HC Deb 31 March 1871 vol 205 cc989-1013
MR. BAILLIE COCHRANE

rose to call the attention of the House to the Conditions of Peace imposed by Prussia on France; and to move— That this House having learnt the conditions of Peace imposed by Prussia on France, trusts that Her Majesty's Government will, in the interest of the future tranquility of Europe, use their good offices, before the negotiations of Peace are finally closed, to obtain from the Imperial Government some mitigation of the severity of these conditions. The hon. Member expressed his profound regret and sorrow at all the occurrences that were now taking place in Paris. It was most sad and most sorrowful that, after the inhabitants of that city had conducted themselves during the siege in so exemplary a manner as to win the sympathies of the whole of Europe, and especially of this country, events should have occurred, ever since the siege had been raised, which the whole of civilized Europe must deplore. He frankly admitted that the events now occurring in Paris had changed the current of popular feeling in this country, and felt the disadvantage in which he was placed in discussing this question under the change of feeling; but, at the same time, he wished to point out to the House that Paris was not France—that Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles together did not represent France—that there was in France a strong feeling of horror against the acts of the population of Paris. At the elections the other day, out of 89 departments, 79 returned members who represented the Party of Order, and only 10 returned the representatives of what might be termed the Party of Disorder. But this was a question which ought to be discussed not merely with reference to French or Prussian interests, but with reference to English interests as well. He had been told that it was now too late to bring the question forward; but that was a mistake, for only the preliminaries of peace had been signed, and the real negotiations for peace were to commence in Brussels next week; and, no doubt, they would take some time. In order to show the House how little the various points on which the peace was to be based were settled, he might tell them that a deputation from Alsace, waited one day last week, upon Count Bismarck, and pointed out the injury to the trade of Alsace, and the calamity which it would be to the people to be annexed to Prussia. After stating to the deputation how much he was forced on by public opinion in Germany, Count Bismarck said— However the complaints made, have, it must be admitted, a good foundation. I advise the delegates to appeal to the Conference to be held at Brussels. The terms are not yet definitively settled, and I think that the objections made will be taken fairly into consideration. The preliminaries having been settled, the other points were fairly open to discussion, and that was the reason why he took the liberty of bringing forward this question. Although he had long known how indifferent the House generally was to foreign questions, he did not think they could stand by with perfect indifference, and express no opinion while the whole map of Europe was being changed, and he might say crumpled up. If it were objected that it was too late to bring forward this question, he would reply that he never knew any time acknowledged to be the proper time for bringing forward a question connected with foreign affairs. The time was always too late or too early. With respect to this Franco-Germanic question, he greatly regretted that the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government would not allow the House last year, before the war broke out, to discuss the merits of the case. He knew it was the opinion of distinguished personages, well known to the right hon. Gentleman, that if the House of Commons, before war was declared by the Emperor Napoleon, had expressed the strong feeling which animated Members of the House at that time against the violent proceedings of France, the effect of the united voice of Parliament upon the counsels of the Emperor would have been such that war would never have been declared. But whenever a Member of the House sought to bring the matter before the House, he was told by the right hon. Gentleman that it would be injurious to public interests to discuss it. The consequence was that France was allowed to go into the war without any expression of opinion from the Parliament of England on such an important subject. Last night, there was in the House a discussion which collapsed in a very extraordinary way. He had heard it for a week past stated that the hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles Dilke) was too late in bringing forward his Motion. But when he proposed, three or four weeks ago, before the Conference had closed, to proceed with his Motion, he was told it was too early; and, in fact, the right hon. Gentleman appealed to him not to raise a discussion. Then, when he did not make his Motion, it was too late; so that as he had said, they were always too late or too early. He had himself proposed to raise a discussion upon the most important question of the indemnity; but he was not allowed to do so, and terms of peace were made. Now, he was told it was too late to go into the matter; but he held that there was still an opportunity for the Government to use its good offices in such a manner as to confer a blessing upon France, and revive in that country the deep sentiment of affection for England which did exist formerly, but which had given place to a feeling of dislike so strong that the Vote of Thanks to England proposed in the Parliament of Bordeaux was only carried by a majority of 2, after general shouts of disapproval had been raised. Two things were often mixed up together—the views of policy which the Government might entertain, and the opinions of the Parliament. He could perfectly understand the difficulty which the Government might frequently have in dealing with certain questions; but Parliment had not the same responsibility, and was more free to express its opinion, and in looking back to past years, he could not find that the Parliament had ever failed to speak out upon the occurrence of any great event in Europe and to exercise its due influence. Neverthe- less, with respect to the recent most disastrous and calamitous war, there had not yet been any strong expression of opinion in that House. He believed if, after Sedan, Parliament had been called together—as it should have been—much good might have been done. He would not have asked the Government to interfere; on the contrary, he admitted that it was right we should not mix ourselves up in this war; but there was a great difference between a policy leading to war, and the free, frank, and open expression of opinion on questions in which we should sooner or later find ourselves deeply interested. He did not wish to make this question, in the slightest degree, a party question. There was no one had a greater admiration than himself of the high qualities which Lord Granville possessed in so eminent a degree. The noble Lord had inherited those qualities from an illustrious father, and M. Thiers did no more than mere justice to the late Lord Granville in what he had recently said in conversation with the Foreign Secretary. He thought it was a pleasing act on the part of Lord Granville to allow the generous expression of esteem, made by M. Thiers, to appear in a despatch; and therefore on that point he differed from the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth (Sir Robert Peel). Still, he thought that the present Secretary for Foreign Affairs had not sufficient alloy in his nature. The noble Lord was too gentle for a Foreign Secretary in unquiet times, though in quiet times there could not be a better model of a Foreign Secretary than Lord Granville. Talleyrand said that one should always mistrust his first impressions, because they were generally generous; but Lord Granville's first impressions were nearly always generous; and yet the noble Lord was in the habit of leaving and running away from them. He— Starts away afraid Even at the sound himself has made. His first despatch to Prince Gortchakoff was admirable; but he did not maintain the attitude he at first assumed. It was not necessary to go further into that matter; and he would proceed to consider the question of neutrality. The Blue Book had been very fully discussed; and he had already stated his view that the Government had not observed a policy of neutrality, for that really consisted in doing nothing; whereas the course taken by Lord Granville had prevented other nations from interfering. He had said to Russia, Austria, and Italy—"None of you move until I move with you; and I do not intend to move at all." Thus it was, that whatever might have been intended by other Powers was prevented from being carried into effect by Lord Granville. It was important that the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government should know that a treaty offensive and defensive was actually going to be signed between Austria, Italy, and France, at the end of July last; but Lord Granville prevented that design being carried out, although he (Mr. B. Cochrane) believed that if the treaty had been made there would have been an end to the war. He could prove his statement by reference to a despatch (No. 119 in the Blue Book of last year), which has been strangely overlooked. Lord Granville, on the 10th of August, wrote to Lord Lyons to the following effect:— The Prussian Ambassador has alluded to various rumours, in regard to which he has sought to obtain some reliable information from me. The first is that a treaty has been concluded between France and Italy, under which the latter would furnish to France a contingent of 100,000 men, and would be allowed to make herself mistress of Rome after the war was over. I have informed Count Bernstorff that I did not believe in the supposed treaty; that the Italian Government had represented to that of Her Majesty that it had been much pressed by France, and desired the assistance of Her Majesty's Government to resist such pressure; and that upon being told that although it was not the present policy of England to enter into any positive engagement for combined neutrality, yet that Her Majesty's Government would be ready, if by so doing they could assist Italy to resist external pressure, to agree with Italy that neither Power should depart from its neutrality without an interchange of ideas, and an announcement to one another of any change of policy. The Italian Government warmly assented to such an arrangement. Another rumour alluded to is that a negotiation for an alliance between France and Austria, combined with an armed organization of Galicia, is in progress; and I have informed Count Bernstorff that I had thought it necessary to warn the Austrian Government that there were many circumstances that had created suspicion as to her neutrality in the minds of both the Russian and Prussian Governments."—[P. 96.] But was that neutrality? As he understood neutrality, it was remaining perfectly passive, and abstaining from interference. At any rate this despatch indicated that even last year Lord Gran- ville knew there was a secret alliance between Russia and Prussia. Then Lord Granville in another part of the despatch, went on to speak about Denmark. He said— Count Bernstorff has also called my attention to Denmark, which Prussia is afraid might be induced by French pressure to take part in the war. The King of Denmark desired to be supported against such pressure, and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg was desirous to take at Paris, in conjunction with England, a common step for that purpose; but I have reminded His Excellency that I had on three occasions suggested to himself how desirable it would be that Prussia, by a friendly arrangement, should take away the temptation to Denmark to yield to any solicitations from France; and I have added that I had last week obtained the sanction of the Cabinet to inform Baron Brunnow that I should be ready to concert with him the time and manner of making a representation to France, urging her not to press upon Denmark a policy so contrary to the interests of that country."—[P. 96.] Was that neutrality? It was anything but neutrality. Lord Granville interfered with Austria and with Denmark; yet, although there were chances over and over again in the war when it might have been put a stop to, there had been no such interference. But he now came to the next point of undue interference. When he proposed the other day to bring forward the question of the indemnity, he was stopped and told that to interfere at that time with the terms of the indemnity would be very mischievous. They had before them the Correspondence respecting the Pecuniary Demands of Prussia on France. It said— Her Majsty's Government are willing, in consideration of the extreme pressure of time, to make representations to Germany on the amount of this indemnity."—[P. 1.] That was on February 24th. It was one of the cleverest things imaginable to be willing to interfere in favour of a country and to do nothing. The armistice was to expire at midnight; and Lord Granville wrote— Her Majesty's Government are willing, in consideration of the extreme pressure of time, to make representations to Germany on the amount of this indemnity, and to tender their good offices in the spirit of friendship to both parties, under the conviction that it is the interest of Germany, as well as of France, that the amount of the indemnity should not be greater than that which it is reasonable to expect could be paid."—[P. 1.] This was written to Lord Augustus Loftus at Berlin. It could not get to Berlin till the 26th, and he was charged to interfere to get the indemnity reduced— that was after the armistice had expired. He telegraphed, no doubt; but Mr. Odo Russell was not charged to make any such representations. In fact, Mr. Odo Russell was in Paris till the evening of the 25th. On the 26th Mr. Odo Russell wrote from Versailles to Lord Granville— I conclude that your Lordship's telegram, through Count Bernstorff, must have reached yesterday morning early; but I have not been able to see the Chancellor myself, who is too much engaged with the French negotiators to receive anyone to-day. The negotiations must be concluded before midnight, when the armistice ends, and hostilities will be resumed if the preliminaries are not accepted."—[No. 3, p. 4.] So that the intention to reduce the indemnity turned out to be nothing at all, and the indemnity was not reduced. The right hon. Gentleman smiled at this statement; but the reduction of one milliard—from six to five milliards—was made by Count Bismarck himself, and not in conformity with any wish expressed by the English Government. He should be very glad to hear that they had had any influence on that transaction. He should like to know what the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government thought of his Solicitor General, who, addressing his constituents at Exeter, a few days ago, said— He could not affect to be sorry that the wicked and corrupt power of Louis Napoleon bad been dashed in pieces; on the contrary, he rejoiced at it. He could not help thinking that such a speech from one of the Law Officers of the Crown was very compromising to Her Majesty's Government. He might be asked what we had to do with all this; and that the two antagonists should be left to fight it out. He was quite sure the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government was too generous, too sympathetic, and too pure-minded to entertain such a feeling. The admirable speech he made the other evening, in which he spoke in a tone that so well became what should have been the honourable position of England, every word he uttered evidently coming from the heart, gave ample attestation to this. But he had often heard it said—"Let them fight it out—the more France is crushed the better it will be for Europe." That would be found far otherwise before long. There were two points to be considered—first, the weakness of France; secondly, the strength of the Germans. With refer- ence to the first, the weakness of France, he would bring to bear one or two most striking circumstances connected with what always was the old diplomatic idea. What said the Duke of Wellington in 1815? In a tone very different from that adopted by several Gentlemen in that House, the Duke of Wellington, addressing Lord Castlereagh, said, in 1815— My objection to the demand of cession from France is that it will defeat the object the allies have held out for themselves in the present and preceding wars. That object has been to obtain peace for themselves and their people, to have the power of reducing their establishments. Care must be taken in making the arrangements consequent on our success, that we do not leave the world in the same unfortunate position as before. There is not a statesman, if great cessions are demanded, who would venture to recommend his Sovereign to consider himself at peace, and to place his armies on a peace establishment; he must, on the contrary, if he demand a large cession, consider the operations of war as deferred, until France can find a suitable opportunity of endeavouring to regain what she has lost; and, after wasting our resources in the maintenance of overgrown establishments in time of peace, we shall find how little worth the cessions we have acquired will be against a natural effort to regain them. And what was the language of the Emperor Alexander when Russia had suffered so much? He said— France penetrated to our capital, burnt our towns, sacrificed our population; God has avenged us; but I shall only use every power to reconcile France and Russia. And M. Talleyrand said— The Sovereigns will respect the integrity of France, leaving her ancient limits; we shall even do more, for we hold as a principle for the happiness of Europe, France must be great and strong. These were the opinions of great men of the past, and uttered on an occasion very similar to the present—on an occasion when, after the war which had lasted so long and at such a sacrifice of blood and treasure, the whole indemnity demanded from France was only £25,000,000. The very different nature of the demand made now was shown by this calculation from The Soir— The campaign has cost France three milliards (£120,000,000), the indemnity is five milliards, the territory to be ceded is equal to four departments, which is equal to a twentieth of the territorial fortune of France, and represents, at the lowest sum, ten milliards sunk for ever, to say nothing of the contributions and requisitions already made. In losing Alsace and Lorraine, there is a loss of 1,600,000 of the most industrious and commercial men in France. And when to all this is added the destruction that has swept over the country, the whole loss is not less than one-sixth of the whole capital of France. Whatever might be the conduct of some part of the population, France must still have claims on Europe, and he would ask if we ought not to endeavour to mitigate the position thus described? He said nothing about annexing territory without consulting the inhabitants; but he contended that by bringing a commercial spirit to bear upon transactions of this kind the standard of public feeling was lowered. A very interesting little work had recently been published, edited, he believed, by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Cowper-Temple)—he alluded to the Tour of Lord Palmerston in France in 1815. He said—"It seems that peace will be made upon the basis of preserving entire the French territory"—alluding to the demands reported to be made on France. No one could have more generous feelings and sympathies than Lord Palmerston, and this was the way in which he spoke— The system of individual plunder had been the ruin of the French Army, and would be the destruction of the Prussian. When officers were allowed to make requisitions for their troops, they soon began to make them for themselves; and those who demanded provisions to-day would call for money to-morrow. War then assumed a new character, the profession of arms became a mercenary speculation, and the officers' thoughts grew to be directed to the acquisition of plunder instead of the attainment of glory. There was a curious passage showing the feeling of the French with regard to Prussian requisitions at Vaudreuil; it was the record of a conversation with a woman of the post-office— We asked if they had had any English. The woman replied, 'Non, Monsieur, malheureusement.' They told us that it is an old saying in Normandy, of a man who is working against his will for the advantage of another, 'Qu'il travaille pour le Roi de Prusse.' They used to apply it to the corvées, but they now have more appropriate occasions for using it. There were also other passages in the book bearing on the heavy contributions levied by the Prussians. So much for the weakness of France. He would now come to the great accession of strength to Prussia. What would be the position of things if Germany became too powerful? The result of the debate of last night was to show that Russia could never have made the proposal she did unless she had had an understanding with Prussia, and that state of things showed that we could not prudently allow ourselves to remain isolated, having regard to possible eventualities. With regard to the alleged treaty between Russia and Prussia, the existence of which the Prime Minister denied—[Mr. GLADSTONE: I said we had no information of it.]—a Vienna paper of March 19 published several statements in confirmation of the revelations made by a London paper with regard to the understanding between Russia and Prussia last year, and it said— It is admitted that no treaty exists; but an exchange of written declarations is alleged to have taken place between Prince Gortchak off and Count Bismarck from the 9th up to the 13th of July, 1870. These declarations embrace five points, the last of which stipulates that Prussia leaves to Russia the choice of the moment for demanding the abrogation of the restrictions in the Black Sea, and that Prussia guarantees her support of this demand on the part of Russia under any circumstances. This state of facts involved a very serious position for this country; and their truth or probability was borne out by the interchange of telegraphic messages which had recently occurred between the Emperor William and the Czar. The Emperor telegraphed— Never will Prussia forget that she owes it to you that the war has not taken the greatest dimensions. May God bless you for it! Your grateful friend for life, William. The Czar replied— I feel happy at being able to prove to you my sympathies for a devoted friend. May the sympathies that bind us together secure the happiness and glory of both countries. These telegrams were inconsistent with the neutrality which we boasted of. He now came to what was going on in Russia. Whilst we, in this country, were in perfect confidence, repose, and peace, what was occurring in that country? From a Russian paper he learned that— The warlike preparations that were made at the outbreak of the Franco-German War are continued with unabated zeal. Latterly the Ministry of War has ordered the formation of a private battalion, which has already begun in all regiments, including those in Poland; the detachments set apart for the ruling and telegraph service in the field have already been organized. New fortresses have been raised in commanding positions. A twelve million loan is raised it is in the interest of Russia to strike at once. At Sveaborg the Russians were at the same time constructing any number of iron-clads and a flotilla of gunboats; in the Caspian they were making pre- parations; several hundred rifled cannon had been purchased from the United States, and at one place alone an order for 12,000,000 ball cartridges had been given. We might say that certain things would not happen; we always said that of things which we did not wish to happen, but certainly matters were in a very serious position. Matters were very serious in reference to the weakness of France, and the strength of Prussia; but beyond this other eventualities might occur, and we might do something towards meeting these eventualities, if we also did something to win back the feelings of our old ally. Suppose that in the future there were a strong alliance between France and Germany, what position should we be in then? Suppose Belgium should be taken as an indemnity to France for the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, what position should we be in then? If war occurred, we should be found without a single ally; for we had lost, by want of sympathy, the one ally we had. We might have a necessity for allies or not; but certainly it was a very lamentable thing that this country should be left in this position. The right hon. Gentleman might say that he did not see why we should interfere—that was, to use our good offices. Other nations were not so delicate in the matter as we had been. The King of Italy had written a letter to the German Emperor, expressing his surprise and disappointment at the hard terms exacted from the French, especially with regard to the cession of territory. It had been said that we were not to express a generous opinion, even when our own interests were not at stake; but he trusted the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister would now take a more generous view, and that he might do so without risking the support of any Member of his party. No one had a greater desire for the maintenance of peace than he had; but still he wanted that men should have the pluck and courage to speak out their opinions; and that we should not stand by, perfectly indifferent when a great crisis in Europe was occurring. In the Royal Speech with which the Session was opened, the Queen was made to say, in allusion to the suspension of hostilities— I pray that this suspension may result in a Peace compatible, for the two great and brave nations involved, with security and with honour, and likely therefore to command the approval of Europe, and to give reasonable hopes of a long duration. In the sense of the terms thus used he appealed to the right hon. Gentleman to use his good offices with the Germans in the settlement of the final terms of peace. He was not one of those who would mock at the expressions of earnestness which had been used by the Emperor of Germany. He believed that great and solemn events called for solemn feelings and expressions, and he had no doubt that those expressions of religious fervour were used in full sincerity; but it was to the feelings of the Emperor of Germany that he would appeal in the language of a writer who was well known to the right hon. Gentleman, and one indeed upon whom he himself had commented, and say— Here, then, is the prohibition to all mortal feuds; mercy to a submissive foe is to be no longer an exceptional and admirable reach of human goodness, but a plain duty. Human beings have henceforth, in all cases, a right to terms, a right to quarter. There was another quotation, better known, which was specially applicable in this case— The quality of mercy is not strained; It droppeth, as the gentle rain from heaven Upon the place beneath: it is twice blessed; It blesseth him that gives and him that takes; It is mightiest in the mightiest. It was in this feeling, anxious to do good only, and hoping that words might be used in that House which would produce an effect upon the Emperor of Germany, that he appealed to the right hon. Gentleman to use his influence and his good offices in the interests of civilization and humanity, and in the interests, he might say, of the future tranquillity and peace of Europe, and of the security, dignity, and honour of this country. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving his Resolution.

SIR HENRY HOARE

, in seconding the Motion, said, that the question had been treated, so fully by his hon. Friend who had preceded him that little remained for him to say upon this great subject. Everyone must deplore the sad disorders which now afflicted France. Her provinces had been ravished from her; her capital was a prey to anarchy; her women were in deep mourning; and her men were humiliated and smarting under disaster; and this being so, it was not surprising that she should now be torn by contending factions. Was it not possible that these disasters were consequent upon the hard terms extorted from this unhappy country. He had heard it stated by a Cabinet Minister that if he had been a Frenchman he would never have consented to the surrender of Metz, as he believed that as long as there was a man in the country who could hold a gun, France ought to have fought for that bulwark of her defence. Metz, however, had been taken from France; and, if that country were at war again with Germany, Paris would be at the mercy of the invader after one successful battle, for he would have to traverse only 150 miles of level champagne country. With respect to the indemnity, an eminent financier had informed him that it could not be raised at a lower rate of interest that 7 per cent. There would, therefore, be a perpetual charge of £14,000,000 upon France, in addition to all the ruin and devastation which had been effected during the war. France, it ought to be always remembered, had been our most faithful ally, and we ought to endeavour to obtain for her some mitigation of the conditions of peace. Some weeks ago it was stated that we had no right to interfere, and that in the event of our doing so we should only anger Prussia, and induce her to impose still harder terms on France. But, looking at the prostrate condition of France, and the colossal triumph of Prussia, might we not now hope to obtain some reduction of those terms? It might, perhaps, be urged that we had already obtained some diminution, and that the indemnity, which was originally fixed at six milliards, was reduced to five milliards in consequence of the representations made by England. He did not say that Her Majesty's Government did not obtain that concession, but if so, the House and the country ought to be distinctly informed of that fact. Looking at the dates of the despatches, it did not appear that the reduction was owing to the action of our Government. In a despatch dated from Versailles, on the 26th of February, Mr. Odo Russell informed Earl Granville that his Lordship's telegram of the 24th, respecting the war indemnity, had been delivered to him on the previous night, after he had returned from the Crown Prince's Head-quarters, where he had heard that the war indemnity had been reduced to five milliards. Again, a despatch from Lord Augustus Loftus, our Ambassador at Berlin, dated the 28th of February, and relating to the reduction, did not indicate that it was brought about by the action of England. As yet, therefore, it had not been shown that we were in any way successful in procuring a mitigation of the terms of peace. It was evident we could not now anger Germany or bring about a state of things which would end in a collision if Her Majesty's Government did their best to obtain some relaxation of their severity. It was too much, perhaps, to hope that Germany would be impelled by a generous and chivalrous feeling to give Metz back to France; but time might be allowed for the payment of the indemnity, which might be further reduced in amount. He pleaded the cause of France, which had always been our faithful ally, and he earnestly trusted Her Majesty's Government would, even at the eleventh hour, do their best to obtain some mitigation of the conditions.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House having learnt the conditions of Peace imposed by Prussia on France, trusts that Her Majesty's Government will, in the interest of the future tranquillity of Europe, use their good offices, before the negotiations of Peace are finally closed, to obtain from the Imperial Government some mitigation of the severity of these conditions,"—(Mr. Baillie Cochrane.) —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. GLADSTONE

I am sure the limited attendance of Members in this House on the present occasion, particularly in some portions of the House, does not arise from a want of interest in the subject which has been brought under our notice by my hon. Friend, but that, if it be due to a special cause, it is due to a sentiment of difficulty in obtaining a definite result from the discussion that has been raised. My hon. Friend must not for a moment think I presume to censure the course he has taken. The events which have been in progress are of such vast interest and importance, and appeal so strongly to the heart and feeling, as well as to the understanding, that it is almost to be considered as a necessity that upon a variety of occasions heart and feeling should be displayed in the discussions in this House; and I cannot refrain from according to my hon. Friend the honour of having moved in this matter entirely from motives of humanity and generous feelings, which never can redound but to his credit. With regard to the speech of my hon. Friend and his Motion, he will forgive me if, while entering into the spirit of his observations, I am unable to concur in all the particular remarks he has made. Indeed, I even venture to hope that the comments which I feel it my duty to offer to the House upon those remarks may, to a certain extent, obtain my hon. Friend's concurrence. I will give them in the simplest possible form. Speaking generally, as far as the speech we have just heard partakes of the nature of a complaint, the complaint is that there has been, on the part of the Government, a want of sympathy with France in her misfortunes. My hon. Friend likewise stated, in one portion of his speech, that in consequence of this want of sympathy on our part, we had become an isolated Power in Europe, and should not, in case we ourselves became involved in a quarrel, have a single ally. It is not necessary to dwell at any length on the latter part of that statement; and I only refer to it for the purpose of saying that, setting aside the momentary dissatisfaction which not one party, but both parties to this war have felt with regard to our conduct—and which dissatisfaction, as a matter of fact, I do not deny—I do not believe there ever was a time when the conduct of Great Britain has received more general assent and approval, or when its result has been less likely to alienate from us the sympathies of the civilized world. I would point out to my hon. Friend this difficulty in his case. He complains generally of want of sympathy; but treating the subject, as he has done, with a perfect ingenuousness, he has pointed out what he thinks are two great defects in our conduct—first, a want of disposition to encourage interposition against France; and, secondly, a want of disposition to allow interference or to take steps ourselves in favour of France. He says that at the commencement of the quarrel we should have freely encouraged any inclination there was in this House— and the inclination was shared by very few Members—to make strong declarations against the policy of the French in those unhappy circumstances which preceded the war. But after that period, and after the fortune of war had declared against France, he thinks we have been defective on the other side, and have not shown sufficient inclination to take steps in favour of France. I must remind my hon. Friend that it is extremely difficult, as he will perceive from his own statement, to give vent to our natural feelings without incurring the risk of doing a great deal of mischief. If we had all of us put into words every sentiment we entertained in the day's preceding the war against the conduct of France, I do not believe we should have succeeded in arresting that war. I believe that we should have succeeded in exasperating the quarrel instead of soothing it; for it is an entire mistake to suppose that when two great Powers are about to lock in mortal conflict, and when the passion and the immediate sentiment of war have come upon them, they are in a condition of mind which disposes or permits them to be arrested in their career by an expression of neutral opinion. I must say, however, that if ever there was an expression of neutral opinion from a particular country it proceeded from the House of Commons, which I am patriotic or vain enough to think does carry considerable weight even in the opinion and sentiment of Europe; and if ever there was a time when a particularly strict observance of neutrality was the duty of the British Government, it was the period at the outbreak of the late war. We could not disguise the fact—and, indeed, it was expressed in official Correspondence—that we thought France wrong in the immediate cause of the war; and we have been sustained in the expression of that opinion, to which we gave utterance at the time, by the declarations of those who subsequently acceded to power and conducted the affairs of France. But while we were impressed with a strong belief with regard to the immediate cause of the war, we could not obliterate the recollection of the long and friendly alliance that had existed between France and ourselves. And then, looking to Germany, while we had no cause whatever for estrangement or alienation from that country as regarded ourselves, but had, on the contrary, every reason and disposition to cultivate the closest and most friendly relations with her, and while we had looked with cordial sympathy, partly owing to the particular means used, and with which we had little to do, upon the processes which gave to Germany strength through union; on the other hand, we certainly had not the most agreeable recollection of the controversy relating to Denmark; and, above all, if hon. Members will carry back their recollection to the period of the outbreak of the war, they will remember that by the strange and startling discovery of what has been called the Benedetti Treaty, a cloud was cast over the whole subject, which impressed upon us, above all things, that we should be wary. These are the steps by which we thought it our duty to approach that great crisis. My hon. Friend says that at the end of July a treaty offensive and defensive was on the point of being signed between Austria, Italy, and France which would have put an end to the war. Whether it would have done so is, of course, a matter of opinion; but with regard to the matter of fact, that such a treaty was on the point of being signed, I do not know where my hon. Friend has obtained his information. We have no reason to believe that there was such a treaty.

MR. BAILLIE COCHRANE

Lord Granville alluded to it in that despatch.

MR. GLADSTONE

No, pardon me, Lord Granville alludes to the subject, not of such a treaty, but of a treaty between two of those Powers, which is a very different thing to a treaty between the three Powers; and he alludes to that treaty, not as a matter of fact, not as a concluded transaction, nor as a transaction that was about to be concluded—he alludes not to the treaty as a transaction into which Italy would willingly have joined; but he alludes to the possibility that such a treaty might have been extorted, which is a matter totally different from that to which my hon. Friend has alluded. Nothing has occurred to lead us to believe in such a treaty; and I must own that, in my opinion, the hon. Gentleman is completely in error with regard to its existence. But my hon. Friend says, and says truly, that Lord Granville warned Austria that circumstances had occurred, or were supposed to have occurred, lead ing to a suspicion of her neutrality. Under what circumstances was that warning given to Austria? Under these—that we were aware of a given amount of disposition on the part of Austria not to act alone, but, had circumstances been favourable, to lean towards the side of France. But we knew also that the first indication of a decisive kind of any intention to give effect to that disposition would bring Russia into the field on the side of Germany. Was not that a contingency most formidable to Europe? Was it not the duty of Lord Granville, so far as he could do so by friendly acts, to point out to Austria the possible consequences of any proceedings on her part in bringing about such a state of action between Russia and herself as would undoubtedly have made the war no longer a war between two Powers, but a general war in Europe? My hon. Friend seems to think that it was an offence or error on the part of Lord Granville that, being neutral, he endeavoured to promote the neutrality of others. He says it was a departure from neutrality to say anything to Austria on the subject of her action with regard to the war. Is that a just proposition? At any rate, I am quite sure of this—the disposition of the Government was made known in this House at the earliest possible moment; and that disposition was to contract, if possible, the circle of the war, or to prevent its extension; and so far from admitting to my hon. Friend that there was anything wrong in that, it appears to me that Lord Granville would have departed from his duty, or would have failed in his duty, if he had not acted in the spirit of that intention. Again, with regard to Denmark, my hon. Friend complains that she was dissuaded from throwing herself into the arms of France. What was the fact? The alliance of Denmark would have been worth little to France. There was a natural feeling among the Danish people in her favour, and it was difficult for the Danish people to resist that feeling; but they knew that their duty to their country required them to resist it. Suppose that that popular sentiment in Denmark had prevailed. Suppose Denmark had cast herself into the arms of France at the commencement of the struggle. Little, indeed, would her assistance have been worth. But what were the gua- rantees that France could have given to Denmark against her suffering the consequences of her taking part in the war? And, so far as this particular case of Denmark is concerned, what would have been the present situation of the North of Europe if Denmark had been induced, not by the deliberate judgment of those who were responsible for her affairs, but by a momentary and very natural feeling—and I cannot say it was a blameable feeling—to cast herself into a cause, as she might and could have done, for what was to her only small and insignificant, but by embarking in which she would have hazarded, and probably at this moment have forfeited, what remained to her of independent existence? I pass on from these criticisms of my hon. Friend to what he has stated as the main ground of his complaint against the Government. He admits that, at the last moment, there was an attempt made on our part on behalf of France; but he says it was so managed that our intervention was no intervention at all. He refers to what occurred after the sudden surrender of Paris, partly before and partly after M. Thiers had assumed the reins of power. I beg my hon. Friend to follow the short statement that I will make, for I will endeavour to set out with perfect accuracy the conduct of the British Government at that moment, because it may be in the recollection of the House that in answering a Question, or in some discussion that arose, I gave an assurance on the part of the Government that we did not contemplate with indifference the transactions that were then in progress, but that we should exert ourselves to the extent of our power, and should certainly not fail to watch for and to seize any opportunity that might offer. The moment that had arrived was a critical and a decisive one. We were to examine whether it was possible to be useful in these negotiations, and when I say, "to be useful" I do not mean to be useful to France exclusively. France was naturally the principal object of sympathy and concern, because she was the worsted Power, and because the immediate suggestion or circumstance was that she might be called upon naturally to submit to conditions of very great severity. The first question was, whether in anything that we might do we should have to act alone, or whether we might hope to be able to act in concurrence with other Powers? And, in referring to the question of acting in concurrence with other Powers, I do not mean whether some particular Power, or certain Powers, could be induced to act with us; but whether we could act in concurrence with such Powers as would really speak with the voice and represent the moral force of Europe. That being the question, our first duty was to ascertain whether the state of things admitted of united action in that sense. We endeavoured to ascertain whether that was possible or not, and my hon. Friend, in his survey of these Papers, has omitted to refer to a passage in the letter of the 25th of February from Lord Granville to Lord Lyons, in which he said— There is, moreover, a want of agreement among all the Powers of Europe, even to examine any proposal which France might make. That is, any proposal France might make in mitigation of the terms demanded of her, and in the declaration then made it is stated that all the Powers of Europe were not prepared to unite to examine, or take into consideration, any proposal which France might make in mitigation of the demands made of her. The hon. Member and the House will not fail to perceive that that was an intimation of the utmost consequence and importance. We had made it our duty to assert what was the state of the case in that respect, and we had found that state to be such that no united action by the Powers of Europe could be made for the purpose either of mediating, or of using good offices, or of intervening, or even of examining jointly any overture which France might make with a view to a mitigation of the terms of peace. The effect of that was that we were reduced to entirely isolated action, because it was our opinion—and I think the House will concur in that opinion—that there could be no advantage in endeavouring to arrange for a partial combination, which probably would not have carried with it even the weight of a single representation, and which would, at the same time, be liable to all the invidious constructions which might, perhaps, attach to any effort to combine the Powers of Europe to propose even a ground of moral intervention. With regard, then, to isolated action, what I venture to say is this—we did all that was in our power, and we did it without the loss of a single moment; and the means which we adopted were such as were calculated to bring to bear with the utmost despatch our action, such as it was, and if it was not sufficiently powerful, that, under the circumstances, was not our fault. It was on Friday morning, the 24th of February, that the French Ambassador arrived here, and it was then that we received the first and only authorative information from France that France requested from us intervention of any kind. On that same Friday morning, when the Ambassador arrived, Lord Granville presented him officially to Her Majesty. After presenting him, Lord Granville came to me and stated the nature of the verbal communication of which the Due de Broglie was the bearer, and I instantly issued a summons for a meeting of the Cabinet. The Cabinet met upon a notice of half-an-hour. In the afternoon of Friday, the 24th of February, an answer was written to the French demand or request which had been received on the same day. The hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Henry Hoare) said he would be very glad if I could prove it was owing to the intervention of this country that a reduction of the pecuniary indemnity from six to five milliards was made. All that I know is this—that with reference to pecuniary indemnity no representation whatever was made to us. The representation that was made to us referred to that most important question—an alienation of territory, and to nothing else. It would plainly be going beyond the limits we had marked out for ourselves if we had had the presumption, when every moment was counted, to attempt to go beyond that question. The representation of the Due de Broglie was that the demand made by Germany was a demand of six milliards of francs, to be paid almost immediately, and to be subject to some deductions not yet settled. It was not in the power of the Due de Broglie—I am here speaking only of what was said in conversation under the extreme pressure of the moment, and therefore it does not appear in an official form—to give an exact definition of these terms; but he said the money was to be paid almost immediately, and was to be subject to some deductions, the nature of which he was not able exactly to specify. He could not, for example, say whether the £8,000,000 war contributions which had been levied on Paris would have to be included in those deductions or not; but the impression he conveyed to us was that the deductions to be made were such as did not materially affect the amount. [Sir HENRY HOARE: May I ask if that has been deducted?] I am coming to that. This was the demand which was represented to us, and it was upon this demand that the letter to Lord Augustus Loftus was written, on which the hon. Member has commented. He had said there was something really absurd in sending off by post to Lord Agustus Loftus, on the 24th of February, a letter which would have to be communicated to the German Government at Versailles, in regard to a matter of the utmost importance, which must necessarily close on the 26th of February, before the letter could reach Lord Augustus Loftus. That is perfectly true. The sending of this letter to Lord Augustus Loftus was merely an official form. A telegram was sent directly by Her Majesty's Government to Mr. Odo Russell, and a communication was made by Lord Granville to Count Bernstorff, with a request, with which Count Bernstorff faithfully and cordially complied at once, that he would also telegraph to Count Bismarck. This was on Friday night. The hon. Member has observed that Mr. Odo Russell did not receive this telegram in time to enable him to act on Saturday; that, in fact, it seemed to have reached him only at a very late hour on Saturday evening or night, and that he was not in a condition to take any step in regard to it until Sunday morning. I need hardly tell my hon. Friend that Her Majesty's Government were struck with the wonderful loss of speed in the matter of telegraph communication, and that something like 27 hours were expended between the despatch of that telegram and its reaching the hands of Mr. Odo Russell. We were not masters of the telegraph. We cannot call my right hon. Friend the Postmaster General to account; because, unhappily, he was not master of the telegraph, and cannot tell what became of that telegraphic message. But there is no doubt that that telegraphic message to Mr. Odo Russell was delayed upon its way. Certainly it was not delayed in England. I have no reason to believe that any delay happened to it before it reached Versailles, except the delay which commonly attaches, as most of us have found, to telegrams which are transmitted very late in the evening. No doubt the telegraph is very uncertain; but there is no doubt that the telegram might have been in the hands of Mr. Odo Russell considerably earlier than it reached him. I have no doubt that he was not sorry that anything prevented the message from reaching its destination, because Count Bernstorff, as I have stated, with that kindness and frankness which distinguish him, at once complied with the request of my noble Friend to send the message direct as from himself to Count Bismarck. We are given to understand that Count Bismarck was in possession of that message on Saturday morning. We have never received an answer to this representation. I cannot tell my hon. Friend anything more than what we know—that is to say, that on Sunday afternoon the preliminaries were signed, and the indemnity was fixed at five milliards of francs. I am not aware of any question of deduction connected with these five milliards. I believe it was an absolute sum, so far as we are informed, and I believe it was so stated in the body of the preliminaries when we came to see them. That is all that I have to state on the case. As to taking credit for having produced a reduction of the indemnity, I should not be warranted in doing that. The only credit we can take is that we did what was in our power. We are not answerable for the result. But I think it may be said that we manifested, both by the nature and by the promptitude of our action, a desire, wherever we could, to prove our sympathy towards a friendly Power labouring under misfortune. I will pass now to the prospective part of the hon. Member's Motion, where he says he hopes—but I do not imagine my hon. Friend intends to press the House for a positive declaration of its judgment— That Her Majesty's Government will, in the interest of the future tranquillity of Europe, use their good offices, before the negotiations of Peace are finally closed, to obtain from the Imperial Government some mitigation of the severity of these conditions. Well, after what I have stated, I hope it will be enough to satisfy my hon. Friend if I say that the spirit in which we have acted is that in which we shall endeavour to continue to act. I think that in the painful circumstances that have occurred, while we have shown that we are not indifferent to the afflictions of France, we have not by word or action endeavoured to curry favour with a great and triumphant Power. I think it would be the height of folly and a very grave offence if we were to undertake to judge with asperity the complaints that have been made of us in the German Press—complaints of all kinds, and in strong language, about the export of arms—or the threats of the vengeance to be inflicted upon us in future times by the triumphant arms of Germany, in consequence of our permitting an export of arms. It would have been, I think, not only impolitic but unjustifiable in us to treat these natural effusions of temper at a period of great and inevitable excitement as if they had been the results of deliberate judgment. So far as all those angry words, which may have been used on one side or the other, are concerned, we effaced them from our memories altogether, and, so far as we are concerned, those angry words shall not influence the future for evil or prevent a continuance of the most cordial feelings. I will only say one word more on the Motion of my hon. Friend, and point out the difficulty of dealing with a case of this kind. My hon. Friend says that we should endeavour to obtain some mitigation of the severity of the conditions. It would be most unwise for the British Government to be hampered by any expression of Parliament on a subject of that kind. In the endeavour to obtain some mitigation great good may be done. If we had any share—I do not say we had—in reducing ever so little the pecuniary indemnity, I am extremely glad, and I think that it was to the interest of Germany herself that a reduction should be made. This difficulty, moreover, is likely to arise. If you, proceeding upon abstract ideas, commit yourself, and endeavour to obtain some mitigation of the terms, you may incur two dangers—first of all, you may find that should you obtain anything at all, it will be utterly ineffectual as regards the substance of the matter at issue; and, secondly, by the mere attempt to obtain such ineffectual mitigation you both place yourself in the posi- tion of a debtor to the dominant Power, and forfeit somewhat of the independence of the Power on whose behalf you are endeavouring to act. I am not very sanguine as to the probability of opportunities for intervention arising, neither can we presume to prophesy in the present state of affairs in Paris. It would be dangerous and rash, indeed, to foretell what the immediate future might bring forth. All that I can say in this matter is, that we have no resentments; no separate objects; we have no selfish interests; we have no partialities. We wish to feel the ties that unite us with those Powers—to forget whatever may at any time have separated us from either of them, and I can assure the hon. Member we shall not fail, should an opportunity occur, for want of vigilance, for want of deep, earnest, and cordial interest in those nations, to use the friendly influence of this country, be that influence great or small, for purposes of the general good and the peace and tranquillity of Europe, and for the welfare of those particular nations which we know to be so dear to the hearts of the people of England.

MR. BAILLIE COCHRANE

said, he should not trouble the House to divide, especially after the speech of the right hon. Gentleman.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.