ADJOURNED DEBATE.

HC Deb 04 August 1871 vol 208 cc886-925

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Question [4th August], That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, a Copy of Correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and the High Commissioners during the late negotiations at Washington."—(Sir Charles Adderley.)

Question again proposed.

Debate resumed.

SIR ROUNDELL PALMER

I repeat that Lord Russell, the illustrious man under whom I had the honour to serve, and on whom fell a great part of the responsibility for the affairs to which reference has been made, was, in my opinion, perfectly justified in declining to go to arbitration at all. That was a course exactly similar to that which had been taken by the United States when a similar question arose between the United States and Portugal. I did not, therefore, myself share in the prevalent feeling of satisfaction at the arrangement made by Lord Stanley and Mr. Reverdy Johnson. It appeared to me to be attended with such considerable risk of unsatisfactory results, that, as far as I was concerned, I would have preferred that matters should remain in the position in which they stood under the previous Administration of Lord Russell and Lord Palmerston. My reasons are these—In the first place, I could never have been a willing party to any arbitration whatever of any point which seemed to me to involve the honour of this country or the good faith of the Government. There are matters fit for arbitration, but this is not one. Every country is answerable for its own honour, and no referee whatever ought to be called in to determine questions of that kind. That is equally true with regard to questions of good faith. Of course it was not the intention of Lord Stanley to refer any question of honour to arbitration. But, in such a reference as that to which he and Mr. Reverdy Johnson agreed, it is manifest, that, if there had been an unfavourable award against this country, it would have been capable of being represented as affecting our honour and good faith. All matters were left entirely at large; there was no question, from the Proclamation of Neutrality downwards, which had been in difference between the two countries, which was not involved in that reference; and, whatever award might have been made, either party would have been at liberty to place its own construction upon it. Arbitration between nations may be a very good thing; and certainly we, as a nation, are bound to take that view, seeing that at the time of the Declaration of Paris we concurred in the proposition, that it is desirable to refer to arbitration all international disputes which will admit of that kind of solution. But such international references have their disadvantages as well as their advantages. It is extremely difficult to find an arbitrator or arbitrators, of whose absolute, rigid, judicial impartiality there can be no reasonable degree of doubt. I do not at all desire to follow the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Charles Adderley) in some observations he has made as to the particular Powers chosen as arbitrators in the present case. I am perfectly ready to admit that they are as trustworthy, honourable, and capable as any arbitrators that could be chosen in the whole civilized world. I think myself bound to assume this, considering that this country has agreed to abide by their award. But of all such high arbitrators this must be said—that they cannot enter without a certain degree of bias upon the consideration of great public questions. We and the United States are the two great maritime Powers of the world; we cannot possibly find as arbitrators any Powers like ourselves. In one respect, that may tend to impartiality of decision: but in other respects there may be a risk of encountering a current of opinion different from that which has prevailed between the two countries parties to the arbitration, and possibly there may be an unconscious bias of political interest arising from the point of view from which the Powers called in to arbitrate may naturally regard similar questions. Bearing that in mind, I would, as I have said, never have been a willing party to making any reference whatever to any form of international arbitration, which could possibly result in an award which might be regarded by the world at large, or by the other party, as affecting the honour and the good faith of this country. That appeared to me a great objection to an arbitration simply at large, such as that agreed upon by Lord Stanley and Mr. Reverdy Johnson. There is another consideration, perhaps of hardly less importance, which also deserves to be mentioned. The elements of the question then proposed to be referred to arbitration were not at all limited or defined. It would have been competent for the arbitrators to have awarded against us upon any of the numerous grounds vaguely involved in the whole matters in dispute. For instance, if they thought that we ought not to have issued any Neutrality Proclamation; and they were not bound to give any reasons for their award. I did not fear on that point, because my impression has always been that, while we were really clear on the main point, we were a thousand times more clear on that. But the matter would have been attended with this inconvenience—that whichever way the award was given, whether for us or against us, nobody would have known the principles upon which it was founded. Suppose the award were in our favour, what might have followed? How would that party in the United States, which had been irritated themselves and had constantly fomented irritation against Great Britain, have regarded an award unfavourable to them? They might have said—"The arbitrators have determined that what was done in Great Britain was right in International Law. Very well; then it is not necessary to use any diligence to prevent ships of war from being fitted out and armed to operate against the commerce of a belligerent Power, for we assert that Great Britain did not use proper diligence." The result, therefore, might have been to exonerate us from responsibility and pecuniary liabiality, but at the same time to leave the United States at liberty to represent the award as establishing it as a rule among nations that, whether they had neutrality laws, such as the United States and we ourselves had, or not, neutral Governments were not under any sort of obligation to use any dili- gence to prevent the fitting out and armament of ships of that description. Such a view as that would not have tended to satisfactory relations between the two countries; for if, in the case of a war in which Great Britain was involved, those who had participated in the irritation against us wished to connive at ships like the Alabama being fitted out against our commerce, the award would not in the least have stood in the way of such a disposition—nay it might rather have led to its more open indulgence. I do not at all mean to say, that, in my view, the interest of Great Britain in this question is because she is, in general, more likely to be belligerent than neutral. I think that this country, if it were to have its own will and its own way, would never go to war at all, feeling that war, if voluntary, is a great crime and wickedness. That being so, I do not look forward to frequent wars on the part of this country. But that very feeling might be likely, under certain circumstances, to involve us in the disagreeable alternative either of having to go to war, or of submitting to such affronts and insults that our most honourable men and wisest statesmen would consider that war was the less evil. Suppose that in the background, that great country the United States, which ought to be our friend, was understood to be in such a frame of mind as to be inclined to ally itself with our opponents, or at least not to be active in enforcing its neutrality laws against its own citizens, war, whether we intended it or not, might be the result. Therefore, a decision favourable to us might have left us in no respect better off, with regard to security, than we were before. By that mode of arbitration, no rule as to the future would have been agreed upon between the two countries. Whatever was vague and disputable in International Law before, would have remained so still. On the other hand, if the award had been against us, it would still have laid down no rule whatever; and the United States would have been quite entitled, if it suited their convenience, to say, that they had succeeded in proving us wrong on the mere special circumstances of the particular case; and, for the future, to stand on the letter of their own laws, and say to us, as they did to Spain and Portugal before—"We shall put our laws in force whenever we have sufficient information and proof of the facts, but we are not obliged to make a better or stronger law than we have already." But whatever maybe thought of the abstract merits or dangers of that arrangement, one thing at all events is certain—that Lord Clarendon, when he succeeded Lord Stanley in office, could not well do otherwise than ratify what Lord Stanley had done; and, from that time forward, this country became irrevocably committed to the principle of arbitration on this subject, both by the action of Lord Stanley and by the subsequent concurrence of Lord Clarendon—Members of two successive Governments representing both the great parties in the State. Whether the course which had been adopted was wise or unwise, it was totally impossible for the present Government, in 1871, to avoid abiding by the offer of arbitration which they had made on the subject before. Mr. Fish said that a removal of the differences which arose during the Rebellion in America, with reference to these so-called Alabama claims, was essential to the restoration of cordial and amicable relations between the two nations. It would have been a mere mockery to deal with the Fishery question, and other things, and to refuse to include this, when we were told that we never could have a restoration of amicable relations unless this was included. What, under this state of circumstances, ought to have been done? The first question is, whether Her Majesty's Government should have simply insisted on the renewal of the Reverdy-Johnson Treaty. Was it reasonably possible for them to do so? Could it be supposed that the United States would, without modification, agree to the very thing which they had rejected, so exposing themselves to the imputation of having acted, only two years before, from mere passion and caprice? But, even if it might have been possible, my own opinion is, for the reasons which I have already given, that it would not have been desirable. The House will, I feel confident, agree with me, that it was desirable that arrangements should be made to obtain the greatest possible amount of security for a good understanding for the future, to insure us against acts of hostility in case we should be at war, and thereby prevent other countries from supposing that in case of war between us and them the United States would com- mit acts of retaliation on our commerce. If we have obtained that for the future, we have got a very excellent thing, which we should not have got under the arrangement made by Lord Stanley with Mr. Reverdy Johnson. And, upon the whole, I am disposed to believe that we have obtained this benefit by the present Treaty. The manner in which the rules established by the Treaty are expressed, may be, and I think is, open to criticism. When it is said that "a neutral nation is bound" to observe these rules, it bears the appearance of an attempt to do a thing which in point of fact is impossible—namely, to create for the future, by an agreement between two nations, new rules of International Law. We may make rules binding between the two nations, which in case all the civilized world adopted them, would no doubt become established rules of International Law; but so long as they rest on a contract only between two nations, they are binding only on those two nations. I should certainly myself have liked the phraseology of these rules to be, in some respects, different from what it is. But it ought to be remembered that to negotiate a Treaty at Washington is a different thing from negotiating a Treaty in London. With regard to forms of expression, the American Commissioners had an advantage, because they were at home and could at once communicate with their Government; whereas the British Commissioners, owing to the delay which would occur in communicating by letter with Her Majesty's Government, and to the inconvenience, and difficulty also, of discussing the bearings of every turn of expression by telegraph, may have considered it better to waive verbal questions, when they thought they were agreed about matters of substance, than to run the risk of disturbing a good understanding, once established, by two great punctiliousness about words. It is only fair to the Commissioners, to whom I think we owe a generous acknowledgment for their services, to remember this. We ought not to be too critical about the mere form of these rules, if the substance is, on the whole, satisfactory. I come, then, to the rules themselves. The first is, that a neutral Government is bound to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping within its jurisdiction of any vessel, which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a Power with which it is at peace, and also to use like due diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction to warlike use. That appears to me to be a very good rule. What is meant by "due diligence?" I suppose it is meant that a neutral should use, within a reasonable sense, all the means legitimately in its power. It has been objected that the latter part of the rule departs from the former, because it does not repeat the words "has reasonable ground to believe;" but that, I think, is an ill-grounded criticism. "Like due diligence," necessarily implies the reasonable ground for belief required by the former part of the rule; and if so, there was no necessity to repeat those words. We, by our present Foreign Enlistment Act, now possess ample powers to prevent the acts intended to be prohibited by this rule, and I cannot doubt that the United States will also pass an Act of Congress as stringent as the law which we passed last Session. The first rule, therefore, provides securities for the future, equally beneficial to the United States and to ourselves; it does so in terms with which our Government has, by our existing law, sufficient powers faithfully to comply; and we are entitled to assume, that the good faith of the United States will lead them, without delay, to arm their Government with powers no less effectual for the same purpose. With regard to the second rule, I confess that when I first read it I was somewhat alarmed. I thought it was expressed with a degree of vagueness which might be dangerous, and which might be extended to things which I did not think it possible the Commissioners could have meant. It is, that a neutral Government is bound not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men. On this point, I was fortunate enough to elicit from the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government, in reply to a Question which I put to him on the 13th of June last, the satisfactory answer that this second rule is understood by Her Majesty's Government, and by the British and American Commissioners, as ap- plying solely to vessels cruising or carrying on war, or intended to cruise or carry on war, against a belligerent, and not to the case of military supplies or arms exported for the use of a belligerent from neutral ports or waters in the ordinary course of commerce. The right hon. Gentleman proceeded further to state, upon the direct authority of General Schenck, the distinguished Minister of the United States at this Court, that the President of the United States himself understood the rule in the same sense, and would be the first not only to admit and allow, but to contend for that construction of it. In the face of such an assurance, on the part of both of the great Powers who are parties to this Treaty, it would be unbecoming in me to criticize any longer the vagueness of the language in which this rule is couched; and without doubt this construction of it will be clearly laid before those other foreign Powers who are to be asked to accede to it. The third rule, being a mere corollary from the other two, requires no separate comment. So far, therefore, as these rules, interpreted and qualified in the manner explained by my right hon. Friend at the Head of the Government, apply to the future, we have gained the assurance of a good and useful understanding between the two nations, which would go far towards repaying us for any pecuniary loss which we might possibly sustain in consequence of an award being founded upon these rules, instead of upon the principles of International Law which were actually in force at the time of the escape of the Alabama. The future observance of these rules, to which foreign nations are to be asked to accede, will, I think, tend to promote a good understanding between all the Powers, and to preserve the peace of the world. In dealing with the question of the retrospective application of these rules to the matters in dispute, which we have agreed to refer to arbitration, the first observation which it occurs to me to make is, that it was not to be expected that the United States would have agreed to be bound by them in future, unless we had assented to their operation being made retrospective; and therefore, if the rules were good in themselves, it was worth our while to run the risk of giving the United States some advantage in the coming arbitration, which they would not otherwise have possessed, in order to insure their adhesion to these rules. The choice was between two methods of procedure: the one, laying down the rules themselves, in terms, which might have been interpreted as expressing the view taken by the Commissioners of the just measure and definition of certain duties, incumbent on neutral nations as to these matters; so that their adoption for the future would carry with it, of necessity, a tacit admission that they ought also to be applied as rules of judgment to the past; the other (which was that actually followed), reconciling the application of these rules of judgment to the past with the views and principles on which our Government have hitherto acted, and distinctly setting forth that, for the sake of securing a good understanding between the two countries, we agreed to be bound by conditions which, in our view, were not in force, as rules of International Law, or by international compact, at the time when the cause of dispute arose. To me this course seems in every way preferable to the other. It is, on our part, the most consistent and the most honourable: it is also that which alone is in accordance with the plain and simple truth. Toll the truth, and shame the evil one, is a good maxim in public as well as private affairs. And, after all, by consenting to the retrospective application of these rules, we have made a concession, which is greater in appearance than in substance. I do not mean to say that we have made no concession, or that it is not possible — though I think it ought not to be so, and I hope it will not be so—that this concession may involve the risk of our having damages awarded against us, from which we might otherwise have been free. There is, no doubt, a difference of some real importance between a compact or undertaking on the part of one nation with another—which, it may be argued, we have authorized the arbitrators to assume in this case—and the mere right of one nation to claim from another the bonâ fide enforcement, by the means in its power, of a municipal or national law, to the same effect. Of the latter right, the municipal or national law is necessarily the sole measure; but not of the former. Still, it is important to point out that, so far as the substance of the obligation as distinct from its foundation and origin is concerned, the un- dertaking on our part, which the arbitrators are to assume, does not materially, if at all, differ from the right which, at the time of these transactions, the United States confessedly had to call upon us to execute in good faith our own municipal law, as it was interpreted and understood by our Government; and which our Government actually, and in good faith, at the time undertook to do. The language of the first rule only differs from the substance of the 7th section of our own Foreign Enlistment Act, which was in force at that time, by introducing words to the effect that all vessels are to come within the ban, which, being intended for use by one of the belligerents, have been specially adapted in neutral ports, wholly or in part to warlike use. It is perfectly true that Lord Chief Baron Pollock and Baron Bramwell, as well as other great legal authorities, thought that such words as these did not convey the true meaning of our then Foreign Enlistment Act; which, in their opinion, was intended to imply only to those vessels which might be armed within our jurisdiction, either completely, or at least so far as to leave our waters in a condition immediately to commence hostilities. But this was never the opinion of our Government; who, following the view taken by Barons Channel and Pigott, thought that the Act would also apply to cases in which vessels, though not so armed and equipped, were nevertheless intended for the use of a belligerent as cruisers or ships of war, and, so far as their actual equipments might have been provided within British jurisdiction, had been equipped—whether in a manner distinctively warlike, or not—with a view to that use. Therefore, the application of this rule retrospectively is not the introduction of so new and arbitrary a hypothesis as to our obligations, as might have been supposed at first sight. The other rule, as interpreted by the right hon. Gentleman at the head of Her Majesty's Government, and by the Minister of the United States, corresponds in like manner with the 8th section of our Foreign Enlistment Act. It deals with the renewal or augmentation of warlike equipments of belligerent vessels. That clause indeed, in our old Foreign Enlistment Act, applied only to ships actually in the war service of a belligerent Power at the time when their equipment was augmented; whereas this rule extends also to ships intended to be used for similar purposes of war service. But this difference does not go beyond matter to be found in the 7th section; so that the two rules taken together, with the authoritative interpretation which the second rule has received, do not exceed the obligation which we had imposed on ourselves by our formal municipal law. To conclude—Looking at all the circumstances, I, for my part, am well content to acquiesce in and accept the recent arrangement, whatever may be its imperfections. I do not propose to go into all those matters which the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Charles Adderley) has touched upon with much more authority, with reference to the colonial aspect of the question; but I may remark that I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that it is a blemish upon the Treaty, that the demands of Canada against the United States for the damage done by Fenian raiders should not have been included in its provisions. I am the more bound to say this, because the demands of the United States against Canada with reference to the inroads of certain Confederates upon St. Alban's were not only complied with, but anticipated by the spontaneous action of the Canadian Legislature, which at once voted the money necessary to make good those losses. The United States might, I think, have been expected to feel, on calm consideration, that the principle of the reference which we have agreed to, applies at least as forcibly to those Fenian raids. Nevertheless, if by the arrangement which has been entered into, permanent peace and goodwill should, as I trust, be secured between these two great countries, I, for one, am willing to pay a greater price for such a result than any which I can imagine the possibility of our having to pay under this Treaty.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

said, he felt it was impossible for him to add anything to the arguments advanced by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Richmond (Sir Roundell Palmer) in favour of the general principle and provisions of the Treaty, and with regard to the other questions raised by his right hon. Friend (Sir Charles Adderley), it might appear more proper that he should leave it to Her Majesty's Government to answer questions and dispose of objections which came rather within their cognizance, than within the cognizance of an individual Member of the late High Commission. Still, there were two considerations which induced him to trespass for a short time on the attention of the House. First of all, he desired to express a hope that his right hon. Friend would not press the Motion, because he could say, from his own experience in the conduct of the negotiations, that although there existed a not inconsiderable amount of Correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and the Commissioners, it would not in his opinion be advantageous to anyone that that Correspondence should be given to the world. It was thought desirable, on all accounts, that the negotiations should be conducted with that freedom which was only possible among those who knew that their communications with one another would be private, and more especially for these reasons—the questions the Commissioners had to deal with were of the most delicate character; they affected the good relations between two great Powers, and had given rise to much misunderstanding in times past, and lastly, in order to settle them permanently, and to bring about the establishment for a long time to come of thoroughly amicable relations between the two countries, it was desirable that the Commissioners should communicate among themselves in the freest and most unreserved manner, and that they should embody their conclusions in the form of documents which really represented the substance of all that passed, but which abstained from raising questions of an irritating character. In order to maintain a thorough good feeling between the two countries, it was better, he felt convinced, that the matter should remain as at present, and that the public of England and America should see the result at which the Commissioners had arrived without going into all the questions raised and discussed in the course of the negotiations. It had been remarked in discussions out-of-doors, and in "another place," that, according to the Correspondence and Protocols laid on the Table, the British Commissioners appeared to have done nothing but assent to whatever was proposed by the American Commissioners. That, however, was not at all the case. Long and animated discussions occurred on every point that was raised. Indeed, it often happened that days elapsed before an understanding was arrived at, and it would surely be most unwise and unnecessary to renew the battles which had been fought in the State Department at Washington. All that was necessary to be known was the general course of the negotiations and the arguments which were finally adopted. The Government, he believed were prepared to give explanations on any point which might be raised; but he thought it undesirable to lay upon the Table of the House Correspondence of a confidential character. He seized that opportunity of saying, on his own part and on the part of the other Commissioners who were not officially connected with the Government, that there was substantially no difference of opinion between them on any of the important points of the negotiations, and, therefore, it was not to prevent its being known that they were overruled in any manner by Her Majesty's Government, that he thought the production of the Correspondence inexpedient. Undoubtedly the position of a Commissioner like himself, who was not officially connected with Her Majesty's Government, was one of some delicacy; but having undertaken the office, it would have been exceedingly difficult and improper for him to set up private and individual opinions—except in matters of extreme importance and urgency—in the way of thwarting the arrangements that had to be made; but, however, it might be assumed, and reasonably too as he thought, that, the responsibility lying on the Government, the Commissioners were not all in accord as to the arrangements that were effected. Speaking, however, for himself, although he did not mean to say there might not have been points on which there was a slight difference of opinion, he must state that he never found himself in a position of that kind. He cordially acquiesced in all; and he most heartily rejoiced in the arrangements that had been made. If he might venture to refer to a saying that he had heard used out-of-doors, that that was a Treaty of which everyone was glad and nobody proud, he spoke for himself as the exception which proved the rule—and he believed he could speak for the rest—that they were all proud of having had a share in that Treaty. He however would go further, and say that he could hardly understand the frame of mind of those who used that expression; for if it meant that the Treaty was one of which the Commission had reason to be ashamed and it would not be a Treaty of which anyone had reason to be glad. But it was important that they should be jealous of national honour; and if there was anything in that Treaty that in any way derogated from the national honour, it must be a Treaty for which they ought not to be glad, but for which they ought to be sorry. But the Treaty did not derogate from national honour; on the contrary, national honour both justified and demanded it. In making those remarks, he wished to guard himself from being supposed to give to the Commissioners any of the credit which more properly belonged to Her Majesty's Government in that matter. It was, in fact, the Government who decided on the basis of the negotiations, and who were responsible for the arrangements which had been made. His right hon. Friend had remarked on five points. He complained of the manner in which the negotiations were commenced; he complained of their having given precedence to the Alabama claims in preference to the Fisheries; he complained of the introduction of the new rules; he complained of the omission of any stipulations with regard to the claims in respect of the Fenian raids; and he complained of their having introduced into the Treaty, a limit of time with regard to the claims of British subjects, whereas there was no limit of time with respect to the Alabama claims. With regard to one or two of those points, and especially the last, he thought his right hon. Friend had hardly read sufficiently the course of the negotiations. It was perfectly true that the claims of British subjects were limited to certain dates, which dates were intended to correspond with the period of the American Civil War. That was thought the most convenient way of describing those claims. But with regard to the claims arising out of the acts of the Alabama and other vessels of the same class, there was no necessity whatever for stating any limit of time, because what they had to deal with was the action of the different vessels, and that sufficiently indicated the claims in question. If the Commissioners had spoken of British claims generally there might have been cases sent in of a miscellaneous character, not included in the arbitration, and that might have prolonged the period of settlement. But with regard to the claims arising out of the action of those vessels, they considered that instead of being to blame for the division that was one of the most successful features in the whole Treaty. The hon. and learned Member for Richmond (Sir Roundell Palmer) in his observations as to the advantage which the Treaty possessed over the Conventions which had been previously negotiated, remarked that the Convention which had been negotiated, but not adopted, had allowed the introduction of a number of claims which could never have been admitted. In fact they were so vague that it would have been possible for the Americans to have raised a number of questions which the Commissioners were unwilling to submit to arbitration. They might have raised the question with regard to the recognition of belligerency; with regard to constructive damages arising out of this recognition of belligerency; and a number of other matters which this country could not admit. But if hon. Gentlemen would look to the terms of the Treaty actually contracted they would see that the Commissioners followed the subjects very closely by making a reference only to a list growing out of the acts of particular vessels, and in so doing shut out a large class of claims which the Americans had previously insisted upon, but which the Commissioners had prevented from being raised before the arbitrators. He contended, therefore, that the Joint High Commission had upon that point worked substantial advantage rather than injury to that country. His right hon. Friend (Sir Charles Adderley) had made it a ground of complaint that the Commission gave precedence to the Alabama claims over the question of the Canadian Fisheries; but that complaint was based upon a misconception of the facts of the case. Undoubtedly, the Commission grew out of a proposal to refer to a Commission the questions arising upon the Canadian Fisheries. The American Government, when the proposal was made to them, made it a condition that the same Commission should take cognizance of other questions, amongst them being the subject of the Alabama claims; and that was agreed to, and rightly so. But when they came to consider the question they did not give precedence to the Alabama claims or the Fisheries. On the contrary, they considered in what order the questions should be taken up, and the very first was the question of the Fisheries. At the first meeting for business of the Commissioners, the first question considered was the question of the Fisheries; and they arrived at a conclusion on the basis upon which that question should be discussed. After that had been settled they went into the Alabama question. It was necessary to communicate with the Canadian authorities, and to get estimates of the value of the Fisheries. It was necessary to carry on a great many communications, and from time to time those questions were taken up. Therefore it was not true that the Commissioners gave preference to the Alabama claims. The question of the manner and time in and at which the negotiations were commenced was one on which it was more proper that the Government should speak than himself; but he might say he was perfectly satisfied, from what he heard while in America that Her Majesty's Government did wisely in taking the opportunity that offered of commencing the negotiations which had resulted in the Treaty now under discussion, and they would have acted unjustifiably if they had neglected the opportunity. What was the position of affairs? That country had departed from the course which they at first pursued, of saying that they declined to look into questions in dispute, and they said they were willing to submit the question of the English liability to arbitration. It was then scarcely possible for that country to withdraw from that position. It was true that having offered to submit to arbitration, and the offer having been refused, England could have refused arbitration. But other matters had come under the consideration of the Government, and it being desirable to come to a settlement, the Americans said they could not settle those things without settling also the Alabama question, and they were willing to go into all those matters. It would not have been right for the Government to have declined that. They proposed that the whole of those questions should be referred to a Commission, not to settle the question, but to consider what should be the mode of settlement. The American Government felt very strongly that an arbitration of a loose and general character would have settled no principle whatever; but that a settlement of differences between the two countries in the interests of peace generally was most desirable. He thought those had been the views of the American Government, and that they were sound at the bottom, although they might from time to time have been stated in a somewhat unpleasant tone, and been accompanied by language calculated to irritate and offend certain classes in this country. He was satisfied that the result which had come of the negotiation, and which had eventuated in the Treaty and the clauses embodied in it, was a result for which all parties concerned ought to feel satisfied, for it would not have been satisfactory to have patched up that particular quarrel on a basis unlikely to afford a permanent settlement of the question. The arrangement not only opened the door for the settlement of a detrimental, difficult, and disagreeable dispute between the two countries, but would lay the foundation of important rules and important principles of International Law, which would be for the benefit of peace, and the general interests of the whole world. He could hardly believe that anyone, looking at the position of England, and considering what the commerce and navigation of England was, and what were her relations with the whole world, could doubt that it was of great importance that they should establish certain rules for the protection of their commerce in time of war. [Mr. BAILLIE COCHRANE: No, no!] There could be no doubt that if England were to go to war her commerce might be seriously injured by predatory incursions on the part of other States, and especially of America, and that it would weaken their position in the eyes of the world, and enable them to speak with less authority than they would otherwise do in its councils. [Mr. CAVENDISH BENTINCK: No, no!] He would venture to ask the hon. and learned Member for Whitehaven who cried "No, no!" whether he did not consider that in any case in which England was concerned it was a matter of importance to consider whether England might see America friendly or hostile? If the hon. and learned Gentleman said it was a matter of no importance he could understand that argument; but it appeared to him to be a matter so simple as to require no demonstration. It might be that they would be perfectly able to protect their commerce, and that it would be unwise for any nation to interfere; but the question was, whether they were in the position in which they would like to be if they were attacked? Was it not of importance in any complication between them and another Power for that Power to say—"If England goes to war we can find plenty of Alabamas;" or—"We can see no use in making such an attempt, because America will not consent to anything of the sort." He should say that was a very moderate proposition. But he would go further, and say that it was of great importance to establish peace not only with respect to their position in the councils of Europe and of the world, but also in that which assisted them in the development of their great colonial Empire. Did that not affect the position of their colonies? Did it not affect the prosperity of the Dominion of Canada? He should like to know what part of the British Empire was so interested in having a good understanding between England and America as that Dominion? It had been said that in some matters connected with the Treaty the interests of Canada had been sacrificed. [Mr. BAILLIE COCHRANE: Hear, hear!] Now, he wanted to know in what way. He ventured to say that if there was one portion of the British Empire for the benefit of which the Treaty had been concluded it was the Dominion of Canada. And if it could be shown that in any minor details Canada had not got as good a bargain as she might have done, still he contended that the result was so great as to outweigh any small interest. [An hon. MEMBER: New Brunswick.] He denied that New Brunswick was a loser in any respect by the Treaty. What did that great Dominion want? She was now organizing herself, and spreading herself over an enormous area, possessing enormous undeveloped resources, which required confidence, peace, and time for their development. She was situated on the frontier of another country, which, however well disposed to England, was of a restless and energetic character, and between that country and Canada causes of jealousy and misunderstanding might from time to time easily occur, for, he thought, there always would be small questions arising along the border line of the United States and Canada. But it was for the interests of the United States as well as for the interests of Canada, that Canada should prosper and be able to develop her resources. He believed that the idea of annexation, although popular with a small section of politicians, did not find much favour in the United States. But if jealousy and bad feeling between that country and the United States should arise, what portion of the Empire would be the first to suffer? They might safely defy the power of the United States in so far as their interests were concerned; but Canadian commerce and credit would be the first to suffer. Therefore it was of the highest importance that a state of feeling which was uncomfortable between that country and the United States should for the sake of this country, and of the peace of the world, be put an end to. The hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) had cheered when he said it was alleged that the interests of Canada had been sacrificed. He would ask what interests of Canada had been sacrificed? There was the question of the Fisheries. Everyone admitted that Canada was rightly in possession of her own Fisheries. That right had been confirmed by the fact that she was capable of making an arrangement for the admission of the United States fishermen for a term of years. Did she admit them for nothing? Not at all. She claimed for her fishermen a market for their fish, and when it was said that Canada complained, he wished to know whether the fishermen of Canada complained or other parties? He believed that the fishermen of Canada, although they would have been glad to get a little more, did not complain in the way which had been spoken of, and that they considered they had got a quid pro quo in the admission of their fish to the principal markets. The markets in which their fish was disposed of were the markets of the United States. And how was the matter looked upon in the United States? A Petition had been presented from Gloucester, in Massachusetts, complaining that the bargain was in favour of the Canadian Fishery and injurious to the American Fishery, and General Butler, in rather strong language, had denounced the bargain as a bad one for the fishermen of the United States. Therefore, what had happened was simply what happened in most bargains—both sides wanted more than they could get, and consequently declared that they had the worst of it. But even if they had got the worst of the bargain the matter might be referred to arbitration. If a fair view was taken of the question, he believed it would be found that a considerable sum would be payable to the Canadians for the advantages which the American fishermen had obtained. The bargain was a gain to both parties, but it was a greater gain to the Americans. But it was said—"What you have really failed to do is this—you have given away our Fisheries, and have failed to get for us what we value far more than money—the Reciprocity Treaty?" But free trade was a point in which both Canada and America were far behind ourselves. He admitted that it was of great importance to Canada to get free admission for her produce into the United States. It would have been desirable, if Canada could, to have obtained a renewal of the Reciprocity Treaty; but that was a matter to which the Americans entertained considerable objection, and it was clear that the renewal of the Treaty would not have been conceded. Would it, then, have been right to sacrifice an arrangement which was clearly for the benefit of Canada because the Reciprocity Treaty could not be obtained? It was a question of some delicacy; but it was clear that they were more likely to get a reduction of duties in America on the productions of Canada by leaving the matter to work itself out than by insisting on the Reciprocity Treaty as a condition. The Americans said—"If England and Canada are so anxious to have that Treaty, and are ready to make so valuable a concession, there must be something very good for them in the bargain, and if it is good for them it must be bad for us." This feeling led them to think that a reduction of duties would have a prejudicial effect on themselves. He believed that progress of the doctrines of free trade in America, although slow, was perfectly certain—that as Western States developed themselves, and gained more and more the power in the councils of the Union, they would carry out the doctrines of free trade with Canada for their own benefit. The present arrangement was one of a temporary character, and Canada 10 or 12 years hence would be in a better position for negotiating than she was at the present moment. She would have completed her communication from the Atlantic to the Pacific—her system of canal navigation, her works on the St. Lawrence—and would become the high road for the great Western States. He therefore felt perfectly convinced that they were acting directly in the interests of Canada herself in not pressing this question prematurely, and in directing the attention of Canada to that which was really of primary importance to her—namely, the consolidation of her Dominion, the maintenance of peace with her neighbour, and the completion of her great lines of communication by river, by canal, and by railway. He was speaking upon matters that had better have been left to others; but perhaps he should take notice of one observation that had been made by his hon. and learned Friend opposite the Member for Richmond. He referred to a certain amount of ambiguity as existing in the second of the rules, and which it was possible might be held to impede the ordinary operation of commerce, the importation of munitions of war. It certainly was not very easy to be very precise in the arrangement of every article. Very often there was difficulty and some little confusion as to the particular choice of language in consequence of the difficulty of telegraphic communication, and perhaps some better phraseology might have been used to make the matter clear to the whole world. But the question whether that particular rule was open to the objection that had been urged was raised before they had left America, and before the Treaty was confirmed by the Senate, and the matter was very carefully considered by the Commissioners, aided by Mr. Barnard and by the best authorities in America, and it was also discussed by some leading Senators of authority in that matter, and there was a universal agreement that the intention of the clause was to limit the rule to cases of naval operations. It was obvious that the opposite rule had always been acted on by the American Government, and had been prominently put forward by Lord Clarendon in his communication with the German Powers, and any other meaning would involve this absurdity—that what was prohibited by sea was allowed by land. Although, however, it was perfectly clear what was the intention of the United States and England—that it was to limit the rule to naval operations only, it would still be a matter of importance, if we came to invite other nations to accede to that clause, that we should leave no room for doubt as to the meaning of the rule. He believed he was correct in saying that communications had passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States that if any other country were invited to accede to this clause that point should be cleared up. He would only, in conclusion, say that for his part he was perfectly convinced that the spirit in which that Treaty was negotiated by England, and accepted and negotiated by America, was a spirit of the utmost friendliness and cordiality; that the spirit in which the negotiation between the Commissioners was conducted — although they certainly tried on both sides to get the best terms for their own country, and occasionally argued pretty closely — the spirit displayed throughout was one of entire friendliness and confidence; and he was fully persuaded that throughout the United States there was but one feeling upon the general questions involved in that Report, and that was a feeling of satisfaction that questions of difference, that might have grown under different circumstances to something unpleasant and even threatening, had been put an end to. They heard from time to time incautious language used here in reference to that great country, and undoubtedly there was extraordinary language used in public journals and elsewhere in America in reference to our own country; but he entirely denied that if it was wanted to get up a popular cry there was none that would be so popular as one against England. He did not deny that if they thought that England was not treating them with justice, or was treating them with contumely, a cry against England might find great support among many Americans; but what they desired above all things was the prosperity of England coupled with friendship between that country and the United States; and that they should be treated with the same friendliness with which they treated other nations. They did not desire that they should treat them as spoilt children, but in the same way as they treated France or Germany. They were quite prepared to their having differences with them occasionally, and they would dispute with them upon such questions in the same spirit as was displayed by other nations. He ventured to say that the peculiar susceptibility of America, as to what they thought contumacious or unfriendly on the part of this country, was no proof that their feeling was against England, but that there was an exceptional desire to stand well with England; and there never was a time when it was more desirable for the maintenance of the foremost position of England in the councils of Europe and of the world with respect to the maintenance of peace, and for the development of the great colonial Empire of England — the interests of which he thought we were hardly sufficiently alive to — and for maintaining, supporting, and consolidating a good understanding between all branches of the great Anglo-Saxon race—there never was a time when they had a greater opportunity, and at which a greater responsibility rested upon them than at that moment, and he firmly believed that the Treaty of Washington, although it might be open to captious observations, and might possibly contain some real defects, was, as a whole, a great step in the promotion and towards the attainment of that desirable end.

MR. GLADSTONE

Sir, I am very desirous, as I may not have another opportunity during the present Session, of making some few remarks before this discussion closes, and especially so as upon my part these remarks need only be of an agreeable character. My right hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire (Sir Charles Adderley) has been the critic of the Treaty of Washington upon this occasion; but subject to some few exceptions, I do not think that even his judgment on it has been very unfavourable, for he closed his speech with a fervent aspiration, and an anticipation that the general result would be favourable to goodwill, peace, and international cordiality; and as to the points on which he bestowed most of his time as to that assemblage, the points that touch the interests of Canada, he gave a very weighty opinion that Canada had reason to congratulate herself on the result of that negotiation. It is not necessary, and, indeed, it would be almost impertinent in me, after the masterly argument of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Richmond (Sir Roundell Palmer), to attempt to enter into these questions at large; but I wish to say, with respect to the American War, how entirely just were the remarks of my hon. and learned Friend. The truth is, we live in a time when the duties of neutrals are becoming more and more delicate and difficult; and of all neutrals there are none whose position is attended with anything like the amount of difficulty which attaches to those of England, when war occurs among other countries of the world; for in truth, the difficulties of those duties vary with the amount of complication of the foreign relations of this country. I know no country that has so large a proportion of its energy in foreign commerce that has so extensive foreign relations; and we have recently had anxious and not painful experience that, make what efforts we will, it will not be possible for us wholly to avoid suspicion and offence when these great occasions of conflict occur. Since the American War we have had to deal with the war between France and Germany. Upon this last occasion nobody could suppose that there was any predisposition of any sort in the mind of this country, or of the Government, unduly and improperly to favour one party or prejudice the other; yet it is fresh in the memory of all on how many points we failed to give satisfaction, and our honest endeavours were frustrated. I do not wish to imply that in any case we ought to object to these complaints, or wonder that they are made. They are the natural results of the excited minds of men engaged in desperate conflict, and of the difficult and delicate nature of the questions themselves with which neutrals, as neutrals, have to deal; but I believe that uprightness of intention and due and reasonable care, with due diligence, will be sufficient to secure, in the first instance, an avoidance of quarrel, and ultimately, in moments of calm and tranquillity, a general acknowledgment that our conduct has been honest, and that we have not knowingly passed from the path of justice either to the right hand or to the left. With regard to the case of America, while there were many circumstances to account for the peculiar sensitiveness it had exhibited on that question, there were circumstances in the conduct of the British Government—plain, palpable and undeniable—which in the mind of every impartial man must show that there was not only a desire on the part of this country and of its Government to maintain its neutrality, but a desire to make extraordinary efforts for the purpose of indicating that design. Some of those circumstances have been referred to by my hon. and learned Friend to-night; others of them are such as from their nature it would be hardly generous or fair, particularly at the present time, to refer to; but there are one or two which I do not think have ever been fully under the notice even of the public of this country. And yet it is only fair to the noble Earl (Earl Russell), fair to the Government of the day, and fair to Great Britain as a nation, that those who care for the subject should bear in mind one of them, which really is a subject that has been fully considered in the negotiation in which my right hon. Friend opposite the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote) has borne a distinguished part, and with respect to him and to the part which he has borne in it, if I do not further dwell upon it now, it is because I have had previous occasions of offering him, on the part of the Government, my cordial acknowledgments. That subject is the Straits of San Juan. The negotiation between the two Governments on that subject was in full activity during the year 1860; and I think it was at the close of that year that the Government of Great Britain, which felt the difficulties of the question, tendered to the Government of the United States a settlement by way of arbitration. They had received no answer to that proposal at the time when the troubles in America occurred. Had there been the least ungenerous disposition on the part of the Government of England, how favourable an opportunity — I would almost say how fair an opportunity, because it would only have been the exercise of an undoubted right—for England to have pressed for an answer to the proposal, and how difficult would have been the position of the American Government if it had been disposed to refuse the proposal of the British Government for an arbitration in the case of the Straits of San Juan! But although we saw no other mode in which the question could be settled, it was allowed to stand over without reply or notice of any kind from the Government of America, from the autumn of 1860, if I remember rightly, until long after the troubles of America had reached their conclusion; and it is impossible to conceive a more emphatic instance of fair, liberal—I think that is a moderate description—and considerate treatment on the part of the Government of this country. There is another instance worth mentioning, and it is the instance of the flotilla which was built in this country for the Government of China. That flotilla was built and intended to be manned by British officers and crews. It was so manned; but it was found difficult to arrange the relations between the British naval force so organized and the official persons of the Government of China. The Government of China determined—as they were perfectly entitled to determine—that they would break up the flotilla, and I fearlessly affirm that with respect to responsibility for that flotilla we had absolutely none whatever, and I believe I am also entitled to say that the vessels of which it was composed were vessels of exceedingly small value according to British ideas for the purposes of the British Navy. And yet, Sir, for fear the slightest whisper should go forth, and the slightest plausible suspicion arise that these vessels when cast upon the market of the world had been so cast with a view to their purchase by the Confederates, in order to be used against the Government of the United States, the Government of this country at once determined to become the purchasers of those vessels; and I affirm that you cannot quote from the history of nations a more remarkable instance of the disposition to give the largest interpretation to the obligations of neutrality. As respects the Government of the United States I will even venture to go one step further, and with reference particularly to the last instance which I have mentioned, I will not hesitate to express the opinion that if the fortunes of that war had been different—if the Confederates had succeeded in establishing their independence, and if they had in such an instance as that called us to account for the manner in which, towards them, we had fulfilled the duties of neutrality, I hope we should have had a complete and good case to make out; but I am by no means sure that we could have confronted them with the same confidence of having done that which was fair, which we now feel with regard to the Government of the United States. Well, Sir, the war passed by, and the present Government, when they came into Office, found themselves happy in being able to commit the foreign relations of this country to the charge of Lord Clarendon. Lord Clarendon was a man who brought to the dealing with that great subject every advantage that a statesman could possess—great ability, long experience, and singular cordiality with all the Colleagues with whom he ever was in contact, extended celebrity, much influence on the Continent of Europe, and that union of every charm of manner, with a kindly heart, which had the effect of making his presence the centre of light and warmth wherever he appeared. This, Sir, was the first question to which Lord Clarendon had to address himself, and I think that, notwithstanding the liberal arguments with which my hon. and learned Friend has shown the positive disadvantages of the unlimited and undefined arbitration that was then before him—in contrast, I mean, with the nature of the arbitration now proposed—the House will feel that Lord Clarendon judged wisely in the interest of this country in taking up the labours of the present Lord Derby, not merely from regard to the spirit and manner in which those labours had been conducted, and which were deserving of every praise, but likewise from regard to the nature and wise consideration of the political exigencies that were before him. Well, Sir, the wish of Lord Clarendon and of the Government was frustrated by the refusal of the American Senate—a refusal which we all lamented at the time, and on which, perhaps, comments might be made. And yet at the point at which we have now arrived, so great is the advantage of having arrived at an arrangement that proceeds upon a basis more definite and clear, and that contains within itself so much of guarantee for the future, that if ever one was disposed to feel displeased and critical with respect either to the refusal of the American Senate or with respect to the nature of some of the arguments and representations that were laid before it, all these feelings we may now safely dismiss from our minds, and look tranquilly in the face the nature of the Treaty that we have to consider. Sir, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Staffordshire complains mildly —as he always does, but still he does complain—that we became petitioners to the United States for the re-opening of negotiations. He says the United States had placed themselves in the wrong, and that there we ought to have left them until they should show some signs of repentance, and themselves request us to re-open the negotiations. My right hon. Friend also stands in particular upon this—that with respect to the Fishery question in Canada, although it was for the interests of Canada a settlement should be arrived at, it was still more important for the interests of the United States. I am not careful to follow my right hon. Friend into that controversy. I would not undertake to determine whether it was more important for Canada and for the British Empire or for America to settle that question. It appears to me that when two individuals have a difference, or two nations have a difference, whichever has the greater interest and whichever has the smaller, that nation deserves praise which is most ready to promote a proposal for the settlement of that difference. With respect to the Alabama claims, it was impossible for us, after what had happened, to undertake the initiative; but my right hon. Friend will see that, having as we had these other matters open, and requiring settlement, it was a great advantage that by proposing a negotiation upon the Fisheries and the colonial questions, we were able to relieve the American Government from what I believe they themselves felt to be a false position. My right hon. Friend has so characterized it — but his generous mind would be the last to take advantage of the fact that it was difficult for the Americans, and impossible for us to propose a negotiation upon the Alabama claims. Now, the proposal which it was open to us to make with respect to the colonial questions at once removed the difficulty from the path of the American Government, and enabled them to take upon themselves the responsibility which they would otherwise have been unwilling to assume, and put the whole of these questions in the position in which they were then placed. My right hon. Friend also complained that the Alabama question, having been thus in a certain sense treated, as to time at least, as secondary and collateral by the Govern- ment, has primarily occupied the time and attention of the negotiators. Certainly, Sir, and why not? First of all, it was the greatest question; and secondly, it was the question which formed the sine quâ non in the minds of Americans to the settlement of any other question; and that desire on the part of Americans to settle the question of the Alabama claims became an effective instrument in the hands of the British negotiators for obtaining better terms than it would be otherwise possible for them to obtain. My right hon. Friend is perfectly just in what he says about the advantages connected with this settlement. But I doubt if even these advantages could have been obtained were it not that, the case of the Alabama being before the negotiators, the Americans were desirous of going further than they would otherwise have done, with the view of settling those claims. There is another point raised by my right hon. Friend, one which relates to the different dates fixed for the claims of the British Government on the American, and of the American Government on that of Great Britain. I trust he has been satisfactorily answered by my right hon. Friend (Sir Stafford Northcote); but there is another question, with regard to which I fully admit I am not able to make him so satisfactory an answer, and that is with respect to the Fenian claims. It would have been just and fair that those Fenian claims should have been included; but, of course, it is not to be supposed that because they are not included in this settlement they have therefore ceased to exist. They remain in all their fulness. We are charged withthem. It is our duty to see that the just claims of Canada growing out of these transactions in their relation with America are not in any way disparaged. But if he asks us why these claims were not included in the present settlement, we say because we were unable to include them, and because we did not think it right to abandon and sacrifice the whole of these extensive arrangements on account of not being able to bring within the scope of them that single and comparatively limited point. I make the statement frankly. I regret the fact; but I know that Parliament and the country will not do otherwise than approve the course we took. Sir, I think I have now noticed the principal points raised by my right hon. Friend, with the exception of the main one, with regard to which he almost adopted a declamatory tone. He said the reference to be made to an arbitrator amounted simply to this—whether, in 1861, England had fulfilled rules which only came into existence in 1871. He said magnanimity was a very good thing, but that they were changing the standard of right, and passing almost from the sublime to the ridiculous. I refer for answer to my hon. and learned Friend behind me the Member for Richmond. I agree that it would be wholly unworthy for us to abandon the ground in principle which had been taken up by the Government of Lord Palmerston, not only because many of us are responsible for the proceedings of that Government, but because there ought to be a continuity in the Government of a great country. But my hon. and learned Friend has pointed out to us, with the utmost clearness and force, that there are two kinds of obligations binding on a neutral—one arising out of International law, and another arising out of municipal law. I will not add a single word, but for my own part and that of the Government adopt that view of the case in which he has shown that the principle embodied in the rules in the Treaty of Washington are the very principles for which the Executive Government of this country contended in the Courts of this country, and which, therefore, it was not too much for the American Government to expect we should be prepared to act on in coming to an ultimate settlement. There is no doubt that a great concession has been made to America; but that great concession lies in this—that we have consented to go to arbitration as to whether there was any defect in the administration of our own municipal law. That is undoubtedly what may be called stretching somewhat the measure of a strict necessity with regard to the fulfilment of international duties. Is there anything unreasonable in that principle? I do not think it shows any disparagement to honour. But be that as it may, this concession which has been made to the United States, so far as regards the specifications contained in the rules, my right hon. Friend has shown us we have had nothing to add to claims which America was already able to establish against us out of our own mouths, while we have obtained the basis of that understanding between the two countries which I hope will harden and widen into an International Law for the benefit of the world. There has been in some minds a supposition, which I take to be quite idle, that this arbitration is a phantasm conjured up by us to cover, under decent forms, a foregone conclusion of defeat. Sir, on the part of the Government, and on my own part, I beg most emphatically to disclaim the slightest approach to any such view or intention. This arbitration will be real, honest, and energetic, though no doubt a friendly contention. All the resources of arguments and knowledge and legal skill will be used for the purpose of establishing the right conduct of England and her fulfilment of her international duties, and the same, no doubt, will be done on the part of America, for the two countries will enter into it as a perfectly real, though amicable contest, subject only to this consideration — that as they are bound by honour, they will either of them accept the result, whatever that may be. Such is a statement of the case, so far as it is necessary for me to touch it, after the speech of my hon. and learned Friend, and after the speech of my right hon. Friend who has just sat down (Sir Stafford Northcote); and I have only further to say that I observe with the utmost satisfaction the spirit of dispassionate calm with which the whole matter has been considered in this country. There has been, on the one hand, a free development of those friendly and fraternal feelings which I trust the English race in England will always entertain towards the English race in America. We are extending and improving communications, and with each addition of knowledge the vulgar errors as to the feelings and sentiments of the people of the United States in regard to ourselves are being dispelled. My right hon. Friend the Member for North Devonshire has given us a most interesting and just description of the feelings entertained on the other side of the water; and coming, as it does, from him, I hope it will assist that beneficial process which is going forward in this country, which is rapidly becoming undeceived, with regard to the existence of prejudices and antipathies, which on many occasions have, perhaps, been by us too lightly assumed to prevail among the great body of the American people, through our having before our eyes peculiar phenomena in regard to certain portions of that people — phenomena painful to ourselves, but not less painful, I believe, to the bulk of intelligent Americans than to us—those intelligent Americans having some reason to feel, too, that the true root of the hostile feelings cherished in America, but not by America, towards England do not lie on their side of the water, but originate in the unhappy condition of a portion of the United Kingdom itself. I congratulate my right hon. Friend again upon the share he has had in bringing about what I believe to be a most beneficial arrangement; and, the more that beneficial settlement is examined, the more I believe the people of this country will arrive at the conclusion that without the slightest disparagement of honour, without any risk other than that which every man who engages in a controversy ought to be disposed to face—namely, the risk of having it decided against him, if so it should be—that Treaty has laid the foundation of future advantage in the administration and action of International Law; and has likewise, by removing the last of all serious causes of dispute between those two great countries, done much towards the accomplishment of the great work of uniting them in the ties of affection where they are already bound by the ties of interest, of kindred, of race, and of language, thereby promoting that strong and lasting union between them which is in itself one of the main guarantees for the peace of the civilized world.

MR. BAILLIE COCHRANE

said, that after the eloquent peroration which had just been addressed to the House anyone who rose to differ from the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government must incur the odium of not sufficiently estimating the value of the blessings of peace. He therefore felt himself in a position of difficulty in replying to the right hon. Gentleman, and still more so, in consequence of the right hon. Baronet, who sat on the front Opposition bench (Sir Stafford Northcote), having been a party to the negotiation of the Treaty. But, although no one set a higher value upon them than he, he also valued the honour of the country, and thought that even such a Treaty as that might be purchased too dearly. He did not blame the Joint High Commissioners, for they stated they acted entirely under instructions by telegraph, so much so, that he understood several thousand pounds had been spent on telegrams alone—he had heard it put as high as £25,000; but from the Papers which had been furnished to the House, he thought he could make out a strong case against the Government, under whose instructions the Commissioners had acted, and after reading those Papers he was astonished, either that Commissioners should have been found to sign such a Treaty, or that the House of Commons should approve it. Only three short Papers had been presented to the House, and he regretted that the whole of the Correspondence was not published, for it might have thrown some light on the extraordinary proceedings at Washington. He desired to know in what position this country stood with respect to the American Government; what we had gained and what we had sacrificed; and whether this country stood higher in the opinion of Europe in consequence of the negotiation of that Treaty. It should be remembered that the demand for this High Commission emanated from England; for, in the first place, Sir Edward Thornton communicated with Mr. Fish, proposing simply to bring before a Commission the question of the Fisheries. To that Mr. Fish replied that the President desired the re-adjustment of other claims, without which the proposed High Commission would fail to re-establish a lasting friendship between the two Governments. The answer of the Government was that all other claims, both of British subjects and citizens of the United States, arising out of acts committed during the Civil War should be referred to the Commission. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Alabama claims were more important than the Fisheries; but how did he reconcile that with the fact that the Fishery claims were the only ones brought before the American Government in the first instance? With reference to the Protocols of the Conference, the right hon. Gentleman had said that the first question submitted to the Conference was that of the Fishery claims; but there was not a single word about that in the Protocols. The first claim made by the Americans was for $14,000,000 for the injury done to their commerce by the Alabama, Shenandoah, and other cruisers. Then the American Commissioners desired that the British Commissioners should place on record an expression of regret by Her Majesty's Government for the depredations which had been committed by those vessels, and it was next stated— Although Great Britain had from the beginning disavowed any responsibility for the acts of the Alabama and the other vessels, she had already shown her willingness, for the sake of the maintenance of friendly relations with the United States, to adopt the principle of arbitration, providing that a fitting arbitrator could be found. The right hon. Gentleman had said there was no reference to arbitration; but here was the offer. It was added— The American Commissioners expressed their regret at the decision of the British Commissioners, and said further that they could not consent to submit the question of the liability of Her Majesty's Government to arbitration, unless the principles which should govern the arbitrator in the consideration of the facts could be first agreed upon. The British Commissioners replied that they had no authority to agree to a submission of these claims to an arbitrator, with instructions as to the principles which should govern him in the consideration of them. They said that they should be willing to consider what principles should be adopted for observance in future. That showed that the principles laid down were not to be retrospective. Then— The American Commissioners replied that they were willing to consider what principles should be laid down for observance in similar cases in future, with the understanding that any principles that should be agreed upon should be held to be applicable to the facts in respect to the Alabama claims. This was on the 8th of March, and the Commissioners telegraphed for instructions; but it did not appear that anything more was done until the 3rd of April. On that date— The British Commissioners stated that they were instructed by Her Majesty's Government to declare that Her Majesty's Government could not assent to the proposed rules as a statement of principles of International Law which were in force at the time when the Alabama claims arose; but that Her Majesty's Government, in order to evince its desire of strengthening the friendly relations between the two countries, and of making satisfactory provision for the future, ageeed that, in deciding the questions between the two countries arising out of those claims, the arbitrator should assume that Her Majesty's Government had undertaken to act upon the principles set forth in the rules which the American Commissioners had proposed. On the 5th of April the American Commissioners, referring to the hope which they had expressed on the 8th of March, inquired whether the British Commissioners were prepared to place upon record an expression of regret by Her Majesty's Government for the depredations committed by the vessels whose acts were now under discussion; and the British Commissioners replied that they were authorized to express, in a friendly spirit, the regret felt by Her Majesty's Government for the escape, under whatever circumstances, of the Alabama and other vessels from British ports, and for the depredations committed by those vessels. And yet the right hon. Gentleman said that the country had done nothing derogatory to its honour; but he (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) considered that proceeding exceedingly humiliating to this country. Then the claims of British subjects arising out of the Civil War were brought forward. The nature of those claims was perfectly clear; but, with something like an ironical insult to the British Commissioners, the American Commissioners said that they supposed that they were right in their opinion that British laws prohibit British subjects from owning slaves; they therefore inquired whether any claim for slaves, or for alleged property or interest in slaves, could or would be presented by the British Government, or on behalf of any British subject, under the Treaty now being negotiated, if there was in the Treaty no express words excluding such claims. Was it possible that they could suppose that the English proprietors in Canada were slaveowners? The British Commissioners replied that by the law of England British subjects had long been prohibited from purchasing or dealing in slaves not only within the dominions of the British Crown, but in any foreign country, and that they had no hesitation in saying that no claim on behalf of any British subject for slaves, or for any property or interest in slaves, would be presented by the British Government. It was plain that the American Commissioners were only laughing at the British Commissioners. At the Conference of the 26th of April the British Commissioners again brought before the Joint High Commission "the claims of the people of Canada for injuries suffered from the Fenian raids. They said that they were instructed to present these claims, and to state that they were regarded by Her Majesty's Government as coming within the class of subjects indicated by Sir Edward Thornton in his letter of January 26, as subjects for the consideration of the Joint High Commission." The American Commissioners replied that they could see no reason to vary the reply formerly given to this proposal, and the British High Commissioners said that, under these circumstances, they would not urge further that the settlement of these claims should be included in the present Treaty, and that they had the less difficulty in doing so as a portion of the claims were of a constructive and inferential character. But now the right hon. Gentleman said that it was intended to bring forward these claims at a future period, though the British Commissioners gave them up. He did not believe that anybody reading the papers could say that anything had been obtained from the American Commissioners, and it appeared that everything was sacrificed on the part of the English. It appeared that the Government had telegraphed to the Commissioners to give up everything. In the first place they apologised, then they gave up the Canadian claims, and they were prepared to pay £4,000,000. When all this was done it was represented that peaceful relations had been established with America; but peace might always be obtained with any country by accepting humiliating terms. In the case of the Reciprocity Treaty the British Commissioners asked most humbly that it might be restored in principle; but the American Commissioners declined altogether to negotiate on the basis of that Treaty. He might in the same way canvass every clause in the Treaty; but it was too late in the evening to do so, and he hoped some one would rise and point out any matter in which the Americans had given way. He contended that in these negotiations England had been subject to insult, an humble apology had been made to America, and Canada had been deeply injured. The right hon. Gentleman said that Canada approved the Washington Treaty; but he could see nothing in the Papers to that effect, though it might be that, in consequence of the formation of the Dominion, the interests of the smaller States were sacrificed to those of the greater. In conclusion, he could not help feeling that the proceedings of the Commission had only resulted in another step having been taken towards the ultimate degradation to this country.

MR. ANDERSON

said, he would not at that late hour attempt to discuss the general question; but, if time had permitted, he would have wished to have done what the hon. and learned Member for Richmond (Sir Roundell Palmer) in his admirable speech had failed to do—namely, to begin at the origin of the dissatisfaction which was felt so strongly in America against this country, and which had really led to and fostered the spirit of hostility evinced in these Alabama claims; and that origin was the allegation that we had unfairly backed the Confederacy by acknowledging them as belligerents. He maintained that our course of action had been eminently fair, and that it was the Americans themselves who first gave belligerent rights by blockading the Southern ports as those of a belligerent enemy. They had done it also in a mode most unfair to this country, for vessels sailing from our ports with clearances from American Consuls were debarred from entering; no time was allowed for the blockade to become known, and the clearances of their own Consuls were utterly ignored. He thought our country had acted fairly all through; but he would confine his remarks to one point in the Treaty, one which had been only alluded to by the right hon. Member for North Staffordshire (Sir Charles Adderley); but which, notwithstanding its importance to British interests, had been passed over in silence by the right hon. Baronet the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote). And on that matter he felt bound to say that the right hon. Baronet had taken a most unusual course in speaking so early in the debate, for it was his place to defend the Treaty, and how could he do that before he knew what was to be said against it? Only two hon. Members had spoken before the right hon. Baronet, and by speaking so early he had shut himself out from his defence, for he (Mr. Anderson was about to charge Her Majesty's Commissioners with prejudicing British interests by allowing the 9th of April to be fixed as the end of the war, when it really was in no sense whatever the end of the war, as he would show the House by the simple statement of certain dates of events. No date had been fixed as a limit to the Alabama claims; but as those were pretty well limited by the sinking of that vessel, it was no object to the Americans to fix a date; but British claims became greater towards the end of the war, and therefore it was of great consequence to America to fix an early date as the limit, while it was our interest to keep to the actual end of the war. The Alabama was sank on the 9th of June, 1864; General Lee surrendered his Army on the 9th of April, 1865; President Lincoln was assassinated on the 14th of April, 1865; General J. E. Johnstone surrendered his Army to Sherman on the 26th of April, 1865; General Taylor surrendered his Army on the 4th of May, 1865; Jefferson Davis was captured on the 10th of May, 1865; General Kirby E. Smith surrendered his Army on the 26th of May, 1865; and, finally, the President of the United States, by Proclamation, fixed the end of the rebellion as the 20th of August, 1866, which date had been ratified by the Supreme Court, on the ground that it was for the Executive by Proclamation to announce the close. With these dates of events of the war before them, he asked how our Commissioners could, with any show of reason, assent to the proposition that the 9th of April, 1865, should be fixed on as the end of the war? Of course, the surrender of Lee and the fall of Richmond were great events; but there remained no less than three other Confederate Armies in the field which were not included in Lee's capitulation. The last of these armies did not surrender for six weeks after, and there was a good deal of fighting and much destruction of property in the interval; but he maintained that even if Lee's surrender was taken as the date, a reasonable time should have been allowed for the event to become known over so large a country, where the railways and telegraphs were disorganized. He had no doubt many important British claims had thus been most unfairly shut out. He had heard of a case where about £12,000 worth of British property, registered as such in our Consulate, had been burned on the 11th of April, just two days after the date fixed by the Commissioners. That was at Montgomery, the capital of Alabama State, where it was almost impossible that Lee's surrender could be known, as well as un- likely that even if known, it would be considered to end the war. It appeared to him that the American Commissioners, with that astuteness which seemed to enable them always to get the better of us in diplomacy, had in this case also succeeded, in getting the advantage of us; that our Commissioners had allowed themselves to be misled into agreeing to a date of a most one-sided character, in every way advantageous to the Americans and disadvantageous to us, and had thereby compromised those British mercantile interests which it was their duty to protect.

MR. RATHBONE

said, he differed altogether from the opinions expressed by the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. Baillie Cochrane). He knew what the feelings of British merchants were on this matter, especially those of Liverpool. That feeling was one of gratitude to the Government and the Commissioners for what they had done in effecting this Treaty. The first public remonstrance against sending the Alabama out came from the leading shipowners of Liverpool. He believed that it would have been utterly impossible to maintain the commerce of this country after the Treaty of Paris, if such vessels as the Alabama could be fitted out in neutral ports, and it was therefore of the greatest importance that the precedent set by the Alabama should be cancelled as soon as possible. From personal experience he could state that the Americans valued the friendship of England more than any other country. We owe a great debt of gratitude to the Government and to the Commissioners, because, putting aside the mere technicalities of law, they have looked only to the great principles of justice and national morality in the consideration of that question, and they had thereby laid the foundation of a real, permanent, and cordial alliance between the two countries.

MR. WHALLEY

said, he must make one observation on the fact that while the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government stated that the claims on account of the Fenian raids were still open, and that it was competent for the Canadian Government or our own to press them, it appeared from the Paper which the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) had read that those claims had been given up by the Commissioners. The Canadians fully understood that the Fenian raids were merely part of a system acted on by a power which had exercised and still continued to exercise great influence over States. That influence was at the root of the Alabama question. The whole object of the organization to which he referred was to foment and create war. The deliberate action of the Roman Catholic hierarchy was directed to produce dissension between America and this country, and one advantage from enforcing the claims on account of the Fenian raids would be that it would enable the Americans to emancipate themselves from the influence to which he had referred.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.