SCOTLAND—DEFENCES OF THE FIRTH OF FORTH.—OBSERVATIONS. (Hansard, 21 April 1871)

§ MR. MACFIE
, who had given Notice to call attention to the defenceless state of the Firth of Forth, and to move— That, in the opinion of this House, Her Ma" jesty's Government should take into their immediate consideration the present defenceless state of the Firth of Forth, with a view to erecting such defensive works as appear necessary, said, the question was of great importance; indeed, he might truly say that it was of great national importance. He was happy to say, however, that it was by no means a party question, and he might further observe that it was not a local question.

§ MR. MACFIE
resumed: It did not seem to him a question which admitted of long delay. The question was, "Ought or ought not the Firth of Forth to be put into a complete state of defence?" Now, if he was able to prove—and he was sure he could—that at present the estuary was undefended, and that the best kind of defence was stone fortifications, it must be obvious to all—and he had the highest authority to back his statement—that years must elapse before the works were sufficiently completed to admit of being supplied with guns for 1521 proper action. Again, it was in times of peace such as those they now happily enjoyed, that works of this kind were best done. They were then executed with leisure, the masonry was solidified more, and no offence was given to foreign Powers, and no alarms were created abroad in consequence of a suspicion that we were disposed to take some action unfavourable to the maintenance of peace. He would not then enter upon the general question of the defence of the country; but he would confine himself to the question of the Firth of Forth. At the same time, he should not do justice to the special branch of the subject which he brought before the House, if he did not present briefly the views of a most eminent naval authority. He had been favoured with a copy of a recent publication by Mr. Reed—a name which carried the greatest weight in that House—and from his work he would make some very brief extracts. That great authority said— I will tell you frankly at the outset that, in ray opinion, the naval defences of the coast, and more especially the defences of the great commercial ports, are in a very unsatisfactory state—a condition wholly unworthy of us as the first maritime Power of the world. I lay down two propositions—first, that those commercial ports would be found to a great extent defenceless should a war break out; and, secondly, that they nevertheless possess in themselves enormous defensive resources, which are practically—I may say entirely—neglected. Again, Mr. Reed said— It would be criminal, in view of these facts, to place all our reliance on our sea-going Navy alone, and to leave any longer our great commercial emporiums without local defence. Now, that is, in point of fact, their present condition. They are entirely undefended; and not only is that the case, but there really are no vessels at the great naval ports adapted for their defence. Towards the end of his pamphlet Mr. Reed remarked— Our present condition is discreditable, and would be more than dangerous should a serious war overtake us. Our great maritime towns, though teeming with men and materials available for their defence, lie open to insult and to robbery. While they do so, we are exposed to all kinds of panic, folly, and extravagant expenditure. The hon. Member then proceeded to read the report of Captain Moncrieff, the inventor of the system of gun-carriages, who had been invited by the Lord Provost of Edinburgh to visit and inspect the district, and report what works were 1522 necessary to place the Firth of Forth in a state of defence. Captain Moncrieff, in his report, pointed out the great importance of the Firth, as a military position as well in respect of its large trade and shipping, as its being a favourable base for an attack by an enemy upon the South of Britain and upon the great emporiums on the Clyde; yet it was, he said, at present without any defence. The key of the position for the defence of the Firth was the island of Inchkeith. It presented favourable points for the erection of batteries, which would bear upon all the channels; it possessed precipitous sides and few landing places, a good supply of water, and convenient spots for hutting the troops. By scarping the hills in some places, by emplacements for field guns and Gatlings to enfilade the landing places, it could be made very strong at a comparatively small outlay. Captain Moncrieff added that upon being asked by the Government to do so, he was ready to prepare plans and furnish estimates for putting the whole place in a state of defence. The hon. Member also read extracts from local newspapers and writers, urging the extreme importance in a national point of view of fortifying the estuary. The depth of water, one writer said, would permit iron-clads to come within easy range of Leith and Granton, and cover the landing of troops from transports; and that from its 40 piers and tidal harbours, and its long sandy beaches so well adapted for the landing of troops, the Firth of Forth was marked out by nature as the most suitable base of operations for an enemy landing in Great Britain. And now he (Mr. Macfie) would put this question—What would a Scottish Parliament have decided if this question were raised there? Surely he was entitled to ask this question. It never was thought, when Scotland was united to the larger country of England, that she was to forego the advantages to which she was entitled by the necessities of her position. Well, in a Scottish Parliament it would be at once determined to do what was absolutely necessary for the defence of her ancient capital. He did not speak from mere supposition. He could appeal to facts. Three hundred years ago this island of Inchkeith was fortified, and another island higher up in the estuary was fortified after the battle of Flodden. Then the fortifications were fortifications 1523 against England; but now they had England on their side to join in doing the work, and they were determined none the less to maintain their privileges in our union. He trusted that all they did might be worthy of the great United Empire. He would now draw attention to the great change which steam had made in naval warfare. By means of steam it was possible to fix beforehand the exact point to which a fleet or a single ship should be directed, and to reach a certain point at a prescribed time in company, and almost without any danger of being intercepted, and without any risk of adverse winds preventing or retarding the operation. It was their business to make themselves safe, so that they might negotiate any treaty, and be free from submitting to indignity from any Power, whatever that Power might be. It was quite clear that the eastern coast of Great Britain was now much more exposed than the southern part of the island. Captain Sherard Osborne had called attention to the want of naval positions on our eastern coast. Not only did the first Bonaparte consider the possibility of landing troops in the Firth of Forth, but not many years ago there was a belief in many burghs that a considerable hostile force was about to be landed there. Was there, in point of fact, anything to prevent a hostile force from being landed there at the present moment. Literally there was nothing whatever. The estuary was large enough to hold almost the whole commercial navy of Great Britain. He would not suppose the arrival of a hostile fleet; but suppose this country were engaged in war, there was nothing whatever to prevent an enemy from coming up and burning the city of Edinburgh. It was an attractive place—the seat of banks where large sums of money were kept; and furthermore, it was the capital of an ancient country, a place of great renown; and if a young commander of a ship or a piratical commander wanted to get éclat, nothing would be more promising or certain than to attack the great city of Edinburgh. That city was situated as near the sea-shore at Leith as Kensington Palace or the Palace of Westminster was to Hyde Park Corner. Leith was in itself a place of sufficient importance to entitle it to a claim to be put in a proper state of defence. But besides Leith, there were a great many other 1524 places of considerable importance not far from the estuary, all of which at present were anything but adequately provided against any foreign attack that might be made upon them. At this present moment the shipowners whose vessels made use of Leith were in negotiation with the Board of Trade on the subject, and the importance of the shipping interests of that part of the kingdom had, he took it for granted, been brought under the attention of the Government. An idea of the extent of the trade of Leith might be gathered from the fact that six or seven of the shipowners there represented 60,000 tons of shipping; and it was not its shipping alone which made Leith a place which should be properly defended. Leith was also the centre of two important railway sytems, which brought to it a large amount of trade. Then, also, there were very considerable warehouses which required protection. He would at present, however, confine himself to the necessity of protecting the shipping. It must be borne in mind that the shipping of this part of the coast was of interest—not merely to England and Scotland alone—the whole Empire was interested in it. Much of this shipping had a close and intimate connection with our Colonies. Surely our Colonies had a right to expect that the ports to which their ships traded should possess proper defences, and that they incurred no risk in trading to our shores. Therefore, on Imperial grounds, he contended that it was the duty of the Government of this country to see that all necessary coast defences should be provided. He might be asked what he thought should be done. It was not for him to say. He felt that he performed his duty by drawing the attention of the Government to the matter. It was for them to consider the matter, and devise the best means of carrying out what was needed. He did not believe that the cost of the necessary defences of the particular part of the coast to which he alluded would be much. If he might be permitted to throw out a hint, he would suggest that stonework defences would be better than floating defences for the Firth of Forth. The stonework would be the more economical of the two, and the advantages of stonework defences, he thought, would be generally allowed. There was, for instance, but little chance of decay in the stonework, and it would 1525 always be found sufficient for its purpose, provided that it was once placed in a state of proper efficiency. He trusted, therefore, that the Government would give his proposition a favourable reception and a careful consideration. There was, as all must know, a great want of a naval arsenal to the north of London. The estuary of the Firth of Forth afforded, in his opinion, the very best place for such an arsenal that could be tit upon. Now the Government, he believed, were so sufficiently alive to the importance and the necessity of the question, that they intended some day or other to carry out the very work which he had been suggesting as of pressing moment. What the Government system of defence should be, it was not for him to anticipate. He had no doubt that it would include torpedoes. Torpedoes, were no doubt, destructive instruments of great value under certain circumstances; but he doubted that they would be very efficient in a broad estuary like the Firth of Forth, if there were not proper defensive works on land also. He had been allowed an opportunity of seeing the plans of the Government respecting the coast defences to be executed when the proper time came. As far as a civilian like himself could judge, they would prove sufficient for the purpose. The question he had at present in hand must not be treated as one affecting the Firth of Forth alone. It was one affecting the great interest involved in the trade of Leith and Edinburgh, and the protection of a very important part of the coast of the kingdom. In this light he wished to put it, and in that light he desired it to be considered. The existing defences were hardly worthy of the name, and as defences of any value they were not worthy of consideration. It was not a question of cost, because he did not think that would be considerable. At present the fortifications they had were not properly defended, and the state of our coasts positively invited danger. The hon. Member was about to move his Resolution, when—

§ MR. SPEAKER
said, that the House having already agreed to the Motion, "That I do now leave the Chair," it was not competent to the hon. Member to do so.

§ MR. SINCLAIR AYTOUN
said, he quite concurred in the arguments of the hon. Member for Leith, regarding, as he 1526 did, the protection of the entrance to the Firth of Forth as a work of the greatest importance in a national point of view as a place of refuge for our ships. He had not much hope, he might add, that we should make much progress in the establishment of an efficient Army, and he was all the more anxious therefore that the question of our naval defences should occupy the serious attention of the House, and that some assurance should be given by the Government that not only the Firth of Forth, but important positions like Liverpool, should be adequately protected.

§ SIR HENRY STORKS
said, he was glad to be able to inform the hon. Member that the question of the defence of the Firth of Forth had occupied the serious attention of the Government, in common with the other coasts of the kingdom. The Defence Committee, of which he was a member, had examined the subject carefully, and had submitted a plan of defence which, if carried out, would render the Firth of Forth completely secure. That plan his hon. Friend the Member for Leith (Mr. Macfie) had seen, and had in private expressed his approval of it. With the details of the plan he would not trouble the House, although he had all the materials for doing so by him. The estimated cost of carrying it into execution he might, however, observe, was £135,000. The Government, of course, had not lost sight of the question of the defence of other commercial ports also; but looking' at the vast amount of the expenditure for the purposes of military defence this year, they had not deemed it desirable—indeed, it would be scarcely possible—to ask the House to vote a sum of money for the special defence of our commercial harbours. A matter so important would not, however, be passed over, and he felt sure his right hon. Friends near him, when the proper time arrived, would not hesitate to propose such an outlay as would put those places in a proper state of defence. He could not, he might add, agree with his hon. Friend as to the strategical importance of the Firth of Forth, for he believed no European Power intending to invade this country—when the difficulties of equipping, embarking, and disembarking an Army for the purpose were taken into account—would select it as a base of operations.

§ MR. HERMON
, while admitting that the defence of our commercial ports was a question of the greatest importance, held that their security could best be provided for by an adequate supply of gunboats. If once stone defences were commenced, no one could see when there would be an end of the expenditure, as the example of the Channel Islands would show.

§ MR. M'LAREN
said, the right hon. and gallant Member (Sir Henry Storks) had told them that there was a plan on paper for fortifications on the Firth of Forth; but that plan might remain on paper for a generation to come. The right hon. and gallant Member had assumed that this was an ordinary case of a commercial harbour. The fact was not really so. An enemy's vessel could not go up to Glasgow without a pilot, and only at certain states of the tide, and the same remark might be applied to Hull, Liverpool, Bristol, and other places; but in the case of Edinburgh, there was nothing to prevent a man-of-war from sailing at any time within three miles of the city, to bombard it, or exact a ransom as the price of forbearance. The funds of all the Scotch banks were kept at Edinburgh; in fact, there was always from £3,000,000 to £4,000,000 of gold in their coffers. The rental of the city was £1,250,000 a-year, being equal to that of 20 of the smaller boroughs in England and Ireland which returned Members to this House. The power which an enemy would have, in such circumstances, of exacting a ransom gave Edinburgh a special claim to protection, and if half the sum proposed to be expended were laid out on the defences it would be quite sufficient. In the South of England the money was swallowed up in laying the foundations of the defences on sandbanks under water; but at Edinburgh Nature herself had laid the foundations. There was an island which commanded the approaches, and little more was wanted than a few heavy guns of long range and a sufficient number of gunners. He thought the Government were bound to show a special interest in this case, and to do something speedily, irrespective of the question of fortifying mercantile harbours generally. The success which had attended the attempts of Paul Jones in former times without the advantage of steam should not be forgotten.