HC Deb 18 May 1874 vol 219 cc399-426
SIR EDWARD WATKIN

Mr. Speaker, in the terms of the Resolution of which I have given Notice, I now beg to move— That the mode of construction (assumed to have been introduced by the late Chief Constructor of the Navy) adopted in the 'Captain' and other iron-Clads—viz., deep empty spaces in the ships' bottoms, and high centres of gravity, demands reconsideration on the part of the Admiralty. I have, Sir, postponed this question on two occasions—once at the request of the hon. Member for Pembroke, the late Chief Constructor of the Navy (Mr. E. J. Reed), who desired an opportunity to reply to my arguments, which he has not yet heard, and again at the demand of the Treasury Bench, to facilitate the discussion of the Intoxicating Liquors Bill. I now ask the indulgence and attention of the House while I, who am merely a man of business, accustomed for a good many years to the building and the management of ships and shipping—I, who am neither a naval architect nor an admiral—endeavour to show that national treasure has been wasted, invaluable life sacrificed, and our naval credit damaged, by an erroneous method of naval construction. Sir, the House will, at all events, confirm me in the proposition that our ships should be safe—that they should be built to swim and to fight, and not to capsize. And if I wanted special justification for appealing to the patience of the House on this vital question, that justification would be found in a grave declaration made in this House by the highest authority—no less an authority than the First Lord of the Admiralty—that, warned by the tragical fate of another ship of peculiar construction, he had taken the Devastation—described by the "Committee on Designs" as "the first-class fighting ship of the immediate future"—out of the list of sea-going iron-clads. In point of fact, the Devastation is "disrated" by the First Lord. Thus, Sir, we find the "first-class fighting ship of the immediate future," the most powerful war-engine of the whole iron-clad fleet, "disrated;" we know that the Captain capsized in no very heavy sea; and the House is familiar with the fact that many iron-clad ships have either been heavily ballasted, or have had their sails reduced, before accepted as safe to go to sea. Of course, it may be urged that this extra ballasting was always contemplated; for the usual official excuse for a miscalculation is, that what the House regards as an error was always contemplated. But I must stop that excuse before it is uttered here, as it may be. What authority can be more conclusive than that of the late First Lord? I will quote it—the right hon. Member for the City (Mr. Goschen) said last year in this House— An error was made in the construction of these ships"—specially alluding, I think, to the Vanguard, Iron Duke, and Invincible classes—"and to correct that error, it was necessary they should carry 300 tons of ballast. "An error was made in the construction," says the late First Lord, and therefore it "was necessary" they should carry extra ballast to make them safe. The design produced an unsafe ship—the ballast tended to ameliorate the defect, and but for the ballast, any one of these ships, in which a capital of several millions was invested, might have capsized as the Captain did. Now, Sir, if the captain of one of Her Majesty's ships gets his ship ashore, he has to undergo a court-martial, and his honour and his professional life—nay, it may be his very life itself, has to be weighed in the balance. But if a Chief Constructor or naval architect miscalculates and produces a bad design, there appears to attach neither investigation nor censure, and he is permitted to escape in a cloud of plausibilities—"someone else" always being to blame. I desire, Sir, to prevent all misunderstanding as to what I specially object to in the construction of the Captain, the Devastation, and other iron-clads, which have probably cost the country not less than £5,000,000, and it may be £10,000,000. It is not necessary for me to criticize the system of buoyant-bottomed ships in any other service than that of the Royal Navy, nor even for some of the uses of war itself. The system, under modifications, may have its area of usefulness, or it may not. What I object to is the adoption of a buoyant-bottom in war ships built with heavy side armour a thousand of tons weight—or far more, perhaps—and with heavy turrets and other top weight. The objection is obviously founded upon the simple action of the laws of nature. The buoyancy and the weight are placed in unproportionate positions; the result is—a high centre of gravity, the lifting up of the ship out of the water, and a deficiency of "stability," or, to use plain language, the power of standing upright in the water. I will now, Sir, with the permission of the House, proceed to show why these buoyant bottoms were introduced in the iron-clad fleet by the hon. Member for Pembroke when he had charge of the "construction" department. I will, not to weary the House, only call one witness. That witness shall be the hon. Gentleman himself. The hon. Gentleman, in a lecture at the Royal Institution, in 1871, said— The distance between the double bottoms has been made great in recent iron-clads, expressly to facilitate the raising the engines, boilers, and other weights, because it has been ascertained that the tendency of ships to roll has been reduced by this means. Now, Sir, here we have the whole object. The "engines, boilers, and other weights" were to be "raised," and the advantage to be gained was a reduction of the "tendency of ships to roll." "It had been ascertained," said the hon. Gentleman, that the "tendency of ships to roll" had been "reduced by these means" (the deep double bottoms). On the contrary, I shall show that in the ships in question, as designed by the hon. Member, the tendency to roll has not been reduced, but the contrary; and I entirely question that the truth of the principle involved, elucidated in its expected results, has ever been "ascertained" at all. On the contrary, when I come to speak of the proposed corrective for rolling in the case of the Devastation—namely, bilge-keels, I shall produce the evidence of the assumed author, Mr. Froude, to prove that his model of the Devastation, without the bilge-keel, actually capsized as the Captain did. Allow me, at this stage, to ask the House again gravely to consider all that is involved. It is said that the nation has invested £12,000,000 in 55 iron-clad ships. Were there any clear and reliable classified accounts at the Admiralty—which I was led to fear, by an answer of the First Lord to a Question of mine the other night, there are not—I have a strong opinion that they would prove that the real outlay has been a long way beyond £20,000,000 sterling. And assuming all the ships in commission, those ships would have a total complement of possibly 15,000 gallant men. What question could be more serious—honour, life, treasure to be saved or wasted by theories and calculations! The First Lord was good enough to direct my attention the other night—in giving me the usual official answer to the plain, practical Question of an independent Member—to the Report and recommendations of the Committee on Designs. Sir, I am aware there was such a Committee, and that it consisted of 11 civilians and six naval officers. A "Committee" or a "Commission," Sir, is a very convenient way of relieving an embarrassed First Lord of disagreeable responsibility. It is, unfortunately for the country, often adopted. The right hon. Gentleman himself has in this way availed himself of its shield and protection. Probably other First Lords will make use of it in future. But the right hon. Gentleman, in advising me to consult the Report of the "Committee on Designs," seemed to have forgotten that there were two Reports. There was a majority Report and a minority Report; and were this the occasion, I should ask why it was that no one of the recommendations of that minority Report, prepared by the gallant Admirals Elliot and Ryder, found a place in his Statement to the House on introducing his Estimates? It is more than two years since that Report was made. What did it recommend? First, that Government should pause; second, that the use of heavy side armour should be discontinued; third, that an armour-plated deck, to protect the vitals of the ships, should be placed five feet below, instead of three feet above, the water line, thereby obtaining real protection for the fighting properties of the ship in place of a sham protection, and obtaining greater stability at the same time; and fourth, that elaborate experiments should be made to elucidate and correct the errors of past calculation. I greatly fear that all this thoughtful advice has so far been thrown away, and that millions of money are being wasted in consequence. I am no advocate for any false economy; but here, I presume to think, we have enormous waste and excessive danger combined, which no petty reductions here and there can redress. In fact, if I am right in my contention, supported as I am by high naval authority, the national treasure is being wasted in the worst possible form—wasted to produce danger to the Fleet. And why, Sir, did these distinguished naval officers—men who have navigated ships at sea, in storm and calm, able mathematicians—not men who only know a ship from drawing one on paper—recommend the discontinuance of side armour? Because the power of the gun's penetration has overcome the thickness of iron side-plating that a ship can float with—and the days of side armour are gone; yet the First Lord is using it still, and the House is voting the money away to waste. The gallant Admirals quoted Sir William Armstrong and Sir Joseph Whitworth, names quite as eminent as that of the hon. Member for Pembroke. Sir William Armstrong said, that— No practical thickness of armour can be expected to secure perfect invulnerability for any considerable length of time. At present, it is only the most recent of our armour-clads which has any pretence to be considered invulnerable. And he added— Vertical side armour should be almost wholly abandoned, and water-tight compartments substituted. And he says further, that— No thickness of iron of less than 20 inches, supported by backing corresponding to that of the Hercules, would have any chance of offering the required resistance. Sir Joseph Whitworth says— It would be necessary, supposing the armour to be such as I have seen hitherto used, to have the plates not less than 20 inches thick; and for protection against a 13-inch gun, the armour would require to be not less than 24 inches thick. And now, Sir, to return to the immediate subject of discussion, I must again call up the hon. Member for Pembroke, and ask what he admits and what he denies. The hon. Member often writes to The Times for the information of his countrymen and of foreign nations. He wrote last year as follows:— Everybody knows that a foolish architect might make the vacant spaces between the bottoms dangerously large for the size of the ship, and that the proper amount should be determined by calculation. It seems to me, Sir, that the hon. Gentleman hero admits the whole question. "If a foolish architect" can make a ship to capsize by "making the vacant spaces dangerously large"—that is, by giving too great buoyancy below, under the circumstances of solid weights of dead iron at the sides and above the water-line, heavy turrets towering above the deck, and the leverage of masts and sails—and if we have the capsizing of the Captain in illustration, surely the obvious inference, primâ facie, is that that "dangerous largeness" was reached in the Captain if not in other ships. And this, Sir, brings me to the case of the Captain. I do not wish to cast blame. I do not profess to have any opinion to offer but that of a man of business, who has travelled much across the Atlantic and on other seas, and who is in the habit of making common calculations of every-day practice. It would appear from the evidence that everyone was to blame for sins of commission or omission except the builder, Mr. Laird, of Birkenhead, who simply obeyed orders in the construction of the ship, but who urged strongly that experiments as to her stability should be made before the ship went to sea—which experiments never were made. The hon. Member for Pembroke will, however, not forget that he not only approved the original design of the Captain—buoyant bottoms and all—but he all but took the whole credit for that design, and likened it in all respects to his own invention in the Bellerophon. Here are extracts from his official letter. The whole of the letter will be found at p. 8 of the melancholy and unsatisfactory volume on the loss of the Captain— Mr. Reed (Chief Constructor) to the Comptroller of the Navy. 20th July, 1866. After due investigation, I am satisfied that the ship is well designed and proportioned, and that her dimensions are not unduly large for the weight to be carried and the speed to be attained. I do not think she differs materially in these respects from what would have been proposed in this department had their Lordships seen fit to sanction in our design an upper deck eight feet above the water. In fact, the tonnage of the new design is almost precisely the same as the Bellerophon, and it was upon the Bellerophon as a basis that I proposed to proceed, and strongly recommended Captain Coles to proceed nearly two years ago, as stated in my evidence before the Turret Ship Committee. The system of construction proposed for the ship is also the same as in the Bellerophon not only as regards the skin-plating and external stringers behind the armour, but also as regards the 'double bottom,' and the mode of putting it together with bracket-plates and short angle-irons. … In all these essential particulars, therefore, the proposed ship conforms exactly to the views which have been entertained for years past in this department. Upon the general question of the absolute, essential requisite of stability (p. 8, Captain), Mr. Barnaby (the Assistant Constructor of the Navy), in his evidence before the Committee on Designs, says— Stability and a sufficient reserve of buoyancy are the main considerations." [104.] Admirals Elliot and Ryder (p. 8, section 9.) state— That the stability of ships of war should be such as to ensure safety under all the varying condition of water and position of centre of gravity under all the exigencies of the service of the Fleet … 'not' sufficient rule of safety to be guided by an angle of vanishing stability calculated upon a normal condition of draught of water and position of centre of gravity (both of which are liable to great variation in the various requirements of the Fleet). It is true, Sir, that the hon. Members of the House are not naval architects, but in one sense we all have been naval architects. We had our little boats in childhood, and what was our experience? We cut out a piece of wood in the form of a boat, and we put in masts and sails. We launched it on the Serpentine, and it toppled over at the first puff of wind. Learning by experience, we then nailed a bit of lead upon its keel. It stood then valiantly upright and resisted its enemy, the wind. Here, Sir, we have the whole principle in illustration. Weight below and buoyancy above the water-line—and therefore stability. The modern life-boat is the same. There are members of the Humane Society in this House. I ask, would they build a life-boat on the principle of the Captain or the Devastation? In fact, excessive buoyancy below and excessive weight above is simply a reversal of the lifeboat principle. Now, I gather from the hon. Member for Pembroke that even he had compunctions; for in another letter of his to The Times, written after the loss of the Captain, he said— It would be quite proper in designing a new sea-going turret ship to replace the Captain, which I earnestly hope will be done, to go some distance in the direction of increasing the beam and of 'lowering the centre of gravity,' and the masting might also be decreased, although that may not be necessary." [Letter, 29th September. 1870.] Let the House put together the "foolish naval architect" and this proposal to lower the centre of gravity, each and both in connection with the never-to-be-forgotten letter of approval of the 20th of July, 1866, and say whether the inference is not a fair one—namely, that the hon. Gentleman became conscious of a mistake and did not frankly admit it? No one can have a higher opinion of the varied talents of the hon. Gentleman than I have. I believe he desired patriotically to promote the progress of the Navy. But I humbly conceive that he made an error—that he adopted a mathematical fallacy. Why should any man be afraid to admit a mistake? On one side, the admission would be taken as a noble deference to truth—and, on the other, men would be reminded that the only people who make no mistakes are the men who do nothing which is original or striking; and that progress must of necessity mount over the barriers of experiment, and great successes be the consequent of brilliant failures. Now, Sir, four causes have been alleged for the loss of the Captain. First, that she had too low a free-board; second, that her turret wrenched itself out of its bearings, that the water rushed into the aperture, and that she went down vertically; third, that she had too little beam; and fourthly, that she was lost through rash seamanship. Sir, I will dismiss the last allegation without a word of argument, as an unjust stigma upon one of the most gallant men of Her Majesty's most gallant Navy. The ship might have been better for more beam, but that cause did not capsize her. As to the second cause, I know the work of Messrs. Laird too well not to be aware that the supposition of her turrets thus giving way is most groundless—even were it not, on the very face of things, absurd and impossible. Nay, we have the evidence of a living man that she did not go down vertically—that, on the contrary, she capsized. She heeled over 18 degrees. "I thought I had a good ship under me," said the gunner who was saved. She heeled again and went over, and the good ship, with her crew, sank never to appear again. Now, Sir, was it low free-board? I will here quote, if the House will bear with me, from the minority Report to which I have before alluded. Admirals Elliot and Ryder say (p. 3 of their report)— It is true that the faulty principle of want of stability became the more dangerous when co-existent with a considerable reduction of height of free-board; but the lowness of the free-board did not necessitate unavoidable danger, but only called for an increased provision of safety—namely, a 'much greater amount of statical stability' not only at small angles of inclination, but at all angles up to that of maximum stability. And they go on to observe— We simply desire, therefore, to dissent here from any conclusion that this feature (low freeboard) necessitated the disaster. Sir, I ask the very serious attention of all concerned as to what is the most probable cause. It is admitted that she had a buoyant bottom—very buoyant. Her guns and engines were to be "raised." It is admitted that she had an enormous weight above this lighter and far more buoyant portion of the ship. It is well known that she had turrets, heavy guns, unyielding "tripod" masts, and sail on. What is the most probable theory? I have the authority of Admiral Fishbourne for stating that the cubic contents of the empty spaces in the bottom of this unfortunate ship were equivalent to 770 tons. "I thought I had a good ship under me," said the gunner, as she heeled over never to go back. The sails were acting like a lever; the heavy turrets, and guns, and armour said, in the simple language of nature, as she inclined more and more—"We want to go down!" and then the buoyant spaces confined down below began to emerge towards the surface, and they said, in that same inevitable voice—"We want to go up!" At the critical instant of time, when buoyancy below and top-weight above had agreed to follow the laws of nature, a sea struck the ship and all was over. To my mind, Sir, and to my experience—and I feel most strongly how deficiently I have stated the case—there can be only one solution of this disaster. I repeat, therefore, with such a disaster before us—with ballasted ships—ballasted to "correct errors of design," and with the Devastation disrated—that the mode of construction to which I have asked the notice of the House demands re-consideration. The responsibility rests now with the First Lord. Will he take warning? Will he adopt and approve the principle, and say that he is personally convinced that it is sound and true, and that he intends to go on on the old line of what more than one eminent man regards as dangerous error, or will he not? It must rest with him, and I hope and trust that he will show the same caution and prudence in sifting the question which have influenced him in the case of the Devastation. I now come, Sir, to the Devastation, and the record of the opinions of both Commissions, Committees, and of scientific individuals is so conflicting and confusing, that if such doubtful and discordant views did not involve something of the tragic, they would be simply ridiculous. I do not hesitate to affirm that in private enterprise such a state of conflict would be impossible, and that as connected with a great national Department it is absolutely discreditable. What can the country think of the way in which millions are voted and spent and wasted, when what I am now going to read is collated and compared? The majority Report of the Designs Committee, dealing with the Thunderer, Devastation, and Fury class of iron-clads, says— It was necessary, therefore, to consider them capable of meeting bad weather in mid-ocean, and of fighting an action there, if necessary. (That is, in European seas, the Channel, and the Atlantic), and they conclude— We are unanimously of opinion that, subject to any improvements which further investigation in the direction we have pointed out may render possible, the Devastation class represents in its broad features, the first-class fighting ship of the immediate future. The Devastation was, according to the Committee, a safe ship to fight an action in bad weather in the middle of the Atlantic. Sir Spencer Robinson, a distinguished authority (Appendix, page 17), says— She will be a perfectly safe sea-boat under all ordinary circumstances [3303], for instance, in a hurricane, or a first-class gale with a cross sea, and with a lee shore and lee current obliging her to be forced against head seas. A most distinguished man of theoretical science (Sir William Thomson) reports— The Sub-Committee unanimously conclude that even without bilge keels or the 'superstructure,' the Devastation could not be capsized under any circumstances of the possibility of which there is any evidence. Now, Sir, these are the printed and published speculations of 17 (less two) distinguished men, with Lord Dufferin and Clandeboye at their head, and the country might have expected that they were safe advisers. But, alas, Sir, for the fallibility of theoretic views, the Devastation is condemned as not safe to go to sea. The united voices of Admirals Elliot and Ryder must now be heard—they objected and protested at the time. They say (Report on Designs, March 11th, 1871)— The Scientific Sub-Committee has reported unanimously that the Devastation will be perfectly safe from capsizing under any conceivable circumstances; but it will be noticed that the curve of stability, as calculated by the Constructors, has been assumed to be accurate, 'and has not been re-calculated'—we are not aware that the theory involved in calculating curves of stability has been confirmed by any practical experiments on a sufficient scale. Let me ask my practical fellow-countrymen what they think of this. The very vital principle—the sine quâ non of safety—upon which all the calculations of safety were based, had it appears been "assumed to be accurate," and had "not been re-calculated;" and at the same time the "theory involved," we are then told, "has not been confirmed by any practical experiments on a sufficient scale." Yet in this condition of things millions are wasted and thousands of lives are imperilled. I venture to think, Sir, that I have made out a primâ facie case for re-consideration. Nay, the question grows in gravity at every step. Doubt augments as more and more confusion and conflict appear all round; and it is impossible not to welcome the advice of 1871, to "pause," and to make adequate experiments on an adequate scale. A word more. Will the House listen to what Admiral Fishbourne—a man who has served Her Majesty in every quarter of the globe, and who knows the behaviour of ships at sea as well as how to design them, a mathematician of no mean order—says about the Devastation? He says, and he has put it, on his responsibility, in print— On one occasion the Devastation gave so deep a lurch that all hands rushed on deck thinking she was not going to rise again, and possibly had she been struck with sea at this critical moment, as the Captain was, we should have had another proof of the folly, to use a mild term, of giving ships small initial stability and deep empty spaces in their bottoms. At the risk of pressing most unduly upon the kindness of the House, I must now allude to the history of these buoyant bottoms, intended to "lift the engines and heavy weights out of the water, in order to moderate rolling"—as if that was everything! The scientific author of the theory is understood to be Mr. Froude; the practical advocate of it Mr. Reed—I mean the hon. Member for Pembroke. Now, I think the first prominent discussion in scientific circles took place in 1863, and Mr. Froude was certainly not unwarned. An eminent and highly-experienced authority, Mr. Scott Russell, said in 1863— Mr. Froude has recommended that ships should be constructed so as to have the largest possible periodic time of roll, and has recommended, as the method of giving this long periodic time, the lessening of her stability under canvas. I have carefully examined the subject with reference to the safety of following out such a principle, and I have compared it with the results of a long course of practice of my own, and have come to the conclusion that, both in principle and in practice, it would be unwise and unsafe to follow his advice. … Mr. Froude recommends for 'insuring the safety of a ship, as a practical measure, that it should have given to it such a distribution of weight as shall insure to it a long period of oscillation;' and he adheres to this maxim under conditions and to an extent which to me appear dangerous and unsound. What I assert is, that such a cure is worse than the disease. I do not think that this synchronism of oscillation (which Mr. Froude fears) is a formidable fact, or is an ordinary source of danger to real ships on real sea waves, as distinguished from experimental models in a fishpond. But, Sir, Mr. Scott Russell was not alone. A man at the head of naval science, the Rev. Dr. Woolley, said at the same period— I may safely say that, in the main, I agree with Mr. Scott Russell's remarks. The Chairman, Canon Mozeley, in his concluding remarks, while allowing fully the merit of the investigations of Mr. Froude, says— In these words of caution I fully concur, and for this reason—that Mr. Froude, in pressing the conclusions of his own theory, which is entitled to all respect, seems to forget that, after all, his mode of viewing the question is but one among several. Had these eminent objectors been told that anyone would be rash enough to add to other objections the dangerous combination of heavy armoured sides and immense turrets, I fancy the protests against the theory would have been even more energetic. Still the First Lord of 1863 must have known all this; and every First Lord ought to have had the good and the bad of the theory from time to time laid before him. But in the Report of the Committee on Designs, a Mr. Froude appears. He was one of the distinguished men whose conflicting views about the Devastation have been read. I presume he is the Mr. Froude of 1863. Now, if hon. Members will peruse that Report, they will find that Mr. Froude has, according to it, made some wonderful experiments "with bilge keels." He had made a large model of the Froude-bottomed Devastation, with bilge keels and without. The Devastation without the keels capsized; the Devastation with these keels—a thing, I believe, Sir, six feet wide, sticking out from the bilge of the ship—kept her legs. But I will read the evidence. Mr. Froude says— With 6 feet keels she made 4 and 3½ double rolls only, against 31½ and 29 without any keels. Tried without any bilge keels, the model rolled 21 degs. (weather-roll greatest), and happening to fall over towards an advancing wave, was overrun by it, and turned right over. Fortunately, Sir, it was the model and not the ship which "turned right over;" but what do not the experiments show of the rottenness of the principle? Then, Sir, with the Captain gone, the Devastation capsized in model, and ballast used to cure "errors of design," it may but be fair to give the hon. Gentleman the credit of his views about the ballast. The late Chief Constructor of the Navy, in writing to The Times on the 7th of November last, and touching upon ships of the Vanguard class, said— It would probably be necessary to correct the centre of gravity by ballast, observing that 100 tons of cheap pig iron in that form would serve the same purpose as 200 tons of expensive iron distributed throughout the hull and wrought into the structure. We have it in evidence that as much as 500 tons of extra iron-cement ballast has been put into one of the hon. Gentleman's ships. Now will he assert that that was his original intention? I think he will not. But will he tell the House, here in his place, that 1,000 tons were saved in the structure of the ship in consequence? On referring to the Report of the Designs Committee, I find all the practical shipbuilders objecting to the weakness of the bottoms of these ships. They say some of them would not take the ground without damage—damage which on an enemy's coast might disable them, and hand them over an easy prey to even a weaker enemy. It may be said that in extending the illustration of 100 tons of ballast saving 200 tons of expensive material worked into the structure, to the sequitur that 500 tons of ballast could save 1,000 tons in structure, I have indulged in the re-ductio ad absurdum. I know, Sir, in my own mercantile experience, we go in for making a strong and safe ship; and we should consider it absurd and uneconomical in the last degree—Lloyd's would pull us up for it—to save material at the cost of strength and safety, and then to trust to ballast to prevent capsizing. The hon. Gentleman's alteration reminds me of George Stephenson's remark to me about Mr. Brunei's atmospheric railways. He said, in good, round north-country dialect—"The man forgets that a pound will never weigh more than a pound." And now, Sir, I have said, and others—who have in every sense a right to say it—that calculation has been in error, and that practical proof of scientific speculation has not been adequately given. I quoted Admiral Fishbourne because he has spoken and written on the result of a life of practical experience. I may abstract his published views of the causes of error. He says— The position of the centre of gravity is determined in the usual way, while the position of the 'centre of pressure' has been erroneously assumed. … The next proposition, &c., supposes the water … to become solid. … This is to introduce a change of law. … Thus it is manifest that the present metacentric method of calculation is erroneous. The House will remember that reduced rolling was the object of the buoyant bottoms. I have here evidence showing conclusively that, while ballast here and there corrected the evil, the only advantage proposed has been utterly illusory; therefore I ash where, when, and by whom has it been "ascertained" that the "tendency to roll" has been "reduced" by "raising the engines, boilers, and other weights?" Now, Sir, what will be urged in reply? It will be said that in the Merchant Navy there are ships even less stable. One error, however, cannot excuse another, and the merchant ship has no armour and no turret. But I doubt the fact. Then it will be said, again, that there are, or were, ships in the Navy itself, less stable than the Captain, and quotations may be made of cases where the distance or depth of the spaces has been greater than in the hon. Member's ships. But that, if so, is only part of the truth. What is the relative total buoyancy in the comparative cases? and what is the comparative relation between the quantity of misplaced buoyancy and its distribution, and the weighting above the water-line? We never can forget, Sir, that unsafe ships make timid sailors. A brave tar said to Admiral Fishbourne, speaking of the iron-clad in which he had served—"They allowed us, Sir, to travel the world over for three years, and 'then' heeled the ship and found her unsafe, and put ballast into her." And further—naval failures in England are an assault upon our naval reputation—a bulwark of strength hitherto even better and stronger than a fleet. Who is responsible? Hitherto responsibility, like assessment, has been a mere "shifting of burdens." We have been warned of "old-fashioned admirals"—maythere not be rash and adventurous naval architects? Which is the best, where life, treasure, and reputation are at stake—over-prudence or temerity? I trust the First Lord will not accept the latter line of conduct. I fear, Sir, much of the fault must ever attach to our system of Parliamentary or party government itself. The exigencies of party in the reward of party service lead to the appointment as First Lord (for example) of some distinguished man from the antipodes, or some great merchant of exchange from the City, or some popular country gentleman quite up to corn and cattle. Usually these appointments are made somewhat late in life; and all the associations and experience of such Gentlemen, great as their talents naturally may be, are in opposite directions to the technical knowledge and power of governing bodies of men in the intricate business of a vast naval Department. Well, when such a First Lord enters upon his duties he must be a nonentity—I mean, that he must be guided and governed by the permanent officials about him. In a while he emerges, and feels his feet somewhat. He becomes an entity. He may at last gather strength enough to discharge some useful officer, whose will may be stronger than his own; and just as he is to become useful, independent, and the owner of a naval policy, the Government to which he belongs is split by a feud, killed by a hostile majority, or commits felo de se through an unexpected Dissolution. The only hope, Sir, that I see for improvement is derived from the belief that this House will give more attention to practical questions, and will be, as I hope in this case, disposed to support a policy of prudence in dealing with the safety and progress of our Navy. The hon. Member concluded by moving his Resolution.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "the mode of construction (assumed to have been introduced by the late Chief Constructor of the Navy) adopted in the 'Captain' and other ironclads, viz. deep empty spaces in the ships bottoms, and high centres of gravity, demands reconsideration on the part of the Admiralty,"—(Sir Edward Watkin,) —instead thereof.

MR. E. J. REED

said, his hon. Friend the Member for Hythe (Sir Edward Watkin) had arrived at a somewhat lame and impotent conclusion. He had complained of City men and country Gentlemen being made First Lords, and yet thought it would be an improvement to make the whole of the House of Commons, in its corporate capacity, the head of the Admiralty. That, instead of being an improvement on the present system, would be one of the most unfortunate things which could happen. It would be utterly impossible for the House to give instructions upon minute points of shipbuilding, respecting which most of its Members knew little or nothing. He objected to such a thing; but he also objected to the hon. Gentleman having linked his (Mr. Reed's) name with the name of the only iron-clad of the British Navy which had been lost, whereas not one single iron-clad ship which he had constructed had been lost or endangered. Whatever might have been his shortcomings when he was Chief Constructor, they had not in any way been associated with the designing of the Captain. That was the one single ship which had been designed outside the Admiralty during his term of office, and that was not even an imitation of anything in the designs which he constructed at the Admiralty. It was intimated in the Motion that he introduced unusually high centres of gravity; that he introduced unusually deep double bottoms; that the designer of the Captain imitated his vicious example in these respects; and that the ship was lost in consequence. The hon. and gallant Member for Chatham (Admiral Elliot) had made many of those brief speeches which were embodied in the words "Hear, hear," but he challenged the hon. and gallant Member to invalidate any of the facts and figures he would now adduce. With regard to the first proposition: before his period of office there were three classes of ships—the Minotaur, representing the Northumberland and Agincourt; the Achilles, representing the Warrior class; and the Valiant representing ships of the Sector class. To estimate the height of the centre of gravity you must have a basis of measurement, and he took the surface of the sea. In the Achilles the centre of gravity was 1½ feet below the water surface; in the Valiant it was 1¾ feet; and in the Minotaur it was very nearly 2 feet In the first iron-clad he had constructed, the Bellerophon, it was a little more than 2 feet. So, instead of producing a high centre of gravity, he introduced a lower one than that which characterized the three classes of vessels introduced by his predecessor. Then with respect to double bottoms: when the building of the Minotaur was committed to the Thames Iron Shipbuilding Company, the managers and architect proposed that a double bottom should be introduced; the Admiralty concurred in the proposition; it was accordingly introduced; and the distance from the inner bottom to the outer one was 6 feet; and yet he never heard that she exhibited any unsafe qualities or any tendency to capsize. In his ship—the Bellerophon—the distance was only 4½ feet. These facts swept away the first two affirmations as to the centre of gravity and double bottoms, which, apart from other considerations, had nothing to do with the safety or unsafety of the ship, and the assertion that they had, would only be made by a person who was dabbling in a subject he did not understand. Next, with respect to the Captain—which he repeated, he did not design—her centre of gravity was placed as low as 2 feet 11 inches below the water, and the space between her bottoms was only 2 feet 7 inches. His hon. Friend was, therefore, entirely wrong in supposing either that he raised the centre of gravity or increased the depth of the double bottoms, or that the designers of the Captain gave her a high centre of gravity and a deep double bottom; indeed he did not know in what respect both in his speech and Resolution, the hon. Member was not wrong. He did not know how far it was right for an hon. Member on such an occasion as that to make a speech travelling over so many important subjects, and so much ground that required special notice and due consideration, nor did he know whether it would be competent for so young a Member of the House as he himself was to take advantage of the indiscretion of another hon. Member, and to go into all the questions which had been raised as to the construction of the Captain and the Devastation. In the letters in The Times, with which the hon. Gentleman had reproached him, he had communicated what he thought due to his position as to both those vessels, but he would now state, however, what it was important the House should know, that the Captain was not lost, and the Devastation was not suspected, from the causes assigned by the hon. Member, and if they had been, his hon. Friend had not exhibited proofs of sufficient knowledge of the subject to enable him to discuss them to the satisfaction of the House. The hon. Gentleman actually attempted to cast derision upon him (Mr. Reed) for having imagined that a ton of ballast placed low would have the same effect as two tons placed high, but probably no other hon. Member was so deficient in nautical knowledge as not to be aware that such was the case.

SIR EDWARD WATKIN

said, it appeared from a statement of the hon. Member that 100 tons in ballast would save 200 tons of material in structure; and from that he had argued that 500 tons would in like manner, save 1,000.

MR. E. J. REED

said, he had no doubt his hon. Friend meant something he thought was correct, but not understanding the subject on which he spoke, he was not correct. The House would remember that a few years ago it became a matter of importance to check the tendency to enormous rolling which many iron-clad ships displayed; and that was done, not by raising the centre of gravity or deepening double bottoms in the abstract, but by making these changes in relation to the meta-centric, and other changes of great importance. They gradually diminished the metacentric height of various ships as they were successively built, until at length, in designing the Audacious class, they believed they had got to the limit, having also saved weight in the bottom from the waterline downwards. They, consequently, had a little less stability than was required, and restored it by placing about half the weight saved in the form of ballast in the bottom. Singular and unnatural as this might appear to the hon. Member, he could assure him that that could be done in exact conformity with natural laws, and he was sure the House would not wish to repeal, or cast doubt upon a law of nature. That they had succeeded in the Audacious class of ships was, he believed, well known. He had a letter from an eminent officer and high authority on the subject, which only reached him yesterday, and he refrained from giving the name of the writer, simply because the envelope in which it was enclosed was marked "private." The Invincible, which belonged to the Audacious class, sailed from Malta and arrived at Barcelona on the 8th March. She encountered very heavy seas and high gales, but her great guns were worked in the worst weather, the practice made being extremely good, three targets being shot away. The gale lasted 30 hours, and the ship rose as buoyantly as if she had been a wooden frigate, and she inspired the utmost confidence not only in her sailing, but her fighting qualities in the minds of everyone on board. That was a sufficient answer to the statements which had been made by the hon. Member on the authority to which he had referred. He (Mr. Reed) did not complain of criticism, but he should be pained if the House were led astray by views derived from the writings of a half-crazy Admiral whether enunciated at first or second hand. ["Oh, oh!"] He hoped he was not out of order in saying that, for he esteemed Admiral Fishbourne's writings as proofs of a half-crazy condition of mind. They were not accepted by any man of science, and he was accustomed to consider gentlemen who imagined themselves wiser than all the world as being in a state of half-craziness. He was satisfied that the ships with which he had been associated had been successful; but he must advert for a moment to the Captain, and if he were asked the cause of her loss, he would explain that, while more stable than ordinary ships in an upright or nearly upright position, she was without sides to continue that stability under other circumstances. Comparing her with the Monarch, which he designed by order of the Admiralty to embody Captain Coles' principle, her righting power at 5 degrees from the perpendicular was represented by 2,330 foot-tons—in other words, a force equivalent to one ton acting at the end of a lever of 2,330 feet, or 2,330 tons at the end of a lever of one foot in length, while the stability of the Monarch, a somewhat larger ship, was 1,990. At 10 degrees the Captain's stability was 4,200 foot-tons, the Monarch's only 3,820. At 15 degrees the stability of the two ships became equal, because the Captain had begun to immerse her deck, while the Monarch went on immersing her side. At 20 degrees the Captain had only 7,000 foot-tons stability, whereas the Monarch had risen to 8,140; and at 25 degrees the Captain was in the fatal position of having a diminishing stability, because of her want of sides. Her stability had fallen to 6,850 foot-tons, while the Monarch's had risen to 10,630. At 35 degrees the Captain's had dropped to 5,000; and the Monarch's had risen to 15,000; at 45 degrees the Captain's was 2,700, while the Monarch's remained at 15,000; and at 55 degrees of inclination the Captain's stability had wholly gone, but the Monarch had 10,600 foot-tons, or double the amount she had at 15 degrees. With figures like those it was idle to close their eyes to them, or to look in any other direction for explanations of a most obvious fact. His hon. Friend said that it appeared from something he (Mr. Reed) was supposed to have said or written, he did not know when, that he had advised, if another Captain was to be built, she should have greater beam and a lower centre of gravity, and he seemed to think that was inconsistent with his present view. In fact, however, it was in exact conformity with all he had ever said or thought about the matter. They might have a ship with as low a free-board as the Captain, but they must give her an enormous initial stability. He thought he had said enough to satisfy the House that the Captain was not built according to his instructions, but in violation of them, and was not lost from the causes the hon. Gentleman supposed; and if the House did decide on dictating to the Admiralty how centres of gravity were to be placed—which he might inform his hon. Friend, were not like stores, which could be drawn out and placed half way up the mast, or half way down the hold—they would be going back to the infantile experience of his hon. Friend. In conclusion, he begged to assure the House that he had very unwillingly taken part in preventing it from proceeding with the actual business before it.

ADMIRAL ELLIOT

said, he stood there in defence of his oldest friend, who was not in this world to defend himself—he stood there to defend the character and reputation of Captain Coles. The hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. E. J. Reed) did not think it unbecoming to bring the name of Captain Coles before his constituents at Hull, and charge that officer with the loss of the Captain. The hon. Member had thereby sought to damage the reputation of Captain Coles; but he (Admiral Elliot) maintained that Captain Coles was no more responsible for the loss of the Captain than the Speaker whom he was then addressing. That able officer was considered one of the brightest ornaments of the profession.

MR. E. J. REED

rose to Order. He was not aware that he had even mentioned Captain Coles, or made any attack upon him. It was of course impossible to refer to the Captain, which was built according to his designs, without his name being involved, but that was no attack.

ADMIRAL ELLIOT

said, that he held in his hand an extract from a speech of Mr. Reed's, taken from The Hull News, October 18th, 1873, wherein he distinctly sought to saddle Captain Coles with the responsibility for the loss of the Captain, and the hon. Gentleman had stated to-night that the Captain was lost owing to one main feature in her construction—namely, the low freeboard which was introduced by Captain Coles. It was not surprising, then, that his widow should ask whether no friend would stand up in his vindication. He (Admiral Elliot) had known Captain Coles for 45 years; he was a man of genius, and commanded the confidence of all who knew him. If he had been in that House, he would have been able to answer fully those who assailed him and who were really responsible for that feature in the construction of the Captain, which was the cause of her loss—namely, insufficient beam. He contended that the Correspondence which had been laid upon the Table proved the real responsibility for the loss of the Captain rested with the hon. Member for Pembroke and the Controller of the Navy, who had approved and carried out the plans submitted to the Admiralty, which plans contained a gross error in naval architecture, for which Captain Coles was in no way responsible. He considered that the hon. Member for Hythe had introduced with great ability a subject of the highest importance to the Navy. He agreed with the hon. Member for Pembroke that a double bottom, per se, was not a criterion of the unsafety of a ship, also that a high centre of gravity, per se, was not a criterion of the unsafety of a ship, and he would go further and say that a high centre of gravity and a double bottom combined were no criterion of the unsafety of a ship; but if they took those two elements in connection with a want of beam, they did get a criterion of the unsafety of the ship; and he considered the Captain was lost on account of not having sufficient stability, and that, he contended, was an error in construction. The design of that ship, when worked out, was submitted to the Construction Department of the Navy, and they reported on those calculations that she had sufficient stability; and if they had not done so, she never would have been built. He thought the hon. Member for Hythe (Sir Edward Watkin) had done good service in calling the attention of the Admiralty to this matter. In the Captain they had a double bottom, a centre of gravity which was not a low one, a freeboard of only 6 feet, and she had 5 feet less beam than the competitive ship, the Monarch. If everything had been done to try and make a ship that would upset, these conditions were found in the Captain. She carried more weights than were necessary; but he believed that with 7 feet additional breadth of beam she would have been a perfectly safe ship, and would have been now afloat, and the most powerful fighting sea-going ship in the Navy. Captain Coles never presumed to be a naval architect, but merely designed a ship, leaving it to the scientific men to work out that design. And there was no reason why they should not have worked it out safety. With regard to the 8 feet freeboard which Captain Coles suggested, it was not proof of itself that the Captain was unsafe, or how did it happen that merchant ships with less freeboard as compared to draught of water, were able to go to all parts of the world in safety, the usual scale for merchant ships being 3 inches of freeboard per foot of draught? It was on record in a public Report that the Construction Department of the Admiralty, at that time, held the opinion that an 8 feet freeboard did not, per se, represent an unsafe ship. It further appeared that while the Captain was in good repute, five shipbuilders were invited to send in to the Admiralty designs for ships-of-war of the same class. The Construction Department reported on these designs, and gave the preference to that of the Messrs. Laird, the height of freeboard of their ship being the same as that of the Captain, as submitted by Captain Coles—namely, 8 feet. That was the hon. Member for Pembroke's own Report. How, then, could it be pretended that the hon. Member had it in his mind at that time that the Captain was an unsafe ship on account of her low freeboard, he having approved of an 8 feet freeboard. Moreover, the late Chief Constructor and the late Controller of the Navy had themselves sent in a design of a ship with only 8 feet freeboard amidships, to compete with the designs of the shipbuilders; so that neither in the mind of one nor the other was the 8 feet freeboard regarded as an element of danger, and in all these competitive designs there was no restriction as to the height of freeboard which might be selected by the designers. Some of the designs sent in had a very high freeboard, yet Mr. Reed gave the preference to a freeboard of 8 feet. He (Admiral Elliot) was one of those who believed that an 8 feet of freeboard would have made a perfectly safe ship if she had sufficient beam, and Mr. Reed must have thought the same, or he would not have selected that height of freeboard for his own design. He considered that, most unjustly, this question of 8 feet of freeboard had been made use of to cover a scientific blunder, and he asserted that giving more beam to the Captain would not necessarily have reduced her speed. After that ship was constructed it was found that she went down 18 inches deeper in the water than had been intended, and yet she was actually allowed to go into the Bay of Biscay, when it ought to have been known that if she heeled over by pressure of canvas in the long swell of the Bay of Biscay, 6½ degrees, she would inevitably go down. This information was afterwards afforded by the Scientific Committee of the Committee on Designs for ships of war, and it ought to have been ascertained by the Chief Constructor before the Captain put to sea. With regard to the question of responsibility for the disaster, he maintained that Captain Coles was perfectly justified in recommending an 8 feet freeboard, for that freeboard was approved and adopted by the Construction Department of the Admiralty. To bring forward, therefore, her low freeboard as the cause of her loss was quite unjustifiable; and he held also that the First Lord or the Board of Admiralty could not be held responsible for a scientific error in construction. They must look elsewhere for the responsibility. The Messrs. Laird, when it was found that the vessel went down 18 inches to 2 feet deeper than was intended, demanded that an inquiry and experiments should be made. A very long delay, which had never been explained, ensued before these experimental tests were made, and after they were made, all concerned were left in perfect ignorance of the result. The Captain was allowed to go to the Bay of Biscay after those tests were made, and remain there after the result of those tests were known to the Construction Department, and neither the Admiralty nor Captain Burgoyne were informed of the real state of the danger which those tests had disclosed, although a telegraphic message to Vigo would have conveyed the information, which would have saved the ship from the inevitable danger which was impending. Was it likely that Captain Coles and Captain Burgoyne would have endangered not only their own lives but the lives of so gallant a crew if they had been correctly informed as to the danger which existed? He held that the paid officers of the Crown ought to have known every feature of the ship when she was constructed, and more especially when it was found that the ship floated deeper by 18 inches in the water than was intended, thereby intensifying the blunder originally inherent in her construction. He held that great neglect was displayed in the delay of making the experiments asked for by Messrs. Laird, and still further in allowing 17 days to elapse before the calculations were made for ascertaining the result; and that the concealment of the danger, disclosed by the result of those calculations, was inexplicable. These gentlemen had written strong letters in their day; but could they show a single letter to the authorities stating that the ship was dangerous and would go over if she heeled 6½ degrees in an Atlantic swell under pressure of canvas? The strong point of evidence in favour of Captain Coles was that although every effort was made to induce him to sign a certificate that the Captain, as built, represented his opinions, yet he would not do so. The hon. Member for Pembroke had referred to the Bellerophon proof that he was not an advocate of a high centre of gravity. But that ship was a notoriously uneasy one, and this fact might have had something to do with the building of ships of less stability. A number of curious scientific notions had existed in regard to the construction of vessels of war. It did not seem to be thoroughly understood that the days had gone by for putting ballast in any ship, much less in a steamship. Then there were vessels like the Cyclops, which were only fit to go from port to port in favourable weather, and others, like the Bellerophon, which drew 5 feet or 6 feet more water aft than forward, and being built with a plough bow, carried tons of water before her as an impediment to her speed. He would call the attention of his right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty to the fact that a large sum of money was to be voted that night for the purpose of building ships to be plated with 8 inches and 10 inches of iron; and it was alleged that this was a sufficient protection against guns now in existence on foreign stations, but he protested against such a dangerous decision. His great principle was to protect a ship in such a manner, by an armoured deck 5 or 6 feet below water, that her boiler and magazine should be safe; but a ship plated only with 8 or 10 inches of side armour could not by any possibility resist heavy guns, and in an engagement, therefore, her boiler and her magazine were liable to be blown up by the first shell of the enemy. The whole story of armour versus guns was this. In 1861, and again in 1872, both Sir William Armstrong and Sir Joseph Whitworth said there was no limit to the power of the gun, and that 24 inches of iron on a ship's side was insufficient to resist the gun that could be produced and carried on shipboard, and could not, therefore, be considered a permanent defence. Beginning with 4 inches we had gone on gradually, as guns increased in power, till now, in the case of the Inflexible, we had reached 24 inches of iron. There was no guarantee that even this thickness would be impenetrable; and he contended that, looking to the enormous sacrifices made of other valuable warlike properties, in order to obtain this thickness of iron over so small a portion of the hull, the continued use of side armour of any lesser thickness could not be supported on the principle of armour protection. On the whole, he did not object to the Inflexible as a last attempt at side armour protection, although he objected to mastless ships. In her there was partially an armoured deck below water, and this was a step in the right direction. He ventured to say, moreover, that she would have more stability than the Devastation, and would live and fight when the Devastation might be expected to founder. As to her side armour, it was to be confined to the centre of the vessel. But to build iron-clads with 8 inches to 10 inches of armour, and to count upon this as a sufficient defence, was neither scientific nor judicious; it was simply inviting an immediate and total destruction of a ship by the exposure of magazines and boilers. Before proceeding further in this course, it was most desirable that the opinions of authorities outside the Admiralty should be ascertained and considered. He wished distinctly to disclaim any intention of casting reflection on the ability of the present Board of Construction of the Navy. Those gentlemen had now obtained great experience—no matter how—but it was nevertheless a pity, he thought, that the old system—under which such men as Mr. Watts and Mr. Large, and Mr. Abethell, who, after long practical experience, had reached the Board of Construction—should have been interfered with. The result had been a greater amount of scientific eccentricities than had ever previously been witnessed—arising out of the appointment of young and inexperienced men in the place of old officers, who, as master shipwrights of Her Majesty's Dockyards, had possessed not only the scientific acquirements obtained from the School of Naval Architecture, but that most valuable feature of efficiency—namely, practical experience. He held that the practical knowledge acquired by master shipwrights, from long and constant interchange of ideas—as regarded the warlike and sea-going requirements of ships-of-war—with captains and Admirals, and, in fact, all the executive officers of the Fleet was most valuable, and that it was most desirable, for the interests of the service that the Construction Department of the Navy should, as in all former days of our naval supremacy, be recruited from the ranks of the master shipwrights of Her Majesty's Dockyards. That system had produced that combination of science and practical efficiency so conspicuously displayed in the perfection of naval architecture during the Controllership of Sir Baldwin Walker. With regard to the Captain, he thought it was a scandal that the loss of that ship had never been brought to bear on those who were really responsible; and he believed that if a full investigation took place, his lamented friend, Captain Coles, would be entirely released from blame, whilst those who had been seeking to sully his reputation would find themselves condemned at the bar of public opinion, if they were not so already.

Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put, and agreed to.