HC Deb 13 February 1872 vol 209 cc319-29
MR. SINCLAIR AYTOUN

, in rising to call attention to the acquisition by the British Government of Territory on the West Coast of Africa from the Kingdom of Holland, and to move— That, in the opinion of this House, no further steps ought to be taken towards the conclusion of a Treaty with the Government of Holland, having for its-object the extension of the British Colonial Territory on the West Coast of Africa, until this House shall have had an opportunity of expressing its opinion on the policy of such Treaty. said, his information upon the subject of the Treaty was derived from a letter which had appeared in The Times a week ago from their correspondent at the Cape. The letter described the effect which had been produced upon the public mind in that country by the conclusion of a Treaty under which, in pursuance of advantages to be secured to Holland in another part of the world, and also of a certain money payment, all the possessions, rights, and obligations of the King of the Netherlands on the "West Coast of Africa were to be ceded to the Government of this country. The population about to be transferred in that manner amounted to 120,000, and it was stated that of these a great number were extremely dissatisfied, and had sent an envoy to Holland to protest against the arrangement, which even in Holland itself had excited considerable indignation. He also objected to the Treaty, and he did so on two grounds. He objected to such an exercise of the Prerogative, without its being first submitted to Parliament; and he further objected to it as one that would be likely to prove injurious to the interests of the country. Treaties were negotiated without any reference to that House. The House was afterwards told that if they disapproved the Treaty they could object to it. Did that afford any appreciable guarantee that that House would be able to prevent such an exercise of the Prerogative as might be injurious to the interests of the country? He maintained that it afforded no guarantee whatever. The House had no means of arresting the action of the Government in these matters. After the Treaty was concluded, all that could be done was to pass a Vote of Censure on the Government, for if the House disapproved of the Treaty, that amounted to a censure on the Government, and the result would be either a change of Ministers or a General Election. That was a state of things which ought not to be allowed to continue. It must strike everyone that there were two powers in the country which could only be rendered compatible with one another by the establishment of a customary constitutional law. The Prerogative of the Crown extended to the making of treaties and imposing on the country obligations and burdens, which, if there was no check on that Prerogative, would render the power of the House of Commons in imposing taxation on the country perfectly illusory. And the right of making treaties apart from the knowledge and interference of Parliament, would, of course, be as absolute in the hands of a Government not having a majority either in the House or the country, as of the strongest Government that ever existed. During the Session of 1866 the Prerogative of the Crown was made use of to grant what was called a "Supplemental Charter" to the Queen's University in Ireland. That was an illustration of the manner in which the Prerogative of the Crown might be used in opposition to the wishes of the House. It was the opinion of those well informed on the point, that if the question of the grant of the Charter had been raised in the early part of 1866, the Government would have been defeated, but at the end of that Session, just about the time they left office, the Government granted this Supplemental Charter. He would just give an instance of a case in which a Treaty was submitted to the consideration of the House, and which he thought afforded a precedent which might be adopted in the case of all other treaties. He referred to the Commercial Treaty of 1860. In the Speech from the Throne at the commencement of that Session, reference was made to negotiations then being carried on for the purpose of concluding a Commercial Treaty. In answer to some Question from the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli), Lord Palmerston said that, when ratified, the Convention would be laid before the House, but he would say then, as to what would be the function of the House of Commons with regard to that Convention, that the arrangements stipulated were made conditional to the assent of both Houses of Parliament. That appeared to him (Mr. Aytoun) to afford a precedent which ought to be strictly followed in the case of every treaty to which this country agreed. It might be said that as this Treaty dealt with customs duties, it was necessary to lay it before Parliament. But in treaties affecting territory, although they did not deal in express terms with questions of Revenue, still they placed that House under the necessity of providing money for the completion of the treaties, and, therefore, he saw no reason why treaties or guarantees should not be laid before Parliament, as well as the Commercial Treaty of 1860. He understood that the sum of £24,000 was to be paid by this country as a part of the consideration for which the Government of Holland ceded their territory to this country. Perhaps some Member of the Government would kindly inform the House where this money was to come from. He had always imagined that no principle was better recognized than this—that the extent of their possessions, especially those in unhealthy and tropical countries, was a source of weakness, and that it was the interest of the country to diminish rather than extend the area of such possessions. The West Coast of Africa was unhealthy, and there was an immense country lying at the back of that colony, which afforded all kinds of facilities for a muddling Government to involve them in little wars. In 1865 a very important Committee sat and took evidence on the subject of their West Indian Colonies, and that Committee—comprising four Members of the late Conservative Government and four Members of the present Liberal Government, three of them being Cabinet Ministers—arrived at the conclusion that, all further extensions of territory, or assumptions of government, or new treaties affecting any protection of Native tribes, would be inexpedient, and that the object of their policy should be to encourage in the Natives the exercise of those qualities which might render it possible for them more and more to transfer to them the duties of government, with a view to their ultimate withdrawal from all those settlements, except, perhaps, Sierra Leone. But, instead of following up that policy of gradual withdrawal, instead of setting their faces against all meddling with the Natives, the Government were actually making a Treaty with the Dutch, by which their territories would be extended, their responsibilities increased, together with the pecuniary burdens on the people of the country. For those reasons, he trusted that the House would accept the Resolution of which he had given Notice, and which he now had the honour to present for their consideration.

MR. OSBORNE

, in seconding the Motion of his hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy (Mr. Aytoun), expressed his regret that it had been necessary to bring it on at an hour (a quarter to 8 o'clock) when the House was necessarily thin. It was not necessary to go into the general question of treaties now, because the hon. Member for Warrington (Mr. Rylands) had given Notice of a Motion on that subject. There were, however, some points appertaining to the Treaty which he hoped the Government would be able satisfactorily to dispose of. It was asserted that the people of the Dutch Settlement of Elmina were favourable to the transfer; but if he was rightly informed, so little did they approve it, that they were preparing to resist the transfer; while the Dutch Government had made application to Her Majesty's Government for two or three ships of war with a force of troops on board to assist in handing over these people of Elmina to us. He hoped that a specific answer would be given to that allegation, not only for the sake of this country, but for the sake of the Gentleman—once occupying a very distinguished position in that House—who had been transferred from the government of the Bahamas to the Governorship of what he could not help thinking would prove the damnosa hæreditas of these Dutch colonies. Everything which could be effected by excellent conduct and wise resolutions would be accomplished, no doubt, by Mr. Pope Hennessy; but for Mr. Hennessy's own sake he (Mr. Osborne) was very sorry that he had been put into that position. The House ought to be distinctly informed how far the people themselves were favourable to the transfer, for, as far as was yet known, the people of Elmina had never been consulted. The Dutch, no doubt, were very anxious to get rid of them, but the people of Elmina seemed to be inclined to "Home Rule"—a principle which was apparently growing into fashion. It would be an awkward thing for the House to accept a Treaty, without receiving some distinct assurance from the Government that the application for ships of war and troops, if made, would not be complied with; and he sincerely trusted that the present system of making treaties, such as it was, would be no longer persevered in,

Motion made, and Question proposed, That, in the opinion of this House, no further steps ought to be taken towards the conclusion of a Treaty with the Government of Holland, having for its object the extension of the British Colonial Territory on the West Coast of Africa, until this House shall have had an opportunity of expressing its opinion on the policy of such Treaty."—(Mr. Sinclair Aytoun.)

MR. R. N. FOWLER

, while observing that their connection with the Coast of Africa, though costly, was one of great honour to the country, expressed an opinion that the Treaty, inasmuch as we had maintained those colonies in order to suppress the slave trade which had been so much condemned, would be productive of great good. England entered on the Coast of West Africa to put an end to the slave trade, and for the advantage of the African race. Difficulties had been met with owing to the prevalence of rival jurisdictions; and it would be much better for the interests and increase of African civilization that there should be only one European power communicating with the Native tribes. The hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Mr. Aytoun) had said much on the subject of Prerogative. That was a wide question, and one into which he (Mr. Fowler) did not intend to follow him. It was one that would be much better debated on the general Motion on the subject which was to be brought forward by the hon. Member for Warrington (Mr. Rylands). The hon. Member for Kirkcaldy also complained of the £24,000 to be paid by us for the acquisition of the territory; but, considering the sacrifices which England had made for the civilization of the African race, if the result of the negotiation should place England in a better position to promote that civilization, he thought she would not begrudge the small sum of £24,000. For his part, he was glad that the Government had entered into the Treaty; and he trusted that the result would be beneficial to the civilization of Africa. We had contracted duties towards the Native population in that quarter of the world, and to retire from our Colonies there would have a most injurious effect upon them.

MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN

said, it would be evident that two questions were involved in the Motion of the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Mr. Aytoun)—the first having reference to the policy of this particular Treaty, and the second to the system pursued by this country with regard to its treaties generally. As to the larger question, as a Notice had been given which could not fail to give rise to very full discussion, it would be most inconvenient, and injurious to the full discussion which was pending, to raise the broad issue now by a sidewind, and therefore it would be beyond his province to enter upon it. In this particular case the usual practice of the country had been strictly adhered to, and the Treaty would be laid upon the Table of the House so that it could be discussed at some future time upon its own merits. As to the policy of that particular Treaty, he had in the interests of the House itself a complaint to make against the hon. Gentleman who had brought the subject forward. He had warned that hon. Gentleman that the Papers on the subject would be delivered to hon. Members shortly, and he had suggested that it would be better to postpone a discussion until the Papers were produced; but the hon. Gentleman had chosen to take a different course, and in consequence he had fallen into one or two errors which he might have escaped from if he had only been a little more patient. The hon. Gentleman had spoken of a dangerous and mischievous interference with the affairs of the natives; but this was not a right or just application of phrases as to our connection with the native tribes on the West Coast of Africa. There was no acquisition of territory involved in the present Treaty at all in the sense understood by the hon. Gentleman. The possessions of Great Britain on the West Coast of Africa consisted of certain forts and settlements, and a voluntary protectorate exercised over a considerable number of native tribes. That protectorate was not very clearly defined. It appeared, from the only written document on the subject, that some native tribes agreed in times past to give up human sacrifice and various other degrading habits, and to allow cases of murder to be tried by British officials; and in return they were to be placed under the moral protection of this country—the object in view being to put a stop to frequent wars, and to promote civilization and Christianity. The original object of our settlement on the Coast was to carry on the slave trade; but that policy was happily reversed, a more enlightened policy took its place, and we held the settlements for the purpose of putting down the slave trade, for the improvement of the condition of the native tribes, and the general development of the country. If Great Britain were now to withdraw, the probability would be that the most disastrous results would ensue—the slave trade would be renewed, and wars and bloodshed would succeed to peace and the spread of civilization. That was the view taken by Sir Arthur Kennedy, the very highest authority upon the subject, who had done so much for Western Africa. The arrangements between the Dutch and ourselves had been these—In 1867, a wise determination was come to, to make an exchange between the Dutch and English settlements, so that the settlements of the two nations could be more consolidated, the Dutch acquiring all the settlements on the west of the River Sweet, and the English on the east as far as the Volta. But while the natives transferred to the British flag came readily into the arrangement, those who were transferred to the Dutch flag did not, and large tribes of natives who had before been content to traffic under the English flag refused to submit to Dutch authority, whence arose considerable misunderstanding, and a state of warfare between the Dutch and the native tribes, on whose part a truce was now in existence only through the moral influence of British officials, and which would undoubtedly be broken if the present negotiations should unhappily fail. The alteration now proposed, however, was likely to have the most benecial result; but there was no intention of forcing our protectorate on any tribe whatever. The Dutch were about to leave the coast, and they would cede to us certain forts—for, in the interests of civilization, and of humanity, and of Christianity, they would rather leave the forts to a great civilized European Power than leave them to be fought for by the various tribes. At the same time, it was our hope that these tribes, hitherto occupied in fighting among themselves, would all come under our flag, which would give a better prospect of peace than having a divided authority, or leaving the unfortunate people to fight it out amongst them. The hon. Gentleman had read one of the Resolutions of the Select Committee of 1865; but he had omitted to read the following which they also agreed to:— The policy of non-extension admits of no exception as regards new settlements, but cannot amount to an absolute prohibition of measures which, in peculiar cases, may be necessary for the more efficient and economic administration of the settlements we already possess. The acquisition of these forts was precisely analogous to the case contemplated by these words, for we required them to make our administration more efficient and complete. The harbour was the only one between Sierra Leone and Fernando Po at which it was possible to coal without re-shipment. By the concentration of our establishments, it was estimated that we should gain £10,000 a-year. The £24,000 was to be paid exclusively for the fixtures and stores in the fort, which we could not expect the Dutch to leave without being paid for them. It was the intention of the Government not to employ any force; rather than do so they would decline to take the place at all. They believed that any dissatisfaction with the transfer, if it ever existed, had been removed, so far as regarded the small tribe of 14,000 or 15,000 living near Elmina, which alone had exhibited any signs of discontent. There were other adjacent small tribes; and beyond all were the Ashantees. Our presence had already moderated strife, and it was necessary to the peaceable government of the country. The propriety of our giving up certain portions of our territory on the "West Coast of Africa had been already discussed, and the feeling of the House was against our abandoning any of our possessions there. The time might come when some of them should be given up; if we looked only at the question of expense, it might have arrived already; but the country did not wish us to leave those settlements until they were fit for self-government, and we should do wrong if we did not avail ourselves of an opportunity to concentrate our possessions. We had created a growing trade; and there were English and Dutch merchants connected with Elmina who were prepared to do more than ever to develop its commerce if it came under the British flag. There was to be no territorial cession except the ground on which the forts stood, and the cession would give us no protectorate over anyone; but it was probable that our presence would exercise a moral influence which would prevent bloodshed and wars, and promote peaceful pursuits. Not a sixpence of the £24,000 to be paid would come from this country; but the transfer would be paid for by the Gold Coast Colony, the resources of which exhibited great development. In 1864, the revenue of the colony was £4,000, and its expenditure £9,400. In 1868, including a Parliamentary grant of £2,392, the revenue was £15,404, and the expenditure £11,651. In 1869, the revenue was £24,127, and the expenditure £18,836. In 1870, the revenue was £30,851, and the expenditure £35,609; but this revenue included a special grant of £11,000 towards paying off the debt. The estimated revenue of the present year, without a Parliamentary grant, which had ceased entirely, was £27,000; the expenditure was estimated at £16,845; and the balance in the chest on the 31st of March was £12,421. While, then, this was the pecuniary aspect of the question, it must be borne in mind that Great Britain had contracted moral obligations towards the people of the West Coast of Africa, from which, he believed, public opinion in this country did not wish her to recede. She had put down the slave trade and the inhuman practice of sacrificing human life; she had extended civilization and Christianity amongst the native tribes, and her good hand ought not now to be stopped in this great work. He thought he had shown that the Motion of the hon. Gentleman was one which it would not be advisable to press.

MR. RYLANDS

suggested that, after the statement they had just received from the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the Colonies, the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Mr. Aytoun) should withdraw his Motion. He should regard any such arrangement as that made in this case with great jealousy; but, at the same time, he believed that when the Papers were before the House good reason would be found in them for the interference of Her Majesty's Government.

SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE

said, he most decidedly objected not to their acquiring, but to their abandoning territory; and wished to know what were the Treaty rights which they were to surrender in Sumatra in exchange for the advantages which they were to gain on the coast of Africa? Some years ago they had a settlement called Bencoolen, on the West Coast of Sumatra, one of the most magnificent islands in the world, though cannibalism prevailed in the interior, and afterwards that was given up to the Dutch; but still they retained certain rights with regard to the trade of Sumatra, and he wished to know what rights in Sumatra they were now going to relinquish? He also wished to suggest, if they wore going to follow up the practice of extirpating the African slave trade, whether it would not be as well for them to increase their possessions on the East as well as on the West Coast of Africa, by making a lodgment at Zanzibar, which was far more healthy than the place under notice, and thus strike at the very root of that degrading traffic?

MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN

replied that the only right possessed by this country was to protest against the Dutch acquiring any more territory in Sumatra. They had, however, acquired more territory, and England had done nothing more than to protest. She had now abandoned her right to protest, leaving the Dutch to acquire territory without any hindrance; and we had gained in return this advantage—that with regard to all territory acquired, and to be acquired, English traders were to be placed on the same footing as the Dutch.

MR. SINCLAIR AYTOUN

said, he would accede to the suggestion made by the hon. Member for Warrington (Mr. Rylands).

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.