FRANCE—DECLARATION OF PARIS (1856).—RESOLUTION.

HC Deb 13 April 1875 vol 223 cc822-64

MR. BAILLIE COCHRANE

, in rising to move— That in consequence of a Conference having been held at Brussels in 1874 on International Law, and the proposed renewal of the Conference at St. Petersburg this year, a favourable opportunity is afforded to the Country of withdrawing from the Declaration of Paris of 1856, and thus maintaining our maritime rights, so essential to the power, prosperity, and independence of the Empire, said, that this question, which was one of the greatest possible importance, was last brought before the House by the hon. Member for Whitehaven (Mr. Cavendish Bentinck), and he regretted that the circumstances of his hon. Friend's official position precluded him from recurring to the subject. It had previously been brought before the House in 1866 and 1867. The general feeling of the House then was in favour of withdrawing from the Declaration of Paris, yet, as no particular question of International Law was then before Europe, it was not thought desirable that the House should come to any Re-solution against the Declaration of Paris. Last year a Conference on International Law was held at Brussels, and it was proposed by the Russian Government to hold another Conference at St. Petersburg this year. He put it to the House that now or never—when attention was directed to questions of International Law—was the time for the House to say whether the country should be bound for ever by the Declaration of Paris of 1856. The Brussels Conference was convened with the professed object of ameliorating the condition of prisoners of war. The Conference, however, went further, and considered the whole question of military warfare by land. There was, however, a secret object in that Conference, and Lord Derby, with great sagacity, had succeeded in discovering what that object was. The real object was to entangle this country again into a confirmation of the Declaration of Paris. It was perfectly apparent in all the documents that had been published. Lord Derby, in his first despatch to Major General Sir Alfred Horsford, appointing him British Representative at the Conference, said— The Powers must give the most positive assurance that the delegates shall not entertain in any shape, directly or indirectly, anything relating to maritime operations or naval warfare. And again— It will be your duty to guard carefully against being led into any discussions which may affect, however remotely, the subject of maritime warfare. In the last despatch of Prince Gortcha-koff, in reply to Lord Derby's declining to recognize any future Conference, the Russian Minister, after saying that there did not exist, strictly speaking, any positive International Law, proceeded to say— In the last century the rights of maritime neutrality had no legal existence until the Empress Catherine II. had proclaimed them and made them the object of Treaties with other Governments. England for a long time contested these rights as being derogatory to existing laws and customs. At the present time they are generally admitted, but have the force of obligatory laws only by the Treaties that sanction them. And in conclusion of the despatch— If the English Government states that it will keep to the principles of International Law, in accordance with which its acts have been hitherto regulated, and that it will impose the same obligation on its Allies, it would have been desirable that its meaning should have been rendered complete by stating what these principles are. He proposed that the House of Commons should say to-night what were those principles of International Law. He would not complain of the atrocities and calamities of war, for they were the best safeguards for the preservation of peace. You could not make war with kid gloves and rose-water. He was astonished to hear what beautiful humanitarian theories were put forward at Brussels; but Peace Congresses were not of modern origin. In one of Æsop's fables a Peace Congress of animals was held, of bears and wolves and bulls, to discuss the laws of war. The wolves and bears proposed that the only weapon used for fighting should be the teeth. The bulls, however, replied—"You may do what you please, but nature has given us two horns, and we intend to use them." The two horns of England and of English right and security were the power of issuing letters of marque and the right of search. What was that right? From the earliest days of England's greatness and maritime power the right had been claimed and exercised of seizing an enemy's goods in whatever ship they might be, and whether under a neutral or any other flag. That right among ourselves had never been questioned. Lord Mansfield, when appealed to by the Government of the day, distinctly laid down the following principles:—(1) The goods of an enemy on board the ships of a friend might be taken; (2) The lawful goods of a friend on board the ships of an enemy ought to be restored; and (3) Contraband goods going to an enemy, although the property of a friend, might be taken as prize. The principle was held by the English Government of that day that they would not waive the right of seizing an enemy's goods under whatever flag they might be found. The next occasion on which this principle was questioned was in 1780, when the famous Armed Neutrality was formed by Russia; but England declined to give way, and the whole question was again settled for the time being. In 1801 there was again an Armed Confederacy, and by an Order in Council we laid an embargo upon the property of each of the countries forming that league. Letters of marque were issued, and in six months the whole confederacy was at an end. Vast importance had always been attached to this great maritime question. He would not go back so far as Vattel or the other great authorities of days long past, but would quote a few of the authorities of later times on the subject. Lord Eldon, for instance, held that the right of searching neutral vessels originated in the rights of nature, and no Convention or Treaty could destroy the right. The opinion of Lord Stowell was conveyed in the following words:— A war and a commercial peace is a state of things not yet seen in the world; there is no such thing as a war for arms and a peace for commerce; and the right of visiting and searching merchantmen on the high seas, whatever he the cargoes, whatever the destination, is an incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent State. Lord Nelson, again, expressed not only the opinion of his own time, but foreshadowed the views of the great naval officers of the present day, when in the House of Lords, in 1801, he described the proposition that free ships should make free goods as— A proposition so monstrous in itself, so contrary to the Law of Nations, so injurious to the maritime interests of this country, that, if it had been persisted in, we ought not to have concluded the war with those Powers while a single man, a single shilling, or even a single drop of blood remained in the country."—[Parl. History, xxxvi. 262.] Napoleon, again, speaking on the same question, said— The greatest blow that could he given to England would be to compel her to give up her maritime rights. Such was the state of opinion in England down to the year 1854, when, as we were drifting into a war with Russia, by what was to him a perfectly inconceivable act on the part of a public man, the following Order in Council was issued:— In order to preserve the commerce of neutrals from all unnecessary destruction, Her Majesty consents to suspend a portion of the belligerent rights that belong to her by the Law of Nations; Her Majesty will suspend the right of seizing enemy's property on hoard neutral vessels unless contraband of war. The result of this extraordinary Order was to afford perfect safety to Russian commerce which sailed under neutral flags. Coming on to 1856, they found occurring an event which was not to be paralleled in the diplomatic and political annals of England. Representatives of the Great Powers—Russia, France, and Austria—assembled in Paris to conclude a Treaty of Peace. The Treaty was signed, and the powers of the Ambassadors were at an end, when Count Walewski proposed to the Congress to conclude its work by a declaration which would constitute a remarkable advance in International Law, and which would be received by the whole world with a sentiment of lively gratitude. It would, he said, be truly worthy of the Congress of Paris to lay down the basis of an uniform maritime law in time of war as regarded neutrals. The four following principles would completely effect that object:—(1) The abolition of privateering; (2) The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, except contraband of war; (3) Neutral goods, except contraband of war, are not liable to capture even under an enemy's flag; and (4) Blockades are not binding except in so far as they are effective. The Earl of Clarendon observed that, like France, England, at the commencement of the war, sought by every means to mitigate its effects, and that with this view she renounced, for the benefit of neutrals, during the struggle which had then come to an end, principles which up to that time she had invariably maintained. If the whole of the Congress were to adopt the proposition of Count Walewski, it should be well understood that it would only be binding in regard to the Powers who might accede to it, and that it could not be appealed to by Governments who might refuse their accession. So utterly unjustified were the Congress in discussing this question, that Count Orloff observed that the powers with which he was furnished having for their sole object the restoration of peace, he did not consider himself authorized to take part in a discussion which his instructions had not provided for. On the same occasion Count Buol declared that he appreciated the spirit and beauty of the principles of maritime law which Count Walewski had proposed for adoption; but that, not being authorized by his instructions to express an opinion upon a matter of such importance, he must, for the time, confine himself to announcing to the Congress that he was prepared to request the orders of his Sovereign. All this was not embodied in the Treaty, but it appeared in the Parliamentary Paper as an annex to the 23rd Protocol. Now, the Plenipotentiaries had no power to discuss such a question as this. They took upon themselves to give away the whole great maritime rights of this country. It never was ratified by Parliament, and it never had received the consent of the Sovereigns. Was this country bound by such a Treaty as that? In fact, it was not a Treaty at all, but merely a dictation of Count Walewski, that was assented to in an evil moment of weak philanthropy by the late Lord Clarendon. He should not quote opinions on this question which had been expressed by any politicians who were now respon- sible for the foreign policy of this country; but he should like to lay before the House the opinion of Earl Russell concerning it. In 1857 the noble Earl said— The rules—'Free bottoms make free goods,' and 'The goods of a belligerent are safe in neutral vessels, and the goods of a neutral safe in belligerent vessels,' have always been regarded as injurious to the interests of maritime countries, and especially to the maritime power of England.…. I hope no Minister of Great Britain will set his seal to a treaty containing any stipulations of this kind without the most cautious deliberation."—[3 Hansard, cxliv. 2084–6.] The late Earl of Derby said, in 1856, that— Whatever losses Russia may have suffered by this war, whatever embarrassments she may-have experienced, I hesitate not to say that they are more than compensated by the adoption of that one Article."—[3 Hansard, cxlii. 537.] What said Mr. Stuart Mill?— Sir, I venture to call the renunciation of the right of seizing enemy's property at sea a national blunder.…. Unless by resuming our natural and indispensable weapon we place ourselves again on an equality with our possible enemies, we shall be burthened with these enormous establishments and those onerous budgets for a permanency, and, in spite of it all, we shall be for ever in danger, for ever in alarm, cowed before any Power or combination of Powers capable of invading any part of our widely-spread possessions. …. Happily, the blunder is not an irretrievable one. The Declaration of 1856 is not a Treaty. It has never been ratified. The authority on which it was entered was but the private letter of a minister.…. How war is to be humanized by shooting at men's bodies instead of taking their property, I confess surprises me."—[3 Hansard, clxxxix. 878–882.] MR. Cobden said— The Congress declared that the neutral flag covered enemy's goods. This resolution reverses the most venerated judgments of our Admiralty Courts, and for the first time imparts the force of maritime law to principles which were resisted by England against the world in arms until the close of 1815. The practical effect would be in case of war with a naval Power to transfer the trade of even our own ports to the neutral Powers. There was only one other authority he should like to quote, and it was that of Mr. Mitchell, his former Colleague, who said— I believe there is no man acquainted with Russia, who would not be of opinion that the greatest means of coercion that could be used against Russia would be the closing of her ports and the stopping of her export trade; and that the best means of hostility against Russia at the beginning of the war would have been to take steps to stop the whole of the export trade of that country. The authorities he had quoted were most eminent men on both sides of the House. He could refer to several other men in support of his view, but to none more important than these. This was not a Party question. It was a question concerning the interests and the maritime greatness of this country. If we accepted the principle that a neutral flag covered enemy's property all the neutral countries would take possession of our place, and the name that Napoleon gave to our Volunteers of the sea in time of war—namely, les loups de mer—would be swept away. If we were to have Volunteers for the defence of our shores, we were equally justified in making use of our great commercial marine in case of war to defend this country. There were various points of view from which the question might be argued. There was the point of view—free ships; then there was another point—that the sea was the highway of all countries, and that in the case even of a ship carrying contraband of war she should not be searched, but he could not conceive anything more fatal—he might almost say, more ridiculous—than such an idea as that. There were thousands of persons who adopted the principle of Silent leges inter arma, and who thought that the Declaration of Peace was nothing—was not, in fact, to be taken into consideration in time of war. That, however, was not an honourable way of looking at the question. Do not let us follow the bad example of 1870 in this matter, when a Treaty was torn up and declared to be so much waste paper. There were those also who said that as we did not intend to interfere with foreign politics, free ships in time of war would be of the greatest possible advantage to us; but then it would be necessary that we should carry-out a selfish isolated policy, and we might as well have no Army and no Navy at all. It had been well said that England did not so much support the right of search as the right of search supported England. The extent and variety of our commerce were so great that we, more than any other nation, were bound over to keep the peace of Europe, but for that very reason we ought to have at our command every means of hostility in case we were dragged into war. No fortifications, no torpedoes, no ironclads, no increase of our Army or Navy, could give us the power that we should derive from the right of seizing enemy's goods at sea in time of war. He denied that we might be called upon by military Powers to discuss that right. We were a great maritime Power. Of all the commercial Navies of the world put together, what was the proportion of ships which belonged to England? 37 per cent. And of the steam navies of the world 58 per cent of the steamers belonged to England. Surely that placed us in an exceptional position. If we armed those great ocean steamers in case of war, and allowed them to defend themselves, what a force we should have. He knew that Lord Clarendon said he was going to inaugurate an era of peace. That prophesy was not fulfilled at all. He (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) was not there to prophesy disaster, but he could not be blind to facts. Twenty years ago the Russian frontier was 1,000 miles from our Indian possessions; now it was not much more than 80; and that was owing to the apathy with which we had viewed these matters. He contended that unless we were to" adopt for ever a principle of selfish isolation, we should do everything to maintain the maritime greatness of this country. We had heard a great deal—and he thought we had heard too much—about the "silver streak" that protected us. As long as we insisted on having our maritime rights we should have command of the seas of the world. As Lord Nelson said— We should lose our last shilling and the last drop of Mood of our last man sooner than give up those maritime rights. In 1870 Prince Gortchakoff wrote to Count Brunow— The Emperor commands you to declare that His Imperial Majesty cannot any longer he hound by the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, as they restrict His Majesty's rights in the Black Sea. If, then, he (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) should be told that he was doing wrong in proposing that this country should withdraw from the Declaration of Paris, his reply would be that the Treaty of Paris was at an end when the Emperor of Russia disregarded the greatest stipulation in it, and for the insertion of which stipulation we had expended a great deal of money and blood. He would urge upon the House, by their vote that evening, to let foreign Governments know that we were determined to go back to the England of long ago; and by exercising to the fullest extent when occasion should require their maritime rights to do everything in their power to maintain the dignity and independence of the Empire. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving his Resolution.

MR. HERMON

, in seconding the Motion, thanked his hon. Friend, to whom he thought the House and the country were indebted for having brought forward this important question at such a favourable opportunity. There was at present peace upon the Continent, and we could therefore withdraw with honour from engagements which had never been ratified by the Queen, sanctioned by Parliament, or approved of by the people. His hon. Friend had so eloquently explained that portion of the subject, and had given so many quotations from the speeches of eminent men and high authorities, that he would not weary the House by going over the same ground. It had been said that in case of war this was a Declaration which would be at once rescinded; and, therefore, its continuance placed England in a position which she ought not to occupy. For his part, he hated and detested war, and he might be asked why then did he support the Motion? His object in doing so was that war might be made as disagreeable as possible, so that it might become hateful in the eyes of all civilized nations, who would thus be induced to recoil from it. He was aware that the proposition before the House would not be pleasant to the Representatives of those nations who took part in the Declaration agreed to at Paris; but they were not there to make things pleasant, but rather to make war odious. It ought to be thoroughly understood by other nations that England was prepared to exercise in time of war her great maritime power in her own defence, and that, he thought, was one of the things which would prevent us drifting into war. He could not but remember the great amount of sympathy which had been exhibited in this country for the sick and wounded during the Franco-German War, and the large fund which had been raised for their relief. He must say he regretted that he had contributed to that fund, for he now believed that it was false philanthropy to do so. The horrors war entailed ought to he forced upon the attention of the nations that went to war, and it ought to be shown them that it was as much their duty to provide food and medicine for their soldiers, as it was to provide powder and shot for them to fight with. With respect to the question of the neutral flag, Mr. Pitt said in that House, in the face of a powerful Opposition— That although he was anxious for peace, yet upon the question of the neutral flag covering the cargo of the enemy, sooner than give it up he would wind it round him and find his glory in his grave. On the 22nd of May, 1856, Lord Colchester brought forward a Motion in the House of Lords to the effect that the right to capture an enemy's goods on board a neutral vessel was an inherent right, the abandonment of which was a serious injury to our naval power; and the late Lord Derby declared that "in signing that Declaration"—that of Paris—"you have sacrificed the maritime greatness of England on the shrine of Russia"—[3 Hansard, cxlii. 587]—while Lord Hardwicke said that "It had struck down the maritime power of England."—[Ibid. 508.] And what said Lord Clarendon himself on that occasion? He intimated that he had not acted within the strict limits of his attributions, by which he supposed the noble Earl meant his instructions. He would remind the House that the United States had declared that in the event of war they would not renounce the use of their Mercantile Marine. Under such circumstances, what position would we be in if we were at war with the United States or with any country of which the United States was an ally? Surely England would not allow herself to be placed at so great and serious a disadvantage? On such a subject the House ought to take a decided view, and express themselves as those who had gone before them had done—in a manner that could not be mistaken. The opinion expressed by Mr. John Stuart Mill on this question had been already quoted by his hon. Friend, and in that patriotic opinion he fully concurred. The right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government had expressed himself strongly on this subject. He said— I believe it (the Declaration of Paris) to have been a most impolitic step, calculated to cripple the Powers of this country.… we must emancipate ourselves from its fatal trammels in a regular manner."—[3 Mansard, ccv. 1497–8.] There could not, then, be a more regular or constitutional manner of doing so than by means of the action of Parliament. It having been declared that by the declaration in the Treaty of Paris we had given up the cardinal principle of our maritime power, and that in consequence of that Treaty never having been ratified by Parliament or by the Queen it was not binding upon us, he thought the present moment, when peace was universal, was the best that could be selected for repudiating our obligations under it. He would further suggest that Her Majesty's Government should take this opportunity of sweeping away many other obsolete Treaties which trammelled us, and which at some future date might be productive of inconvenience if not of danger to this country.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That, in consequence of a Conference having been held at Brussels in 1874 on International Law, and the proposed renewal of the Conference at St. Petersburg this year, a favourable opportunity is afforded to the Country of withdrawing from the Declaration of Paris of 1856, and thus maintaining our maritime rights, so essential to the power, prosperity, and independence of the Empire."—(Mr. Baillie Cochrane.)

MR. CARTWRIGHT

assured the hon. Member for the Isle of "Wight (Mr. B. Cochrane) that it was not from any underrating of the importance of the subject, or from any desire to restrict the maritime force which this country could command in time of war, that he rose to move the Previous Question. It had seemed to him from the first that the Resolution which had just been submitted was extremely inopportune—that there was no practical reason for bringing it forward, and this impression had been fully confirmed by the speech of the hon. Member. The substance of the charge brought against the Declaration of Paris appeared to be that it involved an apostacy from principles which had hitherto governed the policy of this country. He believed it could be shown conclusively by a reference to the acts of English statesmen of undoubted patriotism that that argument was not founded in fact. The Lord Protector Cromwell, who in a peculiar degree sought to establish British ascendency at sea, put his hand to a Treaty by which the principle of a neutral flag covering an enemy's goods was recognized. Sir William Temple, no mean exponent of British feeling, took part in carrying out a similar policy. The principle was acknowledged in the Treaty of Utrecht, and in 1786 it was embodied by Mr. Pitt in a celebrated Treaty of Commerce. In one respect the Declaration of Paris was an improvement on preceding instruments, for it did not renew a preferential bonus in favour of French shipping which had previously been allowed. On no occasion, he would observe, was the Declaration of Paris condemned, although it had been reviewed and discussed in that House, not only in heat and passion, but also at subsequent periods. In the year 1860 the matter was considered by a Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Merchant Shipping question—a Committee remarkable for having among its Members such men as Mr. Lindsay, Mr. Milner Gibson, Mr. Baring, Mr. Cardwell, and the Representative of West Norfolk. By that Committee the question of belligerent rights was discussed, and they stated in their Report that, while aware that grave objections had been urged by high authorities against the Declaration of Paris, they could not refrain from expressing the hope that in the interests of humanity and civilization all private property not being contraband of war should be exempt from seizure. The Committee went on to say that Great Britain was deeply interested in the adoption of such a course, inasmuch as she had at all times a greater amount of property afloat than any other nation. On that recommendation he would not venture to pronounce any opinion, beyond remarking that it showed the Declaration of Paris had not been subjected to all the censure which some supposed. But it was contended that the Declaration might be acted upon unjustly. In contradiction, however, to that, he would point out that when hostilities had occurred between the Republic of Chili—which was a party to the Declaration—and Spain—which was not a party to it—all the facilities and advantages for war the loss of which was deplored by those who were opposed to the Declaration were brought into requisition with the assent of all by the Republic of Chili. No argument had, therefore, he maintained, been adduced by the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight to justify the course which he asked the House to adopt; and he would appeal to hon. Members not by a chance vote to reverse that which was a very solemn agreement, made after mature consideration, and the spirit and substance of which had been ratified by public opinion, as expressed by those who represented it in Parliament. He begged to conclude by moving the Previous Question.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, the subject now under consideration was one on which he should not have ventured to intrude his opinions were it not that the defences of the country and its maritime supremacy were principally delegated in time of war on the Navy. The argument of the hon. Member who had just sat down was rather in support of maintaining the principles of the Declaration of Paris untouched than the postponement of its consideration to some more convenient time. He would, therefore, endeavour to show that it was an entire mistake and would go far to sap the naval power of this country in the event of our being engaged in war. By the 11th Article the neutralization of the Black Sea had been effected, and the result had been the Convention between Russia and Turkey, closing the Dardanelles to ships of war, and limiting the naval forces in the Black Sea. It was a Treaty binding and ratified by the contending parties. The Treaty of Paris, so called, was not a Treaty in any sense of the word, and was negotiated by Ambassadors that were not accredited for that particular purpose. In his opinion, the first two Articles of that Treaty were calculated to impair the naval supremacy of England. They contained this declaration of maritime law:—1. Privateering is and remains abolished. 2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. 3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag. 4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective—that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. It was laid down by a high authority that— The Law of Nations gives to every belligerent cruiser the right of visitation and search of all merchant ships, wherefore resistance to such search amounts to a forfeiture of neutrality. Particular States have relaxed the rigour of this rule, and by express Treaty granted immunity by establishing a maxim—free ships, free goods. A neutral ship refusing to he searched would from that proceeding alone be condemned as a lawful prize. If we find an enemy's effects on board a neutral ship we seize them by the rights of war; but we are bound to pay the freight to the master of the neutral ship, who is not to suffer by such seizure. The effects of neutrals found in an enemy's ship are to be restored to the owners, against whom there is no right of confiscation, but without any allowance for detainer, decay, &c. And with regard to neutral things found with an enemy— Since it is not the place where a thing is, which determines the nature of that thing, but the character of the person to whom it belongs, things belonging to neutral persons which happen to be in an enemy's country, or on board an enemy's ship, are to be distinguished from those which belong to the enemy. These principles were laid down in a book which was put into the hands of naval officers for their guidance. As a general principle it seemed to him that this right of seizing an enemy's goods wherever they might be found ought to be maintained. There was no doubt that unless our Navy had that power the enemy would obtain an advantage over us. A practical difficulty arose immediately after the rupture of 1803. French commerce was spreading all over the world, and a large number of French vessels were in the Black Sea. These vessels Nelson had made arrangements to seize and secure, because they were not only conveying the commerce of the enemy, but that which would have been contraband of war also, if they succeeded in escaping Nelson's vigilance. He stated in his despatch that he was thrown into great difficulty by reason of the facilities the enemy's ships had of changing their flags. It was stated in the Life of Nelson— Without entering into the merits of the case …… there was great cause for suspicion that the vessels or cargoes, or both, were belonging to enemies, and were merely covered with neutral papers. My orders are positive for respect to the neutral flag …… I shall only lastly observe that 170 French vessels were in the Black Sea at the commencement of hostilities, and that by a magic touch of merchants they became in a moment Russians, Imperials, Ionians, Ragusans, and not one French vessel remained. If Nelson had not had then the power which the hon. Gentleman the Member for the Isle of Wight asked to have restored, the transfer of the flag would, under the Declaration of Paris, have allowed them to have eluded his vigilance. All experience, he maintained, went to show that this power of searching neutral vessels and seizing an enemy's goods on board was one of the highest importance. In respect to privateering, also, he thought we should do well to denounce the Declaration of Paris. No doubt, however desirous this country might be of manning a large naval force, and we had, as he thought we had not, a sufficient number of ironclads for defence on the outbreak of war, the only way of covering the seas and of destroying the commerce of our enemy would be by hiring or commissioning merchant ships; and he contended that since Russia declined to be bound by the portion of the Treaty which related to the Black Sea, the best course for us to pursue was to declare that we would no longer abide by Declarations which were framed, not in our interest but in that of others. He had great pleasure in supporting the Motion of his hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Wight.

MR. SERJEANT SIMON

Sir, as the hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Hermon), as well as the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just sat down (Sir John Hay), has appealed to me, and referred to the views which I expressed on a former occasion when this question was before the House, I trust that the House will give me its attention for a short time. In answer to the hon. Gentleman's appeal, I beg to say that my opinions have not changed. I have always thought, and I still think, that the so-called Declaration of Paris was a serious mistake, and that when our Plenipotentiary put his hand to that document he did an act which, in my judgment, will materially affect the interests, and, I will add, the safety of this country in time of war. Holding this opinion, I nevertheless feel myself in great difficulty when called upon to support the Motion of the hon. Gentleman the Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. Baillie Cochrane). According to the terms of the Motion, the assertion of our maritime rights in time of war is made to depend, in a manner, upon "the opportunity arising out of the Conference at Brussels." I do not see the connection. If there is any one act of Her Majesty's Government which com- mands, and, I believe, has received, the universal approbation and thanks of the country, it is the course they have taken with respect to the Conference of Brussels. When they consented to send a representative to Brussels, they did so under reservations and restrictions having relation to this very matter of our maritime rights, and they have since refused altogether to take part in the adjourned Conference. What opportunity, then, does the Conference offer? Does the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) mean that Her Majesty's Government should reverse their policy and send a Representative to St. Petersburg? The objects of that Conference' have been disclosed. We now know that the regulation of military operations on land is not the sole purpose for which the Powers have been invited to meet, and Her Majesty's Government when they found this, did wisely, I think, in declining to take any further part in their proceedings. Again, with regard to our "withdrawing," as the Motion expresses it, from the Declaration of Paris, I would ask the hon. Member (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) to consider whether the Declaration is or is not an engagement. If it is an engagement, then we cannot withdraw from it without the consent of the other parties. To do so would be a breach of honour and good faith. If it is not an engagement, then there is nothing to withdraw from. Now, there is a great deal of misapprehension on this point. There is a notion in some quarters that because the Declaration is not a Treaty properly so-called, we are not bound by it; but just as a man in private life might be bound by his pledged word,—by a parole undertaking, so may a nation be bound—bound in honour and good faith—by a document not bearing the more formal attributes of a Treaty. I have always regretted and condemned what was done at the Congress of Paris, believing it to be fraught with evil, and probable disaster for us hereafter. I may be wrong in this opinion. If I am, I but share the error of many of our most eminent statesmen and public men. The same opinion has been expressed not only by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, the present Prime Minister, and many of his Colleagues, but by the late Mr. John Stuart Mill and Earl Russell. The one was a great philosopher, whose whole life was devoted to the study of what was best calculated to promote the freedom and the happiness of mankind; he was also for some years in Parliament, and sat on the side of the House on which I sit. The other is a renowned and experienced practical statesman, who was for a long time at the head of the Liberal Party in this country. All these eminent men have condemned the Declaration of Paris. Considering the circumstances under which it was signed, the country had a perfect right at the time, or within a reasonable time afterwards, to renounce it altogether, and to tell the Powers of Europe that the Parliament of Great Britain—that the English nation—would not consent to part with, or to jeopardize, one iota of its power as a great nation, or of its means of self defence in time of war. I say that Parliament should, at the time, or within a reasonable time after, have declared itself upon the matter, and have called upon the Government of the day to make known our refusal to sanction the course taken by our Plenipotentiary. But what was done? There were debates in both Houses; that was all; and although two or three times since the matter has been discussed in one House or the other, for 19 years we have slept upon our rights, and not only have we taken no active measures to intimate our dissent, but we have induced other nations to accept the Declaration. How then can we now, with any regard to consistency or honour, call upon the Government to "withdraw" from the Declaration? This is the position in which we are placed. We cannot "withdraw;" we cannot repudiate; and yet a time will come, as I firmly believe, when our safety, as well as our honour, will require us to take decisive action in this matter, and when, perhaps, war alone will relieve us from this fatal engagement. The hon. Member who moved the Previous Question (Mr. Cartwright) has referred to Treaties which have been entered into between ourselves and other countries, in order to show that we had given up before what was given up by the Declaration of Paris, and that, therefore, we had not parted with any very important advantage when we gave up the right of seizing enemy's goods in neutral vessels. In fact, as I understood the hon. Gentleman, or as I have heard others argue, these Treaties go to show that this power of seizure was always opposed to the general feeling of Europe, and that, therefore, we had been obliged from time to time to yield it up. Nothing can be more fallacious. There is the widest possible distinction between waiving a right on a particular occasion, or in a particular case, and giving it up altogether. This is what was done at the commencement of the last war with Russia, when we waived our right of seizure, and this is what was done by the Treaties referred to by the hon. Gentleman. Each of those Treaties was between this country and some particular nation, and was entered into to serve a specific object. They contained stipulations for certain reciprocal advantages, and in time of war between ourselves and any one of those nations a Treaty so made was to be, and was, of no effect. Nay, so far from these Treaties affording proof that the Law of Nations, or the general opinion of nations, was opposed to the right of seizure in time of war, they show the very contrary. The very fact of entering into Treaties or inserting stipulations on the subject was an admission of the right as a well-known, acknowledged, universal maritime rule. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Cartwright) said that hon. Members should study History and Treaties more minutely before citing them, and he then referred to two or three in particular, and called special attention to the Treaty with Holland, which was negotiated by Sir "William Temple. He could not have cited a more unfortunate instance. What was the history of that Treaty? After it had been in existence some 90 years we went to war with France, and finding that the Dutch were rendering material assistance to the French, especially in their trade with their Colonies, we issued an order to our cruisers to seize all enemy's goods in Neutral vessels. The Dutch remonstrated, but we persisted, and we put a stop to the French Colonial trade. Here was an example of what the necessities of a war entailed upon us as a maritime nation, and of the impossibility of giving up under all circumstances a right, or a usage, which we had always exercised, and which was necessary to our strength in time of war. I repeat, the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Cartwright) could not have cited a more unfortunate instance for his argument, nor could he have practised himself the precept respecting the study of History and Treaties which he enjoined upon others. But it is said that this practice of seizing enemy's goods in time of war is a barbarous practice, and owes its origin to barbarous times. What are the facts, and what is the Law of Nations on the subject? I will not go so far back as the Roman Empire; I will content myself with the period when the Maritime Code known as the Conso-lato del Mare became the acknowledged Law of Europe. This period has been variously fixed, but general opinion assigns it to the 13th century. What was the condition of Europe then? There was the Greek Emperor on the throne at Constantinople. Syria, Cyprus, and the Balearic Isles were actively engaged in commerce. You had the Republics of Venice and Genoa, and France and Spain alike, engaged in trade. In the West, the German Emperor was on the throne, and his influence extended to the Netherlands, and as far as the Southern shores of the Baltic. All civilized Europe, in fact, from the East to the West, and throughout the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, and up to the North, as far as the Baltic, was engaged in commerce. It was at that time, and under these conditions, and it was by these maritime communities, that this code of laws was accepted as the rules that were to regulate their intercourse, and their relations in time of war. And what was the particular rule of which we are speaking—I mean with reference to the right of seizing enemy's goods in neutral vessels? Why, it was simply this—it may be summed up in a few words—namely, that a neutral should not be allowed to feed the resources of one belligerent as against another, but that in order to prevent this, besides contraband of war, an enemy's goods should be seized whenever found on board a neutral vessel. And how was this done? Not to the injury of the neutral, but of the belligerent only. The goods of the enemy were seized, but not the vessel. The vessel after adjudication in a Court of Maritime Law, was not only released, but the owners were to he paid, and were paid, the freight to which they would have been entitled had they taken the goods to their destination, and in some instances demurrage was allowed as well. What was there either unfair or barbarous in such a law? This was the acknowledged public law of Europe down to the Declaration of Paris. Two centuries after the time of which I am speaking, Grotius mentions the provisions of the Consolato as containing the constitutions of the Maritime States. Albericus Gentilis, Molloy, Lam-predi, Heineccius, Bynkershöek, our own Zouch and Vattel do the same. In later times Lord Stowell, and Wheaton, Story, and Kent—three great American jurists—repeat and confirm the authority of these writers. These men were all jurists, of the highest order and authority, belonging to different countries—countries, it may be supposed, having in some respects different views and interests upon many questions of national, or public policy; and yet they all agree in asserting and confirming the provisions of the Consolato as a code of public law. It was never disputed until the refusal of Frederick the Great to satisfy the English claims after the cession of Silesia, and then, for the first time, the attempt was made to put forward the new principle that "free ships make free goods; "but we resisted it, and the English claims were paid. Afterwards the celebrated Commission, known as the Prussian Commission, was appointed in order to alter the old maritime code, and establish a set of rules more favourable to Prussian interests. The memorials which were issued by this Commission were answered by the able letter of the Duke of Newcastle, and the masterly report which Lord Mansfield, then Solicitor General, assisted in drawing up, and we heard nothing more of the new doctrine until the Armed Neutrality of 1780 when the Empress Catherine determined to give effect to the new principles of maritime law. But what became of the Armed Neutrality we all know. It was levelled directly against us; but 15 years afterwards, every nation that had joined this combination against England, one by one, as soon as it was found that the new rule touched its interests, abandoned it, Russia itself being the chief instigator. It is curious, if the House will allow me, to refer to some of the Treaties made by these nations when repudiating the engagement into which they had entered. France was the first to throw over the new rule. By a decree of the National Convention of the 9th May, 1793—"enemy's goods on board neutral vessels" were declared "good prize, the neutral ships being released and freight paid by the captors." Here is the old rule of the Consolato revived. This decree was enforced by a decree of the Executive Directory of the 2nd March, 1797. On the 8th February, 1793, Russia renounced her Treaty of 1786 with France, declaring that the principle "free ships free goods" should be "no longer obligatory until the restoration of order in France," that is, until the French nation should acknowledge the "right divine of kings to govern wrong." In the same year Russia renewed with England her Treaty of 1766, stipulating that neutral commerce should be carried on "according to the principles and rules of the Law of Nations generally recognized"—that is, according to the old established rule of the sea. On the same day she made another Treaty with us engaging that the contracting powers should unite all their efforts—to do, what does the House think?— To prevent neutrals from giving on this occasion of common concern to every civilized State, any protection whatever, directly or indirectly, in consequence of their neutrality, to the commerce or property of the French on the sea, or in the ports of France. A similar article was inserted in the Treaty of the same year between Great Britain and Spain, between Great Britain and Prussia, and between Great Britain and the Emperor. Thus, as all these Powers had combined against us to establish a new rule, the moment they found themselves affected by it, they combined again to abandon the principles of the Armed Neutrality and to reaffirm the old rule. The new rules were abandoned by Sweden in the year 1788, and by Russia, France, Spain, Prussia, and by the Emperor. In 1809, Russia herself issued a ukase declaring that— Ships laden in part with goods of the manufacture or produce of hostile countries shall be stopped, and such merchandize confiscated and sold by auction for the profit of the Crown; and," the article continues, "if the merchandize aforesaid compose more than half the cargo, not only the cargo, but also the ship shall be confiscated. After these specimens of Treaties, which of these nations has a right to set up as a claimant for enlarged privileges of neutrality? But the great grievance, or at least the danger arising from the right of seizing enemy's goods, as I have always understood it, was not so much the seizure itself, as the right of search which it involved. This was the chief cause of our differences with the United States of America in 1812. But has the Declaration of Paris removed this grievance, or this danger? It has expressly excepted contraband of war. But how are you to ascertain whether a vessel is carrying contraband of war, unless you go on board and search her? There is no stipulation that the production of the ship's papers shall be sufficient; so that, according to the terms of the "Declaration," if we were at war, we should have still the right to go on board a neutral ship, in order to satisfy ourselves as to whether she was carrying contraband or not. But it has been said the right of seizure is an interference with trade, and that it is demoralizing to allow our maritime population to be rovers on the seas, seizing and carrying away, as spoils of war, the property of innocent people. But I would ask, is it not more demoralizing to feed a war for the sake of gain, to assist an enemy's resources, and enable it to prolong the miseries which war entails? Is it conducive to public morality that one part of a nation shall be at peace while the other is at war? That your merchants and traders shall be carrying on a roaring trade with the enemy, increasing and strengthening its means of aggression or resistance, while we are sending the bravest, the very flower, of our youth to bleed and to die on the battle-field? To my mind, there is a heartless selfishness involved in such a condition of things that is repugnant to every manly sentiment. This is not the way to foster or promote public spirit, or great national virtues in a people—to employ the terse eloquence of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli),—"You might produce rich communities, but you will create weak States." This modern notion of humanizing war, as it is termed, may be well expressed in the phrase, "Slay your enemy, but spare his property"—yes; "Blow him to atoms at the cannon's mouth, but do not touch his goods." How are we, a maritime nation, to defend ourselves against a formidable military power upon such a principle? If Russia were to cross our Indian frontier, by what military force could we resist her? How could we oppose her, except by crippling her trade and annihilating her commerce? If a war were to arise—God forbid that such a thing should happen—between ourselves and the United States, and an army were marched into Canada, what resistance could England make except upon the ocean? These are contingencies—considerations of a practical character that to my mind outweigh entirely the mistaken, however well-meant, intentions of those who would humanize war, as they think, by giving immunity to the trade of belligerents, and converting war into a sort of duel by proxy between nations. Sir, that is not my notion of humanity, or of a sound national or international policy. Every nation owes a duty to itself. It owes a duty also to the world; for to each one a mission has been given. As Rome taught the art of government and the science of law, so it has been ours to spread the blessings of liberty, to show how freedom can combine with social order, and how a nation that is free will become great. As one of the most civilizing influences of the world,—one, so to speak, of its chief moral agents—let us beware lest we lower our position among the great family of nations, and so weaken our power for good.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF

said, the question appeared to divide itself into two parts; first, whether it would be advantageous to this country to withdraw from the Declaration of Paris; and, secondly, whether they were morally entitled to do so? At present, he could not see what great service their Navy would be to them in case of war if they maintained the stipulations of that Declaration. Were they to confine the operations of their fleet merely to the attack of fortresses which were situated on the sea, or of the vessels of their enemies? They were debarred from doing the former by the new system of torpedoes, while they were prevented from attacking men-of-war by their remaining under the protection of their own fortresses. Therefore, the whole function of their fleet would be to defend the shores of England, or to attack the merchant ships of other countries at sea. He would remind the House of the conduct of Russia, after the Treaty of Paris. In the preliminaries of peace, which were put forward by England, it was laid down that all the ports on the Black Sea should he disarmed and their arsenals rendered useless for the purposes of war. After the Congress had met at Paris, Russia maintained that the port of Nicolaieff did not come within the terms of the preliminaries of peace. Our Law Officers of the Crown agreed that such was the case; but in consequence of the neutrality of the Black Sea, Russia undertook not to arm ships at the arsenal at Nicolaieff. The Russian Government, however, subsidized a steam company to build vessels there, and gave it the use of the arsenal on the condition that the ships should be so built that they could be converted into vessels of war. At any moment almost these ships could have waged war. That seemed to him to be an evasion not only of the Treaty, but especially of the stipulation that privateering was abolished. Then, during the war which took place between France and Austria, it was Greece, whose neutrality was guaranteed by other States, and which had, perhaps, the largest carrying trade in the Mediterranean, that profited by the Declaration of Paris. The next point he had to consider was how far would they be justified in withdrawing from the Treaty. Other nations had withdrawn from obligations equally binding. He would not allude to the case of Russia withdrawing from the Treaty with reference to the neutrality of the Black Sea, because the manner in which that withdrawal was made could never be sanctioned by the civilized nations, though he owned there were difficulties connected with the question, and he had not joined in any violent vociferation against the late Government, who had to deal with those difficulties. But it could not be denied that Russia, propria, motu, withdrew from the solemn stipulation of the Treaty. But there were certain other Declarations from which other nations had withdrawn. In the first place, the Principalities were to be governed by two Princes. The Principalities evaded that by each electing the same man, Prince Couza, and when he was driven away, Prince Charles took his place. And now Austria, Germany, and Russia insisted on making a commercial treaty with the Principalities, which was a third evasion. Then there was another arrangement at the time of the Congress of Paris, not so solemn as those with regard to privateering, and the immunity from seizure of foreign goods in neutral bottoms, but it came next, as it was solemnly made in the Protocol. At that time Lord Clarendon proposed, and the proposal was agreed to and signed by the Plenipotentiaries, that in case of any difference arising between the Powers they would have recourse to arbitration instead of going to war. Almost every foreign Government gave its adhesion to that Declaration; but how many Governments had stuck to it? England was the only one which had done so in the case of that celebrated episode in our history, the Alabama Claims. Having shown that it would be necessary to resume the rights abandoned in 1856, and that there was full margin for doing so, he would recommend his hon. Friend not to press his Motion to a division. An almost unanimous opinion had been expressed by the House that we were not bound; he hoped his hon. Friend would rest satisfied with that, and allow the Motion of the hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Cartwright) to be adopted.

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY

said, it appeared to him, from the speeches of that evening, that a great misapprehension existed on this question. It seemed to be supposed that the Earl of Clarendon had, at the Congress of Paris, on behalf of the British Government, abandoned rights which had been up to that moment deemed essential for the protection of the rights and the honour of England. But it should be remembered that at the commencement of the Crimean War this concession to neutral nations was deliberately adopted by a Government, of which Lord Palmerston was a Member—a man not likely needlessly to have sacrified the interests of his country. And it was adopted not only with a view to maintain the peace of the world, and to avoid dragging neutral nations unnecessarily into the war, but above all as a concession to the progress of commerce and civilization which undoubtedly had marked the space which had elapsed from the times of Nelson. No doubt they were very far removed from the times, though not from the spirit of Nelson. But when hon. Members called on them to practise those excessive acts of power and tyranny which were exercised in Nelson's time, they seemed, as the hon. Member for the Isle of "Wight seemed, like another Rip Van Winkle, who, awaking from a 50 years' slumber, rushed into the House and exclaimed, "Good Heavens! what has happened since I was last among you?" It was well known that at the commencement of the Crimean War the Russian Government was going to commission privateers from the United States, and it was only the Declaration in question which saved the world from a horde of pirates issuing from the United States under the Russian flag. When, therefore, hon. Members discussed this question of the Declaration of Paris he must ask them to discuss it as a whole, and not merely as laying down the doctrine of free ships, free goods. Let it be taken in connection with that very important Article of the Declaration—very important for us as a maritime Power—that blockades to be effective must be real; that there must be no such thing as paper blockades. Let it be taken in connection also with the Article which abolished privateering, and he could not believe that any hon. Member could be in earnest when he expressed a desire to see us go back to times gone by, when the practice of piracy and privateering prevailed. With regard to what fell from the hon. and gallant Member for Stamford, he would point out that the abandonment of privateering would not prevent us from fitting out and putting into commission any number of ships taken from our merchant service, placing our own naval officers on board, remembering how far in advance of other countries we were in the resources of our Royal Navy, both as to competent officers and able seamen; he considered that we should, also, under this head, be distinct gainers. In conclusion, he said that, whether this was to be looked upon as a Treaty or not, the House must not forget that we had invited many nations to accede to its provisions, and that, except Spain and the United States, almost every civilized State had now joined in the Declaration.

MR. BOURKE

said, the House would agree with him that the subject which had been so ably brought before it by his hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) was one well deserving of consideration. Her Majesty's Government were well aware that the question was interesting, not only to many hon. Members, but also to many of the people of this country, who took an interest in it from purely patriotic motives. The form of the Motion before the House was one of considerable ambiguity; but after the speech of his hon. Friend, it might be clearly divided into two different propositions—the first, that Her Majesty's Government ought to have taken advantage of the Conference of Brussels to bring the subject of the Declaration before it; and the second, that Her Majesty's Government was not bound by the Declaration. As to the first proposition, if Her Majesty's Government had been ever so willing to bring the subject before the Conference, it would have been impossible to do so for this reason—that the Powers who were signataries to the Declaration of Paris were not the same as those which met at Brussels. Because, although the Declaration of Paris was signed only by Turkey, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Italy, and England, yet upon the invitation of those Powers, various other Powers of the world subsequently sent in their adhesion to that arrangement. That might be looked upon by many as a technical reason for not going into the subject at the Conference of Brussels. But there was a stronger reason which must suggest itself to every man's mind, and that was, that the object of the Conference at Brussels was entirely foreign to the subject of the Declaration of Paris. The subject to be brought before the Congress of Brussels was an inquiry into the rules of military warfare, for the purpose of mitigating the horrors and calamities of war. And it seemed to be clear to Her Majesty's Government that their object ought to be to limit, rather than extend, that inquiry as much as possible. If the course suggested by his hon. Friend behind him (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) had been adopted by the Government, the various theories of maritime warfare would have been discussed; the immunity of all private property at sea, and the most delicate questions of International Law would have been debated in the Congress, and our declared intention to depart from the Declaration of Paris would, no doubt, have been made the pretext by others for getting rid of engagements which for some reason they thought themselves entitled to abandon. Therefore, he said the course taken by the Government was to limit as much as possible the subjects to be considered by the Congress at Brussels. That course was clear and decided. It was laid down in the Papers before the House. They were perfectly determined not to enter into any discussion of the rules of International Law by which the relations of belligerents were guided, or undertake any new obligations or engagements of any kind in regard to general principles; and they required, before sending a delegate to the Conference, the most positive and distinct assurances from every power taking part in the Congress that they agreed to the course proposed by the Government, and would not entertain in any shape, directly or indirectly, anything relating to maritime operations or naval warfare. Such were the instructions given to General Horsford, and that officer had carried out his instructions to the entire satisfaction of the Government. Having laid that down as the rule of their conduct, the Government would have been greatly to blame if they had departed from it, and they should have been guilty of the grossest inconsistency if they had brought forward any subjects like that suggested by the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight. He need not advert to the reasons for not going further. It had been asserted that the Government of St. Petersburg had some secret reason for inviting us to join the Conference in that City. He was not aware what that secret reason could be; but if there was a secret reason, it was all the more necessary for the Government to take the course they did on that occasion—not to allow any discussion of questions of International Law, nor to adopt the suggestion of the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight. In the course which they had taken, the Government had received the unanimous support of the Press throughout the country, and they had also received the thanks of the country for having adhered to that course. The Declaration of Paris embraced four points, but after all, there was only one to which very serious objection had been taken, and that was the Article with regard to the neutral ships. Well, in conceding the right of taking enemy's goods out of principle that "free ships made free goods," there could be no doubt the country gave up a belligerent right she had exercised from very ancient times, and which she considered a powerful arm of maritime warfare. There was no doubt that that right had been incorporated from time immemorial in the code of our maritime laws, and this country on two memorable occasions showed that it was prepared to bravo nearly the whole world for the purpose of sustaining those ancient maritime rights. That right had been sanctioned by the highest authorities, ancient and modern—by Crotius, Vattel, Hubner, Chief Justice Marshal, Kent, Story, and Wheaton. Under these circumstances, we could not be surprised that there were living statesmen among us who had the greatest possible doubt as to the wisdom of the course taken in 1856, and that we ought to leave ourselves to act, as in 1854, not binding ourselves by any new Declaration, but acting on the principle of what was most expedient for us to adopt. But that was not the question of the present day. The question now was, having now this Declaration as part and parcel of International agreements—was it our duty to denounce that Declaration because at the time when we entered into it there were some persons in this country who thought we had taken a false step? These persons seemed to forget that by such a course we were met face to face by another Declaration—the Declaration that was made, on the meeting of the Black Sea Conference in London in 1871, which was to this effect— That it is an essential principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement. Both Houses of Parliament had refused to denounce the Declaration of Paris when the subject had been brought before them. They had refused to alter the terms of the Declaration of Paris, and he was a little surprised to hear some hon. Gentlemen say that because that instrument was not ratified we were not bound by it. All he could say with respect to that was, that he hoped he should never see the day when a Minister of the Crown or one of its Law Officers would repudiate an engagement because it lacked certain formalities. The Plenipotentiary had full power to sign the Declaration, and that went a great way to show that the Declaration was binding upon us. He must say that he thought his hon. Friends who were in favour of doing away with the Declaration of Paris seemed to have forgotten that in the last century the principle which had been acted upon for nearly 70 or 80 years of peace between Prance, Portugal, England, and the Netherlands was, that free ships made free goods, although no doubt in time of war every one of those Powers did not act upon that principle. He need not, however, remind the House that we had entered into treaties with various Powers acknowledging the principle, but that other Powers had done so to even a greater extent than ourselves. And when the effect of the rule was taken into consideration we could not be surprised that such was the case, because everybody must admit that if the right of taking enemy's goods out of neutral ships did to a certain extent allow a belligerent to injure his adversary, yet it must be admitted that it had at the same time the result of irritating one's friends. It had a tendency in times of war to involve belligerents with their allies and to excite the most rancorous disputes between neutrals, while it also served to produce litigation between individuals, for it was always most difficult to prove that the goods seized were the property of the belligerents. He could not, therefore, help thinking that circumstances might arise when the advantage we had gained, and which we certainly did sometimes gain, by capturing enemy's goods in neutral vessels would be more than counterbalanced by the very great evils which might be caused by the irritation of our friends. Should we, he would ask, be likely to bear with equanimity to see our vessels, when neutral, stopped on the high seas, brought into port, and detained for any length of time on the ground that there were enemy's goods on board? Yet, if we withdrew from the Declaration of Paris, that was a result which we must expect; because by withdrawing from that Declaration we should be asserting in the strongest terms our refusal to recognize the doctrine that the neutral flag covered an enemy's goods. He had heard it stated in the course of the discussion this evening that neutrals gained very little by the concession which had been made; but that was, he confessed, to him a somewhat novel statement, for he had always understood that it had been admitted that, whatever effect might have been produced by the Declaration of Paris on belligerents, there had been no doubt whatever entertained of its advantages in the case of neutral Powers. His hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Wight did not seem to be quite satisfied that this country should be neutral; but he could not quite follow his arguments with respect to the taking of tallow during the Russian "War, nor could he concur with what had been said by many hon. Gentlemen with respect to the abolition of privateers. Whenever he had occasion to speak on that subject he had always stated that this part of the Declaration of Paris, at all events, admitted of no doubt. He could not understand how hon. Gentlemen could justify privateering in a point of view which had been called by almost every person the curse of commerce. Even those by whom it had been upheld as the last resource of war had admitted that it was most desirable it should, if possible, be got rid of. This country had gained far more than any other by its abolition so far as we had gone, and if we could only get the rest of the world to agree with us in this matter we should be still further benefited. No nation was more open to privateers in proportion to the strength of our commercial marine compared with a belligerent. Let him suppose that one of the nations, not ourselves, were to be engaged in war with a country at the other end of the world. If either of those countries sent out privateers, there was no doubt our commerce would suffer; because in all probability those privateers would not be very particular as to the ships which they took, and in all likelihood a great many of those ships would have on board English goods. His hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay) had mentioned a species of privateering which he (Mr. Bourke) had never heard of, because he spoke of privateering being carried on by commissioned officers and by officers belonging to Her Majesty's Navy. That was, however, not privateering in the sense in which it was ever carried on, and there was nothing in the Declaration of Paris to forbid an arrangement which had over and over again been said to be most desirable if the commercial marine of this country would undertake it. The hon. Member for the Isle of Wight had said that privateers were nothing but volunteers of the sea; but there was the greatest possible difference between volunteers and privateers, because the volunteer acted under the command of officers and in a regular manner, while privateers could do whatever they chose without any commander or rule whatever, except rules they made for themselves; and they made war for their own purposes and profit. If, again, we became belligerents there was no doubt we should lose a certain portion of our carrying trade; but we should also recollect that we should be able to carry on our commerce in neutral vessels. He trusted, however, that if unfortunately we should be at war, we should be able to protect our commerce with our own Navy, so that as long as we continued to be a powerful maritime nation the fancied evil which would result to our carrying trade seemed to him to be very much exaggerated. For his own part, he did not think anything would be more impolitic than that we should declare beforehand that we were about to sacrifice the Declaration of Paris by stopping the neutral ships of our allies and searching for belligerent goods. Such a course would, in his opinion, be very likely to turn neutrals into enemies. In case of war, we should then be obliged to do one of two things—either to re-abandon the rights of capturing belligerent goods in neutral vessels—not a very dignified course after repudiating the Declaration of Paris—or we must inevitably run the risk of turning neutrals into enemies, as he had just observed. We must also bear in mind that although neutral rights were now more generally recognized than in more remote times, yet the Declaration did not infringe on the right of search, or on the law of contraband; and so long as those two laws remained we need not, in his opinion, apprehend any of those evil results which some hon. Gentlemen seemed to imagine. In consequence of the progress of science in the present day the tendency was to increase the number of articles declared to be contraband of war; and such articles would, of course, be liable to seizure if carried in neutral vessel. In the few remarks he had made he had endeavoured to look at this question in a candid spirit. He did not think that the Declaration of Paris was open to all the grave objections that had been urged against it. He could not concur with those who wished to go further and to give immunity to all private property at sea, because he believed that by so doing we should be sweeping away the most valuable belligerent rights the great maritime Powers possessed. There was a cardinal difference between such a principle and anything that was contained in the Declaration of Paris, which put forward stipulations that were to be carried out by neutral Powers, whereas the abandonment of the right of capture of all private property at sea would concern those Powers who might be belligerent; and there was, therefore, no use in laying clown a principle which would be swept aside the moment the two Powers interested went to war with each other. On the whole, therefore, it would not, in his opinion, be prudent or expedient to get rid of the Declaration of Paris, and Her Majesty's Government could not be blind to the grave results that would arise from disturbing that arrangement. A course of that kind could not be taken without arousing a great difference of opinion not only among the Powers who were the original signataries to the Treaty, but also among the 40 other Powers who had since signed it, and it could not be taken without infringing the great principle of fidelity to international engagements which this country had always endeavoured to uphold. He did not agree, therefore, in the opinion that the Conference at Brussels, or the proposed Conference at St. Petersburg, were occasions favourable for the discussion of this question, and he thought that this would not be a suitable time for discussing it in an European Conference. Entertaining, as he did, the views he had endeavoured to lay before the House, he should, in the event of the House being called upon to divide on the subject, vote with the hon. Member for Oxfordshire in support of the Previous Question.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, he had heard with satisfaction—and he was certain that the country would hear with satisfaction—the prudent, moderate, and sagacious statement of the Under Secre- tary of State for Foreign Affairs; it was a statement worthy of himself, and of the high position which he occupied as one of the responsible Ministers of the Crown. He (Sir William Harcourt) could assure the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) that he would not find in him an advocate of selfish isolation, nor had he addicted himself to the new-fangled doctrines of International Maritime Law which had long prevailed on the Continent of Europe, and which had been largely disseminated in this country. The little he had learnt on the subject of maritime law had been acquired as a disciple in the school of those great masters to whom his hon. Friend had alluded—Lord Stowell, Chief Justice Marshal, Kent, and Story—those great publicists who had established upoh unshakable foundations the great principles which governed the maritime relations of States. He entirely concurred with the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs that those principles—some of which were deliberately abandoned at the Conference of Paris—were principles which were well established in the Law of Nations, and that to attempt to dispute that they were maritime rights were attempts which no jurists or publicists could listen to for a moment. He also entirely agreed with the Under Secretary that the proposition made to exempt private property at sea from capture, and the proposal to abolish the right of commercial blockade were untenable in International Law, and if attempted would be injurious to the maritime supremacy of England. To have introduced a discussion of these matters at the Conference at Brussels would have been entirely impertinent to the matters with which that Conference dealt, and would have been extremely imprudent and unwise on the part of Great Britain. When the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight said that by the Declaration of Paris two great blows were struck at the maritime supremacy of England—by the abolition of letters of marque and by the abandonment of the right of search—he confessed that he heard him with some surprise. Everyone knew that letters of marque were the powerful instruments of weak maritime States, and that they were a thorn in the side of States possessing great Navies, and that if any nation was in- terested in getting rid of privateering it was the one that expended £10,000,000 or £11,000,000 a-year in supporting the greatest and most powerful Navy in the world. The nation that raised the strongest objections to the abolition of privateering was the United States, which possessed no considerable Navy, but which, from the enterprize of its sailors, and the extent of its Mercantile Marine, would, in the event of war, be able to send forth hordes of privateers all over the world. The very fact of the United States objecting to the abolition of privateering, therefore, was the strongest argument to show that privateering was injurious to England. It must have been by inadvertence that the hon. Member had suggested that the right of search had been surrendered by the Declaration of Paris; because the right of search existed at the present time, otherwise the right to seize contraband of war and of blockade could not be enforced. The hon. Gentleman had made another extraordinary statement. He had said that this claim of exempting enemy's goods from capture on board neutral vessels was not advanced till 1751. He alluded to the celebrated case of the capture of Prussian vessels with respect to the Silesian Loan, which all English lawyers admitted with the greatest respect was not altogether creditable to Prussia. He (Sir William Harcourt) had often heard the Prime Minister of England speak of the Administration which was the author of the Treaty of Utrecht as a great Tory Party which laid down the true principles of maritime law. He (Sir William Harcourt) did not admire the Administration of Bolingbroke and Harley; but it had one title to fame in the history of this country—its enlightened commercial policy. The Treaty of Utrecht had always been referred to as one which settled this very question. The Tory Administration of Lord Bolingbroke, which negotiated it, established the principle that free ships made free goods as between the parties to that negotiation; and England, in her Treaty with France and with Spain, made that one of the cardinal features of the Treaty of Utrecht. He therefore rather envied the Tory Party that they were the originators in modern Europe of the establishment of that very principle which was ultimately concentrated in 1856 in the Declaration of Paris. There was another thing which he had also heard the Prime Minister claim for the Tory Party, although in this matter he should feel inclined to dispute the title. In the early days of Pitt, when he was a great Parliamentary reformer, he was also a great commercial reformer, and, following the Administration of Boling-broke, he also advocated the principle of free goods in free ships. If during the whole of the last century this principle was regarded as the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of England, and was ratified in the great settlement of Europe in 1815, and in the great Commercial Treaty of 1786, it was a little extraordinary that the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight had now come forward to say that it was a novel proposition. The hon. Member had referred to the history of the Armed Neutrality; but the declaration of Armed Neutrality was made in 1780, at the period of the great weakness of England, when, owing to the unfortunate policy of the war with America, the greatness which Chatham achieved for her had been almost annulled in Europe. England, it was true, accepted the principles of the Armed Neutrality, but she was not in a situation to resist them, and therefore, in 1780, although she protested against those principles, she was practically compelled to acquiesce in them. It was perfectly true that in the second Armed Neutrality, in 1800, she stood in a different position. She was then, by the genius of Nelson and the valour of her sailors, mistress of the seas, and in a situation to dictate to the world, as she did in the attack on Copenhagen. Then was made a Treaty which conceded not this particular point, but other points, which led to a protest by Lord Grenville. From 1815 this question slept in the policy of Cabinets, but not in the literature of International Law. There were Continental writers who were unanimous upon this subject and unanimous against the claim of capture. It was perfectly true that England had never conceded that right, but she was not bound to concede it. But when, unhappily, as he should always think, the great peace which had lasted 40 years was broken up by the Crimean "War, England had to consider what she ought to do upon this matter. She was engaged in a war with Russia, one of the parties to—indeed, the principal promoter of—the doctrine of the Armed Neutrality. She was looking for allies, and her ally was France, and France was as deeply pledged to this principle as Russia, her opponent, was. She could not have found in Europe or this side of the Atlantic a single maritime ally who would have joined her upon the principles which she herself desired to maintain. She could not have found such an ally on the other side of the Atlantic. If she had gone into that war with Russia maintaining the right of capture of enemy's goods in neutral vessels, she would have found herself not only without any ally, but with every neutral Power in the world her enemy. It was under these circumstances that the Government of England waived—only in the first instance waived—this principle at the outset of the Crimean War. Then came the peace and the Conference of Paris. He had often had the advantage of conversing with Lord Clarendon, and he regretted, from the reverence he bore his name, the manner in which his hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Wight had spoken of him. But he had heard Lord Clarendon say that this Declaration would have been made in Paris whether England had joined in it or not—that the Declaration of all the Powers of Europe upon the subject was so pronounced and unanimous that in that great Conference, which was in some sense a re-adjustment of Europe, that Declaration would inevitably have been made; and Lord Palmerston had also made that statement. Now, a very strong proof that the concession then made was irresistible was to be found in this—that the American Government declined to be bound, and was not under any obligation to observe it. But what happened? When they went to war with the Southern States in 1861 they were compelled to adopt the principles of the Declaration of Paris, and did adopt them. Both sides in that war, in fact, adhered to the abrogation of privateering—to the principle that the goods of an enemy were not to be taken in a neutral vessel, and acted in every sense as if they were signataires of the Treaty of Paris. That, he thought, was a sufficient proof that the course that was taken was necessary. He had always regarded the Declaration of Paris as a compromise, and not an unfair compro- mise, between the rival pretensions—on the one hand of the neutral claims of the Armed Neutrality, and on the other hand of the belligerent claims which had been previously claimed by England, and in former days by France and other countries. The document should be looked upon as a whole. While his hon. Friend had only referred to two points of the Declaration, his Resolution would abrogate the whole of it. He would first point out what was gained by the Declaration of Paris, and then allude to what was lost by it. We gained the abolition of privateering, and he agreed with the Under Secretary of State that to a great maritime Power that was an infinite gain. It was more; it was a gain to the civilized world. According to the French name for the word a privateer was a corsair, and that thoroughly expressed the meaning. Privateers were not bound by the sentiments which belonged to officers in the naval service or by the discipline which was to be found among regular soldiers. His hon. Friend compared them to volunteers, but they were more like Franc-tireurs, and volunteers did not go out for gain as they did. That was not the spirit by which they were actuated. The second gain was a practical regulation of the claim of the second Armed Neutrality on the subject of convoy—a claim set up in the great Swedish case decided by Lord Stowell—namely, that a single armed ship might exempt a fleet of merchantmen from search, although they might be laden with contraband of war. The Declaration practically repudiated that claim. The third thing England gained was a definition of blockade; and since that Declaration the war with the United States had established the doctrine of blockade on a sounder footing, and had guarded it with greater stringency with regard to belligerents than before. Now, that was a most valuable right to a maritime Power. It was shown to be in the war with the South, as it was by the stress of the blockade that the great superiority of the Northern States reduced the South to submission. The Declaration of Paris had strengthened rather than weakened a right which was most valuable to a maritime Power. One other right had practically been confirmed, and that was the right of search. There had been put forward by writers on behalf of neutrals all sorts of claims to limit the right of search, but these were practically repudiated by the Declaration, and in the war with the United States the right of search was more rigorously exercised than ever before. That was what England had gained. What had she lost? She had conceded the principle—for unquestionably it was a concession—of free ship, free goods. When we were a belligerent we lost the right to seize an enemy's goods on board a neutral vessel. But England had found herself unable to exercise that right, and she could not at present exercise it in Europe or in America unless she was prepared to fight the whole world, and no other statesman in his senses would maintain that the Declaration should be repudiated on such terms. [A laugh.] His hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Wight laughed; but did he expect that we should he at war longer than at peace? Since 1815, happily, we had been very little at war, and he hoped our policy might be long of that character. But what had been the result? Since the Declaration of Paris, Europe had been at war and America had been at war, and England had monopolized the carrying trade of the world. In time of war what would happen? It might be thought that we should carry our own trade in our own vessels. Since the Declaration of Paris, however, there had been war in the United States, and a single Alabama drove the whole trade of the States into neutral bottoms. A merchant's goods would always be safer in a neutral bottom, and the mere difference of the insurance would induce the merchants of a belligerent State to ship them in neutral bottoms. What would be the result of a withdrawal on our part from the Declaration of Paris? That our enormous foreign trade, which was 30 times as great as in the days of Nelson, would be at the mercy of every South American Republic. ["Oh!"] Yes, England could not monopolize the principle, and if two American States went to war, they would have a right to search the whole merchant shipping of England in search of contraband of war. Was it for our advantage that hostilities, whether in Spain or elsewhere, should expose us to the exercise of the right of search by other Powers? No doubt the Declaration of Paris operated as a premium in favour of neutral Powers, and he was glad of it. It was a reward upon those who remained at peace, and a fine upon those who went to war. The conditions of warfare were very different from what they had been. Railway communication had wrought a great change. In old times many countries could only communicate with each other by sea, but now the trade could be transacted by land. The abrogation of the Navigation Laws had put an end to the coasting and colonial trade and to the rules of 1756. The hon. Member for the Isle of Wight did not deny that the Declaration of Paris was advantageous to England in time of peace. For 20 years we had derived all the profits, and had become the carriers of the world under this principle, and yet we were asked to repent of the obligations under which we had derived such advantages. He did not think that would commend itself to the House of Commons or to the English people. England derived great advantages from her maritime superiority and the courage of her seamen; but she derived still greater advantages from the moral strength belonging to a country that knew how to observe its engagements and maintain the stability of its policy. The hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Hermon) had referred to the late Lord Derby. He would, on the other hand, refer to the present Lord Derby, who now represented the Queen in her relations with foreign States. He occupied the same high position in 1867, when this question was brought before the House by the late Mr. John Stuart Mill. Lord Derby answered Mr. Mill; and what would be the position of the House of Commons and the country if, after declarations such as he was about to quote had been made by Minister after Minister belonging to both parties in the State, the House of Commons should now attempt to evade engagements of this character? The present Lord Derby, in 1867, being then Lord Stanley, said— The power to intervene effectually is a temptation to do so; and, if the Declaration of 1856 has prevented us from mixing ourselves up with Continental complications with which we had nothing to do, all I can say is that that is one of the best arguments I have yet heard in its de fence …… With regard to the subject gene rally, I entirely agree with the hon. Member in laying down the principle that it will not do to go on with a Declaration of this kind if we do not mean to act upon it. You are bound either to repudiate it at once, or to act on it when the occasion arises. …. The trade of the countries going to war, for the time only, but still for the time, passes into neutral hands; in other words, both the combatants suffer heavy loss, both are heavily fined, so to speak, for their breach of the peace, and the fine goes for the benefit of those who have continued to remain on good terms. … I think we have to look at the question as a matter of good faith and consistency. We have given a pledge, not merely to the Powers who signed with us, but to the whole civilised world. We have urgently and continuously invited other States to join in that Declaration; we have done so with very considerable success, and it would be hardly intelligible or in accordance with our position to turn suddenly round and change our policy."—[3 Hansard, clxxxix. 886–7–8–9–90.] Some hon. Members thought that as this Declaration of Paris was not a Treaty we need not be bound by it. Our present Foreign Minister had, however, pointed out that this Declaration was not the act of the Executive alone, but had been repeatedly brought before Parliament, and on every occasion Parliament had refused to interfere and had practically given its adhesion to the Declaration of Paris. He would not think so meanly of one bearing the name of Stanley as to suppose that the Foreign Secretary, after holding that language in the presence of the House of Commons and in the face of Europe, could consent to repudiate that which he had declared England was morally bound to maintain. If the Motion of the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight was carried, Lord Derby, he was sure, would rather resign than give effect to it. He would detain the House no longer. The language he had read was far more deserving of attention than any he could command. It was worthy of the man, worthy of the office he held, and expressed the spirit which he ventured to think would influence the House of Commons in the decision at which they would arrive.

MR. FORSYTH

regretted that he could not say, with the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt), that he had listened with satisfaction to the speech of the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. It would have been different if the Under Secretary had merely maintained that we had been right in not taking part in the Conference at Brussels, and that the present time was inopportune for a withdrawal of the Declaration of Paris; but he had gone much further than that, for he had defended categorically every one of the propositions involved in the Declaration. It remained to be seen whether other Members of the Government concurred in that speech; but the present First Lord of the Treasury, in March, 1862, pointed out how seriously the Declaration of Paris affected the maritime strength of England, and suggested that the Ministers of the day ought to consider by what means it might be altered. It was right that the goods of neutrals should be respected wherever found; but in assenting to the proposition that the goods of an enemy ought not to be seized on board neutral ships, they gave up a cardinal principle of England's power and greatness. The principle for which he contended had, except in certain peculiar cases and for exceptional purposes, been steadily adhered to from the earliest times down to 1856. It had been said that we ought not now, owing to the lapse of time, to withdraw from the Declaration. That was a most dangerous argument, for as time went on we should find ourselves more and more bound to abide by it. If we deferred withdrawal till the outbreak of a war it would be natural for foreign nations to say to us—"You have lulled us into a false security, and you have no right to take this step now." Now was the time—a time of profound peace—when we had a right to say to foreign nations—"We made a mistake some years ago; we are not now going to war; but we are determined to assert the old principle which England always maintained—namely, that we have a right to seize the goods of the enemy wherever they are found." He would ask hon. Members who said that enemy's goods should not be seized on board free ships whether they were also prepared to say that the enemy's ships themselves should not be seized? If goods should not be seized, why should merchant ships be taken? And if this were adopted we might as well cease to be a great maritime power. Whatever might be the result of the division, he trusted there would be no misapprehension on the part of other nations as to the fact that the great body of opinion in that House was in favour of the proposition that free ships did not make free goods.

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD

supported the Motion. If the Declaration of Paris remained unaltered the effect upon our merchant fleet might be very serious. Of course, if we went to war there would be many cruisers of the Alabama class belonging to the enemy, and after a few of our vessels had been destroyed by them, merchants would naturally put their goods in the vessels of other nations, and shipowners would have either to lock up their ships in harbours at home or sell them to foreigners, as had been done in America. The result in the case of the United States was that they had now a very small fleet. It might happen, under these circumstances, that the country would be even more affected after the war than during it. There was a consideration also as to prize money. He did not say that naval officers joined the service for the sake of prize money; but probably most Gentlemen would agree with him that a large bag of prize money was not at all to be despised.

MR. BAILLIE COCHRANE

, in reply, said, he had not spoken disrespectfully of Lord Clarendon. What he said was that he could not comprehend how Lord Clarendon took the step he did of signing the Declaration of Paris. Under the circumstances, he was unwilling to press his Motion to a division. It was well known that a division did not always represent the opinion of the House.

Previous Question put, "That that Question be now put."—(Mr. Cartwright.)

The House divided:—Ayes 36; Noes 261: Majority 225.