hesitation in coming down to ask the House to vote such sums as would enable him to effect that object. The hon. and gallant Gentleman had further said it was a sin and a shame to send thousands of our troops to be destroyed in India, but he found that the rate of mortality was only 13 per 1,000, which was really a low rate considering the climate. The Medical department reported that there was no greater influx into the hospitals than there was in former days, and if those men were so wholly unfit for service as had been represented, surely the hospitals would be full and the deaths much more numerous. The hon. and gallant Gentleman said we used to have so many Irish recruits. The great reduction of the population, and the better condition and payment of the working classes in Ireland had tended to deprive us of them in the Army. Did they suppose when those men were more prosperous that they could tempt them away from their country as easily as when they were starving? And in England they must have regard to the change of circumstances. There was a gradual migration of the population from the country to the towns. Therefore, in regard to England, it was a serious question whether many of the depôts were placed in the right locality for recruiting purposes. In one case some of the worst specimens of recruits that he saw, all came from a particular Brigade Depôt, and he was informed that in character also they were by no means good. But in many of the recruiting places the recruits were unexceptionable. When he visited Aldershot his sole object was to get at the facts, and he believed that the officers had really told him the facts. They had only received warning the day before, and no preparation was made. He spoke freely to the officers, and there was no check upon conversation. His only object was to get at the facts, and he should certainly not have thought ill of any officer who gave him any representation he thought it his duty to make. Although some expressed regret that the men were not better, the great majority said that while the men were weakly at first, they became strong in five months or a year, or, at the outside, two years. He was not there to gild deformities, and he had told the accurate truth with regard to the Army. He did not admit the figures of the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms) with respect to desertions. The desertions for 1874 were given at 5,572, but if the hon. Member would look further he would see that 2,052 joined from desertion, so that the amount was much reduced. [Mr. J. HOLMS: Does not the 2,052 refer to the previous year's desertions?] It might include some; but he was showing that a certain number came back, and those who joined from desertion went on the strength of the Army. The hon. Member further said they wanted nothing but common sense and organization. He could not help thinking of a noble Lord who spoke from a hustings near Beading, and as he was getting on rather badly, some one in the crowd called out—"Why don't you do it better?" He said—"I wish you would come up here and try yourself!" They had every desire to bring the Army into a perfect and efficient state, but he hoped the hon. Gentleman would show them a little more consideration, and allow them time to think over the statements which had been made and to make inquiry. In conclusion, he hoped the Committee would allow the Vote to pass.

Vote agreed to.

(2.) £4,543,000, Pay and Allowances, &c. of Land Forces.

CAPTIAN NOLAN

complained that although when the Staff College was established, it was the intention to require, as a general rule, that officers appointed to the Staff should have gone through a special training, yet, as a matter of fact, that qualification was insisted upon with reference to only about a sixth of the officers.

MR. GATHORNE HARDY

replied that it had never been intended to appoint none but officers who had passed through the Staff College. The importance of that qualification, however, was fully recognized, and, in point of fact, a considerable number of the appointments was reserved exclusively for these officers. They had at the same time an equal chance with other officers of obtaining the appointments not so reserved.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, that the system aimed at was an examination of Staff officers of the nature of a University examination, which should be the threshold to Staff appointment, without being exclusively connected with the Staff College. He hoped that the Secretary of State would inquire into the matter referred to by the hon. and gallant Member for Galway, as he thought there was a mistake in the present regulations.

Vote agreed, to.

House resumed.

Resolutions to be reported To-morrow; Committee to sit again upon Wednesday.