RESOLUTION.

HC Deb 25 February 1873 vol 214 cc919-68

MR. SEELY, (Lincoln)

in rising to move— That this House, in order to remedy certain defects in the administration of the Admiralty, recommends the Government to take into consideration the propriety of administering that department by means of a Secretary of State; and further, of appointing to the offices of Controller and of Superintendent of Her Majesty's Dockyards persons who possess practical knowledge of the duties they have to discharge, and also of altering the rule which limits their tenure of office to a fixed term of years, said: The subject, Sir, of Admiralty administration is one which has excited a great deal of discussion, for there are some who think that the changes made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) were highly objectionable, as tending to weaken the action of the Board. I take a different view of this subject. I think that the action recently pursued by my right hon. Friend at the head of the Admiralty is very bad, and I trust that the House will give me its attention while I advance a few reasons in favour of my view. The system established by my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract may briefly be described thus. By an Order in Council of the 14th of January, 1869, it was decreed that the First Lord was responsible for all the business of the Admiralty. The first Naval Lord was responsible to the First Lord for the personnel; the Controller, who was made a member of the Board, was responsible for the material; the Parliamentary Secretary was made responsible for the finance; and the Permanent Secretary was reponsible for the secretariat. Fixed meetings of the Board wore discontinued, and the Board was only called to meet on special occasions. By an Order in Council of the 19th April, 1872, the Order in Council of the 14th January, 1869, was revoked. Certain alterations were made, and they were briefly these:—Instead of one Lord being responsible for the personnel, there are now three Naval Lords, to whom the First Lord assigns any business that he thinks fit from time to time. The Controller is no longer a member of the Board. There are now three Secretaries instead of one—[Mr. GOSCHEN: Two]—and the Board, instead of being called together on special occasions, now meets daily as it did before 1869. Now, it appears to me, that the changes made by the First Lord are injudicious, more particularly in one respect, and that is, that the personal responsibility is greatly weakened. But I object to a Board altogether, and it was in this respect I think my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract erred. He had great opportunities. He was a member of a powerful Government with a large majority, and he might have swept away the Board so completely that it could never have been revived. He missed that opportunity. The Board is now nearly what it was before. Though, however, it may be said that all Boards are bad generally, yet there may be special reasons why this particular Board of Admiralty may be good. But, in my opinion, there are special objections to this Board of Admiralty. The Patent by which the Lords of the Admiralty are created, and the Order in Council which defines the particular business allotted to each Lord, are inconsistent with each other. The Patent says that what is necessary is to be done by the five Lords, or by two or more of them. The Order in Council says that the First Lord is supreme, and that every other Lord is merely subordinate to him, just as much as any ordinary secretary is subordinate to his chief. The objection I make to this system is that orders are issued in the name of the five Lords of the Board, while in effect, according to the Order in Council, the order is that of the First Lord. I am aware that this is not a very strong objection, but still it is an objection. The whole thing is a sham, and I think in the present day we ought to get rid of such shams. And I may add, it is scarcely courteous to ask Her Majesty to put her name to a document one clay which says that five Lords, or any two or more of them, shall have power to do what is necessary, and then, a few days afterwards, to ask her to put her name to a document which says the First Lord should do entirely as he likes. But my main objection is that the business of the Admiralty is divided amongst those several Lords, with the exception of the First Lord. The business is a very important and complicated one. It is a business which requires great energy and experience, and I fear those Lords are generally selected for political considerations. The First Lord shakes his head; but I think I have tolerably strong arguments in support of my assertion that, as a rule, members of the Board of Admiralty are selected for political reasons. I will quote the opinion of a Gentleman who has had as much experience in this matter as the present First Lord—I mean his immediate predecessor. My right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract, speaking in this House on the 18th March, 1872—I quote from Hansard—said— I know there are official and constitutional reasons that make it convenient that, when a change of Government takes place, the new Mi- nister should have the power of reappointing the Board."—[3 Hansard, ccx. 184.] But my right hon. Friend, as reported in The Times of the following day, was much more clear, for there he is reported to have said— I am quite with those who think it would be better if the heads of departments were appointed permanently instead of being, as they are in many cases, at present political appointments. Of course I except from this the Financial Secretary, who should be a Parliamentary officer. Upon this subject I would refer to a paragraph in The Army and Navy Gazette of the 27th April, 1872. This is one of the Service newspapers, which are supposed to be well-informed on what is going on, and it said— Captain the Hon. F. Egerton would probably have been offered a seat at the Board, but for a question as to his re-election. The Broad Arrow, another Service paper, said on the 11th May, 1872— "The Tall Mall Gazette is informed that it was proposed to Admiral Seymour, when first offered a seat at the Board, that he should contest the county of Antrim against his own cousin. He refused. The office was then given to him without any stipulation. I will quote one other opinion, and it is that of the late Chief Constructor, Mr. Reed, who, in a letter to The Times on the 21st of October, 1872, said— The Controller and I wished to make progress in spite, at times, of the opposition of the little conclaves of party politicians and naval men called Boards, who one after another were set in authority over us. If this be the case, and if these members of the Board have to manage the business of the Admiralty, as a matter of course the interests of the Navy must be sacrificed. My objection is not only that the members of the Board of Admiralty are appointed from political considerations, and that consequently the best men are not sought out, but that there are constant changes in the composition of the Board. By a Return issued in 1871 (No. 405) I find that from 1832 to 1871 there have been 51 patents of the Admiralty, 75 fresh Lords, 14 different Parliamentary Secretaries, and 10 changes of Government, In five of these changes, all the Board of Admiralty were changed. In three, all were changed save one. In two, all were changed save two. Now, if the members of the Board of Admiralty are selected from political considerations, and without reference to special knowledge of the duties they have to perform, and if they only remain in office on an average about three years, I will ask the House how it is possible that all these different businesses—for there are many of them —can be carried on with success? It is impossible to overrate the evils of these constant changes. I thought at one time I should have the First Lord of the Admiralty with me on this subject, for on the 7th of August, 1871, he said— The presence of the Controller on the Board might involve his always leaving office with the Ministry."—[3 Hansard, ccvii. 1050.] Again, the right hon. Gentleman said on the 18th March, 1872, that he thought the Controller ought to be a permanent officer, so that he might acquire that knowledge and experience indispensable to an officer like the Controller of the Navy."—[3 Hansard, ccx. 207.] He further went on to say that it had become a question whether the Controller ought to become a member of the Board and be a permanent officer; but he considered there would be an anomaly in having "one permanent Lord of the Admiralty, and others who would go out with the Government." Now, Sir, I ask, if it is necessary that the Controller shall be a permanent officer, in order that he may acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for the discharge of his duties, whether there are not other positions at the Admiralty which likewise require great knowledge and experience? Surely, the First Naval Lord requires knowledge and experience which can only be acquired by a tolerably lengthened tenure of office. And here again I thought I might count upon the support of the present First Lord of the Admiralty. Theoretically he agrees with me; because, on the 7th August, 1871, in answer to the right hon. Member for Tyrone (Mr. Corry), he said that the question whether there should be another naval member of the Board was well worthy of consideration. Why? Because he "should be glad to do anything to secure continuity and permanence," so as to "be able to carry out the same policy when any change of office took place." [Mr. GOSCHEN: Hear, hear!] The right hon. Gentleman cries "Hear, hear!" but I ask him to explain that statement made on August 7, 1871, with what he stated on March 18, 1872, because there is something like inconsistency between the two. I should like to know what the right hon. Gentleman has done to carry out his views. He has added another Naval Lord to the Board, but he has not made him a permanent officer. Has he done anything to secure the continuity and permanence, or that the same policy should be carried out? I may mention, in reference to the subject of the constant changes at the Admiralty, that there have been in the 39 years between 1832 and 1871, 22 Civil Lords, making an average of one year and nine months for each of them. These young gentlemen came into office to be educated for the performance of their duties; but that is not the way to manage the Navy. Bearing on this question of the frequent change of office, I beg to quote a remark made by President Grant just previous to his re-election to the Presidential office. It is in The Standard of June 11, 1872. President Grant hopes his political life, as shown by past experience, may guide him in avoiding the mistakes which are inevitable with novices in all occupations. If it had not been for the permanent officers of the Admiralty, this Board of Admiralty would have broken down again and again. And here I must once more quote the First Lord, who, on March 18, 1872, said— Some who have got the best brains and are working the hardest at the Admiralty are receiving the same salaries as men who are practically carrying out their Minutes."—[3 Hansard, ccx. 209.] These, then, are some of the reasons why I ask the House to agree to this Motion. I have not gone generally into the question of administration by Boards. I do not wish to weary the House by giving reasons with which hon. Members are already sufficiently familiar, and which I have urged before. But for those special reasons which I have mentioned, and for those general reasons which apply to all Boards, I think it would be far better that the Admiralty Department should be carried on by a Secretary of State with the assistance of permanent heads of departments, selected for their special knowledge of the duties they are called upon to discharge in lieu of having what Mr. Reed terms "little conclaves of party politicians, called Boards," coming and going nearly as quickly as summer and winter. I do not know what course the right hon. Gentleman will take to-night; but I will now refer to some of the objections which were taken to a similar Motion which I brought forward two years ago. My right hon. Friend at the head of the Admiralty, on the 11th of July, 1871, said— The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Ship Company and the North Western Railway Company were managed by Boards, just as the Admiralty was managed by a Board and he therefore did not see the force of the argument of his hon. Friend."—[3 Hansard, ccvii. 1471.] Now, Sir, there is no similarity, except in name, between the management of the Peninsular and Oriental Company and that of the Board of Admiralty. The members of the Board of Admiralty are selected by the Government of the day, and remain in office, on an average, for three years. The Directors of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, on the other hand, are 11 in number. Two re tire by rotation every two years; but unless they retire voluntarily, they are invariably re-elected. They meet once a week, not to transact any of the ordinary business of the Board, but to decide any-special questions submitted to them—such as what new ships are wanted, and the like. The ordinary business of the Company is managed by three of the Directors, who attend daily at the office, and those Directors have never been changed since the establishment of the Company, except when a vacancy has occurred by death. Three such vacancies have occurred, and one was supplied by appointing the Secretary, and the other two by appointing gentlemen who had filled the post of manager. Thus at the Board of the Peninsular and Oriental Company you have both permanence and knowledge. At the Admiralty there is the absence of both. Another objection to the Motion was taken by my right hon. Friend. He asked whether it would be possible to get distinguished admirals to join the Admiralty in the position of permanent officers in the subordinate posts which the hon. Member proposed to assign to them "—[3 Hansard, ccvii. 1472.] Here is an assumption totally unwarranted by anything I said. The right hon. Gentleman assumes that I wish distinguished admirals to join the Admiralty in subordinate posts. But where is the proof of it? He takes three Naval Lords, and by an Order in Council he may assign to each of them from time to time any portion of the business relating to the personnel of the Navy which he may think fit. He may say to one, "do this," and to another, "do that," and to a third, "do the other." [Mr. GOSCITEN: Do you doubt it?] That is the Order in Council. What I propose is that one distinguished officer should be responsible for the personnel of the Navy and the movements of the Fleet; and is there anything subordinate in the position which I would thus assign to him? The First Lord further says that the tenure of office by these gentlemen must depend on the stability of the Ministry. I, on the other hand, would make them independent of a change of Ministry. Then, again, my right hon. Friend says the Admiralty require responsible advice to be given to them by men who are responsible for it. But is my right hon. Friend more likely to get such advice from men who change office every two or three years than from men who devote their whole lives to the service? Which of these two classes of men is likely to advise the Admiralty best? Is Sir Spencer Robinson most likely to give good advice at the close of his 10 years of service or at the beginning? With regard to Councils, I may further observe that there is nothing, in my opinion, to prevent a Council from being held at the Admiralty if the permanent heads of departments were chosen solely on account of their fitness, and held office irrespective of a change of Ministry. At the War Office, I believe, Councils are frequently held. The Secretary of State for War will sometimes summon a Council for his own information, and is occasionally requested to summon a Council by the head of a department. There is another point which I wish to bring under the notice of the House—namely, the arrangements which the First Lord has made for carrying on the business of the Admiralty in his absence. I believe it has been arranged that when he is absent the first Naval Lord should give all orders respecting the personnel and movements of the Fleet; and that on all other questions the First Sea Lord should be the head of the Admiralty, in conjunction with the Parliamentary Secretary. Now, I have two objections to urge against that arrangement. One is, that the First Naval Lord and the Parliamentary Secretary may be both new to office when they have to act for the first Lord; and the next is, in case they differ, who is to decide? It is obvious that a difference of opinion must sometimes arise between them. It appears to me that the best way of getting over this difficulty, as well as many other difficulties connected with the Admiralty, is by the appointment of a Deputy First Lord who should hold office permanently and act in the absence of the First Lord, with all the power of the First Lord. When the First Lord comes into office, new to his business, the Deputy First Lord will be able to advise him. All the Secretaries and Heads of departments would have to report to the Deputy, and to obey his orders. In short, if I may so express myself, the Deputy First Lord would hold in his hands the threads of all the various departments, just as the manager of a railway company holds in his hands the threads of the management of the different departments of the railway. I see that my right hon. Friend looks astonished at this proposal of mine; but, nevertheless, I may remark that I have thought somewhat on the subject, and that I am therefore bound to express my opinion to the House. Of course, the First Lord will be supreme; but I think it is very desirable to have some one permanently at the Admiralty who knows what is going on, and this I believe is the course taken in many great companies. I remember a conversation I had with my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Mr. Price), who is Chairman of the Midland Railway Company. We were talking about this subject of Railway and Admiralty administration, when my hon. Friend assured me he conceived that one of his main duties was "to educate his successor." I have little more to say upon this branch of my subject, except to notice the Amendment which has been placed on the Paper by my hon. Friend the Member for Hastings (Mr. Brassey). I am sorry I shall not, on this occasion, have my hon. Friend's support in regard to the abolition of government by a Board. On a former occasion he said— The reform of the Admiralty Department would have been more complete if the plan of government by a Board had been abandoned, and a competent Naval Staff had been created in order to carry on the business and to afford the necessary advice to the First Lord."—[3 Hansard, ccvii. 1466.] Such were the words used by my hon. Friend on the 11th of July, 1871; but I suppose that since then he has seen some reason to alter his opinion, as he has now put an Amendment on the Paper to leave out the words "Secretary of State," in order to insert "A Board of Admiralty, with such modifications of constitution and procedure as experience has shown to be desirable." My objection to the Board of Admiralty is that its members are selected for political considerations, and that they go out of office with the Ministry. But though I shall lose the formal support of my hon. Friend on this branch of the subject, yet I am happy to say I shall have his hearty support in reference to the other portions of my Resolution. One portion of that Resolution declares that the Controller should have a practical knowledge of the duties he has to discharge. My right hon. Friend (Mr. Goschen) himself, speaking on the 11th of July, 1871, said—"He had no objection to say that the Controller should always have special fitness for the office." Now, what are the duties attached to the office of Controller of the Navy? He is intrusted with the building and repairing of ships, the settling of the designs for ships, the superintendence of four dockyards, in which 13,000 men are employed. He has also to see that the workmanship and the materials are good. Again, the Constructor of the Navy is constantly to consult the Controller. My right hon. Friend thinks that these important duties ought always to be intrusted to a naval officer, and that all civilians ought to be excluded. Now, I hold that naval officers know little, as a rule, of naval architecture. Of course, I am aware that my opinion may be wrong on a matter of this kind, and I will therefore cite an opinion promulgated by a very high authority—namely, the Committee which was appointed by the Admiralty in July, 1870, to inquire into the Higher Education of Naval Officers. Admiral Shadwell was the Chairman of that Committee. And what was its Report? That neither naval architecture nor shipbuilding forms part of the education of English naval officers, but that in the United States and France naval architecture is taught, and that in Russia officers are instructed both in the theory of shipbuilding and in naval architecture. The Committee go on to recommend that naval architecture and shipbuilding should be taught to our officers. The Times newspaper, commenting on this Report on the 13th of September, 1871, remarks that— Such an education was supplied between the years 1806 and 1821, but since the latter year it has been altogether ignored and discouraged. Again, Mr. Reed, in giving his evidence before the Committee on the Education of Naval Officers, was asked this question (1,579)— If naval officers possessed an elementary knowledge of the principles of naval architecture, do you think they would be in a better position to critically estimate and report on the sea-going capabilities of the ships of the Fleet? Mr. Reed's reply was—"I have no doubt they would be." I think, therefore, I am justified in assuming that our naval officers possess no knowledge of naval architecture. I also think that the Controllers of the Navy since 1860 have not possessed this qualification. When Sir Baldwin Walker, who was Controller of the Navy in 1860, was examined before the Royal Commission, the following question (571) was put to him— The Controller of the Navy cannot inspect these various works in the different dockyards himself? Sir Baldwin Walker replied— He is supposed to inspect them, but as he is not a professional officer he is not competent to give an opinion with reference to shipwrights' work. The subjoined question (608) was also put to him— You are responsible as to whether a ship is properly adapted in all its parts. To which Sir Baldwin Walker replied— Yes; I am supposed to be responsible, but am guided by my officers. Indeed, when Sir Baldwin Walker was appointed Controller of the Navy, it was commonly reported that, in reply to congratulations on his being selected for so important a position, he said he knew nothing about shipbuilding, and presumed that it was on that account he had been selected. And what did Sir Spencer Robinson say after he had been for 10 years, or nearly so, Controller of the Navy? Being asked a question (589) with reference to the Glatton, he said— It would be referred to the naval architects. I can give no opinion upon it. And to another question (14,873) put to him by the Megæra Commission, he replied— I being a naval officer, with limited knowledge as to the construction of ships, consulted the constructors, &c. Captain Hall was appointed Controller of the Navy two years ago, when I put a Question to my right hon. Friend as to his ability in this respect. What did my right hon. Friend (Mr. Goschen) say of Captain Hall? Speaking on the 11th of July, 1871, he said— Captain Hall had for years occupied the post of Dockyard Superintendent, and had superintended the building of many of our large ships. He had given eminent proof of his qualifications for years past, and it was exactly for the possession of this special knowledge that Captain Hall had been selected."—[3 Hansard, ccvii. 1468.] Why is he not Controller now? He held the office only 15 months. If he had such special knowledge of the duties he had to discharge, why did not the right hon. Gentleman keep him? I do not wish to impute motives; but I cannot help suspecting that some circumstances connected with the building of the Royal yacht Osborne had to do with his ceasing to be Controller of the Navy. The subject has been referred to before; but I must again recall the circumstances. The yacht was built at Pembroke, and she was sent to Portsmouth. On arriving there it was found that she leaked "nearly all over her bottom," owing "to the general bad workmanship," and to the using of "fir plank when teak or other hard wood should have been used." I am informed that this negligence entailed on the country a very large cost—something like £9,000—and that anything like moderate efficiency of management, and the expenditure of £400 for hard wood and better work, would have saved all this. The matter was alluded to on the 27th of May, 1872, by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tyrone (Mr. Corry), who said of the yacht that she was "thoroughly unseaworthy." It was also mentioned on the same day by the right hon. Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington), and my right hon. Friend (Mr. Goschen), in alluding to the subject, said—"This case was the one he most regretted as regarded the management of a dockyard." Further, in reply to a Question put by the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. Scourfield), the right hon. Gentleman said that the suggestion for using fir instead of teak "was made to the Admiralty by the dockyard officials and adopted." The office of Controller was next filled by Admiral Stewart—an estimable and courteous man, but no better qualified for the post than any of his predecessors. I think, then, I may fairly say that since 1860 it is clear that no Controller has had a knowledge of naval architecture, and that each Controller must have rested entirely upon the Constructor's department. In reference to this department, I must say I think the changes made by the present First Lord have not increased its utility. We had formerly a Chief Constructor, who was responsible for that particular department. I do not know how many Constructors we have now; I think we have seven. [Mr. GOSCHEN: No, we have not. There are a chief and two assistants at present.] And also a Council. [Mr. GOSCHEN: There is a Council of seven, including the engineers and others.] There is a Council of Construction of about seven members; and Mr. Henry Morgan, secretarial member of the Council, in his evidence before the Megæra Commission, question 13,391, said—"We are put in a sort of Commission;" while Mr. N. Barnaby, President of the Council of Construction, in answer to question 13,390, said—"The other members of that Council now take more independent action than when there was a Chief Constructor." The Controller not only has to settle designs for ships, but he has also to manage the dockyards; and on the 18th of March, 1872, according to The Times, the right hon. Gentleman said— We propose to appoint a Deputy Controller who shall have the title of Director of Dockyards, and whose special business it shall be to attend to the official working of the dockyards, and to deal, without reference to the Controller, with most of those questions which merely touch the administration of the dockyards. This would, to some extent, make the Deputy Controller an independent officer; and my right hon. Friend added that he thought "the Deputy Controller ought to be a civilian." I do not know what induced my right hon. Friend to alter his opinion as to the title; but at a Court held at Osborne on the 9th of August, 1872, an Order in Council was agreed to, which, among other passages, contains the following:— And whereas, after a careful consideration of the whole subject, we are humbly of opinion that it would be advisable to alter the title of Deputy Controller and Director of Dockyards to that of Surveyor of Dockyards. I must ask my right hon. Friend if the only change which, "after a careful consideration of the whole subject," the Queen was called upon to make by Order in Council was that the gentleman who was to manage the dockyards on behalf of the Controller was to be called Surveyor of Dockyards instead of Deputy Controller? It seems to be a foolish arrangement that the head of the State should be required to put her hand to a solemn document, declaring that, after a full consideration of the whole subject, it was advisable to call the officer a Surveyor instead of a Deputy Controller.

MR. GOSCHEN

My hon. Friend is entirely in error. It was not the change of title from Deputy Controller and Director to Surveyor of Dockyards which alone was made by the Order in Council. That dealt with a number of other matters.

MR. SEELY

I accept the explanation; but there is the passage which I have quoted from the Order in Council, and that passage speaks for itself. I have now to put it to my right hon. Friend, if the Controller has no knowledge of naval architecture, and if he does not know anything about the management of dockyards, what is the reason that he should be paid a larger salary, to use the words of the First Lord, than men of the "best brains," who are "working hardest;" or, as the right hon. Gentleman asked, why should men of the "best brains, and working hardest, receive the same salaries as those who are practically carrying out their minutes?" It is time that we ceased to act upon the principle of paying high salaries to men without knowledge and experience. With regard to Superintendents, I ask the House to affirm that they should have a practical knowledge of the duties they have to discharge. In other cases, the Admiralty do their best, on making appointments, to secure something like a special knowledge of the duties men have to perform. Naval officers are called upon to undergo a strict examination, and so are seamen gunners, carpenters, engineers, and others. My right hon. Friend (Mr. Goschen) seemed to agree with me on a former occasion, for on the 11th of July, 1871, he said it was a "truism to say that only persons having special knowledge should be appointed." He "denied that men without special knowledge had been appointed." He said— They took one officer, and gave him the command of a ship because he seemed to have the qualities of a good commander, and they took another for the management of a dockyard because he possessed administrative capacity, and understood shipbuilding and the management of stores." —[3 Hansard, ccvii. 1475.] My contention is that my right hon. Friend does not put his theory into practice, and I ask the House to decide whether he does, or does not, when he confines these offices to naval officers who enter the service at 13 or 14 years of ago. It is most unpleasant to have to refer to particular persons; and I will take only one case—the last appointment to Pembroke Dockyard. I quote from the Active List of Flag Officers, by Captain W. Arthur, which states that Captain Courtenay entered the service at 13 or 14, and that his services have been as follows:—Sea time as captain in ships of war at sea, 6 years, 2 months sea time as captain in coastguard ships, 3 months; sea time as commissioned officer, 23 years, 4 months; harbour time as commissioned officer, 3 months; and half-pay time, 8 years; so that at the age of 51 he has been 38 years in the service; and I ask what opportunities can he have had of obtaining a knowledge of the diversity of business carried on in a dockyard? I may mention, likewise, the case of Captain Hall, so eulogised by my right hon. Friend, who spoke of him as having been for years a Superintendent, as having superintended the building of many of our large ships, and as having given eminent proof of his qualifications, so that it was exactly for the possession of this special knowledge that he had been appointed. I may be allowed to quote a few lines from a pamphlet, written by a gentleman who has, perhaps, a better knowledge of the working of our dockyards than the First Lord, or any hon. Member of this House. The writer says— Practically, the Admiral Superintendent does not give any orders in professional subjects; he merely repeats orders sent him from the Admiralty. He never initiates reports on any professional subject, such reports always being made by the professional officers of the yard. It is now nearly 40 years that naval officers flying their flags afloat have been on their trial as Superintendents of Dockyards; and, during this period, the country has paid untold sums in consequence of not having properly qualified managers to carry on the business and extensive works of these large public establishments. Everyone must see the absurdity of a man parading about a dockyard as its manager, in an admiral's or captain's uniform, with a sword by his side, when these form, in too many cases, the only certificate of competency he possesses. An energetic naval man generally occupies much of the professional officers time in obtaining information from them on points he is unable to fully grasp on account of having had no previous scientific or technical training, and of being unacquainted with book-keeping and accounts as connected with work, &c. In consequence of this absence of knowledge, the Superintendent is reduced to occupying the position of being nothing more than a medium of communication between the Admiralty and those who do the work. May I be allowed to strengthen my case by quoting the opinions on this subject of several high authorities both in this House and out of it? And I would begin with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), who, on the 19th of February, 1867, when speaking in this House on a Motion which I then brought forward in regard to the Superintendents of the dockyards, said— He concurred with the hon. Member for Lincoln as to the inexpediency of the present arrangement, under which no civilian could be the Superintendent of a dockyard, and no Superintendent could hold office for more than five years; and, if he were promoted, the time was less."—[3 Hansard, clxxxv. 641.] Again, in addressing his constituents on the 29th of December, 1871, the same right hon. Gentleman was reported in The Times to have said— In relation to the dockyards, the more fully the public employer of labour, stalled or otherwise, follows the practice of private employers, the better both for the men and for the country. Again, the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter), in addressing his constituents on the 12th of October, 1871, was reported to have said that— The defects in Admiralty administration were to be found principally in the control and in the superintendence of our dockyards. And, in giving his evidence before the Megæra Commission, the hon. Member for Montrose, in answer to questions from 15,570 to 15,576, stated that it was essential to the safety of Her Majesty's ships that each yard should have a Superintendent thoroughly conversant with iron shipbuilding. Mr. Reed, the late Chief Constructor, in his examination before the same Commission, gave evidence to this purport. I will not trouble the House with the answers to each question; but Mr. Reed stated that— Responsibility was so divided and sub-divided amongst the departments that there was great difficulty in fixing the blame when anything went wrong. Next I come to the hon. Member for Sandwich (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) who, in addressing his constituents, was reported by The Daily News, on the 18th of November, 1871, as having said—"That the Government were not to blame for the loss of the Megæra;" and that "what they had to find fault with was the system." Well; but why do not they alter it? Then, Sir Spencer Robinson, in answer to question 14,907, told the Megæra;" Commission this— Until you get under one head the whole management of a dockyard, you will never succeed in being perfectly certain that some one has not omitted something because it was not in his department according to his judgment. But the opinion which will, perhaps, carry the most weight with the House is that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright), who, speaking in this House on the 16th of June, 1865, upon a proposal similar to my present one, said— It is not that you shall not have as Superintendents of dockyards naval officers, but that you shall not have them of necessity. It is that when you appoint a naval officer, he shall be a man who has a technical knowledge of the duties he is expected to superintend. Was anything more rational ever proposed to Parliament? I shall not say, was anything so rational ever refused by Parliament."—[3 Hansard, clxxx. 391.] There was a division taken on that occasion, and, owing to the powerful advocacy of my right hon. Friend, 36 voted for the Motion and 34 against it; but, in a subsequent division, there voted 33 for, and 60 against the proposal. There is still a further authority in favour of my view which I would quote—namely, that of the Megæra;" Commission, who, in their Report, paragraph 108, say— We feel compelled to add that we have formed, however unwillingly, an unfavourable opinion as to the mode in which the administration of Her Majesty's dockyards is generally conducted. Well, then, what have we to set against such weighty evidence and opinions as I have adduced? First of all we have the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Tyrone (Mr. Corry), whose absence I deeply regret, more particularly on account of its cause, and whom I hope soon to see again in his place, taking his usual part in naval discussions. Speaking on July 11, 1871, in this House, that right hon. Gentleman said that— A Superintendent has not only to superintend the repairing and building of ships, but to see to their rigging, fitting, arming, &c."[3 Hansard, ccvii. 1478.] Here, observe, he gives up the question of the Superintendent of a dockyard knowing anything of the building and repairing of ships. His opinion might have done pretty well if he had not unfortunately given his reason for it; for I am informed, upon the most unquestionable authority, that the Superintendent in no case gives an order or superintends the rigging of a ship; that a Superintendent has nothing to do with the general fittings of a ship; and also that in no case does he interfere in any matter connected with the arming of the ships. Another authority in opposition to those by whom I am supported is that of the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Goschen). And here I would ask, in passing, upon what ground does a gentleman who once took an active part in managing a large and prosperous private concern set himself against what I venture to call a common-sense and business-like mode of managing a large public department? But I got a little light on the subject by reading a speech of his—for I did not hear it—delivered on the 7th of August, 1871, when, in answering the right hon. Member for Tyrone, who had objected to civilians being appointed as Superintendents of naval hospitals and victualling yards, the First Lord reminded the right hon. Gentleman that the hon. Member for Lincoln wished actually to have civilians at the head of the dockyards, and then went on to say— For his own part, he wished to keep a due mean, and not to rush to extremes by excluding entirely either the civilian or the naval element." —[3 Hansard, ccviii. 1052.] Now, I altogether object to this "due mean" principle. If naval officers are better qualified—nay, if they are as well qualified—as any civilian for an office at the Admiralty, let them have it; but do not put them in an office simply on what my right hon. Friend calls the "due mean" principle. If he had chosen to defend the changes made by his immediate predecessor on the ground that they had been beneficial, he could have clone so with great effect, more particularly with regard to the naval hospitals. I came across a paragraph in The Army and Navy Gazette of the 4th of January last, in which it was stated, on the authority of officers and correspondents who had themselves seen and experienced the working of the naval hospitals, that those institutions "were never in such a thoroughly efficient state as they are at present." I should have thought that was a strong argument in favour of applying the same principle to the management of our dockyards; but the First Lord actually uses it as an argument against the change, and he wishes to keep to the "due mean," and therefore, as civilians are employed in the naval hospitals and victualling yards, he must have naval officers as Superintendents of the dockyards. My impression is that the Admiralty themselves know that their managers of the dockyards are inefficient, or they would not have encumbered their books with such a mass of written instructions. They know that they are not efficient, and in order to lessen the evil of that inefficiency, they send forth an enormous number of written instructions—so enormous that Admiral Sir Sydney Dacre, when he was examined before the Megæra Commission, in answer to question 15,997, said— I know that orders are multiplied to such a degree that people do not know actually where they are. Admiral Sir Frederick Gray, in answer to question 13,850, before the Megæra Commissioners, said— I cannot say what the instructions to the dockyard officers are, for though begun to be revised in 1862 and 1863, they are not yet completed or issued. Perhaps the House will allow me to give an extract from the appendix to the Report of the Megæra Commission, showing the minuteness with which the Board of Admiralty attempt to manage this business. On the 16th of August, 1870, the carpenter of the Megæra reported that the mizen cross-tree of that vessel was broken. The staff commander approved of the Report, and. sent it to the Commander-in-Chief; the Commander-in-Chief approved it, and referred it to the Superintendent at Sherness; the Superintendent at Sheerness referred it to the dockyard officers; the dockyard officers reported that the cost of the repairs would be The Superintendent then reported to the Controller; and on the 29th of August, or 13 days afterwards, the Controller ordered the work to be done, costing £6. This system of written instructions of course necessarily multiplies correspondence inordinately. The First Lord of the Admiralty, in speaking of the correspondence of his Department, in connection, I think, with a question that was raised in this House with reference to the loss of the Megæra, said, "It was a matter of extreme difficulty in so vast a Department." Now, Sir, I do not think there is any difficulty in dealing with the correspondence of a large department. I think that a large business, if the system is good and the managers are efficient, is generally better managed than a small business. But I deny that this correspondence— 100,000 letters per annum—is so excessive. As soon as I had read the report of my right hon. Friend's speech, I asked my own bankers—the London and County Bank—to give me the number of letters they received in the course of the year, and they were kind enough to let their letters be counted for one week at the head office; and I find that they received 498 letters and 25 postal cards per day, or 523 communications altogether, being an average of 163,176 a-year. And this they told me was a fair average of the number they received week by week, except upon special occasions, when the number was largely increased. I have reason to believe that at the General Post Office 160,000 letters a-year pass through the Secretary's office, and that there are about one and a-half or two unregistered papers to each letter; making the whole number between 400,000 and 500,000 in the year. And I venture to assert that this mode of attempting to manage business by written instructions, instead of by having efficient managers in the different dockyards, has failed, and ever must fail as long as the world stands. Then, in addition to this want of experienced managers, you have the tenure of a dockyard Superintendent's appointment limited to five years, and practically to only three years. I really do not think that folly could go much further than that. This, then, briefly summed up, is the way in which the Admiralty manage their business. The Controller, who superintends the designs for shipbuilding, is ignorant of naval architecture; while the Superintendents who manage your great shipbuilding yards know nothing whatever of shipbuilding. No wonder there is much extravagance, and that many grievous mishaps occur. We have lately introduced something like common sense into the mode in which the Admiralty purchase their stores, and I have no doubt a considerable sum of money has thereby been saved; but I believe that saving is small compared with that which would be effected by having efficient Superintendents of dockyards. But the saving of money would not be the only advantage gained by altering the system. There would be many other advantages. I believe the costly establishments at Whitehall might be materially reduced. They would not then have to take into consideration whether a mizen cross-tree should be repaired at a cost of £6, but would be able to devote their attention to questions of far greater moment. A further advantage would be that we should, in all probability, be spared those serious blunders such as led to the loss of the Megæra. Here was a vessel sent on a long voyage, dashed to pieces on a desert island, and 300 or 400 lives put in great peril; and what are the facts which are ascertained? Why, that year after year, for many years, her bottom had been crumbling to pieces, and that she had been during this time in more than one dockyard for repairs. I cannot conceive that under an efficient administration this would happen. But the greatest advantage which I think would accrue from an alteration of the system would be, that we should have a better chance of securing the best type of ship in future; and when we bear in mind the many costly reconstructions of our Navy, the millions of money that have been spent—some of them unnecessarily spent, in consequence of want of skill and foresight—I say we ought to summon to our aid the highest skill that the country can afford. I further say—and I say this deliberately—that the man who neglects to summons to his aid the best talent that the country can furnish is guilty of an act of great folly, and of a gross breach of duty. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving his Resolution.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House, in order to remedy certain defects in the administration of the Admiralty, recommends the Government to take into consideration the propriety of administering that department by means of a Secretary of State; and further, of appointing to the offices of Controller and of Superintendent of Her Majesty's Dockyards persons who possess practical knowledge of the duties they have to discharge, and also of altering the rule which limits their tenure of office to a fixed term of years."—(Mr. Seely.)

MR. WHITE

said, he begged to thank his hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr. Seely), for again calling attention to a subject which, despite the scanty attendance, was one of great importance, involving the maintenance of that maritime superiority which the country was resolved to secure at whatever cost. It was to secure this and the efficient conduct of the Department that his hon. Friend had, with laudable pertinacity, year after year brought the question before the House, having already achieved much good, and being likely he trusted to achieve much more. The object of the Resolution which he wished to second was, the practical enforcement of the doctrine of direct personal responsibility in naval administration. Could it be surprising that much distrust was felt by the public as to the condition of the Navy, and its management, seeing that our iron-clads, according to the late Commander of the Mediterranean Squadron (Lord Clarence Paget), "were not safe when near land or one another, at sea, at anchor, or in bad weather, without steam power?" According to Admiral Sartorius, "they were equally unfit for the exigencies of coast or distant warfare, and for blockading an enemy's ports impracticable." Another Admiral, Lord Dunsany, stated eight months ago, in the other House, that a "flag officer might now attain his flag without ever having taken his own ship out of harbour." This distrust was not unreasonable when Her Majesty's ship Achilles had four captains appointed to her—before she left Sheerness—in a little over three months, in order, it was alleged, to evade the regulation now in force, that a captain must have been afloat and in command of a ship within seven years of his promotion to flag rank. This insidious and expensive process must unduly swell the number of flag officers, already out of all proportion to the requirements of the service. We had now 295 admirals on the retired, reserved, and active lists. Mr. Cobden 20 years ago complained of their being almost one admiral for each ship in commission; but, deducting coastguard ships for the Naval Reserve, and ships under repair or stationary, we had, by the latest return, 211 ships in commission, showing nearly an admiral and a half for every ship now in commission. The inefficiency of the present system might be shown by the collisions and catastrophes which had befallen the Navy, but they were so recent, and had so strongly affected the public mind, that he need only express his dissatisfaction at the advancement of the officials who were or ought to have been made responsible for the loss of the Megæra. So far from dereliction of duty—he might say culpable neglect or delinquency—being a bar to promotion, it apparently operated as a stimulus or plea for advancement on the official mind. Hence it was disheartening to be driven to the conclusion that the new system was not much, if at all, better than the old. As to official responsibility, no word was more profaned, for a First Lord might build a fleet of useless vessels, as had indeed happened, the country bearing the cost. Impeachment was obsolete, and the block at Tower Hill was no longer a national institution. If a dockyard was wastefully managed, would the First Lord be compelled to make good the waste? For 19 years the Admiralty had been undergoing constant reorganization, and the views of successive Boards constantly changing; the consequence was confusion, which would have become absolute chaos but for the permanency of the subordinate officials. The Board changing with the Government, a political feeling was imported into the service, orders not being cheerfully obeyed, and a spirit almost of mutiny being encouraged. Officers and men often held on for a change of Government, hoping for it if dissatisfied, as was their normal condition. Duties were perfunctorily performed, and too often the subordinates, from political feeling, opposed and strove to thwart, if not to betray, their chiefs. How often had First Lords justly complained of information being furnished to Opposition Members before they had themselves been made acquainted with it. Now, with a Secretary of State and permanent professional advisers this state of things would be wholly or to a great extent avoided. Under the existing system Parliamentary novices and young political aspirants became Civil Lords and Secretaries to the Admiralty, and when holding those offices they not merely advised but they actually controlled largo Departments conducted by men who had devoted their lifetime to their management. Consequently, the policy of those Departments was never uniform, and the waste of public money arising from changes of design was very great. But the worst effect of the present system was, that the heads of Departments were thus deprived of their personal responsibility. Hence it was not surprising that in the fleet at the present time there were almost as many types of ships as there were ships. But the fact was that a system which. changed the First Lord, the Civil Lord, the Secretary, and the other Lords every two or three years, and the Superintendents of the dockyards every five years, was so absurd that its absurdity would need no exposure were it not for the obstinate inaptitude of those Chinese of Europe, the ordinary English officials. The Superintendents of our dockyards were merely the month-pieces of officers who disclaimed all responsibility. In our dockyards there was really no one who superintended, in the true sense of the term. The most important functionary whose duty should be to blend the several offices under him into one harmonious whole—to use the language of the Secretary of State for War—was an official who was entirely ornamental and absolutely useless, when not mischievous. He might ask whether the Government had not given up the point insisted upon by his hon. Friend by having recently abolished the Naval Superintendents at the victualling yards and naval hospitals? As to the office of the Controller of the Navy, he wished to know why it should be given to an admiral who had no professional knowledge of shipbuilding, and who could only act as a mere buffer between the First Lord and the Chief Constructor of the Navy. It was chimerical to suppose that we could ever see a perfect administration under a Parliamentary régime, but a Minister would most nearly attain that result by courageously discarding all antiquated practices and superannuated procedure in the conduct of his Department. Therefore, while he was aware that with regard to the public service we should never discover a perfect substitute—to use the language of the Prime Minister—"for the vigilant, the ever-living sense of self interest which applies to private concerns," still the question was, how near we could get to the solution of the problem of an efficient substitute? He believed the adoption of the Admiralty of such an admistrative policy as had been recommended by his hon. Friend would greatly assist in the solution of this difficult and vital problem. In conclusion, he would ask, what could be said of a system which affixed no clear and indisputable authority anywhere—a system which laid on the First Lord duties before he could have any knowledge how to perform them? It established confusion in the inferior departments, where there ought to be a clear definition of functions, and prevented the possibility of the enforcement of a steady and consistent line of policy with permanent official and individual responsibility.

MR. BRASSEY

The Motion of the hon. Member for Lincoln refers to two separate departments of naval administration—namely, the organization of the office of the Admiralty, and the management of the dockyards. The Amendment which he (Mr. Brassey) had placed on the Paper referred to the former subject only; but, inasmuch as the management of the dockyards was by far the more important and difficult problem of the two, he proposed to apply himself mainly to that branch of the subject. Good administration in dockyards could never be secured except by appointing competent men to manage them on the spot, with plenary powers to carry out, according to their own judgment, the instructions received from the Admiralty. The managers of dockyards would be held individually responsible for failure in the performance of their duties, and should receive a liberal recognition for faithful service. Having seen how vain the attempt has been to manage the dockyards from Whitehall, he could not but turn for guidance to his father's experience, which showed that a business, almost as large and complicated as that of the Admiralty itself, could be managed with success, by the delegation of the responsibility of local administration to well selected agents. Since he had the privilege of addressing the House on this subject, the loss of the Megæra had furnished another convincing proof of the entire dependence of the central office on the local officers in the dockyards. Mr. Reed, in his evidence before the Megæra Commission, disavowed any intention to undertake the supervision of 750 ships from Whitehall. He said that— He did not consider that it had been any part of the Chief Constructor's duty to be responsible, or to see even that the master-shipwrights did their work thoroughly. A master-shipwright was the highest ship-building and repairing officer belonging to the Admiralty, and the office of the Chief Constructor and his staff was only that of adviser to the Admiralty on professional questions relating to that work. His own opinion was that, if any action were taken, which tended to weaken the responsibility of the dockyard officers, and to place the care of the ships in the Admiralty office, for every mishap that we now had in the Navy, we should have a hundred afterwards. Mr. Barnaby expressed a similar opinion. Sir Spencer Robinson took the same view— When," he said, "you put a man at the top of his profession, as a master-shipwright; you put the greatest possible confidence in him; you take such steps as you can to remind him of the importance of the work he has to perform, and any further interference would be disastrous to the best interests of the public service. From what class, then, are the managers to be selected? A naval officer of the highest rank must be at the head of the dockyard, but for good workmanship and economy we must look to the professional officers of the yards. Whenever Admiral Superintendents have been before Commissions on dockyard management, they have universally declined to accept any responsibility either as to expenditure or workmanship, alleging that the professional officers were solely responsible. But if this be the case, the nominal responsibility of the Admiral for the internal economy of the dockyards, and the practice of requiring him to affix his signature to every document relating to ship-building, must be prejudicial to the public service. The great changes recently carried out in naval administration, seem to have left this serious evil untouched. In his evidence before the Megæra Commission, Mr. Andrew Murray said that— While the Admiral or Captain-Superintendent was necessary in a dockyard as a head, he should not be concerned in its details, or in the management of the men. But, unfortunately," he said, "it is the case with the rules now—and they seem to be attempting to go further in that direction—that they take the power out of the hands of the principal departmental officers. Mr. Reed urged very strongly a similar criticism— The shipbuilding officers in the Admiralty have not," he said, "any power of controlling a dockyard, and if the result of this inquiry should be to establish an arrangement by which they should be authorized and enabled to look after the ships, I would consider it to be a very happy result. But there has been no such position given to the professional staff of the Admiralty, and I believe, under the latest improvements, there have been no changes in that respect. There ought to be an organization by which there should be a professional officer in each dockyard, and a professional officer at the Admiralty, who should be looked to for the exercise of that responsibility, and who should have the means of' exercising it. Mr. Reed further expressed an opinion that— The naval officer should be consulted on all parts of the ship which relate to his professional work, but the want of a definition of the shipbuilder's duties, and of the naval officer's duties, worked very great mischief, and a great change in that respect was necessary. In a dockyard, the Superintendent must always be required, as the local representative of the Admiralty; and his experience afloat—the more recent that experience the better—would enable him to exercise a most beneficial supervision over the equipment of the ships. But these duties were entirely distinct from those involved in the internal management of the yard. Having showed that we want the best shipbuilders in the country as managers of dockyards, we had now to consider what steps should be taken to induce the most qualified men to enter the public service. The pay should be gradually raised. The present salaries were entirely inadequate, when compared with the importance of the duties, or the corresponding salaries in the employ of private firms. Owing to the insufficiency of the salaries, we were continually losing some of the most valuable subordinate shipbuilding officers in the dockyards. The surveyors at Lloyds were almost all obtained from the dockyards. But large salaries were not the only means of making the employment attractive. The relative rank of the professional officer should be considered. The civil manager of each dockyard should have adequate relative rank. He could not see why he should not rank with, but after, a rear-admiral, or, at any rate, with, but after, a post-captain. Again, honorary distinctions had never of late been bestowed, though it was clear that meritorious services in the dockyards gave as good claim to the Order of the Bath, as the work in any department of the Civil Service of the Crown. The same neglect of our great naval shipbuilders was not manifested in former days, when Sir William Sepping and Sir William Rule were distinguished—and very properly so—by some mark of the favour of their Sovereign. That men of so much ability as some of the present master shipwrights should be induced to remain where they are, only shows how easily the Government might make such employment attractive. The professional officers should not be promoted workmen. Men promoted from the ranks often show that melancholy dread of responsibility which was so painfully exhibited in the Megæra inquiry. Sir Spencer Robinson gave a strong opinion on this subject when he said that— Knowing the timidity, and the sort of want of straightforwardness which belong to the class from which many of those officials were sprung, he considered that, being aware that they had committed an oversight, the whole of their evidence was untrustworthy. Sometimes the most suitable officer might be appointed from a private establishment, but as a general rule he would be found among the subordinates trained in the service. Occasionally a naval officer might have had an opportunity of showing a special fitnesss for the post. Having made a happy choice of a fit person, it remained to consider what modifications might be desirable in the duties of the appointment. The correspondence should be materially reduced. Sir W. Edmondstone told the Megæra Commissioners that the master-shipwright was more occupied in office work than in the practical part of his duty; and that he was completely dependent on the assistant master-shipwright and the foremen. The most elaborate returns, do what you will, afford no security for economy. Immediate skilful personal supervision over the labour employed and the conversion of materials can alone secure economical administration. Every master-shipwright should be relieved of the duty of appending his signature to documents which he signs as a mere matter of form. A highly qualified confidential secretary should be assigned to every master-shipwright, who should be authorized to deal with all matters of office routine. When a ship was to be built or repaired in the dockyard, the master-shipwright should be required to make a careful examination of the work, and prepare his own estimate. If this estimate were approved, and the work ordered, his name should be inserted in the Naval Estimates, in a separate column, opposite the figures for which he was responsible. This practice would tend materially to create a sense of individual responsibility, which would never be felt by officials who were allowed to screen themselves from criticism behind the nominal authority of the Controller or Admiral Superintendent. The various suggestions which had been proposed could not be adopted, unless the Admiralty felt justified in placing implicit reliance on their staff. Personal confidence between principal and agent could only be established after many years of careful training and thorough trial in subordinate positions. The head of a private business had the means of putting his agents to such a test; but in the public service, under a Parliamentary system, where political and personal considerations caused frequent changes, the same opportunity of long continued observation of the conduct of subordinates was rarely given to a Minister at the head of a Department. At the same time he was convinced that the more we decentralized, the more vigorous and economical our dockyard administration would be. Among the illustrations which might be adduced to show the evil effects of excessive concentration of authority at the Admiralty, none could be more striking than the present arrangements for the promotion of workmen. The events which were daily occurring around us, showed the difficulty of managing large bands of workmen. The professional officers were responsible for workmanship and economy in dockyards, and yet the artizans employed under their directions were placed under the Admiralty Superintendent for the regulation of discipline, while their promotion depended on the will, or at least, on the approval of the Controller in London. The Controller could have no knowledge of the individual merits of the workmen, but his nominal intervention deprived the local officers of their legitimate authority over the men. It was because the central authority had no other means of testing the capabilities of the workmen that recourse had been had to the plan of applying a literary test to artizans who were candidates for promotion. The qualifications required were manual skill and diligence; but inasmuch as the central authority would not trust the local officers, the aspirant workman was tested by examination papers, although it must often happen that the most skilful artizan with the pen was the least skilled in the use of the adze and the saw. With regard to the tenure of office of the Superintendent, who was a temporary, and of the master-shipwright, who was a permanent officer, if the latter were raised to the position of manager of the yard, there seemed no reason why the present rules as to the appointment of Admiral Superintendent should be changed. Before finally quitting the subject of dockyard economy, he would urge the importance of avoiding spasmodic and violent alterations in the shipbuilding programme. The right hon. Member for Pontefract had very wisely laid down a scheme for the production of a given quantity of armoured and unarmoured ships each year. The number of workmen, the supply of materials, the arrangement of the machinery, must be regulated with reference to the amount of work proposed. As regards the armoured ships, our policy must mainly depend on the preparations of other Powers. The condition of foreign navies was accurately known, and no important changes could be effected suddenly, or without our knowledge. The unarmoured ships could be rapidly produced whenever required, both in public and private yards. A large staff of workmen would not therefore appear to be necessary for the solo purpose of building vessels of that class, though enough must always be retained to undertake repairs of the fleet. Encouragement was much wanted, both for workmen and sub-officers—such as foremen. A percentage on profits, where there were none, could not be offered; neither could a percentage on savings be proposed without the risk of important work being scamped. But a distribution of gratuities to deserving workmen, on the satisfactory completion of any difficult work, might be a valuable stimulus to exertion. He would now say a few words on the government of the Navy by a Board. He had on a former occasion supported without reserve a Motion very similar to that now introduced. Further consideration had induced him to withdraw from his former position. The inquiry held before the Duke of Somerset's Commission, and the strongly expressed opinions of Sir John Hay, Sir Frederick Gray, Sir Alexander Milne, and Sir Sydney Dacres, had convinced him that he was ill-advised in advocating the dissolution of the Board. When the First Lord was—as it usually happens—a civilian, it must be right that he should have an opportunity of hearing more than one opinion on a controverted naval question. It must also be well that all the members of the Board should have a general knowledge of the proceedings of the Admiralty. Again, in matters of patronage it must be undesirable that a. Minister should be entirely dependent on a single adviser. The Navy was a scattered service. Only a certain number of officers could ever have served under the personal observation of one individual, and it must be impossible for an Admiral to place the same confidence in officers he has never seen in service, which he feels in those who have been under his own command. Hence an inevitable tendency to a select band of followers. The presence of other officers at the council table of the First Lord would secure fair consideration for the claims of those who were not personally known to the First Sea Lord. It did not follow that the advice of the Board should impair the authority of the First Lord. In commercial life many boards wore governed by the chairman with autocratic power. How much more easy must it be to secure a similar supremacy at the Admiralty, where the authority of the First Lord was effectually protected, both by usage and by the influence due to those personal qualifications, without which he would not have been selected to fill such an important post. The charms, too, of antiquity are universally recognized in an ancient country; and if by wisdom in practice all that is objectionable in point of form could be effectually remedied, it would not be wise to make a change on theoretical grounds. At the Admiralty—as in other departments of the Government— That which was best administered was best. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the Amendment of which he had given Notice.

Amendment proposed, To leave out the words "Secretary of State," in order to insert the words "a Board of Admiralty with such modifications of constitution and procedure as experience has shown to be desirable,"—(Mr. Brassey,)

—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words 'Secretary of State' stand part of the Question."

SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE

in seconding the Amendment, said, he thought the discussion premature, as upon the Navy Estimates the House would hear more distinctly what the policy of the Government was to be. The tenor of the argument of the hon. Member for Lincoln seemed to be that seamen knew nothing of ships and nothing of navigation. He agreed almost entirely with what the hon. Member for Hastings (Mr. Brassey) had said. Some years ago he (Sir James Elphinstone) had moved Resolutions for the purpose of strengthening the Board of Admiralty, and he still adhered to the opinion that the great defect at the Admiralty was the want of power and the placing of an enormous amount of work upon the officials there. The same might be said of every Department of the State. The Judges were dying of hard work; it was the tendency of the Administration to heap more work upon public servants than they could possibly perform with justice to themselves and to the State. There was one office which he was sorry to see abolished, and which he cordially welcomed when established by the right hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers); he meant that of Chief of the Staff. The position of Chief of the Staff was, in his opinion, a most im- portant office, because the person filling it was one with whom inferior officers could communicate with much more confidence than with the First Lord of the Admiralty. Take the Coast Guard, the divisions of which were commanded by some of the most distinguished officers of the service—these could communicate with the Chief of the Staff, and discharge their business much better in that way than by directing their communications to the First Lord of the Admiralty, who had various functions to discharge. The Resolutions which he proposed on the occasion to which he had referred wore not his Resolutions; they were drawn up by some of the most experienced officers of the Navy, who contemplated and forecast almost everything that had since happened. They foresaw that an emergency was about to arise in which it would be absolutely necessary to have our Navy reconstructed in a form and on a scale quite unknown in this country before. They saw the old ships, built for £120,000 vanishing from the face of the earth, and their place supplied by vessels which would cost £500,000. In view of that change the object of the Resolutions was to strengthen the professional arm of the Admiralty, and to give the First Lord the very best professional advice. And hero he must differ from his hon. Friend in holding that sailors knew more about ships than engineers. The consequence of the Admiralty being starved was that they had fallen into one mistake after another. We were now gradually getting into something like a policy. We had a considerable number of seaworthy ships, though he thought they were all overmasted, and in other respects not quite what they should be. But it was absolutely impracticable to have all things combined in a sea-going iron-clad. She must be a compromise in any case, and as to our last iron-clad, the Devastation, he must implore that she should not be sent to sea until after the Equinox. He had had a good deal of experience, and he must say that he would not go to sea in her unless there was the gravest necessity. She was perfectly suited for harbour defence, she had the most powerful engines of destruction, but he did not think a ship of her construction could perform the services for which she had been built. Then as to the changes in our dockyards. We never heard of any Member in the House getting up and calling on the Government of the day to reduce the corps of Royal Engineers; and yet there was hardly a Gentleman who came into Parliament with any small mechanical knowledge who did not endeavour to break up establishments which were of the greatest importance to the public. Before the establishment-men of the dockyards were broken up they were not only a body of the best behaved and most perfect mechanics, but they were also a half military corps, being trained to the use of artillery, and quite ready to defend the dockyards should the force to which that duty was intrusted be called away. The best policy which the Government could possibly adopt would be to re-establish a highly qualified and educated corps—he did not mean men having mechanical knowledge merely—for the purpose of construction, reconstruction, and repairs of ships, and to make them as stable a body as the Royal Engineers. The change to which he alluded had operated in the most unfavourable manner. The continual terror in which the men were kept lest there might be some alteration to their prejudice made it an absolute duty in those who represented the arsenals to endeavour to reassure them. And here he must bear his testimony to the excellent conduct of these men during the strikes which were so prevalent throughout the country. They had behaved in the most temperate and orderly manner, and that under very trying circumstances. If we looked at the price of provisions, of coals, and of all the necessaries of life, these men were nearly 60 per cent worse off than they were 10 years ago, and their pay was very much less than what they would get in private yards. They had behaved, as he had said, with the most perfect propriety during the whole of this most trying season; they now looked to the Government to take their just claims into consideration, and he hoped they would not be deceived. The great use of our Navy in times of peace appeared to him to be to maintain a body of well-trained officers and well-trained and contented men, and the great facilities there were for service in quelling the slave trade on the coast of Africa, in taking charge of our colonies on the coast of China and other parts of the world, and in discharging the duty we had imposed upon ourselves of maintaining the police of the seas, made it easy for us to keep up small squadrons of ships in various quarters in a state of perfect efficiency.

MR. R.W. DUFF

said, there was one class of men who had been rather hardly used in the course of the debate, and that was the naval officers. The hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. White) went out of his way to compare the number of Admirals with the number of ships; but it did not appear to have entered into the calculations of the hon. Member that in proportion as we increased the strength of our ships we must increase the number of officers on half-pay. One iron-clad was probably equal to six vessels that used to be afloat when the majority of our Admirals entered the service. Whatever might be said of naval officers, they were very sensitive of their reputation, and he should be sorry it should go abroad uncontradicted that these men were a mere burden to their country. Most of them had served their country well, and their patriotism would bear comparison, at least, with that of the hon. Member for Brighton. It should be further borne in mind that the half-pay these officers were receiving was miserably small, being in many instances less than what the colliers in Lanarkshire had struck work on. The hon. Member also talked of the influence at work at the Admiralty. No doubt there was a time when political jobbery existed at the Admiralty, but he believed that time had gone by. Notwithstanding all that had fallen from him, the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. Seely) would not, he believed, deny that, in spite of all the shortcomings of the Admiralty, we had got a more efficient Navy than any other country in the world.

MR. LIDDELL

considered a change in the constitution of the Board of Admiralty perhaps the most important administrative change which the House could be called upon to make, and the question he naturally put to himself was whether they were really sincere in asking for it. Certainly the numbers in the House, and its general attitude during this discussion, did not enable him to answer that question in the affirmative. There always had been one great de- feet in the constitution of the Admiralty —namely, its want of continuity of action and permanence of policy, and that defect remained unremedied to this hour. But why was there this absence of continuity of action and permanence of policy? Because they insisted on having a political chief at the Admiralty, and he believed that so long as this was the case they would have to regret the absence of these two elements. He had never been able to get any answer to the question why they had a permanent chief in the sister arm of the service—the Army—and had nothing of the sort in the Navy. The hon. Member for Brighton talked about Ministerial responsibility; but he ventured to think the responsibility of the First Lord of the Admiralty was a great deal more ideal than real. There had been occurrences which had roused the heart of the country and filled England with sorrow, alarm, and dissatisfaction; but he had never seen them satisfactorily accounted for or responsibility brought home. Theoretically, the First Lord was responsible, but not really. The civilian who was selected to fill that office found himself suddenly seated at a table with three or four naval men of the highest standing, the longest experience, and a minute knowledge of every detail of the Navy. How could he be responsible in the face of his advisers for the discipline of the Navy, the allocation of the fleet, and the construction of ships? The First Lord must, in such a position, be entirely in the hands of his advisers. When he had served his apprenticeship and acquired some knowledge of the situation, he was either transferred to another position or was obliged to leave office altogether in consequence of some Ministerial change, and the whole thing had to be done over again. That was a defect in the constitution of the Board which would not bear argument. Responsibility had a double action—the man who bore responsibility should feel it, and those who imposed responsibility must, when the occasion arose, be in a positon to enforce it. Within two or three days after the right hon. Gentleman entered the Admiralty, the Megæra left Sheerness; she was proved to be unseaworthy before leaving the Channel. There was an Admiralty order then in existence that any ship so found to be unseaworthy should return to her port to be repaired; but that order was not obeyed; she left Queenstown in violation of that order, and they all knew what had occurred. Was there any Vote of Censure on the First Lord? Certainly not. He had only been at the Admiralty two or three days, and might not have known of the existence of the order; but if there had been a trained and permanent head of the Admiralty, Parliament would not have hesitated to enforce responsibility, and the country would have supported Parliament in doing so. That could not be done so long as they had a shifting head. Allusion had been made to a letter written by Lord Clarence Paget, who was well qualified to write on the subject, for he had just then returned from a five years' command of an ironclad fleet; he had been at the Admiralty himself; and he said that those iron-clads were not safe either at sea or at anchor unless they were under the full power of their steam. Civilians could not help coupling such statements with the grounding of the Lord Clyde and the stranding of the Agincourt. People asked how such things happened, and could never get an answer to the question—Who was responsible? He wished Lord Clarence Paget would write again now, for many things had happened since his last letter. There had been a collision between the Bellerophon and the Minotaur. They had heard of the Sultan touching ground somewhere, and of the Northumberland hanging upon the prow of the Hercules in the roads of Funchal, and yet nobody was responsible. A naval officer had stated that out of six iron-clads composing the Channel Fleet, three were shaky at the bottom. He wished Lord Clarence Paget would ask, with the authority duo to his position in the Navy, whether the Northumberland and the Hercules were provided with anchors and chains corresponding with their weight. He very much doubted whether that could be shown. The House was entitled to ask for explanations on all these points. Of course, there were Courts-Martial to adjudicate on facts; but he was referring to matters of naval administration, and the responsibility for naval administration seemed to be more nominal than real. As to stores, he was glad a Committee had been appointed upon this subject, and thought that good might come of the inquiry, especially with reference to the working of the new purchase system at the Admiralty. Another point worth notice was that inventors seemed to find great difficulty in getting heard at the Admiralty, and in testing even good inventions. Was the best anchor in use in the Navy? He very much doubted it. His hon. Friend (Mr. Seely) wished to put our great naval yards upon the footing of private undertakings. But it must always be remembered that in public establishments the feeling of self-interest was wanting. It was like requiring a vast workshop, all the machinery in which was driven by one steam-engine, to work without steam. You could not in a public yard have the stimulus which was afforded in a private under - taking, where capital, character, and livelihood depended upon a man's success. He gave the utmost credit to the officials in our dockyards for their devotion to duty, but this one feeling must always be lacking; and, further, what was wanting was a permanent head at the Board of Admiralty, whether a civilian or a naval man. He could not agree with his hon. Friend (Mr. Seely) that Naval Lords were appointed from political reasons. One of our most eminent sailors was Admiral Milne, who had served in the Admiralty under a Conservative Administration, and was still a member of the Board. But what was wanted was permanence given to the action and policy of the Board by the appointment of a Naval Commander-in-Chief.

MR. GOSCHEN

The natural result of a Motion such as this, and a debate such as this, is that it must afford the opportunity of bringing into prominent notice almost every disaster which has happened of late years in the Navy, and every act of maladministration; that it must attack the character of many administrators at various periods; and that these attacks and charges are so various that it is almost impossible, in replying, to notice them all. The speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr. Seely) was directed mainly to two points —the constitution of the Board of Admiralty and the substitution of civilian for naval officers in the Department of Controller and as Superintendents of the naval yards. It is easy for me to state my opinion upon those two points. But the hon. Member, in substantiating his case, alluded to a great deal of historical matter, and was followed in that by other hon. Members, so that if I were really to give an exhaustive reply to the speeches made, I should have to deal fully with the whole case of the Megæra; I should have to explain the history of the collision between the Minotaur and the Bellerophon; I should have to enter upon the question of anchors and cables; to revive the debate upon the circulars respecting coals; to explain the mishap to the Lord Clyde and the Agincourt, and the construction of the Devastation; in fact, there would be no end to the speech which it would be my duty to make. On the other hand, let me say with great earnestness that it is painful to me to leave these things unanswered. It is, however, impossible, in a speech in reply to a Motion like this, to give a full explanation; and, whilst this is so, I must be in this position—that I see statements go forth that must remain partially uncontroverted until the proper opportunity comes. I shall be most happy to answer any question that may be put in the usual way; but to deal with all these matters in a single debate is beyond my powers. If, however, I have felt some pain at the revival of all the recent mishaps in our naval annals, I feel still more pain at some observations from the hon. Member (Mr. Seely), the effect of which, I think, he scarcely anticipated. The practical effect of a portion of his Motion is to convey the impression that the officers now performing the duty of Controller and Superintendents of the yards are not competent. It will have been observed, however, that first of all he assigns to them certain duties, and then states that they are incompetent to perform not their actual duties, but the theoretical duties which he himself assigns to them. The hon. Gentleman said in respect of the naval officers of whom he spoke that he did not understand what they were doing; that they got large salaries, and that he objected to their receiving those salaries until he knew what they got them for. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that those officers perform great and laborious duties, and in a manner which would excite his admiration were he acquainted with them. It is but just to the officers in question that I should bear this testimony to their most valuable services. I must ask the House and the public to assume that in respect of many of the cases of alleged maladministration, there is a complete defence, although it is impossible for me to enter into those matters of detail to-night; and, on the other hand, I ask, is there a single establishment of the enormous size of the Navy—is there a single company with so large a number of ships—is there one undertaking managed privately or by a Board that has not had its disasters, and very much in the same proportion as the Navy? And yet every disaster that happens in the Navy is assumed to be the consequence of Admiralty maladministration. You cannot have an enormous fleet at sea without occasional disasters occurring. And while I deeply regret the events which have occurred, I congratulate myself—I congratulate the Admiralty—far more, I congratulate the gallant officers in command of our ships on the fact that we have had—owing to their skill—so few disasters at a time when storms were unexampled in severity. The House will forgive me if I do not go further into this part of the question, inasmuch as the hon. Member has not attacked the present Admiralty. But he has attacked the Admiralty in the way that so many hon. Members in the House, and so many other persons out of the House, have been accustomed to do—namely, by magnifying every accident which happens, and exhibiting it as a sign of the decline of the Navy, forgetting that accidents are as numerous in foreign navies, if not more numerous than in our own. I venture to make these preliminary observations with a view to lessen the effect which statements such as we have heard are calculated to have on the country if they remained uncontradicted. I assure the House that we are fully conscious of our responsibility and of the administrative shortcomings to which we are liable; but I am anxious that there should be no exaggeration as to the facts. I must say I regretted to hear the statement made by the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Portsmouth (Sir James Elphinstone) with regard to the Devastation. I can only say that the able officers at the Admiralty—the Naval Architect and the Constructors—are fully alive to their duty and responsibility, and that nothing will be left undone which is calcu- lated to secure the safety of the ship referred to, and every precaution and means will be taken to sift everything connected with that ship to the very bottom; but we do not entertain the opinions of the hon. and gallant Gentleman. I now, Sir, address myself to the Motion before the House. My hon. Friend recommends the substitution of a Minister of State for the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the abolition of the Board. He has been partly answered by other hon. Members who have spoken; but I wish to point out that while objecting to my illustration of the word Board in connection with railways, my hon. Friend wished to assign a particular meaning to the word Board in the case of the Admiralty, and then dealt with the special meaning thus assigned. The fact is, the Board is now a Council, and a most efficient Council it is—one with which I should be very unwilling to dispense. But let it be called a Council or Board—or give it no name at all—always provided its members give their advice under a sense of responsibility. It is not the name, it is the thing that is of importance; and I have stated before as strongly as did my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract, that the action of the Board is never to be a cloak to cover the responsibility of any of the members of the Board in their separate departments. They meet in Council; but that fact does not relieve them of doing the work specially assigned to them, or of responsibility for that work. My hon. Friend says that the Board meet every day. What is done is this—The members of the Board and the Controller and Secretaries meet for a short period every morning to see what the main points of interest are arising out of the correspondence of the day. They meet to exchange views, and to become thoroughly acquainted with what is going on, and I attach great importance to those daily meetings. Then, there are generally two meetings a-week of the Council—if I may so call them—to discuss the higher and more important questions affecting shipbuilding, naval discipline, and other matters as to which it is desirable that the views of the naval members of the Board should be ascertained. My hon. Friend says it would be better to have a permanent Council than a shifting Board; and he suggests that at present the members of the Board are chosen from political considerations. That statement has been replied to by the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Liddell), who said that, at all events, the present Government has shown an example to the contrary. I assure my hon. Friend that I am actually unacquainted with the political opinions of two out of the three naval officers at the Board. They are eminent sailors, and as such they advise the First Lord, and assist in the conduct of the public business. I can tell my hon. Friend that there is no truth in the assertion to which he referred, that a suggestion was made to a gallant Admiral that he should fight the county of Antrim if he wished to sit on the Board. I am only astonished that my hon. Friend takes such statements in the Service newspapers as gospel. But it is perfectly true that I should be glad if Admiral Seymour were in the House, as it would be an advantage to the Service and to the House if he were here; and, in corroboration of that view, I need only refer to the great advantage it is to my right hon. Friend at the head of the War Office to have the able assistance in this House of my right hon. Friend the Surveyor General of Ordnance. I regret, for the sake of the House and the Service, that there is not some naval officer on this side as well as on the other. Political considerations ought, as little as possible, to influence the choice of naval members of the Board; and, in fact, they have not influenced the present or the late Government. Sir Sydney Dacres sat under different Administrations, and so also did Sir Alexander Milne. But my hon. Friend says that, at all events, it is desirable that the members of the Board should be permanent, and not shifting, and he quoted words of mine in favour of continuity at Whitehall. Well, I have, as far as possible, endeavoured to establish continuity of administration. I have made the Controller a permanent officer, and I have appointed a permanent Naval Secretary. With respect to the permanency of the other members of the Board, I am quite aware that an argument might be urged in its favour; but, on the other hand, the naval service might say that there is considerable advantage in having a flow of naval officers through the Admiralty—officers who would bring to the discharge of their duties the fullest and the latest knowledge as to the state of the Fleet and as to the different requirements and feelings of the service from day to day. You thus secure the modern as well as the older opinion, and that both as regards the Navy and the dockyards, and that I consider a matter of no little importance. What I particularly should wish to realize is that naval officers should be instructed in the working of all the departments of the service, and that they should be imbued with the idea that they have to perform administrative duties as well as to command ships. In foreign countries, the same rule is observed. In France, they pass as many of their officers through the Admiralty as they can. I have a very strong feeling upon that subject, because I have seen that, whenever there is an antagonistic feeling between the civilian and the naval element at the Admiralty, confusion and disadvantage to the country have followed. And now with regard to the administrative powers which naval men possess, it should be remembered that admirals and captains do not simply command ships, but have also to undertake a system of administration upon a great scale. A Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean may have to administer the affairs of 4,000 men under his command, and officers are thrown so much upon their own resources in all parts of the world that, in addition to an intimate and minute acquaintance with their ships, they may be said to receive a special training in affairs of administration. The hon. Gentleman asks me why the Controller should be permanent and the Naval Lords not. I answer that the former has got more difficult and complicated matters to deal with than have the Naval Lords; and, therefore, there is a great reason for the distinction. The permanent staff are, no doubt, invaluable, and I do not lose sight for a moment of the assistance they render to the Department; but so far from thinking that it is a disadvantage that an officer fresh from service should take office at the Admiralty, I look upon it as an advantage. With reference to the present state of affairs at the Admiralty, the new system, as far as I am aware, is working entirely satisfactorily. A question has been asked about the conduct of business at the Admiralty during the absence of the First Lord, and my hon. Friend suggested the appointment of a deputy First Lord. My hon. Friend did not, however, say whether the deputy First Lord should be a civilian or a naval officer. It is a question of considerable importance whether such an officer should be a civilian or a sailor. If the latter, in what position would he stand with relation to our first naval adviser? It is possible, owing to the nature of our constitutional arrangements, that the First Lord may be either a civilian or a sailor; and this being so, it is clear that the next in authority should be a naval man. If the deputy First Lord suggested by my hon. Friend were a sailor of high rank, the difficulty I have alluded to presents itself; if he is of lower rank, how will you get officers of superior rank to act as his subordinates? And then what is to become of the question of money in case of the absence of the First Lord? My hon. Friend would say that you must be so careful in your choice as to be able to place full confidence in him. Well, if he were a permanent officer the First Lord of the Admiralty would have no choice in the matter; and if he were not a permanent officer, I doubt whether Parliament would confide the expenditure to any officer who was not responsible. That is a great difficulty in the matter. Parliament insists upon keeping so strict a financial control, that the Admiralty cannot even give a gratuity above a certain sum without first referring to the Treasury. I come now to the question of the Controller, and here let me say that I was very sorry to hear what fell from my hon. Friend with reference to Captain Hall. The suggestion made by my hon. Friend was one of those suggestions which unfortunately are not only not warranted, but are calculated to cause considerable pain. In respect to Captain Hall, he was considered to possess excellent qualifications when he was appointed to the post of Superintendent and afterwards Controller; but it is now alleged that he had been removed from his office in consequence of the building of the Osborne. It was true that he had left his post, and been appointed permanent Secretary to the Admiralty; but there was no connection between this change and the building of the Osborne. When a case of mismanagement or inefficiency occurs, we continue to hear of it for three or four Sessions, until it is thoroughly worked to death. The very iteration of the disasters that are alluded to Session after Session, really seems to show how few cases of the kind occur. My hon. Friend has been hammering away at the Admiralty, with more or less success, from 1865 to 1873, and a few cases have served him from year to year. The Megæra will last for three or four Sessions, and the Osborne has already lasted two Sessions; but I would ask hon. Gentlemen whether as a rule—though it is no doubt questioned whether work is performed as economically in public as in private dockyards—there is any doubt at all as to the quality? It is not right to pick out an isolated case of bad workmanship, and instance that as a specimen of the work performed in the Government dockyards. Do the private shipbuilders of this country manage their affairs so well as to turn out all their work perfect? Is there a shipbuilder in the world who has succeeded in escaping criticism in respect to some part of his work? Indeed, I cannot help thinking that the few charges which are brought against the Department is one of the best proofs of its efficiency. My hon. Friend has made a great and cardinal mistake in supposing that it is the duty of the Controller to be a naval architect. The naval architect is a most important officer of the Admiralty, but he is not the Controller; and when Sir Spencer Robinson said of certain matters that he referred them to the naval architects, it did not prove that he was a bad Controller, but that the question was not within the particular sphere of his duties. The duty of the Controller is not to make calculations about the building of ships; that is a matter for the naval architect. Nor is it to give directions about engines; that is a question for the engineer. My hon. Friend only did justice to the great public services of Sir Spencer Robinson; but his general argument was that, because he was not a naval architect, he ought not to have been Controller. That was a great mistake. That he was a most efficient Controller is recognized by the country at large; but I understand my hon. Friend to argue that a professional naval architect ought to be Controller. [Mr. SEELY dissented.] My hon. Friend does not deny that the main defect he found in the Controller was that he was ignorant of naval architecture, and that he was not a professed naval architect. If he had formed a proper conception of the duties of the Controller he would see that this part of his case was not well-founded. It was the duty of the Controller to look at the condition of the Navy; to inform himself as to the state of every ship; to decide whether particular ships were worth repair or not; to advise the Board of Admiralty from a naval point of view, and to state whether the designs of the naval architect can be depended on. The naval architect brings you designs of the class of ships you require to be built; but the Controller advises the Admiralty as to the various qualities which the ships ought to possess. He is expected to know something about every point of a ship—the system of masting, of rigging, and an infinite number of details which only a sailor can understand. A ship might be sent to sea that was efficient so far as the naval architect was concerned, but which, but for the supervision of the Controller, would not satisfy the wants of the service. The case of the Admiral Superintendent of Dockyards is analogous to that of the Controller. My hon. Friend asks what man of sense would over wish that the post of a Superintendent of Dockyards should be held by a naval officer? I will tell him: Every man who goes to sea in the ships that are being built in the dockyards. My hon. Friend has quoted the opinions of civilians of eminence and of men of science; but the opinion of the great service which intrusts its lives to these ships ought to be considered. My hon. Friend spoke favourably personally of Admiral Stewart; but expressed his doubts whether he was competent to perform the duties of Controller. What have been the antecedents of Admiral Stewart? He has been flag captain of the North American station, and afterwards flag captain of the Mediterranean station, and as such had under his eye a vast amount of business. It was his duty to become acquainted with every ship. He had the opportunity of seeing the correspondence relating to most of them. That was his first training as a man of business, and as something more than a mere sailor. He was then three years flag captain at Devonport, in which capacity he saw a portion of the working of the dockyard, although he was not responsible for it. Then Captain Stewart was for five years Superintendent of Chatham Dockyard, where he superintended the building of modern ships of the greatest importance. During that period he became fully acquainted with the ins and outs of the dockyard. He was afterwards Admiral Superintendent of Devonport, and subsequently of Portsmouth, Dockyard. The consequence is that the present Controller of the Navy, who is responsible for the shipbuilding and administration of dockyards, has had all the experience necessary for such a post. He has not only been at sea, but has been in and out of every shop in these dockyards, and seen every ship that was in course of being built there. Admiral Stewart knows all the principal employés at the dockyards, and, indeed, I know of no man who knows them so well. My hon. Friend points to things, but Admiral Stewart knows the men, and the government of the men constitutes one of the greatest difficulties of the changes which the hon. Member for Lincoln proposes. I have dwelt upon the experience of Admiral Stewart, because the post of Controller is a most important one, and it would be wrong to place in it any one in whom the Admiralty had not confidence. Looking, however, at his previous experience as a manager of three dockyards and as acquainted with every detail that he has had to superintend, I contend that we could not have found a better man for the post of Controller than Admiral Stewart. I admit, in answer to the hon. Gentleman the Member for Hastings, that shipbuilding is a most important portion of the work done in dockyards; but it is not the only work done there. It does not constitute one-half of the work done in the dockyards—not, perhaps, more than one-third. There are captains coming in and out, ships being put in commission and going out to sea, and the Admiral, Superintendent is the connecting link between the service afloat and ashore. Much of the duty which the Superintendent of a dockyard has to discharge could be ably done by a civilian—possibly, indeed, better than by a naval officer; but there is also a great deal that he could not do so well. A captain, for instance, comes in and makes a demand for a certain number of stores. Or perhaps he points out defects in his ship. If the captain were overruled by a civilian, and went to sea, and if it were found that he had not sufficient stores, an opinion might prevail that the naval view had not been sufficiently considered, and the captain might take such measures as would defeat your civilian Superintendent and cause a conflict between the civilian and naval element which I should greatly deprecate, as disadvantageous to the service. My hon. Friend the Member for Hastings still retains the opinion that the Superintendents of dockyards ought to be civilians. [Mr. BRASSEY dissented.] I thought he said that naval officers were not competent to perform the duties of Dockyard Superintendents. But whom would he select to fill those posts? He said he would not take dockyard officers who have risen from the ranks. But most of our ablest dockyard officers and naval architects have risen from the ranks. What better class of men could my hon. Friend obtain for the purpose, from his point of view? Would he take a shipbuilder who had never been to sea, and who would have to deal with the captains, who would come to him day after day to consult him as to the defects which had occurred to their ships? And, indeed, generally speaking, shipbuilders are not naval architects. It is not every shipbuilder who can himself design a ship. There is a technical side to a dockyard, and there is an administrative side; and it would be an error to say that the man who is the most capable to build a ship is therefore the best administrator to place over large bodies of men. I doubt whether even my hon. Friend would say lie would take for the administration of the dockyards men who are without experience in nautical affairs. At the same time, I admit there is some force in the objections raised to the present tenure of office. It may be right that the officers should retain their posts for a longer period. Indeed, I freely admit that there are many matters connected with the suggestions of my hon. Friend the Member for Hastings which are well worthy of attention; but they do not go to the point of the Motion. I have dwelt upon this point longer than I should otherwise have done, partly because my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr. Seely) made so able a speech that it necessitated a full reply. In conclusion, I wish simply to insist on the point which I have already put before the House more than once. It is that we should endeavour to interest our naval men, as far as possible, in our ad- ministration, rather than separate them from it altogether. Do not exclude them entirely from the administration. Great improvements may possibly be introduced into the dockyards; and I can assure the House that everybody connected with the Admiralty is perfectly alive to the great difficulties we have to encounter in the dockyards, and that they are occupied in devising remedies for existing evils. I do not think, however, that the adoption of the Resolution of my hon. Friend would lead to a satisfactory solution of the question.

MR. SEELY,

in replying, said: In answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Northumberland (Mr. Liddell), who said that the members of the Board of Admiralty are not selected for political considerations, and who gave as an instance the appointment of Admiral Milne, I would only say, that the fact remains unquestionable that the average tenure of a Lordship of the Admiralty during the last 30 or 40 years has been about three years. With regard to the Board being now a Council, I have no objection to a Council, but only to the mode in which the present Board, or Council—call it what you will—is appointed; composed as it is of men without any special fitness for their office, and who are frequently changed—for these facts are undeniable. As to the argument of the First Lord, that because naval officers have to sail their ships and fight them, they must necessarily build them, I would only observe that the Cunard and other great steamship companies manage to get their magnificent fleets of ships built in yards which have no naval officers as their managers. With regard to naval officers generally, I must say I have a very high opinion of them. I admit their bravery, frankness, manliness, and other good qualities; but, at the same time, I do not think their education is at all likely to fit them to manage and superintend large bodies of intelligent artizans. I am not aware that there is any other particular point to which I need advert.

MR. BATES

said, he knew the owners of the Cunard line and all the private shipowners in Liverpool sent their vessels to be fitted out and rigged in yards which were superintended by sailors who did all that was required without reference to the owner or any other party. He must, therefore, endorse the state- ment of the First Lord of the Admiralty that sailors, and sailors alone, ought to superintend the fitting out and rigging of the ships belonging to the Royal Navy.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Original Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 13; Noes 114: Majority 101.