§ SUPPLY—considered in Committee.
§ (In the Committee.)
§
(1.) Original Question [Feb. 27] again proposed,
That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 128,968, be maintained for the service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and for Depôts for the training of Recruits for service at Home and Abroad, including Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, from the 1st day of April 1873 to the 31st day of March 1874, inclusive.
§
Whereupon Question again proposed,
That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 118,968, be maintained for the service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and for Depôts for the training of Recruits for service at Home and Abroad, including Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, from the 1st day of April 1873 to the 31st day of March 1874, inclusive."—(Mr. William Fowler.)
§ SIR JOHN PAKINGTONsaid, he wished, with the permission of the Committee, before the question was disposed of, to address a few observations on the statement made by the Secretary of State for War the other night, when he made his annual Report on the military force for the coming year. The House was entertained each year with the discussion of two subjects which at first sight 1124 might appear to be somewhat different; the one was the amount of force which the Government thought necessary for the service of the country, and the other the mode of the administration of those forces, which was adopted by the Government and the Secretary of State. On the present occasion, without any intention to delay the Committee by any extended observations, he would, in the first instance, deal with the first of these subjects—the amount of force which Her Majesty's Government proposed for the service of the year. The hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. W. Fowler) had proposed to reduce this force to the extent of 10,000 men. He had no hesitation in saying at once that he should record his vote in opposition to that Amendment of the hon. Member for Cambridge. At the same time he desired to express his regret that Her Majesty's Government had thought it their duty to reduce the forces for the year, though he was not quite sure he understood the proposal in reference to the Staff brigade depôt to be formed from the auxiliary forces.
§ MR. CARDWELLexplained that the real number for the purpose of present comparison was 125,004, and not the increased number of 128,968, because the 3,964, were future men who, or a portion of whom, would become soldiers of the brigade depôt as the permanent Staff now employed upon the Militia were gradually absorbed. Therefore, they would not come into existence until there was a corresponding reduction, or a more than corresponding reduction in the permanent Staff of the Militia.
§ SIR JOHN PAKINGTONI may speak of them as Militia to be gradually drafted into the Army.
§ MR. CARDWELLAnd added to the Army as they are absorbed.
§ SIR JOHN PAKINGTONsaid, that this question of the amount of the force ought to be discussed without reference to party or political feeling. It was the clear duty of the Government of the day to provide a force sufficient for the requirements of the country, and no Minister would be justified in proposing any force that he honestly thought would be below the fair requirements of this great Empire, but, at the same time, they were not justified in exceeding those requirements by a single man. He therefore deprecated party, or what 1125 he might call popularity Motions on the subject. It was not very difficult, in the absence of any emergency, to estimate our military requirements. The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms) had taken the total amount of the Estimates, and, dividing that by the total number of men, had calculated the cost per man. Such a mode of calculation was obviously fallacious at any time, and especially at present, considering the way in which our force was armed, and many other matters. There was only one way of fairly testing the Estimates of different Governments in respect to the Army, and that was by judging of the number of men proposed for the Army. He wished to go back as far as 1866, the last year of the Government of Lord Russell, when the present Prime Minister was Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the present Chief Secretary for Ireland was Secretary of State for War. In 1866 the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) asked Parliament to grant, exclusive of the men serving in India, 138,117 men for the Army. He took for his comparison the number of our own British troops on the face of the Estimates. He did not remember that any objection was raised to that proposal as being in any degree excessive, or beyond what the fair requirements of the Empire demanded. Soon afterwards a change of Government occurred, and General Peel succeeded the noble Marquess at the War Office. On General Peel's retirement, he himself (Sir John Pakington) succeeded to that Department, and in 1868 it was his duty, as the then Secretary of State for War, to introduce the Army Estimates for the year. The number of men he proposed in 1868 was 136,650, or in round figures, about 1,500 men fewer than the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Hartington) had proposed two years before. It was also in 1868 that the right hon. Gentleman now at the head of the Government made that tour in Lancashire which had not been forgotten, and very naturally desired to show why the late Ministry should go out and the present Ministry should go in; and hero he must confess he had always regretted that the right hon. Gentleman, instead of resting his case on the broad difference of policy between the two contending parties, had charged the late Government with extravagance in expenditure. 1126 He himself had always warmly denied that accusation; and he thought the figures he was quoting showed that, so far as the Army was concerned, there was no justification for making it, the number of men which he proposed in 1868 being 1,500 fewer than had been proposed by the previous Government. However, the right hon. Gentleman opposite had thought proper to say so much about the extravagance of his opponents that when he again came into Office it was necessary that something should be done to fulfil the expectations he had raised. Now he desired to allude —and he hoped to do it in no offensive manner—to the administration of the present Secretary of State for War during the last four years, because it could not be denied that, for good or for harm, his administration had been most remarkable. That he was perfectly free to acknowledge. Let them look at that administration financially, and what would they find? He did not say in consequence of those Lancashire accusations, but immediately after them, in 1869, at one fell swoop, a reduction of 12,000 men was proposed. Again, when the Estimates of 1870 were laid before Parliament, away went 13,000 men more; and during those two years, under the administration of his right hon. Friend opposite, between 24,000 and 25,000 were struck off from the strength of the Army. Well, the year 1870 had not passed away before 20,000 of those men had to be put on again. [Mr. CARDWELL dissented.] His right hon. Friend shook his head, but the proposal of the Government in 1870 was to add 20,000 men to the Army, in round numbers; so that within about eighteen months from the change of Government 25,000 men were reduced, and 20,000 men were put back again; and in 1871 the Estimates of his right hon. Friend were within 2,000 men of the number he had himself proposed in 1868. There was an old saying—"Let bygones be bygones;" and he did not want to dwell on that subject unnecessarily; but he did say that to his mind those fluctuations, those sudden jumpings up and down, were unworthy and undignified. Successive Governments ought to arrive, as he believed they might arrive, at something like a clear understanding of what was the force required in ordinary peaceful times for 1127 the defence of this great Empire, and they ought to maintain that force. No Government of the day ought to allow itself to be dictated to by any quarter, or ought to think it was its interest to play those tricks with the strength of the Army. It would be his duty to vote against the Motion of the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. W. Fowler), for he had heard nothing like an argument to justify the reduction which that hon. Gentleman proposed. Indeed, he had not heard from the Secretary of State himself any good reason for the reduction of men which he now proposed. Why were these men to be reduced? Were they superfluous last year? If so, why was the House asked to vote them? If they were not superfluous last year, why were they superfluous now? He never had liked, and he did not like now, the policy of the present Government in bringing back so many troops from the colonies. One obvious consequence of it was, that in the ratio in which they reduced their forces in the colonies they increased it at home. Thus they had what seemed to be a very large force to meet the requirements of this country; and those who wished to reduce the Army took the number of men they saw quartered at home, and apparently without occupation for their time, as the basis of their arguments. He did wish that the present Government, and all Governments, would take a steadier line of policy, ascertain what amount of force we really required, and would then keep to it, whatever it might be. They ought not to be induced by the passing politics of the day to make those constant changes, knocking off thousands of men in one year and putting them on again the next year. He next wished to refer to the administration of the Army during the last two years. Within that time they had had four of the most remarkable changes that had occurred for a long period in that administration. They had had that great measure, as he admitted it to be, for good or for evil—abolishing the system of purchase:—next, the term of service in the Army had been shortened; thirdly, they had had that great withdrawal of troops from the colonies to which he had already adverted, and their concentration at home; and, lastly, came the Act for amalgamating our Auxiliary Forces with the Regular 1128 Army and establishing those depôt centres, which he was glad to hear from his right hon. Friend's statement the other night would in a short time be commenced, and which he hoped would be rapidly brought into active exercise. His right hon. Friend had pursued a bold policy, and if it proved successful, as for the sake of the country everyone must desire, he would be entitled to the honour of these changes. The most hazardous one of them was the abolition of purchase. He thought it from the first a very costly experiment, but if it succeeded, no one would have a right to complain of the cost. The anxiety and doubt, however, with which he originally viewed the measure had not yet been removed. He had been disappointed in not hearing his right hon. Friend explain the inevitable consequence of the change on our system of promotion and retirement. It might be premature to press for his decision as respected retirement, but it was clearly the right and duty of his side of the House to solicit explanations from time to time as to the manner in which the changes were being carried out, and he hoped to hear a statement as to promotions to the command of regiments. Much was said in the discussions on purchase, of "seniority tempered by selection," but the information within reach of the public had led him to suppose that seniority had decided appointments to higher posts and to the command of regiments, and that there had been little, if any, selection. The next great change was the short-service system. Now, it was not satisfactory to find desertions so prevalent as to excite general anxiety, and he would ask whether any measures were in contemplation to check the evil? He was not sanguine of the success of the short-service system, and he wished to know how it was to be reconciled with service in India? The Government had resolved to supply the Indian Army with seasoned soldiers, not with boys of 17. He thought the House did not fully understand from his right hon. Friend's answer on Monday night how the reliefs were to be regulated, and how the supply of soldiers of proper age was reconciled with the short-service system. Turning to the next great change, as to which he had not to adopt the same tone of objection, he felt sanguine that his right hon. Friend's 1129 scheme for the amalgamation of the forces at home and in depôt centres would prove the best adopted by any War Minister for many years. It would tend to make the troops much more effective, and he hoped that in time the "harmonious whole" anticipated by his right hon. Friend would be brought about, so that the Auxiliary Forces and the Regulars would work together on a more satisfactory footing. As to linked battalions he was one of those who, in company with much more competent men, urged on his right hon. Friend the reduction of the number of regiments and the adoption of that plan. The change required an effort, but his right hon. Friend had done so many bold things that this could not be deemed beyond his powers. He wished to know whether his new plan was a fair substitute for the old system, and whether any serious difficulties were likely to arise in combining different regiments? He hoped that in any case the object in view would be persevered in. He had been glad to find that the apparent reduction in the Militia Vote, which seemed at first to imply a reduction of the Force, was the result of the transfer of two considerable items to another Vote. Nothing should induce his right hon. Friend to swerve from the resolution displayed throughout his administration of keeping up the Militia. Possibly, a similar explanation might account for the reduction of £40,000 in the Volunteer Vote, for he was sure the country would regret any falling off in the numerical strength or efficiency of this valuable Force. He had heard with satisfaction the right hon. Gentleman state the other evening that certain stoppages in the pay of the soldier were to be abolished, but the right hon. Gentleman went on to state that the soldier would consequently receive 1s. a-day clear. He was afraid there was some mistake with regard to the latter statement, and he wished to afford the right hon. Gentleman an opportunity of correcting a misapprehension which, if allowed to get abroad, would cause the soldier to believe that the promises of the Government were not being fulfilled, and that they were not dealing with him in good faith. He had that morning received an anonymous letter signed "A Soldier," which had been posted at Manchester, and which was evidently written by a person in humble 1130 life, in which it was pointed out that the soldier would still have to pay for his groceries, vegetables, barrack damages, and sheet washings, which would cost him altogether 4½d. a-day, leaving him only a clear pay of 7½d. a-day, instead of the shilling mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman. He should be glad if the right hon. Gentleman would set this matter right, in order to prevent a misunderstanding with regard to it. He would not trouble the Committee with any more observations, further than to say that above and before all he most earnestly hoped that, whatever Government might be in power, they would not yield to these periodical proposals to reduce the Army by 10,000 men or to raise it by 5,000 men, but would steadily adhere to that force, and that force only, which the requirements of this great country demanded.
CAPTAIN BEAUMONTsaid, he was not disposed to vote in favour of the Motion of the hon. Member for Cambridge in its present form, but he should have been prepared to support it had it proposed to pass men from the Regular Army into the Reserve, in accordance with the terms of a Motion he had brought forward about two years since. He objected to any Motion for a lump reduction of 10,000 men, and thought that even if the House of Commons considered a reduction necessary, it should be left to the War Office to decide upon the details. By pursuing the course he indicated, the services of the men would have been retained, while the Estimates might have been considerably reduced. He was glad to hear that the question of the soldier's pay had at length been dealt with in a manner which had met with the unqualified approval of both sides of the House. He suggested, however, that the soldier should be made to pay for his uniform as well as his under-clothing; a due allowance being, of course, given him for the purpose. Such a reform would encourage him to be more careful with his clothes than he was at present. He had also heard with satisfaction that the details of the Army re-organization scheme would be forthcoming in the course of next month. There were one or two omissions in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. He was sorry, in the first place, that the right hon. Gentleman had not alluded to the question of the 1131 stagnation in promotion that now existed in the Ordnance Corps. In point of promotion the junior ranks of that branch of the service were worse off than before the recent promotion of first captains to majors, because the senior ranks were now so attractive that men could not be got to leave them. The proposal of the Government for the abolition of purchase was supported by himself and other hon. Members on the understanding that for the purchase system some scheme would be substituted which would provide for the efficiency of the service as regarded non-stagnation. Until the question of the stagnation of promotion had been grappled with, he could not look upon the abolition of purchase as a satisfactory settlement. He wished to call the attention of the Committee to the fact that although the Estimates had been reduced, the economy which had been effected had been the result of striking so many fighting men off the muster-roll, more than the result of increased efficiency, which was the proper source to look to for economy. He was also disappointed in not hearing from the right hon. Gentleman a statement as to the mode in which he proposed to deal with the question of promotion in the Army generally. With regard to the system of short service contemplated by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, he could only say that it differed very materially from the system advocated by the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms), with whom he was disposed to agree. The short service which the hon. Member for Hackney and himself approved was such a system as would pass men rapidly from the ranks into the Reserve. The present system of short service appeared to him to be wrong for two reasons—In the first place, we had under that system enlistment for the Regular Army, and at the same time enlistment for the Militia. A process which could hardly be conducive to efficiency. In the next place, six years' service gave a man a taste for military life and unfitted him for the duties of a civilian. If they accepted the principle of short service they must accept that which had been recognised here and on the Continent—namely, that in three years a man was made a soldier; and they must also recognise the fact that the remainder of his ser- 1132 vice must be passed in the Army Reserve to secure discipline and efficiency. The country did not care whether they were defended by the Regular Army or by the Reserve. He believed that if a system of three years service, together with sufficient pay in the Reserve were fairly tried, the War Department would get a sufficient number of men. He must congratulate the right hon. Gentleman upon the first step which he had taken towards decentralization, and he hoped the Government would go further in that direction, and establish complete localized Army corps.
§ MR. AUBERON HERBERTprotested against the whole system on which our Army was founded. His right hon. Friend tried to do the best he could with that system; but the system in itself was radically wrong. It possessed only one good feature—it could not possibly last; and it had three great defects — it was expensive, it was immoral, and as a weapon of offence or defence, it was inefficient. As to its cost, he would say nothing. The naked figures at the foot of these Estimates spoke for themselves. But he would call attention to the second point. The number of desertions had already been matter for comment. His right hon. Friend reckoned that the number in 1871 was 4,553; and it had been said that this could hardly be the full number, as over 8,000 were advertised in The Police Gazette. He wished, however to show the ratio of increase during the last 10 years. It was true that in 1861 the number of desertions was as high as 21 per thousand; but in the intervening years it varied from 13 to a maximum of 18, till in 1871 it sprang up to 24 per thousand. In his opinion, this meant that at the present time the rate of wages was increasing, that better means of employment were afforded to the labouring classes, and that they were becoming more and more disinclined to accept the pitiful terms offered them for military service. It was well known that men who had fallen into misfortune took refuge under the system of compulsion of entering the Army, and the result showed itself in the number of desertions. Another point to which he wished to call the attention of the Committee was, that there was good ground for believing that the class from which our recruits were drawn was de- 1133 teriorating, and that the men were not equal to those who formerly entered the Army. The statistics of 1871 showed an increasing proportion of young soldiers who had but shortly joined the service, and who were committed to military prisons. In 1868 the percentage of those who had only served two years and under in comparison with the whole number of soldiers admitted into military prisons was 27 per cent. In 1869 and 1870 the same percentage was shown, but in 1871 it leaped up to 43 per cent. These figures showed unmistakably that the class of men who had lately joined the Army was a deteriorating class. Then, what was the state of the whole Army as regards crime? The Report of 1871 stated that 9,310 sentences by court-martial had been passed, which was at the rate of 1 man in every 11, a state of things which the most sanguine admirers of our military system could not regard as satisfactory. In considering these figures it should be remembered that the punishments awarded by courts-martial were always severe, and that they did not include penalties for smaller breaches of military discipline. These smaller offences numbered 178,754, a percentage of 178 percent; this number was perhaps less surprising than the number of punishments for serious offences, especially when it appeared that 886 of the latter were for periods of from 7 to 14 years' imprisonment. But besides this the Inspector General of Prisons had stated that the amount of crime would have been greater but for the fact that the bad characters, the habitual offenders against military law, had been discharged from the Army in 1870 and 1871. As many as 2,842 of these utterly bad characters were discharged in the year ending with April, 1871, and 1,174 were discharged in the following year. He would now tread upon somewhat more delicate ground, by showing the state of immorality in the Army. This immorality, he believed, formed another ground for suspecting the soundness of the system on which it was founded. Few would credit the fearful amount of venereal disease existing among the men; an average of no less than 112 admissions to hospital of syphilitic cases was reported per 1,000 men, and 12 per 1,000 of the more serious form of the disease.
§ COLONEL STUART KNOXrose to Order. He wished to know whether those details were necessary?
THE CHAIRMANsaid, the hon. Gentleman was doing nothing contrary to the Rules of the House, and must be left to the exercise of his own discretion.
§ COLONEL STUART KNOXOr to common decency.
§ MR. AUBERON HERBERTcontended that it was urgently necessary to lay these statistics before the House and the country, and he had not the slightest intention of refraining from submitting them. They should have been studied long ago, and he was convinced when once the country became aware of the immorality produced by our present military system, no Government could hold its hand from reforming it. The 124 cases per 1,000, however, did not show the extent of the evil. The Reports of the various medical Inspectors asserted that this disease had been much reduced by the operation of certain Acts. One Inspector thought the disease had been reduced one-third by them, and the Inspector at Colchester reported that the great immunity from disease existing since 1868 was entirely attributable to those Acts. Prior to 1868 he reported 500 admissions per 1,000, and in 1870 only 178 per 1,000. So that large as were the admissions to hospital at present, they did not disclose more than a small part of the great immorality lurking in our military system. These were very unsavoury details, and quite as unpleasant to him as to any other hon. Member. Would the House and the country allow a system which could foster such immorality to continue? He wished to say distinctly, as he had said before, that the system on which the Army was based combined three great evils—it was an enormously expensive system; it was a grossly immoral system; and he ventured to add, that as a means of defence, it was altogether inefficient. Foreign critics might come over to this country, and under the influence of the urbanity and hospitality of the Minister for War pass some favourable criticism upon a few points connected with our Army; but he refused to believe any general of reputation on the Continent would pronounce our standing Army fit to oppose the citizen Army of a nation equally intelligent and as powerful as England in other re- 1135 spects; the system upon which we relied rendered it utterly impossible.
§ SIR WILFRID LAWSONsaid, that the discussion they had had that night was not a very lively one, nor was the subject of the last speech very pleasant, and he did not wonder that 24 hours ago there were found 33 Gentlemen from both sides of the House to vote that the debate should be given up. He ventured to think, however, that it was well that they had one more night's debate, because all would admit that it was most important to discuss thoroughly, freely, and fully not merely the details, but the policy on which those Estimates were founded. The Prime Minister very truly told the House that this Vote was connected with the policy of the Government; therefore the House of Commons was only doing its duty in giving that policy a calm investigation, because when once these men were voted there was virtually an end of any important discussion of the Estimates. The position in which the Committee found itself tonight was a very peculiar one. On the first day of the Session, in the Speech which the Queen delivered by the advice of her Ministers, Her Majesty informed Parliament that she had "the satisfaction of maintaining relations of friendship with foreign Powers throughout the world," and that was certainly a very satisfactory announcement. And yet, in that state of things, when we were at peace with all the world and well protected by a most powerful fleet, we were called on to provide for the defence of the country twice as many men as we thought sufficient before the Crimean War, and this at a time when we had withdrawn our troops from the colonies, and when we were living under a Government which came into office on the policy of retrenching the public expenditure. He freely admitted—though the admission might be damaging to his views—that there was no outcry in the country against the military expenditure of the Government. So much the Government might say for itself. It was not right, therefore, for the right hon. Gentleman, who spoke so ably that night in a rather thin House, to say that those who were advocating retrenchment were seeking a cheap popularity. The expenditure of the Government was not unpopular, and therefore it was all the more important that those who con- 1136 demned it should lift up their voice. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, in his concluding remarks on bringing in the Estimates, said that in preparing the Estimates it was the most sincere desire of Her Majesty's Government to be as economical as was consistent with the efficiency of the service, and to see that the people of the country got the full value for their money. He also said that both in public and private life there were two things to go together—one was, that we should show by our conduct that we desired to live on terms of peace with our neighbour, and the other was that we should make other people equally desirous of living in peaceable relations with us. He (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) believed the right hon. Gentleman was carrying out economy and efficiency satisfactorily, but he doubted very much whether the right hon. Gentleman was taking the best way to bring about that peace which he desired. The right hon. Gentleman said that the way to procure peace was to keep up in this country 462,000 armed men. He must take leave to doubt that policy. His hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Barttelot) who made such a good speech last night, as he always did, cheered him ironically, for the hon. and gallant Gentleman had said that the proper thing was to be prepared for war. No man knew modern history better than his hon. and gallant Friend. But let him look at France, at Austria, at Prussia—all of them nations which had devoted themselves to keeping up large standing armies and preparing for war, and the result was that within a few years they had been engaged in deadly conflict. The question now was, was there any necessity to keep enormous forces in this country? Lord Derby, speaking not long ago with that good sense which always characterised everything he said, observed that the first thing to be done when they talked about Army organization and efficiency, was to ascertain what they really wanted that Army to do. Now, he wanted to find that out from his right hon. Friend. He tried last year, and ho could not. What did his right hon. Friend want this enormous number of men to do? We had given up the policy of assisting distressed nationalities—many of his hon. Friends thought wrongly—and of going abroad like knights-errant to 1137 defend the weak against the strong. We had given up the old policy, and now we merely wrote "meddling and muddling" despatches which generally made things rather worse than they were before. We did not want any troops to go and protect Turkey. We had had enough of that. When we wished to interfere now we called a few gentlemen round a green table, and got the thing settled; and he believed the new policy was better than the old. Before, we used to go to war first, and then make a Treaty. Now, we made a Treaty first, and thus avoided going to war. Neither did we want to redress the balance of power; for he was happy to say that the Government, to their everlasting credit, kept this country out of the great Continental War three years ago. The hon. Baronet the Member for Maidstone (Sir John Lubbock) had told an amusing story illustrative of that policy to his constituents. It was this—A man met his landlord one day and asked what the news was. "Oh," replied the landlord, not minding what he said, "the Dutch have taken Holland." "Well," said the farmer, "I reckon we shall have to put them out of that pretty quick." Now, that policy had been done away with, and instead of invading other countries, our only policy was to make peace. Our policy was, when war was over between other countries, to supply the starving population with food—a policy which would go further than anything else we could do to promote peace. His hon. Friend the Member for Hertfordshire (Mr. Brand) made a thundering speech last night, and said that we ought to be prepared, because the Central Asia question might be troublesome. But who cared about the Central Asia question? No one but a few writers in the Press. No Government would dare to go to war for such a matter, or any that did would be hurled from power by the people of this country. Therefore our Army must be kept up entirely for "defence, not defiance." The motto of our old standing Army might be "defiance," but that of the Volunteers was "defence." Another argument of his right hon. Friend was that this great force was kept up to get rid of panics, and he said that the age of panics was gone. He did not believe a word of it. What could reasonable measures do to stop panics? Panic was the child of unreason. We had heard 1138 before that the Militia would stop panics. Then we were told that the fortifications would put an end to panics, and then the Volunteers. But ever since we had no end of panics. That being the case, against whom were we providing those enormous military forces? Not against France—nobody was afraid of France now, and he would not insult the Committee by talking of it. Not against Prussia. Prussia, we knew, had no fleet to speak of, while we had an enormous fleet, and Prussia had quite enough on her hands in looking after France. If the Minister of War would get up and give his word that he knew as a Cabinet Minister that there were some intrigues going on, that some nation in some part of the world was plotting against our peace, then he would not vote with his hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Mr. W. Fowler). But if the right hon. Gentleman would not tell the Committee that, he would believe the words of Her Most Gracious Majesty, that we were, as she said, "maintaining relations of friendship with foreign Powers throughout the world." His right hon. Friend, on the 11th March, 1872, used these words—
If we were to maintain our influence among nations, perform our obligations, protect our colonies…. then this House and the people of this country must be of opinion that in the presence of enormous military Monarchies, an Army something on the scale of that which was proposed for this great country of England was not disproportionate or absurd."—[3 Hansard, ccix. 1832.]There was the cloven foot. It would appear from that observation that the right hon. Gentleman wanted us to compete with the large military monarchies on the Continent. That would be a dangerous, if not a fatal, policy. What was the use of running this mad race with the Continental Powers in regard to armaments? The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, on the 26th of July, 1861, recommending an arrangement between England and France with regard to their national rivalry said—"What is the use of diplomacy, what is the use of Governments, what is the use of cordial understandings, if such things can take place?" These were wise words, and he wished the country had attended to them more at the time. But if his right hon. Friend wanted to compete with the military monarchies of the Continent, he had far too few men. He kept 1139 up force enough to irritate, not to overawe; to make us hated rather than feared; to make us suspected, not respected. Of course, he should be told invasion was possible, and he admitted it. But so was an earthquake. The Japanese Ambassadors who had lately visited us, remarked in a book they published that they wondered what all the inhabitants of London would do in their houses in the case of au earthquake. Perfect security was absolutely impossible in this world. They must be guided by probability in their movements. They were all liable to an attack every day of their lives; but they did not on that account go out to walk with chain armour round their bodies. He, for instance, might be assailed any day by a combination of infuriated licensed victuallers, and in the same way the hon. Member for Derby (Mr. M. T. Bass) might be set upon by some rabid teetotalers, nevertheless neither of them thought it necessary to take the precaution of going about fully armed. What was the use of spending year after year all these millions in getting up this enormous military machinery? By keeping up an enormous Army we were incurring certain evils to ward off problematical ones. But there was a higher view to take than that of expense. We robbed peace of half its blessings by resorting to those means of defence from remote apprehensions of war. Such a policy stimulated fresh and unhealthy excitement, and unfitted our people for the pursuits of peaceful industry. It appeared to him absolutely revolting that in 1873, when so much was said of religion and civilization, Europe should be filled with armed men who devoted all their best energies to manufacture machines for the destruction of the lives and property of their fellow-creatures. To indulge in such a course was worse than the actions of wild beasts. The wild beasts allowed their angry passions to rise, but those passions subsided. They did not, like mankind, spend their whole lives in preparing for slaughtering one another. This continued maintenance of large armaments which were forced up by a mad rivalry of other nations was the monster curse of Europe at this moment. Was it not a nobler course for us to set an example of peace and contentment to all the world? He asked his right hon. Friend, he asked the Go- 1140 vernment, was it absolutely necessary to enter on this senseless controversy and to continue it. We should engage in some more noble strife—we should aim not to be stronger, but better than other countries. Why should the beautiful lines quoted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer with reference to Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen not be applied with equal truth to the country she governed?—Her armour is her honest thought,And simple truth her shield.And it would be so if they only adopted an honest, straightforward, manly policy. Mr. Cobden said, about 10 years ago—There is a vacant niche in the Temple of Fame for the Ruler or Minister who shall be the first to grapple with this monster evil of the day.He hoped that the Prime Minister would yet qualify himself to fill that niche. He thought that the right hon. Gentleman had the power of occupying that splendid position, and he was sure that he had the will and the ability to achieve it. To his Government belonged the honour of initiating the policy of international arbitration. Disarmament followed arbitration as certainly as night followed day. If the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister would but adopt this policy and carry it out to its completion, he would not only lighten the burdens of his own country, but he would do something towards fulfilling that prayer which we often put up for the giving to all nations of unity, peace, and concord.
§ MAJOR GENERAL SIR PERCY HERBERTsaid, he must remind the hon. Gentleman who sneered at the tone of this debate, that if he really desired to attain the object which he and his Friends had in view they should have taken a different course, and brought forward a Resolution calling on the Government to take back their Estimates and re-consider them. They could then have approached the subject free from matters of detail. Some uneasiness had been expressed in consequence of certain statements which fell from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, and he should be glad if they were explained. Soldiers of the Guards seemed to fear that they would be liable to some diminution of pay in consequence of their rations being stopped. He believed that was an error, although 1141 they would not gain so much as soldiers of the Line—the gain of the one being only one halfpenny per day, while the other gained three halfpence. With regard to the pay of men going on furlough, the amount they were entitled to was 8d. a-day in advance. The practice had been that the officer on his own responsibility advanced them the greater proportion of their pay, because it was impossible to subsist upon 8d.; and knowing their men, and wishing to be on good terms with them, they ran the risk of any loss that might occur from desertions, and made the advance. If the men deserted, the pay was stopped out of the pocket of the captain. By the arrangement now proposed by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War the difference between the regular pay of the soldiers and the pay on furlough was only £6,000. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would re-consider this arrangement, as it was not worth the discontent it would cause. There were many soldiers who were employed away from their regiments—orderlies and serjeants — who received their full pay. These men must have some allowances, and he hoped their case would receive liberal consideration. He hoped discretion would be used in applying the rule as to stopping the pay of men in hospital for certain disorders, or there would be danger of diseases being concealed, leading to serious consequences. As to branding the men with the letter "D", it should be understood that officers did not want to mark them for the purpose of retaining them in the service, but for the purpose of preventing their re-enlistment. Next, as to the number of recruits. Information on that point was incomplete without the standard, and he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would tell the Committee what the standard was. Another point to which he had to advert was, that of the examination of the men. He believed examination had been done away with two or three years ago, and men were allowed to come into the Army, many of whom—as he had been informed by Militia officers—were unfit for service in consequence of being unsound. The hon. Member for Hertfordshire (Mr. Brand) wished to abolish the Militia, in order to have a larger Reserve. Now, 100,000 thoroughly trained men in service were, of course, more 1142 valuable than 100,000 Militia men. But how were they to be obtained? The Militia should not be sacrificed for the sake of grasping at a Reserve, which took time to acquire. He had been amused at one remark which had fallen from the hon. Member for Hertfordshire, that, as far as economy went, he would vote for the Motion of the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. W. Fowler). As a matter of economy they could all vote for the reduction of the Army Estimates by half-a-million or by several millions. The only reason for voting the Estimates at all was to maintain the defence of the country. The reduction of 8,600 men this year, if followed up by the Amendment of the hon. Member for Cambridge would render a Reserve impossible; for how with successive reductions could a considerable number of men pass through the ranks, and form the Reserve? They should remember, also, what service this Army was called on to perform. They had, first of all, to furnish a supply of troops to India; there were always several battalions on the way backwards and forwards between the two countries, and they might at any moment be called upon to send 20 battalions to India. How were those 20 battalions to be got? How was the reduction proposed by the hon. Member for Cambridge to be carried out? Were the garrisons to be withdrawn? We had already withdrawn our troops from the colonies, excepting from those parts necessary for maintaining our naval supremacy. Did he want the garrisons to be withdrawn from Malta and Gibraltar? That might give him his 10,000 men. Or did he want the garrisons to be withdrawn from Halifax and Bermuda, which might give him 3,000 or 4,000 men; or from Hong-Kong, the Mauritius, and the Cape? If we withdrew the troops from Bermuda and Halifax, what men had we to defend our great colony of Canada? A great deal was to be said in favour of withdrawing our troops from an extended line, and the Canadian line was a very indefensible line; but from Bermuda and Halifax we could carry on war, and bind over the Americans to keep the peace to us and our possessions. The hon. Baronet (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), who seemed to think the defence of the country of no consequence, had paraded the large number of men under arms as calculated 1143 to lead to war; but what means did they afford us of aggressive war, and what possibility or probability was there of the Militia and Volunteers being sent abroad? An invasion was not very probable, though it was more probable than an eaathquake, and was a contingency against which we were bound to provide; and he would ask whether the Volunteers and Militia could be expected to make a stand alone against a large body of Regular troops? Had the hon. Baronet been asleep during the last two or three years? Had he not heard of the painful, sad, and distressing position of France when left to the resources of Volunteers and Militia—and were we to be in the same position? Were we not to have a small leaven of Regular Forces in the country? Considering the number of foreign stations to be held, surely the force was not excessive; he hoped, therefore, the Committee would not countenance any proposal to reduce it.
§ MR. CARDWELLI do not see in his place my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), who made so interesting and agreeable a speech, or I should remind him that the conversation, near the close of which he found great fault with the largeness of the Army, began in the same good-tempered and kindly manner, by my right hon. Friend and predecessor criticizing the smallness of this year's Estimates. I hope, therefore, he will see that that hateful object in his eyes, the Minister for War, has adversaries to contend with both on the right and the left, and that it is not altogether his fault if he is not able to give entire satisfaction to everybody. My hon. Friend (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) said he was open to a bribe. If I would reveal to him a secret of the Government, and inform him that some foreign State was deeply meditating some extremely dangerous project, and that we therefore required an unusually excessive force, he promised me his vote against the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Mr. W. Fowler). I am sorry to say that I must be content to forego the honour and pleasure of my hon. Friend's vote. I can give him no such information. I venture only to recommend these Estimates on the ground that they are just and moderate; that they are not in any sense excessive, when you consider the 1144 greatness of this country and the duties which it has to discharge; and that our desire is not only to live peaceably ourselves with everybody around us, but to maintain preparations so commensurate with our duties and position that others, respecting us, will be equally desirous of living peaceably with us. It is in that and in no other spirit that these Estimates have been framed. And, now, Sir, little remains for me but to answer the many questions put to me as briefly as I can, and then to turn to the Motion of my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge. And, first, I will notice the friendly observations of the right hon. Member for Droitwich opposite (Sir John Pakington). He charged me in the most good-humoured manner possible with having brought in Estimates merely for the purpose of fulfilling pledges which some hon. Members of the Government had given with regard to economy—with turning off men one year from motives of popularity, and then immediately taking on the same men again. Now, there is this much foundation certainly for the charge, that we did begin with considerably reduced Estimates founded upon these considerations—that we thought it right to withdraw our forces from the colonies and concentrate them at home —a policy on which the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down agrees with us, and differs from his right hon. Friend who sits beside him. Another was, that we immediately set to work to get up our Reserves; and, although we reduced the total number of forces for which the taxpayer paid, we had in this country when the German War broke out a far more considerable force, as I showed at the time, then we should have had had we rested upon the more costly proportions of 1868–9. But, then, my right hon. Friend says, we took back the same men. [Major General Sir PERCY HERBERT: You then took boys.] I beg to say there is no ground for the supposition of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, and we were in a position to discharge the duties we had undertaken. Well, we certainly did increase our force —we were not unconscious of the circumstances of the time; but we did not take back the men we had parted with. We did not take back the two West Indian regiments. We did not take back the Canadian Rifles, whom we had assisted to maintain at the expense of this coun- 1145 try for the defence of Canada. Nor did we take back the Cape Mounted Rifles, an excellent force, but not as competent as the Cape Mounted Police to discharge frontier duty. The truth is, what we did was to have a much larger number of batteries of Artillery, of companies of Engineers, of regiments of Cavalry, and of battalions of Infantry at home. They were attenuated regiments, because, having Reserves at home, it would have been an unwise policy not to have them attenuated. Then my right hon. Friend says he hopes we shall pursue a steadier line in future. I venture to assure him that so long as I have the honour to conduct the office in which I at present serve, I shall be guided by the same principles by which we have been guided hitherto—namely, of making our arrangements efficient as regards the service and the defence of the country, and at the same time as economical as we can with regard to the taxpayer. The right hon. Gentleman also asked me some questions, and I will speak first with regard to what has been said in reference to the new system of stoppages. I entirely agree that nothing could be more unfortunate than that there should be the slightest misunderstanding on the subject. Nothing could be more mischievous than to hold out by any careless expression, expectations which could not afterwards be realized. But I do think that the other evening I excluded the matter from all possibility of misapprehension, since I not only stated what the stoppage was to which I referred, but I also stated the precise amount—4½d. and I used a phrase which had reference expressly to that 4½d.—namely, that the soldier was to receive a clear shilling. I did not mean a clear shilling out of everything ho might be called upon to expend, whatever it might be. I was speaking of the 4½d., and of that only, and I said that the Infantry, instead of receiving 10½d., would now receive a clear shilling. I perceive there was an expectation in the minds of some persons that the grocery stoppage would be excluded also. Well, that is not a stoppage of the same nature as the stoppage for bread and meat rations. The bread and meat stoppage is universal through the Army, and is compulsory. The grocery stoppage is merely a matter of account within the regiment, with 1146 this exception—that at certain places the mess find it cheaper to obtain their groceries from the Control department, and in those special cases it is a matter of account with the War Office. Where that arrangement prevails there is the stoppage to which I refer of 1½d. a day for that special convenience. What I meant and said was that the soldier was to have a shilling a-day clear, that is, of the bread and meat ration of 4½d. Again, I find that some persons apprehend that in some particular cases an actual loss will accrue to the soldier from the new arrangement. That I negative. I can assure them that there is not the smallest intention of inflicting any loss whatever upon anyone by reason of the change in question. My right hon. Friend asked me what we were doing with regard to promotion and retirement. Well, with regard to retirement I have always said that I do not think it would be prudent or proper to introduce any new plan of retirement for the Line generally until the arrangements with respect to the purchase system had worked for a few years, or while the stimulus derived from the sale of commissions was going on; because to do so would give rise to vested interests and future claims which would be detrimental to the public interest. But this I will say with regard to promotion and retirement, that we have succeeded in solving a very difficult question as respects the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, which, as my right hon. Friend said the other evening he had bequeathed to me as a question of great importance and difficulty. My hon. Friend the Member for Durham (Captain Beaumont) complains of the stagnation of promotion in these corps. I have before me a list of the times at which the junior officers were promoted. What we aimed at was that the lieutenant-colonel should be promoted after 25 years. The junior lieutenant-colonel of the Royal Artillery was actually promoted after 24 years, the junior lieutenant-colonel of the Royal Engineers after 25 years and four months; the junior major of the Royal Artillery and the junior major of the Engineers each after 17½years, while what we aimed at was 18 years. The junior captain of Royal Artillery was eight months in advance of the time—so far what my hon. Friend said was true, that officer's pro- 1147 motion being after 12 years and eight months; while that of the junior captain of the Royal Engineers was after 13 years and two months. So that we have kept very closely to that which we have set before us. Now, with regard to the mode in which selection has been carried on. Promotion has been by seniority tempered by selection. There has been an infusion of selection, but it has been principally by seniority, and those who remember what occurred in the debates will bear me out entirely when I say that the expectation held out has only been fulfilled by that result. I believe it has given general satisfaction in the Army, and that there is confidence in the Army in the mode of promotion which the now system has brought into operation, and I am sure that by it many old and deserving officers who have been frequently purchased over have derived the benefit, which they would not otherwise have derived, of receiving their legitimate promotion. I am asked whether the check to recruiting which occurred in the course of last year is due to short service. Now I hold in my hand the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting, which deals with that subject on both sides, but he ends by quoting statistics which show that the number of recruits during the last two years has not been injuriously affected by enlistment for short service. With regard to service in India, it may be easily reconciled with short service. The arrangements made with the Indian Government contemplated that a man might be sent to India, provided that he has two full years to serve when he gets there. Under this arrangement fewer wives and children would be sent out; fewer invalids would come home; and a variety of considerations of this kind convinced the Indian Government that the arrangement was one to which they need not object, especially as, by the plan of double battalions, and by the introduction of system into the provision of reliefs for India, we expected to be able to comply with the declared wish of this House, in that recruits should not be sent to India until after they had been seasoned and prepared for service there. In this way we hope to reconcile the system of short service with a proper system of relief for India. Then I was asked whether we had gone far enough in the arrangements with regard to 1148 linked battalions—arrangements fully explained in the Report circulated yesterday morning. As I stated last year the closer the ties between those battalions can be drawn, the more I shall be gratified. But everybody knows—and I am sure the military men here present will feel it strongly in dealing with anything so sacred to the feelings of the Army as the existence of the regiment, it was our bounden duty to proceed with the greatest caution. This question was very carefully considered by the highest military authorities. It was with the entire sanction of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, and of other eminent military men who took counsel with him upon the subject, that the arrangements contained in the Report which is on the Table were adopted. From the time when the new sub-lieutenants who have been appointed under the new system become the officers of the brigade, I think the union will be complete. But no doubt during the interval, as in all transitions, we must be content with an imperfect adaptation to the object. We have adopted what we believe to be the best and most practical means; and if the officers do not find the exact arrangements now made are the best for their convenience, but that the connection may advantageously be made a closer one, we shall be ready to meet their views. Then I was asked by the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Mr. H. B. Samuelson) whether we meant to include in the same system the two Militia regiments in the same brigade. Where both regiments belong to the same county, I shall be disposed to take the same course as in the Regular Army —that is to say, to appoint the junior officers not to the individual regiment, but to the brigade. In the case of regiments already existing there might be a difficulty, and I think we should not proceed differently from what we propose in the Army, unless we carry along with us the feelings of officers in the regiment. The next question put to me was, whether the reduction in the Militia Vote was to be regarded as evidence of an intention to diminish the numbers of the Militia, or whether it was due entirely to the transfer of considerable sums from one Vote to another. The main cause of the reduction is the latter. We thought that when the 1149 Militia were to be brigaded with the Line, since the Transport service was to be performed by my right hon. Friend the Surveyor General, for the Militia as well as for the Line, there ought to be no separation between them, and that they ought to appear under the same heads. The only reduction, if it can be called a reduction, is this—we are engaged in making a great increase in the Militia and have not completed the whole of it. I therefore took the number given me by the Inspector General of the Auxiliary Forces as the largest to which he could expect to attain during the present year, and estimated the amount accordingly. The same remarks apply to the Volunteers. Allowances in lieu of forage and of lodging are transferred to Vote 10; and I expressed my belief the other evening, when I introduced the Estimates that, far from bringing about a permanent reduction, the little increased stringency in the regulations affecting the Volunteers would ultimately tend rather to increase than diminish the Volunteer Force. My noble Friend the Member for Essex (Lord Eustace Cecil) invited me to explain how it was that our numbers are still 4,000 above the number of the coming year, if we require 20,000 recruits to keep up our numbers, and only got 17,000 during the past year. The explanation is easy. I was speaking with reference to the number we shall require hereafter, when short service is in full operation, and we require the normal number. At present, as the Report shows, 17,000 leave us only 1,400 below the casualties of the year, and as we are effecting a considerable reduction in the establishment of 1873–4 as compared with that of 1872–3, we are still some 4,000 men iu excess of the reduced Estimate. I have been invited to state my views with regard to the supply of horses, and I do so in a single sentence. If you want horses, pay for them. A Committee has been appointed on this subject in the other House. I hope their inquiry will be interesting and satisfactory, and it will give me great pleasure if they can point out a cheaper way of obtaining horses than that I have mentioned. But, as I am asked for my opinion, I give it for what it is worth—the cheapest mode of getting horses is to have nothing to do with them when you do not want them; and 1150 when you do want them, to go into the market and buy them as cheaply as you can. My hon. Friend the Member for Wenlock (Mr. A. Brown) urged me not to waste money upon the military defence of the colonies. But my hon. Friend was preaching to the converted. The essence of the retrenchment we have been able to make is, that we have resorted to the policy of concentration, and have given up the mischievous and losing system of dispersion of force, not because we have given up any duty we owe to the colonies, or are less careful to discharge our duty to our colonies, but because we desire to have, at the least cost to the country, the greatest amount of power with which to discharge all our duties, whatever they may be. My hon. Friend the Member for Hackney (Mr. Holms) made, as he always does, an able speech, but it contained some curious calculations. First, he pointed out the way in which expenditure had increased, and showed that the present Estimates were the most costly ever submitted to Parliament, and he supported that view by taking the gross amount and dividing it by the number of men, in order to show that the cost per man is greater than it has ever been before. I thought this a very odd criticism from an hon. Gentleman who was recommending us to take 10,000 men out of the Army, and put them into the Reserve, because with 10,000 fewer men the result would be to leave each remaining man still more costly than before. The system, of which my hon. Friend is so zealous an advocate, of maintaining numerous cadres to be filled from Reserves, is, upon this singular mode of calculation, not the most economical, but the most expensive of systems. Again, if you were all called upon to spend a great deal of money in any one year upon naval arsenals, upon arms for the Navy, or for any other object not directly connected with the Army, and in the same year resolved to economize upon the Army and to maintain a small number of men, the result of this ingenious mode of calculation must be to make the cost per man seem very great, and you might easily prove that the administration of the Army for that year was the most extravagant ever seen. The next matter is the allegation that desertions have for the two last years been going on at a rate 1151 quite disproportionate to former years. There is no doubt there has been a great deal of desertion during the last two years—more than during the same period previously. And why? Because you raised 30,000 men in eight months in 1870–1, and generally after you have raised an unusual number of recruits at an interval of one or two years, you have an unusual number of desertions; and if you go back to the last analogous period —that of the Indian Mutiny and the China War in 1861–2, when recruiting was also taking place on a large scale—you will find that they also were years of great desertion. But my hon. Friend's mode of calculation is entirely fallacious, as I showed at more length in the statement which I made the other evening. I have now endeavoured, to the best of my ability, to recollect and reply to the principal questions put to me in the course of this debate. [Major-General Sir PERCY HERBERT: Furlough.] I gave the only answer the other evening which it was in my power to give on this subject. It is certainly our intention to make everyone a gainer by the changes proposed, and to get rid of the practice of accounting for the rations altogether. I promised to consider the subject, but the right hon. and gallant Gentleman will not expect me to pledge myself to-night.
§ COLONEL BARTTELOTThe length of service in the colonies.
§ MR. CARDWELLI am authorised by the Commander-in-Chief to state that in his opinion it is not desirable, for military reasons, to limit the period of service in distant colonies to so short a period as the hon. Gentleman opposite recommended for India. There is no reason to limit the period of service to that in India, but it is thought that about 10 years may be fixed upon as the limit.
§ MAJOR ARBUTHNOTThe pledges given in regard to the Artillery officers have not been carried out.
§ MR. CARDWELLThe hon. and gallant Gentleman must not expect me to take him on his own terms, and I cannot admit that I have departed from any pledges I have given. I have endeavoured to do my best for the Artillery and Engineer officers, and I referred to the Adjutant General of the Army the question of the organization of the Artillery. His Report has been laid on the Table. One of the proposals alters 1152 the organization so as to make the number of batteries in a brigade equal, and the Adjutant General reports upon that subject; but pending the inquiries which we understand are being made in India about the Artillery serving there, we have not thought it desirable to make changes at present in the general organization of the regiment.
§ MAJOR ARBUTHNOTasked, whether majors in the Artillery were to be placed in the same position as in the Line?
§ MR. CARDWELLThat is a question which the hon. and gallant Gentleman may discuss with the Government of India.
§ MAJOR ARBUTHNOTBut in England?
§ MR. CARDWELLA major in England receives 14s. 6d. pay and 6d. in respect of command pay, and the hon. and gallant Gentleman's grievance is that it is not all paid in one lump. That I pass by for the moment. I now come to the Amendment before the House. The hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. W. Fowler) says that the Estimates are too large, and that we had better reduce them by 10,000 men. He says his great object is to put an end to panics, and that there have been panics ever since 1802. I wish as much as he does to put an end to panics. He speaks of the number of men in the Army of this country in 1802. This is the first time I have ever heard the example of 1802 referred to as one that it is desirable to follow. He says we ought not to emulate Germany in the number of our forces. Most assuredly if we have made such an attempt, it is a very lame one, for we are asking for but 125,000 men. He says we ought to be conscious of our strength and power; but if we are to be conscious of our strength, it is necessary that strength should exist. But is it too much for this great country, and under present circumstances, for the Government to ask for 125,000 men of all ranks and arms of the service? The hon. Member says—Let us adhere to the numbers we considered sufficient in 1870–1 He reminds us that we proposed those Estimates, and said that those were ample numbers. Let me tell him how we propose to meet that argument. He takes no objection to the increase of Artillery over 1870, and I do not believe he would wish to diminish our present strength of Artillery. I do 1153 not think he would desire to reduce the Cavalry, or the small number of our Engineers, or the very moderate additions we have made to the departments of Control and the Army Hospital Corps. I now conic to the Infantry, and I tell my hon. Friend I am prepared to stand by the numbers of 1870–71—not the numbers in the aggregate, because there has been an increase in the Cavalry, the Artillery, and in the others of which I have just spoken, but to the number of the Infantry. In 1870–71 the British establishment of Infantry was 67,192, and there are in 1873–4 69,605 men. That is a small increase. But then I have to set off the West India diminution, the reduction in the colonial forces, and the Madras Force, which is in our Estimates and voted by us. With these reductions the comparison is slightly in favour of the present year, the number being in 1870–71 72,725, and in 1873–4 72,074. I hope I have now satisfied my hon. Friend that we stand on the ground of 1870–71, with only those exceptions which experience and necessity require us to adopt, which the House and the country went with us in adopting and maintaining, and which I venture to say the House would desire us still to maintain.
§ COLONEL STUART KNOXsaid, that he ventured to rise at the same time with the right hon. Gentleman, but he supposed the Secretary of State for War wished to shorten the discussion. The hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), who made a most agreeable speech, objected to the only part of the plan which he (Colonel Stuart Knox) could support—that of preparation; but he must say he did not think that the argument of the hon. Baronet showed much consistency. He thought the hon. Member who once belonged to the 7th Hussars (Mr. A. Herbert) had made a speech which would not have been tolerated in the mess-room of his regiment. He wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman a question as to the position and status of sub-lieutenants in the Army. There was a feeling among them that they were not properly treated. They had been told that if they went to Sandhurst and remained with their regiments a year they would be appointed lieutenants. That promise had not been carried out. These gentlemen had also been compelled 1154 to pay 30s. for a stamp, but they did not hear on what the stamp was to be placed. He wished to know also whether they were qualified to sit on courts-martial? If these gentlemen were to sit on courts-martial, and were not commissioned officers, the prisoners brought before them could not be imprisoned according to the law of the land. Ho wished to ask whether sub-lieutenants were commissioned officers, and whether they could legally sit on courts-martial?
§ MR. CARDWELLI believe there is no legal disqualification which prevents sub-lieutenants from sitting on courts-martial, but I fancy that practically there is always a great desire to select officers of sonic age and experience for that important duty. I will take this opportunity of stating, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman has alluded to the stamp, that at the present time every officer of the Army is required to pay for a stamp upon every new commission he receives; but it is now intended to give a gentleman, when he becomes permanently an officer, a commission which he may always retain, and to exempt him from the necessity of paying for fresh stamps.
§ COLONEL STUART KNOXsaid, an ensign up to this time was placed during the first six months, on every court-martial in his regiment, and afterwards took his turn of duty; and asked whether ho understood rightly that he was not now supposed to be qualified even to learn his duty till after a long time had elapsed?
§ SIR HENRY STORKSA sub-lieutenant is a commissioned officer. Ho joins his regiment, and is treated just as an officer always is treated when ho joins his regiment for the first time. He is sent to drill, and goes as a supernumerary on courts-martial; and when he is considered by his commanding officer to be fit to sit as a member, he does so. At the end of 12 months, if he is reported on in favourable terms, he goes for a year to Sandhurst. On his return to his regiment he gets the commission of lieutenant, and the date of the commission depends upon how he has conducted himself during his first year, and during his second year at Sandhurst.
§ Question put.
§ The Committee divided: — Ayes 43; Noes 158: Majority 115.
§ Original Question put, and agreed to.
1155§ (2.) £5,072,500, Pay, Allowances, &c., of Land Forces.
§ COLONEL BARTTELOTsaid, he wished to call attention to the item as to the sale of horses. He pointed out that the purchase of horses was put down last year at £38,000, while this year the sum had increased to £45,000; but the sale of horses last year had produced £33,160; and this year only £23,360. He could not understand these figures, seeing that horses had increased in value from 25 to 30 per cent.
§ MR. MACFIEsaid, it was desirable that a gymnastic instructor should be sent round to various schools to teach gymnastic exercise, in order to prepare young men for the Army.
§ SIR HENRY STORKSstated, in reply to Colonel Barttelot, that, after the Autumn Manœuvres, all the horses which had been specially purchased, except a few which were selected to fill up casualties in the Army Service Corps, were sold by auction and brought an average price of £25 8s. 4d. each.
§ MAJOR-GENERAL SIR PERCY HERBERTcalled attention to the drivers and gunners of Artillery. Ho asked the Secretary of State for War to reconsider his determination with regard to them, and not get get rid of good men who were trained soldiers.
§ COLONEL STUART KNOXasked on what principle the pay and allowances of colonels of depôt centres had been settled? Many of them had held higher positions and pay than they would get under the present arrangements.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (3.) £46,800, Divine Service.
§ (4.) £27,000, Administration of Military Law.
§ (5.) £247,400, Medical Establishments and. Services.
§
(6.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £815,400, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge for Militia Pay and Allowances, which will come in course of payment from the 1st day of April 1873 to the 31st day of March 1874, inclusive.
§ COLONEL WILSON-PATTENasked the Secretary of State for War to take into consideration the altered position of the Militia surgeons, and also the Militia 1156 Staff sergeants, who would be affected by the recent changes that had taken place. He also called attention to the position of the quartermasters.
§ SIR JOHN PAKINGTONcalled attention to the complaint of the officers commanding Militia regiments with respect to their transference to the Line.
§ MR. CARDWELLsaid, that arrangements with regard to Staff sergeants and quartermasters must grow with the new system; that the transfer of officers from the Militia to the Line must depend upon the number of vacancies, but it was estimated that from 120 to 130 commissions would be given this year; and that he was not prepared to commit himself to an increase in the number of subaltern officers in Militia regiments, being under the impression that the Government were now acting in a liberal spirit, and making a transition with as much fairness as possible. The appointment to commissions in the Line from the Militia would be with the commanding officer, but subject to confirmation by the general officer of the district.
§ SIR DAVID WEDDERBURNmoved to reduce the Vote by £30,000, being the additional charge for men who may engage to serve in the Militia Reserve Force. This money was paid as a sort of extra bounty for about 30,000 men, who undertook no special service and received no extra training. Their present position was, that in case of special emergency, such as invasion, they were liable for service at home or abroad in connection with the Regular Army; but in the meanwhile no additional strength was acquired to the Army by the payment of this £30,000. He expressed his belief that so long as they maintained the Militia as a sort of competitor for recruits with the Army, they would fail to have an amalgamation of the various elements of their complicated system of defence, and that the Militia Reserve, as now constituted, tended to keep up that rivalry between the two branches of the service. He could not help thinking that the Secretary of State for War intended, when the First Class Reserve was completed, to dispense with the services of the Militia, and that in doing so ho would act wisely. But in the meantime they might save that £30,000, without injuring the efficiency of the Militia. He begged, therefore, to move the reduction of the Vote by that sum.
§
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £785,400, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge for Militia Pay and Allowances, which will come in course of payment from the 1st day of April 1873 to the 31st day of March 1874, inclusive." —(Sir David Weddeirburn.)
§ MAJOR-GENERAL SIR PERCY HERBERTwished, before the right hon. Gentleman rose, to ask a question respecting the medical examination of men admitted into the Reserve. He had been informed by a Militia officer that the examination was held for some time, but that afterwards orders were given for admissions into the Reserve without it; that the only way of accounting for this alteration was an anxiety to swell the list; and that in consequence men had been admitted who proved to be physically unfit for the service. Would the right hon. Gentleman state whether that had happened or not, and the cause of it?
§ MR. CARDWELLsaid, that during the first or second year of his holding Office, he found great unwillingness on the part of the men to undergo a second examination, and also that there was no real necessity for a second examination. With regard to the Motion of the hon. Member for Ayrshire (Sir David Wedderburn), he had been himself exceedingly sceptical about the Militia Reserve; but, upon examination, and after consulting those who were most qualified to give an opinion, he had come to the conclusion that it would be desirable to maintain this Reserve. General M'Dougall, he might add, was also strongly in favour of maintaining this Force. He therefore thought it would be unwise to refuse that £30,000 which gave them so very valuable a body of men.
§ Question put.
§ The Committee divided: — Ayes 32; Noes 137: Majority 105.
§ Original Question put, and agreed to.
§ (7.) £78,900, Yeomanry Cavalry.
§ MR. A. EGERTONcalled attention to the circumstance that some of the regiments had to pay for their own ranges, and added that £200 or £300 a-year would meet all the expense which it would be necessary to incur on that score. Some of the regiments had also to hire their own exercise ground. Most of them were allowed to assemble in 1158 some nobleman's or gentleman's park; but where that was not the case they had to engage a field for their exercise.
§ MR. BARNETTpointed out that the staff sergeants of the Yeomanry Cavalry only received 2s. 3d. a-day, on which they were supposed to maintain themselves in a respectable position.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (8.) £430,300, Volunteer Corps.
§ MR. A. BROWNasked whether it was the fact that a Committee was sitting upon Volunteer clothing?
§ MR. CARDWELLreplied that no steps had been taken that would interfere with the Volunteer uniform. If Volunteer battalions desired that their uniform should be assimilated to that of the Regular troops with whom they were brigaded, their desire would be favourably entertained.
§ COLONEL BARTTELOTthought it would be a great advantage if the sergeant instructors were allowed to engage in recruiting for the Militia.
§ MR. CARDWELLsaid, the sergeant instructors and recruiting would both be under the command of the colonels.
§ MR. WHEELHOUSEsuggested that adjutants attached to Volunteer corps should receive a pension after a certain number of years' service.
§ MR. RODENthought that Volunteer officers should not be put to any expense out of their own pocket in acquiring the knowledge now required from them.
§ MR. CARDWELLagreed that the Volunteers, who gave their services gratuitously, ought not to be called upon to pay any expense out of their own pockets, and it was for that reason that the recent increase in the Capitation Grant was made.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (9.) £123,200, Army Reserve Force (including Enrolled Pensioners).
§ House resumed.
§ Resolutions to be reported upon Monday next;
§ Committee to sit again upon Monday next.
§ House adjourned at a quarter after Twelve o'clock till Monday next.