SECOND READING. ADJOURNED DEBATE. [FIFTH NIGHT.]

HC Deb 17 March 1871 vol 205 cc203-59

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [6th March], "That the Bill be now read a second time;" and which Amendment was, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, the expenditure necessary for the national defences and the other demands on the Exchequer do not at present justify any Vote of Public Money for the extinction of Purchase in the Army,"—(Colonel Loyd Lindsay,) —instead thereof.

Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

Debate resumed.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, that as this was the fifth night of the debate on the Amendment of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Berkshire (Colonel Loyd Lindsay), he wished to express to the House an apology, if he detained it for a short time in going over some portion of the ground which had already been traversed, and alluded to the matter which was now before the House from a different point of view from that in which it had been treated. He did so because he perceived that the Government measure would not re-organize the Army in any sense, but would only introduce a destructive element by abolishing the system of purchase which at present existed for the promotion of officers in the Army. During the last 10 years he had had the honour of being appointed by that House to serve upon three Committees, whose duty it had been to consider subjects which were extremely germane to the question now before it. He had had the honour of serving on the Committee on Navy Promotion and Retirement, over which the right hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. S. Walpole) presided; he had also had the honour of being a Member of the Committee on Seniority in the Artillery and Marines, over which, the right hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) presided; and he had had the honour of being a Member of the Army Colonels' Committee, in reference to promotion in the East India Army, and of which the hon. and gallant Member for Bewdley (Major Anson), who made an excellent speech the previous night on the subject before the House, was Chairman. He desired to allude to the Reports of these three Committees, because the system of promotion in the three services which these Committees referred to, were the very systems of promotion, one of which must be adopted, in the British Army in exchange for the system which now prevailed. He would take these Committees in the order in which they had sat and reported to the House. In the system of promotion and retirement in the Navy, it was ascertained by the Committee that up to the rank of captain in the Navy promotion was by selection, and from the rank of captain to that of flag officer promotion was by seniority. Either promotion would have to be by selection or by seniority under the altered conditions of the Army which was proposed by the present Bill. The Committee reported on the subject of promotion by selection, that— Notwithstanding the weight which deservedly must attach to some of these rules, your Committee are not prepared to recommend, as a general rule, a recurrence to a practice which the Admiralty had for nearly a century endeavoured to uphold, and were compelled to abandon. The late Lord Herbert of Lea was one of the witnesses who gave evidence before a Committee on the Navy, Army, and Ordnance Estimates, and on the 10th of July, 1848, he said— Then, again, I must say in respect to the Army the amount of promotion is very much larger in the Army, though the reductions in the dead weight have been greater. The Army themselves maintain an enormous retirement out of their own pocket by the system of purchase. Old men are bought out by young men, and there is a constant stream going through the Army, which has prevented their suffering from the evils which afflict the Navy. That was the evidence of one whom both sides of the House respected, and it was entitled to great weight, as being the opinion of one who had had great experience in the management of both the Army and the Navy. With regard to promotion by seniority, the Report of the Committee on the system in the Artillery and Engineers states— Your Committee are of opinion that the system, or, rather, the combination of contrivances under which officers are retired from the Artillery and Engineers is unsatisfactory. It is complicated, uncertain in its operation, based upon no clear principle, and inadequate for its purpose. And the Committee added— There can be no doubt, from the evidence of General Lefroy, that under them, at a future date, promotion in the Artillery will be entirely paralyzed. After such evidence as that there ought to be some very strong reason for suggesting the change which had been put forward by the Government Bill. The speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Bewdley (Major Anson) gave a very clear statement of what the present system was, and what results were to be expected from the Bill. He would not traverse that ground again; but he desired to point out to the House that a great deal of mischief had been done to the system of purchase by the name which was attributed to it. If the word purchase were not used, if there were not some sort of belief that promotion in the Army was a system of bargain and sale, he could not but believe that the House would hesitate before they consented to tax the country to the extent to which they proposed to tax it for the abolition of purchase. There were very few professions certainly, hardly any profession, in which the person who entered it had not, to some extent, to lodge a bond for his good behaviour, and that practice in the Army must be, and was, very much to the advantage of the country, for it happened that an officer, owing to his being able to pass an examination of a very high character, received his first commission and his promotion without any favour whatever. The ordinary average officer of good character and of good ability, passing such a test as might be thought necessary for the purpose, entered the Army, and lodged a bond for his good behaviour, and at each succeeding step he increased that bond. If at any period of his career he should fail in the performance of his duty and be cashiered he would forfeit his money; but if he fulfilled his duty with credit to himself and advantage to the country he could retire, at any time when his services could be spared, without adding a fraction to the national charge, but receiving back the money he had lodged as a bond for his good behaviour, and the money thus became the nest egg on which he and his family could live. Now, the proposal which was before the House was that the security to the State which was provided at present by the bond, which each officer gave by the purchase of his commission, should be done away with; and, in addition to that, the officer at the end of his career became a burden to the country to an enormous extent. Various estimates had been given of that expense; but no distinct estimate had been submitted by the Government of the amount of charge which would be entailed on the retired list. But all the estimates approximated very nearly, so nearly that he thought the House might fairly be guided by them. In the evidence which was before the Select Committee on the Artillery and Engineers, it was found that, though no sum of money was reported by the Committee in these two corps, the cost for the retirement which the Committee seemed to deem necessary would amount to £286,000 a-year, and the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington), having a regard to the interests of the taxpayers of this country, hesitated to incur so large an outlay. Comparing the number of officers in the artillery and engineers with the number of officers in the Line, it appeared to him that the sum of money which would be necessary for the retirement of officers of the Line would amount to £850,000 a-year. The hon. and gallant Member for Truro (Captain Vivian) had stated, or the statement had been quoted in that House, to which he had assented, that the sum would amount to about £1,000,000 per annum, and an estimate of £1,100,000 had been, given by the noble Lord the Member for Berwick (Viscount Bury). The House might assume that about £1,000,000 per annum would be necessary for retirement, and that £8,000,000 or £10,000,000 would be required for the purchase of the commissions, which were at present the property of the officers, and it would therefore be necessary to saddle the country in perpetuity with a sum of £38,000,000, in order to secure the doubtful benefit of extinguishing purchase in the Army. The hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Candlish) had recently addressed the House on the extinction of the National Debt, and would he support a proposal for adding £40,000,000 thereto? If he did, his vote would hardly bear out the views he had expressed to the House. That being the case, he could not see why the House should suddenly plunge into this enormous expenditure, when it had been shown by three Committees before the House that promotion by selection, promotion by seniority, and promotion by the bonus system, on which latter the Indian Committee reported adversely, were systems which could not be recommended in place of the system which at present prevailed. The advantages of the system of purchase had been frequently pointed out. In the first place, there was much less dissatisfaction caused among the gentlemen in the profession, some of whom had passed the highest tests, at being passed over by reason of an arrangement in which all had agreed—namely, the lodging of a considerable sum of money in the hands of the Government. If any process of selection were adopted, all officers who were passed over would deem themselves aggrieved. There was only one mode in which selection could be exercised with advantage to the State, and that was by a general in command of an army in the field. In that case, it was desirable that a commander should have the power of rewarding distinguished services, for that would give a great stimulus to personal bravery and gallantry. The want of that power was complained of by the Duke of Wellington in his despatches from Spain. There had never been jealousy in the Army or Navy when, in the course of a war, the good luck of an officer enabled him to distinguish himself, and when he received a reward for his bravery. On the contrary, rather a desire was kindled in the breasts of others to distinguish themselves in a similar manner. But during a time of peace when an army was quartered in all directions, and in all climates, it was impossible for officers to bring to the notice of any Board of officers in a satisfactory manner the merits of officers who were performing their ordinary duties. Every promotion, except a promotion by seniority, would be challenged by those who were passed over, and the result of the challenge would be the very natural feeling of dissastifaction in the breasts of the officers who were passed over on the ground that they were less meritorious than those who had been promoted. The system of selection, under these circumstances, would naturally dwindle down to seniority. There was one branch of the Navy which the right hon. Baronet (Sir John Pakington), when he was with him in the Admiralty, entrusted to his care. It was a very small matter—the Paymasters of the Navy. He had then submitted to his right hon. Friend a scheme of promotion to which he acceded. No promotion was made in that branch of the service while he was there; but in the vacancies which occurred—he had always waited for three vacancies before filling up any of them—two were given to seniors, and one was given to some young man who had distinguished himself. But the number of young officers promoted in the year was so very small that those who were passed over, although they might feel aggrieved, were not able to make their grievances known. The scheme must have dwindled at once down to a seniority promotion if the expedient had not been adopted of occasionally giving promotion to young officers, so as not to keep the upper branch so old as to be unfit for service. The plan to which he had just referred was not a new one, but had been recommended by the Army Organization Committee of 1848. It would be utterly impossible, however, to apply a rule of that kind to promotion in the Army. If the attempt were made, he believed that, except in the case of officers who had rendered eminent service before the enemy, the promotion would, in practice, be entirely by seniority. And if it were to be by seniority alone, they would do away with a great deal of emulation and of esprit de corps to an extent that would be destructive to the regimental system. He therefore felt that before the House pledged itself to this enormous expenditure—for it was an enormous expenditure—of £38,000,000 to change the system of promotion which had worked well, it ought to take care to investigate that system of promotion which was proposed to be established in its place. There was another system which was brought under the notice of the Army Colonels' Committee—a system of bonus, in which all the officers contributed to buy out the man at the head of the regiment; but even under that system there was not enough money to obtain that rapid flow of promotion which could give vitality to the Army. Before sitting down, he desired to say a word on one of the branches of the military profession, and to point out that the money proposed to be spent in the abolition of purchase might have been laid out in a manner much more advantageous to the public. There would be laid on the Table of the House in a very few days—he believed it was now very nearly completed—the continuation of the Returns of guns which had been made, and which was supplementary to the Return laid on the Table of the House last year. He believed he should not be mistaken if he said that these Returns would show the House that, at this present moment, for our peace establishment—not for any war establishment, but for our peace establishment, including the Navy, there would be required an expenditure of £3,228,000, and that not for ships which were obsolete, but for effective ships and for the field artillery. He thought that 1,628 guns were required for the forts which had been built on our coast, besides a number for Gibraltar, Malta, and Quebec. About 3,000 guns would be required to complete the field artillery, and 1,000 guns for ships which were on the effective list. And in addition to that, a large sum would be required to provide munitions of war, carriages, and the matériel necessary to render the guns useful. Now, with this expenditure staring us in the face, was it wise to spend £8,000,000 at once in buying up commissions, and to incur a permanent charge of something like 1d. or 2d. in the pound income tax in order to provide for the retirement of officers from the Army? For his own part, he believed no system which had ever been successfully worked had been so advantageous in regard to promotion as the so-called system of purchase. However that might be, he was of opinion that until hon. Members had before them all the details of the proposed system it could not be right to impose on the taxpayers a charge of £1,000,000 a-year in perpetuity and a payment of £8,000,000 down. For these reasons, he intended to support the Motion of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Berkshire.

MR. ANDERSON

said, he hoped neither the Speaker nor the House would entertain the idea that the course he had felt it his duty to take on the previous night's debate was from any undue wish to force his opinions on the House, or to attribute too much to the circumstance that the constituency he represented was a large one. In ordinary questions it might be different; but he thought the House would admit that in questions involving a large amount of taxation there was a peculiar fitness in the House learning the opinions of the large constituencies, so far as it could do so, through their Representatives, and when he had observed that London, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Manchester, Liverpool, and Sheffield were all unrepresented in the debate, he thought that Birmingham was not enough. There was the additional reason that though the general subject appeared to have been pretty well threshed out, the two points on which he particularly wished to speak—the Volunteer question, and the payment of the over-regulation prices—had been very slightly touched. As regarded the Volunteer force, the scheme was very faulty. The Secretary of State for War had said that the Volunteers were satisfied. He wished to remove the impression that they were so. He knew they were not; and he did not believe they had in any way done anything that could give that idea. On the contrary, the officers of the West of Scotland had prepared a return which absolutely proved that not 5s. but 12s. 10d. was the deficiency, and their returns had never been in any way refuted. The War Office had made out 5s. to be the deficiency; but it was done by taking some exceptional corps who had nothing to pay for ranges, who got Westminster Hall for nothing to drill in, and who turned out so seldom that their uniforms lasted long; but these figures could easily be contradicted. However, supposing 5s. to be the amount, did Government give that? They had taken great credit for being the first to acknowledge that Government ought to pay all necessary expenses, and having found out that 5s. was necessary, and that the Volunteers had, therefore, been bearing that deficiency for years, the duty of Government was at once to relieve them of the burden; but instead of that they had proposed a scheme which they knew, or ought to have known, could not give even 5s. The right hon. Gentleman proposed that five sergeants and three officers shall be enabled to earn £2 10s. each, and provided that every one of them should succeed in doing this, he contends that that would amount to 5s. a-head for 80 men. But he ought to know that the establishment is only four sergeants, not five, to 80 men. And he also knew that many officerships were vacant, and could not be filled, on account of the pecuniary burdens. The scheme was, therefore, only calculated to make those officers who had done their best to be efficient, and to bring their men up to the standard, bear the burden of those who had failed, or who did not exist; and he believed it would be shown that though some odd companies earned the full 5s., no whole battalions would be found to have done so. They ought first to have fairly freed them of the acknowledged burden, and then imposed conditions. Then about shooting. The scheme was to make no allowance at all to those men who did not do sufficient shooting to get out of the third class; thus depriving them of the 20s. they now earned. The right hon. Gentleman said he had seen 60 rounds done in two minutes at Wimbledon, and therefore he was not asking much; but did he know anything of the difficulties about ranges? Was Government prepared to provide accessible ranges? Was it not the fact that City Volunteers had to travel from three to ten miles to get to their range, and when there to fall in and take turn in their squad? It was not consistent with musketry regulations to fire through the classes in one day—so that, instead of two minutes, it took nearer two days! But, supposing it to be a good rule to apply to the Volunteer force, why penalize them alone? The right hon. Gentleman said it was an anomaly for a rifleman not to go to the butts; but if an anomaly for a Volunteer, who with his administration cost less than £4 a-year, was it less so with a Militiaman, who with his administration cost over £11 a-year; who notoriously could not shoot; who was seldom taught to shoot at all? That needed no proof. He had merely to state that, while the number of men was not very widely different, the ammunition expended by the Volunteers was £60,000 a-year, and that by the Militia only £8,000, showing how little they shoot. But was the Lineman so much of a shot that even his position justified thus penalizing the Volunteer alone? Let the right hon. Gentleman deprive the Lineman who could not shoot of his pay, and the Militiaman who could not shoot of his pay and allowances, and he was very sure the Volunteer would not shrink from a similar test. Why, if there was one thing the Volunteer could do, he could shoot. If there was one service the Volunteer force had conferred on the country, it was that they had made rifle shooting a national pastime and a national science, and had in that taught England to lead the world. He thought that was a service that could not be denied to the Volunteer force, and yet this was the very point that was selected to penalize them in. The Bill gave no encouragement to extend their efforts in nationalizing rifle practice. The next penalty he came to—for as regarded the force the Bill was all penalty—was that they were to be put under the Mutiny Act when brigaded with other troops. But what was their present position? In case of invasion they were to come under the Mutiny Act, and perform all the duties of regular soldiers; but, on the other hand, they were to receive all the emoluments also. Here the right hon. Gentleman proposed to give them the penalties and duties without the emoluments. That was unfair; but it was more than unfair, more even than useless, for it was damaging. At present, when in the field, their discipline was quite good. He had himself been in the force from the beginning, and had been present at every great turn-out in Scotland, and whether in battalion or acting on the Staff, he never saw any want of discipline in the Volunteers; and he had no hesitation in saying that if there was any slackness of discipline, it was more the fault of the commanding officer not using his powers, than of any unwillingness in the men to obey. But their difficulty was to get men to turn out, not to deal with them after they were out, and how was the Bill to help them in this respect? Actually by a penalty that would deter the men from coming. The reasons why they could not get our men out were well known. In the first enthusiasm of the Volunteer movement, employers took a pride in having their men out; but that had all died away now, and employers looked with disfavour on their young men asking for holidays to attend drill. Unless, therefore, the Bill should offer some inducements to get the men out, it will do harm instead of good. They wanted more inducements; and he proposed at least the very small one, that those who had already given five years efficient service should be as free from Ballot as the future yearly engagement men. The fact was, that far too much was expected from the Volunteers. They had done far more than was expected at first, and the more they did the more was demanded, till now officers not only without pay, but bearing a heavy pecuniary burden, were expected to pass as severe an examination as salaried officers of the Line, and the men without pay were expected to be as good as Regulars. He quite approved of one part of the right hon. Gentleman's scheme, and that was attenuated battalions—keeping up the cadre of a regiment, and letting the rank and file get few. But to make that good they needed something at the back of it—if not a people trained by conscription, at least a people with considerable knowledge of drill and skill in arms. And how was that to be got? He would propose two mild expedients. One was to encourage the Volunteers, so that a greater number of men should pass through their ranks. They did not care about the same men staying always, but allow them to retire after a time with some privilege. The Volunteers had done something towards disciplining the people, and their services had not been acknowledged. Already, he believed, that they had trained twice as many, or more, as remained in the ranks. These men would be quite ready to return in case of emergency, and the number might be greatly increased, so that when danger came the ranks of the Army could be filled not with raw recruits, but with men who could fall into their places, and do good service there. The other expedient was to introduce drill at all schools. He could see no objection to that; and its results would be to give, in the course of a very few years, a considerable amount of training to the people. He wished to say a little about the purchase system. He considered it a bar to all economy and all reform, and that its abolition would open the door to many economies that were hardly thought of. The hon. and gallant Member for Bewdley (Major Anson) had made an excellent speech, and had brought forward his arguments in a very able manner; but he had over-proved his case. He tried to show that under the present system the Army was cheaply officered. He even said the officers now served their country for nothing; but, able as his arguments were, one simple fact was enough to sweep them all away, and it was that each man in the Army cost over £100 a-year, and the hon. and gallant Member for Truro (Captain Vivian) proved that only £34 went to the private. So it was evident £66 per man over the whole Army went to pay for officers, for administration, for pensions, and for stores. He thought that was absurd. If our Army costs £15,000,000—five going to the one, and ten to the other—it proved that our mode of officering the Army was not very cheap. He was surprised that the Gentlemen in the profession did not hail the Government Bill, instead of endeavouring to crush it. The Government offer, in the matter of over-regulation price, was very liberal, and would hardly be supported if submitted to the constituencies. He, for one, should oppose it strongly, as he considered that to pay over-regulation prices was only rewarding men for having broken the law. They had to consider not only the £3,000,000 which it would cost to do it, but also the effect on the future. Would it be anything but an inducement to men to find new ways of evading any new law we made? A great deal had been said about keeping up the gentlemanly feeling in the Army, and a great deal about their indifference to money and their sensitiveness of honour. Why, up to 1824, every officer had to sign a declaration, on his honour as a gentleman, that he had not paid and would not pay over-regulation prices. Yet they did it; and even now adjutants of Volunteers had to sign a very strong declaration to a similar effect, and yet men who considered themselves officers and gentlemen bought and sold adjutantcies every day. In the Queen's Regulations, up to 1868, there had been the most stringent rule on the subject. It provided— That any officer guilty of paying or receiving more than the regulation sum for his commission shall be tried by court-martial and cashiered, and that even if he have left the service he shall be liable to indictment for misdemeanour. He was sure those gallant Officers in the House who had been in the Army had all done their purchasing and selling with that regulation staring them in the face; and, though it had now dropped out of the Queen's Regulations, the Act of Parliament was still unrepealed, and, as the Committee had reported that the military authorities had in no way sanctioned the practice, he would oppose paying the over-regulation price. He would also oppose the proposal of the hon. Members for Warrington (Mr. Rylands) and for Birmingham (Mr. Muntz), to pay down the regulation price at once; but as that had already been replied to by the right hon. and gallant Member for Ripon (Sir Henry Storks), he would not now trouble the House with repeating it. Subject to these amendments, he would cordially support the Bill. He wished to ask if the Bill applied, as regarded Ballot and barracks, to Scotland, as he noticed that the rules for Ballot were strictly limited to England, and the machinery for building barracks did not suit for Scotland, but he had no particular wish that that provision should apply?

MR. HERMON

said, he could not support the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire (Colonel Loyd Lindsay), for he was in favour of the abolition of purchase, if such a proposal were coupled with a good scheme of retirement and promotion. As, however, he did not see that these points were provided for in the Bill of the Government, he could not vote for that measure. In proposing to pay over-regulation as well as regulation prices, the Government were going quite as far as they could, and by this handsome dealing with the money question had disarmed a good deal of criticism. But in the opinion of military men the Bill was not calculated to improve the service or uphold the regimental system, which was so highly extolled. The Secretary of State proposed to build barracks for the Militia out of the county rates. Now, he looked upon the defence of the country as an Imperial question, and though these barracks were a step in the right direction by preventing billeting, they should be paid for out of the Consolidated Fund or out of the annual Revenue. The right hon. Gentleman proposed an increase of £3,000,000 in his Estimates besides the sum necessary for the abolition of purchase; but the country was not parsimonious, and would not grudge the money, if only there was a guarantee for its judicious expenditure. He regretted, however, to find no good practical scheme in the Bill for the amalgamation of the Army, the Militia, and the Volunteers. His own proposal was, that after paying the Militia for four weeks' drill, they should have permanent pay of 2d. a-day, although the Chancellor of the Exchequer might prefer 1d. That sum would depend upon the men presenting themselves one Saturday afternoon every month, which periodical drill would keep them in form. If the Government abolished the purchase system without establishing a good plan of retirement and securing an efficient re-organization of the Army, they would simply be destroying a system which had done well in times past.

MR. R. R. TORRENS

said, he was desirous to elicit from the Government an account of what might reasonably be assumed as the set-off against the very heavy charge which the present measure would necessarily lay on the taxpayers of the country. While the minimum charge for the abolition of purchase was definitely fixed at £8,000,000, there was much indefiniteness about the maximum, some placing it at £15,000,000 and others at £20,000,000. There was still more indefiniteness as to any savings that might be assumed as a set-off against this charge. The first item of saving mentioned by the hon. Member for the Border Burghs (Mr. Trevelyan), as a consequence of the short-service system, was a prospective diminution in the remote future of the charge now incurred for Chelsea Hospital and military pensions, although he (Mr. R. Torrens) thought the right hon. Gentleman might with advantage show more faith in that principle, and substitute 9 for 12 years, applicable to men enlisting under the 1st Schedule, and a maximum of three years' service with colours before entering the 2nd Schedule. Other savings might, however, have been more definitely stated, such as the amount of pay given to cornets and ensigns, as that grade in the service was not to be continued. He should like to see the Secretary for War lift his hand a little higher, and prune the upper branches of the service, dealing with the dead weight and the non-productive branches of the Army. He should like to know whether the Government would pledge themselves not to make any more appointments to honorary colonelcies, for thereby a saving might be effected, without impairing the efficiency of the Army, of £163,000 a-year? He would also ask the Government whether, as the number of general officers was in the proportion of one to 240 rank and file, they contemplated to reduce the number gradually, as deaths occurred, to something like the reasonable requirements of the service? Such a proceeding would effect a saving of £60,000 or £100,000 a-year. Another question he would put to the Secretary for War was whether he contemplated in a short period to discontinue the payment to Army agents out of the public funds, amounting to £37,000 a-year? Adding all these savings to the saving which might be expected from the abolition of the rank of ensigns and cornets, and on account of the diminished expenditure for Chelsea Hospital and the Pensioners, it was impossible to calculate the amount of saving at less than £500,000. He put these questions in no spirit of hostility, but to enable the Government to impart more information on the subject. He must express his unmitigated condemnation of the compulsory Ballot Clauses of the Bill, which, in case of an emergency, would place undisciplined and untrained men in the field in these days of scientific war and arms of precision. That would be a highly culpable mistake, which, indeed, had been most impressively pointed out by the Secretary for War himself. He hoped the Government would be prevailed upon to entertain a proposition which he had urged on their acceptance, requiring, as a condition to receiving public money in aid of primary schools, that military drill should be systematically taught to the youth of the country. Then these clauses might safely remain in the Bill, for when an emergency arose there would be a body of trained men at once to place in the ranks. The 24th section of the Revised Code permissively authorized instruction in drill, and two hours a week would be allowed to count as instruction under the head of military drill. The time allowed was ample for the purpose; but the subject should be included among those selected as standards of examination, and should be systematic and uniform throughout the country.

COLONEL DYOTT

said, he thought the unreasonable and unjust statements which had been put forth during the debate ought not to pass unnoticed. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War congratulated himself that in rearing a mere superstructure, he would recognize the fundamental principles on which our military system was now based, his object being to combine all the various elements into one harmonious whole. But his Bill did not fulfil the expectations held out. The system of purchase was one of the foundations upon which the regimental system was founded. Yet it was abolished, while the principle that the Militia service was the old constitutional service, so far as a Reserve was concerned, was entirely demolished. He could see no possible connection between the amalgamation of the Militia and the Line and the abolition of purchase. At present there was a much closer connection between the two branches of the service than could be under the Bill, because half-pay officers served in the Militia, while non-commissioned officers of the Line were the most numerous on the Staff. If fault was found with the present system in point of numbers, it must be because of there being too many and not of there being too few. Six companies of 100 men each, rank and file, were deemed, some years ago, the handiest battalion that could be taken into the field. It had been said that the Militia was ill-trained and ill-officered. Now, so far as his own experience was concerned, that charge was altogether unfounded. What was likely to be the case for the future? One hon. Gentleman had stated that it was necessary to have a solid nucleus of professional officers; but were they to be established without the local authorities having any voice in the matter? He should like to know how the Secretary for War reconciled that with the statement that he had raised his new superstructure upon the old fundamental principles of the service? In his opinion, if the Army Regulation Bill was to be carried out to its full extent, instead of re-organizing the Militia service it would tend very greatly to disorganize it. It would not at all tend to increase that harmony which ought to exist amongst the officers at the present time; and with regard to the men, the proposal to send Militia recruits to some central place of training, to be kept there for six months, would deter many men from enrolling themselves in the ranks. Hitherto there had been no difficulty in raising and maintaining the Militia regiments, and his own had given 1,460 men to the Line. He thought it would be much better to let the present system alone, than to adopt the change proposed by the Government. In his opinion, the Bill contained the minimum of good and the maximum of evil. If the present system had some faults, it had also some good, and he, for one, would Rather bear those ills we have Than fly to others that we know not of. For these reasons he should, with a clear conscience, vote against the second reading of the Bill.

SIR WILLIAM RUSSELL

regretted that, owing to the terms of the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire (Colonel Loyd Lindsay), the debate had been confined almost exclusively to the subject of the abolition of purchase in the Army, which was in truth only a secondary point in the much larger question of the re-organization of our forces. He agreed cordially with the statement of the hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire that the purchase system had given us a constant flow of officers, who had done their duty on every occasion to the satisfaction of the country. Four arguments had been used against the abolition of the purchase system. It was said that the purchase system had given us good officers, and that it was not likely the system of non-purchase would give us the same class of men; but he had not heard any reason to satisfy him why we should not have the same class of men for the future that we had had in times past. It was next said that it would destroy the regimental system. That system, no doubt, was extremely valuable; but he thought that if the Government proposed to maintain the regimental seniority up to the rank of major that would be sufficient to maintain the regimental system in its most important point. With regard to the rapidity of promotion and self-adjustment, which were two great and important points in favour of the purchase system, he could not see that the pro- posal of the Government would prevent either. On the contrary, he thought that the two things which they proposed would assist very materially—namely, that the major and lieutenant-colonel of a regiment should hold those appointments for five years, as Staff appointments. The next point that would have to be considered with regard to the rapidity of promotion was, that the country must be prepared to give a fair scale of retirement to take the place of the existing money payments. He would make the payment by the country of the money which the officers would lose by the Bill a necessity. He thought that if officers who had served not less than 5 nor more than 15 years should receive on retiring from the service a bonus of £100 for every year they had served, that would be a sufficient inducement to those who had entered the Army and found that the Army did not suit them, or they did not suit it, to enter some other occupation in which they would do better. Thus the stagnation would be relieved in the lower ranks of the Army, where it would be most likely to exist. With regard to the retirement of the senior ranks, that must be left to the Government, which alone could effectually deal with the matter. Of the arguments against the abolition of purchase, one was that any scheme of re-organization was rendered impossible by its existence. He could not himself see that such was the case. Without saying that re-organization was rendered impossible by the retention of the purchase system, he believed that its abolition would greatly facilitate such re-organization. He now came to the great argument which weighed with him in voting upon this measure. He referred to the great injustice that was done by the existing system to the poorer officers, many of whom were the most efficient in the service, but who were passed over from time to time by others possessed of more means. Having himself served for 30 years, 25 of them on full-pay, purchasing all his steps, he had seen many cases of that kind, which had forced, on him the conviction that the purchase system must sooner or later be swept away. He thought the Army would be very unwise if it did not accept the offer of the Goverment, and endeavour through its Representatives in that House to get the terms modified so as to suit it better. He greatly doubted whether the officers would have so good an offer again, because, though the country was now prepared to deal liberally with them, it might not at another time be in the same mood. He would also support the second reading of the Bill, because he was fully convinced of the absolute necessity of an effectual re-organization of our forces. But he regretted to say that the Government had not dealt with the subject in the large, comprehensive, and satisfactory manner that might have been expected. He did not think they had started on a sound basis. The proposal of the Government simply amounted to an extension of our present inefficient machinery. What the country required was a voluntary system. He did not believe that it would submit to a compulsory system till the voluntary system was proved to have entirely failed. He had entire confidence in the voluntary principle, and believed that it would always prove sufficient for our requirements. Another thing which the country required was that a large body of civilians should be passed through a school for drill and discipline, so as to be thoroughly trained at the least possible cost and disturbance to the civil occupations of the country; then to be returned to civil life, from which they would again be withdrawn when required for the national defence. Again, owing to our Indian Empire and our Colonies, and the requirements of our national obligations, it was absolutely necessary that we should have men enlisted for a longer term of service, that those men should be of the smallest possible number, and in the highest state of efficiency. It was useless patching up this old system of ours, which, well as it had worked in times past, and valuable as it had been proved to be, was entirely unsuited to the present times. Every nation in Europe was making its entire male population into soldiers, and he would like to see Her Majesty's Government lay down some sound, elastic, and intelligible principle on which the forces for the defence of this country should be raised—a principle which he could nowhere find in this Bill. He would not wish to copy servilely any foreign systems. He would pick out from them those portions which would suit our national habits and tastes. He would not submit to have all our male population trained as soldiers. We had a great advantage over foreign nations. We had the "silver streak," which was most valuable to us. We had our magnificent Navy, which was a match for all the navies in the world, as our first and main line of defence, and to which we ought to devote our main care. He believed that no nation could break through that first line of defence unless by surprise. Our Navy might be eluded; but it could not be defeated. England wished for peace; but she was determined to have no more war panics: she was determined also that our opinions, as a nation, should be respected by foreign nations, because they knew that that opinion could be enforced. With regard to the period of service, he could not agree with the hon. and learned Member for Nottingham (Mr. A. Herbert) that three months was a sufficient period for training. We did not give a military training to the boys in our schools which was given in Switzerland, and which he thought would be a great advantage; but as we did not do so, three months' training would not be sufficient. It might be sufficient for mere drill, but not for discipline, which was a far more important matter. It took 12 months to teach an infantry soldier discipline, and an artilleryman would require two years' training. A year would amply suffice to teach an infantry soldier drill and discipline, without taking him too long away from his civil occupation or giving him a distaste for it. He believed that the only real and constitutional force on which this country ought to rely, was not our Regular Army, but our general Militia. He called it a general Militia in order to distinguish it from the present Militia regiments, which he would, call the local Militia. He believed that that general Militia must be the tree deeply rooted in the soil of this country, and drawing its supplies from that soil would furnish nourishment to its branches. He believed that the enlistment in that Militia must be voluntary; that it should be for one year, the Ballot being retained to make up the quota should the number of Recruits be found insufficient by the voluntary enlistment. This tree should have a branch, consisting of the standing Army, which should pass out by voluntary enlistment after the first year, and from that should come the Army Re- serves and the Pensioners. There should be another and main branch rising from the stem, which should be the local Militia, similar to the Militia as at present existing. That should be for five years, and from this should spring their Militia Reserves, which should exist for 10 years, and then going back to the general Militia. The general Militia ought to be the most perfect machine possible for the purpose of manufacturing trained men. The force must always be embodied. It must be quite complete, composed of all the various branches of the service, infantry, artillery, hospital appliances, and all the various services. It should be located in 10 different departments of the country, each forming a division of the Army of Defence. This general Militia should consist of men of from 18 to 21 years of age, who should be recruited and enlisted for terms of one year's service in this force, five years in the local Militia, and 10 years in the Reserve. The officers of the general Militia should be appointed from the Regular Army. It should be considered a Staff appointment in the Army, both for officers and non-commissioned officers. They should receive, during the time of service, extra pay, and should have a step of rank on leaving it, in order to induce the best men to be anxious to serve for this purpose. Then to meet the requirements of India and the Colonies, they would have a 12 years' term of service for the men taken from the general Militia into the standing Army. He did not think that there would be any difficulty in getting the men to volunteer from the general Militia into the Army. Then there would be this great advantage, that all the men joining the Army would be trained soldiers. All the rest of the men must go into the local Militia for five years. If this scheme were adopted they would get a standing Army of 150,000 men by voluntary enlistment, all trained men instead of recruits; an Army of Reserve and Pensioners, which would give, after allowing for casualties, a force of 725,000 men eligible for service in case of emergency, with 160,000 Volunteers, to whom he would give all encouragement—making a total of 885,000 out of an annual enlistment of 50,000 men, at no greater cost than the present charge for the standing Army. These 885,000 men would consist of 50,000 general Militia, 150,000 standing Army, including the men in India; 100,000 of the first Army of Reserve, 100,000 second Army Reserve and Pensioners, 125,000 local Militia, 200,000 first Militia Reserve, and 160,000 Volunteers. He urged upon the Government to found their scheme upon some larger basis than they at present contemplated. With regard to the Volunteers, they had received but scant courtesy from the Secretary for War. He thought they deserved every encouragement that could be given to them. Although they could never be expected to work in large bodies, their services, as light troops, would be available in case of invasion. If the attempt were made to put the Volunteer force under the Mutiny Act, he believed the result would be that one-half of them would resign. He did not think there was any occasion to put them under that Act, considering the way in which the Volunteers had indicated their anxiety to serve the country. The general scheme of the Government should be based on a sound and broad principle that would admit of elasticity. In his view the Militia should form the mainstay and source from which all our troops should be derived. He proposed to vote for the second reading of the Bill, because he approved the principle of re-organizing the forces; but he also proposed to embody his own idea of re-organization in clauses which, if the House approved, might be incorporated with the Bill in Committee.

MAJOR WALKER

said, he did not intend, towards the close of the fifth evening of debate on this Bill, even to refer to the purchase or to the regimental system. He had chosen for himself a much humbler task—that of criticizing, but in no unfriendly spirit, the proposal of the Government with reference to the Militia service. He did so the more readily, because he thought the subject had been touched upon imperfectly, and there was a general concurrence of sentiment that the Militia was the only constitutional force of the country, and that something should be done towards its amalgamation with the Line. With regard to the doing away with the power of the Lords Lieutenant in the appointment of officers, that proposal had his entire concurrence; for not only was the present system a cumbrous one, but he thought it was seemly that officers who commanded Her Majesty's troops should hold their commissions direct from the Crown. The grounds, however, on which the change was justified had been much exaggerated. One popular idea on the subject was that Lords Lieutenant had been in the habit of making these appointments purely from personal or political motives, and that, consequently, the ranks of our Militia force were officered by country gentlemen entirely ignorant of military duty. On this point it would suffice for him to remind the House that the very large majority of the commanding officers in the Militia had served in the Regular Army; while the minority were far from being civilians utterly ignorant of military duty. Doubtless much remained to be done. Considering the neglect the Militia service had suffered during the last 10 years his wonder was, not that inefficiency should exist, but that there should be so much efficiency, and he could confirm the statement of the Secretary for War that since the right hon. Gentleman had applied himself to raising the Militia service in the estimation of the country, there had been a gradual but marked improvement in both the number and quality of those who offered themselves for service. In reference to the proposal of bringing officers into the Militia from the Regular Army, he had always advocated that some such course ought to be adopted, in order to impart a professional leaven to the civilian element which formed the bulk of the service. While that was desirable, the principle involved was one which might be productive of great good or of great evil. A great good would arise if the introduction of the professional officer were limited to cases where officers of regiments in the higher ranks of the Militia were incapable of performing their duties efficiently. If, on the other hand, the professional element were used simply as a convenience for the service, as a means, for instance, of disposing of men on half-pay, and of reducing charges on the non-effective list, then he feared a great evil would be the result, because there were already in the Militia 2,000 gentlemen, many of whom had acquired a thorough knowledge of their professional duties. In the course of this debate, much had been said about a service of seniority. The Militia had certainly a service of seniority; but it was one aggravated by several peculiar circumstances. It was a service of seniority in which promotion was entirely checked at the stage of lieutenant-colonel. Promotion in the Militia, especially in the higher grades, was very uncertain and slow; and if, in addition to this stagnation, officers were brought in from the Line to fill the higher appointments, another obstacle would be raised, and the system would become entirely blocked, as in the course of years the junior ranks would be crowded with men from 40 to 60 years of age. He therefore hoped the Secretary for War would see the delicacy of working this system, and the propriety of establishing a high standard of efficiency for Militia officers in every grade, and that he would, at the same time, afford every fair opportunity of attaining that standard by means of schools and camps of instruction. As to the small amount of training which it was proposed to give to Militia recruits, his observations would differ from those of hon. Members who had criticized that portion of the measure. If he could see his way to calling out the Militia for the 12 or 24 months he would gladly support such a scheme; but there was one important consideration which had rather been lost sight of in the course of this debate, and that was that the Militiamen and the soldiers of the Line were not really drawn from the same classes of society. It was a popular idea with officers of the Regular Army that all recruiting for the Militia was a sort of poaching on the preserves of the Line, and that every man enlisted in the Militia was a soldier lost to the Regular Army. But that idea had very little foundation in fact. It might be true, though he disputed even that, that the social classes from which both ranks of men were taken were to a certain extent identical in each case; but the motives which induced the Militiaman to enlist were very different from those which induced the enlistment of the soldier of the Line. The man who enlisted in the Line had generally quarrelled with the society in which he lived—with his town, his village, or his home—or else he was a man of a reckless and roving disposition, who sought to satisfy the instincts of his nature by foreign service and expatriation. But the Militiaman enlisted from entirely different motives—he had not the least idea of divorcing himself from the occupations of civil life, and only joined that force because he found his pay, and the annual retaining fee, a very welcome addition to his scanty means, while the healthy exercise and the pageantry of soldiering afforded a pleasant variety to the monotony of his daily toil. He would give the House an illustration in support of this view. At the close of the Sepoy war a large body of Militiamen were quartered at Aldershot. It was decided to disembody a large portion of them, and at the same time it was thought desirable to increase the strength of the standing Army, because there was growing up between this country and France that uneasy feeling which a year later resulted in the Volunteer movement. It was believed that some Militia officers had stood in the way of their men volunteering into the Army—that, if the regiments were disembodied, the officers would not have any object to serve, and that the men being permeated with martial instincts would be only too glad of the chance of entering the Line. It was imagined that there would be no difficulty in securing a large proportion of those Militiamen for the Army, and volunteering was, therefore, commenced in anticipation of receiving a large accession of troops. Recruiting officers were sent down from Westminster; but the result was that of the three battalions, numbering 1,500 men, they only brought back four recruits. He would give another instance. Shortly after the Volunteer movement commenced, the training of the Militia was, as a matter of paltry economy, reduced to 21 days in the year. The commanding officers, finding it impossible to carry on the Militia under these conditions, made strong representations on the subject to the Secretary of State for War, and after some negotiations it was decided to increase the training to 27 days, on condition that there should be a reduction of 25 per cent made in the rank and file in order to provide funds for the additional training. This step threw 20,000 or 30,000 men into the recruiting market. Now, if the Line and the Militia were recruited from the same classes of society, it is obvious that the result must have been an immense accession to the number of men available for the Line. In point of fact, however, that period was the very one in which the recruiting for the Line fell to such an extent that the Army was 20,000 below the establishment, and it became necessary to appoint a Royal Commission to investigate the subject of recruiting. He wished now to make a few remarks respecting the training which the country could afford to give to the Militia. If the period of training were largely extended the present class of men would be driven out of the Militia, and it would be necessary to begin an active and dangerous system of recruiting in opposition to the Regular Army. He thought, therefore, that the Secretary of State was right in approaching this subject of increasing the period of training in a very tentative manner. He should be very glad if the period could be extended to three months; but he did not think the right hon. Gentleman could go further without interfering with the recruiting for the Line. Referring to certain points which were omitted from the Bill, he said everybody who had studied the subject was aware it was of the first importance to bring the Militia together in brigades and divisions. It was not worth while arguing whether it was sound policy to establish the largest possible military unit for the purpose of training and exercise. The regiment was in this country the military unit. This, indeed, was inevitable because we could not keep our Regular Army together in great bodies, as large numbers of troops were always on service in the Colonies. But what was impossible in the Regular Army was perfectly easy and practicable for the Militia. It should be remembered that the Militia was a local force. The men were year after year at the same head quarters, and, therefore, there could be no difficulty in bringing them together. Every professional soldier would agree with him that four battalions accustomed to act together in brigade, and knowing their brigadier and Staff, would be worth at least five battalions brought together hurriedly, perhaps on the eve of action, and utter strangers to one another and to the officers who commanded them. He regretted, therefore, that he did not find either in the Bill or the Estimates any indication of an extensive system of brigading the Militia. He admitted it was not easy to introduce matters of this kind into the Bill or the Army Estimates; but, still, if the scheme was to be carried out on a large scale some indication of such intention would probably have been given in one or the other. There was another point of equal, if not greater importance. We could get any number of men and bring them into a fair state of efficiency; but this was useless unless we could place them under the command of well-trained and well-instructed officers. There was little difficulty in obtaining the services of an almost unlimited number of young men of the leisure classes of the country, who were best fitted for the purpose, and there could be no difficulty in giving them sufficient instruction for the simple duties they had to perform. To a certain extent the Secretary of State had provided for the necessity by establishing certain schools of instruction; but he feared the right hon. Gentleman fell short of the necessities of the case in more than one respect. In the first place, the amount of training was quite inadequate. It might be better than nothing that young men joining the Militia should go through a course of one month's instruction; but that time ought, in his judgment, to be multiplied by three, in order to be really effective. A more serious objection to this part of the Government measure was that it was one of those permissive schemes which were so popular at the present moment. The permissive system might do very well for a Liquor Bill; but it was not right to tell a gentleman who was to have the command of troops that it was optional with him whether he should know his duties or not. He hoped, therefore, the Secretary of State would exchange permission for compulsion, and insist that every officer should go through a sufficient course of instruction. In connection with the Militia service there was another important question, on which he had spoken every Session since he had had the honour of a seat in that House. He meant the question of billeting. As far as drill was concerned it was impossible to get the same amount of work out of men quartered in billets as could be got out of men quartered in barracks, for the same punctuality and restraint which were to be found in barracks could not be found under the billeting system. In many cases men who were quartered in billets had to go backwards and forwards between their quarters and the place of drill eight, nine, and ten miles a-day. Such a waste of power was wholly indefensible. Drill, however, was but a small part of a soldier's training. Discipline and subordination were far more important. In barracks a man was always imbibing ideas of discipline and subordination; but in billets the moment a man was dismissed from parade he was his own master, and his officers and non-commissioned officers ceased to have any control over him. In such circumstances there were no means of establishing any system for his education or recreation, and he too frequently spent his time in listless idleness or mere animal enjoyment. It was impossible seriously to contemplate the present method of billeting if the Militia was to be made a practical and efficient service. The provisions in the Bill enabling counties to build barracks would, in his opinion, prove entirely delusive, and he trusted the right hon. Gentleman would bring in a large and statesmanlike measure on the subject, for until this were done our Militia system would be costly, demoralizing, and inefficient.

CAPTAIN GROSVENOR

remarked that his noble Friend the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) had at the commencement of his speech expressed his regret that so narrow an issue had been selected for discussion on the second reading of the Bill, and he confessed he had heard that expression of regret without surprise, because he entertained an opinion, which was doubtless shared by his noble Friend—but which it was quite natural, under the circumstances, that his noble Friend's modesty should have precluded him from offering to the House—an opinion that if, instead of the first Amendment on the Paper, the House was discussing one which boldly affirmed that the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would not place the military system of the country upon "a sound, economical, and enduring basis," no independent Member, who had paid the slightest attention to the subject, however anxious he might be to support the Government in its general policy, could refuse his assent to that proposition. His noble Friend's Amendment to that effect could not now, unfortunately, become a subject of discussion, and he regretted this the more, because his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Berkshire (Colonel Loyd Lindsay), who spoke with so much authority on military subjects, and his hon. and gallant Relative, who always addressed the House with so much effect, he referred to the hon. and gallant Member for the county of Tipperary (Colonel White), showing a want of tactical skill which could hardly have been expected from them, and, passing over the weak points which he should have thought might have been attacked with some prospect of success, had elected to run their heads against a fortress bristling with defences—against the very stronghold of the Ministerial position. He ventured to think that in the purchase clauses, conceived as they were in a liberal spirit, and directed as they were towards a practical end, was to be found what some had called the soul, and others the pith, but what he regarded as the keystone of the Ministerial measure. He hoped he should not be accused of underrating the class of officers who had served their country under the purchase system, because such an accusation would be unfounded. No one could recall their deeds of heroism with more heartfelt gratitude; none could dwell with a more honest pride on their honourable and gentlemanlike bearing. But when he reflected that there were branches of our combatant services where purchase did not exist, yet where gallantry was unsurpassed, and the officers of which, if tried by the test of honourable tone and gentlemanlike demeanour, need shrink from no comparison, the conclusion appeared to him obvious that it was not in consequence of, that it might be in spite of, the purchase system that this country had been served by a class of men of whose gallantry as officers, and of whose uprightness as gentlemen we were all so justly proud. But if he was not inclined to credit the purchase system with the advantage to which he had referred, there were two other advantages that had been frequently put forward in its favour in this debate, and which candour compelled him to admit had a more direct connection with it. He referred to a rapid flow of promotion and to the almost entire exclusion of military appointments from the operation of favouritism; and although he was far from taking it for granted that by no other means could an adequate flow of promotion and an equitable distribution of appointments be secured, he would go so far as to admit that the easy at- tainment of these two advantages under the purchase system was sufficient to account for its existence, and would be sufficient to justify its continuance if the objections to it were only of that theoretical character ascribed to them by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington). There were, however, in his opinion, three objections of a very practical character which might be urged against the system. First, that which was stated the other night by the Surveyor General (Sir Henry Storks), and the statement of which was characterized by the right hon. Baronet to whom he had just alluded as a vague declaration, whereas an illustration by which it was accompanied was declared from the same source to have nothing in it. To his mind, however—and it was with the greatest diffidence that he expressed dissent from anything that had fallen from so high an authority as the right hon. Baronet—the argument seemed to possess great practical force and the illustration to be perfectly valid. The Surveyor General's position was that Government had been unable to carry out any re-organization of the Army system because, when any such scheme had been suggested, they had been met by the vested interests that had grown up under the purchase system; and he illustrated his argument by referring to a scheme, put forward but not carried out, for abolishing the ranks of ensign and cornet. Why was not that scheme carried out? Everybody knew the reason, because these vested interests stood in the way. The hon. and gallant Member for Bewdley (Major Anson) said that was all nonsense, because by the payment of £200,000 those particular vested interests could have been swept away; but so far as he was concerned he was neither surprised nor sorry that the Secretary of State should have declined to commence doing that by driblets which he must have felt would very soon have to be done wholesale. He did not contend that no scheme of Army re-organization could be commenced so long as the purchase system remained; but that the vested interests would have to be met and bought out of the reformer's way at every turn, a far more inconvenient and expensive mode of dealing with them than that which was contemplated under the Bill. He might be told that the course to which he had just referred was precisely that indicated in the Bill, because the Government did not propose to pay to the officers at once the value of their commissions. He would come to that in a moment; but first he would respectfully urge the Government to accept the suggestion of the hon. Member for the Border Burghs (Mr. Trevelyan) that they should keep no unwilling officers, or, in other words, that no limitation beyond those already in existence should be placed upon the retirement of officers desiring to accept the proffered terms. Returning to his argument that it was better to meet these vested interests in the gross than in detail, and that this was the policy adopted in the Bill, that argument was not affected by the fact that the Government did not propose to pay all the money at once, and for this reason, that the moment the Bill was passed all uncertainty as to the sums to be paid would disappear; and no new vested interests could arise to complicate the questions of the future. The second practical objection he saw to purchase was that the feeling of the majority of the country was dead against it. That might, perhaps, be described as a vague declaration; but he would venture to appeal to hon. Members on both sides of the House who had, in common with him, the pecuniary interests of the officers in the Army at heart, whether it would be wise, under all the circumstances of the case, to put that declaration to the proof. The war that had just concluded, so startling in its progress—so fatal, to all appearances, in its termination for the future tranquillity of Europe—had fairly opened the eyes of this country to the fact that if she wanted to maintain her greatness and her independence, she must have something more in future to protect her than "a streak of silver sea," something more even than a fleet upon that sea; she must have in the last resort an Army to fall back upon which, as regards its rank and file, should be a national Army, and, as regards its officers, a professional Army. On the very threshold of the formation of such an Army stood the vested interests created under the purchase system, if not actually to bar the way, to clog, to impede, and to retard. Was it reasonable to suppose that they could withstand the concentrated force of public opinion. Ought not the House and the public to be too thankful that they could be removed from the path in such a manner as to prevent the men in possession from crying out that the Government by their removal was sanctioning confiscation and condoning robbery? His third objection to the purchase system was that it had made amateurs instead of professionals of the officers of the Army. Receiving, as they did, a bare interest for the money they had disbursed, they took in exchange for what should be pay the prestige of the uniform, the social life of the mess-room, and the luxury of just sufficient occupation to save them from the reproach, though he feared not always from the tedium of idleness. Ready as they had always been in time of war to face the foes of their country with unflinching gallantry, in time of peace, with very few exceptions, they received little and they gave little. They had neither inclination nor inducement to study those scientific details of their profession which in every pursuit constituted the superiority of professionals over amateurs. If England wanted officers professionally skilled she must remember that "the labourer is worthy of his hire." If she paid her officers well she would get fair value in return for her money, if she gave them fair inducements to work, their attainments would soon rise to a level with their bravery. He did not think that was the moment, with the clear though narrow issue before the House, for him to refer to the many objections that might be taken to the Government Bill. He would vote for the second reading of the Bill; but hoped that its scope might be greatly extended in Committee, for otherwise he feared it would not be safe to trust to it as the guiding principle of our military system.

MR. DISRAELI

Although I did not insist yesterday on the adjournment of the House, and gave only one vote on that occasion, I confess I am not sorry to have an opportunity of trespassing for a short time on its attention, because I entertain on this subject some opinions different from those which have been expressed by some on my own side of the House; and because I have observed considerable diversity of opinion here, and also from the opposite Benches on several topics, which in- duces me to hope that I may offer some suggestions which may tend to a more general agreement. And I would venture to observe that when the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just addressed the House rose, five Gentlemen on the Benches opposite rose at the same time, which seemed to me an argument in favour of the opinion that the resources of debate last night were not quite so exhausted as the right hon. Gentleman opposite imagined.

Now, with regard to the question before us, this is what would strike me in considering it—that if none of those events which have rendered the last seven months memorable had occurred, the purchase system would still have been a subject for debate. It was, and had been for years, a Parliamentary question. It was a question on which there had been Royal Commissions and Parliamentary Committees; on which public opinion was gradually forming itself; and on which, in all probability, the opinion of the House of Commons would have been asked in due course of public business. But the events which have made the last seven months memorable have made the people of this country require something much more than the abolition of the purchase system. What has agitated them during the autumn, and what has induced them to express their feeling in a manner which has commanded the attention of the Government, has been the conviction, from the experience so recently gained, that the security of their own country was not sufficiently assured, and that the protection of the Empire was not complete. Measures to effect those great purposes were the measures which were expected by the country. Now, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, when he introduced his measure, laid down a programme of his intention, from which we were to gather the purport and provisions of his Bill. He told us that, in the first place, the object of his Bill would be to render the Army more efficient; secondly, that it would secure for this country ample and adequate Reserves; and thirdly, that it would place all the military resources of the country under one single and supreme organization. That was a general description of the measure given by the Secretary of State, and as a general description satisfactory to the House. Sir, in considering the Bill as the fulfilment of that programme, I am bound to say, though anxious to consider it in a spirit of candour, that I cannot view that alleged fulfilment without some surprise. I will not enter into the question whether the measure of the Government has a tendency to render the Army more efficient, because I admit that there is a vagueness in that expression which might lead to a controversy probably inconvenient on the fifth night of a debate at any time inexhaustible. But, Sir, when I ask myelf the real question—whether this Bill supplies those adequate and ample Reserves upon which the mind and attention of the country were fixed, I cannot say that the course of this debate has satisfied me that that object has been fulfilled. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State has not concealed from us that he looks to the short service system, and to the provisions which he has proposed in reference to it, as being the source of the Reserves on which he particularly counts. But we have some experience of the short service system. I will not presume to obtrude my opinion upon that system when there are authorities on both sides of the House upon such a subject, to whom the House would naturally listen with an attention which I have no right to command. But I may be allowed, as a civilian, to express my general impression, and it is one favourable to the short service system. I am in favour of it. I supported a measure of the Government last year which had that object. The results of that measure are not altogether unsatisfactory. But surely the House will agree that those results are not such as the people of this country expected in consequence of the important events of the last seven months, which convinced them that the country was not in a proper state of defence, and that the basis of a proper state of defence was a great system of military Reserves. The right hon. Gentleman has proposed the same policy in his present Bill. He has developed to a certain, but slow and limited degree, the same scheme of short service from which last year he anticipated the commencement and creation of a military Reserve. But if we are to guide ourselves by the consequences of his pre- vious measure, it appears to me that the objections which have been urged against the proposition of the Government, that the results must be slow, and not at any time considerable, appear to me to be well founded. Now, I watched with great attention the answer of the Secretary of State upon that head. Objections were urged by Gentlemen on both sides of the House with great effect upon that subject; and I confess to me it appeared that the answer of the right hon. Gentleman wanted substance, and was of a shadowy and speculative character. It dwelt upon contingencies, it contemplated consequences; but it contemplated consequences at the termination of a considerable time. I do not think that the Government have made out their case, or that they have satisfied the House that the provisions which they have brought forward with the object of creating and establishing this ample and adequate Reserve are calculated to effect that object.

Now, Sir, there is another source from which that Reserve might be derived. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State does not altogether discard that source; but it is one from which I believe the country generally anticipated that the best results might have been expected, and that was the Militia. I am greatly disappointed at the mode in which the Government dealt with the whole question of the Militia, and particularly as to the furnishing of these Reserves. I cannot but believe that they might have found, if they had availed themselves of that course, a much surer and larger means of effecting their object than they can attain by so strictly adhering to a Reserve furnished by the Line through the medium of short service. The Reserve, which the right hon. Gentleman anticipates, is a contracted one. We wanted a comprehensive one. The way in which the right hon. Gentleman deals with the Militia is unsatisfactory, and, to a certain degree, trifling. I am not sure myself whether the first effect of the provisions in the Bill with respect to the Militia would not rather tend to diminish the number of those who enlist, instead of increasing them. I am connected with a part of the country in which that service has always been popular. There is no part of England in which Militia service has been more popular as in that county which I represent. There are two things which the people there thoroughly understand—they understand the present scheme of Militia, which, as I have said, is highly popular, and they understand also embodiment, which is not less so. But the proposition of the Government is a proposition which greatly interferes with their lives and livelihood, and I cannot believe that it will be received with the same feeling of sympathy which an embodiment of the Militia under the present system commands. It is probable that you will obtain a certain number of Militiamen who will submit to a considerably increased term of drill without being embodied, and you may thus obtain a more effective Militia after a certain period; but I think it is very doubtful whether the general result of the provisions in the Bill of Her Majesty's Government will not be to diminish their numbers. But certainly the provisions of the Bill which Her Majesty's Government should have brought forward ought to be of a very different character if their object was to find a fruitful principle of military Reserve in a largely-developed scheme of Militia.

Nor, Sir, are the other provisions of the measure altogether of that satisfactory nature which I expected, and which I really believe the country itself looked for. I did not suppose that the right hon. Gentleman was going to introduce a Bill which should furnish us with the number of guns that we should have, or the ambulances which we ought to possess, or the baggage which we require. The right hon. Gentleman is quite right in repudiating such minute details. But I thought we should have a fulfilment, a completer and more substantial fulfilment, of the three great principles of his programme—that we should see more clearly the means by which the Army was to be made more efficient, by which ample and adequate Reserves were to be obtained, and by which the whole of our military means and arms should be placed under one simple and supreme organization. It appears to me that the method contained, in the Bill by which this last object is to be attained is very slight and very shadowy. One might say, with regard to the Volunteers, that all that is done with them is to secure their being placed under martial law on Easter Monday. Much more was expected from the Government, without dealing with those details which could not be looked for in a Bill like the present. A scheme for the organization both of the Militia and Volunteers, and of their blended and united action, was expected to be found in the provisions of a Bill the object of which was the re-organization of the Army and the formation of the Reserves of England. But having thus given my first view of the general character of the Bill, though I find it less satisfactory and complete than I expected, I cannot forget the expressions which I used on the first night of the Session with regard to the measure of the Government—expressions which were maturely considered—namely, that I should give to their measure of military organization my support, though I might object to many of its details, and even at the expense of some point of principle—referring to the possibility of their making propositions which I do not, I admit, find in the Bill. I cannot, therefore, because I find the measure inadequate on the whole, and less vigorous and decisive than I imagined, reconcile it to myself, or bring my mind to think that it is my duty to oppose the main question that is before us—namely, the second reading of this Bill. But I do so, I confess, with the conviction that if we go into Committee on the Bill it will not be a formal Committee, but a real working Committee; that the provisions of the measure may be strengthened; that we may see in this Bill something of that doctrine of evolution which is so fashionable at present; and that the tentative efforts and certain indications and dispositions of Her Majesty's Government, which are now only faintly adumbrated, may, by the encouragement and interference of the Committee, be brought out in substantial legislation; in fine, that we may see many of their suggestions carried out in vigorous, masculine, and commanding provisions.

Well, having said so much generally as to the measure of Her Majesty's Government, I have now to consider the Amendment which has been moved by an hon. and gallant Friend of mine (Colonel Loyd Lindsay), who brought it forward with all that spirit which one naturally expects from one so distinguished. Now, the question of purchase, which has taken up the greater part of this important debate, but has not, I am glad to say, prevented, if not a complete, yet a most interesting discussion of the still more important subjects contained in the Government measure, is, as I ventured to say before, not a novel question in the House of Commons. It is one of those questions that have perplexed mankind for a considerable period. It is a question of which it may truly be observed that a great deal may be said on both sides. It is a question very much belonging to the same class of questions as marriage with a deceased wife's sister. Each side is convinced that their solution is the only one absolutely necessary for the welfare of society; while calmer minds, who do not take so extreme an interest in the subject, are of opinion that, whichever way it may be decided, it is possible affairs may go on much the same. But the question of purchase in the Bill of Her Majesty's Government assumes a character very different from that which it has ever taken before in Parliamentary debate, because it assumes a financial character. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that we should proceed with due caution and with all that prudence which becomes the House of Commons when financial questions are concerned. Now, Sir, before touching upon the amount that may be required—and in forming an opinion as to the conduct we should pursue, I think that this a matter of some importance—I would say at once, if there be a great desire in the country upon a question like purchase that we should put an end to it, a Minister would, in my opinion, be most unwise to oppose it, provided, he is convinced that the country really understands the question, and fully knows the cost about to be incurred in order to obtain the satisfaction of that desire. If the country is suddenly become so squeamish and scrupulous that it cannot endure the idea of the State selling a commission—if that be the passion of the people at present, I am quite of opinion that that is a sentiment that ought to be well considered, and, perhaps, deferred to, by a Minister. But, Sir, I say, before a Minister assents to some proposition which is supported by public passion, and which may be a source of considerable expenditure, he ought to be sure that the country really comprehends the question before it; and that when people say they are ready to make a sacrifice to effect their object they may not afterwards repent of their generous indiscretion, and turn round on the Government, and say—"See in what disaster you have involved us." Therefore, as far as the question whether the State should sell a military commission or not is concerned, if the country is of opinion that it is a violation of that sublime equity which becomes a nation, and can afford to pay for what they desire, I think a Minister is quite justified in proposing and prosecuting a scheme for the purpose. But before I come to the consideration of financial details, I must say if that be the case I think there is a great deal in the suggestion which was made in the speech of the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Muntz), a speech distinguished by its common sense, and, indeed, he never speaks without showing much of that quality. I think that point well worthy of consideration. The nation may be so scrupulous as to feel that there ought to be a termination to what they now consider a public scandal—the State selling commissions. But the nation ought to be fully satisfied of that, and, at the same time, to take care that an attempt in this direction shall not increase still more the burdens of the country, whilst in the end it would fail to achieve the object it seeks to bring about. It appears to me, so far as I can form an opinion, that the question for us to consider is not whether it is politic or expedient to promote these arrangements between officers for over-regulation prices, but whether merely as practical men it is in our legislative power and capacity to terminate such practices, and whether we may not be hurriedly induced to enter into a vast expenditure, and find in the end that the very system which we made so many sacrifices to abolish still proceeds and flourishes.

Now, one word as to the cost which we are called upon to incur in order to terminate this system of purchase, which, after all, is only one portion of the Bill, which we are now told is the pith of the Bill, but which, as I have reminded the House, was, and had been, a Parliamentary question for years; whereas, we know the Bill of the Minister is brought forward in consequence of the great events that have recently taken place in the German and French War. We have not as yet any clear estimate given us of the financial results of putting an end to the preliminary and secondary in the Army. The minimum estimate given to us was £8,000,000. Now, in the course of this debate I have endeavoured, so far as the utmost attention could enable me, to ascertain from Her Majesty's Government the data upon which they founded that estimate. All the other estimates that I have seen exceed £8,000,000, and it appears to me that Her Majesty's Government have formed their estimate in somewhat the same way as two years ago they estimated the fortunes of the Irish Church. Having counted on a number of men becoming generals, and a number of men dying, they make their computation as they make estimates sometimes of the national fortunes, when they put to the credit of the nation the amount of all unclaimed dividends. They have gone upon this assumption, that what is due will not be asked for. Now that appears to me to be a dangerous mode of making estimates. The country, I think, must prepare itself for the payment of a greater amount than £8,000,000 as the cost of getting rid of this old military system. Can the country afford to pay for its abolition? If the country can afford it, whether the sum be £8,000,000 or £16,000,000, few could object to such a result, provided the country desires it. But can, I repeat, the country afford it? I, for one, do not take by any means a dark view of our financial position. I have read some estimates made by what are called great authorities on the subject, which are calculated to frighten any person, but I give no heed to them. I have little doubt that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will, after all, be able to meet us with a confident brow. What I desire to impress on the House is this, that we could decide with much more convenience and satisfaction on this question of purchase, so far as its financial aspect is concerned—and I am now confining myself entirely to that—if we only happened to be in possession of that statement which in a very few weeks will be laid before us. Because if this were to happen that the people of this country should find, in the course of a month or so, that they have to incur a new tax in order to do away with the system of purchase, the state of affairs would, I think, be somewhat like that which prevails in a portion of Ireland, recently described by the noble Lord the Chief Secretary for Ireland—it would be intolerable. Now, I want the House fairly to consider that part of the question. I saw an Estimate to-day of what might be the probable cost on the forthcoming Financial Statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the contribution which the country might be called upon to make this year for the abolition of purchase. As to the accuracy of that statement, I give no opinion. All I can say is that it appeared in an organ of great financial reputation and of violently Liberal views. By that sum I see that the Government are prepared for a payment this year of a sum not considerably under £1,000,000 sterling. If we plunge without sufficient consideration into a speculative series of measures which may increase the taxation of the country in order to terminate a point of a doubtful character, and about which there is great controversy, the step is one which I cannot but feel we shall not be justified in taking. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Berkshire has framed an Amendment as to the question of purchase which has been described by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War as disingenuous. I confess that I was not myself consulted with respect to the Amendment which my hon. and gallant Friend gave us with the impetuous valour which distinguished the Charge at Balaklava. I must, however, say that I cannot believe that there is anything with which he is connected that can be of a disingenuous character; and I can see nothing in the language of my hon. and gallant Friend's Amendment which at all justified such an imputation as that cast on it by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. [Mr. CARDWELL: I made no such imputation.] Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman wishes to make an explanation to my hon. and gallant Friend. I shall, of course, give him this opportunity of doing so. [Mr. CARDWELL: I have no explanation to make.] I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that my hon. and gallant Friend has been suffering from this imputation some time. But now, as my hon. and gallant Friend has got rid of this difficulty, I should be very glad if he would consent to disembarrass us of another, though I cannot suppose that after the appeals which have been made to him by others, any appeal from me will be effective. I cannot help saying, however, that it seems to me to be most unwise, in dealing with a large measure, the second reading of which I believe the majority on both sides of the House wish to see passed, to invite our decision on a limited issue which cannot be discussed to advantage except in Committee. It is in Committee, and in Committee only, that this question of purchase, with all its details, can be satisfactorily settled. It is in Committee only that some modification of the proposals of the Government can be made, and I do not at all despair myself that the proposal which has been suggested by the hon. Member for Birmingham may not in Committee be maturely discussed and considered. There are seeds of compromise which, it appears to me, may be combined with that increased efficiency of our Army which hon. Gentlemen opposite seem to think is so much involved in the abolition of purchase, and that regard to financial discretion of which, I trust, the House in Committee will not forego the consideration. There is another reason why I am anxious, if possible, to go into Committee on the Bill—however I may disapprove some of its provisions—without a Division. This is a subject which at this moment engages the attention not only of this country, but of Europe generally. The eyes of Europe are on England re-organizing her Army. It is, therefore, of importance that we should on the main question show, if possible, an unbroken front. I expressed the same views on the first night of the Session. I then took the liberty of intimating my opinion that whatever might be the measure of the Government when introduced, so long as it was a bonâ fide measure for the re-organization of the Army—and I do not think any candid person can doubt the animus of the measure, though he may believe its provisions to be inadequate—it should receive at our hands the fairest consideration. The animus of the measure is surely good, and the proposal of the Government is the first attempt to weld the three great arms of the country—the Regulars, the Militia, and the Volunteers—into one force. Though many of us may think that the machinery proposed is not sufficient for its purposes, these are not, in my opinion, reasons sufficient to justify us in opposing in any way the second reading. The Committee, then, is clearly the place for the consideration of the Amendment of my hon. and gallant Friend, and where I am in hopes we may come to some arrangement that may meet the views of my hon. and gallant Friend, as well as the full concurrence of the Government. Now, Sir, these are my views on the matter. I am ready to fulfil the expressions I used on the first night of the Session, and whilst supporting the second reading I wish to leave myself open in Committee to propose, and support even, extensive alterations in the Bill; but into Committee I wish the House to go. I hope my hon. and gallant Friend, particularly after having received so complete an explanation from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State will not consider it a point of honour to ask his Friends in this House to support him against the Motion for the second reading; and that we shall be able on the earliest day which the Government may appoint, to consider in Committee many Amendments with the view of making this a more effective and more vigorous measure—above all, one securing to us more adequate and ample means for the military defences of our country.

MR. GLADSTONE

I wish, Sir, if necessary, to add emphasis to the supposed apology of my right hon. Friend near me for an expression which he did not use. For myself, I should say that the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Berkshire (Colonel Loyd Lindsay), whatever else it may be—be it wise or unwise—is certainly very ingenuous. It raises very fairly an important issue on the great question of Army organization, and it calls on the House to affirm that on account of the expenditure necessary for the national defences and other national purposes, it would not be justified at present in voting the public money for the extinction of purchase in the Army. The Amendment fulfils at least one vital condition of a Motion applicable to the second reading of a Bill. The carrying of it would be plainly fatal to the measure, as it is intended to be, and that being so, of course it is for the hon. and gallant Gentleman and others to consider the course which they will take with respect to dividing the House, while we, from our point of view, after five nights' debate, will naturally ask that the voice of the House on the proposal of the hon. and gallant Gentleman should be pronounced "Aye" or "No." [Murmurs.] When I say "the voice of the House," I mean that it would not be consistent with our duty to acquiesce in the withdrawal of the Amendment. I mean nothing more. The speech of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) demands from me distinct notice; and it forms, I think—if I may presume to say so—something in the nature of a land-mark in the history of this question. The right hon. Gentleman not unnaturally expresses disappointment with the Bill of the Government; but, at the same time, he has stated as a reason why the House should not reject the second reading of the Bill that this is the first proposition which has ever attempted to weld into one harmonious whole the three great arms intended for the defence of the country. I think that is a frank and valuable admission. I think, also, that it fulfils the pledge given by the right hon. Gentleman, that he would apply himself to the consideration of this measure in a fair and just spirit; and I hope that, if I proceed in my turn to canvass the criticisms he has delivered, I shall be able to do so in a spirit corresponding with that to which I have just referred. The right hon. Gentleman has taken exception to two parts of the measure—one relating to the Reserves and one relating to purchase. In one portion of his speech he stated that the Bill was the fulfilment of the programme of the Government. Now that, as he afterwards indicated himself to be aware, is far from an accurate description of the case. The Bill of the Government fulfils only so much of the programme and intentions of the Government as forms the legitimate and necessary subject of legislative arrangement; but those portions of military organization which form the necessary subject of legislative arrangement constitute but a limited portion of the entire question. However, the Bill deals with three great questions—one relating to the combination of the arms, on which the right hon. Gentleman has touched in a manner quite accurate. Next, he touched upon the question of Reserves, and complains that my right hon. Friend's provisions on that subject are not satisfactory. He states, and I am glad to hear him say so, that he himself is favourable to the principle of short service so far as it goes, and he is not slow to confess that in some degree there has been a change in his opinions on that subject, due, probably, to the pointed instruction which we have all, in one form or another, been receiving from the great events that have occurred upon the Continent. If I am to judge from the language of the right hon. Gentleman at a time when the Secretary of State for War, under circumstances far less favourable to the acknowledgment of the necessity for military reform, induced the House to adopt the principle of short service, the vote of the right hon. Gentleman was not given as I presume it would be given now. While, however, approving of short service, the right hon. Gentleman is not prepared to admit that short service forms the basis on which we ought principally to found our system of Reserves. I think I may assume that both sides of the House are agreed in the general proposition that what we ought to look to is an Army with the colours relatively small, and Reserves, ready at all times to join that Army in an effective state, which shall be relatively large. Now, as I understand the matter, it is undoubtedly our contention that, for the purpose of providing such an expansion, short service ought to be our principal, and would be our shortest and most effective resource. I understand the right hon. Gentleman to sustain an opposite opinion, and I heard an hon. and gallant Friend on this side of the House concur to-night with the right hon. Gentleman in this respect. He thinks we ought to look not to short service as our principal resource, but to the Militia. Well, if we are to look to the Militia as our principal resource, I ask you what effect the adoption of such a proposition is to have upon the first initial steps for training and arming the Militia? We hold that, for our main Reserves for the Army, we ought to have men who have gone thoroughly through the training of a soldier, so that when called again into the ranks, they may be that which the German Landwehr is—that is to say, worthy in all respects, not only to support the efforts of the Regular Army, but to compete with the Regular Army in its distinctions—nay more, because I am not technically accurate in comparing them with the German Landwehr, that they shall act as Reserves to the Regular regiments of the Army. Is the House prepared to adopt the proposition that it shall be a condition of entry into the Militia that all who come there are to undergo that period of military life and military training that are necessary to raise them to the character of soldiers in that high sense? I hope that the House will consider well what is involved in such a proposition. What sort of demand are you going to make upon a labouring population, whose training for the Militia we have never dreamt of making more than a temporary severance from civil life? Hitherto, I repeat, that training has been little more than a holyday, or such a temporary military training as is compatible with civil life, and I hope the House will consider what is really conveyed by the alternative measure. My belief is, that if you are to look to such a method of procedure you will not improve your Militia force, and that you would be obliged to make changes that would involve a total revolution in the character of that force, and injure it seriously. However, I admit that it is a question that may be very fairly raised and very fairly discussed when we come to deal with the provisions of the Bill. I must, however, take the liberty of saying that I think the objections urged against the Bill by the right hon. Gentleman are plainly in conflict one with another on this head. He said the Militia ought to be your chief resort for your Reserves. Therefore, the Militia must consist of soldiers thoroughly and perfectly trained; and he objects that we do not make an adequate provision for this. What is his other objection to the Bill? That my right hon. Friend (Mr. Cardwell) has inserted provisions which tend to make the Militia less popular, and to repel the people from joining its ranks. What are those provisions? They are the provisions by which my right hon. Friend proposes to lengthen the necessary period of drill and discipline for the Militia. He has not even aimed at inserting such provisions as would be necessary to make the Militiaman an accomplished regular soldier. But thinking it necessary to enlarge the period of attendance for military recruits, he is immediately met—so far, I admit, not altogether unjustly—and told that he is repelling recruits from the ranks of the Militia. If, however, the plan of the right hon. Gentleman is to be adopted, and our Militiamen are expected to join in masses at a moment's notice, not upon an emergency alone, as comrades to our regular soldiers, my right hon. Friend must greatly strengthen these provisions of his, and still more severely repel recruits from the ranks of the Militia. Well, then, with regard to purchase. The right hon. Gentleman at one portion of his speech appeared, I thought, not perhaps fully to appreciate the great importance of this question. What kind of importance it is I will endeavour to describe by-and-by; but the greatness of its importance cannot be over-rated; and such is the view of the Government. Here I must venture to criticize that portion of the speech of the late Secretary for War (Sir John Pakington), in which he said the proposed abolition of purchase was nothing more than a party project and a sop to the Democracy. I am convinced that the right hon. Gentleman was himself endeavouring to look at the Bill in a spirit of impartiality, and I cannot help regreting that he failed so egregiously in giving effect to the good intention. Those Ministers who want to frame party projects and give sops to Democracy would think twice before exposing themselves to the obvious popular disadvantages of pressing, at a period when their duty compelled them to ask for large augmentations of Army expenditure, that the House should incur a special expenditure, which they themselves estimate at £8,000,000. The right hon. Gentleman has adverted to a variety of estimates upon this subject, and I wish to commemorate one which is worthy of being held up to public admiration, but which might possibly be deprived of admiration, as it was delivered at a time when the state of these Benches reminds one of what was said of old—solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant. It was the estimate of the hon. and gallant Member for Stamford (Sir John Hay), who showed to his own satisfaction that £38,000,000 would be the real cost of the abolition of purchase. If that be so, I must say the sop to Democracy is not a very skilfully devised one. I think the £38,000,000 was made up first of all of £8,000,000, assuming that to be the first cost, and then of £1,000,000 a-year, capitalized at £30,000,000 more. I cannot object to the right hon. Gentlemen's precepts of prudence which he has laid down in this matter; but I must object to the mode in which he appears disposed to give effect to those precepts of prudence. He thinks that common sense recommends that we should attempt to deal with purchase so far as the regulation price is concerned; but that we should leave the over-regulation prices to look after themselves as transactions between officers themselves, and not make them the subject of legislative interference. It appears to me that such a plan would be the gravest error which in the present juncture could be committed. The right hon. Gentleman treated regulation prices as representing sales made by the Government to the officers of the Army, and over-regulation prices as representing sales made by the officers of the Army to one another. But, as a rule, that distinction is merely a formal one, with respect to the payer and the recipient of the money. The Government are not the recipients of the regulation price for their own use and benefit more than of the non-regulation price. [An hon. MEMBER here named the case of first commissions.] Certainly, in exceptional cases that may be the case; but what do those exceptions constitute out of the total? It would be idle for me to detain the House with these minute exceptions—for minute they are, compared with the great totals involved. Speaking generally, Government are the stewards of the transaction as regards regulation prices, and the payer and receiver are the same in both cases. If, however, the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman were adopted, the consequence would be that the regulation prices would be thrown into the form of non-regulation prices, and you would realize the reproach, that commissions are put up to the highest bidder. My right hon. Friend quoted two opinions on this subject, which may have escaped the notice of the right hon. Gentleman. When in 1824 the question was raised about the declaration made by officers with respect to non-regulation prices, Lord Hardinge stated that the effect of those non-regulation prices was to introduce a constant traffic in commissions, by which officers in the Army were most seriously injured; and Lord Palmerston said that if commissions were permitted to be sold, and the price to be paid was not fixed by regulation, but left a mere transaction between man and man, if every officer were permitted to purchase according to his means and desire of promotion, abuses would occur beyond all calculation. The right hon. Gentleman also says that our calculations of the amount to be paid for the abolition of purchase are unsafe calculations. I admit that is impossible to scrutinize those calculations too sharply in the interests of the public; but let it not be supposed that my right hon. Friend has neglected any means which a responsible Minister is bound to adopt to insure safety, so far as safety can be insured. He founded his calculations on the process of actuaries. How does he supply the actuaries with the cases? He takes the average number of sales in every year and estimates the deaths at the actual rate of deaths in the infantry during the last 10 years, and he takes in each rank, to regulate his future proceedings, the maximum of sales within the last five years, each rank of officers separately. I do not know what error has been committed in the adoption of these rules. I do not mean to say that they are calculated with mathematical precision; but if the sale of commissions are slower than he calculates, the effect will be not to increase, but to diminish the cost of the operation. The right hon. Gentleman has spoken of the measures of the Government as small and inadequate, and seems to think that we have no due sense of the exigencies of the country. It is fair, I think, to bear in mind that my right hon. Friend, as comparing the present Estimates with the Estimates for three years, shows upon them an augmentation of 53,000 men in the Militia, and 20,000 men in the Regular Army at home. We may be censured for the reduction of troops in the Colonies; but so far from admitting the justice of that censure, we pride ourselves on that reduction, which is to be commended in point of policy, as it is convenient in point of economy. In 1868 the Militia Reserve was under 3,000 men; in 1870 it was 20,000 men; and in 1871 it is estimated to be 30,000. I refer to these figures to show that my right hon. Friend has not only been looking into the distant future, but has been making provision for the present. I greatly rejoice that the right hon. Gentleman has given the weight of his authority to the adoption—for so I understand his speech —of the principle that purchase ought to be abolished; and I cannot help hoping that that declaration proceeding from him will sink into the minds of many hon. Members who sit behind him, and will be made by them the subject of reflection—not only of those who sit behind him, but of a few who sit on this side of the House, and will, perhaps, have a more winning effect, and be more operative in carrying persuasion home, than any argument that could be used by us in the position in which we stand. But, still, we think, even with the advantage of the admission he has given us, there will be up-hill work to undergo in dealing with this question, because we are in conflict with a system which, strange and anomalous as it is, is, in the first place, very powerfully represented in this House; and, secondly, in regard to the Army at large, and not merely to those purchasing officers, who are the class almost exclusively represented in this House, it is a system of so old a date, and has fitted itself into all habits and arrangements; and, undoubtedly, to propose to officers of the Army the abolition of purchase is not a mere financial or pecuniary change, but a fresh starting point for a new career. Therefore I should not be surprised if we encounter a good deal of hostile opposition. But it is necessary to put out of the way the apprehensions which exist. Hon. Gentlemen have argued, as if once having got the £8,000,000 which we propose to devote to the abolition of purchase, they are entitled to consider that sum as already appropriated to military objects, and each one indulges his own inclination in showing that fortifications, and guns, and small arms, and arsenals, and various other objects would offer more convenient methods of disposing of the money than the abolition of purchase. But, so far as the Government are concerned, while we have made up our minds that the expenditure of this large sum—for it is a large sum, although not a very large sum when you consider that it is little more than six months of the military expenditure of the country, while it refers to a reform which will spread over a great number of years—yet we must be bound by the assumption that the £8,000,000, if given for the abolition of purchase, must be devoted to other uses instead of remaining in the pockets of the people. It is boldly ar- gued that if purchase is abolished pay or emoluments must be increased in one shape or another, and that is the foundation of all the calculations of the hon. and gallant Member for Stafford (Captain Talbot). Now, I want to know why we are to asume that by the abolition of purchase there must be an increase in the charge on the British public in respect of the officers of the British Army. If that misapprehension which some entertain that purchase represented a price which the State received, for its commissions were a sound view of the matter, I could understand the plausibility of the representation that, when you cease to sell commissions, you must expect to obtain the benefit in one way which you lose in another. But this is the true economical statement of the case regarding the officers of our generation, and the officers of the British Army as a whole. The officering of that Army is, at present, loaded with a mortgage of £8,000,000. But how did it come to contract that mortgage, but because it is worth the while of the incoming officers to get into the place of the outgoing officers? If it be worth the while of the incoming officers to pay £8,000,000 to get into the place of the outgoing officers, the place of the outgoing officers is worth £8,000,000 to sell; and if the new generation of officers, instead of paying the £8,000,000 to the old generation of officers, is to come in without paying one farthing, I want to know why this is to constitute the reason for paying increased salary? I represent it in this way, as I read the matter. The abolition of purchase is itself a very large in-increase of pay. I take the cost at £8,000,000, at any percentage you like; I take it at 4 per cent, which will give a sum of £320,000 a-year. I think that is the sum of money which will remain in the pockets of the incoming generation of officers in lieu of the outgoing officers, and I want to know why is this a reason for an increase of pay? That is a paradox which it is very difficult to sustain. I do not enter at the present moment into the quesiton whether the reason is to be this—that the gentlemen officers are to be displaced, and officers of another class who must be wholly dependent on the Army for their means of support are to come in their room. If I believed in that result of the abolition of purchase I should see something to be said in support of that paradox. But my belief about a gentleman officer is this—he is very much like other Englishmen. He is not too fond of work unless he is obliged to work. That I take to be the greatest defect of the wealthy classes of this country. We are not like Germans, where everyone is busy from morning until night to turn to the best account the mental faculties he possesses. That is not the character of the English boy at school—that is not the character of the Englishman in public life, unless you put a pressure upon him. But put a pressure upon him—in popular language called the "screw"—and there is nothing that he cannot do. But, of the various classes of this country, I believe the gentleman class, who, I do not scruple to say, and I hope it will not be offensive, wants a stimulus, does not get a sufficient stimulus; but when made to exert itself, when put into fresh, free, and full competition with other classes—I do not mean by examinations alone—it will hold its own. We should make a great mistake were we to suppose that the abolition of purchase constituted in itself a great reform. I have said this improvement cannot be over-rated; but it is not the institution of a great reform. It is the removal of what we believe an insurmountable impediment to essential reform. It has been said over and over again in this debate that if you want better conditions of education you can have them, and that you may impose whatever regulations you like. I believe—such is my confidence in the liberal spirit and good sense of our officers—that, loaded and saddled as they are with the expense of their commissions, they would endure much in the way of improved regulations; but how is it possible to ask when their offices are their property that they should be subject to that unrestricted handling for which it is necessary that Government should have unrestricted power? It has been assumed in the debate that were purchase abolished almost everything else is to continue as it is. We have heard a great deal about retirements and about admissions to the Army; but that, in my opinion, is a narrow and insufficient view of this question. If the system of purchase is to be abolished at this great cost—I would almost call it this vast cost—the reason why it is to be abolished is, that the whole position of the officers of the Army may be fully and freely considered, and may be subjected to review in all respects where it may seem susceptible of improvement. It has been said by some that there is nothing to be amended—that where there is anything to be done the officers are always ready and able to do it—that it is invariably and exclusively the civil arm that fails, and that most remarkable declaration, for I hold it to be a most remarkable declaration, by the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Berkshire, that the Balaklava Charge was not only magnifique, as General Canrobert declared it to be, but likewise agreeable to the spirit of the art of war. Well, Sir, so far as gallant self-devotion is concerned, so far as contempt of life is concerned, so far as sense of duty is concerned, so far as close, and confidential, and affectionate relations of men engaged in the work of war is concerned, I do not suppose that anything can be wanting or added to the officers of the British Army as they are. But has it been sufficiently considered by the hon. and gallant Gentleman, not only that war is a science in the study, but an art in the field—the most difficult of all arts, and that one of all arts which makes the severest demands on those who are called upon to enter upon it? I think it is no slight to the officers of the British Army to say of them what we are accustomed to say of ourselves when engaged in arduous duties—namely, that we fall short in their accomplishment. It is not only the question of retirement and admission into the Army—there is the preparation of the officer for the service—the method of his first appointment; the mode of promotion when in office; the rate at which he ought to be promoted; the number of officers in relation to men; the emoluments of officers in whatever form received; the tenure of the officer; the condition on which the transfer of his services and his retirement should be made—and all this independent of that in which all is summed up—namely, the duties of the officer. Perhaps if I were to refer to what I understand to be the actual state of things in the British Army I ought also to say that a subject of consideration when purchase is abolished would be the system of leave given to an officer, for the liberality of that system which I generally find to prevail, undoubtedly is carried to a point which is not quite consistent with the great object so well described by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Westminster (Captain Grosvenor) in his able and interesting speech this evening, when he said, speaking in sharp, definite terms, but with immense precision and truth, that we should have, not amateur, but professional officers. Now, if it be difficult to carry on the art of war, where does the knot of the difficulty lie? What are the officers of the Army? They are the brains of the Army, without ceasing to form a most important portion of its manual force. Is it an easy matter; is it a matter to be done without thought; is it to come by accident, that you are to have officers in your Army raised to the highest degree of perfection? How has the Prussian Army been formed? It is not the work of to-day, it has taken half a century to make the Prussian Army what it is—not only half a century, but half a century in a country of traditions the most military in all Europe, because not even France herself has been so military in traditions as Prussia has been under the extraordinary series of warlike Sovereigns whose personal character has contributed, during so many centuries, to make it what it is. And in Prussia it would not have been possible to realize all these results had it not been that she made her last great start under circumstances of distress and difficulty which made exertion absolutely necessary—circumstances of distress and difficulty compared with which our position in undertaking our task is one of ease and security. Our officers have done everything we had a right to expect from them under the rules we had laid down for them, and if I estimate very highly the work yet to be done with reference to them, and if I hold that without the very best system for our officers all other improvements must be looked upon as dust in the balance, because they will want the living centre on which to depend, I hope it will be seen that in being thus conscious of the present deficiency I throw no imputation or blame on the officers of the British Army. I cannot understand for the life of me why the paying of £320,000 a-year into the pockets of a body of gentlemen is to entail a further payment to them in other respects. My right hon. Friend has been complained of for not laying down a detailed scheme of retirement; but if he had done any such thing he would have proved himself unfit for the office he holds. No doubt a scheme of retirement is a matter which it is essential to consider and determine; it is part of a system, all the parts of which are to be balanced one against another; and what is contributed to, or taken from each portion, must influence the whole scheme of retirement. What the Secretary of State would answer is this—if the country is going to pay £8,000,000 it is not for the purpose of getting worse officers than we have now, but for the purpose of getting the very best officers we can. If we have been raising the pay of the soldier, if we have been shortening his service, if we have been endeavouring to improve his condition, if we are so ambitious as even to seek to draw him from a far better and more desirable class than that in which the recruit has in former times been found, it is not that he may have inefficient and ill-trained officers to command him. The idea is to have the very best men and the very best officers; but though we are to have the very best officers they are not to go into the Army by compulsion, they are to go into it by free choice; and it will be an absolute necessity that Parliament should make the conditions of service such as will draw the best men, first, relatively to the duties of the soldier in the ranks; and, second, relatively to the higher duties of the officer. It will also be necessary for Parliament to make provision with regard to future emoluments and future retirements, and other conditions of the officers' position; but it would be unwise in any Minister, in order to curry favour, prematurely to frame a scheme before he is in possession of the essential data upon which the whole of such a scheme must depend. I do not think I need further detain the House, and I am obliged to it for having listened to me with so much patience. I accept the challenge of the right hon. Gentleman opposite in the spirit in which it is given. We should go into Committee expecting, even inviting, criticism, and not with a pedantic assumption that in matters of so much difficulty we have in all cases been able of ourselves to hit upon the right expedient. We shall look for a spirit of co-operation in all those who may join us in endeavouring to adjust the clauses of the Bill, and above all, we shall proceed in this confidence that as we believe in regard to those who sit over against us, so also they will believe in regard to those who have framed this measure, those who have prepared the plans of the Government, and those who sit on this side of the House at large, that we have but one common object in view—an object of the highest and purest patriotism—that is to secure that in the future, if possible even more than in the past, the British Army shall be and remain worthy of the British nation.

COLONEL LOYD LINDSAY

said, he was well aware he had no right to make a reply; but he wished to offer an explanation in answer to the appeal of the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli), the Leader of the party to which he belonged. In the exercise of the discretion which belonged to every Member of the House, he had proposed the Amendment before them; and he did so because he wished the question of purchase to be considered separately and apart from the rest of the provisions of the Bill, and because he deemed it essential that it should be brought prominently before the constituencies of the country. The debate had lasted five nights, and a speech which was made last night by an hon. Member opposite went so straight to the point—["Order!"]

MR. SPEAKER

The hon. Member must confine himself to what he proposes to do now.

COLONEL LOYD LINDSAY

said, he simply wished to explain the course he proposed to take, and to give the reason why he did not propose to press the Amendment, for the object he had in view had been answered by the debate. With regard to a matter personal to himself, the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire was anxious that the expression which the Secretary of State was believed to have used should not be applied to his conduct in moving the Amendment. ["Order!"] The Secretary of State spoke with great kindness towards him, but said that the Amendment was not characterized by "that frankness" which belonged to himself. In a conversation with the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire he used the word "disingenuous" as expressing the same idea; and his right hon. Friend, with great kindness, endeavoured to obtain a withdrawal of the sentiment, in the reporting of which he accidentally used a word which the Secretary of State did not employ—a mistake for which he apologized. Satisfied with the excellent debate which had taken place, he begged to be allowed to withdraw the Amendment. ["No, no!"]

MR. CARDWELL

said, he certainly was surprised at having attributed to him the word "disingenuous" when he had not used it; and he had not the slightest intention to use any expression which could give pain to the hon. and gallant Member.

Question put, and agreed to.

Main Question put, and agreed to.

Bill read a second time, and committed for Friday next.