§ MR. HUNT, in moving the Vote for £602,757, for Wages, &c., for Seamen and Marines, said: Sir, I feel that I need the indulgence of the Committee in endeavouring to perform the task assigned to me on this occasion—because not only is the time since I undertook the duties of my present office exceedingly short, but the work of the Department is entirely new to me. Under these circumstances, I feel conscious that I shall not be able to give the assistance to the Committee in explaining the Estimates that I could have done if the time afforded to me had been longer; and therefore I hope the Committee will bear with me in any shortcomings I may exhibit.
At the outset it is better to say that the Estimates I am about to present to the Committee are the Estimates I found in my Department upon my accession to office—with one single exception, which I will mention hereafter. These Estimates were merely what are termed Departmental Estimates—that is to say, Estimates framed by my right hon. Predecessor the Member for London, with the assistance of the officers of the Department, in accordance with his views and the requirements of the service, but which had not received the sanction of his Colleagues in the Cabinet. It is under these circumstances that I present the Estimates to the Committee, and the 850 sums asked for are the sums that the right hon. Gentleman would have asked his Colleagues to sanction—with the exception of £7,000, which I added to the total amount before presenting them to Parliament, for the reason I will presently give. The gross sum asked for the naval service of the year is £10,179,485; but from this gross sum certain abatements have to be made. There are extra receipts and repayments amounting to £143,000, and contributions from the Indian Government on account of the expense of the fleet on the Indian station of £70,000; making together £213,000, leaving the net charge for the Navy for the year at £9,966,485. One thing, however, I should mention—that the comparison made in the printed Estimates between this year and the last is not now accurate, owing, as the Committee will remember, to a Supplemental Estimate having been presented at the close of the financial year of £105,000 for the enforcement of the squadron that is, amongst other things, to operate at Zanzibar for the prohibition of the slave trade. The sum stated in the Abstract presented with the Votes last year amounted to £9,899,725. which, with the Supplemental Vote of £105,000, amounted to £10,004,725. I propose to lay upon the Table a corrected statement of the expenditure for the past year for convenience of comparison with the Estimates for the present year. Comparing the sum now asked for with that of last year, there is an increase of £174,760, instead of £279,760 as shown in the Estimates so presented. As I have stated, the net amount required this year is £9,966,485; but of this amount there is a certain sum taken for the Army Service, which, by the rule in force at the Treasury, must be, as it is administered by the Admiralty, met in the Navy Estimates, amounting to £175,600, leaving the net balance chargeable for the Navy Services proper at £9,790,885. But there is reciprocity in these matters, for in the same way my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War takes in his Estimates certain charges for the Navy; and this year the balance is rather against me—the sum so taken amounting to £202,782—leaving with that sum the real charge for the Navy at £9,993,667, or as nearly as possible £10,000,000. The Committee 851 will no doubt like to hear how that sum is apportioned under the two great divisions of the Estimates—the Effective and the non-Effective Services. For the latter, which are represented by Votes 15 and 16, for Half-pay and Pensions, there will be required £ 1,815,000, leaving a little over £8,000,000 for the Effective Services. Of this sum one half may be considered, in round numbers, as spent on the personnel of the Navy, including' Marines, Coast Guards, and Naval Reserve, represented in Votes 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, and 12. Of the other half, the matériél as represented by Votes 6, 10, and 11, absorbs, in round numbers, £3,700,000, leaving something over £400,000 for Administration, Scientific Branches, Law Charges, and Miscellaneous. The division I have made must not be taken as strictly accurate, but for general purposes it will answer. Thus I have taken the charges for the Victualling Department and the Medical Establishments as part of the personnel of the Navy, because, for the most part they exist for the purpose of feeding and keeping in good health the officers, men, and boys of the Elect, though no doubt they are also available, to a certain extent, for those who are employed in the Dockyards as well as those on board ship.
I now propose to examine and go through the different Votes in order, and to call the attention of the Committee to any point I think of special interest to them, and to which I have been able to give particular attention, and to explain the difference between the amounts asked for this year as compared with those of last year, where such difference is of any substantial importance.
The Committee were good enough, a short time since, to vote the Number of Men without any statement being made by me; and I may remind the Committee that the number was the same as that of last year. The Officers, Men, and Boys have been taken at 46,000, and the Marines at 14,000, making a total of 60,000 asked for the year. The boys were reduced 500 last year, and they now remain at 7,000, of whom 3,000 are under training in training ships. During the Easter Recess I had the opportunity of inspecting a large portion of the force of boys under training. I inspected 1,700 of them at Devon- 852 port, and anything more satisfactory than their appearance, and the manner in which they did their drill cannot be imagined; and the military officers who were looking on envied me the promising nursery I had there for boys. The healthy appearance—I may say the muscular appearance—of these boys, their discipline, and the regularity of their movements excited the praise and commendation of all who were present. The Marines remain the same in number that they have stood at for years—14,000. The Wages for the Seamen and Marines stand at £2,602,757, of which the Committee has already voted £2,000,000, leaving a balance of a little over £600,000. There is an apparent decrease in the Estimates, in respect of this Vote, of £27,127, and it may appear strange that there should be this decrease upon the Vote when the numbers are the same. The fact is, that it is owing to a transfer to another Vote—in consequence of an alteration made by my predecessor—of the sum of £31,000, which would otherwise have appeared in this Vote, this sum now figures in the Victualling Vote. Indeed, after the accounts shall have been thus adjusted, there is an increase in the Wages Vote of nearly £5,000 over last year's Estimate.
I now come to Vote No. 2, the Victualling and Clothing Vote. When the number of men is once fixed, this Vote is governed by it, and the amount follows as a matter of course. A correction must be made in this Vote, consequential on the correction in Vote 1; so that there would have been, in fact, a decrease of £3,375 in Vote No. 2, instead of an increase of £28,545, as shown in the Estimates, if the transfer had not been made.
Vote No. 3, for the Admiralty Office, of £178,066, shows an increase of a little over £3,000, chiefly due to the progressive increase of salaries due to length of Service.
In Vote No. 4, of £163,311, for Coast Guard Service and Royal Naval Reserve, there is a decrease of £4,261; but those who remember the discussion introduced the other evening by my hon. Friend the Member for Hastings (Mr. Brassey) will be aware that this decrease does not represent a decrease in numbers, for it is satisfactory to find that, chiefly owing to the judicious alterations made by my predecessor, the right hon. 853 Gentleman opposite (Mr. Goschen) the Force is increased by 2,400 men. The reason for the decrease in the Estimate is that the experience of last year shows that a certain number of the men who enter the Naval Reserve do not present themselves when called upon for the training, and, therefore, it was felt that an abatement might be very fairly made, which has been taken at 10 per cent.
In Vote 5, £111,170 for the Scientific Branch, there is an increase of £12,516. of which the larger part, £7,000, is due to expenses in connection with the observations of the Transit of Venus, a charge which is, of course, exceptional for this year.
There is in the Vote a charge of £33,500 for the Royal Naval College at Greenwich. I am sorry I have not been able as yet to find time to visit this establishment, but I find from Sir Cowper Key, who is at its head, that 194 officers have availed themselves of the education given in the College; but I shall certainly watch with interest the progress of this establishment.
In Vote 6, the sum required is £1,180,326 for Dockyards and Naval Yards at home and abroad; there is an increase of £65,246, arising mainly from the employment of 800 additional men in the Dockyards. The reason which the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Goschen) had for the increase in the Vote which he contemplated was that this year there would be a great deal of repairing required in connection with our iron-clads. It is in this Vote that I have made the alteration alluded to, by adding 100 men to the 700 proposed by my predecessor, and rendered necessary by the great amount of repairing work required this year on account of our iron-clads now coming in for repair. The alteration I have made is for the sake of putting a new armament on the Minotaur, which will now be more powerful than before. I found that this vessel required very considerable repairs, and that her new armament had been prepared. Orders had already been given that the new armament should be put on board the Achilles, and the addition that I hare made will allow of the Minotaur being dealt with in the same way. The additions which I have referred to will give a total of 14,300 men, as proposed in the Estimates before the Committee, and the proportions are 6,080 men on 854 the establishment and 8,220 hired men. Of the additional men employed, 190 will be set to work at Chatham, 350 at Portsmouth, and the remaining 250 at Devonport. There are four iron-clads in commission now undergoing a temporary re-fit, and there are six not in commission that will have to undergo very substantial repairs. The experience we have had of the repairing of these ironclads is of very recent date. In the last financial year three iron-clads came in for repairs; two have been repaired, but the third is not quite finished. The experience gained in repairing these vessels shows that a larger number of men than was anticipated must be employed on these repairs. In addition to that a very formidable question arises with regard to the boilers. The improvements that have taken place in engines and boilers whereby certain advantages have been gained have resulted, apparently, in a much shorter duration of life than was formerly averaged to these boilers; and that experience has not been confined to the Royal Navy, because by communication with the great Steamship Companies we find that the same complaints are experienced by them. I may here say, therefore, that I have at once determined to do that which I rather believe my Predecessor had in contemplation—to appoint a Committee to consider the subject. I have the advantage of having secured the services as Chairman, of my hon. and gallant Friend (Admiral Elliot) who earlier in the evening called the attention of the House to the subject of Dockyards. With him will be associated the names of certain persons connected with the Admiralty whose position and authority will add weight to the decision arrived at by the Committee, and I have also asked the Steamship Companies to confer together and select a representative. The Committee will also number among its members an eminent chemist; so that we may be sure that anything that can be suggested as a remedy for the evils complained of will not be lost sight of. I have by me the Reports which have been made on this subject of the boilers by the Departmental Committee, and the Committee can see from them that the propriety of re-commissioning ships upon a foreign station, where there is not proper dockyard accommodation, is a very doubtful one. If it is wished, I will lay that Report 855 upon the Table; but, in any case, it will be submitted to the Committee which is to be appointed. The greater part of the Report is of so technical a nature that I will not trouble the Committee with it; but I desire to call attention to the case of the Dryad. The Dryad's boilers were put in order in 1866. On the 22nd of February, 1871, a little more than a month after the first signs of corrosion, a number of small holes began to appear in her boilers. During one portion of her commission she was serving on the south-cast coast of America, and during the other in the East Indies. Sonic repairs were made, and she was sent to Bombay, where a survey was made. Her boilers were reported to be defective, and in consequence of the unfavourable terms of the report she was ordered home. Now, this was one of the cases where reliance had been placed on the report that the ship's boilers were in good condition. The nest ship noticed is the Eclipse; and the Report states that when the boilers of the Eclipse were examined, after she was paid off—the boilers were put in in 1867, and she was paid off in 1872—they were found to be very much worn, but not to such au extent as not to be reparable. She was accordingly repaired at Sheerness at a great expense, the cost of the repairs being about half the first cost; but if the ship had been left in commission a few months longer, the boilers would have been past repair for a new commission. [Mr. GOSCHEN: She has not been re-commissioned?] No; the reason why I mentioned it was that here was a ship that has not been re-commissioned; but if she had been kept in commission a few months longer her boilers, according to the Report, would not have been worth repair. The Report goes on to say, in some general observations, that when circumstances permitted, it would be advisable to have boilers examined in Dockyards and repaired every three and a-half years. As to the propriety of that course, I am not, perhaps, so able to judge as some other members of the Committee; but if that opinion is correct, and if the recommendation ought to be attended to, it certainly is against the policy of re-commissioning ships at foreign stations without their undergoing a proper examination. I have stated 856 that the cost of repairs of iron-clads, according to the experience we have obtained is far greater than had been anticipated; and I will now give the Committee an account of the expense of the repairs of some of our iron-clads. There are three ships of which the repairs have been completed, and there are others in regard to which the expense is only estimated. The Warrior cost originally £356,693. She was seven and a-half years in commission; her first repair cost £69,928. [Mr. SHAW LEFEVRE: The first was the replacement of her boilers.] I am mentioning this, not with reference to boilers alone, but to the large expense incurred in the general repairs of these iron-clads. The cost of the repairs just completed is £51,897; so that the total cost of the repairs of the Warrior, after being seven and a-half years in commission is more than £121,000, which is a little in excess of one-third of the original cost. The Defence cost £232,000. She has been nine years in commission; her former repairs cost £32,000; and her recent repairs £33,000; making a total cost of £65,000. The Resistance cost originally £242,000; her repairs up to this time, when she has been a few months again in commission, have cost £68,610. I now come to the estimated repairs. The Hector cost £283,000. Her first repairs cost over £31,000; her estimated repairs are more than £44,000, making a total of £76,239. The Minotaur cost originally £456,804. She has been six years in commission, her former repairs cost £18,000, and her estimated repairs are £75,000, making a total of £93,000. The Achilles cost originally £444,546. She has been 8½ years in commission, her former repairs were £25,000, and her estimated repairs are £82,049. The Black Prince cost originally £357,636. She has been ten years and four months in commission, and the aggregate cost of her repairs amounts to the very large sum of £108,495, the present estimate being £61,000. The Valiant cost originally £320,288. She has been five years and four months in commission, her repairs cost £17,000, and her present repairs if the estimate be correct, will be £45,000; making a total of £62,000. This seems to be a rather alarming account of what we must expect to have to spend upon repairs of our ironclads. The matter is, indeed, so important that I 857 propose to lay on the Table of the House a detailed statement showing the history of these ships—first of all where they were built—whether in Government Dockyards or private yards—the work they have done, so as to show the difference of climate and local influences upon the duration of a ship; and at what period the repairs of ships should be undertaken—I mean what period in the life of these ships should elapse before they are overhauled to see what repairs they require.
§ MR. MUNTZWill the Report give the distinction between the repairs of the boilers and the general repairs of the iron-clads?
§ MR. HUNTYes; the paper I have made out will distinguish between the cost of the hull and the cost of the machinery. I will, if practicable, have the cost of boilers added, and put into a separate column. A question which here arises, to which I will advert by-and-bye, is whether, in consequence of this state of affairs, the number of men taken for our Dockyards—namely, 14,300, will be sufficient to keep up the present establishment of ships. The work done in the Dockyards generally falls short of the estimate. The tonnage proposed to be built in the Dockyards in 1873–4 amounted, in the whole, to 12,757 tons: but of that only 10,902 were actually built. I believe that year will not be found to be an exceptional one, because, if the account is analyzed, it will be found that for some years past that has been the normal state of things; and it applies not only to Dockyards but also to the work done by private contract. As regards the distribution of the shipbuilding work, it was proposed to build 8,105 tons of iron-clads. The amount actually built last year was only 5,592 tons. In frigates and corvettes it was proposed to build 3,138 tons; but there was built more than the estimate—namely, 3,605 tons. Of sloops and gun boats, it was proposed to build 770 tons, but nearly double that quantity was built—namely, 1,395 tons. Of other vessels, it was proposed to build 444 tons, but there was actually built 310 tons only. I am not aware of the reasons, but the result is this, that whereas this House was under the impression that 8,000 tons would be added during the year to our iron-clads, it fell short of that to the amount I have named, 858 while in other classes it was considerably more than was anticipated.
There then follow three Votes, No. 7, Victualling Yards, £72,000; No. 8, Medical Establishments, £63,701; No. 9, Marine Divisions, £18,720. There is a slight increase on these Votes, but not such as to call for any remark.
We next come to Vote 10, which is in two sections. The Vote being a large one usually gives rise to a good deal of discussion. The first section of it is for Stores, and the amount asked for is £1,143,159, showing an increase on the Vote of last year of upwards of £70,000. A very small amount of that increase is due to myself in consequence of the change in the armament of the Minotaur. Then there is Section 2, which is for Steam Machinery and ships built by contract. Upon that, there is an increase of £98,538, about half of this amount being for ships and half for machinery. There is included in the Vote a sum for breaking up ships—namely, £4,000. Now the question of the breaking up of ships is one on which I wish to make a few remarks. It is a question by no means now to me, because I used to discuss it, not unfrequently, with my late lamented friend Mr. Corry. I find that Mr. Corry was adverse to breaking up so large a tonnage of ships as he would like to have done by the consideration that the expense would nominally swell the amount of the Estimates. He was anxious that the amount paid for the work should come out of the proceeds of the ship. But that, according to the rule laid down by the Treasury—and a very proper one—was not permitted—the whole of the money to be spent must be shown on the Votes, even though it may be a remunerative outlay. However, Mr. Corry's endeavour to get the rule altered showed how far the increasing of the Estimates operated on his mind. For my own part, I believe that the breaking up of ships which are useless now, and never likely to be useful hereafter, is a very economical process, and I shall not shrink from increasing the Estimates for that purpose. The increase is only a nominal increase. There are two sides to the account. There is, first, the amount of stores which will be serviceable for the Navy for building and repairing purposes, particularly in the article of copper, which will, so to speak, add to the amount 859 of your assets. There is the material which can be used again—copper which may be remanufactured and used for new ships, also iron work and wood. Then also there are the proceeds to go into the Exchequer of those parts of a ship which are not likely to be required for future use in the Dockyards. It seems to me that in a matter of this kind the Navy yard is very much in the position of any private establishment. You go into some private house and find there a lumber room containing old things which have been thrown aside as useless and not worth repair. Now, my own private experience has taught me that such things are not likely to be useful 50 years hence, and I have proceeded on the principle in my own house of having no lumber room. There is no use, in my opinion, in keeping a thing to be repaired at some distant date if it is not worth repairing at the moment. If there are any things which are found useless now, I would have them either burned, sold, or given away rather than keep thorn on the chance of of their being wanted. I made an inspection, with my late lamented friend Mr. Corry, of one of the principal Dockyards, and as it was my first visit I was struck at seeing the enormous amount of useless lumber that was lying about. No doubt there is the consideration that some large vessels may be converted to useful purposes. They may be used for receiving ships, hospital and store ships, coal hulks, and so on. But there are some that are quite useless for any service at present, and are not likely to be required in the future; and they are in the Admiralty lumber room. I am of opinion, under these circumstances, that it would be an economical operation to extend the breaking up of ships, and I shall not be afraid of the consideration which deterred Mr. Corry from extending it—that it would nominally swell the amount of the Estimates. I say so because I give credit to Members of this House who study the subject, for looking at the two sides of the account, and for seeing that what is apparently an increase in expenditure is in reality a reduction in the charge to the public. Of course the question of the breaking up of ships does not always depend on how much money can be spent on the operation, because there is always the question of what accommodation there is for 860 the purpose. In some Dockyards there is very little, in others more. My wish is to cause reports to be made on the matter, and if even in the present year I were to ask the House of Commons to sanction the grant of an additional sum of money for breaking up old ships. I hope hon. Members will not consider that I am running into any very great extravagance. Section 2 of Vote 10 provides for building this year by contract three corvettes, two sloops, and two gun-boats. The total amount which it is proposed to build in the Dockyards and by contract is estimated in round numbers at 20,000 tons, of which 13,000 tons will be built in the Dockyards, the remainder being contract work.
The next Vote is No. 11, for New Works and Buildings, £682,061. This large amount is chiefly due to new works at Chatham and Portsmouth, the former absorbing about £110,000 and the latter about £300,000. There is no change in the amount of last year. Nor is there any change in Vote 12, for Medicine and Medical Stores. £70,520. Vote 13 is for Martial Law and Law Charges, and there is in this Vote a slight decrease, the amount being £15,505. The next Vote for Miscellaneous Services is £113,510, which shows an increase of £8,992, owing to its being found that the sum taken for telegraphic communication was not sufficient.
We come now to the Non-Effective Services. The Vote for Half-Pay and Retirement is £870,166, an increase on the sum voted last year of £7,704. The retirements among officers in 1873, excluding sub-lieutenants, navigating lieutenants, and assistant paymasters, have been 344. The numbers on the Retired List on the 1st of January, 1873, were 2,153, and on the 1st January of this year 2,360; showing an increase of 207. There is an increase in money on the two years of £52,842. The result of these and other changes in the Active Lists I will give the Committee. The Order in Council which governs the matter lays down what is considered as the standard numbers of the different ranks. The result is as follows:—Admirals of the Elect, 3, as proposed in the Order in Council; Admirals 12, being five in excess of the standard; Vice-Admirals, 15, the same as the Order; Pear-Admirals, 25, the same as the Order; Captains, 178, being 28 in excess of the 861 standard; Commodores, 205, being only five in excess; Lieutenants, 662, being 62 in excess; Sub-Lieutenants, 382, or 182 in excess; Navigating Officers, 260, being 10 below the standard; Chaplains and Naval Instructors, 92, being 8 below the standard; Medical Officers, 441, or 35 below the standard which is 476; Paymasters, 217, being 17 in excess; Assistant Paymasters and clerks, 287, being 57 in excess. These figures show how the state of the Active List has been operated upon up to the present time by the retirement scheme of the right hon. Gentleman opposite.
The next Vote is No. 16 in the Non-Effective Service, for Military Pensions and Allowances, amounting for military pensions to £657,090, an increase of £13,874, which is owing to a greater number of seamen being pensioned off this year than last. Section 2 of the same Vote is for Civil Pensions, £288,670, being a decrease of £7,778, which is caused by the number of deaths. The Vote for the Army Service is £175,600, being an increase of £7,860. This is a Vote over which the Admiralty have no control:—it depends chiefly on the movement of troops, for which we have to provide in the Navy Estimates.
I come now to what is always a very interesting subject to hon. Members in these discussions—the programme of ship-building works provided for in these Estimates. It is proposed at Chatham to advance the Superb, ironclad broadside, to 56–100ths; the Téméraire, iron-clad broadside, to 33–100ths; the Euryalus, iron corvette, wooden-sheathed, to 52–100ths; a composite corvette (new Magicienne) to 32–100ths; and to provide materials for a composite sloop (new type Albatross), which is to be delivered. We shall also complete, after delivery from the contractors who have built them, the Rover, an iron corvette built by the Thames Company, and two composite sloops, the Sappho and the Daring, built by the firm of Wigram. At Sheerness, it is proposed to complete the corvette Diamond, which will be ready for launching next July; to begin a composite sloop (an improved Fantóme), though not to make much progress with her; to complete a paddle steamer, the Pioneer, built by contract; and to employ 850 men in repairing ships for reliefs, &c. At Portsmouth it is proposed to advance a new iron-clad, the 862 Inflexible, to 22–100ths; to complete by September next the iron frigate the Shah; to advance the Boadicea, corvette, to 62–100ths, the Bacchante, corvette, to 46–100ths; to complete the turrets only of the turret-ship Thunderer; to complete the yacht Osborne by June next. I saw the Osborne the other day. She is now in the condition to have a commander appointed to her. She will be appropriated to Her Majesty's use; but it is to be understood that by permission of Her Majesty she will from time to time be used by the Prince of Wales, and in conveying foreigners of distinction coming to this country. It is proposed to complete the torpedo vessel Vesuvius on its arriral from Pembroke, and also the troopship Assistance, "built by the Messrs. Green. At Devonport it is proposed to complete the corvette Sapphire and the steam-tug Perseverance; to begin a composite sloop (an improved Fantóme); to complete the composite sloop Egeria; to complete the gunboats Cygnet, Contest, and Express, built by contract, and the composite sloops Arab and Lily, likewise built by contract; and also to employ 1,888 men on repairs. At Pembroke it is proposed to advance the Fury, turret-ship (an improved Devastation) to 69–100ths, and the Shannon to 44–100ths; also to begin a composite corvette—a new Magicienne. The number of men to be employed in the Dockyards is, as I have stated, 14,300: and they were apportioned in this way in the present Estimates. I say in the present Estimates, because my right hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay), by a Notice he has given to-night, thinks they ought to be apportioned in a different manner. It is proposed to employ in shipbuilding, 4,700 men; in repairs and refits, 4,757; in yard manufactures, 1,931; in yard and harbour service, 2,809; and 103 for store purposes at Deptford and Haulbowline; making in all 14,300 or 800 more than last year. Next, I will give the Committee some account of the work to be done by contract. It is proposed, by contract, to complete the Dover, advance the Magicienne, and commence and advance three new Magiciennes—all five being corvettes; also to complete the following sloops and gunboats:—The Sappho, Daring, Arab, Lily, Cygnet, Express, and Contest; to commence and advance one new Fantôme, 427 tons, and 863 another, 428 tons. We shall likewise advance three new Cygnets, complete the Resistance, troopship, for which 592 tons are required; and the Pioneer, paddle steamer, requiring 166 tons. It is proposed that a new tug shall be purchased, if possible, or built by contract. That is the detail of the works proposed under these Estimates to be done by contract, and in the Dockyards. The tonnage to be built is—in the Dockyards, 13,851 tons, builders' measurement, and 5,618 tons by contract; making together a total of 19,469 tons. This is the work proposed to be done; but, according to the number of men taken for the purpose, if we look at the experience of the past as regards the Estimate and the actual result, I do not think we are likely quite to realize the full amount that is expected.
The list of the fighting ships in commission at the present time is as follows:—23 iron-clads—besides the Glatlon and Gorgon—one Devastation, eight frigates, 14 corvettes, 27 sloops, 32 gun vessels, and 18 gunboats—total, 123. As stated in the Controller's Report, there are of efficient unarmoured ships and vessels 110 altogether, of which 25 require immediate repairs. That is exclusive of troop and store ships, yachts, and tenders.
I now come to the question of the ironclads. I should not be satisfied to give the Committee the present state of the iron-clad fleet, and what is proposed to be done with respect to it, without looking back for a period of years. I must revert to the time before the late Government acceded to office to show what was done under the previous Government of which I had the honour to be a Member, although not then holding in it my present position. I wish to show what was then done in strengthening the Navy in the matter of iton-clads, what has been the course pursued since then, and also to draw attention to the result which has ensued. In 1867, my noble Friend (Lord Hampton) was at the head of the Commission, but in February that year he was transferred to the War Office, and his place at the Admiralty was filled by the late Mr. Corry. In that year—1867—the following iron-clads were commenced:—The Audacious, the Captain, the Invincible, the Vanguard, the Iron Duke, and the Sultan—making six. The next year, 864 while my lamented Friend was still First Lord, there were commenced four more iron-clad ships—namely, the Hotspur, the Swiftsure, the Glatton, and the Triumph. That is to say, 10 were commenced in those two years. [Sir JOHN HAY: And the Repulse, which was not only begun, but finished.] My right hon. and gallant Friend says, I ought to add the Repulse, and there appears to be good authority for doing so. These, then, were the iron-clads commenced in 1867 and 1868. I would ask where should we have been as regarded our fleet had not that policy been pursued by Mr. Corry? It was the fashion at the time and shortly afterwards in the House and in the Press to decry the extravagance of the Conservative Government; but without that so-called extravagance would my right hon. Friend who preceded me have been able to effect the so-called economics of the Liberal Government? What has since been done in the way of iron-clad building? Seven have been begun, of which the Cyclops, Hecate, Gorgon, Hydra, Devastation, and Rupert, have been completed; while the Thunderer, though considerably advanced, will not at the present rate of progress be completed till October, 1875. My predecessor has bequeathed to me five more iron-clads—the Superb, Fury, Shannon, Téméraire, and Inflexible; but the first three of these will be completed very late in 1876, the Téméraire in July, 1877, and the Inflexible, which is only just commenced, in October, 1877. It has been said in some quarters that the Conservative Government commenced a lot of ships and left them as a burden on their successors; so that the former could not take credit for them. I do not wish to claim any credit which is not due, but I have obtained a Return of the gross tonnage of ships of all kinds built in different years. In 1866–7, under the programme of the Russell Government, which preceded that of Lord Derdy, it was 15,384 tons; in 1867–8, for which Mr. Corry was responsible, 33,701; in 1868–9. 26,290; in 1869–70—when, notwithstanding a change of Government, there had been no great change of policy—24,230; in 1870–1, 19,925; in 1871–2, 21,137; in 1872–3, 16,092; and in 1873–4, 17,329. Taking the tonnage of iron-clads only, the figures for the successive years were 7,013, 12,448, 15,045, 18,769, 12,567, 865 10,678, 4,798, and 4,050, showing a rapidly descending ratio down to a very small amount indeed. As regards the present strength of the Navy, especially the iron-clad fleet, which is its mainstay for fighting purposes, the "extravagant Conservative Governments" may take credit for having added a very large part. The sums spent in building and repairing ships of all descriptions were in 1867–8, £2,236,000; in 1868–9, £2,316,000; in 1869–70, £1,833,000; in 1870–1, £1,344,000; in 1871–2, £1,719,000; in 1872–3, £1,456,000; and in 1873–4, £1,781,000; while the present proposal is to spend £1,888,000. The result of the policy which has been pursued has excited much interest, and has led to a discussion "in another place," while my right hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay) who intended to offer a Motion upon the subject before the House went into Committee has courteously deferred it, in order to save me the inconvenience of having to reply to it before introducing the Estimates.
With a view to ascertain the present condition of the iron-clad fleet, I have employed all the resources of the Admiralty establishment, and have obtained the assistance of the Controller of the Navy and of all the Sea Lords; not satisfied with which I have endeavoured to check their accounts by information from the Admirals in command of squadrons. I have accidentally been able to confer personally with one of them and go into detail as to the state of his ships; while from the Admirals at different stations I have availed myself of opportunities, which I admit were not very great, of getting valuable information. Pessimists may think my statement too flattering, while others may deem it too disparaging; but I have no wish to exalt or depreciate our strength unduly. We have 55 ironclads, of which 41 are seagoing, and 14 are adapted for harbour and coast defence. In the latter category I have included the Devastation; for though some authorities think her fit for seagoing service, I shrink, after the sad warning furnished by another ship of novel construction, from placing her without further trial and advice among the seagoing ships. Wherever she is she is no doubt a very powerful instrument of war, and the most extraordinary piece of mechanism which human inge- 866 nuity has ever devised. What is the condition of the seagoing ships? I think the Committee will be prepared to hear, after all they have read in the ordinary channels of communication, that the state of many of those ships, not to put it too strongly, is anything but satisfactory. The list of 41 includes the five now building. With respect to the rest I must decline to give their names, however I may be pressed to do so. It is a very delicate matter to state to the public, British or foreign, the exact condition of every ship in the Navy. Five ships are, as I have said, being built. There are nine others that are either obsolete or considered not worth repairing for seagoing purposes. That reduces the list to 27; and of these only 18 can be considered as effective in the proper sense for service during the present year. Fourteen out of the 18 are now serviceable and effective, and 4 are under repair, and will not be ready until August next. There are 9 others which are not condemned but which cannot be considered as effective for the service of the year. Some of them are under repair, and these will not be ready until next year. There are some now undergoing a temporary refit, which, when refitted, cannot be counted upon as good for more than a year.
§ MR. GOSCHENWhat ships are these?
§ MR. HUNTI decline to specify them more particularly; but there are nine of the description I have stated.
§ MR. GOSCHENWill you say how many are in each category?
§ MR. HUNTThree will be reach-next year, and 2, when out of hand, will be fit for one year—the sanguine say for a longer time, but the best authorities say but one year can be reckoned upon. Then there are 4 ships whose boilers are nearly worn out, and which will require thorough repair. Such is the account I have to give of the sea-going iron-clads according to the best information I can acquire. Then of the 14 which are adapted for harbour and coast defence only 9 can be considered effective, of which number 8 are complete and 1 is being built; and of the 8 the Devastation is one. The other 5 are not worth mentioning; some of them are at distant stations where they serve certain purposes, but from which they never can be brought home. Such, according 867 to the best investigation I have been able to make, is the condition of the iron-clad fleet. I have no doubt it is too sanguine a view for my right hon. Friend (Sir John nay), and too disparaging a view for some hon. Gentlemen opposite; but I offer it to the Committee as a moderate, and proper, and reasonable view to take of the ease. For my part I do not think, after the history I have given of the shipbuilding operations of the last few years, that any different result is likely to be exhibited.
I am more anxious, in consequence of the absence from among us of my late right hon. Friend (Mr. Corry), whose reputation is much concerned in the matter, than I otherwise should be, to state the cost of the Naval Service since the year 1867–8 inclusive, because I want to show that that which has been called great economy was not and has been found not to be any real achievement of that nature. In 1867–8, the aggregate Votes were £10,976,253.
§ SIR JOHN HAYIncluding Abyssinian expenditure.
§ MR. CHILDERSThere was an excess Vote of £340,000.
§ MR. HUNTWell, I did not prepare the paper before me; but I am quite prepared to take the fact to be as my right hon. Friend states. In 1868–9, the Vote amounted to £11,157,290; but a correction of about £200,000 should be made in consequence of a different mode of keeping the accounts then and now; so that the sum voted really was nearly £11,000,000, the highest amount reached during the period to which I am calling attention, and that was the last year for which my late right hon. Friend (Mr. Corry) was responsible. It has been stated that the Estimates of my late right hon. Friend for the year were what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich would call "transitional Estimates." It has, been admitted from that bench that if my late right hon. Friend had remained in office the Estimates would have fallen by about £600,000, as the reduction did not depend upon any change of policy. I now come to the reductions which were made under the late Administration. These reductions were, I suppose, the work of political necessity, but I do not wish to go into controversial matters. I have stated facts to the Committee, and I hope in a 868 manner which has not been at all unpalatable to right hon. Gentlemen opposite. I suppose the reductions in question were the result of political necessity, because so much had been said about the extravagance of the last Conservative Administration, and the enormous economies that could be effected by a Liberal Government coming into office; and those views of economy recommending themselves to the country, it was almost impossible not to make very considerable reductions in the Estimates as a matter, as I have said, of political necessity. Accordingly, the Estimates next year, 1869–70, instead of being nearly £11,000,000, were £9,996,000, or, in round numbers, £10,000,000. In 1870–1, they amounted to £9,370,000, the Estimates being artificially swelled by £ 120,000 to meet certain extra charges consequent upon monthly instead of quarterly payments. The sum voted when that abatement was made was £9,250,000—the lowest sum to which the Estimates fell during the period I am reviewing. Well, the great political necessity having passed away, the requirements of the Navy began to be taken into consideration, and we find that in the year 1871–2 the Estimates increased from£9,250,000 to £9,891,000. In the year 1872–3, they amounted to £9,532,000, and in 1873–4, they amounted to £10,004,075; so that the late Government, with a change at the Admiralty, found the necessity of retracing their steps and of spending more money on the Navy. The proposal for this year is, as I have already explained, departmental only, they not having received the sanction of the late Cabinet; but the sum that the right hon. Gentleman thought it would have been necessary for him to propose to his Colleagues, for the Naval Service for the present year, is £10,170,000, and I wish to ask how much that is short of the sum taken by my late Friend (Mr. Corry), after deducting the £600,000 by which, it was admitted after the change of Government, he would have reduced his Estimates for 1868–9. I have not made the calculation before; but the original amount being something under £11,000,000, after the £600,000 and the £200,000 to which I have referred had been deducted, there would remain the sum of £10,350,000 as against the Estimate of the right hon. Gentleman 869 for the present year of £10,170,000. I wish to know whether there could be a clearer vindication of the policy of my late Friend (Mr. Corry) than these figures exhibit? I do not wish to overstate anything in connection with this subject; but there is no question that, even after making due allowance for the very considerable increase since 1868–9 in the amount of wages and the price of coal and iron and many other materials, the right hon. Gentleman had raised his Estimates to nearly the level at which they were left by Mr. Corry. Having in view the statements I have just made to the Committee, I wish to ask whether the policy of Mr. Corry and of the late Conservative Administration was one which ought to have been derided as extravagant and foolish, and whether the so-called economical policy of the late Government was really in the true interest of the Navy and the country? I have felt it to be my duty to make this explanation in justice to the memory of my late Friend (Mr. Corry) as well as in the public interest.
I wish to explain to the Committee the position in which I am placed with regard to these Estimates. The Committee are well aware of the extraordinary difficulties under which the Government have presented anything to the House during the early days of this Session. The time at which the dissolution of Parliament took place, and the consequent change of Government, left the incoming Administration so short a time to discharge its duties that I have found it impossible to revise the Estimates which had been prepared by my predecessor, except with regard to the point of the new armament of the Minotaur—the necessity for which was so obvious that I did not hesitate, after a few days, to sanction the necessary expenditure for it. But the question is am I satisfied with the provision made for the Naval Service for the year? Representations were made to me early on my accession to office that the provision was insufficient. I thought that it would be wrong of me in a hasty way to alter the figures which had been arrived at by my predecessor in his responsible position after the short time allowed me for the preparation of my Estimates; and I do not lightly estimate the responsibilities of a Minister when I place my Estimates upon the Table of this 870 House,—and even now I do not feel that I am prepared at the present moment to make any proposal to the Committee in augmentation of those Estimates. I, however, feel bound to say that urgent appeals for further expenditure have been made continually, and that demands which I do not see my way to refuse are daily pressed upon me, and that they are daily increasing. Representations have been made to me from the responsible officer of the Department that the number of men taken for the Dockyards is not sufficient to keep up the present establishments. I have had the assistance of my hon. Friends beside me, the Financial Secretary and the Civil Lord, in looking into this matter, and with the aid of the naval members of the Board, I have gone into the scheme of reliefs established by the late First Lord, and although I am not prepared to dispute that that scheme might suffice for the present year, the right hon. Gentleman himself will doubtless admit that it provides no margin, and that if a single important ship in that scheme came to an untoward end there is nothing whatever to take its place. In my opinion that is a state of things which is not satisfactory. I have, however, thought it my duty to look into the question of reliefs for next year, and I will lay before the Committee the information I have obtained up to the present moment. Bearing in mind what has come upon us in connection with the worn-out boilers, there will be, as far as I understand the matter, a hiatus valde deflendus in two of the squadrons which form part of the establishment, taking it upon the present numbers as considered sufficient by the late Administration. That is a very serious matter. I am not in a position to make any proposal to the House at the present time, and, as I have already stated, the seriousness of disputing the Estimates of my predecessor weighs very much with me because I know that he had paid very great attention to the Navy, and because I could see that in his policy he was endeavouring to correct many of the evils which had resulted from the mistaken and misconceived reduction: and therefore without very careful consideration, and without further examination, I should hesitate to announce to the Committee any proposition for additional demands upon 871 the public purse. I cannot, neither have I the wish to conceal from the Committee that I shall have to submit to my Colleagues in the Cabinet some further demands for the service for the year. There has been an impression in some portion of the public mind that when a change of Government took place, what was tailed "the old Tory notions" of expenditure and of extravagance would be revived. I do not know what those old Tory notions were, because I have never lived in those days; but I can say that my late official experience has been in a Department where expenditure is very closely watched, where it is the special duty of the Department to check extravagance in all the great spending departments; that I have come to the Admiralty with Treasury views, and that I shall feel it my duty to regard with the most rigid scrutiny any proposals for increased expenditure. At the same time, however, if I see that the exigency of the service requires it I shall not shrink from my duty in coming to this Committee and stating what I think is necessary for the public service, and unreasons for thinking so. As long as I remain at the Admiralty it must be understood that I do not mean to have a fleet on paper; that whatever ships appear as forming a part of the strength of the Navy must be real and effective ships and not dummies. It is with that view that I have taken the office which I now hold, and it is with that view that I have made the statement which I have had the honour of making to the Committee to-night. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the Vote for £2,602,757 for Wages for Seamen and Marines.
§
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £602,757, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Expense of Wages, &c. to Seamen and Marines, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1875.
§ MR. E. J. REEDsaid, that if they had not heard the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Hunt) that evening, they would nevertheless have known perfectly well that for several years past the expenditure of the Government upon now iron-clad ships had been undergoing a very rapid diminution. In fact, close 872 observers of the Navy Estimates must have noticed that our expenditure upon new iron-clads, the difficulty in repairing the iron-clads needing repair, and the corresponding diversion of money from iron-clads to other vessels, had been characteristics of recent Estimates. Doubtless, many hon. Members had listened to the right hon. Gentleman's statement with considerable alarm, and it was natural that many should feel disposed to greatly censure the late Government for having cut down our ironclad shipbuilding to the degree they had done. He cared very little for the political recriminations which they must naturally expect in debates of this kind; but he was most anxious to show to the Committee that there were far larger causes than mere political tendencies and considerations underlying the difficulty in which the Committee found itself; for he thought it would be acknowledged that when they had heard descriptions like that of the right hon. Gentleman, of our iron-clad Navy, it would be found that we were in a very considerable difficulty, and he could not hold out the least encouragement to the right hon. Gentleman that he would be able to avoid Supplementary Estimates in the present year. The Committee would easily see the difficulties underlying this question. Under the old state of things a line-of-battle ship would cost £150,000, and carry 1,000 men; whereas, an iron-clad now-a-days cost double the money and carried half the number of men. If, therefore, they now desired to send the same number of men to sea as they did formerly, the idea of securing uniform Estimates was a delusion. It would, of course, be said that a great number of our ships were not iron-clads; that a very large portion of the public service was performed by other ships, and that was true; but it was also true that all the ships of to-day were much more ex-pensive than the ships of former times, because of the introduction of sanitary and other improvements. He had been told by an official that night, that if one took the whole of the ships of the Royal Navy afloat now, it would be found that they had cost nearly 1.7 times the cost of ships in former days; or, to put it in another form, for every £100 which we had to invest in ships in the old days, we had now to invest £170 in order to carry the same number of men to sea. 873 It therefore followed, as a matter of course, that if we wished to expend the same sum of money annually upon the Navy—if we had to enhance the expenditure upon ships per man in the proportion named—it was a matter of necessity to cut down the number of men in order to do it. But we did not cut down the number of men enormously. In 1869–70 the number of men was 63,000; in each of the three succeeding years, 61,000; last year it was 60,000; and the last-mentioned number appeared again in the present Estimates. Therefore, since 1869–70, there had been a reduction of only 3,000 men; and he thought, in connection with this part of the subject, that if any naval reformer should attempt to induce the present Parliament to reduce the number of men in proportion to the increase in the cost of ships, he would entirely fail in his object, for as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Goschen) showed last year, a very large part of the Navy was employed on service which could not—merely because iron-clads had gone tip in price—be done away with. Therefore, they found themselves in this position—that if the 60,000 men were to be retained, and it was to be made practicable to send them at any time to sea, it was necessary to spend more money upon the costly ships that Mere now employed, for it was unwise to hide from ourselves the absolute necessity that existed for a large expenditure on those services which were the means of retaining the great possessions which this country enjoyed. If any hon. Member on the Opposition benches could show him how they could go on sending 60,000 men to sea in modern ships at the present Estimates he would be very happy indeed to hear the solution of the difficulty; but it seemed to him that it was an impossibility, and he would be sorry if this fact remained concealed amid political recriminations passing between opposite benches. Now, what were the actual circumstances with regard to the expenditure? During the first 10 years of the existence of ironclads, when they were merely in an experimental condition, the expenditure on them had averaged £984,000 per annum; in 1869–70, the year in which the economics of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) were in full bloom, the expen- 874 diture exceeded £1,000,000 sterling, owing, it would probably be said, to the necessity for completing a number of ships which the predecessor of that right hon. Gentleman had begun. However that might be, the outlay in 1869–70 was greater than it had been in any of the previous 10 years. So great and rapid, however, had been the diminution in the expenditure on our iron-clads since then, that the average had been reduced from £981,000—the sum he had already mentioned with regard to the first 10 years—to £925,000, the average for the past 15 years; and the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty had put before the Committee Estimates that evening, and had hesitated to increase them, saying that he still doubted whether he would have to ask the Committee to increase them or not, to the amount of only £660,000 for the expenditure of this year upon iron-clad ships. That expenditure was about 30 per cent less than it had been during the first 10 years of their existence when they were purely experimental, and it would surprise him if the House regarded this proposal with satisfaction. If they did, it would deprive the Ministerial side of the opportunity in the future of declaring that its policy was to correct any deficiencies they might discover in the public services of the country. Not only was the outlay on the building of these ships falling off, but the arrears of repairs were also accumulating, and although the right hon. Gentleman had given them fuller information on this head than they had been accustomed to receive, still it was incomplete, and it left a great doubt in his mind as to whether it was the intention of the Government to bring the existing iron-clads as far as possible into a state of efficiency during the year, that being, as he thought, the least duty of the Administration. Was there anything to justify this enormous diminution of expenditure upon iron-clads—this setting aside, he might almost say, of the ironclad as one of the things on which we counted most in connection with the armaments of the country? In the autumn of 1872 he ventured in the columns of The Times to draw attention to our iron-clad Navy as compared with that of foreign Powers, and there followed an official contradiction, not of his statements, but of himself; for whereas his 875 affirmation had referred to the rate of progress in the construction of iron-dads, the reply was, that we were very strong in those vessels, and that was quite a different matter. He had the satisfaction of finding, however, that the Admiralty immediately afterwards pressed on the work to which he had referred. That was just what he had wanted, and it was well to be content with accomplishing our objects, though we got a little ill-usage in the process. He would mention another objection that he had to the Estimates of this year. Before he left the Admiralty, foreseeing the necessity for increasing the number of armour-plated ships, and believing that the day would come when some foreign Power, wiser than we, would adopt the Whitworth gun, which penetrated armour beneath the water, he prepared a plan of such a vessel as he thought was required, and this plan, which he had kept secret from everyone except the confidential draftsmen and the Controller of the Navy, he left in the possession of the Admiralty. While the excitement prevailed, a year ago, about building more ships, the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Goschen) came down to the House and spoke in very glowing terms of a vessel which he proposed to construct. The designs were explained minutely to a Committee of 16 gentlemen called together for the purpose, and he was surprised subsequently to find an account of the plans offered him in Germany, and it was known also in Russia some months before it was published in England. Somehow private documents on these subjects did reach foreign countries, and in the present instance the system which had been so much extolled in the House by the right hon. Gentleman had been adopted by foreign Powers. The system to which he referred was that which had been proposed for the Inflexible, and it was precisely the one which he had secretly prepared in outline for the Admiralty. The right hon. Gentleman having undertaken to push forward the building of the ship, failed to perform this task, and the tenth part which he proposed to execute during the year dwindled down to a hundredth part. The work done represented only 79 tons out of a total of 8,000, and he trusted the House would not think it too much to urge the Government to make much greater exer- 876 tions than were proposed in the construction of the Inflexible. The amount of tonnage to be built in the iron-clads now in course of construction was to be reduced to an extent that made some of the figures in the Estimate seem to him incredible. He more particularly referred to the Thunderer. The reason seemed to be to test the Devastation still further in some way or other, and until that was done it seemed that the Thunderer was only to have 231 tons added between this time and the 31st March, 1875, leaving more that 500 tons still unfinished. He could not understand such a policy, and it appeared to him to be perfectly incredible that any Minister should make such a proposal. The argument which led the right hon. Gentleman to take that course, if allowed to influence the mind of a naval administrator, must bar his action whenever he was called upon to do anything which was really right and wise. He hoped, however, the Committee would not sanction a proposal to keep the Thunderer in an unfinished state during the whole of the year. It was one of the advantages of our Dockyards, that emergencies of that kind could be met by simply employing more men on the ships we were engaged in building, and the present Government would, he felt satisfied, give great satisfaction to Members even on the Liberal side of the House who took an interest in the Navy if they would undertake to proceed a great deal further with the Inflexible, the Fury, the Thunderer, and the Superb, so that the country might feel that the fleet of the future was not meant to be a phantom fleet, a fleet on paper, as the right hon. Gentleman had promised. He was afraid, however, that if the policy which the right hon. Gentleman had indicated were to be followed, we should be a long time in arriving at that result with regard to some ships.
§ MR. HUNTsaid, the hon. Member had misapprehended him. He had stated that he was determined to have an efficient Navy, and for that purpose, after consultation with his Colleagues, he trusted to be enabled to propose some additional Estimates. In the meantime, he contented himself with moving the Estimates of his predecessor in office.
§ MR. E. J. REEDsaid, he was glad to receive that explanation from the right hon. Gentleman, because the less he 877 followed the Estimates of his predecessor in this matter the better he should be pleased; and although it might seem a strange thing that increased expenditure should be urged from his side of the House, yet until it was recognized by the House that the circumstances of the Nary demanded an increased relative expenditure upon ships as compared with men, nothing effectual would be done. He would add that it was one thing to build and repair our iron-clad fleet, and another thing to use our ships properly when we had got them. That we had not hitherto dealt properly with our iron squadron, he was sure the naval Members of that House would support him in maintaining, and upon one point he wished to impress the House very strongly. We had not worked out the problem of naval tactics and manœuvres to the extent we ought to have done, nor had we placed at the disposal of the Admiral in command a sufficient supply of coal for the purpose. He did not-mean that a great increase of coals should be given to the Admiral to do what he pleased with; but the time had, in his opinion, arrived when it should be made the duty of the Admirals of our Channel Reserve squadrons to meet in the autumn and to carry out a proper programme, which they should be furnished with after due deliberation at the Admiralty. If we did not take more pains in the development of naval tactics we should, he was afraid, find ourselves in a very unfortunate position in time of war. Another point to which he desired to direct the attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty was that with respect to compound engines. It was doubtful whether we might not suffer from the general adoption of compound engines in time of war, and it was desirable that we should make provision for using low pressure steam in action. He would further observe—after complimenting the First Lord of the Admiralty upon the appointment of Captain Evans, R.N., as Hydrographer—that we seemed to be in a somewhat unfortunate position with respect to the surveying service, and the House was, he thought, entitled to further information as to what surveys were in progress, and how they were being carried on. The result at present was, that the only use of the official documents sent in by surveying ships was to supply the Chairman of the Royal Geogra- 878 phical Society with a paragraph for his annual address. The surveying service had not, in his opinion, a farthing too much expended on it; but the country ought not, he maintained, to be left in such complete ignorance as to its objects and results. In conclusion, he might say that while he congratulated the late First Lord on the establishment of the Naval College at Greenwich, he observed the disappearance of a former Tote for a Director of Admiralty Education, and trusted this was not to be taken as evincing an intention to leave the superintendence of education to the admiral in command of the College, who had other duties to perform.
§ SIR JOHN HAYthanked his right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, not for his Estimates, which he thought were insufficient, but for the clear and candid statement he had made to the House as to the state of the Navy generally; above all, he thanked him for his excellent defence of his lamented Friend, Mr. Corry, from all the slander which had been heaped upon him. The memory of Mr. Corry, he felt sure, would never be forgotten as that of the civilian in this country who best understood the wants of the Navy. He intended, he might add, to move to-morrow for a Committee to inquire into the state of our Iron-clad Fleet, but after the statement of his right hon. Friend, he did not think it would be necessary for him to take up the time of the House on the subject, or to force the right hon. Gentleman's hand, which would be unfair to one newly come into office. With regard to Vote 1, his right hon. Friend had mentioned the sums of money which had been appropriated to the public service, but he did not mention the number of men, and they ought to be contrasted, because in former days the number of men ruled the amount of money voted for the Navy. The sum appropriated to the Naval Service in 1868–9 was £10,806,690, and the number of men voted in that year was 67,120; but in this year's Estimates, which amounted to above £10,000,000, only 60,000 men, or 7,120 fewer, were provided for. Therefore, when the reduced expenditure was spoken of, hon. Members ought to remember that the Navy itself had been reduced both in the number of men and the quantity of supplies, as well as in the number of ships, of which 879 so sorry an account had just been placed before the Committee. The Marines bad been reduced from 14,700 to 14,000, and the seamen and officers from 52,070 to 46,000. He would now call, attention to the charge on the other Votes. In 1868–9, the last year in which be had had a share in the administration of the Nary, the Vote for Victuals amounted to £1,335,842. It was now £1,064,264, or nearly the same sum for 7,000 fewer men. Again, a vast deal had been said of the great advantage which was to accrue to the country from sundry reductions which were made at the Admiralty by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract. Well, in 1867–8, the charge for the Admiralty was £ 176,018, and this year it was £178,066. In addition to that, the Civil Pension List had increased from £176,000 to £214,300. The violent reductions which were made threw a number of gentlemen out of work, but they continued to draw their civil pensions, and had been replaced by persons of less experience, who would also have to be pensioned eventually. As to the Vote for Stores, it amounted in 1868–9 to £892,908, but this year, although the number of ironclads was smaller, the amount was £1,143,159. In 1869–70, this Vote was reduced to £801,789, as the Navy was living on the stores accumulated by former Administrations. Referring next to the Building Vote, he wished to point out that the number of men employed in shipbuilding in 1868–9 was 5,439, and that the number employed in repairing was 9,815, making a total of 15,254 men, exclusive of the 4,000 engaged as hired men during six months of that year. But in 1870–1 the building men were 6,349 in number; while the number of men employed in repairing was reduced to 4,793, or about one-half the number winch had always been considered necessary to maintain our Fleet in its proper condition. In fact, it was owing to the reduction of the men employed in repairing that the iron-clad fleet was in the disgraceful condition reported to the House to-night by his right hon. Friend. The fact was, that the men had been reduced to 11,000, while it had been stated by a noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) that 18,000 was the lowest number of men that ought to be employed in our Dockyards. That number, however, bad not been 880 reached since the noble Duke himself was in office. In the Estimates of this year the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Goschen) had increased the number of repairing men to 9,497; but, unfortunately, we had only 4,700 men for building. He was represented by his right hon. Friend as taking the pessimist view of the condition of the Fleet. Well, he would state his opinion of the condition of the Fleet, and leave the future to be the judge between his right hon. Friend and himself. He would now refer to the subject of restoring the rank of major to the Marine service. There were three so-called seniority corps in Her Majesty's Service—namely, the Royal Engineers, the Royal Artillery, and the Royal Marines. Till 1798 the officers of the Royal Marines rose to the rank of major, but in that year the corps was deprived of the rank of major in order to assimilate it to the corps of the Royal Engineers and the Royal Artillery. Within the last two or three years the rank of major had been restored to the Engineers and Artillery, and a considerable number of senior captains of Marines were being-passed over constantly by officers of corresponding rank in the Engineers and Artillery, who were obtaining the rank of major. He brought this subject forward last Session, when the right bon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London made a sort of promise that, as far as the Marine Artillery were concerned, the rank of major should be conceded. It was to be hoped that that promise would be carried out in both branches, and he hoped the gallant corps of Royal Marines would no longer be deprived of the rank of major, to which they had so strong a claim in consequence of its having been restored to the other seniority corps. The gallant manner in which Colonel Festing and his Marines had borne the brunt of the Ashantee War in the worst months ought to induce the Government to do justice to a portion of our Force which had, not only upon that, but upon all occasions, displayed such gallantry. With respect to the condition of the ironclad fleet, he would refer to a Return he had recently moved for. He wished to call the attention of the Committee to the condition of our iron-clad fleet as it was reported to the House by the right hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) on 881 the breaking out of the Franco-German war, and he would then compare it with its present condition. On the breaking out of that war, the right hon. Gentleman, in reply to some observations which he (Sir John Hay) addressed to the House, said that there were 28 broadside iron-clad ships and 12 special ships then ready for sea.
What I have said," remarked the right hon. Gentleman, "are plain official facts of which there is no doubt. …There are 5 in the Channel Fleet, 8 in the Reserve, 6 in the Mediterranean, 3 on distant stations, and 6 fitting out. … Of the 12 special ships, 2 are of the first class, 4 of the second, I of the third, and 5 of the fourth."…[3 Hansard, cciii. 1350.]Although he believed that there were three short of the number, three having been launched afterwards, he was not going to contest the official figures of the right hon. Gentleman; but what was the condition of the ships? The Hercules and Sultan, the two first-class ships of the Navy, were in good condition. The Audacious, the Invincible, the Vanguard, the Iron Duke, the Swift-sure, and the Triumph were built by the Conservative Government, and were all serviceable. The Bellerophon, he believed, was also serviceable. The Lord Warden, now in the Mediterranean, had her boilers very much worn out, and her hull in a bad state. The Lord Clyde had been in a wretched condition for a long time, and the right hon. Gentleman could only recognize her as a gigantic mushroom bed, seeing that he (Mr. Hunt) had been shown a prodigious mushroom which she had produced, and which in the space of 21 hours had grown 24 feet. The Minotaur was at present re-fitting, and was not as yet ready for sea; but, no doubt, as his right hon. Friend had promised to improve her armament, she would be made in time, a good serviceable ship. The Agincourt and the Northumberland both had their boilers much worn. [Mr. CHILDERS: Is the right hon. Gentleman reading from the Return?] He was not, but he was giving some information additional to the Return, which would be found to be correct, though he might be told he was speaking from the pessimist point of view. The Royal Alfred was completely worn out in her boilers and hull. The Repulse was in good order, but the Penelope, he believed, had her boilers in a bad condition, and the ship in her present state 882 was useless for the line of battle. The boilers of the Achilles were worn out, but were being replaced by new ones. The Royal Oak, the Prince Consort, the Caledonia, the Ocean, had not only their boilers worn out, but their hulls also, and were not worth repair. The Valiant and the Hector had their boilers worn out, and so had the Zealous, and her hull was much out of repair. The Warrior had her boilers in good condition, and so had the Defence and Resistance, but the Black Prince required new boilers before she could be considered fit for service. The boilers of the Pallas were good, but the boilers of the Favorite were worn out. The Research was in good condition, but the Enterprise was worn out in boilers and hull. This completed the list of the broadside armour-clad ships of the Navy. He should not weary the Committee by going through the turret and special vessels; but the Monarch, one of the most powerful ships in the Navy, was about to be commissioned with boilers, in which the pressure was reduced. In this year's Estimates it was proposed to repair the Minotaur, and, thanks to his right hon. Friend, she was to have a new armament, the money for which was not included in the Estimates before the House. It was also proposed to repair the Hector, the Hercules, the Achilles, the Black Prince, the Valiant, the Audacious, and the Penelope. But there were 10 ships—namely, the Agincourt, the Northumberland, the Lord Clyde, the Lord Warden, the Caledonia, the Ocean, the Prince Consort, the Royal Oak, the Zealous, the Favorite, the Enterprise, and the Royal Alfred, which were not worth repairing, and which ought to be rejected at once from the effective force of our iron-clad Navy. No Estimate was taken for repairing the Monarch, the Prince Albert, and the Royal Sovereign, which also required repair. He now wished to point out how little had been done to build new ships for the Navy in the last five years. Of the iron-clads laid down by the late Administration only one, the Rupert, had been completed, except the four harbour-defence ships of the Cyclops class. So far as concerned the building of the Repulse and the Monarch, they were completed all but seven-eighths of an eighth during the time he had the honour of being at the Admiralty. There were 10 iron- 883 clads which they had in hand, and so far from their being in the condition which the right hon. Gentleman mentioned at Bristol, out of 80 eighths into which they were divided. 35 eighths had been completed before he and his Colleagues left office, and the remaining 45 eighths was leisurely done in the two or three following years. He wished now to call the attention of his right hon. Friend to the condition of the only five ships which were coming forward—the Superb, the Téméraire, the Inflexible, the Fury, and the Shannon. Something also was to be done with the Thunderer, but he agreed with the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. E. J. Reed) that they might proceed with the Thunderer somewhat more leisurely in order to push forward the ships which were so much behind. The number of men employed on our iron-clad fleet was 2,821, an increase of 401 upon the number employed last year. Last year, 6,705 tons were estimated for, but only 4,475 were built. This year it was proposed in the Estimates to advance 8,022 tons; but if 2,420 men could only build 4,475 tons last year, it was quite evident that fewer men were taken this year than would be required to build the amount of tonnage proposed to be built. He ventured to say that in this particular these were very foolish Estimates. In the first place, 8,022 tons was too small an amount of tonnage to build, and, in the next place, the men taken to build this tonnage were too few even for that purpose. The Superb it was proposed to advance to 56–100ths, or little more than one-half: but if the money voted last year and the year before had been expended, she would have been advanced as far as that now. The estimated advance for 1872–3 was 1,500 tons, and £82,500 was voted; yet only 191 tons Mere built, and only £9,500 expended: so that the arrears of work in 1872–3 were 1,309 tons, and the arrears of expenditure amounted to £73,000, which must have been applied to some other purpose. In 1873–4 it was proposed to advance her 2,087 tons, but only 1,265 tons, or little more than half of that was done, and the arrears were 822 tons, or £42,900 in expenditure. In the original estimate of the cost of this and other ships, a proportion was taken for labour and a proportion for materials, but this information was not now given. No 884 approximate sum was given of what was expended on material, and some explanation should be given of the cause of this omission in the table of ships building. In the Estimates for 1872–3 and 1873–4, the Superb was proposed as a most powerful steam ship, with 9,000 indicated horse-power for engines; that horse-power was now reduced to 8,000, which seemed insufficient, and no explanation of that reduction had been given to the Committee. The progress made in the Téméraire was equally lamentable. She was estimated to cost £281,000, and was to have engines of 7,000 horsepower. She was to have been advanced to 1,162 tons, and instead of that only 354 were built, so that the arrears were 880 tons on that small estimate. They were now invited to advance her to 1,826 tons, and the number of men was totally insufficient to do the work. The date of completion of the five ships building—namely, Superb, Téméraire, Inflexible, Shannon, and Fury, was stated to be uncertain in the Return now in the hands of hon. Members. This was the condition of the five iron-clads which ought to have been built, which were handed over on paper, and which the right hon. Member for the City took credit for. With all respect for his naval Colleagues, he wished to say it was discreditable that the late Board of Admiralty should have allowed the Navy to get into its present condition. It was the duty of the naval officers of the Board, if they saw it getting into that state, to have resigned their seats, and not to have lent their countenance to an Administration which had done so much mischief to the profession. He had the greatest respect for Sir Alexander Milne, with whose personal friendship he had long been honoured, but he said that if he could not convince the right hon. Gentleman opposite of the necessities of the service and the danger of our ships falling into decay, it was his business to have resigned. That was the course which he (Sir John Hay) and his late lamented Colleague (Admiral Seymour) adopted, and the result was a change in the Estimates for the purpose of adding to the armour-clad Navy. No doubt, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City was anxious to remedy the mistakes and blunders of his predecessor; he gave him credit for what he did with such an Administration as that to 885 which he belonged, who were pledged to parsimony, and whose sole object seemed to be to discredit the Navy. He had criticized the Estimates, which were the Estimates of the late Administration, as he would have criticized them had he been sitting on the Opposition benches, and he condemned them as insufficient for the public service, and he gave the First Lord credit for his announcement that when he was more completely master of the subject, he would seek to restore the Navy to a decent condition, or at least to rescue it from the deplorable condition in which it was now left.
§ MR. GOSCHENsaid, he anticipated receiving the sympathy of both sides of the House on this account—that three elaborate speeches having been made against the Estimates for which he was more or less responsible, he laboured under the disadvantage of having to reply to those speeches on the spur of the moment, and of being required to remember the innumerable charges which had been made, while in such a case the attack had a great advantage over the defence in the careful preparation of all statements that were to be advanced. Under these circumstances, he hoped the Committee would not be dissatisfied if he made out that the case was not so black as it had been painted. He thought that even the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty would not be sorry if the effect of the speech of the right hon. Baronet (Sir John Hay) was somewhat mitigated, preceded, as it was, by the far more cautious, but also far more important, statement of the First Lord. One circumstance he greatly regretted, and that was that the speech of the First Lord was not made before the delivery of the Budget by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But five days ago, when the surplus was settled, a very delicate and slight allusion was made to the possibility of Supplementary Estimates which might be called for by unforeseen circumstances, and it was said that the Estimates submitted by the Government might be taken to be substantially those of their predecessors. He could not understand the discrepancy now revealed: but he was glad of one thing, and that was that this debate had occurred before the proposals of the Chancellor of the 886 Exchequer were finally settled. After the important speech of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty this matter could not be disposed of without much further discussion; and without acting up to the views which evidently were in the mind of the right hon. Gentleman, he (Mr. Goschen) would promise on the part of the Opposition, that every proposal he might make for additional expenditure should be examined with the greatest anxiety to arrive at the truth, and not with any view to prove that his (Mr. Goschen's) own Estimates were adequate to the occasion. It was far more important that the country should be satisfied the Navy was in an efficient condition than that his own Estimates should be vindicated. The right hon. Gentleman had gone into a comparison of the Estimates for the last six years; but he (Mr. Goschen) had hoped that that night they might have discussed the Navy Estimates in a different spirit; he had thought they might possibly have done with what had happened six years ago, for year after year precisely the same comparisons had been made, and he was sorry that they were a legacy from one Parliament to another. The right hon. Gentleman had been a comparatively short time in office, yet from his speech it appeared that the greater part of his time had been occupied in obtaining comparative historical statistics with regard to what had been done by different Administrations instead of devoting himself to the more essential part—namely, the present state of the Navy. He (Mr. Goschen) hoped that that would be the last time of its occurrence, and that in the future they would be able to discuss the Navy Estimates without continually recurring to the past, and he trusted that not even the spirit which that debate had assumed would cause his late Colleagues or himself to depart from the resolution at which they had arrived, which was that they would discuss the Navy Estimates, so far as they could, without any party spirit whatever. The right hon. Gentleman would now have great responsibility. For himself, he (Mr. Goschen) had not been free from anxiety and responsibility; he had had a very difficult task, to which, possibly, the right hon. Gentleman had scarcely given adequate consideration, for on 887 comparing the present with preceding Estimates, the right hon. Gentleman did not mention one important consideration, or only mentioned it as an after-thought—that coal, iron, and wages, everything entering into the composition of the Estimates and the cost of ships, had risen enormously in price. During a time like that, in which it was his duty to preside at the Admiralty, though he knew that they would be exposed to the obloquy of spending more money and increasing the Estimates, he said to his Colleagues in the Government that they must not shrink from asking increased sums to be voted, in view of the increased price of such articles as he had enumerated, and they had not shrunk from doing so. It was to be hoped that the right hon. Gentleman intended making up the arrears in a similar way, for the comparatively small sum of £150,000 would not meet the kind of objection to which the right hon. Baronet the Member for Stamford and those who seconded his views directed attention. For two or three years the Estimates had been rising, and now the turn of the right hon. Gentleman opposite had come would he shrink from acting up to his opinions, and placing on the Table Supplemental Estimates adequate to what he conceived to be the necessities of the case? They had been taunted with arrears; did the right hon. Gentleman mean to make them up? The hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. Reed) had spoken with great candour, and told them that the state of the iron-clads was such that they should not be content with the progress sketched out in the Estimates, but that they should be finished as fast as possible by placing on them as many men as they could get. That was an intelligible course, but he (Mr. Goschen) did deprecate any Minister standing up in that House and giving a picture of the Navy which might alarm the country, and which would have its effect upon foreign countries; while at the same time that Minister did not take adequate action and deal with the matter in a bold and broad spirit. The hon. and gallant Member for Devonport (Captain Price), in the early part of the evening, said that for five years the Conservative party had been denouncing Dockyard economies as practised by the late Government: he accepted the challenge of the hon. and gallant 888 Gentleman, who had very properly said, either let them be acquitted of the charge, or let the evil be remedied. But to tell the country that they had been starving the Dockyards, that what had been done was insufficient, and yet to abstain from measures to correct the evil, while they had a surplus of £6,000,000, could not be endured. If the late Government had left the Navy inefficient, they had at least given their successors a surplus of between £5,000,000 and £6,000,000 to put it right, and he therefore asked the Government not at the same time to denounce their parsimony, while taking advantage of their surplus to apply it to other objects. But now, with regard to the charge that they had done nothing during the five years they had been in office, they had, within 200 tons, added the respectable figure of 100,000 tons, or 20,000 tons of shipping a-year to the Royal Navy. With regard to himself, it had been his duty to propose to the House and receive its sanction for the commencement of nearly 50 men-of-war during the last three years—four iron-clads, 10 corvettes, eight sloops, three double-screw gunboats, 11 seagoing gunboats, 10 coast-defence ships, a troop-ship, and a brig. That might not be a very sensational programme, but he thought it was sufficient to show they had not been idle, and if they considered that in five years he had added 100,000 tons to the shipping of the Navy, and received the sanction of Parliament for the commencement of 50 ships during the last three years, it would show that, at all events, he had not been insensible to the wants of the country. At the same time, he must candidly say he had during the last three years to contend against difficulties which had thrown them back more than he liked with reference to shipbuilding of various kinds. It had, therefore, been his duty to propose the addition of 700 men, and last year he also asked for 600 more men to complete the work undertaken. For those connected with the administration of the Dockyards and with shipbuilding in them, had found during the last two years that the cost of repairing the iron-clads had been much greater than was anticipated, and was that to be made a reproach to them? They had taken extreme pains with the Dockyard officers to estimate the number of men 889 that would be required to carry out the programme in its entirety. They asked how many men would be required for repairing such and such ships which were inserted in the programme; but, notwithstanding this precaution, they had been greatly disappointed. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty did not state the number of men that would be required to repair the iron-clads; but he (Mr. Goschen) would do so. The Warrior required 425 men, while only 851 were estimated: the Defence required 320, while the estimate made was 144; the Resistance required 270, while only 159 had been estimated. It would, therefore, be apparent to the Committee that if the men required thus exceeded the estimate, unless the estimate was to be greatly exceeded the men would have to be taken off other work. He now came to a point with reference to which he asked the attention of the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. Peed) and he was glad to meet that hon. Gentleman in the House rather than have to reply to him in the columns of a newspaper. The hon. Gentleman alluded to a controversy that had taken place respecting the state of our iron-clad Navy, and spoke of a fallacy which he thought had been introduced into it. It would be remembered that in a letter which he addressed to the newspapers, the hon. Member rather scared the public by the account he gave of the Peter the Great, which was to steam into our ports and find no vessel able to resist her. The general impression was, at the time, that the hon. Member was speaking of the present, though he now called this a fallacy. It certainly was the fact that the iron plates of the Peter the Great had not at the time left this country, but were still at Sheffield. Now, if the Devastation was not to be classed as a sea-going ship, he (Mr. Goschen) trusted that the same reservation would be applied to vessels like the Peter the Great. He found that it was always English ships which suffered from these disparaging comparisons, and that those who made these attacks upon our ships as obsolete, actually adduced as examples for intimidation, the ships of other countries which were still more obsolete. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty deprecated any public statement of the condition of any ship in the Navy, but his 890 appeal did not have much effect upon the right hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir John Hay), and the public would have to-morrow his pessimist account of the state of the Navy, without being-able to compare and correct it with the First Lord's official statement of the condition of these ships. There was another subject of great anxiety which had prevented the late Admiralty from carrying out their programme as they could have wished, in relation to which it might be interesting to the Committee to receive some figures as to unarmoured ships in order that they might realize the course which lay before them if they intended to act upon those pessimist views. The late Government had to repair unarmoured ships, and had devoted a considerable amount of their resources to that purpose; but if they had neglected them, they would have been told that they had no ships to send to foreign stations, and that they had allowed this useful class of vessels to fall into arrears. During the last three or four years the ships of the most modern construction required a stupendous outlay in repairs after a very short time. The Eclipse was launched in 1867, and after being in commission four years she cost £'21,000, or 33 per cent on her original cost for repairs. The Sirius was launched in 1868, and after four or five years' work, her original cost having been £'02,000, her repairs cost £21,000. The Nymph was built in 1866, and after four years' work, her original cost having been £63,000, her repairs cost £30,000. The Juno, a vessel of 1,400 tons, was launched in 1867, and, her cost having been £72,000, he received proposals for her repair at a cost of £36,000. These vessels had absorbed so large an amount of the time of the Dockyards in their repair that they had made it excessively difficult for the Admiralty to keep time in their programme, and, in fact, none of their scientific advisers had been aware until the last two or three years that the timber and boilers of these vessels would wear out so fast. In the first place, then, the late Government had had to contend against dearer coal, higher wages, dearer iron, and dearer materials of every kind; next, the iron-clads which had come upon the Admiralty for repairs had taken almost twice the number of men that had boon anticipated; and, in 891 the third place, it had been found that ships of modern construction, which might have been expected to last through two commissions before they required great and serious repairs, now came up for repairs after one commission. That was the state of things which the late Admiralty had to deal with during the last few years, and it was not, he thought, a bad account of their stewardship to state that they had added 100,000 tons to the Navy. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty had truly said that these were not the Estimates of the late Government, but that they were departmental Estimates. Being departmental, they might be regarded as maximum Estimates, as a Cabinet was apt to question whether Estimates were not too great, rather than to complain that they were not greater. What they had to ask themselves was this—looking to the fact that the cost of building ships was very much greater than it used to be, and that the repairs were more costly and extensive, the question remained, how Parliament was to deal with this state of things? Were the Government to go on increasing the Navy Estimates in every direction, and were they to look exclusively at the state of the British Navy, without looking to the armaments and shipbuilding of foreign countries, or were they not rather to take stock of all these considerations, and at the same time go forward with caution and prudence? He had yet another reason to give for the non-fulfilment of their programme. There had been very great difficulty in the delivery of iron owing to the extraordinary and abnormal position of the iron trade, and the late Board of Admiralty pressed repeatedly for the delivery of iron for the Téméraire and another ship, but it was impossible for a long time to get it. Special iron was required for all these particular ships, a special order had to be given, and it was difficult to get the orders executed. He only hoped the right hon. Gentleman would be fortunate with his deliveries as regarded the programme of this year, and that he would not suffer as the late Board of Admiralty had suffered, without any fault of their own, from the non-delivery of iron. The First Lord of the Admiralty stated that at the present rate of progress the Thunderer would not be 892 completed till October, 1875. But why would not she be completed till then at the present rate of progress? The story was told in the Estimates, and it was this—that a most important experiment was to be tried upon the Thunderer, with regard to loading by hydraulic machinery. A contract had been made with Sir William Armstrong for carrying this out, and an important experiment was being tried on the turrets of the Thunderer, which involved considerable delay, and the work of which was by no means of an ordinary character. But the Thunderer could be finished, if it was desired to complete her beforehand, at a much earlier period. That experiment had been one of very great interest. It would enable the Thunderer to mount very much heavier guns than the 3.3-ton guns which she already had, and, looking at the state of Europe, the late Board of Admiralty thought it was not necessary to complete the Thunderer to the prejudice of a new mechanical experiment, which might be of the greatest advantage to ships that we might build in future. If the hon. Member for Pembroke had been in the House last year, he would have known that the late Board of Admiralty were urged not to proceed with the building of the Fury until experiments had been made on the Devastation.
§ MR. E. J. REEDsaid, his complaint was that, in addition to the 200 tons on the turrets, there were 500 tons on the hull not to be completed.
§ MR. GOSCHENsaid, the ship was practically completed, except as to the turrets; and the 500 tons was equivalent to so much more money to be spent for men and material. That led him (Mr. Goschen) to the comparatively small amount of iron-clad ships that had been built during the last two or three years. The delay had not been an unmixed evil. The late Board of Admiralty were desirous of avoiding the building of iron-clads which in a few months might be pronounced out of date. The result of the delay had been that they received most important suggestions as to modifications of the design for the Inflexible, which had made her infinitely more powerful than she would have been if she had been proceeded with before. The noble Lord the Member for Chichester (Lord Henry Lennox) last year urged that no new iron-clads of 893 the first class should be laid down till the Devastation had been tried. In that view nothing could have been more imprudent than to rush into the construction of new iron-clads before the type had been finally settled by naval architects; and while experiments were being tried, the late Board of Admiralty did their best to increase the number of our unarmoured ships, a course which was approved by the House, for unarmoured ships were as necessary for their purposes as ironclads were for theirs, not to take into account the fact that through the chief efforts of the Admiralty being concentrated on iron-clads for five or ten years, the number of unarmoured ships had fallen into arrear. He therefore maintained that the late Board had endeavoured, taking Parliament Session after Session into their confidence, to arrive at the best programme they could, and their only regret was that, owing to the causes which he had stated, they had not been able to proceed so far with that programme as they had anticipated. He wished to say a few words as to the state of the iron-clad Navy as placed before the Committee by the right hon. Gentleman. The words "obsolete," "inefficient," and other epithets of that kind were very difficult of definition. What did an obsolete iron-clad mean? Did it mean an iron-clad that had 41 inches of iron? An iron-clad with 4½ inches of iron might be obsolete when sent against ships of superior power, but it was not obsolete when sent against ships plated with a similar thickness of iron. He should have liked the right hon. Gentleman when he presented his statement as to the number of ships requiring repair, to have stated whether it was ships of the best class or ships of the worst class that most required repair. He was glad that even the right hon. Baronet the Member for Stamford had said something re-assuring on that point. The right hon. Baronet had said that the Sultan, the Audacious, and her sister ships were in excellent repair, and in those vessels combined with the Monarch and the Devastation, we really possessed an enormous force, because we must estimate the force of our Navy not by the numbers, but by the qualities of our ships. He did not wish the doctrine to be spread about that these vessels could not hold their own in the Channel, for he maintained they could sweep it without being sup- 894 plemented with other ships. Other countries had ships whose boilers required repair, and there was no steam packet company with all its boilers perfect; indeed he wished the Committee could read the debates which took place in France and America on the subject, for those countries possessed corresponding critics to the right hon. Baronet the Member for Stamford. Boilers must be in various stages of repairs, and the difficulties on this head belonged to all Administrations. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir John Hay) had stated that the First Lord's guarded account of the state of our Navy showed it to be in a disgraceful state. The right hon. Baronet, however, himself admitted the first 10 of the 41 sea-going ships to be in excellent order, and at any period of our history there must be a certain number of ships coining in, after four years' service, which required new boilers. That accounted for six or seven more, and unfortunately, many ships having been built at about the same time, their boilers had to be replaced at the same moment. The boilers, however, were quite reach' for them, as shown by a Return moved for by the right hon. Baronet. The charge, he presumed, was, that boilers had not been put into all the ships early enough; but would the First Lord pull ships to pieces and put in new boilers as soon as the old ones were three or four years old? If boilers were to be at all times in first-rate order the additional expense would, he predicted, be more than hundreds of thousands, and this would be pursuing a policy not adopted by any other country. He trusted the boilers would be kept in sufficient repair; but if the Admiralty were to be blamed if there were six or ten boilers at any time on which pressure had been reduced, the practice of all previous Administrations would have to be reversed. He regretted much that he had felt it his duty to make any remarks of a controversial character; it had not been his intention to do so, but after what had been said he had felt it his duty to touch upon the various subjects, and he thanked the Committee for the attention with which they had listened to him. He did not wish these alarmist statements to go forth uncontradicted to the country, and he would only conclude by saving that if the right hon. Gentleman the First 895 Lord made out a case for increased expenditure, he would promise him that it should not be criticized, as far as his own influence went, from a party point of view. If the right hon. Gentleman had simply spoken of lagging behind for the last two years, leeway might easily be made up; but if he imputed such a fault to the last five years he would find it his duty to submit very different Estimates. If the notion that every ship was to be efficient were pushed too far, we should not have so many ships at sea for the training of our men, for the most liberal House of Commons would at length be staggered by the expense incurred. During the last ten years our unarmoured as well as armoured Navy had had to be reconstructed, and of the ships built previously to 1860 or 1865 very few remained. He had always advocated Estimates sufficient to keep the Navy in a proper state with reference to its duties, but he deprecated alarmist statements, and if the First Lord thought that whenever an important ship broke down there should be another to fill her place, whether she was immediately wanted for any special service or not, and that there must be a certain number of ships in commission, whatever the requirements of the public service might be, he did not wonder that he spoke of difficulties. There was now a Reserve, however, in the Flying Squadron formed by his right hon. Friend (Mr. Childers); and from that Reserve ships might be detached when there was real occasion for the presence of another ship on any foreign station. He had hoped and still hoped to co-operate with the First Lord for the benefit of the Navy and the Service. That right hon. Gentleman was surrounded by naval men in whom he (Mr. Goschen) himself had the greatest confidence, and by professional men of the highest ability. Two of his naval advisers were summoned to the Board of Admiralty by himself, and the third, Lord Gilford, was appointed by himself to a responsible position at Portsmouth. On the professional questions, therefore, the First Lord would have the best advice, and any supplementary proposals he might make would be candidly considered by himself.
MR. SCOURFIELDthought that the statements they had listened to that evening went to show that those hon. 896 Members who, like himself, were afraid that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had over-estimated the amount of the surplus, were justified in holding that opinion. If the naval expenditure was to be so elastic, they might expect that the same elasticity would extend to other branches of the expenditure, and that consequently the claims upon the Revenue would be considerably increased.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. Samuda.)
§ MR. GOSCHENasked when the debate would be resumed?
§ Motion agreed to.
§ Resolution to be reported To-morrow:
§ Committee also report Progress; to sit again upon Wednesday.