§ MR. EYKYNasked, Mr. Attorney General, Whether, having regard to the proposed constitution of a Supreme Court of Appeal, it is expedient that an Ex-Lord Chancellor of England should be appointed paid Arbitrator at a maximum fee of 3,500 guineas under the Bill now before this House to wind up the affairs of the European Assurance Society; whether there is not an implied contract or understanding between the State and the Ex-Lord Chancellors of England that, in return for the pension of £5,000 per annum granted on retirement, their time and services as Judges should be reserved for the Country, on the Judicial Tribunals of which they are members; and, whether it is consistent with the dignity of their position, if such understanding does exist, that in accepting the office of Arbitrator they should take reward for their services?
THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, he felt obliged to preface his answer to the Question as he prefaced one which he gave yesterday—with a protest. He must say, with all possible respect for his hon. Friend, that this was a kind of Question which it was not proper for him to ask, and even if it were proper for him to ask, it would not be proper for the Attorney General, as such, to express any opinion on the subject. The Question was one of an extremely delicate and difficult nature, and if he entertained any strong opinion on the matter he should not desire to express it in a short and summary way, nor unless he could give the reasons at large for entertaining it. With regard to the first part of the Question, "whether it was expedient that an Ex-Lord Chancellor of England should be appointed paid Arbitrator at a maximum fee of 3,500 guineas under the Bill now before the House?"—that was a matter entirely for the House itself to settle. 968 The Bill to wind up the affairs of the European Assurance Society was before the House, and as hon. Members would have a full opportunity of discussing its provisions, he must decline altogether to express any opinion upon the measure in the form in which the Question now arose. As to the second Question, he wished to point out to his hon. Friend that an understanding must reside in facts or circumstances, and there must be two parties to it; and what passed, if anything did pass, in the nature of an understanding at the appointment of Ex-Lord Chancellors to the office which they had filled, he (the Attorney General) had no means of knowing, nor did he think it his duty to inquire. He was not personally aware of any contract or understanding that they should perform certain services in return for their pensions—that must be a matter left absolutely to the honour, feeling, and judgment of those noble and learned persons themselves. He (the Attorney General) was not the arbiter of the honour, nor the director of the conduct, or of the judgment of those noble and learned persons; and those persons must be left to judge for themselves as to whether a particular course, under particular circumstances, was or was not the proper and the dignified course to take. It would have been more satisfactory to him, and probably it would have been more satisfactory to the House—he did not know whether it would have been more agreeable to his hon. Friend—if it had been possible for the noble and learned Lord referred to in the Question to have been present to answer the Question himself.