HC Deb 12 April 1872 vol 210 cc1151-83
SIR WILFRID LAWSON

, in rising to move— That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to take the needful steps for withdrawing from all Treaties binding this Country to intervene by force of arms in the affairs of other nations, said, that in introducing the Resolution he could not do better than read a passage from the great speech of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) at Manchester. In that speech, the right hon. Gentleman said— Your relations with other countries are the most important part of politics. There is nothing which so much influences the amount of taxation, and nothing which so much influences the enjoyment or the embarrassment of your industry. He (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) concurred in that statement, and he believed non-intervention in the affairs of other nations was rapidly being recognized as the rule of our political life. Last Session the House spent a large portion of its time in arranging for the reorganization of the Army, and this year we were still proceeding with the same business. We knew that we had a larger force than had ever been previously kept up in time of peace. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that we maintained it to defend ourselves; but neither the right hon. Gentleman nor his Colleagues had told us whom it was we were defending ourselves against, and there was therefore room for suspicion that these large armaments were kept up for some other purpose. He was induced to] think so, from what the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government had said last year, which was to the effect that our duties "extend somewhat beyond the limits of our own territories," and— That we were not prepared, absolutely and irrespective of circumstances that might arise, to withdraw from a position in which we might be called upon to perform duties over and above what pertain to the immediate safety of the country. A little before that the right hon. Gentleman spoke of the Army as a force liable to be called upon not only to defend our shores, but for any great European purpose. At a later period the noble Lord the Chief Secretary for Ireland spoke of the Army not only as a defensive force to insure us against invasion, but—and here he differed from the Chancellor of the Exchequer—as "a standing Army, well organized, capable of striking a blow in any part of the world." It must be owing to the existence of the treaties he would allude to, that our statesmen spoke in this manner of our armaments. It must be through infraction of those treaties that the circumstances the right hon. Gentleman alluded to could arise which would call for action on the part of our troops. Therefore, if those treaties were of no use, and if we might honouraly get rid of them, he would say let us do so. Although it was all very well to spend our time in organizing the Army, it was still better and more profitable in his (Sir Wilfrid Lawson's) opinion, to spend our time in endeavouring to remove the causes of possible quarrels; and he wished to ask whether the benefit arising from these treaty engagements was worth the risk to which they exposed us; and whether it was advisable that the national credit should be lent to the undertakings to which he was about to refer? Last year the hon. Member for Merthyr moved for a Return showing all the engagements to which we were liable, and he was glad to find there were no more than 15 of them. He would state shortly the substance of these treaties, and he should leave it to the Ministry to state what was the advantage to us of adhering to them. First came three treaties, made respectively with Honduras, the United States, and Nicaragua, which had reference to the protection of railways and canals. These Treaties he should only name, as they did not appear to him to be of such serious importance as the others. Then came the joint guarantee of England, Prance, and Russia, for maintaining the independence and monarchical constitution of Greece, and he wished to know why the people of this country were to maintain armaments for that purpose? Then the Five Powers guaranteed the neutrality of Switzerland, who, he should think, was well able to take care of herself. With reference to Portugal, there were an immense number of treaties, going as far back as 1373, but that which appeared to be binding was made in 1815; but what had the people of this country to do with protecting Portugal against France and Spain? England, France, Sweden, and Norway, in order to maintain "the balance of power"—which ought to have been exploded by this time—had come to an understanding to secure the independence and liberty of the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway against the aggression of Russia. Surely, that was not a work which we were called upon to undertake. Of the Luxembourg Treaty it had been stated both by the late and the present Earl of Derby that it was not a separate, but a collective, guarantee; which, of course, rendered it comparatively a harmless instrument, so far as involving us in war was concerned. He now came to a more intricate treaty, by which Austria, Prussia, England, and France entered into a guarantee to secure certain parts of Saxony to Prussia; and he should not have thought it worth while to dwell upon that, if it had not been for a speech made by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) about the time the late war broke out. The right hon. Gentleman said these treaties were engagements to guarantee—and "probably the most solemn guarantee England ever gave, certainly in modern times"—not neutrality—but territory. Again, there was the treaty with Turkey, by which each of the contracting Powers pledged themselves to consider any breach of the treaty by the parties thereto as a casus belli. It was the Belgian Treaty, however, to which he desired chiefly to address his remarks. Under the Belgian Treaty, entered into at the end of the year 1870, an agreement was made between this country and France, and between this country and Prussia, to co-operate in order to preserve the neutrality of Belgium. He understood that that treaty was now dead and buried, as it was provided that it should only remain in force for one year after the termination of the war between France and Germany. It was necessary, therefore, to revert to the old Treaty of 1839, by which the Five Great Powers guaranteed the neutrality and independence of Belgium. Of this very Treaty the Prime Minister had said that— Under it we should have had to act, without any stipulated assurance of being supported from any quarter whatever, against any combination, however formidable. It appeared to him to be a most unsatisfactory state of things that we should be bound to maintain by force of arms the independence of Belgium. A proof that the Treaty of 1839 was unsatisfactory was afforded by the fact that when in 1870 we became alarmed at what might happen in Belgium his right hon. Friend and his Colleagues did not think fit to trust to it, but made a new treaty, which was to remain in force during the war and for a twelvemonth afterwards. In the autumn of 1870 the excitement in that House was very great. It was thought we should be dragged into the war in consequence of Belgium being interfered with; and, accordingly, the Government easily obtained an additional Vote of £2,000,000 and 20,000 men. In spite of the treaty, however, he did not believe his right hon. Friend and his Colleagues would have taken upon themselves the responsibility of dragging this country into war, although, no doubt, they felt themselves justified in asking for this additional money and these additional men, and thus commencing a suicidal policy of extravagance. There was, he thought, ample evidence to show that there existed among the Belgians a great sympathy with France. His right hon. Friend had said that if France were to attack Belgium it would he the direst crime that ever stained the page of history. That was a very strong remark, considering what we had seen in Poland, Savoy, and Denmark. It seemed to him (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), however, that a crime still more dire would be committed if the Ministry of this country were to shed the blood of Englishmen in an insane attempt to protect Belgium against France, or any other Power. Not only that, but to show how these treaty obligations were observed on the other side, he would remark that in the treaty Antwerp was to be kept as a port of commerce only; but there had been a naval arsenal there for years past, so that Belgium herself had failed to carry out its stipulations. His hon. Friend the Member for Waterford (Mr. Osborne), in the course of the debate in 1870, summed up the popular opinion in a single sentence, when he said that were Belgium in the hands of a hostile Power the liberty and possessions of this country would not be worth 24 hours' purchase. All this fear about Belgium arose in consequence of the saying of the Great Napoleon, that Antwerp in the hands of France would be a pistol presented at the head of England. There was in reality no cause for alarm, for nobody could suppose that the addition of 4,000,000 to the population of France—already 40,000,000—and of 40 miles to her extent of coast—already extending to nearly 1,000 miles—could cause any additional danger to this country. Charity began at home, and it was no part of our duty to enter upon such Quixotic enterprises, for it was impossible to protect Belgium in the way that had been suggested. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had found out that our Army was only a defensive one, and if that were the case it could not be sufficient to protect the independence of Belgium from any attack. We were, therefore, not in a condition to fulfil these treaties. Moreover, our armed interference in Continental politics had never done any good. Remember our course during the Great War at the beginning of this century. We fought against Napoleon and his dynasty; but ultimately one of his descendants became our most faithful ally. Then, again, in the Russian War, what a large amount of blood and treasure were expended! Yet the other day, as the Leader of the Opposition said, we had "destroyed all the results to secure which the blood of England had been forfeited—for which 500,000 men had perished." We ought not to bind ourselves down by treaties, but cultivate friendship with all nations without entering into partnership with any. He would now say a few words to the objections which might be urged against his Motion by the Government. There were probably some hon. Gentlemen in the House who would boldly affirm that treaties were eternal. If that were so, there would be an end to this proposal; but he failed to see why treaties should possess the attribute of eternity to any greater extent than belonged to any other of the works of man. Commercial treaties were made for a term of years, and he thought the same rule might very properly apply to treaties generally. A strong case in favour of the view he took was the alteration made so recently as last autumn in the treaty affecting the Black Sea question. The Note sent by Prince Gortchakoff was, no doubt, a sort of threatening letter; but Her Majesty's Government nobly, honourably, and with a high degree of moral courage agreed to a Conference, at which many of the stipulations of the treaty were set aside, and the whole matter was amicably settled. He proposed nothing more serious than was done on that occasion, and to carry out his proposal would not involve this country in anything either improper or dishonourable. His Motion simply asked them to take such steps as might be necessary and desirable for withdrawing from all treaties binding this country to intervene by force of arms in the affairs of other nations. If this could not he done without dishonour, then let it not be done. At the present time, England was at peace with the world, and therefore the occasion was opportune for her to put her house in order, instead of waiting until possibly a war might break out and render the task difficult, if not impossible. He did not wish to dogmatize, and point out to the Government the course they should take; but simply to express his opinion that it was quite possible for them to carry out his proposal, if they only sought a way of doing so. He should be told, in all probability, that his Resolution belonged to the "abstract" class; but he contended that it was not entirely so, inasmuch as he moved for an Address. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had recently defended the expenditure of the Government by saying that it was forced upon him by Parliament. Why, then, should not a Resolution involving a retrenchment of expenditure also be forced upon the Government by the House of Commons in a similar way? He did not wish to point out the way in which these negotiations should be commenced; but he believed the Government could devise the means if they had the will to do so. It was dangerous that these treaties should be left like a red flag, to induce a Minister with war like tendencies to involve the country in a war by urging upon the House that the honour of England was wrapped up in her treaty obligations. If these obligations were not intended to be acted upon, they were discreditable, mischievous, and absurd. If, on the other hand, they were intended to be acted upon, they were calculated to lead the country into all manner of rash, dangerous, reckless enterprises, involving possible ruin to England and to other nations of the world. The hon. Member concluded by moving the Resolution of which he had given Notice.

MR. RYLANDS

, in seconding the Motion, said, that the terms of the Resolution called upon the Government to reverse the traditional policy of the Foreign Office. But he thought the House had a right to take that course when they remembered what that policy had been since the commencement of the present century. It had, in fact, been full of miscalculations and mistakes, and had frequently involved the country in difficulties and dangers. The most distinguished instance of the policy of the Foreign Office was the Treaty of Vienna, which was considered at the time of its ratification a great diplomatic triumph. It was, in fact, a congeries of treaties of guarantee, and no doubt the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers seated round the Conference Table, after they had, with great difficulty and great deliberation, parcelled out the territories of Europe, and settled the claims of contending Sovereigns without reference to the interests or wishes of their people; and when at the close of their labours they invoked the solemn sanction of the "Name of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity," calculated that the treaty would be a work of long duration, and would promote the stability of Europe. But in the short space of 15 years it began to crumble to pieces, and had since been infringed by every State that was a party to it, until, eventually, it sank to the lowest point of degradation, when Louis Napoleon ascended the throne of France, from which the Bonaparte Family, by the terms of the treaty, were for ever excluded. All this furnished a strong reason in favour of the Motion of his hon. Friend, and it bore out in a remarkable manner the observation made by George Washington, 100 years ago, when he said— Whatever may be the Conventions entered into, my experience teaches me that nations and Governments rarely abide by Treaties or Conventions longer than it is their interest to do so. So it was with the Treaty of Vienna—Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France all violated its provisions as soon as it was to their interest to do so. It was urged that England had not been a party to violating treaties, but had honourably maintained her engagements. He did not deny that such was the fact; but that was only another reason for withdrawing from mutual obligations and engagements with other Powers, because it must necessarily place us in a false position if we undertook obligations which we were determined to carry out, whilst the other Powers were only disposed to carry them out so long as it was their interest to do so. When Prince Gortchakoff wrote his Note in 1870, respecting the Treaty of Paris, there was great excitement, and people cried out that a great blow had been dealt to treaties; but they seemed to forget that since 1815 there had been a constant succession of blows to treaties. In the midst of that excitement there was a passage in the money article of The Times which he would read to the House. It said— The Russian Note has caused a hope to be entertained in the City that the warning thus given will cause England for the future to have as little as possible to do with treaties or guarantees. Her position in such affairs is compared with that of an established merchant, who might in good faith enter into a transaction in joint account with a number of partners, everyone of whom would simply intend to take any benefit that might accrue, and in the event of loss, to break off from their liability and throw upon his shoulders the whole responsibility. It seemed odd that the shrewd people in the City, who were generally alive to their own interests, did not find that out long ago. He believed it would have been found out, and that treaties of guarantee would have been strongly condemned by public opinion many years since, but for the influence of one great statesman over the foreign policy of the country. Of course, he alluded to Lord Palmerston, and it was impossible to overrate his influence. From the time when Lord Palmerston became Foreign Secretary in 1830, up to the period of his death, he controlled the foreign policy of this country, with the exception only of a few years, during which Sir Robert Peel—whose policy was the antipodes of Lord Palmerston—was at the head of the Government. Whatever position he nominally occupied in the Cabinet, he pulled the strings of the Foreign Office. As Foreign Secretary in Lord Russell's Administration he refused to be controlled by his Chief; and when in consequence he had to retire from his office, he soon took an opportunity of breaking up the Government. Shortly afterwards when the positions were reversed, and Lord Russell was Foreign Secretary under Lord Palmerston, the noble Lord had made the curious confession that in important matters he allowed his Chief to write his despatches, and all he did was to affix his signature to them. That showed that Lord Palmerston had always a definite policy, and it was that policy which was struck at by the present Resolution. The late Mr. Cobden once calculated that Lord Palmerston had cost this country at least £100,000,000; and he said that taking his value as a statesman at the highest estimate, he thought he was dear at the money. He (Mr. Rylands) believed that Lord Palmerston's policy had involved this country in even a larger expenditure. Why, they were even now paying large sums because of the policy which Lord Palmerston steadfastly adhered to, and last year we expended still more for guns for the fortifications which some Members of the present Government, he believed, regarded as useless, but which they, nevertheless, continued to carry on. The policy of Lord Palmerston lay at the root of our treaty guarantees. It was a policy in support of what was called "the balance of power," by bolstering up small and weak States, and preventing their being absorbed by large and stronger ones. If men chose to believe that the swallowing up of small States and the increase of large ones was a disadvantage to this country he could understand their adopting such a policy, but everyone had seen that that policy had been utterly impracticable. It was not possible to put a strait-jacket upon Europe, as Lord Palmerston attempted to do, and to keep the European nations within the limits which they formerly occupied. It was an attempt to check the development of national elements of progress; and whilst this continual interference with the affairs of Continental States was, no doubt, believed by Lord Palmerston to be conducive to the interest of this country, he could not help feeling that, like most other selfish policies, it was a short-sighted one, and that so far from promoting the interests of England it had a contrary effect. He dwelt upon these considerations because the grounds of the present Motion entirely turned upon them. If Lord Palmerston's policy was right, then so far from withdrawing from existing treaty guarantees, they ought to extend them. But he maintained that the policy was a mischievous one. He would remind the House that on the other side of the Channel they had in M. Thiers the counterpart of Lord Palmerston's policy. The independence of Italy and the consolidation of the German Empire had been just as distasteful to M. Thiers as they would have been to Lord Palmerston, and the present degradation, distress, and suffering of France were due to the ambition, intermeddling interference, and national jealousy which were the natural results of that policy. And yet M. Thiers said the other day, amid the ruins of Paris, and while France was still suffering from internal disorders and weakness—"that France must become once more what she had a right to be in the interests"—not of the French people, but—"of all States." They could see the folly of all that on the part of Prance, and could trace the ruin and destruction that had followed her insane ambition to be the arbitress of Europe. But Lord Palmerston's policy was equally foolish, and equally dangerous. Indeed, it was only by accident—or, perhaps, he ought rather to say—by the good Providence of God, that Lord Palmerston's policy had not led this country into similar disasters to those which had fallen upon France. In 1852, Lord Palmerston negotiated a Treaty with Denmark, on the subject of the Schleswig-Holstein question, and pledged the people of this country to engagements in relation to a matter in which they had no possible interest. He ventured to say that at the time the treaty was negotiated, not one man in a thousand had the slightest idea of what was going on. In 1864, when the emergency contemplated by the treaty arose, we were bound to take action upon it. And what action did we take? We sent remonstrances to Prussia and Austria, and had a large amount of diplomatic interference and correspondence. Lord Palmerston stated in that House that if Prussia and Austria attacked Pen-mark, they would find that Denmark did not stand alone. Against the contemplated interference, meetings were held in Manchester and elsewhere; but Lord Palmerston was not the man to be influenced in that way, and probably asked what cotton lords and shopkeepers could be expected to know about foreign affairs. Mr. Cobden believed that the expression of public opinion had prevented intervention, but that was not the case, as at the very time Lord Russell had sent a despatch—probably one of those written by Lord Palmerston—to our Ambassador at Paris, Lord Cowley, to ascertain whether the Emperor of the French would join us in an offensive war, if necessary, to protect Denmark. It was the refusal of the Emperor to listen to that application, and not public opinion in England, that prevented our being dragged into a Continental war. It was most fortunate for this country that the Emperor refused to listen to Lord Palmerston's proposed intervention. Had he taken the other course, and there had been war, we could read now by the light of recent events what would have happened. If the military force of France had been crumpled up by the power of Prussia alone, it would have been crushed even more effectually by the combined forces of Prussia and Austria; and whatever we might have done with our Navy, the only result would have been enormous losses and degradation to England, ending in a humiliating peace. Lord Palmerston used to justify his policy by a very dan- gerous axiom. He said that "England is strong enough to brave consequences," and so we ought to be if we were to enter into such guarantees as we had done in times past; but it was because he (Mr. Rylands) believed that we were not strong enough to brave the consequences that he contended that it was our duty to avoid them in future. Lord Salisbury had last year, in "another place," made a speech full of wisdom and caution, in which he had pointed to the lessons taught by the late war. He said that the course of the future would be marked by the absorption of small States into large Empires; that small Powers would have hard work to live at all; and that the guarantees we had given would be no sinecure. "The territories," he remarked, "we have guaranteed, are of all others the very territories that are likely to be attacked." Lord Salisbury then pointed out that Germany possessed 1,000,000 soldiers, Austria another 1,000,000, and Russia 1,500,000, and asked how it was possible for us to support our obligations with 100,000 men. The alternative was thus forced upon us to consider whether we should withdraw from these treaties of guarantee, or maintain a force equal to supporting them, which was, in fact, absolutely impossible. But he contended that if England were powerful enough to enforce these guarantees, she had no interest in maintaining them. Experience had proved that the existence of petty States was a source of danger to the peace of Europe. The consolidation of Germany had been a positive advantage to this country already. A few years ago the small German States were centres of intrigue. France spread her net of diplomacy over Germany, and in all these small capitals crowds of diplomatists of high standing were stationed to promote the objects of the Emperor. Their high salaries made our own diplomatists' mouths water; and in the course of the inquiries of the Diplomatic Committee, upon which he was serving, this state of things was urged by the Foreign Office as an example to be followed by this country, and as a justification of a high scale of expenditure. Now, however, all this had come to an end, and there could be no doubt that the consolidation of a Conservative Power such as Germany, would tend to render the peace of Europe more secure. But to justify the continuance of this policy of guaranteeing small States, and of attempting to control the Great Powers of Europe, we ought not only to be strong enough to brave consequences, but we ought to have at the Foreign Office a faculty almost amounting to the power of prophecy. Lord Palmerston evidently had an impression that he was more gifted than others in that respect, for in a letter addressed by him to Lord Granville, when Minister at Paris, he complained of the difficulty he experienced in getting the Cabinet to act with as much vigour as he wished in some foreign intervention; and said— There are very few public men in England who follow up foreign affairs sufficiently to foresee the consequences of events which have not happened. That was a kind of prescience the Foreign Office usually arrogated to itself; but considering the number of mistakes it made, there was considerable doubt as to whether any such power could be claimed for it, and certainly experience had shown that the policy which grew out of the fancied possession of the gift of prophecy was a policy of difficulty and danger. He therefore called upon the Government to withdraw from obligations which could not be fulfilled, and which were often detrimental to the interests of this country. He wished to limit our obligations to our own frontiers, and to the defence of our own people. The House would remember that striking passage in The Edinburgh Quarterly Review, which had frequently been referred to, but which he would quote once more— Happy England! Happy, with a special reference to the present subject, in this—that the wise dispensation of Providence has cut her off, by that streak of silver sea which passengers often and so justly execrate, though in no way from the duties and the honours, yet partly from the dangers—absolutely from the temptations—which attend upon the local neighbourhood of the Continental nations. We might well rejoice over our possession of the English Channel as our first line of defence, and, certainly, if the Government were to content itself with looking after our own frontiers we should be in a position of enormous strength. It was generally acknowledged to be almost impossible, with the sea for a base of operations, to land upon these shores an Army sufficient to subjugate the country; but if by a stroke of the pen, as the noble Lord (Lord Elcho) had said, England was to make the frontiers of Belgium her frontiers, our circumstances would be entirely changed, and the Channel would be a source of embarrassment and danger to us rather than a protection. The Prime Minister when at the Mansion House recently had commented upon the security of our geographical position, and had advocated the wise course of inspiring the people of the world with a belief that our policy was not governed by base or narrow motives. He said he rejoiced that it was most unlikely, except by our own fault, that we should ever be called upon or tempted to take part in any future struggle, so happily were we exempted from foreign jealousy. But in order to carry out that high and noble policy, as sketched by the Prime Minister, we must free ourselves from entangling alliances. It was with that view that they asked the Government to take the needful steps for withdrawing from treaties of guarantee. They proposed that that should be accomplished by negotiation with other European Powers. It might be difficult to withdraw immediately from all such treaties, and he agreed with his hon. Friend (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) that we should not do anything which would bring dishonour on the country. But there could be no difficulty in the way of withdrawing from the obligations under which we rested by virtue of the shreds of the Treaty of Vienna—a treaty which had been broken by every contracting Power except ourselves. In the remarkable debate in that House in 1850, upon the conduct of Lord Palmerston towards Greece, he was defended by Lord Russell, who said— I can answer for my noble Friend that he will act not as Minister of Austria, or as the Minister of Russia, or of France—or of any other country—but as the Minister of England."—[3 Hansard, cxii. 106.] That was said in defence of a bullying foreign policy in the supposed interest of England by thwarting the objects, and by attempts to lower the influence of the Great Powers of Europe. But there was a far higher sense in which a statesman might earn the proud title of Minister of England. It was the duty of the Minister of England to give the first consideration to the welfare, the happiness, and prosperity of the 30,000,000 of his fellow-countrymen, and not to imperil their happiness by supporting some fancied national interests of 4,000,000 of Belgians, or by the maintenance of a Government such as that of Greece, which was a disgrace to the civilization of the 19th century. Such a policy might be called a selfish policy, and a policy of isolation; but in pursuing it he believed the Minister of England would not only be a benefactor to his own countrymen, but would promote the happiness and progress of mankind.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to take the needful steps for withdrawing from all Treaties binding this Country to intervene by force of arms in the affairs of other nations,"—(Sir Wilfrid Lawson,) —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. SINCLAIR AYTOUN

said, he could not support the Motion, for, although he was as much opposed as anyone to needless intervention, the Motion of his hon. Friend seemed dictated by a policy of peace at any price. ["No, no!"] At any rate, the Resolution, if carried, would, it appeared to him, convey the impression that we were not prepared to take up arms in support of the Treaty, even when our interests demanded that we should do so. But whether that was so or not, he objected to the Resolution because it implied that this country was bound by the provisions of a treaty which could only be carried into effect by the taxation of the people; because if the hon. Mover were of opinion that the power of refusing to carry out treaty obligations rested with that House, he must admit his Resolution could not be productive of much good. His own opinion was that, in order to avoid foreign complications, it was only necessary that that House should exercise the power with which it had been invested by the Constitution. He recollected that the present Lord Derby, when Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in 1867, said, in reply to a Question which he had put to him as to whether this country was bound to interfere by force of arms in the event of any attack being made on Luxemburg, that— The House of Commons could, at its discretion, grant or refuse supplies for the purposes of a war, so that it was in the last resort sole judge of whether war should be made or not. Such words, coming from a statesman of great weight, were, he thought, of the utmost importance; and if that view were correct, the Resolution of the hon. Member for Carlisle was not only unnecessary but it would suggest a recognition on the part of the House of the principle that they were bound, whether they liked it or not, to carry out the provisions of a treaty requiring the expenditure of public money. [Sir WILFRID LAWSON: Bound in honour.] He would touch upon the question of honour presently; but, meanwhile, he desired to read an Amendment of which he had given Notice, and which he intended to move in the event of the proposition of the hon. Member for Carlisle becoming a substantive Motion. The Amendment proposed to omit from the Resolution all the words after "that," and to insert— As according to the acknowledged principles of the British Constitution, the people of this Country cannot be taxed by any exercise of the Royal Prerogative, or in any other manner than by the votes of their Representatives in Parliament, this House is of opinion that in all Treaties to which Parliament has not given its formal assent, the nation is under no obligation to carry out such Treaties if, by so doing, money is required for making war, increasing our armaments, or for any other purpose. Prerogative was the remains of the despotic power once possessed by the Sovereigns of this country; and at the Revolution of 1688 taxation by Prerogative was declared in the Bill of Rights to be illegal. Much of the Royal Prerogative had fallen into disuse; but what remained was so large and so important, that by common consent it was held that it could only be exercised by the advice of the Ministers; and self-government could not exist side by side with Prerogative if the latter were not, as a matter of rule, exercised through the responsible Ministers of the Crown. There was an opinion that the House had nothing to do with treaties while they were being negotiated; but if Parliament was not allowed to exercise control over such negotiations, and they resulted in treaties necessitating an outlay of public money, it was clear that taxation by Prerogative would take place. It was absurd to suppose that such an interpretation of the power of Prerogative with regard to treaties could be correct. The Ministers, in exercising the Prerogative of the Crown, were only to make use of the power belonging to the Prerogative. No one disputed the right of the Crown to make treaties; but he denied its right to tax the people of this country, and he asserted that a treaty requiring expenditure of public money could have no force until it had received the assent of the people through its Representatives in Parliament. Why, in the case of the Treaty with Holland for the surrender of certain Dutch possessions, the Secretary for the Colonies had stated that the treaty could not be laid on the Table until it was ratified, and that the only function of the House was to criticize the conduct of the Government after the treaty had been concluded. The hon. Member for Carlisle seemed to think that we should be bound in honour to carry out such a treaty, when ratified; but foreign diplomatists must know that the Government of this country could not give any pledge as to the action this country would take at some future time, if that should involve a violation of our constitutional principles. Whatever might be done by future Governments, the House of Commons ought to jealously scrutinize the course taken by the present Government with regard to the exercise of the Royal Prerogative. They were told that these questions of Prerogative were only of theoretical interest, and that no Government would do anything not in accordance with the opinion of the country; but the House could not have forgotten the manner in which the Prerogative was exercised in the Session of 1866 as to the Charter of the Queen's University. The right hon. Member for Tamworth(Sir Robert Peel) and the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, having heard of an intention on the part of the Government to grant a supplementary Charter to the Queen's University, put Questions to the Government with the view of obtaining a pledge that the Prerogative should not be exercised until the opinion of the House of Commons upon the project had been expressed. But towards the end of the Session, and just at the time when the Government left office, that Charter was granted; and more than astonishment was expressed by the two right hon. Gentlemen he had mentioned. In 1864, too, an extraordinary speech was made by the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the present Government, who told the House that in 1815 a treaty was concluded at Vienna by which this country gave up a sum of money due to us from Portugal, and expressed the opinion that the mere power of Prerogative was sufficient to cover the Government in making such a remission. As the exercise of the Prerogative was highly important, and as the circumstances he had referred to had shown that they must not trust to public opinion for restraining any Government from availing themselves of the advantages to be derived from its use, he hoped to have an opportunity of taking the sense of the House on his Amendment; but he regarded the Resolution of the hon. Member for Carlisle as being entirely uncalled for, as the House possessed in the fullest manner the power of protecting the interests of the taxpayers; and, therefore, if a division were taken, he should vote against the Resolution.

MR. W. C. CARTWRIGHT

said,* that after listening to the speeches of the hon. Mover and Seconder of the Resolution, he saw no reason for altering his indisposition to support the Motion, to which he objected on the ground that it was an abstract Resolution, and that it was incorrect and misleading in its wording. Now, to frame in an abstract Resolution an Instruction which was to be made to guide under all circumstances the policy of this country, must necessarily be a most abortive attempt. The hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle said that a string of treaties had been made at divers times, which either had brought, or might bring, this country into political combinations, involving responsibilities; and, as he disliked these, he wished at once, and for all time, to proscribe similar treaties. This manner of proceeding on his part resembled that of some one who, having filled his mind with the conviction that it was owing to the flank-march our Army failed to enter Sebastopol at once, should move that it be made the fixed rule for the British Army never to perform flank-marches again. The exigencies and requirements of policy were just as impossible to reduce to hard rules as those of strategy, and therefore a Resolution of the kind now proposed was quite beside the purpose for practical ends. But besides, its terms were misleading, for they implied the existence of stringent obligations on a scale and in a degree which were imaginary. He could not help thinking that the two hon. Gentlemen who moved and seconded the Motion could never have studied the treaties they spoke about as all involving such positive guarantees on England. For the most part the treaties in question were merely deeds of diplomatic registration, by which political facts that had arisen became recognized and received that sanction from the representatives of established Government which secured the said facts from challenge, and so protected them against violence. So these treaties, which were inveighed against as instruments of a mischievous policy in the main, had contributed to afford stability to facts and to prevent war. But really it was quite impossible to lump all the treaties descanted upon together. Each case had to be taken singly, and treated on its own merits. It was absurd to bring within one sweeping Resolution treaties dating from the 14th century that could have only an antiquarian interest with treaties concluded a few years ago. The real pith of the Motion was to obtain the authority of this House for two stock terms in modern political phraseology—to obtain a sentence of condemnation against the bugbear called "balance of power," and the affirmation of what was called the "doctrine of non-intervention." Now, really it was as well that they should look this bogie of the balance of power in the face, and see what it actually consisted of. The balance of power in diplomacy was really nothing more nor less than the balance in the internal arrangements of States. It was that distribution of forces which naturally was commanded by the centre of gravity. Taken in that sense, the balance of power meant nothing more than the development of national elements of progress—free trade given to organize forces. It insisted on elbow-room being given to what was growing up naturally. No doubt the theory of the balance of power had often, and for a long while, been seriously misconstrued. It had been made to serve the assertion of personal ambition and the prosecution of dynastic interests; but, because it had been misapprehended and perverted, the thing in itself had not ceased to exist, and could not cease to exist, for it really was a natural force. But the hon. Baronet, he maintained, in discussing the treaties he impugned, had shown, in his opinion, a singular inability to gather their respective bearings. He had began by eliminating, as of no serious consequence, the treaties with the United States and Central America in reference to guarantees for a neutral passage across the Isthmus. He really was amazed that supposed study of the Blue Book had led the hon. Baronet to such a conclusion; for if these were treaties of guarantee the country had entered into, which might become pregnant with consequences, it was precisely those very treaties which the hon. Baronet dismissed as quite unimportant. But then he went to Belgium, and dwelt greatly on the great obligations contracted in regard to it. Now, so much had been said, and so much had been spoken, wildly, about this Belgian guarantee, that it was as well to define its nature. It was comprised in the 7th Article of the Treaty between Belgium and Holland, defining the territorial limits within which Belgium should form an independent and neutral State, and should be bound to act neutrally towards all other States. The three lines giving these demarcations were substantially inserted in the Quintuple Treaty subsequently made by the Five Powers. To those three lines the whole guarantee was restricted, and not one letter beyond. Now, what did that really amount to more than that, by this diplomatic act, the existence of Belgium was recognized by the bodies constituting the Powers of Europe, and that its existence in peace was secured by this pacific instrument? Now, the hon. Baronet had inveighed against this treaty as a piece of that mischievous and ambitious policy which had led to wars and prosecuted fanciful purposes. But what was the first political fact which effectively broke in upon the political traditions which ruled the world under the order of artificial ideas con-firmed by the Congress of Vienna? Why, the successful assertion of Belgian independence—and the treaty denounced by the hon. Baronet was the first diplomatic instrument that breached the old diplomatic system of repression and coercion. It stayed the hand of war, and prevented intervention; so that the hon. Baronet—the would-be apostle of nonintervention—was denouncing the very instrument which first secured the sound assertion of that principle. But, then, a charge was made against the Government on account of the treaty which it entered into at the opening of the German War. Well, he would only ask his hon. Friend, whether he would dispute that both that treaty and the one entered into about Luxemburg had proved a most effective instrument for limiting the area of war? Was that not doing good work in behalf of peace? He would not go through the whole bead-roll of treaties; but something had been said about the extraordinary guarantee given to Prussia with regard to Saxony, which deserved a passing word. If ever there was a guarantee—given in a passing moment of grave exigency to meet a particular and temporary contingency—which was obsolete, surely it was this one; and he was perfectly at a loss to understand how, on a former occasion, the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire should have attached such importance to what was merely an historical incident of by-gone times. Well, then, there was the doctrine of non-intervention, on which it was necessary to fall back upon, and of which so much was spoken. Now, it was well to make to oneself a clear idea of what that doctrine actually meant. The name of Mr. Cobden was freely quoted as the great defender of that doctrine. He was, indeed, a powerful advocate of it; and he gave a curious definition of what he understood it to mean. Mr. Cobden, who knew well the meaning of words, and neither spoke nor wrote lightly, in one of his most elaborate writings, The Three Panics, defined "non-intervention" as a protest, not against ever doing anything, but against our Government interfering on the wrong side. That was a very different thing from the doctrine as propounded currently by many who considered themselves Mr. Cobden's disciples. A policy carried out according to their reading of Mr. Cobden's teaching, would lead to our rolling ourselves up in hedgehog-like fashion within the four corners of our strict insular limits. Now, no State could permanently confine itself absolutely within itself, without becoming hidebound and shrivelled. What the condition of such a State must come to, they had had knowledge of from China, as that country was before it became opened to other nations. China enjoyed many conditions of prosperity. It teemed with a busy, an industrious, and, in many respects, a cultivated population. But yet China was a stagnant country—an eminently stunted and unprogressive country. Why was that? Why, solely because it had cut itself off from all international intercourse, and so deprived itself of all the alimentations, without which progress became impossible. The hon. Member for Warrington said the true policy of this country should be to content itself with peacefully allying itself with the elements of progress, and yet he advocated a policy of exclusiveness which was incompatible with that active international sympathy without which progressiveness was out of the question. It was intelligible how that notion should grow up. England being geographically an island, the idea of insulation seemed plausible and specious. But England was not merely an insular Power; she possessed a Continental Empire, and the Queen was also Empress of India; and he would ask his hon. Friend what was to become of the whole series of Indian treaties, containing positive guarantees binding on the Crown? The Resolution before the House was one to guide the policy of the country, and therefore, if adopted, it must hold good for the whole policy of the State in every direction. But, as soon as they went to India, circumstances arose out of the very nature of that possession which at once imposed conditions that could not be dispensed with, and rendered impossible the acceptance of such a Resolution. But there were two pervading fallacies in regard to this non-intervention doctrine which it was desirable to expose. It was currently affirmed that the old policy of political interests on the Continent was entirely due to old-fashioned and exploded elements which had no root in the New World. On the other side of the Atlantic—in the great Republic—the absurd notions of a balance of power and of an encroaching desire for intervention could not exist. Well, he would ask hon. Gentlemen if they had never heard of such a thing as the "Monroe doctrine," and whether that doctrine was anything but the doctrine of the "balance of power" transferred to the American Continent, and clothed in an American form? And as for the impossibility of an intervention policy ever prevailing in America, he would remind hon. Gentlemen of the circumstances attending the Mexican War, followed by a forced cession of territory, which was quite unparalleled in extent. Those instances proved that much that was considered antiquated and exploded still had force in the New World. But if the political programme laid down by the hon. Member for Carlisle were carried out to the letter, a positive stop would be set to the development of that international policy which it was the especial object of Mr. Cobden's political life to promote. The great work of his statesmanship—the French Treaty of Commerce—never could have been made, if the narrow principles enunciated by the hon. Baronet had been the principles of his action; but he believed Mr. Cobden never was the advocate of such doctrines as the hon. Baronet maintained, and he had memorable words of Mr. Cobden's to warrant his disbelief. On the 8th of August, 1859, at the close of the Italian War, Lord John Russell made a remarkable declaration in that House. A Motion had been made very much in the sense of literal non-intervention as regarded the Conference at Zurich, then pending with respect to Italian affairs, and Lord John Russell asked if Austria, Prussia, and Russia should consent to an arrangement in which the wishes of the Italians would be consulted, was England to raise an objection to go into the Conference? The noble Lord further asked, was it not reasonable, if the House of Commons left every other important question to the Advisers of the Crown, that they should leave this question also? And he added that he could not believe in this new-fangled policy, by which this country could separate herself from the whole world and attend merely to her own affairs. On the 17th of August in the same year Mr. Cobden, speaking at Rochdale of this declaration, said— Lord John Russell in the House of Commons has laid down certain conditions upon which alone Government would be disposed to go into a Continental Congress in order, if possible, to arrange and perpetuate the terms of peace. He has made conditions which I think are good, although I am afraid they are not very likely to be accepted by the great European Powers. Mr. Cobden, therefore, publicly declared his approbation of the principles laid down by Lord John Russell. He (Mr. Cartwright) did not wish to see this country enter on a course of needless, vexatious, and ambitious intervention; but unless they were going to abdicate their Imperial position, and to cut themselves adrift from all their connections, they must be prepared to encounter on some occasions complications of a more or less serious nature. Whether it was incumbent to withstand and boldly confront such complications, or whether they were to be quietly put up with, must depend on circumstances that could not be decided upon beforehand. He was convinced that an abstract Resolution of the kind before the House was perfectly incompatible with the exigencies of the public service, and could not be adopted consistently as a guide in foreign policy.

SIR DAVID WEDDERBURN

said, he wished to direct the attention of Her Majesty's Government to a particular class of guarantee treaties which appeared to him exceedingly objectionable, and which had a special significance at the present moment. Among those treaties which had been recently laid before them there were three, the professed object of which was to secure protection to routes of communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans across the Isthmus of Panama. Of course, such an object was in itself desirable; but it was only proper to consider what were the risks incurred in order to promote it. The first of the treaties was the least objectionable, being a Convention (1850) between Great Britain and the United States for the joint guarantee and protection of a ship canal through the territory of Nicaragua— So that the said canal may for ever be open and free, and the capital therein invested secure. The ship canal had, indeed, not yet been constructed; but by Article 8 it was agreed— To extend protection by treaty stipulations to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway, across the Isthmus which connects North and South America. It was, however, merely as a precedent that that Convention involved practical danger, for against Great Britain and the United States acting in concert no serious opposition could be offered in Central America. The two remaining treaties were between this country and the two Central American Republics of Honduras and Nicaragua, and bore the dates of 1856 and 1860 respectively. They were both Conventions— For the protection of all routes of communication, natural or artificial, whether by land or water, through the territories of these Republics, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In the case of Nicaragua, the employment of military force on the part of Her Britannic Majesty was permissive, not obligatory; and the treaty was for 20 years only, after which it was terminable on due notice being given; and it would probably be well to terminate it in 1880, although the risk involved was not great. With the Honduras Treaty it was altogether different; in return for certain concessions, of which two free ports were the chief, the strongest possible guarantee was given by this country to the Republic—a guarantee which could only be withdrawn upon six months' notice, and under certain specified conditions. It was couched in these terms— Article 2. In consideration of these concessions, and in order to secure the construction and permanence of the route or road herein contemplated, and also to secure, for the benefit of mankind, the uninterrupted advantages of such communication from sea to sea, Her Britannic Majesty recognizes the rights of sovereignty and property of Honduras in and over the line of the said road, and for the same reason guarantees, positively and efficaciously, the entire neutrality of the same so long as Great Britain shall enjoy the privileges conceded to it in the preceding section of this Article; and when the proposed road shall have been completed, Her Britannic Majesty equally engages, in conjunction with the Republic of Honduras, to protect the same from interruption, seizure, or unjust confiscation, from whatsoever quarter the attempt may proceed. Considering the nature and position of such a Republic as Honduras, its relations to its immediate neighbours in Central America, and its past history, no inconsiderable danger attached to the signature of such a treaty, to say nothing of the well-known Monroe doctrine, which might lead to the most serious complications. The recent intervention of European Powers in the affairs of Chili, Peru, or Mexico, had not had satisfactory results, nor would it be otherwise in Central America. But the consideration of these treaties had an immediate practical bearing upon our present policy. With the direct sanction of Her Majesty's Government, and of the India Office in particular, a Select Committee of that House had been appointed to consider the various projects for establishing railway communication between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, or Black Sea. Should that Committee report favourably of any one of those schemes, it was only too probable that our Government would be urged—and possibly induced—to contract with the Ottoman Government a similar treaty to those with Honduras or Nicaragua. Against such a course the strongest protest should be entered beforehand. The existence of such treaties as he had quoted was sufficient proof that a protest was required. They must, in fact, contract no more of those treaties, and they ought to take such steps as were consistent with honour to terminate those which already existed, especially in cases where it seemed as if the national credit and safety were imperilled, in order to promote the schemes of speculating capitalists.

MR. GLADSTONE

Sir, the question upon which my hon. Friend who has just sat down has addressed the House is, in the main, distinct from the general subject of the Motion before us, and on that account, and not because I think it unimportant, I will not enter into its discussion at the present moment. Neither will I detain the House by dwelling on the speech of the hon. Member for the Kirkcaldy Burghs (Mr. S. Aytoun), a speech mainly consisting of a disquisition on an Amendment which, as I understand, he had no other reason for introducing into this debate than that he was otherwise unable to move it. It would be a waste of the time of the House to enter upon a controversy about the conduct of the Government in 1866, a matter upon which I know my hon. Friend entertains a conviction which he cherishes dearly, but which I regard as an entire delusion, though I should be sorry to disturb him in the enjoyment of it. My hon. Friend the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. W. C. Cartwright) has discussed the Motion before the House with an ability and force and likewise with a knowledge of the question which could surprise no one acquainted with him, and has suggested what, I think, must appear some very strong reasons, even to those who may not be disposed entirely to agree with all his objections, to the adoption of the Motion upon which my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) intends, I believe, to take the judgment of the House. But whether that is so or not, my hon. Friend has introduced his Motion to our notice in a spirit which I am sure is calculated to attract to it much attention. I am not going to take the objection which he anticipated, and to say that it is in the nature of an abstract Resolution, for it appears unimpeachable on that score; it is a declaration of opinion upon our foreign policy by this House which, if adopted, must lead to immediate action on the part of the Government. And I must also allow that there is not the charge against my hon. Friend which is generally applicable in the case of abstract Resolutions, to the effect that his proper course would be the introduction of a legislative measure, inasmuch as the subject of these Resolutions is not within the scope of the legislative functions of the House. But the practical objections to the Motion of my hon. Friend are conclusive, and those, too, are drawn from various quarters. In the first place, it would be no easy matter for this House to undertake to obtain a formal release from a number of covenants which, whatever they amount to, are covenants, generally speaking, without being limited as to time, and which it would be very difficult to assign special reasons for our desiring to decline and to annul at this present moment, after we have allowed them to the present time to stand. It would not be easy to attain such an object, and the very effort to do it would certainly lead to much misunderstanding. It would lead to a belief that there was, on the part of the Parliament and the people of this country, a conviction, suddenly arrived at, that there had been some fundamental error in the course of international policy down to the present epoch from which they were determined to escape for the future, and of which they intended to eradicate every trace and record from their public engagements. Well, my hon. Friend may be prepared to go the length of that proposal; but I do not think that his view is shared by the generality of the House, or by any large number of persons in this country. The distinctions of policy which may be drawn from our proceedings in foreign matters at one period and at another are distinctions of degree much more than of principle. There has never been that radical opposition of opinion in the policy of one party or another, or in the policy of one Government and another, with respect to foreign affairs, which may upon particular questions, at least, be traceable occasionally with regard to home affairs; and, although an opinion may be very usefully expressed in this House with reference to a modification of the spirit and the direction of the course of our foreign policy at a particular time, an attempt to revolutionize that policy would not, I am sure, receive from Parliament any degree of countenance. But my hon. Friend, in my opinion, aggravates the evil of guarantees, such as those evils may be—and I do not deny that certain inconveniences may be attached to them—but he aggravates those inconveniences by appearing to attach to a guarantee, as such, a more stringent character than it actually bears. He appears to be of opinion that every guarantee embodied in a treaty is in the nature of an absolute, unconditional engagement, binding this country, under all circumstances, to go to war for the maintenance of the state of things guaranteed in the treaty—irrespective of the circumstances of this country itself; irrespective of the causes by which that war may have been brought about; irrespective of the conduct of the Power on whose behalf the guarantee may have been invoked, and which may itself have been the cause of the war; and irrespective of those entire changes of circumstances and relations which the course of time frequently introduces, and which cannot be overlooked in the construction of these engagements. I have often heard Lord Palmerston give his opinion of guarantees both in this House and elsewhere; and it was a familiar phrase of his, which, I think, others must recollect as well as myself, that while a guarantee gave a right of interference it did not constitute of itself an obligation to interfere. Without adopting that principle as a rigid doctrine or theory applicable to this subject—on which it is very difficult, and, perhaps, not very convenient to frame an absolute rule—yet I think there is very great force in Lord Palmerston's observation; and that, as coming from a person who had so long been engaged in the conduct of the foreign policy of this country, and who was so thoroughly conversant with all the transactions of foreign policy, and the rules by which it is guided both here and abroad, it was an observation of great importance; and I have the more satisfaction in quoting it upon the present occasion, because I think it ought to remove that apprehension with respect to a guarantee under which the hon. Mover and Seconder of the Resolution appear more or less to labour. As the hon. Member for Oxfordshire has observed, there are immense differences among these guarantees. Take, for example, the case of the guarantee with Russia in 1814. That is one of the guarantees which one may mention without fear of misapprehension. I do not think that guarantee could have a powerful practical application to a state of things which has so entirely changed, as the state of things which has come to exist, since the time when it was contracted. Then, if we take one of the strongest of our guarantees in terms—the guarantee of a very ancient treaty with Portugal in 1661—undoubtedly the terms are alarmingly stringent. The King of Great Britain declared that he would take the interest of Portugal and of its dominions to heart, defending the same with his utmost power by sea and land, even as England itself. Now, that was apparently a very stringent guarantee; but let us see how it proceeds. The King undertook to transport two regiments of horse, each consisting of 500 men, and a body of 1,000 foot, to be armed at the charge of Great Britain; but after they were landed at Portugal they were to be paid by the King of Portugal. The sting of many animals and of many guarantees may be carried in the tail; but, undoubtedly, the tail of that guarantee takes the sting out of the preceding part. As the hon. Member for Oxfordshire had observed, as far as mere words are concerned, there is really one very stringent guarantee still in existence, for another very stringent guarantee was contracted with, I think, the deliberate approval of Parliament, by Her Majesty's present Government in 1870; but that guarantee contained in the treaty with France and Prussia, in relation to the kingdom of Belgium, expired on a day which my hon. Friend may think was an appropriate one for the expiration of such a guarantee—namely, on the 1st of April. There still remains a stringent guarantee in the Treaty of 1856, called the Tri-partite Treaty, to which Austria is a party with Great Britain and with France. That treaty is remarkable, because it contains a distinct reference to the obligation to take arms corresponding in terms with the Treaty of 1870. But undoubtedly that treaty constitutes an exception, and other treaties which exist are rather in the nature of general declarations, and strong declarations of policy and of general intention, than in the nature of covenants of a specific and determinate character, the obligation of which can, under all circumstances, be exacted. I will take the case of 1870. In 1870, when we had a guarantee of a general character already upon record, we proceeded to make a most stringent guarantee for the defence of Belgium against the dangers into which it appeared to have been brought not only by the war which had just then broken out, but likewise by certain circumstances anterior to that war. But why was it that this stringent guarantee of 1870 was entered into? It was not because of the guarantee contained in the Treaty of 1839. That treaty would have stood where it was but for the new circumstances that occurred, and for the universal feeling and sentiment of the country with regard to those circumstances. It is not possible, I think, to contend from the nature of these general guarantees, that they are such as to exclude a just consideration of the circumstances of the time at which they may be supposed to be capable of being carried into effect. I believe that consideration of circumstances will always have a determining influence, not only without derogation to good faith, but in perfect consistency with the principles of good faith, upon the practical course to be pursued. My hon. Friends, I think, have not been altogether just to these guarantees. I admit with them that guarantees are engagements to be looked upon with jealousy; not to be hastily or frequently entered into; never but for grave cause; and, if possible, in those more determinate forms which are perfectly understood as not being liable to misapprehension, and which are applicable to specific objects. But let my hon. Friends fairly make the concession which the hon. Member for Oxfordshire demands from them—namely, that gua- rantees have been powerful instruments for the avoidance of the causes of actual and positive intervention. Take the guarantee of the Treaty of Vienna. The vice of that treaty did not lie in its guarantee; it lay in this—that the arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna were in various instances made with too little consideration for the feelings and convictions of the people with whose interests the assembled Powers had to deal. Take the momentous years from 1830 to 1839. I think my hon. Friends will hardly think that the moderately and cautiously expressed guarantee of the Treaty of 1839 was an unwise and unjust engagement. In my opinion, that treaty reflects great honour on the countries which acceded to it, and great honour on Lord Palmerston and those immediately concerned for this country. I believe, indeed, that in future times he will be remembered for nothing with greater distinction and honour than for the extraordinary perseverance, energy, and sagacity with which he conducted the whole policy of this country, and influenced so powerfully the policy of Europe between the erection of the kingdom of Belgium in 1830 and its consolidation in 1839. Though there are those who may think that on some occasions Lord Palmerston's policy of intervention was open more or less to question, I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that by those Belgian negotiations he was the main instrument in the avoidance of what otherwise would very probably have occasioned a general and bloody European war. Take, again, the guarantee of the kingdom of Greece. It can hardly be doubted that the union of Russia, Prance, and Great Britain not only stopped a very sanguinary intestine feud in the Ottoman Empire, not only raised hopes which may not have been altogether realized, but which still subsist for the future, but that it removed a great cause of political difficulty and danger. The case of Luxemburg has been referred to in like manner, and, I think, with equal justice. The general conclusion at which any dispassionate person, not hard-ridden by theory, must arrive is that, although it is quite right to regard these guarantees with jealousy, to admit that the presumption of the case must be against them, that the onus of proof is on those who contract them, that they ought not to be need- lessly multiplied, nay more, that they might, if bad, be advantageously qualified or annulled as opportunity may occur; yet that it would be a great mistake to pass upon them a sentence of general condemnation, because they may be effective instruments of composing quarrels and avoiding disastrous wars. My hon. Friend is not bound to accede to these reasons; but I think he should not ask the House to pass a judgment upon his Motion. He has referred to declarations of the Government which he thinks are not entirely consistent with one another. Now, some of us have at times spoken, and I think with great propriety, of defence as the end and aim with which in the main, and as a rule, the military and naval establishments of this country are kept up. That is a perfectly sound and just doctrine; but, on the other hand, we cannot undertake to register a positive and absolute vow, by which we are to be restrained from recognizing any duty beyond our own island barrier. The people of this country would not consent to record such a vow, and I am bound to say that if they did they would never keep it; for on great occasions, partly from considerations of danger which, though remote, might become proximate, partly from considerations of honour, partly from sentiments of sympathy, partly from the sense of an interest, not narrow or selfish, but wide and honourable, in the maintenance of general peace, they would think, without any disposition to a meddlesome policy, that there might be occasions when it would be their duty to look beyond what immediately and absolutely concerned themselves, to the general interest of the civilized world. To an abstract proposition of this kind we cannot be parties. General recommendations of caution we shall gladly endeavour to follow, for the pacific temper of my hon. Friends is worthy of all admiration. The past errors of this country, moreover, have not lain on the side of refraining from war, but on the side of needlessly rushing into it. Cautions, therefore, we ought to accept; but though they are likely to be useful warnings against the indulgence of a besetting sin, we cannot agree entirely to forswear brotherhood with other nations with respect to any dangers except those which menace an absolute invasion of our own territory. To that length we must decline to follow them, for to consent to it would be to make ourselves not the organs of a wise, comprehensive, and practical national policy, but rather the mouthpieces of ideas which, however respectable on account of the benevolent motives with which they originate, are, and must be, the ideas of only a narrow section of men, and are incapable of influencing the conduct of kingdoms at great crises.

Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

The House divided:—Ayes 126; Noes 21: Majority 105.

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