§ MR. DISRAELI, in rising to call attention to the provisions of the Treaty of Paris (1856) as to the Black Sea, with reference to the statement on that subject lately made by the Prime Minister, said: Sir, in the remarks—the few remarks, and the fewer inquiries—I am about to make respecting the Treaty of Paris of 1856, it is not my intention, or my wish, to enter into any discussion as to the great principles of policy involved in that subject. A more important theme could not engage, in my opinion, the attention of Parliament; and on a right appreciation of all the circumstances connected with it I would venture to say that the future power of this country greatly depends—and, more than that, the fortunes of no inconsiderable part of the globe. But a subject of that kind is not to be treated in a casual and desultory manner. An hon. Member has already given Notice of his intention to bring the whole question before the House, and I have no doubt that the House will then enter into the discussion with that interest and attention which the gravity of the question requires. The remarks that I am about to make are rather preparatory to a discussion of the matter. They will divest the theme of some controversial details, which, if not now treated, would only embarrass that greater discussion of policy which is involved in the Notice that has been given. Among other points which I should like to decide to-night would be to ascertain, for example, the avowed object of the Conference that is now sitting in London. That subject seems involved in an 840 atmosphere of ambiguity. The reasons which have been given by persons in authority for that Conference appear to be perplexed and, in a certain degree, contradictory. The whole matter seems to be mixed up with so much mysterious inconsistency, that I thought no time should be lost in order that the House of Commons should more precisely and accurately ascertain the state of affairs with respect to it. I therefore took the earliest opportunity I could of giving Notice on that subject last Friday; but I was not so fortunate as to be able to bring the matter before the consideration of the House.
I had occasion to advert to the subject of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 in some remarks I made on the first night of this Session, on the meeting of the House. They were necessarily of an imperfect character, and the view from which I then took, it was not possible for me to enter into any detail with respect to that particular Treaty. I had one object, and only one object, in making those remarks on the first night of our meeting. I thought that, considering the great events—almost unprecedented in importance—which had occurred in the interval since the Prorogation, it was not inexpedient to draw the attention of the House to their great consequences. I wanted to impress upon the House that in the interval, in consequence of those events, there had been a great revolution in all our diplomatic relations—that all the principles and traditions with respect to external affairs had become obsolete—that the balance of power in Europe was destroyed—that in consequence of that balance of power being destroyed there had been a repudiation of treaties by several States, and that of all existing countries the one which would most suffer by any diminution of diplomatic morality and any violation of public law would be our own. That was the object I had in making those remarks, and as they necessarily extended over a variety of instances, it was not possible for me to dwell in any minute detail upon any particular treaty. Nevertheless, with regard to the Treaty of 1856, I did venture to make more than one observation as to its character. I said distinctly, with regard to that Treaty, that Russia, in repudiating the conditions of the Treaty which referred to the neutral character of the Black Sea, had, in fact, repudiated 841 the very gist of the whole subject—the essence of the Treaty; and that, in fact, that was the question for which we had struggled and made great sacrifices, and endured those sufferings which never can be forgotten. Sir, I did not think it necessary to enter into any demonstration of such a position, even if I had the opportunity. I knew well that I was speaking to a House of Commons, of which even now a majority of the Members were Members of Parliament during the Crimean War, and were perfectly acquainted with all the circumstances which preceded, accompanied, and terminated that great struggle. The House, therefore, I assumed, was perfectly aware that after that war had been waged one whole year, Russia intimated her desire to come to some understanding with her opponents. The Government of Austria in 1855—the Government which, when I described as neutral, the right hon. Gentleman disputed the accuracy of that definition, but which I find mentioned in official documents of 1855 as a Government friendly to both parties, to the Allies and to Russia—the Government of Austria interfered with a view to bring about a pacification. I will treat the circumstances with extreme brevity; but it is necessary that I should place them clearly before the House. After some communications it was ascertained that peace might probably be successfully negotiated on four points—those celebrated Four Points which hon. Gentlemen may still recollect. The first point referred to the government of the Principalities. The second to the free navigation of the Danube. The third point was that some means were to be invented for terminating the naval supremacy of Russia in the Black Sea. The fourth point referred to the future protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte. A Conference was held at Vienna — Russia having intimated that she was prepared to negotiate on these four points—that is to say, having admitted the principle which these four points embodied. The result of the negotiations was shortly this—The first two points, as framed by the Allies, were, after discussion, admitted by Russia. The fourth point, which referred to the protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte, was never brought under formal discussion at the Confer- 842 ence; but Russia privately intimated that she would accede to that fourth proposition, and so no difficulty arose in that case. But with regard to the third point, when the Conference had to decide upon the means by which the naval supremacy of Russia was to be terminated in the Black Sea, great difficulties arose. It appears that Russia having admitted the principle of the third point, the Allies, with great courtesy, and I think wisdom, suggested that Russia should herself propose the means by which that result should be attained. But, after waiting for instructions from St. Petersburg, the Russian negotiators declined to do that; and, therefore, the proposition of the Allies for establishing the neutral character of the Black Sea was brought forward, and that proposition, after considerable delay, and after waiting again for instructions from St. Petersburg, was utterly rejected by Russia. The state of affairs, then, was this—Russia had consented formally to the two first propositions, and privately to the fourth. The government of the Principalities, the free navigation of the Danube, the due protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte not by one Power, but by all the Powers—these points were all conceded; and the point upon which the negotiations for peace were broken was the neutral character of the Black Sea. A great responsibility, therefore, rested upon the negotiators of the Allies, and especially upon the English Government, which took so eminent a lead in these negotiations. Was the war to be continued? Was immense treasure to be further expended, and great sacrifices of human life to be incurred for this unsettled point—the neutralization of the Black Sea? It was an awful responsibility, no doubt, to decide on this point; but responsibility in a free State is not, or should not be, a source of annoyance to individuals, but rather of honourable pride; and it would be well for the House to remember, so far as this country is concerned, who were the statesmen upon whom this great responsibility peculiarly devolved. The Prime Minister of this country then was Lord Palmerston; who, however some of his last feats of foreign policy may be questioned, must be admitted by all to be a man who had a most vigorous perception of what were the interests and duties of this country, and who at that 843 time was unquestionably in the full exercise of his powers, and with no apparent diminution of that decision and that spirit with which he had always conducted our foreign affairs. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was that distinguished nobleman whom the right hon. Gentleman. (Mr. Gladstone) invited more than two years ago to assist him by his experience—Lord Clarendon. The negotiator who represented this country at Vienna was a nobleman who was a Member of this House for nearly half a century—who has the largest experience of public affairs of any individual of our time, who has occupied every office, from Paymaster of the Forces to President of the Council, and who had been for seven years Prime Minister of England — Earl Russell. These were the men upon whom, so far as this country was concerned, peculiarly devolved the responsibility of deciding whether, under the circumstances, the war should be pursued. They did not hesitate, in order to obtain the neutrality of the Black Sea, as it is expressed in the Treaty of Paris negotiated, the following year, to recommend their Sovereign to prosecute the war, and not to cease until the Allies had effected a settlement similar to that which Russia had rejected. Well, the war continued another year:—and the House and the country have never forgotten the circumstances—great glory and honour to the Allies and to Russia also, much exhibition of heroic conduct on both sides, and on both sides, no doubt, unprecedented suffering. In the course of another year Russia was exhausted, and the Treaty of Paris was negotiated. And what was that Treaty? Russia was exhausted; but the Allies, victorious and triumphant, though they had incurred immensely increased expenditure, and endured aggravated sacrifices of life, did not demand from Russia the Crimea, which they might have restored to Turkey. They did not demand any indemnity for the expenses of the war. All the points in that Treaty, except the neutrality of the Black Sea, had been offered by Russia at Vienna in the preceding year, and therefore had been obtained by our negotiators in the first instance; but as a full satisfaction, as a settlement that completely justified the great exertions and sacrifices that had been incurred, as a settlement which 844 they believed would secure the peace of the world so far as that portion of it was concerned, they insisted that the neutrality of the Black Sea should be accomplished.
Now, Sir, having touched—I hope accurately—upon these important facts, and recalled them I trust not without convenience as regards future discussion, I would venture to ask was I not justified in my statement the first night of the Session that the neutrality of the Black Sea was the very basis and gist of the Peace of Paris of 1856—that it was the main object of the war, the great result for the accomplishment of which this country and France and their Allies made the vast sacrifices of life and treasure now so freely acknowledged? That being the case, I asked myself, had we any reason to believe that the policy of England had ever changed? I believed myself it had not changed—I believe that it cannot change. But when I spoke the first night of the Session we were not in possession of Papers which have since been placed on the Table. Now, what do these Papers show with reference to this policy? We find in those Papers a despatch from the Queen's Ambassador at St. Petersburg; and what does he say? Sir Andrew Buchanan writes to the Secretary of State, Lord Granville, and mentions that he had long foreseen that Russia would attempt a revision of the Treaty of 1856, and that he had frequently expressed that opinion to his Lordship and to the late Earl of Clarendon. From these Papers it appears that what Sir Andrew Buchanan had long foreseen did at last occur, and though he had for some time avoided touching on the subject with the Russian Minister, he is at last obliged to encounter the disclosure which he had so long dreaded. And what were the expressions which were used on that occasion by Sir Andrew Buchanan to Prince Gortchakoff? He stated to the Russian Minister that he had the most serious apprehensions as to the light in which the report would be viewed by Her Majesty's Government, and that he should expect to receive orders immediately to ask for his passports and to quit St. Petersburg. Now, I ask the House to bear in mind that Sir Andrew Buchanan is one of the most experienced members of the diplomatic service. He 845 has been engaged to my knowledge for 40 years in posts of important trust; for I recollect that when I was in Constantinople in 1830 he was, if I mistake not, Secretary to the Embassy; and he is a man of ability and sagacity, as well as of discretion. Can it be doubted, then, that, having frequently expressed to Lord Granville and Lord Clarendon his apprehension of the danger which he foresaw, those distinguished statesmen had furnished him with instructions as to the tone he should adopt when the disclosure was made, and the language which he should use? And that the language used by Sir Andrew Buchanan was language strictly in accordance with the instructions which he received, no one who knows him can for a moment doubt. That is a proof, therefore, in these Papers, that the policy of England, with reference to this question, had not undergone a change. But they furnish us, on that head, with another proof. Her Majesty's Ministers, in the difficult position in which they were placed through the repudiation by Russia of the condition of the Treaty of Paris which refers to the Black Sea, took a step which, on this occasion, I will not criticize — I reserve any such criticism for that larger debate which is impending—but I may now at least observe that it seems to me to be one of the most remarkable steps ever taken by a Government. They resolved on sending a special envoy to Count Bismarck. Now, I am not quarrelling with the Government, because, in a position of great difficulty, they decided on sending a special envoy to what may be called the Prussian Court. I can easily conceive adequate reasons why Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin should not leave the seat of his labours. Nor am I here to quarrel with the selection made by the Government for the post. It is said that one of the tests of competency to fill the office of Prime Minister is the capacity for fixing on the right man for any public appointment, and I do not challenge for a moment the propriety of selecting Mr. Odo Russell in this particular instance. He may not have the experience of Sir Andrew Buchanan, and for a reason with which I am sure he will find no fault — because he is a younger man. But Mr. Odo Russell has, nevertheless, had great experience in diplomacy. He has had questions 846 entrusted to him at a post where they were both critical and delicate; and, so far as I am acquainted with his conduct, has, upon all occasions, proved himself to be a man to whose judgment and knowledge might be safely committed the interests of his country. Mr. Odo Russell, moreover, was not abroad — and that was an additional reason why he should be selected as a special envoy to Versailles. He had been re-called from his diplomatic appointment, and promoted to a post in the Foreign Office of the highest trust and importance. He was the right-hand man of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and was in daily communication with his chief. Now, hon. Gentlemen must see at once of how much consequence it is, when you have a special envoy who is to execute, under extraordinay circumstances, business of the most difficult and delicate kind, he should be a man with whom the Minister is in personal connection, so that he should not have to depend merely on written instructions prepared for the special occasion; but an envoy who—fresh from frequent intercourse with the Secretary of State and the head of the Government—should set out upon his mission thoroughly impressed and impregnated with their policy and their views, and thoroughly acquainted with their resources to meet all contingencies. Under such circumstances, we could hope and expect that its interests would be faithfully represented and attended to. Now, what happened in the case of Mr. Odo Russell, our special envoy under such favourable circumstances, and personally so well qualified as he was for the post? He left England late in November, and it was some time before he succeeded in arriving at Versailles, owing to the difficulties of travelling through the seat of war. He, however, arrived at Versailles at last, and lost no time in placing himself in communication with Count Bismarck. There is, in these Papers, an interesting narrative of what occurred on that memorable occasion. Mr. Odo Russell was twice closeted with Count Bismarck in the course of the day. He saw him in the morning, and in consequence of what then passed Count Bismarck communicated with St. Petersburg. He saw him again at 10 o'clock in the evening, and was closeted with him until midnight. Now, Mr. Odo 847 Russell having, after much trouble and pains, obtained the interview which he sought for, did, I have no doubt, full justice to his mission, and spoke with that adroitness and judgment which became the representative of the interests of this country, instructed by the highest authorities of the State. Well, what did Mr. Odo Russell say to Count Bismarck? He pressed for a settlement of a question which, as he informs us, he had frankly proved to Count Bismarck was of a nature, in its present state, to compel us, with or without allies, to go to war with Russia. I ask the House again, was I not justified in the statement which I made on the first night of the Session, that the question of the Black Sea was the real question which was involved in the Treaty of Paris? Have I not proved to the House that this was the view of eminent statesmen like Lord Palmerston, Lord Clarendon, and Lord Russell, who were engaged in the negotiations at Paris and Vienna? And have we not primâ facie evidence that on the 22nd of November last this was the confirmed policy of the English Cabinet—the policy of such men as Lord Clarendon and Lord Granville? I was, I must confess, astonished to learn, having these Papers before us, from the highest authority, that Mr. Odo Russell made the representation to which I have just referred to Count Bismarck without the sanction of the Government. I have heard many remarkable things this Session, which, although it has but just commenced, promises to be rife with interest. We heard last night, for example, that on Monday next a Secret Committee is to be moved for, in order to discover for the Government how to govern regenerated Ireland. How to govern regenerated Ireland! when we thought that we had employed the last two Sessions in perfecting that exalted and sublime legislation which was not only to cure the evils of the past, but which even anticipated the remedies for the future! It seems to me, I must confess, that our Irish legislation is somewhat like our Crimean Treaties, which assume a different character to that contemplated when they were originated. I heard also this Session—and I look upon it as one of the most remarkable things of which I have any recollection—that a functionary who sought to publish a correspondence connected with his Department, which he not only believed to 848 be necessary to vindicate his character, but to be of the greatest interest to the country, received permission to do so, provided he altered the dates. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Hear, hear!] Yes; that was a thing that certainly surprised me, and I am glad to see that the right hon. Gentleman agrees with me at least on that point. Secret Committees and such frank permissions are certainly surprising things; but I cannot help regarding it as more surprising still that a special envoy should be selected at such a critical moment — himself admirably adapted, as nobody will deny, for the post, and with the immense advantage of being fresh from interviews with Ministers of State and of receiving in person instructions from his chief—and that he should be sent on one of the most trying occasions not only in the history of his own country, but of Europe, not further than Versailles, and should, the very first moment he encounters the great opponent with whom he had to deal, immediately take a course which his instructions did not justify. [Mr. GLADSTONE: I never said that.] The right hon. Gentleman will, perhaps, by-and-by notice the observations which I am making. I heard what fell from him on a former night, and I was certainly under the impression that—to use a phrase which, though vernacular, is perhaps scarcely fit to be employed within these walls—Mr. Odo Russell was "thrown over" by the right hon. Gentleman. If it be a mistake, I believe it is a mistake which was shared by both sides of the House. I understood the right hon. Gentleman distinctly to say, in answer to a distinct inquiry, that Mr. Odo Russell had no authority to make that representation. There is one observation I wish to make with regard to Mr. Odo Russell. For a special envoy to declare to a foreign Minister that, with or without allies, we were prepared to go to war for a particular object, is one of the most decided announcements ever made upon political affairs. Admit that he had no authority to make the declaration—an admission which is overwhelming in its incredibility—why was no despatch written by the Secretary of State to contradict the declaration? Why was no printed record made with the frankness becoming an English Government, so that the indiscretion of the special agent should not be concealed from us? Why do we not learn that, at the moment when Her 849 Majesty's Government heard of such an announcement, the special envoy was told by a flash of lightning that he had exceeded his authority? Sir, there is not a line—not a scrap—not a jot to this effect; and until the inquiry was made, and the answer given by the right hon. Gentleman, no one doubted for a moment, looking to the character of the official Papers, that the declaration was made by authority, and that Mr. Odo Russell was sent to Count Bismarck to make it.
I have now, Sir, placed before the House these remarks, the object of which is to show, first, that I was entirely justified in the description I gave of the condition relating to the neutrality of the Black Sea in the Treaty of Paris on the first night of the Session—that it was the cardinal point of British policy; that it was always so considered; that for it, and for it alone, the war was continued and the greatest sacrifices made. I think I have also shown, from the Papers furnished us by the Government, that until within a brief space—which we shall probably hear more about on another occasion—the Cabinet was faithful and firm to this policy, and that men of the vast experience of our Ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburg and the great ability of our special envoy at the Court of Versailles were instructed—and, I think, admirably instructed—how to treat such a violation of the Law of Nations and of public morality. And now, Sir, having, I hope, placed this matter fairly before the House, let me advert to the remarkable manner in which my observations upon that head were met by the right hon. Gentleman on the first night of the Session. I had endeavoured to recall to the recollection of the House the vital importance of the neutralization of the Black Sea. I did not enter into any proof of a policy which I believe was supported by the people of this country, and by the majority of the House, and upon which it appeared to me it was then far from necessary to enter into any controversy. I was content to confine myself to an opinion as to the vital importance of the neutralization of the Black Sea? What said the right hon. Gentleman? Lest I may be accused of inaccuracy, I avail myself of a memorandum containing, I believe, an accurate report of the statement made by the right hon. Gentleman. He entirely joined issue with me. As for the vital importance of the neutralization of the Black Sea, he said— 850 "That was never, as far as I know, the view of the British Government." The right hon. Gentleman said—
In this House, in the year 1856, I declared my confident conviction that it was impossible to maintain the neutralization of the Black Sea. I do not speak from direct communication with Lord Clarendon; but I have been told since his death that he never attached value to that neutralization. Again, I do not speak from direct communication, but I have been told that Lord Palmerston always looked upon the neutralization I as an arrangement which might be maintained and held together for a limited number of years, but which, from its character, it was impossible to maintain as a permanent condition for a great settlement of Europe.Now, Sir, upon these startling observations of the right hon. Gentleman I will make one or two remarks. And, first, when the right hon. Gentleman says the vital importance of the neutralization of the Black Sea was never, as far as he knew, the view of the British Government, and that he had declared his confident conviction in 1856 that it was impossible to maintain it—I would observe that the right hon. Gentleman—unintentionally, of course — conveyed an erroneous impression to the House by allowing himself to mix up his own individual opinions with those of the British Government. [Mr. GLADSTONE: No; I do not admit it.] Does the right hon. Gentleman complain of the accuracy of the report? Of course, I shall take any explanation which the right hon. Gentleman has to offer, and if he said exactly the reverse of what is attributed to him, no one will congratulate the House and the country more sincerely than I shall. But, Sir, when the right hon. Gentleman talks of the views of the British Government and brings forward himself as an authority, allow me to inform the House—because some time has elapsed, and we fortunately have a good many young Members among us, and some old ones—that when the right hon. Gentleman made this speech against the importance of the neutralization of the Black Sea in 1856 he was not a Minister of the Crown, nor was he the Leader of the Opposition. The right hon. Gentleman was connected in this House with a minute coterie of distinguished men, who had no following in the country at the time. They were condemned by the country on account of their conduct with respect to this very question of the Black Sea and Turkish affairs generally. Rightly or wrongly—I will not enter into the 851 question now—the country was convinced that the Crimean War was occasioned by the lukewarmness and the hesitation of this small body of distinguished men. But of these distinguished men the most unpopular in the country was the right hon. Gentleman; because, when war was inevitable, and was even declared by the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen, the right hon. Gentleman at that time having the control of the finances, it became necessary that he should propose the Ways and Means for carrying on the war, and the country was of opinion that the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman were not adequate to the occasion, and were not such as the honour and the interests of England demanded. The people of England remembered a celebrated item moved by the right hon. Gentleman in Committee of Supply—namely, a Vote proposed by him, in a spirit of ironical finance, for the despatch of Her Majesty's Guards to Malta and back again. They never forgot and never forgave that item. They foresaw then, with an instinct of Englishmen which it is impossible to deceive, that we were about to prosecute a war in a spirit which must bring calamity and disaster upon the country. Such was the position of the right hon. Gentleman; and, therefore, the House must not be influenced by his statement of the views of the British Government at that time. He did not represent the British Government. He represented no party in this House and no party in this country. I come now to the statement of the right hon. Gentleman about Lord Clarendon and Lord Palmerston. It was a very responsible thing, I ventured to say, to advise the continuance of the war in 1855. But almost as responsible a thing, in my opinion, is it to impute to statesmen of great eminence, and now unfortunately departed, opinions not only which they did not hold, but which were contrary to their convictions, which contradicted their whole policy, and which would intimate that public men of the highest distinction who proposed a policy, in enforcing which the treasure of the country was expended without stint, and the most precious lives of the country were sacrificed, were laughing in their sleeves at the excitement of the nation. I would make one remark respecting those extraordinary quotations of the opinions of Lord Clarendon and Lord 852 Palmerston as to the neutralization of the Black Sea. Nothing can be more inconvenient and injurious to the privileges of this House than such quotations by Ministers of the private opinions of their Colleagues—and especially if those Colleagues are deceased. Why, we are so punctilious on these matters that a Minister is not even permitted to quote from a despatch without laying it upon the Table! There would be an end to all freedom and force of discussion if it were in the power of a Minister to get up and say—"You have taken such and such a view of affairs, but your facts are wrong," and thus to carry away the House by some declaration of which we had no proof whatever. Everyone must feel that we cannot be too rigid in the application of our rules on such matters; and even if the right hon. Gentleman was convinced that these were the private opinions of Lord Clarendon and of Lord Palmerston, he was not justified in referring to the private conversations of Ministers who are since dead. I am not here to vindicate the honour either of Lord Clarendon or of Lord Palmerston. There are those in this House connected with Lord Clarendon by blood, and who, moreover, resemble him in his capacity of conducting public affairs. An eminent Relative of Lord Clarendon has a seat in this House, and upon him should devolve the duty of defending the noble Earl's memory from such misstatements. Nor am I here to vindicate the honour of Lord Palmerston; but I may make one observation with regard to that distinguished man, because it may throw some little light on these painful disclosures which have agitated, and surprised so many persons. We have also had it stated in "another place" that Lord Palmerston made some light observation to a diplomatist who spoke to him on the subject of our policy with regard to the Black Sea. Now, everyone who knew Lord Palmerston well knew this of him—that with a smiling countenance he often evaded inconvenient discussions on serious affairs. Lord Palmerston was a man who, when most serious, availed himself very often of the weapon of banter, and not merely the diplomatist in question—and I do not seek to inquire who he is—but many diplomatists, if they would only acknowledge it, would confess that when they have wearied Lord Palmerston 853 with their grave assiduity, or have attempted to pump Lord Paknerston with their practised adroitness, he has often unsheathed his glittering foil and has soon disarmed and disabled inconvenient opponents. Lord Palmerston was a master of banter and disliked discussion of grave matters when not in his Cabinet or in this House. But I cannot refrain from recording my solemn conviction that the policy of Lord Palmerston with respect to maintaining the neutrality of the Black Sea never wavered for a moment, and that nothing but securing that great condition of the Treaty of Paris would have reconciled him to the comparative leniency of the other terms.Now, Sir, I hope I have vindicated myself from the charge that I was not authorized in the description which I gave the first night of the Session of the importance of the neutrality of the Black Sea; that I was not justified in saying that it was the cardinal principle of the settlement of 1856; that those were the opinions of Lord Palmerston, Lord Clarendon, and Lord Russell; that they broke up the negotiations at Vienna; and that the war was renewed, or rather continued, solely with the view to maintain that condition. I think I have shown, that the policy then adopted by Her Majesty's Government was the policy not only of Lord Clarendon, but that it must also have been that of Lord Granville up to a very recent period. Now, Sir, I have only one observation to make upon the Conference. Why a Conference was called is to me a matter difficult to comprehend, and I hope we shall learn clearly to-night what its object is. I think myself that, under any circumstances, a Conference would have been a mistake. But if the Conference had been called to vindicate the honour and the rights of England and of Europe, I should have thought it, though a hazardous, at least a bold and loyal course. But why a Conference should be called—a Conference which Russia did not require—for Russia only really initiated an abstract outrage of public morality, and only theoretically violated a treaty, and, therefore, it was quite unnecessary to do anything, even if you felt you were not prepared to resist her when she put her policy into practice—I say why, under such circumstances, a Conference should be called merely to 854 register the humiliation of our country passes my understanding. But there was one declaration made by the Secretary of State which may, perhaps, have some light thrown upon it by that consummate master of language who has several times contradicted me in the course of this speech, and who will very likely follow the same course when he rises on his legs. The declaration was made by a Secretary of State who was at one time ready to go to war with or without allies, but whose policy changes in a moment, and the policy being changed, a satisfactory and plausible reason is offered to the British people. The Conference is to be held, but on this understanding—there is to be no foregone conclusion on the subject. That statement was generally accepted. What was the weight and value of that condition I will not now attempt to ascertain; but, at any rate, it meant something. If it was not to influence events, still there was a semblance of dignity about it. And now, if the Conference was to be held without any foregone conclusion by any of the Powers upon the question of the neutrality of the Black Sea, I want to know how the right hon. Gentleman reconciles that position with the statement which he made the first night that Parliament met, in which he proved that there was a foregone conclusion—a foregone conclusion in the mind of the Prime Minister, and that, a foregone conclusion against the honour and interests of this country?
MR. GLADSTONESir, in the remarks which the right hon. Gentleman so studiously announced as intended to be very few and very brief, his anxiety for brevity in the course of his hour's speech led him to refer to two subjects outside the circle of discussion. One of those was—and I am sorry to be compelled to follow the irregularity of the right hon. Gentleman in referring to it —a Notice given by my noble Friend near me (the Marquess of Hartington), that on Monday next he would move for an inquiry into a dangerous conspiracy existing in a certain spot in Ireland, and I should have thought that the right hon. Gentleman's regard not merely for the ordinary propriety of this House, but for the principles which govern public order—and which it is necessary to observe for the security of life and property—would have led him 855 to refrain from an illusion intended to prejudice the Motion of my noble Friend near me on a subject of gravity so extreme. The right hon. Gentleman is the judge—I make my protest against that reference. The right hon. Gentleman then referred to a subject of much slighter moment, and condescended to taunt me with having told Sir Spencer Robinson that if his Minute were dated on the day after his resignation of the Lordship of the Admiralty it would remove all formal difficulty as to its production. Why does the right hon. Gentleman condescend and stoop to take up this paltry and contemptible accusation? ["Oh!"] Hon. Members opposite cry "Oh!" ["Hear, hear!"] I see the hon, Member for Stamford. [Sir JOHN HAY: Hear, hear.] Yes, very good. Well, if not contemptible, it is a most grave accusation, and I challenge the hon. and gallant Gentleman to put this accusation into words and make it the subject of a Motion. There is nothing I would desire better, as far as I myself am concerned; and if the House thinks fit that it should be discussed, by all means let it be brought to an issue. Sir, I now come to the main subject—which is a more important subject—of the right hon. Gentleman's remarks. The right hon. Gentleman has studiously confounded in the course of his speech matters which are entirely and absolutely disconnected. In the first place, he says I denied that the subject of the neutralization of the Black Sea was of vital importance in the Treaty of 1856. Sir, what I did was this—I challenged the statement of the right hon. Gentleman that it was not only of vital but of exclusive importance—and by exclusive importance I mean paramount and central, such as he has described it to night. Now, Sir, that I hold to be totally untrue. The great object of the negotiations, and the great object of the peace, was to put an end to that system of interference in the affairs of the Turkish Empire, grounded on real or alleged treaty rights, which enabled Russia at her will, through the medium of Turkey, to disturb the peace of Europe. Russia had those rights in a pacific form in the Principalities; she likewise had them, or was supposed to have them, with regard to the Christian subjects of the Porte; and it was the power of thus interfering between Turkey and her sub- 856 jects which gave to Russia her standing ground in the Ottoman Empire; and it was at the total abolition of that system that the war and the negotiations were aimed. Therefore, when I spoke of the neutralization of the Black Sea, and objected to the extravagant statement of the right hon. Gentleman, this subject was totally overlooked and passed by, and this power of interference on the part of Russia in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire was treated as a matter of no account. I never denied that, even in my own opinion, and much more in the opinion of the British nation and Government, the matter was one of great importance at that time. "But," says the right hon. Gentleman, "it has been the policy of the British Government to treat this question of neutralization as a question which formed the whole pith and substance of the Treaty of 1856; and so it was until the 22nd of November; but on the 22nd of November we find, from the course that was taken, so different from what the language of Sir Andrew Buchanan led us to expect, and from the course taken with respect to Mr. Odo Russell, that the importance of neutralization was forgotten, the policy of the Government was reversed, and the honour of the country was compromised." The right hon. Gentleman—I have no doubt without any intention — has entirely misrepresented the sentiments of Sir Andrew Buchanan. He has given it to be understood that the alarm of Sir Andrew Buchanan, the pointed representations which he made to the Russian Government, and the apprehensions which he expressed that he would have to send for his passports, turned upon this — that there was a question as to the neutralization of the Black Sea. Sir Andrew Buchanan never used one of these words with respect to the question of the mere policy of the neutralization of the Black Sea. The language of Sir Andrew Buchanan had reference to the Note of Prince Gortchakoff; the intimations which Sir Andrew Buchanan threw out were intimations which left perfectly open the question of the neutralization of the Black Sea, and had exclusive reference to the Note of Prince Gortchakoff, involving the principle that a single Power, having been bound by its signature to a treaty, had a right, at its own option, to release itself from this obligation. And it is impos- 857 sible to conceive a more gross misconstruction, a more absolute misapprehension, a more pointed misapplication than the right hon. Gentleman has made in his speech, founded upon my speech of a fortnight back, and carefully hatched during that fortnight. What is the page of the despatch? [Mr. DISRAELI: Page 45.] No; it is page 13. The right hon. Gentleman has misrepresented the meaning of Sir Andrew Buchanan. I did not think he would have been so consistent as to misstate even the page of the despatch. Sir Andrew Buchanan says—
I regret to say that I have reason to believe the Russian Government have decided to open the question of the Treaty of 1856 in a way which may prove embarrassing to Her Majesty's Government. I have long foreseen that a proposal on the part of Russia for the revision of the Treaty would not be long delayed, and I have frequently expressed this opinion to your Lordship and to the late Earl of Clarendon. I confess, however, that I was not prepared for the manner in which, if the report which has reached me be authentic, it is proposed to carry out this intention."—[Correspondence, No. 16.]He then goes on to describe his expectations that despatches either had been, or would be immediately, forwarded to the great Courts of Europe, communicating to them that Russia would not acknowledge hereafter the obligations she had contracted under the Treaty of 1856. It was upon these expressions that Sir Andrew Buchanan founded his intimation that he expected he would have to send for his passports; and it is upon that passage that the right hon. Gentleman leads the House to believe that this intimation was founded upon the sense which we entertained of the value and importance of the neutralization of the Black Sea. So much for Sir Andrew Buchanan. I do not think we shall hear much more on that subject. ["Oh!"] We shall see. I now come to Mr. Odo Russell. And there, again, I must complain that the right hon. Gentleman made an uncandid and most inaccurate reference to my language. The question was put to me—I am speaking from memory of what occurred—the question was put to me, as I understood it, whether Mr. Odo Russell made a particular statement by the authority of Her Majesty's Government—that is, by the direct authority or instruction of Her Majesty's Government. I answered that I imputed no blame whatever to Mr. Odo Russell for the statement, but that he 858 did not make it by the authority or instruction of the Government. And then the right hon. Gentleman comes down and says that I declared that the statement was not justified. I never said anything about its being justified; but the right hon. Gentleman chose a word insinuating a meaning that he did not think fit openly to express. I will now call the attention of the House to what Mr. Odo Russell says, and will point out that again the right hon. Gentleman has studiously employed the very same artifice. The language of Mr. Odo Russell has been handled in the same way as the language which Sir Andrew Buchanan used with reference not to the neutralization of the Black Sea, but exclusively to the Note of Prince Gortchakoff, and the principles which that Note asserted—twisted by the right hon. Gentleman into a reference merely to the neutralization of the Black Sea. Here are the words of Mr. Odo Russell. Now we have got to page 45—The Chancellor authorized me to telegraph to London that if your Lordship consented he would willingly take the initiative"—I beg the House to follow me closely—of proposing a Conference for the purpose of endeavouring to find a pacific solution to a question which I had frankly proved to him was of a nature in its present state to compel us, with or without allies, to go to war with Russia."—[Correspondence, No. 76.]I am bound to say in construing this sentence, and exercising the same liberty of opinion which every Gentleman who hears me is at liberty to use, that these words appear to me not to be the words of Mr. Odo Russell himself—this is not a vital point of the case — but I conceive that Mr. Odo Russell is reciting words which Count Bismarck had used. ["Oh!"] I will read them again, that hon. Gentlemen may see if I am right—He authorized me to telegraph to London that if your Lordship consented he would willingly take the initiative of proposing a Conference for the purpose of endeavouring to find a pacific solution to a question which I had frankly proved to him was of a nature in its present state to compel us, with or without allies, to go to war with Russia.That I understand to have been the language of Count Bismarck, repeated by Mr. Odo Russell. ["Oh!"] I should be glad if hon. Gentlemen had this book before them, in order that they might observe whether I am right or wrong. But about that I am comparatively in- 859 different —what I want to point out is that Mr. Odo Russell never conveyed upon any construction of these words—or that Count Bismarck, if the words were his, as I believe they were, never implied—that the question of the neutralization of the Black Sea was a matter which would compel us to go to war with or without allies. What becomes, then, of the pretended policy which, according to the right hon. Gentleman, remained fixed until the 22nd of November, and then dissolved like an airy vision? Whether the language were that of Mr. Odo Russell—which I do not think it was—or that of Count Bismarck, what was said was this—that the question was of a nature in its present state to compel us to go to war. What was "the present state" of the question? One in which a solemn State Paper was before us, emanating from the Russian Chancery, and in our opinion maintaining and asserting, on the part of Russia, a right to liberate herself from one or all of her treaty engagements; and that was the principle, and not the neutralization of the Black Sea, which Count Bismarck judged was one that would compel us, with or without allies, to go to war. Well, you may say, why did we not correct Count Bismarck? If Count Bismarck had spoken with regard to the neutralization of the Black Sea, there might have been some necessity for such a course; but, while he kept to the Note of Prince Gortchakoff, it would have been very wrong in us to give instructions for any such purpose to Mr. Odo Russell. We never said that the policy involved in the Note of Prince Gortchakoff was not a matter that might lead to difficulties between the two countries—even, possibly, eventuating in war. We never said that it would; but we never compromised our own liberty on the subject. And that, I say, was the wise and rational course to take, although it has laid us open to the ungenerous and torturing process of language practised by the right hon. Gentleman, who has endeavoured to show that we were speaking of neutralization when our words had reference to the "present state of the question," and the present state of the question alone—in which we had before us a Russian document that appeared to us — rightly or wrongly is not now the question—to assert, on the part of Russia, a right and 860 intention to release herself, at her own mere will, from any treaty obligations whatsoever. I hope I have shown that these two great pillars of the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman with respect to the policy which we maintained up to the 22nd of November have entirely crumbled away. He has furnished no foundation whatever for the policy which he attributes to us. What our policy was with reference to neutralization I will now proceed to state, but a little more carefully, in combination with the retrospection of the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman has referred to the language which I used a fortnight ago; he has examined it at great length, and with the advantage of collateral lights thrown upon it by discussions reported to have occurred "elsewhere," which he has brought in aid of his own ingenuity. The right hon. Gentleman has anatomized the language which I used on that occasion. I will go over the points to which he has referred. The right hon. Gentleman has said that I misled the House by causing it to suppose that I was a Member of the Government in the year 1856. Now, it is not altogether pleasant to have imputed to oneself accusations which imply a degree of childishness and a degree of ignorance unworthy of the lowest boy in a National School. The right hon. Gentleman, having studied a report of my speech in the newspapers, thinks it worth his while to state that I implied to the House that I was a Member of the Government in 1856. Now, Sir, I refer confidently to what I did state, and I affirm that, in addition to the words reported in the newspaper, I used on the 9th of February preparatory words, carefully distinguishing between what referred to the Government and what referred to my own personal position. Before I went to the graver part of the case, I said that even as respected myself there was a personal difficulty—namely, that in 1856 I had objected to the neutralization of the Black Sea. Therefore, I do not require the obliging reminder of the right hon. Gentleman that I then had no following, that I was not in the Government, that I sat in an undistinguished post, and was the most unpopular man in the country. All I know is that I was trying to do my duty, and I do not care a pin whether I, or the right hon. Gentleman, or anybody else 861 was the most unpopular man in the country. It may fairly be asked—"Why did you indulge in egotism—why did you quote your own insignificant words in 1856?" My reason was this—Although they were the words of a person who at that time had no official responsibility, yet they had been quoted and printed in St. Petersburg during the present year as words very convenient to be used by the Russian Government in its negotiations with the Government now in Office. That is my apology for having referred to myself. Then comes the question of my conduct as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and my insufficient proposal with regard to the Russian War of sending the Guards, or a certain number of men, to Malta and bringing them back again. Has the right hon. Gentleman looked at dates, and does he know whether that was done in the war or not? Not having the power of reference at the present moment, I cannot be certain; but, to the best of my recollection, it was a very early and preparatory measure taken by us, and had no connection with those operations into which the war subsequently developed. What is the nature of the charge made by the right hon. Gentleman? He seems to be so ill-acquainted with the relations of Cabinets in which he has often sat, that he thinks it is in the power of the Chancellor of the Exchequer of this country, after the country has entered into an European war, to limit its cost and fix its scale. Such a charge to be made by the right hon. Gentleman is perfectly absurd. Surely any man who has learnt his A B C in political matters must know that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if he had the power of doing such a thing as that, would not be Chancellor of the Exchequer alone, but would absorb in himself the entire power of the Government, while the rest of the Cabinet would be reduced to mere ciphers. I am sorry to say that the Chancellor of the Exchequer in this country has not power enough when war breaks out. When a war breaks out in Germany, the old principle of parsimony and good thrift is not forgotten, and in the wars of Napoleon every franc which was spent had been as carefully considered as if it had formed part of a grant to the Louvre Gallery. In this country, however, the case is different, and from the moment war is contemplated, the Chancellor of the Exche- 862 quer becomes a cipher. His responsibility and his control, which are real in time of peace, are entirely absorbed, and the whole of his mind is directed towards providing Ways and Means for carrying out the plans framed by others, and in respect to which he can only give his opinion, like any other Member of the Cabinet. As regards war expenditure, I do not know whether it is to the interest of the right hon. Gentleman to provoke discussion on that subject, but if he chooses to return to it another night, I shall be most happy to follow him. The right hon. Gentleman enlarged on the subject of Lord Clarendon and Lord Palmerston, and the iniquity of my referring to their real or supposed opinions. The right hon. Gentleman is loud in their praise. How generous he is in his praises of the dead! I have heard him eulogize the late Sir Robert Peel and many others who have passed away, and I cannot but think it would be as well, if with that liberality for the dead, he mingled a little equity for the living. The right hon. Gentleman has treated this matter as if I had professed to give accurate information. In point of fact, I was careful to state that I spoke on indirect information; but I take the first opportunity of stating that though, from the character and position of the person who principally informed me about Lord Clarendon, I thought I was justified in mentioning what I did mention, I now have reason to believe that that information was erroneous, and I have no intention of saying anything about Lord Clarendon and the neutralization of the Black Sea. With regard to Lord Palmerston, however, the question stands differently. The right hon. Gentleman speaks as if I had made some imputation on Lord Palmerston. He objects to my referring to anything that Lord Palmerston said or did which is not recorded in an official document; and next he regards it as an imputation on the character of Lord Palmerston, to say he looked on the neutralization of the Black Sea as being of temporary rather than of permanent value. With regard to the first of these objections, I want to know on what principle the right hon. Gentleman can snow that it is an offence against our cardinal rules to mention something I have heard related in regard to what is matter of history—namely, the opinion of Lord Palmerston. 863 Why, the right hon. Gentleman himself, in his speech delivered on the very same evening, entertained the House for a quarter of an hour with a statement—void, as I believe, of the slightest foundation—of what he had heard and what he had gathered with respect to a tour of Lord Clarendon on the Continent, and all manner of political plans and schemes then arranged between him and the Ministers of Foreign States. With regard to the alleged imputation, was it an imputation on Lord Palmerston? My proposition was that Lord Palmerston—and I asserted it as a fact not actually known, but rationally believed—looked on the neutralization of the Black Sea, not as a thing insignificant, not as a thing unimportant, but as a provisional arrangement, which could not be permanently maintained. That was the whole of my argument. I never said the neutralization of the Black Sea was not important in the view of the Government; I never even denied it was important in my own view, though I thought the difficulties of maintaining it so formidable that they might in time become insurmountable. Lord Palmerston took the just and rational view that, for a time, the neutralization of the Black Sea could be maintained, and that, if it were maintained for a time, Turkey would be afforded that opportunity of effecting internal reforms and improving her organization, on the right use of which the possibility of her maintaining her place among the Powers must ultimately and substantially depend. Now, with respect to the right hon. Gentleman's references to my language, I may remark that it was used in reply to him; and those who think it was wrong in me to accumulate evidence on the subject of the neutralization of the Black Sea should consider what charges had been made against the Government on the first night of the Session. The right hon. Gentleman said—Now, when Russia repudiated the Treaty of 1856 I do not think the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government was a wise one. I admire the reasoning by which Her Majesty's Secretary of State showed to the Russian Minister the fallacy of his position; but I think that the inference he drew from his own premises was lame and impotent. Our proper answer to the first Note of Prince Gortchakoff should have been to protest against it, and to have said at once that Russia roust take the consequences of such a step. In that case I doubt very much whether at this moment we should have heard any more about it. But that was not the course 864 adopted by Her Majesty's Government. The plan of a Conference on the Treaty of 1856 which France could not attend was not politic, and the inability of France to take part in it was alone a sufficient reason in refusing to listen to any such project.The right hon. Gentleman had condemned our policy. He had said—"You ought not to have had a Conference; you should have intimated to Russia that she must take the consequences of the step she has unhappily been induced to adopt." In other words, with one great quarrel and controversy raging in Europe, in the midst of blood and fire, the right hon. Gentleman would have recommended us to keep open another, and not to take any means to arrive at an amicable solution of the question. We were to say—"No, we will not negotiate; we will stand on our treaty rights, and refuse all modification of them; and if you act in the way you point out you must take the consequences." This is what the right hon. Gentleman recommended. This is the sort of policy by which he seeks to maintain the honour of England. He recommended that at a moment when France was prostrate—when it was known that France had long ago expressed her willingness to modify the Treaty of 1856 with regard to the neutralization of the Black Sea — when Austria had actually taken the initiative in proposing some years ago the abrogation of that part of the Treaty—and when Russia had made known to us that she would not abide by the Treaty as it stood. The wisdom, the policy, and the resources of the right hon. Gentleman suggest to him nothing more than this in such a state of European sentiment and feeling. When Russia uttered this announcement, we should have merely said—"Very well, you must take the consequences;" thereby at once placing ourselves in a position of estrangement from that important Power at a time when we thought we had one most sacred duty to discharge—namely, to keep together, if possible, in harmony and co-operation, the neutral influences of Europe, in the hope, that in some happy moment we might be able to contract that range of misery and destruction which we had long seen extending. And then, Sir, he is sad and melancholy about the honour of his country, and he thinks there was a foregone conclusion when the Conference was held. Certainly there was 865 foregone conclusion to the extent that I stated on February 9th, and to the extent that had been stated in the gracious Speech from the Throne; a foregone conclusion to this extent—that it was hoped that the principles of public right and the general policy of the Treaty would be upheld, and that the Powers would co-operate cordially in the revision of some of its conditions in a fair and cordial spirit, and would accept the results of that revision. The right hon. Gentleman asks—"What is the object of the Conference?" I would rather have said nothing about the Conference, which we might have discussed with very much greater advantage possibly in the course of a few days, now that we have, I am happy to say, a French Ambassador in London, and there is a prospect of peace being restored; but as the Conference has been dragged into debate, I will say that the object of the Conference is to receive, in a manner compatible with, and conformable to, public international law, the representations that Russia may have to make; to give to those representations a fair, candid, and friendly hearing; and to consider, renovate, and, if need be, fortify any of the other provisions of the Treaty of 1856 against which it may be found by the Conference any reasonable objection can be raised. Now, Sir, I believe I have met the allegations of the right hon. Gentleman, though, I am afraid, not in a manner satisfactory to him. I need not go back upon his recital of the Four Points, and the different matters which, I have no doubt, are to be found in the Annual Register of that day, of which he gave us a copious, interesting, and, I have no doubt, an accurate account; but with regard to the fundamental fallacy that ran through the whole speech of the right hon. Gentleman—namely, his continually representing the question of public law raised by the despatch of Prince Gortchakoff as being simply the question of the policy of the neutralization of the Black Sea, and with regard to the intentions of the British Government, I trust I have succeeded in showing the House there is not the slightest shadow of foundation for the charges he has made.