SUPPLY—ARMY ESTIMATES. (Hansard, 16 February 1871)

§ MR. CARDWELL

said: Sir, since we last met in this House to consider questions of military organization and military expenditure events have occurred in Europe of so marvellous a character that I think it no exaggeration to say they have no parallel in the records of history from the pages of Herodotus to those of Sir William Napier. These events have excited in the minds of the English people an anxious interest and a settled purpose to review their own military institutions, for the purpose of placing them on a basis of permanent security. The task which is before the English Parliament is not like that which was before the Prussian 328 Legislature after the battle of Jena. We have no reverses to repair; and we do not begin upon a cleared foundation to build a new superstructure. Our more grateful, but not, perhaps, necessarily easier, task is to combine in one harmonious whole institutions which have great excellences, but which require considerable improvement in order to bring them up to the requirements of the time. There is the standing Army, with its historical associations and glorious memories, recruited by voluntary enlistment, and having a larger amount of foreign service than any other army in the world; there is the Militia, whose theory is conscription, but whose practice is voluntary enlistment; and there are the Volunteers, who have most of the attributes of military life, and all the independence of the most perfect civil freedom. To combine these different institutions in one complete whole is, as I believe, the desire of the House of Commons and of the English nation. Her Majesty's Government have thought the present opportunity favourable for accomplishing this object, because, while we have no dangers to apprehend, we have on the part of the community at large an interest in the subject which, in former years, it has been very difficult to evoke. And, Sir, it is the opinion of the Government that, if we are to deal at all with a question of this magnitude and importance, we ought not to deal with it in a superficial and partial manner, but ought to take a broad and comprehensive review of the subject, and endeavour to lay the deep foundations of a system which may render danger or the apprehension of danger in the future altogether unknown.

In endeavouring to discharge to the best of my ability the task imposed upon me I will first speak of the numbers of men for which the present Estimates provide, and next declare the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the great questions which underlie all the details of military administration, and which must be settled by Parliament before any Department can undertake, in a complete manner, the work of detailed organization. First, I shall speak with regard to the question of compulsory or voluntary service; then on the question of purchase in the Army; and, lastly, of the position of Lords Lieutenant of counties in regard to the auxiliary forces, 329 with a reference to the relations which ought to subsist between the regular and the auxiliary forces of the country. And, perhaps, I may be permitted in the outset to quote some words of Mr. Pitt as being the natural and guiding principle for any Government in dealing with such a question as this. In 1803—at a time of great danger, very different from the present time—Mr. Pitt addressed to the House words which I think appropriate to a case like the present. He said— I am still of opinion that to a regular Army alone, however superior, however excellent, even aided by the Militia, we ought not solely to trust; but that in a moment so eventful. …. We ought to superadd to the regular Army some permanent system of national defence, either to a certain degree compulsory, or formed upon the voluntary zeal and patriotism of the country itself. This ought to be resorted to as the grand source of domestic security. The Army must be the rallying point; the Army must furnish example, must afford instruction, must give us the principles on which that national system of defence must be formed, and by which the volunteer forces of this country, though, in a military view, inferior to a regular Army, would, fighting on their own soil for everything dear to individuals and important to a State, be invincible."—[1 Hansard, Dec. 9, 1803.] The present Estimates are, I am sorry to say, very much larger than those of last year. They amount to £15,851,700, being an increase of £2,886,700, or of £1,486,700 after taking into consideration the Vote of Credit assigned to the War Department, and amounting to £1,400,000. Over the Estimates of the preceding Government in 1868–9, after making an allowance for those Estimates on account of the Survey and some Indian payments — my right hon. Friend (Sir John Pakington) well knows what I refer to—the increase is about £718,000. Now, with regard to fully £1,000,000 of the increase, I shall not occupy the time of the Committee with any details, because I think it will probably be desired that we should not now occupy ourselves with mere details, but proceed to the larger questions which are involved in the subject before us. All I will say is that my right hon. Friend who sits beside me, the Surveyor General of Ordnance (Sir Henry Storks), will be able, when the time comes, to show you that the £1,000,000 to which I have referred is an expenditure of a kind which will never occur in ordinary years. With regard to the increase 330 of 20,000 men made last year, that accounts for an increase in the Estimates of £1,049,000. The increase for the Militia is £412,000; for Volunteers, £81,500; and for the Army Reserve, £61,000.

Before I pass on to other subjects I should like to say, almost in a single sentence, a few words about the increase of men. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) spoke the other evening of disbanded veterans and attenuated regiments. We disbanded no corps of the British establishment proper, but only colonial corps, and I maintain that it is almost a universally accepted principle of English policy that colonial corps shall not be maintained at the expense of the taxpayer at home. The doctrine is that at home the population shall do more in its own defence in comparison with the amount of the standing army, and that it is no longer necessary to maintain, at the expense of the British taxpayer, a standing army to relieve our distant Colonies from the necessity of doing anything to defend themselves. And there is no one who has more clearly or more forcibly expressed that opinion than my right hon. Friend whom I see opposite (Sir Charles Adderley), who represented the Colonial Office under the late Government. I contend, therefore, that when we disbanded the Canadian Rifles, who defended the frontier between the United States and Canada, we did nothing to impair the defensive power of England, nor did we do anything to diminish that power when we disbanded the Cape Rifles, on the report of the Governor of the Colony that the mounted police would do the work better; and the same remark may apply to the West India regiments and to the black troops on the West Coast of Africa, neither of whom afforded any source of strength to England. These disbandings lighten the burden of the British taxpayer, while they in no respect diminish the power or the influence of this country.

Then with regard to attenuated regiments. The first person who introduced attenuated regiments was, I think, General Peel, acting as a member of the Government of the right hon. Gentleman opposite. That was, in my opinion, a most judicious and wise course, and let me take the liberty of saying that if you are ever to have a combination of efficiency 331 with economy, you must, in a time of peace, have attenuated regiments. Such regiments do not look so well on parade; they are not so agreeable to commanding officers as regiments which are not attenuated, but they are very agreeable to the British taxpayer, and when you have them backed by a reserve they are equally conducive to the strength and power of the country. General Peel did not reduce those regiments below 600; that was at a time when the reserves were not yet formed, the time when he introduced the Reserve Bill. We reduced them to 500; but that was at a time when the reserves were raised and were ready to be put into the battalions. I will for a moment make a comparison in order to show our exact strength when we came into Office with what it was when this subject was dealt with last year. I am taking a comparison certainly not too favourable to myself, for the right hon. Gentleman had at that time at home rather more men than his distribution had provided, while in August last I had fewer than my distribution contemplated. In December, 1868, the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir John Pakington) had in this country 89,080 regulars, and 3,494 reserve men liable to service abroad. That left at home 92,574. On the 1st of August, 1870, we had only in this country of regulars 84,376—not because the Estimates did not provide more, but because 5,000 had not yet returned from the Colonies; but there was at that time a reserve of 22,313 men, making a total of 106,689, against 92,574. [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON: Chiefly Militia Reserves.] Yes, they were; that is to say, there were at home liable to serve abroad 14,000 more men after the Estimates had been reduced by two millions and a quarter. I say, therefore, the policy of attenuated regiments is a policy to which I am prepared to adhere when there are reserves prepared to fill those regiments.

Well, now about Militia Reserves. I have never been enthusiastic for Militia Reserves; but I own I cannot understand why special disparagement should be cast on a Militia Reserve from the quarter that carried the Bill for establishing it, and actually created it. If it was not a reliable reserve, why create it? If it is a liable reserve, why disparage it? My own opinion is, that you may 332 have a much better reserve—namely, the Army Reserve. It was for the purpose of securing that object that I introduced and carried through Parliament last Session a Bill for short service, which I hold to be at the very root and foundation of all Army Reform. Having used the reserves which my predecessors had placed in my hands, and having passed a Bill for the purpose of introducing a better reserve, I consider myself entitled to adhere to and sustain the policy of attenuated regiments in a time of peace.

Now I should like to say a few words upon the subject of recruiting, about which I have been asked a Question in the course of the evening, because, to my great surprise, all through the Recess, some patriotic critics appeared to have taken special trouble to prove that our attempts at recruiting were failures. What possible satisfaction that could give to any person who had the strength or glory of his country at heart I could never understand. But let me state a few of the facts of the case. I have laid on the Table the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting. The recruiting began in the middle of the harvest. It began without bounty, and I beg leave to remind the House that until last year it was an almost universally, accepted dogma that recruiting without bounty was impossible. Well, we began recruiting without bounty, and almost immediately the occasion arose which led us to ask, and the House to vote, 20,000 additional men. The result has been that there was a larger number of recruits than during the time of the Crimean War, and even during the time of the Indian Mutiny, which has always been looked upon as the period when the greatest number of recruits were raised; and when a bounty of £2 was given and the medical examination was relaxed, the number did not greatly exceed that which we have now obtained. When you look at the bounty, the standard of height, and the medical examination, you will probably be of opinion, when you read the Inspector General's Report, that the recruiting of last year was really and substantially equal to that of 1857. Before I pass from the subject of bounty, I will observe that the system of bounty carried along with it the supposed necessity for the practice of marking. Bounty having been done away with, I have desired that the practice 333 of marking may also be discontinued. [Murmurs.] I thought everybody in the House knew what marking was. Marking is the practice of imprinting letters upon the person in the way sailors frequently mark themselves. The letter "D." is put upon a deserter; the letters "B. C." upon one who has been guilty of very bad conduct. [Several hon. MEMBERS: Branding.] It is not branding. It is still sometimes said that we entrap and decoy recruits; but when you read the Report you will find that the recruits are sent without escort, a railway ticket being given to them at the places where they are recruited. They are sent by themselves to join their regiments; and a very small decimal represents the percentage of those who absent themselves, and that of these many afterwards join, having only missed a steamer, or a train. On the whole, I am sure you will feel that the recruiting has been extremely satisfactory.

On the question of short service, I wish to say that the numbers recruited under the Bill of last year are small, but that this may be accounted for by the operation of the prejudice which has always favoured the old plan, and because until the ranks of the Army were full we were not able to pass any men into the Reserve. The ranks of the Army are now full, or nearly so, and in a short time we shall begin to pass men into the Reserve. One of the objects of the measure I have to introduce will be that greater elasticity may be given in regard to short service than we were able to obtain by the Bill of last year. The House will remember that we had a great deal of discussion upon the subject. We were almost compelled to apply it only to the infantry, and that only for six years; but the war which has been raging on the Continent has shown abundantly that excellent soldiers can be made in a much shorter period than six years; and therefore I hope the House will permit us to extend the short-service principle to a much greater length, and thus to increase the Army Reserve.

I now wish to speak of the Militia, called, and justly called, by the Royal Commission "the solid and constitutional reserve of the country." We issued a circular to the commanding officers of the Militia regiments, in order to ascertain whether, in their opinion, 334 they would be able to raise additional battalions or additional companies, and the result has been that we have received accounts which I have laid on the Table and which appear to show that we can raise 45,000 additional men in England, Scotland, and Ireland. Therefore, for the present year, there will be, including officers and permanent staff, 139,000 Militiamen. This is more than the statute at present permits us to raise; and one of the clauses of the Bill I shall have the honour to introduce will have for its object to enable the Crown to raise those additional Militiamen by voluntary enlistment within the limits of the Vote that Parliament may sanction.

The Volunteers have in the course of the year shown an increase of efficients to the number of 577, and of extra-efficients to the number of 8,176. The schools of instruction opened in the course of the autumn have been very readily attended, considering that they have been opened for so short a period, and at the present moment out of 460 men, 142 have passed the schools, and 318 have received certificates of competency. In the Estimates I have taken £40,000 for the Volunteers, in anticipation of the certificates to be obtained by officers, commissioned, and non-commissioned, in the present year. This arrangement made last year was not received at first with much favour by those who spoke about it in this House; but I hope those Volunteer officers who are present will agree with me in opinion that they have been received favourably by the Volunteer Force.

I will now pass on to state the numbers for which we propose to provide. The present Estimate provides on the British establishment for 135,047 Regular troops, 139,000 Militia, 14,000 Yeomanry (9,000 whom we hope to get for the First Army Reserve), and 30,000 Second Army Reserve and Pensioners, making in all 327,047 men, and if you add for efficient Volunteers 170,671, the whole will amount to 497,718. Of these there will be in this country 108,108 Regulars, 139,000 Militia, 14,000 Yeomanry, the First Army of Reserve amounting to 9,000, and the Second Army of Reserve and Pensioners to 30,000, making a total of 300,108, besides 170,000 Volunteers. And now I will just state how the 20,000 men added to the Army are disposed of. 335 The artillery has been increased by 5,254 men, the cavalry corps by 1,888, the infantry by 12,257, the engineer train by 333, the army service corps by 319, the army hospital corps by 140, making in all 20,191. Deducting from this 211 men, mainly consisting of two companies of the Ceylon Rifles, which are to be reduced, the number will be 19,980. Now, for this force of 300,108 men, which I said we shall have at home, one of the most important questions is—What is to be the field artillery? We have raised the horse artillery from 10 batteries to 16, having 96 guns; and we have turned 20 garrison batteries into field batteries, making 40 altogether, with 240 guns, making a total of 336 guns. And in reserve we have 12 batteries, with 72 guns, making in all 408 field guns, which would be a sufficient number of guns for a force of 150,000 men. I think it right to state these figures, partly because the subject is one which excites great interest, and partly because it is a necessary introduction to the first question which I wish to lay before the House—that is, the question of voluntary or compulsory service. Until we have clear ideas whether we mean to adhere to our present system of voluntary service, or to adopt some one of the many plans of compulsory service which we see daily presented to us, we cannot proceed, with any detailed arrangements. Now, the question is not whether compulsory service shall be, as it has always been, a portion of the law of the country, not whether it shall be that last resource which the Sovereign and Parliament can apply in the moment of supreme emergency, but the question is, as we see every day recommended, whether compulsory service shall be called into action and become part of the daily administration of our military system. Sir, before enforcing a plan like this we should require indeed conclusive proof—something which should compel us to change our ancient habits and enter upon a course which, to my judgment, would be most distasteful to the country, and extremely objectionable in every point of view. It is sometimes said that compulsory service would be simple and logical, that it would solve all difficulties, and that if you only had recourse to it all the objections which surround it would at once disappear. 336 That argument seems to me to involve that there should be compulsory service for the standing Army, a proposition which nobody ever, I think, was bold enough to support. If it is to be compulsory service for the Militia, on what ground is it to be defended? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Walpole) in 1852 brought in the plan, which works extremely well, of voluntary enlistment for the Militia. Why depart from it and establish a compulsory system? I have seen it argued that it would be a great moral advantage if all men of all classes were compelled to serve together in the ranks under pressure of an Act of Parliament. To me it appears that there is not a nobler spectacle than this country presents, where all classes serve together, but serve together in a voluntary service, and have always hitherto in our time maintained a sufficient force. Before the Great War the theory of compulsory service existed, and what was the result? Why that almost all the persons who served were substitutes. And what was the result of that in its bearing, whether upon the individuals selected or upon the country at large? To the rich it was simply unqualified injustice. A rich man who was struck by the Ballot simply paid out of his own purse a large sum when he ought to have contributed only his portion as one of the community. What was it to the poor? From the poor man you took everything he possessed, his capital, his labour, his time, which was his only capital. And what was it for the State? By raising the price of the substitute in the market you enhanced the price of your recruit for the Army; you were bidding against yourself, you defeated your own measure, and you were absolutely obliged to give it up. Well, Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to recommend that there shall be compulsory service, whether with substitutes or without them. They agree entirely with the language used the other day by Lord Derby at a meeting in Lancashire, where he said—"You would find it the cheapest in the end to pay for the labour which you want." I have gone into the subject and expressed my views upon it at some length; but so much has been said about it for the last few months that I wished to express clearly and strongly the opinions which 337 I entertain. They are so well put in a Report upon recruiting by the late Mr. John R. Godley, that I cannot do better than quote his words. Mr. Godley wrote— Conscription, which is, at first sight and superficially, a cheap mode of recruiting armies, is, in reality, the most expensive that can be adopted. It is a tax by lot, confessedly the very worst kind of tax that a Government can impose. Where substitutes are allowed and provided, the tax is paid in money, and consists of the price paid for the substitute; the only difference between such substitutes and recruits provided as ours are being, that in the former case the bounty is paid by the unfortunate individual on whom the lot has fallen; in the latter case by the public. The case is still harder with those who cannot afford to purchase substitutes; on them the conscription is a tax which takes at one swoop their whole capital—i. e., their labour and their time. It matters not what the value of that capital may be—whether they be skilled or unskilled, educated or ignorant, earning high or low wages, producing largely or producing nothing, down comes the relentless conscription, takes possession of them for the best part of their lives, and gives them in return hardly more than clothing and food. In these cases the pecuniary amount of the tax is represented by the difference between the value of the conscript's labour at his calling and his pay as a soldier. But no pecuniary expression can represent the full amount of individual suffering and public inconvenience which must be the result of so extensive and violent a dislocation of labour. Compulsory service of any kind would be peculiarly injurious to a country inhabited by an enterprizing and colonizing people like the English. Such a people always sits loosely to the soil, and the prospects of a conscription would infallibly lead to a regular and large immigration of our best workmen, a class of whom we already lose too many. Of course, if there is no other way of getting an army, we must have a conscription; but surely everything else ought to be tried before we have recourse to it. Well, it appears to me also that everything else ought to be tried before we adopt this system. We do not employ conscription even for the Navy, our first line of defence. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Cambridge based his Militia Bill on the voluntary principle, and I hope that in ordinary times we shall be able to secure a sufficient force without departing from that principle. In cases of emergency the law imposes the obligation of compulsory service; but it is not enforced in a manner which can be said to be either very efficient or simple. We, therefore, propose to insert in the Bill clauses empowering the Sovereign in times of emergency to call Parliament together, and to raise, without delay, the forces which may be deemed to be necessary 338 under such circumstances for the national defence. Well, if we can have a force sufficiently large in all ordinary times by means of voluntary service, and if we supplement that force in cases of emergency by having recourse to the common-law obligation of every man to defend his country, the next question which arises is—How are these forces to be organized? When you come to consider this subject, you will find that there are two great questions which must be decided before you can enter into details. These are the questions of purchase in the Army, and the position of the Lords Lieutenant of counties with reference to the auxiliary forces. I believe it to be the desire of the country and of Parliament to unite and amalgamate all the different forces of the nation into one harmonious and compact body, so that they may be employed with the greatest advantage for the purpose for which they exist. In order to effect that object you must place them under one government, and in order to place them under one government you must apply to them something like the same rules and the same system. You cannot have the purchase officers of the Army amalgamated and interchangeable with the non-purchase officers of the reserve forces. You cannot have all your forces amalgamated and interchangeable so long as you retain a system under which at present the regular forces are under the direct government of the Crown, and the auxiliary forces under the control of the Lords Lieutenant of counties. Therefore it is that you must make up your minds as to whether you will continue or abolish the system of purchase, and whether you will keep your reserve forces in the hands of the Lords Lieutenant or transfer them to the Crown.

Now, with the permission of the Committee, I will take the question of purchase first. Everybody knows that the practice of purchase is co-existent with the existence of our Army. It was prohibited by William III. for a short time; but it was revived in 1701, and in 1711 rules, and in 1719 regulations, with respect to it were made. In 1857 a Royal Commission was appointed, of which the Duke of Somerset was Chairman, and by which many distinguished men were examined with respect to the question of purchase. The Commissioners, 339 in their Report, sum up all that is to be said against and for the system with judicial impartiality. On the one side they say— It is contended that it is vicious in principle; repugnant to the public sentiment of the present day, and equally inconsistent with the honour of the military profession and with the policy of the British Empire. The system it is moreover affirmed produces ill effects on the constitution of the Army, and impairs its efficiency by giving an undue pre-eminence to wealth, discouraging exertion, and depressing merit. It encourages habits of expense and dissipation, injurious to discipline and embarrassing to the poorer officers. It sends an officer into battle with the knowledge that in hazarding his life, he hazards also the future prospects of those who are dearest to him. This, indeed, has been since the Crimean War modified as regards the regulation, but still remains as regards the over-regulation price. The Report proceeds— The regulation price of commissions is a fiction. … Cases of this kind lead to traffic and bargaining among officers, whereby a mercenary feeling, it is alleged, is created in men whose guiding principles should be a nice sense of honour and a disinterested attachment to the public service. Now it is impossible to conceive anything more alien from the feelings of that noble profession, whose object is not the acquisition of wealth but the discharge of duty and the attainment of honour, than the qualities which are spoken of in that Report of the Duke of Somerset's Commission. They may truly say— They are not covetous for gold.… Such outward things dwell not in their desires: But if it be a sin to covet honour, They are the most offending souls alive. On the other side, the Commission reported that the feeling of the Army was generally in favour of the continuance of the system of purchase, on the ground that it facilitated retirement, and was a security against favour. The Commission pointed out that the command of a battalion was a most important trust, and that no man, unless there was reason to believe he was thoroughly competent, ought to have the lives of his fellow-subjects committed to his charge. They showed that the loss of a battalion, the result of his incapacity, might be the loss of a battle, and the loss of a battle serious disaster to the Empire. They therefore recommended that, at least with regard to the command of a 340 battalion, the system of purchase should be abolished. We are now in the fourteenth year since that recommendation was made. In 1860 it was taken into consideration by the Cabinet of Lord Palmerston, and it was determined to adopt it. We are now in the eleventh year since that decision was arrived at, and nothing has been done, and no wonder: for, in the first place, it was almost equally applicable to the major, and, in the next, the abolition of purchase in the case of the lieutenant-colonel must affect the interests of every officer in the regiment. Again, in 1868, my right hon. Friend (Sir John Pakington), whom I see opposite, submitted to the Queen that it was advisable to do away with the rank of cornet and ensign in the Army. He did not, however, remain in Office long enough to devise and submit to Parliament a scheme on the subject. That task fell to me, and I endeavoured to discharge it to the best of my ability. I took the advice of some of the most experienced soldiers in the Army with respect to it, and I had every reason to believe that the plan which I proposed would be satisfactory until I announced it in this House. A more dismal reception than it then met with—a more universal rejection never in my recollection fell to the lot of any proposal made within these walls. What was the cause? It was that while I was asking Parliament to make a considerable contribution of the public money for a purpose which I believe was admitted to be advantageous to the Army, I had omitted to provide for the case of over-regulation prices, and yet I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will not say that he would have proposed a Vote for the over-regulation price. That rendered it necessary to have an inquiry, for, although everybody knew what over-regulation prices were, except those who were responsible, yet everyone who was responsible was obliged to be entirely ignorant. The Royal Commission which was appointed consisted of the most eminent men, many of them being Members of this House, and at the head of it was my right hon. Friend the Member for Morpeth (Sir George Grey). They reported unanimously, and I think I may, without fear of contradiction, say that their Report was strongly in favour of over-regulation prices. Now, statutes more stringent than those prohibiting over-regulation prices it is impossible to 341 conceive. We have, therefore, Acts of Parliament prohibiting that in favour of which a Royal Commission has reported. The conclusion I draw from that is, that Earl Grey was not far wrong when he told the Duke of Somerset that the wisest thing we could do was to let purchase alone until we could abolish it altogether. Having those Acts of Parliament to which I have just referred on the statute book, are we to enforce those stringent penalties, notwithstanding the Report? Are we to leave them on the statute book, and fail to enforce them? Are we to repeal them, and declare that we have no control whatsoever over the system of purchase? Are we to say that there is to be no protection for the officers who cannot afford to meet the rise in price, so that, in fact, the obtaining commissions shall be simply a question of the highest bidder? ["No, no!"] But it would be so when you repealed the Act of Parliament. We are, therefore, brought by two classes of considerations to the absolute necessity of considering the subject. You can decide in favour of maintaining the purchase system or in favour of abolishing it. But under the circumstances of the nation at the present time you are compelled by irresistible necessity to come to a fixed and settled determination. You want to introduce a reform which, probably, will involve a complete change in the organization of your Army; you have heard or read of the Prussian system, and are considering, perhaps, whether, in some respects, it might not be advisable to adopt some portions of that system; and you cannot stir without interfering with pecuniary interests in a manner which you would regret, or without creating new pecuniary interests which you have no right to do until Parliament has made up its mind on the subject. I say you are compelled to come to a decision on this subject. Now, what is this decision to be? The arguments on the side of retaining the purchase system are strong, and the first is that you will have to pay a very large price if you wish to abolish it. If you decide in favour of this course, and if you accept the recommendations of my right hon. Friend, as I, for one, think you will be obliged to do, and recognize to the full the customary price of commissions, the amount in the purchase regiments will not be less than £7,500,000, and may run up to nearly 342 £8,500,000, as will be seen from the calculations which I shall lay upon the Table of the House by-and-by. Well, that is a very large sum. But there are other difficulties still greater. What will you do about retirement? It is impossible to determine with accuracy what will be required in the way of retirement. The Duke of Somerset's Commission reported that to do away with the system of purchase you must introduce these two principles — selection and compulsory retirement. I am not able to tell you what retirement will be necessary—no one, indeed, but a prophet could tell you that. It must be tried by experience before you can come to any result. There are those who believe that, if purchase was abolished, many men would send their sons into the Army for the benefit of the training, to leave it after a short interval, and that promotion would, therefore, be as rapid as it is now. They would say, why should I be less willing to send my son into the Army when I have no commission to pay for, and when the Army would be a better school? I confess I do not agree with that opinion, and believe that we should have more retirement to provide. Another possible conclusion might be arrived at, and that is that in the reserve forces we hope to be able in future to find many places for officers of the regular service. How far that would furnish the retirement without putting the country to the expense of providing retirements no person can possibly predict. It is a question which you must look forward to face when it arises, and all you can say is that the charge, if it does arrive, will be a necessary and a legitimate charge, and that Parliament must be prepared to meet it. But there remains another difficulty, and that is, how promotion is to be regulated. The Royal Commission say—and I think with truth—that you would do harm in the Army if, in abolishing purchase, you substituted seniority, pure and simple. I believe the truth is that, if you abolish purchase, you must accept the principle of selection. You must act upon the principle of selecting for promotion those who merit it, and you must not allow inert or inefficient seniority or a system of pecuniary advantage to prevail. Well, then, the question is, are you prepared to meet these three objections?—Are you prepared to sacrifice a very large 343 sum of money? Are you prepared to look forward to dealing with the question of retirement? and are you prepared to adopt the principle of selection? Her Majesty's Government have carefully considered all these questions. They are of opinion that unpaid service is very generally the dearest of services. They are of opinion that this system of trafficking and purchase in this glorious profession ought to cease, and they therefore recommend to the House the abolition of the purchase system. The Bill which I shall have the honour of laying upon the Table of the House will explain the mode by which it is proposed to carry this into effect. After a certain date no pecuniary interest shall be taken by anyone in any new commission, and no man shall be placed in a worse position as to the commission he at present holds in respect to either regulation or customary price. Commissioners will be appointed, who will at once ascertain the over-regulation price in every regiment, and with money from the Votes of Parliament they will stand in the place of purchasers. When, therefore, an officer retires by the sale of his commission, he will receive from the Commissioners both the regulation and the customary price of his commission. I use the phrase "customary price" because it is the most accurate legal definition of the money paid in excess of the regulation value. When an officer retires on full pay or half-pay, and proves that but for the abolition of the purchase system he would have received the over-regulation price of his commission, the amount will be paid him; and when he wants to sell his half-pay commission, and is permitted to commute it, and proves that but for the passing of this Act he would have been eligible to sell, whether by exchange or otherwise, he will receive from the Commissioners the difference between the regulation price and the commutation. An officer, again, having on the appointed day a claim by years of service to a price higher than that of his present commission, and afterwards promoted, will receive the price, if subsequently promoted, out of the regulation price of the higher commission—that is to say, the Bill recognizes the vested interest of a non-purchase officer, as it recognizes the vested interest of the purchase officer. The Act also contains 344 a clause which provides that claims to compensation in the old Indian regiments shall be considered by the Commissioners according to the recognition which has been given to such claims by the Secretary of State for India. At present, of course, only those officers can sell who can find purchasers; and in framing a measure of this kind in a spirit of great liberality it is necessary to fix some limit; or, if you make the Consolidated Fund the universal purchaser, there is no saying how rapidly the process might go on, and after some time you might observe that a very great diminution had been made in your Army, and some considerable diminution in your Consolidated Fund. Therefore the limit we have fixed is this—that no greater number of officers shall retire in any year than the maximum number of that rank and branch of the service in any of the preceding five years, without the sanction of the Treasury. I believe that no case has been omitted from the draft of the Bill. I shall lay the computations upon the Table of the House, and, as hon. Members will see, it will vary from £7,600,000 at the least to £8,400,000 at the most. Of course it will not all occur at once. It will be a considerable charge for the first few years, after which it will rapidly decline, and become comparatively small.

The next important question that arises is as to first commissions. If the House should adopt the scheme of the Government the first commissions will, of course, be given without purchase, and therefore it is necessary to consider what is the proper and legitimate way for the public to bestow that which it is intended to give as a free gift. We propose that the first commissions shall be given in one of several ways. First, that admission to Sandhurst shall be by competitive examination, as recommended by the Royal Commission on Military Education; and that those who have obtained admission to Sandhurst by competitive examination should receive commissions, provided they were found to conduct themselves in such a manner as to entitle them to the position; that a certain number of subalterns of Militia regiments who have served for two years in the Militia regiments and have received favourable testimonials should be granted commissions without purchase in the Line. Non-commissioned 345 officers, of course, as now, should obtain commissions; and considering that one of the consequences of this proposal would be to abolish the rank of cornet and ensign, it is necessary to consider whether it would not be expedient to institute an order of cadets. The Royal Commission on Military Education recommended that there should be garrison instructors and regimental instructors in the regiments. We have carried into effect the proposal as regards garrison instruction to great advantage; and when you have extended it to regimental instructors, it is at least a question whether it would not be of great advantage that young men should enter the regiments as cadets under the regimental instructors before they received their commissions. If this were done the commissions could be withheld in the case of young men who found, upon trial, either that they did not like the service or that the service did not like them. Then, of course, there would be the University men, who now are qualified for commissions, and those commissions to which these several sources did not furnish candidates would be filled from the general public by competitive examination. These are the modes by which it is proposed admission to the Army should be gained on the abolition of purchase.

Then we come to the question of promotion, and if we adopt the opinion of the Royal Commission of 1857 we must decide that promotion be made by selection. But of all the problems of life none is so difficult of solution as to decide in whose hands the power of selection should reside, and by what rule that power should be exercised. One thing, however, is quite certain; we shall all agree that the administration of the patronage of the Army should not be placed in the hands of a political party. That is a point upon which the Committee of which Sir James Graham was Chairman expressed the strongest opinion. At present the responsibility rests upon the Secretary of State for War, and I do not think he should be relieved of that responsibility. If an improper appointment be made, the person who should be responsible to the Crown and the country is the Secretary of State; but the selection of the person destined for promotion should not rest with him, but with a high military 346 officer, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State. To secure fairness of promotion, the reports of general officers inspecting will be furnished in greater completeness to the General Commanding-in-Chief, and be tabulated and recorded in the office of the Military Secretary. These will form the basis for selection according to the regulations about to be laid down; but I will not enter into details upon the mode in which security is to be afforded to the Army for the impartiality and fairness of promotion, because the matter is still being carefully considered by some of the most eminent officers in the Army; and I must render my thanks to Sir William Mansfield for the assistance he has been good enough to give me upon this subject, in conjunction with his Royal Highness the Field Officer Commanding-in-Chief. Speaking generally, promotion from subaltern to captain would be regimental, and, speaking generally, promotion from captain to major and from major to lieutenant-colonel would be army promotion. First appointments to the rank of major and lieutenant-colonel would be limited in point of time, so that those whom experience proved to be inefficient, and whom it would not be desirable to re-appoint, at the expiration of some limited, period—say, five years—would not be re-appointed. There should likewise be a limit of age. I believe this is very much the system that prevails in the Prussian Army, where it is attended with this consequence — that when a man finds that he is not selected, he naturally discovers he is not wanted and leaves the service. It is, in fact, a system designed to sift out those failing through defect in character, health, conduct, or intellect to come up to the proper standard of military excellence; it will not prejudicially affect officers of average ability and zeal, nor will it operate to elevate juniors far above their seniors, except in cases of very extraordinary merit. But you will observe that there is one important consideration at the root of this part of the question—namely, that if you do not retain selection at every part of the system, you will immediately find, as soon as you have spent a large sum of money in abolishing one system of purchase, you have laid the foundation of another. The security against the growth of another system of purchase 347 is first a rigid enforcement of the law. If Parliament consents to make this great contribution towards the abolition of purchase, Parliament will not be satisfied without its enforcement. The next principal consideration will be, that the successor shall never be known until his predecessor has left his place; and the third is that, wherever there is the slightest suspicion that any corrupt pecuniary arrangement has formed the basis of retirement, selection shall be vigorously exercised to put it aside. With regard to the rapidity of promotion after the change is made, it is impossible, at the present moment, to say more than that changes will occur after the passing of the Bill, and those who take positions in the Army must be prepared to accept those positions on that understanding, with the knowledge that a reasonable rapidity of promotion will be secured probably much the same as the average of past years. Then, Sir, in whose hands are these large powers to be vested? The answer is—they will be vested in the officer who is chosen by the Government of the Sovereign to be Commander-in-Chief of the Army, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for War. Hitherto there have been two offices from which military affairs have been administered—that of the Secretary of State for War in Pall Mall, and that of the officer commanding-in-chief at the Horse Guards. It is not easy to exaggerate the inconvenience arising from the separation of these two offices. That inconvenience was commented upon by Sir James Graham's Committee more than 10 years ago, and it is, I believe, universally admitted; but physical obstacles have hitherto prevented our overcoming this inconvenience. It is the desire of everyone, I believe, that, if possible, a new building should be ultimately erected upon the historical site where the Horse Guards now stands; but we have never been able to obtain the means of carrying that into effect, and even if we had the site to-morrow it would probably be something like 10 years before the design could be accomplished. Hitherto there has been no room for the two establishments in either one of these buildings; but last year a very considerable reduction in the establishments of both was made, and now we shall be able to accommodate under the roof of the War 348 Office in Pall Mall the officer commanding-in-chief and all that belongs to the principal establishment of the Horse Guards. The next question is, what is to be the tenure of the officer commanding-in-chief and the Military Secretary? Perhaps I may be allowed to say, in passing, that I have seen with very great regret a good deal of comment made on this subject, which seemed to me to have had a personal character. I shall therefore make no further allusion to this fact, lest, by doing so, I should be myself the unwilling instrument of importing matter of that description into the discussion, matter which I am persuaded it would be the wish and the duty of both sides of the House to avoid. With regard to these two offices, Her Majesty's Government have considered that the position of the officer commanding-in-chief must be looked upon as an exceptional one as compared with that of any other Staff officer, and that, therefore, it cannot be regulated with mere reference to time. It is obvious that he should be in harmony with the Government of the day, and that his continuance in, and removal from, office must depend upon considerations of public policy; and Her Majesty's Government therefore think that it would be a mistake to apply to the person holding that office a condition derived from the mere limit of time. But with regard to the post of Military Secretary, which is now exempt from the five years' rule that applies to other Staff officers, I think there is no reason for the exemption, and that it ought to be rescinded. Our object should be to secure the greatest exactness and the greatest impartiality in regard to every officer in the Army; and the intention is that promotion should rest upon the selection of the officer who may be commanding-in-chief, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for War. I have now, I think, exhausted—I am afraid at too much length—what I have to say on the difficult question of purchase. I do not say that we have devised a theoretically perfect plan; but, after balancing the matter with the best judgment I have been able to bring to bear upon it, I do earnestly recommend our proposal to this House as being the one surrounded with the smallest difficulties; and I do not see how you can achieve any complete organization in this country of an army 349 combining the regular with the auxiliary forces until you have abolished the system of purchase in the Regular Army.

Then, with respect to the auxiliary forces, in 1869 we obtained power from Parliament to place the Militia, when out for training, under the command of the general officer of the district, and in 1870 we divided our military districts into sub-districts, under the command of general officers; and that arrangement, as far as I can understand, works to the satisfaction of the officers of the Militia. I believe they prefer that amount of union with the regular service, and to be placed under the general officer of their district. But we have now in these Estimates included a colonel on the Staff for every one of these sub-districts, who will have under him between 15,000 and 20,000 of the auxiliary forces of the country; and we propose to make him a kind of brigadier, or commander of the whole force, in order that the regular and auxiliary forces may be more closely compacted and united together. The Inspector General of Reserve Forces, after a study of the reports of the inspecting officers, tells me, I am happy to say, that he thinks them satisfactory as regards these auxiliary forces. Yet I think it will be admitted by Gentlemen connected with them who sit in this House, that there has not been a sufficiently close inspection of them, and that if there were a more vigorous one, and it were known where to apply the pruning knife and to remove that which it was desirable to remove, that would greatly add to the efficiency of those forces. We, therefore, propose that there should be a colonel on the Staff of the regular Army for every 15,000 or 20,000 of the auxiliary forces in each district. Then we come to the question from whom should these auxiliary forces hold their commission; and this is a question which, at some periods of our history, was a great political consideration, but I think it has long ceased to be so. The opinion of Her Majesty's Government is, that the commissions now given by the Lords Lieutenant of the counties should in future emanate from the Queen. We propose, therefore, to transfer to, or to re-invest in, the Queen the issuing of these commissions, and to make the auxiliary forces — though of course recruited, enlisted, and embodied, when they are embodied, according to 350 their own separate constitution and character—all hold from the Queen, all be under one command, and all be regarded as members of the general defensive and military system of the country. The promotions will all be made on the same principles as in the Regular Army, the Inspector General of the Reserve Forces being always consulted with respect to every promotion. In reference to first commissions, I should hope that the Lord Lieutenant of the county would give his recommendation, so that that most valuable element of the Militia Force—the county influence—may not be entirely got rid of. In communicating to the Militia a more military character, it is far from the desire of the Government to deprive it of any portion of that local character which we know to be so important.

Then, Sir, we come to the question—How we can give a greater local connection to the Regular Army? I have already said that the detailed organization of the forces cannot be completely undertaken, much less carried into effect, until Parliament has declared its purpose upon these great questions. Do you agree with the Government in thinking that in ordinary times we should look exclusively to voluntary service, and should not entertain the notion of compulsory service except in the case of a great emergency? When Parliament has come to its decision on that point, one important part of the problem will have been solved. The next question is—Do you approve the abolition of purchase in the Army? and the third question is—Do you approve of the transfer from the Lords Lieutenant of counties of the power which they now exercise of granting commissions in the auxiliary forces, that power being re-vested in the Crown? But in the meantime there are some means to which we may resort for establishing a closer connection between the regular and the auxiliary forces. The old principle of depôt battalions was much objected to on several grounds. It was costly; it was inefficient; it removed the officers from direct subordination to their commanding officers, and placed them under the commanding officers of the depôt battalions. Now it is proposed to establish training centres for the regular troops and the Militia upon the local principle. Each colonel on the Staff having from 15,000 to 20,000 of the auxiliary forces under him, would 351 also have under him the whole recruiting service of his district; he would have the command of all the reserves, except the technical instruction of the artillery, which would be conducted under the officers of the Royal Artillery. The infantry regiments which have now a local designation would retain that designation, and be attached to the sub-district in which the county they belong to is included. Regiments not having a local designation will be assigned to a sub-district, regard being had to its population and recruiting power. Regiments will recruit in their own sub-districts. The permanent Staff of the Militia and the Volunteers will be utilized by the colonel on the Staff when the regiment is not out. Recruits for the Militia will be trained, as far as possible, with those for the Regular Army, and it is proposed to train them for a longer period than the period during which they are now trained, the object not being to extend the term of training the Militia—which would, generally speaking, be such a disturbance of the labour of the country that it could not be endured—but sending the recruits to be much better trained at first in order that they may not require a longer training after they have joined their regiments. The adjutants of the reserves should be frequently selected from captains on full pay of a regiment of the same district, and they should be appointed for five years, subject to renewal if specially recommended, being in the meantime supernumerary to their regiments. In that way a close connection would be established between the regular and the Militia regiments of the county. In like manner the permanent Staff of officers of the county regular regiment would frequently be lent to the Militia regiment during the period of training if it desired to receive it. The Militia Reserve of the sub-district would, as a general rule, in the event of war, be draughted to the regiments in the same sub-district, although, from the exigencies of the service, it might not be possible to do so in all cases. That is a sort of general outline of the mode in which it is proposed, under the colonels of the Staff, to unite more closely than ever was done heretofore the regular and the auxiliary forces of the country.

With regard to the Volunteers, the Volunteer Force is one for which I have 352 always felt and expressed the greatest possible respect; and I think it is a noble spectacle to see the sacrifices of time and convenience which has been made by men who have no other desire than to serve their country. At the same time, I believe everybody sees that a much more careful organization of the Volunteer Force is necessary if it is to be made an integral part of our effective military system. Well, I think I may say for myself that we were the first to admit the principle that all necessary expenses for the Volunteers were to be paid by the State. We examined carefully what these necessary expenses were, and they amounted, after the best calculation we could make, to the sum that is now allowed—namely, to the power of earning 35s. per man per annum. But, inasmuch as one of the greatest deficiencies of the Volunteer Force has been the imperfect fitness of the officers for the discharge of the duties devolving upon them, we have thought the proper way of giving an additional capitation allowance would be not to scatter it broadcast over the whole body, but to give it in large sums to those officers and non-commissioned officers who go to schools of instruction, or who otherwise qualify themselves for the discharge of their duties, and we have taken an additional sum of £40,000 in these Estimates for the officers and non-commissioned officers who have qualified during the year. Further, we do not intend that any commanding officer of Volunteers shall hold at the same time two commissions; or, at least, if he does, one of them shall be a purely honorary commission, and shall not be in any way a substantive one, and we think that after a very limited period, every officer in the Volunteers may be expected to make himself thoroughly competent. Allowances have, for some time, been made to that most valuable force, the Artillery Volunteers, to enable some of their body to proceed to Shoeburyness for the purpose of receiving instructions, and those Members of this House who have read the Reports made by the Royal Artillery officers on the subject must have been struck by the great value which this training has had. We now propose to extend this system to the Rifle Volunteers, and to enable some of them to attend camps of instruction, a proceeding from which we expect much 353 good to result. Speaking generally, we do not wish to lay down for the body of Volunteers any small and vexatious rules; but when there is a colonel of the Staff responsible for every 15,000 or 20,000 of the reserve forces, I am sure that the Volunteers themselves will be satisfied that we ought to strike off from the capitation grant all those corps, and all those Volunteers, of whom the colonel or the Staff is not able to report that they are really and actually efficient as defenders of their country. Some of the rules at present in existence do not appear to be of much benefit to the force. It is an anomaly that a man may be technically "efficient" as a rifleman without ever having been to the targets. It must appear reasonable that a man should be expected to make himself a rifleman before receiving the capitation grant. All that is now required to be done by a Volunteer to entitle him to a certificate granting capitation for extra efficiency is that he should fire 60 rounds, a feat which I have seen performed in little more than two minutes at Wimbledon, and, therefore, I think it would not be calling upon the Volunteers to make any excessive sacrifice if we ask them to submit to terms which will render them efficient for the service they have bound themselves to perform. It is one part of the Government plan to make arrangements for brigading the Regulars, Militia, and Volunteers more largely than has been the case in the past, and that being so, I have put a clause into the Bill, which I shall ask leave to introduce, providing that when Volunteers are out with the Regulars they shall be considered as being on actual military service, the meaning of which is that the Mutiny Act would apply to them. Another great difficulty with which we have had to contend in reference to the Volunteers has been the irregularity with which many of them attend to their duties. It seems to me unreasonable that when a flying column has been sent from Aldershot to Wimbledon to be present at a Volunteer Review, and when His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief or some officer of high rank in the Army has undertaken to go down and review the forces, it shall be a matter of uncertainty how many Volunteers will be present. This is a state of things we ought to take measures to remedy. 354 Again, under the Volunteer Act a Volunteer is exempt from the Ballot for the Militia, although he is allowed to leave the corps to which he belongs after a fortnight's notice. We do not propose to continue that exemption. There is a clause in the Bill which will enable the Volunteer's contract to be made for a longer period, and if the Ballot ever takes place at all those only will be exempted from it who have entered into a longer and more satisfactory engagement. I have, therefore, only to say, in conclusion, that if these arrangements are carried out, all the forces being under one command, and that command being exercised in every division by the general officer commanding, there will be under him colonels and lieutenant-colonels in charge of the auxiliary forces, and lieutenant-colonels of the Royal Artillery, especially for the Militia and Volunteer Artillery; the recruiting and training centres will be 'so managed that the regiments will have local names, and recruit in their own localities; and the Militia recruits will be trained with those of the Regular Army; and the adjutants and permanent Staff of the Militia will be under the control of high military officers.

I may now, perhaps, repeat to the Committee the forces to which we should have to look for the defence of the country if the proposals I have made were carried out, and all the branches of the service raised to a high standard of efficiency. There would be — field and horse artillery, 8,473; garrison artillery, 7,419; depôt brigade and riding establishment, 2,852; Militia artillery, 15,854; and Volunteer artillery, 34,005, making a total of 68,603 artillerymen. There would be 12,952 cavalry and 14,000 yeomanry, amounting in all to 26,952. The engineers would number 3,949, and the Volunteers 6,280—in all, 10,229. Of infantry regulars there would be 69,181; of Militia, 123,146; total, 192,327; and of Volunteers, 130,386, making a total under that head of 322,713, to which must be added departmental corps 3,282, giving a grand total of 431,779; with the First and Second Class Army Reserve, 470,779. This force will be raised by voluntary enlistment, and may, by the Ballot, be still further increased in case of emergency. I have only to say besides that there is a question which I have before brought before 355 the attention of the House—I mean the question of billeting, which is one of considerable interest. We do not know whether it is likely that in many counties or localities use will be made of such a provision—I have been told that in some cases it is likely, but on that I will offer no opinion; but we propose to give to any locality or localities the power to borrow money from the Treasury, at a reasonable rate of interest, and to take powers for the Secretary of State for War for pledging to the locality during the currency of the loan the annual sum voted by Parliament for the billeting of the regiments. We are on the best possible understanding at present with the railway companies; but I have thought it right to insert a clause which in case of emergency will enable the State to possess itself of the railways in the same way that it used to have power to possess itself of the telegraphs, so that the whole communications of the country might at once, in case of emergency, be made use of for military purposes. These are the principal features of the Bill which I shall have the honour to introduce.

A few words on one or two other points, and I have done. Some time ago I applied to my right hon. Friend at the head of the Government to authorize me to say that the patronage of the Post Office, which has a great number of out-door employments suitable for pensioners and persons connected with the Army Reserve, might be used for the purpose of giving employment to such persons. I am authorized to say that, so far as is consistent with good service, it is intended to act upon the suggestion I made to my right hon. Friend.

The year just passed has seen many changes both at home and abroad. Her Majesty's Government has introduced the 35-ton gun, which is, I believe, the most powerful weapon known in the world; we have altered the field artillery and introduced the 16-pounder gun, which is of its kind the most powerful weapon known; and by changing the Snider for the Martini-Henri rifle we have prepared to arm our infantry with the best rifle known. One other incident of the year I think it right to mention. Amid so many great events the expedition which was sent to the Red River Settlement, in consequence of an insurrection in the territory, has been 356 almost entirely lost sight of. It' is due to those who took part in that expedition that they should have the credit of it. The expedition consisted of about 420 of the British Army and 750 Canadian Volunteers, acting in harmony together—a very agreeable circumstance. It involved a journey of 600 miles from Lake Superior over forests never hitherto traversed by a military force, and with intervening obstacles of the most serious kind, both by land and water. But all the difficulties were successfully overcome, and the troops, having accomplished their object, returned immediately to Canada, there being a total absence of crime and of sickness, every arrangement having previously been made to meet every difficulty. My hon. Friend the worthy Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), will rejoice to know that one of the reasons of this happy state of affairs was that spirits formed no part of the daily ration, and no intoxicating liquors were obtainable in that inhospitable country. But if the House will allow me, I should like to read one passage from the report from Sir Garnett Wolseley, who commanded the expedition, under the direction of Sir James Lindsay; and the reason why I wish to read it is this—that we are constantly told that the civil administration would be sure to break down whenever it was tried. But it is due to the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir John Pakington), who instituted that department, and to myself, and others who took part in promoting it, to state the successful manner in which it overcame the difficulties it had to encounter in this expedition. Colonel Wolseley says— As regards the civil administration I have to remark that the amalgamation of the many civil departments into one, that of the Control, was put upon its first practical trial in the field during this expedition, with the happiest results. I found that having all the civil officers available for any sort of duty connected with administration was a great economy of labour, and enabled the duties to be performed by a much smaller number than could have been done formerly, when, under similar circumstances, it would have been necessary to have had an officer of each department present at every post, and perhaps with each detachment of troops. A vast amount of useless correspondence is saved by the new system, and the administrative labour that must always more or less devolve upon an officer commanding a mixed force in the field is greatly reduced, and his work facilitated thereby, giving him much more time to attend to his important military duties. And he goes on to pay a high compliment 357 to Mr. Irvine, whom the Surveyor General had selected for this duty. That was the object, as I understood, the late Government had in view in instituting the department—that there should be a saving of useless correspondence, a saving of administrative labour, and that an officer commanding a mixed force in the field should have more time to attend to his important military duties. I think it due to all concerned to mention this expedition, and the success which attended it.

Now, Sir, I think I have concluded—I am conscious how very imperfectly—the arduous task I had undertaken. Her Majesty's Government call upon you, if you adopt their measures, for a great sacrifice; but if you make that sacrifice the objects we have in view are these—we ask you for no increase of the standing Army beyond that which you made at the end of last Session; but we propose to raise the Army Reserve as rapidly and largely as we can by the increased introduction of short service in the Army. We desire to pass as many men through the ranks as can be done having regard to the number of recruits and the time required to make a man an efficient soldier. We propose to increase the Militia, and to improve the organization of the Volunteers; to provide for compulsory service in case of emergency; to abolish purchase; to withdraw from Lords Lieutenant the power they have now in regard to the auxiliary forces; to combine the whole under general officers; to appoint colonels on the Staff in sufficient numbers to this Army; to combine recruiting for the Line with that of the Reserves; to fuse together as we can the Regular and Reserve Forces by appointing officers of the Regular Army to positions in the Reserve, and by giving subalterns in the Militia commissions in the Line. We propose to brigade them together, to find field artillery for all arms, to enable counties to get rid of the inconvenience of billets, to gain command of the railway communication of the country in case of emergency—in short, we propose to unite all the voluntary forces of the country into one defensive army, with power to supplement by compulsion in case of emergency—all to be under the command of the general officers commanding in the districts, subordinate to one Commander-in-Chief, who will act with 358 the approval of the Secretary of State; and, therefore, the whole will be under the direction and supreme control of Her Majesty's responsible Ministers. I earnestly commend to your favourable consideration these proposals. You will at any rate agree that we have not attempted to glide over the surface and propose some mere superficial and partial arrangements. We have done our best to deal with the principles that lie at the bottom of the service, to lay, if you should be pleased to approve of the measures, the firm foundation of a defensive force, which may be a perfect security to the country not merely against danger, but against that which is scarcely less intolerable to the spirit and independence of Englishmen—the perpetually recurring apprehension of danger.