HC Deb 23 June 1871 vol 207 cc540-54
MAJOR ARBUTHNOT

, in rising to call attention to the state of the Regular Artillery Forces of Her Majesty's Army, both as regards organization and efficiency, and to move— That, in the opinion of this House, it is expedient that a complete and searching inquiry be at once instituted into the same by means of a Royal Commission, or such other court of inquiry, as Her Majesty's Government may see fit to appoint, said he should be most ungrateful if he did not, at the outset, acknowledge the courteous treatment he had received at the hands of the Prime Minister, which enabled him to proceed with the Motion standing in his name on the Paper. He would observe that while he did not think it necessary to vindicate himself, in anticipation, from even the suspicion of being animated by feelings inimical to that branch of the service to which he was proud to say he belonged, and the members of which entirely approved of his course of action in asking for this inquiry, he, once for all, disclaimed any wish to make that Motion the basis of an attack upon the Secretary of State for War, for though he might have to criticize the policy of that right hon. Gentleman in a hostile spirit in some respects, the subject with which he had to deal was of far higher and wider interest than the mere success or failure of any individual Minister. He therefore trusted that hon. Gentlemen would approach the question in no party spirit, but that they would decide according to the validity, or otherwise, of the arguments which he might adduce He had said that the members of the artillery service approved of this Motion, and he might inform the House that within a fortnight of his having given Notice of it, he received more than 130 letters from artillery officers of high rank, nearly all of whom expressed similar views to those which he held himself. Everyone, he believed, except those hon. Members who were in favour of total disarmament, must desire to see England in possession of a formidable, expansive, well-organized and efficient artillery service, especially after what had happened in the course of the late France-Prussian War. The capitulation at Sedan was necessitated by the fact that the French Army were surrounded and hemmed in by a formidable circle of field guns, through which, as admitted by their own generals, it would have been impossible for them to have forced their way without the loss of half their men. And what saved Metz from any capitulation, save that enforced by the pressure of starvation, was the number and dispo- sition of its heavy guns. But it might be said that we have a force of artillery fulfilling all these conditions. It was because he denied that assertion, because he impugned the efficiency of our artillery, that he stood there to ask for an inquiry. They had heard much during the present Session in praise of the way in which both artillery officers and artillerymen performed their duties. He was quite prepared to endorse all that praise. He would go further. Having seen the artillery of nearly every country in Europe, he did not hesitate to say that both as to personnel and matériel, we were in advance of any. But there our superiority ended; we were deficient in that without which the most enduring personnel, the best constructed matériel, were useless—we had no organization; or, what was worse, what organization we had was of an imperfect or faulty description. He would now give the substance of some letters he had received from highly distinguished officers, as he had before stated, which would serve to show how general was the feeling in favour of the necessity for an entire reorganization, and how deeply sensible the writers were of the deplorable state of things which now existed. One most distinguished officer in writing to him complained that nothing could be worse than their present brigade system, and that the artillery wanted, above all, a recognized and responsible head; another declared that no one but an artilleryman could realize the chaos which at present existed; while a third stated that unless something were done the nation would in time of war lose its right arm in the event of war, and that while they now had no efficient artillery organization, the brigade System was one which was galling in peace and would prove disastrous in time of war. He would not trouble the House by referring in detail to the opinions of his correspondents; but in these complaints they all concurred. In his own opinion the artillery service was in a most unsatisfactory condition, and, setting aside such minor details as the appointment and education of officers, the question of promotion, the amalgamation of the English and old Indian artillery, the question of reliefs, the desirability of having a professional head, and the harmonious blending of the Regular with the Militia artillery, all of which were subjects well worthy of inquiry, and all of which, he might say, were capable of great improvement, there were four simple and practical points connected with it, any one of which, if proved, would, he believed, amply justify him in asking, and the Government and the House in granting, a full and searching inquiry. These four points were—first, the total collapse and failure of the system of organizing by brigades; secondly, the unsatisfactory state of their garrison artillery; thirdly, the inefficiency and inexpensiveness of the field and horse artillery; and, fourthly, the non-existence of any Reserves. For the first two points the Government were not responsible; but in the others, he thought they had committed an error of judgment. The brigade system was originated in April, 1859. Previous to that time a battery, or company, was the tactical unit of the artillery, and a certain number of companies formed a battalion, the commanding officer of which performed merely administrative duties, while the maintenance of discipline was intrusted to the officer commanding at each artillery station. The object which the promoters of the brigade system had in view was, he presumed, to do away with that dual responsibility, and to place both the administration and discipline under the control of one and the same officer. With that view the regiments were re-distributed into horse batteries of five guns, and field and garrison batteries of eight guns, the horse batteries having since been increased to eight guns, and the field batteries to ten guns. At the first blush this was plausible enough; but the result proved that the conflict of responsibility and authority was only intensified, while from the very outset, owing to the size of our Army, the size of our country, and the character of our colonies, the system entirely broke down, and the intention of moving large bodies of artillery from one district to another was found to be impracticable. In 1865, the state of the 4th Brigade proved the absurdity of the system, for that brigade had its head-quarters in England, while it had batteries both in America and New Zealand. Again, in 1866, when the 8th Brigade were under orders for India, one battery was found to be in North America, so that the brigade would either have to go to India with one battery short of its complement, or the battery that was expected home from its turn of service in the piercing climate of Canada would immediately on its arrival be sent out to experience the exhaustive heat of India—a most arbitrary measure; or, if neither of those courses were taken, they would have to draft a battery from another brigade. The last course was adopted; and as the officers were drafted from the battery in question, it could scarcely be said that the plan resorted to was the one best calculated to promote the efficiency or discipline of the brigade. To show the estimation in which the brigade system was held one officer had written to him saying it was rotten throughout, and full of absurdities arising from the dispersion of the batteries composing the brigade; another, that there was no use trying to patch it up, but that it would be better to start afresh on a sound and well-considered basis; another said, whenever you have a chance, try and get the brigade system done away with; another, that he should be glad to drive a nail into its coffin; while the last he should bring under their notice said the attempt to carry on, or rather prop up, the system was the sole cause of the confusion that now existed. Having disposed of those testimonies in his favour, he should now pass on to the second point he had selected—the unsatisfactory state of the garrison artillery, which being of a somewhat technical character he should touch on very briefly. That was, in his opinion, the highest branch of the artillery arm of the service, although it was not generally so regarded, most officers preferring to use it merely as a stepping-stone or passage to the field artillery. He thought that officers entering either the field or the garrison artillery should be permitted, as far as possible, to choose the branch which they preferred to join, and that, having joined, they should be encouraged, or, if necessary, compelled to render themselves efficient, and to remain in the service. Passing on to consider the third and most important point—the question of field artillery—the hon. and gallant Gentleman said there had been for some considerable time a growing conviction in the public mind that this branch of the service ought to be maintained in a high state of efficiency. That feeling first found open expression on the occasion of the Wimbledon Review of last year, when great dissatisfaction was expressed in the Press and elsewhere at the impossibility of a battery being turned out for war service, except by breaking up a second battery, and the Government, instead of taking what would in his opinion have been the wisest course—namely, commencing to form artillery Reserves—proposed to increase the batteries of horse artillery from 172 men and 112 horses, to 218 men and 156 horses; the field batteries to be increased from 170 men and 84 horses, to 182 men and 116 horses. These figures included the depôts; but they had been reduced very shortly before. The officers were naturally delighted with this arrangement, because it enabled them to turn out their batteries in a better manner than they had ever been turned out before, and things went on well until the Franco-Prussian War again raised the question of military armaments, and the feeling of the country reached its culmination when the leading journal, in October last, contended that the Regular artillery should be calculated not merely for the requirements of the Regular Army, but should cover the requirements of both Regulars and Auxiliaries; and that, therefore, it would be no extravagant proportion to provide themselves with a sufficient number of guns to arm 200,000 men, instead of 60,000 men, as Mr. Cardwell boasted. Without going into the question as to the proportionate or aggregate number of guns it would be well to possess, he would point out that, though the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Surveyor General of the Ordnance stated in replying, on a former occasion, to an observation of the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho), that there had been a large increase in the number of guns, the increase was not likely to be very useful, for the reason that an analysis of the figures and facts proved that many of the guns in the depôt batteries were old smooth-bore arms, and that in many instances there existed great deficiencies in the matter of stores, ammunition, and even gunners, there being only those who were required absolutely to take charge of the guns. There were, to begin with, 366 guns, or 61 batteries, inclusive of 30 depôt guns, old smooth-bore 6-pounders, but without ammunition or gunners. Now, they could not be a powerful addition to the forces of the country. Of the remainder, comprising 336 guns—the actual number of guns in this country—180 guns, or 30 batteries, were old batteries, while 156 guns, or 26 batteries, were either new or converted from garrison batteries, or transferred from a brigade in India. Of these 26, five had—at the time the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Surveyor General made his statement—barely left India, and the length of time which must necessarily elapse before a battery, arriving for the first time in England, became thoroughly efficient, anyone conversant with artillery matters would know. This left 21 batteries to be accounted for. Of those, 10 had no horses and 5 no guns; of the remainder, some had a few horses, but no harness; others had harness and no horses; while some had a few horses with harness, but no artificers to fit that harness, no rough rider to instruct the men in riding; so that, in point of fact, they were no better off than those batteries which had no horses. He did not quote all these facts for the purpose of discrediting the Government, but in order to show that the batteries had been raised out of elements which were of a very indifferent character, and that the Government would have done better if they had devoted their attention to produce fewer guns of a more serviceable character, and if they had acted upon a rational scheme of expansion such as might be found in a judicious amalgamation with the Militia. At the same time he could not disguise his opinion that the Government might have been candid and given the House more precise information on the subject, especially respecting the difficulty experienced in obtaining horses, of which there was, even then, a deficiency of nearly 2,000, and the protest from the colonels commanding brigades of horse artillery as to the want of sufficient strength in non-commissioned officers and men. Neither he nor any other artillery officer was in favour of large batteries being always kept up on a war strength, but it was highly desirable that their batteries should be expansive. Replying by anticipation to the argument repeated ad nauseam, and the validity of which he utterly denied, that their artillery was as well off, in regard to the number of men, as the Prussian artillery, he would point out that the organization of the latter differed in several important respects from their own, and that the men were not required to do so much work when in the field as English artillerymen. He maintained, too, with regard to another point equally persisted in with the former, and equally erroneous, that by the reductions in the number of non-commissioned officers for instruction and barrack duties; artificers, to repair damages: gunners, for the field artillery, and drivers and men in proportion to the number of horses, their artillery was deprived of that character of expansiveness and elasticity which was so desirable. Passing by the testimonies he had received, all tending to the condemnation of the existing system as utterly useless and inefficient, he now came to the fourth point, as to which he had only to say, that no attempt had been made to show that any Reserve existed at all beyond the depôt which, in fact, was no Reserve, but merely a means whereby the batteries serving abroad might be kept up on a peace establishment. Even that small requirement, they were unable to meet, for demands for volunteers were annually made on the batteries at home. In conclusion, he felt bound to dissent from some remarks made by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, in the speech to which he had before alluded, to the effect that all artillerymen, except horse artillerymen, were interchangeable. If those words implied the old and lamentable system of moving batteries from field to garrison duty promiscuously, he must protest against it. Then, again, it was said that field artillerymen had nothing to mount except the limbers. He would ask, whence came the non-commissioned officers, and had they not to ride? The last observation to which he took exception was, that it was, in his opinion, hardly fair that the whole credit, or the blame, of the late changes, which were certainly not popular, should be attributed to the Deputy Adjutant General of the Artillery, as it had been by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Surveyor General of the Ordnance. Was it not patent to all that the Deputy Adjutant General had no choice in the matter, and that that would have been the observation he would have received at the hands of the Secretary of State for War, if he had raised any difficulty, or abstained from doing his best to carry out a difficult and unpalatable task. While anxious to express his regret at having occupied the time of the House so long, he could not help stating that the difficulty he experienced had been somewhat increased by the fact, that until that evening, he (Major Arbuthnot) had been under the impression that he was to be met half-way, and that an inquiry of some sort was to be conceded, and he still hoped that the Government would consent to an Inquiry. He did not wish to infer that he had been misled by anything which had fallen from the Treasury bench; and even now, he hoped the Government would act on his suggestion. If, however, they declined to take any steps in the matter, he should feel compelled to take the sense of the House; and he would appeal especially to those hon. Members who were jealous of public expenditure, and ask them to satisfy themselves that they were getting their money's worth for their money. If it were argued that it was not the province of that House to interfere in matters of discipline and detail, he maintained that that was neither the one nor the other, but it was entirely one of organization; and hon. Members owed it to themselves and to their constituencies to leave no stone unturned which would secure the best possible organization in every branch of our forces. If it were said that inquiry would be a slur on the artillery, he had very good reason to know that such an Inquiry as he moved for would be received with satisfaction by both officers and men, who would feel that they had advanced one step towards the attainment of that efficiency of the necessity of which they were so deeply sensible, and the absence of which they so deeply and bitterly deplored. He begged to move the resolution of which he had given Notice.

MR. HEYGATE

, in rising to second the Motion, said, that he should do so from the civilian point of view, and without professing any special knowledge on the subject. It was incumbent on that House to see that they had a proper return for their expenditure; and when they were told upon such undeniable authority that there was a want of organization and efficiency in a part of the service—and an important part—their duty was to institute an inquiry into these allegations. There was, doubtless, every variety of opinion generally on military matters, but he believed that no difference of opinion on the point that a good and effective artillery service was simply indispensable to the Army. Without it, all the other branches of the service, however good they might be, were comparatively useless. Though it might well be that that House was weary of Army debates, it ought not to shirk this subject, and to consider it in no party spirit. He hoped that the Government would not refuse the Inquiry. He observed that an Amendment to the Motion had been given Notice of, under cover of which the Government might escape; but he hoped that the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Seely) would make his Motion an independent one. The evidence that had been adduced by his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hereford had clearly shown that Inquiry was required, and he appealed to the House to take care that it should be held.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, it is expedient that a complete and searching inquiry be at once instituted into the state of the Regular Artillery Forces of Her Majesty's Army, both as regards organization and efficiency, by means of a Royal Commission or such other court of inquiry as Her Majesty's Government may see fit to appoint,"—(Major Arbuthnot.) —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

SIR HENRY STORKS

said, everyone must admit the importance of the question involved—that of the efficiency of the Royal Artillery. He did not agree with the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Major Arbuthnot) when he impugned the efficiency of the Royal Artillery: but, on the contrary, he believed it to be in a most efficient state as regarded discipline, men, materials, and everything belonging to it. The hon. and gallant Member had stated how the brigade system originated. Before 1859 the organization of the Royal Artillery was by battalions, and the permanent head-quarters were at Woolwich. That arrangement, however, was considered unsatisfactory; one alleged disadvantage of the system being the undue amount of the permanent Staff at Woolwich, to remedy which in 1859 what was called the "brigade system" was established; and experience had since shown that doubts might be entertained whether that system could not be considerably improved. It was sometimes doubtful whether the system had quite answered; and having personally had some experience of the brigade system, in garrison duty, he did not hesitate to say that in some respects it was defective. The next point to which the hon. and gallant Gentleman had referred was the garrison and field batteries, and on that point it might not be amiss if he were, perhaps, to give the result of the progress made during the last few years. In 1805, when Napoleon was encamped at Boulogne with a large Army, threatening the invasion of England, we had 336 guns, horsed and equipped; and, so far as he had been able to ascertain, that was by far the greatest number that had ever been maintained in the United Kingdom. During the many years of peace which succeeded the Battle of Waterloo the field artillery was permitted to fall very low, and it was not until 1852 that it once more assumed any adequate proportions. In 1818 we had 50 guns; in 1819, 22; in 1821, 38; in 1828, 47; in 1848, 60; in 1849, 70; in 1852, 120; in 1855, 114, with 92 guns in the Crimea in addition; in 1856, 180; in 1858, 174; in 1860, 180; in 1870, 180. The late Lord Hastings and Sir Hew Ross, in 1856, at the conclusion of the Crimean War, recommended that 148 guns should be maintained in the United Kingdom, to be expanded to 222 in time of war. The Royal Artillery in the United Kingdom at the beginning of 1870 consisted of 10 batteries of horse artillery, with 60 guns, 2,046 officers and men, and 1,236 horses; 20 field batteries, with 120 guns, 3,656 officers and men, and 1,730 horses; 12 depôt garrison batteries, with 1,441 officers and men; 52 garrison batteries, with 5,200 officers and men; and the Coast Brigade, consisting of 1,542 officers and men, making a total of 94 batteries, with 180 guns, 13,885 officers and men, and 2,966 horses. The Royal Artillery in the United Kingdom, in 1871, it was proposed should be as follows:—16 batteries of horse artillery, 40 field bat- teries, 12 depôt batteries, 35 garrison batteries, and the Coast Brigade, which would give a total of 103 batteries, 366 guns, 18,392 officers and men, and 5,800 horses. Now, the hon. and gallant Gentleman has said that the depôt guns were smooth-bore brass guns, and that no doubt was the case; but the guns were not intended for service, and were used only for purposes of instruction for the drivers; but the full equipment of these batteries, as regarded guns, harness, and every other requirement, was ready to be issued at a moment's notice. [Major ARBUTHNOT said, he had asked whether the gunners were also in store?] No, they did not keep gunners in store. The hon. and gallant Gentleman had talked of the want of expansiveness of the field batteries, but he would remind the hon. and gallant Gentleman that in time of emergency there would be 2,627 men in the depôt batteries, a portion of whom would be available for foreign service and a portion for home service. If more field batteries were required, the men would be taken from the garrison brigades, and they would be converted into field batteries. At the same time we would have for garrison defence the Coast Brigade; 1,542 old soldiers, comprising skilled non-commissioned officers, 15,000 Militia Artillery, and 37,000 Volunteer Artillery; and the value of the two latter auxiliaries, he believed, would be acknowledged by every hon. Member. In fact, we would be able to put into the field 408 guns, exceeding the Prussian proportion to an Army of 150,000 men. Now, as regarded the peace establishment of field batteries, France had 137 officers and men, and 88 horses; Austria had 109 officers and men, and 37 horses; Prussia had 112 officers and men, and 40 horses; while we had 149 officers and men, and 88 horses, which equalled the Prussian war establishment as regarded men, and exceeded them by one more officer in each battery. Then, too, as regarded non-commissioned officers, we had 14 now to 13 we had in the Crimea, and to 12 in the Prussian batteries. With respect to horses, from inquiries he had made he was satisfied that upon emergency we could purchase 5,000 draught horses in a week or ten days—horses in every respect fit for immediate work. The garrison batteries had been augmented to 150 men, in place of 90. With regard to field guns we shall have, this year, a total of 692, and after taking 336 for field service there would remain 356 in reserve, exclusive of 80 40-pounder guns of position. He did not consider that sufficient, but there was no doubt that the productive resources of the country were such as to give the requisite number within a very short space of time. The Government could produce two batteries a-week complete, and the general trade would be able to supply as many if not more. He would conclude by saying that he was fully impressed with the importance of the artillery as a branch of our military service, and with the necessity of keeping it in a thorough state of efficiency. But he thought that the statement he had made would be satisfactory to the House, and as the attention of his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War and of His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief was directed to this question, it would not, he believed, conduce to the interests of the service to accede to the Inquiry demanded by the hon. and gallant Gentleman.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

said, he must say that his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hereford (Major Arbuthnot) had called attention to a subject of great importance, and he collected from the observations of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Surveyor General of the Ordnance, that the Motion was not an ill-timed one, because that right hon. Gentleman had admitted that the reserve of guns was not so great as was desirable. The right hon. Gentleman had spoken of the brigade system in the most delicate terms, amounting to an admission that it had broken down, and it was impossible to deny that the artillery generally, and especially the field artillery, was not in that state of efficiency in which everyone would wish to see it. He thought his hon. and gallant Friend had stated fair grounds for an Inquiry, and he would vote for the Motion if his hon. and gallant Friend proceeded to a division.

MR. CARDWELL

said, that the artillery was very much larger in the number of men than when the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich was responsible for the affairs of the Army, and the number of field guns when that right hon. Baronet was in office was 180, and it was now 336, besides 30 in depôt. Therefore the artillery was not in point of numbers in that deficient state which had been described. The Government, moreover, were this year at an expense of nearly £500,000, adding 5,234 men and 2,894 horses to the artillery. They were also taking steps to make the artillery of the Militia and Volunteers efficient, by providing them with officers of the Royal Artillery. He was anxious for the fullest inquiry on the subject, but he was not prepared to hang the matter up by referring it to a Royal Commission, or to any tribunal which would take it out of the hands of the Government. He deprecated, as a general principle, the habit of referring every executive duty to a Royal Commission, and thereby throwing off the responsibility from those to whom it properly belonged. He did not pretend to have any predilection for the brigade system. The battery was the natural unit of the artillery, and when they went beyond that they got into an artificial system. There had been 12 years' experience of the brigade system, and it was now time to re-consider it, and the Government had no desire to do anything except what was necessary for the good of the service.

MR. LIDDELL

said, he was glad that the Government took on themselves the responsibility of inquiry, and were not willing to shift it off to a Commission or a Committee. The artilleryman was the highest trained soldier in the service, and he wished to know what had been done to get a reserve of artillerymen?

LORD GARLIES

said, he should have been glad if an explanation had been given of the number of gunners and the equipment of the different batteries. The Government had announced that the present state of the artillery was not entirely satisfactory, and that the subject was under their consideration; he therefore thought, unless they stated to the House candidly that within 10 days they would announce what their intentions were relative to the organization of the artillery, his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hereford (Major Arbuthnot) should press his Motion to a division.

CAPTAIN VIVIAN

said, he wished to take that opportunity of stating, in answer to his hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Liddell) the state of the artillery reserves. After completing the whole battalions at the full war complement, there would be left 5,000 Artillerymen for the Reserves.

MR. WHALLEY

said, there was a question overriding all these military matters, and that was—What special grounds had we for apprehending danger? It appeared to him that the apprehension of danger arose from the agitation of a great question which at the present moment occupied the attention of most of the States of Europe—namely, the declaration on the part of the Pope of Rome—

MR. D. DALRYMPLE

rose to Order. He wished to ask Mr. Speaker whether the Pope of Rome had anything to do with the question of the organization of our artillery?

MR. WHALLEY

said, he was out of Order, and would resume his seat to rise again when that Motion was disposed of.

COLONEL WILSON-PATTEN

said, he understood that the Government acceeded to the spirit of the Motion before the House—[Mr. CARDWELL assented.]—and he therefore would advise his hon. and gallant Friend to accept the announcement of the Government, and leave them to make an inquiry into the matter.

MR. A. GUEST

said, he hoped the Government would consider the subject of forming an artillery reserve, and also the advisability of having a certain number of heavy guns in reserve, so that they should not have to be manufactured when an emergency arose which required their use.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."